2019: A turbulent and eventful year for Indo-China relations

My article 2019: A turbulent and eventful year for Indo-China relations appeared in Mail Today/DailyO

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Even as China speaks of ‘early harvest’ in border negotiations, existing Confidence Building Measures need to be improved in 2020 for a good crop to both the countries.

This has been a turbulent and eventful year for Sino-Indian relations. The informal summits between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping, helped maintain a ‘sound momentum’ in 2019, reported PTI sounding an optimistic note.

Doval-Wang Yi meet
However, while preparing the balance sheet of 2019, it is not easy to objectively see the ‘sound momentum’. After the 22nd Meeting of the Special Representatives (SR) of India and China held in New Delhi on December 21, between National Security Adviser Ajit Doval and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, an Indian communiqué mentioned: “The talks were constructive with focus on taking forward the India-China Closer Developmental Partnership as per the guidance provided by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping at the 2nd Informal Summit at Chennai in October 2019.” The two spoke of “the importance of approaching the boundary question from the strategic perspective of India-China relations and agreed that an early settlement of the boundary question serves the fundamental interests of both countries.” This approach is not new.
During the meetings of the officials in 1960, while the negotiators of the two countries looked at the issue from a historic and juristic angle, in July 1961, China proposed a new ‘strategic’ approach. Zhang Wenji, director of the Foreign Ministry’s Asian Affairs Department met G Parthasarathy (GP), the Indian Chargé d’Affaires in Beijing. Zhang suggested that “each country presents a factual basis and, objectively compares them, looking to see whose information is relatively more logical, and finally parceling the land out to the country whose version is more beneficial to the two countries’ friendship.”
The Director further proposed that “if the two sides’ views differ greatly and it is impossible to bring them into line, each can keep to its own position and consider, from a political standpoint, what kind of resolution would be more beneficial.” “We can consider using the second method, with each side keeping its own views; depending on the facts of the situation, we will make some compromises and resolve the issues,” GP answered immediately. He added that the difficulty lay “in swaying popular opinion.” GP could not think of a way to overcome this political obstacle “other than making a big gesture.” He said that though it was his personal opinion, the first method, “is a very good method [examining the historical background], but I don’t know how much chance it has of succeeding.” He suggested making a “gesture that would do something to change the atmosphere… to stop conceiving of each other in a hostile way.”

‘Swap’ diplomacy?
The implications of Zhang’s proposals meant that India would keep NEFA (today Arunachal Pradesh) and China would continue to occupy the Aksai Chin, the ‘strategic’ artery between Xinjiang and Tibet, the two most restive provinces of the Middle Kingdom.
Beijing’s ‘solution’ had already been mentioned during Premier Zhou Enlai’s visit to Delhi in April 1960; for Beijing, it was ‘the most beneficial’. During the Doval-Wang meeting, Beijing went in the same direction, it agreed to “actively advance boundary negotiations in line with the Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question.” This was the agreement reached in 2005, which translated into keeping the status quo for inhabited areas like Tawang.
So, the recent talks are bringing us back to the 1961 formula, “let us go for a ‘swap’” and exchange areas administrated by India (Arunachal) against the ones occupied by China (Aksai Chin).

India, China status quo
Another major issue remains the Gilgit area, on which India has recently reiterated its claims by publishing new maps of the Ladakh Union Territory.
This is the fourth Sector of the boundary (along with the Eastern, Central and Western Sectors); it cannot be left to a hypothetical future accord, otherwise the ‘early harvest’ mentioned by China would be meaningless. Let us not forget that the UN resolutions of 1948 and 1949 prove without a doubt that the Gilgit area was part of the erstwhile territory of the Maharaja of J&K and, therefore, Indian territory.
Another problem is China’s changing claims. In 1956, Zhou had agreed to a line on a map in the Western sector; in September 1959, following China’s advances in the Aksai Chin, another line became the de facto line of control and then post-1962 war, China’s claims indented further into India’s territory. Where will India draw the line in these circumstances?
Today, even if China speaks of ‘early harvest’, it is not clear who will benefit from the harvest. It is far more important to “maintain peace and tranquility in the border areas, pending final settlement of the boundary question,” as per the Indian communiqué. Existing Confidence Building Measures, i.e. Border Personnel Meeting points, trading landports, bilateral communications, etc., need to be enlarged and improved; if this is done in 2020, it could bring a good crop to both parties.

Will the 'paharis' look after the Himalayan borders?

My article entitled (sic) Smell the coffee along the China border appeared in the Edit Page of The Pioneer.
 
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While Beijing has been pressing with remarkable speed in developing infrastructure along its borders with India, the latter has shown equally remarkable laxity over the same. Hopefully, things will now change

The Army Commanders’ Conference was recently held at the Indian Military Academy at Dehradun. Led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, National Security Advisor Ajit Doval and Minister for Defence Manohar Parrikar, dignitaries were given an extensive briefing by the three Services chiefs, particularly on  infrastructure development along the China and Pakistan borders.
At a time when China is investing billions of yuans to develop its ‘Indian’ frontiers, it was a timely review. On January 23, the website, China Tibet Online, announced that a road leading to the last two townships without road access in Tibet, would soon be completed. Both roads in Metok County of Nyingchi town, started in 2015, are expected to be soon operational. The Metok County is situated north of the Tuting Circle of Upper Siang of Arunachal Pradesh, where the Yarlung Tsangpo enters India to become the Siang (and later the Brahmaputra).
The Chinese article says: “The geological conditions are complex with high mountains and deep valleys, leading to high road construction costs and long construction periods.” In 2017 alone, a total of 52 billion yuan (nearly six billion dollars) will be invested in infrastructure assets on the plateau, and “355km of high-grade highway [will be added], leading to a total highway mileage of more
than 90,000 km.”
The Chinese website adds that these roads could not be built earlier “due to the high mountains and deep valleys”. It was only in October 2013 that Metok Highway was officially opened to the public: “Metok waved goodbye to China’s last County without road access”, said China Tibet Online.
On the other side of the range, the situation is different. A recent article in The Arunachal Times describes the sad state of affairs. Journalist Tongam Rina recounts her ‘memorable trip’ to Tuting; she had joined an all-women team from the Arunachal Institute of Tribal Studies of Rajiv Gandhi University in Itanagar. Rina writes: “After a few kilometres of good roads, we hit the typical Arunachal road; forever under-construction, chopping off hills that inevitably result in landslides during the monsoon, at the same time destroying whatever is left of an existing road.”
She continues her narration after a first night on the way: “…The next morning, the caretaker of the guesthouse prompted us to eat, “Tuting ka rasta bahut dur hai, khana jaldi nehi milega… After a few kilometres out of town, we were on bumpy, narrow road again. The only saving grace was the mighty beautiful Siang, flowing majestically below.”
The description is vivid: “And a bad jerk forced me to look at the road again. The road is so bad that one can’t drive more than 15 kilometres per hour. One bad move from the driver because of the bad road could literally end the journey.”
On the other side, China is planning to build a Gangdise International Tourism Cooperation Zone in Ngari Prefecture, adjoining Himachal Pradesh and Ladakh, ‘to serve as an opening window to South Asia’(sic). Gangdise or Trans-Himalaya is a term coined by Swedish explorer Sven Hedin in the 19th century. It is the space on both sides of the main Himalayan range, following the Indian border.
KangbaTV, a Chinese site about Tibet, explains that the zone will cover areas around the Himalaya, mainly in Ngari area, but it will also include Shigatse, Lhoka (southeast of Lhasa), Purang (near Mt Kailash), Zham (landport with Nepal), Yatung (in Chumbi Valley), Kyirong (border between Nepal and Tibet) and Tsona (north of Tawang). But the main development will focus on western Tibet. The website adds: “Scenic spots in Ngari area are all featured. With the drive of the main scenic spots, travelling routes of other tourist spots have been gradually developed, which will make Ngari tourism a growth-pole of Tibet’s tourism.”
China is planning to transform the Trans-Himalayan region into a mega tourist spot. For the purpose, Beijing announced that two new highways will soon be constructed leading to the Indian border and that Highway G219, the main artery connecting Tibet to Xinjiang (also known as the Aksai Chin road) will be upgraded. All this will be done during China’s 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020).
The first new highway, known as G564, will branch off from the G219, near Mount Kailash (Tharchen) and head south, passing between Mansarovar and Rakshas lakes before reaching Purang, near the tri-junction Nepal-India-Tibet. The length of the road will be 107 km; it is designed for a speed of 80 km/h. The construction should be completed by August 2019. The second highway, the G365, will connect the G219 to Tholing and Tsaparang. The ancient monastic complexes are presently being restored to bring a large number of Chinese tourists to the famous ruins of the Guge Kingdom.
Another important development is the construction a second highway between Tibet and Xinjiang, via Minfeng. The road will be 558 km long. The deeply-worrying aspect of the project is that it crosses the highly eco-sensitive Changthang National Nature Reserve. It will run for 110 km in the main reserve, about 270 km in the buffer zone and some 100 km in the ‘experimental area’. More than one billion American dollars is invested in the project. The road should be put into operation by early 2021.
All this comes at a time when Beijing has announced the creation of a new Central Commission for Integrated Military and Civilian Development. It was launched on January 22, and according to The People’s Daily, experts have declared it vital for China’s national defence “The commission will decide and coordinate affairs on civil-military integration”. It will function directly under the Politburo’s Standing Committee with President Xi Jinping as the Chairman.
In the meantime, Delhi still lives in the Middle Ages, with an antediluvian Inner Line Permit and hardly any cooperation between the Armed Forces and the civil administration (at least in Ladakh).
But India has perhaps a chance. For the first time, the National Security Advisor, the Army chief and the Director of the Research & Analysis Wing are all natives of Pauri Garwhal in Uttarakhand. One can hope that the paharis will understand better the issue of mountain development.
The Indian Expressrecently noted: “Pauri Garhwal district has the distinction of sending three men to topmost positions in the current security establishment. At the same time, it suffers high migration out of the hills, thanks to near-zero irrigation, declining farming, zero employment, poor education and health facilities.”
And no highways of course! Let us hope that this will be remedied soon. It’s of vital interest to the country’s security and stability.

Of a strong man and a beautiful woman

My article Of a strong man and a beautiful woman appeared in the Edit Page of The Pioneer.

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Manohar Parrikar's four-day visit to China will accelerate India-China security dialogue, but it’s unlikely the Defence Minister will discuss about the difficult situation faced by people living in border area of Demchok
As Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar arrived in Beijing on a four-day visit, The Global Times asserted: “India would like to continue to be the most beautiful woman wooed by all men, notably the two strongest in the house, US and China.” The mouthpiece of the Communist Party was particularly referring to the Logistics Support Agreement, signed when the US Defence Secretary Ashton Carter came to Delhi a few days earlier.
The usually hard-hitting newspaper explained: “This is not an unfamiliar role to India. We can still recall how its diplomatic manoeuvring had earned itself a special role between the two competing blocs during the Cold War.”
Well, it is doubtful if Beijing will fall in an Indian honey trap during the Defence Minister’s visit and agree to some of the Indian demands. Apart from the usual requests, such as China providing maps of their perception of the Line of Control, the difficult situation of the border populations in Ladakh should be taken up. Let me explain.
While the number of Chinese intrusions across the LAC is slightly less due to the mechanisms put in place between Delhi and Beijing, the Chinese refuse the ‘permission’ to the villagers in the Demchok area to undertake basic work on the Indian side of the border.
On April 13, just four days before Parrikar’s departure, The Daily Excelsior reported: “Frustrated with the Chinese Army’s frequent intervention raising objection on carrying out any kind of developmental activities near the borders areas, the inhabitants of Demchok village, residing on the Indo-China border, have demanded resettlement.”
On April 8, the Scientific Advisory Committee from Nyoma tried to pacify the inhabitants of the 39 households in Demchok who refused to end their dharna; later a delegation approached Prasanna Ramaswamy, the Deputy Commissioner in Leh, demanding to be shifted; the People’s Liberation Army had raised some objection over the villagers laying a pipe line from a hot spring for drinking water. The residents of Demchok listed several instances, when the PLA stopped them to undertake developmental work.
According to The Daily Excelsior: “The residents had put up a tent at bank of Demchok nallah with national flag on its top, insisting the administration to shift them somewhere as the Chinese objected to carry out any kind of developmental activities in their village since 2000.”
On their side of the nallah, which for centuries marked the border, the Chinese do not face any Indian objections. In the last couple of years, Beijing has invested millions of yuans to develop the area along the Indus river from Tashigong, the first Tibetan village, to a place they call ‘Dian-jiao’ (the Chinese pronunciation for Demchok). They have even roped in the Shaanxi Province which provides the necessary funds for development. New buildings (particularly guest houses) can clearly be seen from the Indian side.
Though Demchok has been the first Ladakhi village since immemorial times, during the negotiations for the Panchsheel Agreement in 1954, China refused to acknowledge this. Due to China’s reticence to recognise Demchok, the talks went on for four months (from December 1953 to April 1954), instead of the expected three or four weeks. The main Chinese objection was mentioning Demchok on the route to Western Tibet.
On April 23, 1954, a few days before the final signature of the Agreement, N Raghavan, the Indian Ambassador to China, wrote to RK Nehru, the Foreign Secretary, that Chang Han-fu, the Chinese negotiator ‘vigorously’ objected to the inclusion of Demchok in the Agreement: “(He) conceded that traders customarily using this route might continue such use but said an oral understanding to that effect between two delegations would suffice. We strongly contended inclusion of route in Agreement.”
Very cleverly, another Chinese diplomat ‘privately’ told TN Kaul, his Indian counterpart, that he was objecting because they were not keen to mention the name ‘Kashmir’ as they did not wish to take sides between India and Pakistan. Though Kaul could see through the game, India finally gave in. Kaul later wrote: “However, their real objection was, I believe, to strengthening their claim to Aksai Chin which they needed for linking Sinkiang (Xinjiang) with Western Tibet.”
Finally it was agreed that: “the customary route leading to Tashigong along the valley of the Indus river may continue to be traversed in accordance with custom was worked out and Delhi approved it.”
Demchok was not mentioned. The issue faced by the villagers is the outcome of this formulation. In 1954, instead of using the opportunity to clarify the already contentious border issue, the Chinese were allowed to walk away with a vague statement which opened the door for future contestations.
Already then, the ‘beautiful Indian woman’ was unable to woo the tough Chinese negotiators. It may not be different 62 years later. China has truly a problem with Demchok.
Last year, the Chief Executive Councilor of the Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Council, Rigzin Spalbar wrote to the then Jammu & Kashmir Chief Minister  Mufti Mohammed Sayeed to request him to take up with Delhi the re-opening of the Kailash-Manasarovar route via Demchok.
A few months earlier, President Xi Jinping had ‘generously’ offered (as a ‘political gesture’) to open a new route, via Nathu la in Sikkim, for Indian pilgrims wanting to go on the yatra. The Indian Press clapped. It is true that for those who were unaware of the topography of the Himalayas, the Chinese offer to open Nathu-la seemed reasonable.
In his letter to Sayeed, Spalbar, after mentioning the historical background of Demchok, which till 1954, was used by most of the Indian pilgrims wanting to go on pilgrimage to the Kailash, also suggested re-opening the route; the Holy Lake and Sacred Mountain are located at a mere two-day drive from Leh and the route is relatively easy as it does not encounter any major pass. But here too the Chinese are not ready to be wooed.
Will Mr Parrikar’s visit be a success? Perhaps one or two Border Personnel Meeting points may be agreed upon, which is good; Demchok, however, will not be in the list. Perhaps the Joint Tactical Exercise held for the first time last year between the troops of both countries in the Chushul-Moldo area will be repeated on a larger scale. Great!
And in a few months time, a hotline may be established between the two military headquarters as part of an effort to improve border management. This however will not solve more serious issues such as Demchok. It may be left to the National Security Advisor and Special Reprehensive for the border Ajit Doval to raise the issues with his counterpart State Councillor Yang Jiechi. Will Yang be charmed by the NSA and agree to release the tension on Demchok? This will be a meaningful confidence-building measure, but is the ‘strong boy’ interested to please the ‘beautiful woman’?

McMahon Line, more than just a border issue

The Indian flag flying over Dekilinka, the Indian Mission Lhasa

My article McMahon Line, more than just a border issue appeared today in the Edit Page of The Pioneer.

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India must seek to preserve the sanctity of the McMahon line because it not only demarcates its legal border with China but also marks its historical ties with Tibet, which was once an independent nation

While the Indian archives are still jealously kept in the vaults of the Ministry of External Affairs, the Chinese are slowly (and selectively) declassifying their documents. Is declassification on the agenda of Modi Sarkaar? If it is, it will be good for the country because slowly Chinese perceptions are starting to prevail among Indian ‘experts’.
Let us take an example. During the annual KF Rustamji lecture, National Security Advisor Ajit Doval (who is also the Special Representative for border talks with China), said that he was surprised that, while China agreed to the McMahon line being the Sino-Burmese border in 1960, it does not accept the same principle for India. Some Indian ‘experts’ have argued that Mr Doval was wrong to compare the Sino-Burmese and Sino-Indian border issues. The Agreement on the Question of the Boundary between China and Burma signed on January 28, 1960, slightly departed from the McMahon alignment.
Also, Burma did not call its border with China, the ‘McMahon Line’. Why so? Today, like in 1960, Beijing wants to wipe out all proof that Tibet was once an independent nation and signed bilateral treaties with other countries; therefore, China insists we forget about Sir Henry McMahon, the Indian Foreign Secretary, who signed one such agreement with Tibet in 1914. The treaty between China and Burma was based on a principle that the northern boundary would follow the traditional McMahon line, but the imperialist name would be removed. For Burma, it did not matter much if the independent status of Tibet was erased.
For India, it is different; Tibet’s status matters hugely. Not only does the Dalai Lama and many of his countrymen live in India, but for India, its deep cultural, economic and religious contacts with the Roof of the World far pre-dated the arrival of the British in the subcontinent. The border issue is not just a question of ‘demarcating’ a line between China and India; it is also about acknowledging this ancient relation between India and Tibet. For this reason, Mr Doval is absolutely right to call the Sino-Indian border the McMahon Line.
Mr Doval also reminded his audience of the existence of Arunachal Pradesh: “We are particularly concerned about the Eastern sector where [Chinese] claims have been made on Tawang which is totally in contravention of accepted principles.” He was referring to the Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles signed on April 11, 2005, between India and China. Article VII says: “In reaching a boundary settlement, the two sides shall safeguard due interests of their settled populations in the border areas.” Beijing seems to today have forgotten about the 2005 Guidelines!
Soon after, the Chinese Foreign ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying affirmed: “The Chinese side holds a consistent and clear position on the eastern section of the China-India boundary: Arunachal Pradesh is a part of Southern Tibet.” Ms Hua explained: “The Chinese Government does not recognise the McMahon Line, which is illegal.”
What does history say? The Wilson Center in Washington, DC, recently released the translation of important documents from the Chinese Foreign Policy Database, an online resource on China’s international relations. According to one of these documents, in early 1952, the Indian Ambassador in China, KM Panikkar, speaking to a Chinese official, gave a report about “the existing conditions [in Tibet], without implying that those conditions should be preserved.” The “existing conditions” meant the existence of a full-fledged Indian mission in Lhasa.
Soon after entering the Tibetan capital in September 1951, Beijing realised that the Indian mission was proof of Tibet’s independence. Zhou Enlai met Panikkar in June 1952 and agreed that “to proceed in this manner was very proper”, ie the “existing conditions” need not to be preserved. Zhou felt that the situation was a scar left by Britain: “For all of this, the new Government of India was not at all responsible.” He went on to say that “to settle the question of Sino-Indian relationship in Tibet, time and proper steps were required. Therefore, the Chinese Government proposed that the Indian mission, previously stationed in Lhasa, be changed into an Indian Consulate General.” Zhou insisted that this “specific problem” should be solved first.
The Government of India readily (and foolishly) agreed and offered a Consulate in Mumbai to the Chinese as ‘bonus’ (though the Indian Head of the Mission in Lhasa, S Sinha,  was deeply upset about it, as he understood the far-reaching consequences for the future Indo-Tibet relations). Wanting to please Zhou Enlai, Panikkar added: “The Government of India was very anxious to remove those conditions through negotiations; for example, the 200 Indian troops stationed at Yatung [in fact in Gyantse], and the postal and telegraphic establishments of India in Lhasa.” According to the Chinese declassified documents, the Indian Ambassador continued: “The Government of India would be willing to transfer these to the Chinese Government as soon as the latter was ready to take them over.”
It was Sales Season! India was ready to offer all its Tibetan ‘privileges’ for free to China. During the following months, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was under the impression that the situation was settling down in Tibet and slowly the Tibetans were accepting the invasion of their country by the Peoples Liberation Army as fait accompli. He was wrong; the Chinese had begun interfering actively in the life of the Tibetans whose resentment was boiling.
On October 21, 1953, Beijing’s representative in Tibet, General Zhang Jingwu, sent a cable to Beijing to explain the “existing conditions” which had to be disbanded: “The Indian troops and officials should be withdrawn; postal facilities shall be taken back; Indian radio facilities shall also be withdrawn or transferred to us, all [dak bungalows] relating to posts and telecommunications shall be withdrawn; as a consulate general already exists in Lhasa, the Indian commercial representatives in Yatung and Gyantse shall be cancelled; radio stations should be given to China [in India to ‘balance’] the one of the Consulate General of India in Lhasa.”
He further suggested that trade should continue for some time and “when [the Chinese presence] becomes mature, one or two years later, relevant rules on entry and exit visas may be established.” It is what happened after the signature of the Panchsheel Agreement in April 1954. Import duties were levied on Indian goods and progressively, by the end of the 1950s, the flourishing Indo-Tibet trade and while it became impossible for Indian pilgrims to visit the holy sites in Tibet.
The McMahon Line is more than a line; it symbolises centuries of close contact between India and Tibet, which unfortunately does not exist anymore. Why should India rewrite history, and wipe out a glorious past just for the sake of Beijing’s good conscience? And what about the Indian archives?

Ajit Doval reminds China of History on border issue

My article Ajit Doval reminds China of History on border issue appeared in NitiCentral.


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‘The views of the two Governments remain as far apart as before’, wrote Subimal Dutt, the Indian Foreign Secretary in April 1960.
He was addressing ‘all the Indian Missions abroad’ to inform them about the visit of the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, who had come to Delhi to discuss the Sino-Indian border issue.
Tens of hours of talks between Nehru and his Chinese counterpart led nowhere. The transcript of the discussions has recently been declassified in The Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, (Series II, Volume 60). These documents make fascinating reading, particularly in the context of Prime Minister Modi’s recent visit to China and the seemingly stuck border negotiations.
Let us return to the present. During the annual K.F. Rustamji lecture, National Security Advisor Ajit Doval (who also officiates as Special Representative for the border talks with China), affirmed that while India's relations with China ‘were looking up’, India needs to remain on a ‘very very high alert’.
Speaking on 'Challenges of Securing India’s Borders: Strategising the Response’, Doval noted: “We have got a very long border, a very difficult and mountainous terrain snow-clad... for the bilateral relations with China, border is the critical and vital issue.”
Considering that Ajit Doval admitted that ‘advancement made in the relationship with China are centred around the settlement of the border’, it makes the ‘partnership’ all the more unstable.
Doval touched upon Arunachal Pradesh: “We are particularly concerned about the Eastern sector where [Chinese] claims have been made on Tawang (in Arunachal Pradesh) which is totally in contravention of accepted principles.”
Obviously, the NSA refers to ‘Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question’ signed on April 11, 2005 between India and China.
Article VII speaks of the ‘settled population’: “In reaching a boundary settlement, the two sides shall safeguard due interests of their settled populations in the border areas.”
Ten years after the signature of the agreement, Doval reminds the Chinese that: “there is [a] settled population in these areas particularly in Tawang and other areas which have been participating in the national mainstream all through.”
But Beijing has forgotten about the 2005 Guidelines!
It is not even mentioned in the Joint Statement signed during Mr. Modi’s visit to China! It is a serious issue: if an agreement is reached after a lot of effort and time and soon after Beijing become affected by Alzheimer disease, it creates a huge problem for the co-signatory.
Doval mentioned another point: he was surprised that while China has agreed to the McMahon line being the Sino-Burmese border in 1960, the same principle was not accepted in the case of India. He added: “So, these are the ticklish issues. But these ticklish issues have to be talked about, deliberated and worked out.”
Doval also readily admitted that the Special Representative talks between India and China on the boundary issue had not made any headway so far: “Special Representative level talks …haven't reached anywhere. But it is also true that for last 30 years we have not exchanged a single bullet. But, it is also true that the number of intrusions have gone up and down. Fortunately, in the last one year the intrusions have become much less."
Beijing was quick to react to the NSA’s statements.
Foreign ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying declared: “The Chinese side holds a consistent and clear position on the eastern section of the China-India boundary: Arunachal Pradesh is a part of Southern Tibet.”
Madam Hua explained: “The Chinese government does not recognise the McMahon Line, which is illegal,” adding: “The Chinese side is ready to work with the Indian side to resolve the boundary question through friendly consultation at an early date."
Hua did not say anything on the McMahon Line and Burma, she just noted: “it is not easy to resolve the China-India boundary question, as it is an issue left over from history."
Minus the 2005 Guidelines!!!
Incidentally, about the ‘left over from history’ theory, Morarji Desai, the then Finance Minister told Zhou Enlai during the 1960 talks, that it was wrong. China has created ‘history’ by invading Tibet: “Our attitude to Tibet has been condemned not only by our people but also by our friends abroad. They say that instead of being neutral in this dispute between Tibet and China, we should not have allowed you [Chinese] to dominate the Tibetans.”
The future Prime Minister added that India “surrendered all the privileges that we had inherited from the British. This was not entirely to the liking of our people but the Government of India and its leaders are convinced that what we did was the right thing.”
As mentioned earlier, Subimal Dutt told the Indian Missions that the Chinese and Indian views ‘remain as far apart as before’.
That was in April 1960. Unfortunately, nothing has changed since then.
After Zhou left Delhi on April 26, 1960, Dutt wrote to the Indian Ambassadors: “The Premier had seven long talks with the Prime Minister.”
Can you imagine today Modi and Xi together for a week and having 7 rounds of talks (of several hours each) on the disputed border?
What was Beijing’s position vis-à-vis China’s border with India in 1960?
It is summarized by Dutt: “The Sino-Indian boundary is not delimited and has to be settled by discussion between the two Governments.”
Delhi has always said the Eastern sector (then NEFA, today Arunachal) was settled in 1914 during the Simla Convention (i.e. the McMahon Line).
Dutt continues to quote Beijing’s views: “The Chinese will never accept the McMahon Line as a valid boundary. The NEFA area was traditionally part of Tibet and in many parts the Tibetans had been exercising jurisdiction. Indian control has extended there during the last 20 or 30 years.” Madam Hua says the same thing now!
China was (and still is) unwilling to acknowledge that in 1914, Tibet, an independent nation, was entitled to sign treaties or agreements with other countries.
According to Dutt, the next Chinese argument was: “The Ladakh area has been historically and traditionally part of Sinkiang [Xinjiang] in China and western Tibet, and has never been disputed until India tried to extend her control during the last one or two years.”
Here again, Beijing rewrites the history, and the Chinese position is as inflexible 55 years later.
Finally, Beijing equates the situation on the East (where the Chinese claim Tawang) to the West (India’s claims over the Aksai Chin) and says: “The position in Ladakh and NEFA is exactly similar in that there is a line upto which Indian control extends in NEFA and there is a line upto which Chinese control extends in Ladakh. The Indian claim to Ladakh must be treated in exactly the same basis as the Chinese claim to the NEFA.”
Dutt’s conclusion was: “We have disagreed with the Chinese stand on every single point,” however he told the Ambassadors, that it was “quite obvious that the Chinese aim is to make us accept their claim in Ladakh as a price for their recognition of our position in NEFA.”
In another words, a swap.
Today, Beijing is not even ready for a swap as it has added Tawang and the ‘populated’ area around, to its claims, in total contradiction of the 2005 Guidelines.
An Alzheimerish China is dangerous for India and Delhi ‘needs to remain on a very high alert’.

1960: The views of the two Governments remain as far apart as before

Nehru, Zhou Enlai, Chen Yi, Swaran Singh (April 1960)

During the annual K.F. Rustamji lecture, National Security Advisor Ajit Doval, (who is also Special Representative for the border talks with China), affirmed that while India's relations with China ‘were looking up’, but there was a need to remain at a ‘very very high alert’.
Speaking on 'Challenges of Securing India’s Borders: Strategising the Response’, Doval admitted: "We might have to see China border in a different way once the boundary is settled.”
According to PTI, he explained: “We have got a very long border, we have got 3,488-km [?] long border, a very difficult and mountainous terrain snow-clad... now for the bilateral relations with China, border is the critical and vital issue.”
After he affirmed that ‘advancement made in the relationship with China are centred around the settlement of the border’, he touched upon Arunachal Pradesh: “We are particularly concerned about the Eastern sector where the claims have been made on Tawang (in Arunachal Pradesh) which is totally in contravention of accepted principles."
Doval refers here to ‘Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question’ signed on April 11, 2005.
Article VI says: “The boundary should be along well-defined and easily identifiable natural geographical features to be mutually agreed upon between the two sides.”
And even more importantly, Article VII speaks of the ‘settled population’: “In reaching a boundary settlement, the two sides shall safeguard due interests of their settled populations in the border areas.”
Doval rightly said: “The fact is there is settled population in these areas particularly in Tawang and other areas which have been participating in the national mainstream all through.”
Apparently, Beijing has forgotten about the 2005 Guidelines!
It is a serious issue, because if an agreement is reached after a lot of efforts and time and soon after, Beijing become affected by Alzheimer disease, it is a problem.
Doval mentioned another point: he was surprised that while McMahon line was agreed till Burma by China (in 1960), the same principle was not accepted in the case of India.
He concluded: “So, these are the ticklish issues. But these ticklish issues have to be talked about, deliberated and worked out …there was a need for working out a larger plan for tackling China.”
He also admitted that the Special Representative talks between India and China on the boundary issue had not made any headway so far: “There have been a series of Special Representative level talks, about 17 rounds and they haven't reached anywhere. But it is also true that for last 30 years we have not exchanged a single bullet. But, it is also true that the number of intrusions have gone up and down. Fortunately, in the last one year the intrusions have become much less and some of the intrusions which have been made were controlled."
Beijing was quick to react.
Foreign ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying declared:  “The Chinese side holds a consistent and clear position on the eastern section of the China-India boundary: Aunachal Pradesh is a part of Southern Tibet.”
She explained: “The Chinese government does not recognise the McMahon Line, which is illegal,” adding: “The Chinese side is ready to work with the Indian side to resolve the boundary question through friendly consultation at an early date and create more favourable conditions for the development of the bilateral relations."
Hua did not mentioned directly the McMahon Line and Burma, she just said: “it is not easy to resolve the China-India boundary question, as it is an issue left over from history. …During Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's recent visit to China, the two sides reaffirmed their commitment to a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable solution to the boundary question by pressing ahead with the process of the special representatives' meeting."
Minus the 2005 Guidelines!!!
It is interesting to look at China’s position 55 years ago, when Premier Zhou Enlai came to India with a large delegation to try to resolve the dispute.
As Subimal Dutt, the then Foreign Secretary wrote to the Indian Missions abroad: “The views of the two Governments remain as far apart as before.”
That was in April 1960.
The Foreign Secretary’s note makes interesting reading.
Nothing has changed 55 years later.
Will it change one day?

Subimal Dutt to Heads of Missions

Premier Chou En-lai and his party left Delhi 26th morning. The Premier had seven long talks with the Prime Minister. He and Foreign Minister Chen Yi had also separate talks with Vice-President and several senior Ministers. The views of the two Governments remain as far apart as before.

The Chinese took the following stand.

(1) The Sino-Indian boundary is not delimited and has to be settled by discussion between the two Governments.

(2) The Chinese will never accept the McMahon Line as a valid boundary. The NEFA area was traditionally part of Tibet and in many parts the Tibetans had been exercising jurisdiction. Indian control has extended there during the last 20 or 30 years. The Chinese however recognise that the area is now under full Indian control. This area has always been disputed between China and India.

(3) The Ladakh area has been historically and traditionally part of Sinkiang in China and western Tibet, and has never been disputed until India tried to extend her control during the last one or two years. The dispute in this area has therefore arisen because of attempted penetration by India. Chinese have always been in control of this area which has been shown as part of China in Chinese maps.

(4) Neither side should make a territorial claim as a precondition. China is not making any such claim to the NEFA and undertakes not to cross the line upto which Indian control has extended. Similarly, India should recognise that Chinese control extends upto the line shown in the Chinese maps and should not try to cross that line. The position in Ladakh and NEFA is exactly similar in that there is a line upto which Indian control extends in NEFA and there is a line upto which Chinese control extends in Ladakh. The Indian claim to Ladakh must be treated in exactly the same basis as the Chinese claim to the NEFA.

(5) A joint committee of officials should meet, examine the material in the possession of both sides and make recommendations for border adjustments.

2. We have disagreed with the Chinese stand on every single point. In regard to point (2) we have reiterated that the NEFA area south of the McMahon Line has always been part of India by custom, tradition and exercise of jurisdiction and there is no similarity between the Indian stand in respect of NEFA and the supposed Chinese stand in respect of Ladakh. We have also made it quite clear that officials cannot be entrusted with the task of making proposals involving the sovereignty of a country.

Top Secret

3. It is quite obvious that the Chinese aim is to make us accept their claim in Ladakh as a price for their recognition of our position in NEFA. Throughout the discussions they have invariably connected Ladakh with NEFA and stressed that the same principles of settling the boundary must govern both these areas. It was also obvious that if we accepted the line claimed by China in Ladakh they would accept the McMahon Line. There might be need for minor frontier rectifications, but that would not create much practical difficulty.

4. The only substantive agreement in the joint communique is that officers of both sides should examine the maps, documents etc. in each other's possession and send a joint report to the two Governments listing the points on which they agree and the points on which they either disagree or which, in their view, need further clarification. It is not known whether the Chinese will implement this agreement sincerely. Whatever be it, it leaves the way open for further consideration of the border problem by the two Prime Ministers. It would however be entirely incorrect to give the impression, that each side appreciates the other's point of view better or that prospect of reasonable settlement is even remotely in sight. The Chinese might try to give that impression to the world.

5. You should use the information contained in this telegram discreetly for rebutting any misleading Chinese propaganda and to give a correct appraisal of the Delhi talks.