Mirage in the High Himalayas

Same Senior Colonel (ext. left) with General Zhang Yang
in Ngari a few days earlier
Was General Zhang informed about Burtse?

After a swift victory, Julius Caesar is said to have bragged in the Roman Senate: “Vini, Vidi, Vici” (I came, I saw, I conquered). These historic words need to be adapted for the recent intrusion of the Chinese Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) in Ladakh: “they came, they saw, they built a tower, but they did not come.”
It is at least what Hong Lei, Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ spokesman affirmed in Beijing: "As far as I know, there is no such 'face-off' between China and India in the border area."
And of course, he added, China is committed to maintaining peace and tranquility on the border area.
Let us look at the facts from this side of the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

Indian officers with Chinese Senior Colonel
during flag meeting on September 8

As it happened before the visit of Premier Li Keqiang to India in April/May 2013 and also when President Xi Jinping arrived in Ahmedabad in September 2014, on September 11, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) intruded on India’s territory.
The next day, it was reported in the Indian press that a face-off had occurred in Burtse area, a few miles east of Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO), where the 2013 confrontation had occurred.
According to The Times of India, “the bone of contention is a surveillance structure being erected by the PLA very close to the LAC.”
The Indo-Tibetan Border Police apparently objected to the construction of the structure and, with the help of the Army, stopped the PLA. Subsequently, the PLA called for reinforcements, followed by a massing of more Indian forces in the area.
On September 12, The Times of India said: “The two forces are still locked in an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation and efforts are being made to defuse the situation.”
The nationalist Chinese newspaper, The Global Times, quoting Jiang Jingkui, director of the Department of South Asian Languages at Peking University counterattacked: “this is not the first time that Indian media has reported 'confrontations' that do not exist in the Sino-Indian border area. These news are often untrue, negative, misleading and aimed at provoking public opinion, and are harmful to the relationship between China and India."
Such media accusations are unreasonable, as Chinese troops have never intruded, he said. In other words, the PLA did not come, they not did see anything, they did not erect a tower.
Jiang added that this type of information always come from “a certain group of people, including the military, who are hostile towards China.”
Conclusion: the Indian side must have been victim of a high-altitude mirage.
Not only were the local Indian troops fooled by the visual phenomena (they quickly rushed reinforcements), but the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and other Long-Range Reconnaissance and Observation System, mistakenly saw the PLA troops entering Indian territory near Burtse, erecting a tower and later massing troops.
A more serious aspect has however not been mentioned in the Indian press.
Just a day before the stand-off in Ladakh (which never was, according to the Chinese!), a senior member of the Chinese Central Military Commission (CMC) visited the region.
A coincidence, you may think?
Or a mirage?
On September 9 and 10, a member of the all-powerful CMC visited Ngari Prefecture, which borders Ladakh, in Western Tibet. General Zhang Yang, Director of the PLA’s Political Department was in Tibet to ‘celebrate’ the 50th anniversary of the creation of the Tibetan Autonomous Region.
At the end of the grandiose function held in Lhasa, the ‘Central’ delegation split into different groups.
Yu Zhengsheng, chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, who headed the delegation, went to Shigatse and visited the Tashilhunpo, seat of the Panchen Lamas.
Vice-Premier Liu Yandong, also a member of the Politburo, headed towards Shannan (Lhoka) Prefecture, while Jampa Phuntsok, an old Tibet-hand ‘inspected’ Nagchu. Another ‘sub-delegation’ led by Du Qinglin, one of the CPPCC’s Vice-chairpersons went to Nyingchi, north of Arunachal Pradesh.
On September 7 in Lhasa, Yu Zhengsheng personally met the Army and the Armed Police; he urged them “to crack down on separatist forces and be ready to fight a protracted battle against the 14th Dalai [Lama] clique.”
Yu also asked the defence forces “to improve their abilities of governing Tibet according to law [sic], specifically cracking down on the separatist forces.”
The defence forces should uphold the correct ‘political direction’ and exert a larger role for safeguarding border stability and ethnic solidarity, he said.
Does it help to ‘safeguard border stability’ by crossing over to the neighbour’s side?
And this happened a day after General Zhang Yang spent 2 days in Ngari Prefecture. Officially, he came to convey the ‘loving care’ and the ‘deep feeling’ of the CPC Central Committee, the State Council, and the Military Commission to the ‘cadres and masses of all nationalities’, affirms the Chinese press.
Like his colleagues in other parts of Tibet, General Zhang brought along a banner carrying President Xi’s words, ‘Strengthen National Unity and Construct a Beautiful Tibet’. Interestingly, though Ngari depends upon Xinjiang Military District (MD), Zhang was accompanied by Lt Gen Xu Yong, commander of the Tibet MD and not Lt Gen Peng Yong, the Commander of Xinjiang MD.
A day earlier, speaking at the grand function in Lhasa, Lt Gen. Xu Yong had asserted: “During these 50 years in the same boat, the troops stationed in Tibet and police staff always depended on the Party to write [the history] of the bloody battles to defend Tibet.”
What ‘bloody battles’ does General Xu refer to? Battles in Ladakh during the 1962 conflict with India? We will probably never know.
Also in the delegation to Ngari, was Wang Yongjun of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI). A year ago, WantChinaTimes had reported that the CCDI’s boss, Wang Qishan had started ‘parachuting’ CCDI officials into key posts around China in order to strengthen the party's anti-graft campaign and bring new blood to certain regions.
Wang’s presence may be an indication that heads could soon roll on this front too. Let us not forget that a ‘bloody’ battle against corruption, particularly in the PLA, is raging in the Middle Kingdom; more than 50 generals have already lost their jobs.
Apart from the customary photo sessions with the ‘cadres and the masses’, (i.e. herders, farmers, toilers, etc.), General Zhang Yang and his delegation “made a special trip to lay a wreath on the revolutionary martyrs’ cemetery,” said the Chinese press. Which martyrs? Of 1962 War again?
One line also mentions that Zhang 'visited the troops'.
This raises an important question: was the CMC’s member informed that the PLA was planning to build a structure in an area considered by India to be within her territory?
Let us presume that Zhang was not informed, it means that the PLA has a serious problem of command. A free for all in the PLA?
If he was informed, it is a serious issue for India (despite Beijing’s denial).
By the way, why did a Division Commander (Maj Gen Joshi) need to participate in a flag meeting if nothing had happened?

PLA's winter training on the Indian borders

Year 2104 has seen a heavy traffic of VIPs/VVIPs in Ngari (Western Tibet).
One of the reasons is that Beijing has decided to consolidate its borders, whether sea borders in the South China or East China Seas or land borders with India (mainly in Aksai Chin/Ladakh region).
In July, China Military Online reported that Xu Qiliang, a member of the Politburo of the CCP's Central Committee and also one of the 2 vice chairmen of the  Central Military Commission (CMC) inspected Xinjiang and Tibet garrisons.
According to the official website: "Xu Qiliang recently inspected the troops of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the People’s Armed Police Force (PAPF) garrisoning Xinjiang and Tibet."
The article adds: "During the inspection, General Xu Qiliang visited the officers and men in frontier areas, and held talks with the leaders of the troop units garrisoning in Hotan [Xinjiang, near the Aksai Chin], Ali [Ngari or Gar] and Lhasa [in the Tibetan Autonomous Region or TAR] areas to discuss the development and reform of frontier troop units.
Xu Qiliang also visited sentries in Shenxianwan (just north of the Karakoram Pass and the Depsang Plains) frontier defense company who were performing duties at the altitude of 5,380 meters.
Now the winter has set on the high plateau.
It is cosier for the VVIPs to remain in Beijing, while the frontier guards continue to live in the rarefied altitude of the Xinjiang Military District opposite the Indian troops in Ladakh.
The PLA websites published a photo feature of the life of the PLA soldiers in Shenxianwan.

Shenxianwan-Karakoram pass area

Incidentally, the PLA made another incursion in Ladakh last week.
The Times of India reported: "Barely two months after a fortnight long stand-off between Chinese and Indian forces was resolved in Ladakh, China's PLA made another incursion leading to a standoff for over three hours. While the last standoff (in September) took place in Chumur area, the latest one has been reported from near Chushul which is reeling under -30 degree celsius temperature."
An official of the home ministry told The Times of India: "This was not the same as the September standoff when matters had really escalated. But given that Chinese continue to come in despite unfavourable weather shows their intent to continue to needle us. Earlier incursions were never heard of in winters. For the past couple of years, they have become common. Our forces, however, are prepared and have been responding with equal force."
Here are some pictures of the training of the PLA on the Xinjiang's side of the border, not far from the Karakoram pass (see map above).
Though the military website said that the pictures were taken from the same area, it appears that some pictures are not from the Aksai Chin area (i.e. snow on the trees).
Propaganda is not always factually correct!

 

 

 

 

On December 19, in another 'photo op', China Military Online shows 'Troops in Tibet brave in winter training'. This time in Chengdu Military Region.
The caption says: "A soldier is eating dry provisions with snow as his lunch [sic]. A troop unit under the Rikaze [Chinese for Shigatse] Military Sub-command of the Tibet Military Command (MC) of the Chengdu Military Area Command (MAC) of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) organized its troops to conduct cold-resistance and anti-anoxia training on a winter field training ground at an altitude of 4,500 meters on the early morning of December 15, 2014."
"The soldiers are in winter training",says China Military Online.
This series is clearly for the show.

 

 

 

 

Was the local Chinese local Commander behind the Depsang incident?

Last year, when I wrote that the Depsang incident of April 2013 was perhaps due to the initiatives of some PLA's local commanders, I was told that "it can't be. the PLA's generals  are a disciplined lot and Chairman Xi is their Supreme Commander".
I later thought I might be wrong, if everybody thinks it is a foolish idea.
Yesterday, I was amused to read in The Business Standard that Shrikant Kondapalli, the JNU professor and expert on China affairs, expressed "his concern about the fresh Chinese incursion into Indian territory". He claimed that "this could be a message given by the Chinese troops to its President, Xi Jinping, that no fruitful discussion on the boundary issue be held with the Indian leadership during his official trip."
It clearly means that some very senior PLA generals were not happy about the thaw between India and China.
Kondapalli told ANI: "It is not clear exactly what is happening in the Line of Actual Control (LoAC) areas. If the reports about 5000 [500, not 5000, my comment] troops are correct then I think that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the People's Armed Police Force are sending signal to the civilian leadership not to have any fruitful discussions on the border dispute while President Xi Jinping is speaking to Prime Minister Modi in New Delhi".
Kondapalli is also absolutely right when he says that the claim to Chumur was unheard of till a few years ago.
Chumur, located north of Himachal Pradesh, has never been historically  claimed by Tibet (and consequently, later by China). It is totally new claim with no historical basis.
Some other areas have been 'historically disputed' (these areas were discussed in detail, during the 5 months border talks in 1960), but Chumur is pure land grabbing by the People's Republic of China; 'expansionism' as Prime Minister Modi had put it during the legislative election campaign.
But, if my theory (and Kondapalli's) is true, it is a very serious issue as it means that Xi Jinping, the Chairman of the Central Military Commission does not fully control his generals.
Is the sacking of Ambassador Wei Wei linked to this issue?
It is too early to say.
The solution for the 'intrusions' has been enunciated by the Indian Prime Minister; he stated yesterday:

I raised our serious concern over repeated incidents along the border. We agreed that peace and tranquility in the border region constitutes an essential foundation for mutual trust and confidence and for realizing the full potential of our relationship. This is an important understanding, which should be strictly observed. While our border related agreements and confidence building measures have worked well, I also suggested that clarification of Line of Actual Control would greatly contribute to our efforts to maintain peace and tranquility and requested President Xi to resume the stalled process of clarifying the LAC. We should also seek an early settlement of the boundary question.

In military jargon: 'let us exchange these bloody maps of the LAC'.

My post of November 4, 2013 

In May, in an article in Rediff.com, I had suggested that some Chinese PLA generals posted in Lanzhou Military Area Command were possibly responsible for the Depsang Plain incident; the PLA had then planted their tents between the Chinese and Indian 'perceived' LACs, creating a lot of tensions between India and China.
Many thought that this was far-fetched.
The sacking of General Peng Yong, reported by Reuters (see article below), seems to confirm my theory.
But who is General Peng Yong?
According to his biography, Peng Yong is a Han, born in 1954 in Lulong County, Hebei Province. In 1970, he entered the Party's work force; a year later, he joined the CCP; later graduated from Shijiazhuang Army Academy Long-Distance Education Program with a Bachelor Degree in 1998. 
From 2004 to 2011, he was Group Army (Corps) Commander of 47th Group Army of PLA. 
From 2011 till recently, he commanded the Xinjiang Military Region. In November 2012, he was promoted as a member of the CCP's Central Committee. 
Let us remember that the Xinjiang Military Region of the Lanzhou Military Area looks after the Indian border in Ladakh as well as Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand.

General Peng Yong

Reuters says that he had been 'booted off' for the attack, presumably by Uygyur militants, on the Tiananmen Square.
Why should the PLA Xinjiang Commander (and Central Committee) be responsible for a problem of law and order (Tiananmen incident).
The PLA's job is the defence of China's borders and is concerned with external threats from abroad (in this case, India).
The internal threats are dealt with the People's Armed Police (PAP) and State
Security apparatus (Public Security Bureau or PSB).
If a head had to roll for the embarrassing (for Beijing) incident which happened in the heart of the Chinese capital, the Party Secretary (and Politburo member) Zhang Chunxian should have lost his job.
PAP and PSB should have also been sacked.
They did not. It means that Peng Yong was shown the door for other reasons, the Depsang incident is a strong probability.
Let us see what happens next.

Chinese Military Boss Booted Off Ruling Council Following Attack 
Jason Lee
BEIJING
Reuters
China's ruling Communist Party announced on Sunday the removal of the military chief of restive Xinjiang from the region's governing council, following a car crash in Beijing's Tiananmen Square blamed on Islamist militants from Xinjiang.

The official Xinjiang Daily said in a brief front page report that Peng Yong had been sacked as a member of Xinjiang's Communist Party Standing Committee, and would be replaced by Liu Lei, an army veteran with more than a decade's experience in the region.
The newspaper gave no reason for the move, but the party frequently removes top officials following such incidents as it seeks to apportion blame. The incident was especially embarrassing for the stability-obsessed party given the billions of dollars it spends every year on domestic security, not only in Xinjiang but across the country, and that the crash happened in the heart of Beijing.
Peng was appointed commander of the Xinjiang military region in July 2011. It is likely that he will also be relieved of his military duties.
Real power in China lies with party bodies rather than government ones, as that is where the key decisions are made.
The government has blamed Islamist extremists plotting holy war after a vehicle police said was laden with gasoline ploughed into bystanders outside the front entrance of the Forbidden City, on the north of Tiananmen Square.
The three people in the car died, as did two tourists. More than 40 were injured. Police have also detained five suspected accomplices. Security has been stepped up in Beijing and Xinjiang following the incident. Beijing party chief Guo Jinlong has urged the police to improve their capacity to collect intelligence and take precautions against further attacks, the city government-run Beijing Daily said on Sunday. Guo urged police and security forces to "look for vulnerable links" and "learn the lessons" from the incident, the report said.
Xinjiang is home to the Muslim Uighur minority, many of whom chafe at China's restrictions on their religion, culture and language, though the government says they are granted broad freedoms.
Xinjiang has been wracked by unrest in recent years, blamed by the government on the separatist East Turkestan Islamic Movement which Beijing believes was also responsible for last week's incident.
Rights groups, exiles and some experts say, though, that there is little evidence of a cohesive extremist movement operating in Xinjiang.
In 2009, some 200 people died in Xinjiang's regional capital Urumqi during riots which pitted Uighurs against the majority Han Chinese.

(Reporting By Dominique Patton and Ben Blanchard; Editing by Ron Popeski)

Latest Developments in the Aksai Chin

The website Chinamil.com.cn publishes a series of pictures of a Chinese 'post' in the Aksai Chin area, close to the Indian positions.
The Chinese troops are obviously better off than their Indian opponents in Depsang Plains or Daulat Beg Oldi.

The caption of the photo is: "The Heweitan sentry post of a frontier defense regiment of the Xinjiang Military Command of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), with an altitude of 5418 meters, tops the list of the PLA frontier defense sentry posts at high altitudes. The sentry post is situated at the middle section of the Karakorum Mountains, near the headstream of the Karakax [Karakash] River in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region." 
Where is the Karakash river located? 
Wikipedia says:

Heweitan area

The Karakash or Black Jade River, which flows in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region, originates from the Aksai Chin region. The river has its source at 19,000 feet (5,800 m) about 11 km northeast of Galwan Kangri peak in the Aksai Chin.

It flows north to Sumnal (15,540 ft), then turns sharply eastwards (skirting just north of the Soda Plains of Aksai Chin) until just beyond Palong Karpo, when it turns sharply northwestwards, and crosses into Xinjiang proper. It flows past the towns of Sumgal, Fotash, Gulbashem, until it reaches Xaidulla.

The river then turns sharply northeastwards again near Xaidulla, and, after passing through Ali Nazar crosses the Kunlun mountain range near the Suget or Sanju Pass, passing east of Khotan, running parallel to the Yurungkash River, which it joins near Koxlax (some 200 km north of Khotan), from where it continues north as the Khotan River passing Piqanlik, and seasonally crossing the desert, joining the Tarim River at 42°29′N 80°56′E.

The Karakash River is famous for its white and greenish jade (nephrite) carried as river boulders and pebbles toward Khotan, as does the nearby Yurungkash (or 'White Jade') River. This river jade originates from eroded mountain deposits of which the most famous one is near Gulbashen, in southwestern Xinjiang. The Karakash Valley was also a caravan road for the north-south trade between Yarkand (China) and Leh over the Karakoram Pass in Leh District of Jammu and Kashmir.

Here are the photos of the Chinese 'post'. The captions are from the Chinese site.

Soldiers of the Heweitan frontier defense company are seen in the photo take in late September, 2013

The former site of the Heweitan sentry post

Two signalmen of the of the Heweitan frontier defense company are in operation

A group of soldiers of the Heweitan frontier defense company are on their way of patrol in the karakorum Mountains

Do you want to visit the Aksai Chin,
click on this video (from www.tibet.raize.ch)

Mr. Li and the Three Idiots

Li came, Li saw (the Indian confusion) and Li won.
It was not difficult. He spoke of the Three Idiots, a film that his daughter ‘forced’ him to see, and the Indian establishment (and media) melted: “The guy is really nice; he loves Indian movies”. Further, he chose to eat vegetarian at his Indian counterpart’s banquet. Wow, here is a Chinese leader who is different; he deeply respects our customs.
But is Mr. Li really different?
The South China Morning Post believes that Li’s foreign tour (India, Pakistan, Switzerland and Germany) was a success: “On his maiden, eight-day diplomatic trip as premier, Li Keqiang not only engaged in serious bilateral talks but also attempted to show his personable side to boost the image of the Chinese leadership.”
The Hong Kong publication continues: “Li expressed his appreciation of foreign culture and appeared self-confident when touching on sensitive issues.”
In Germany, he even watched live the European Champion League final between Bayern Munich and Borussia Dortmund.
He told a charmed German chancellor "If we both come together in an ideal and optimal way, a dream team will emerge."
The tough lady also melted. Though the European Commission had planned to impose hefty duties on solar panel imports from China, making it difficult for Beijing to dump low cost panels and destroy the European solar industry, Merkel said that Germany would oppose Brussels’ decision.
In Berlin, Li even announced that China was willing to preferentially open up its market to Germany; never mind that it is impossible under EU rules, Mr. Li made the offer.
As Mr. Li was demonstrating his charisma in Europe, the news flashed that China had managed to construct a road upto Finger–IV area in the Sirijap sector, on the northern shore of the Panggong Lake in Ladakh, some five km deep inside the Indian territory. The incident took place on May 17, only two days before Li’s arrival in India.
As Delhi was keen to have a ‘successful’ visit by the Chinese Premier, the cat was kept in the bag.
In any case why to worry, the Defence Minister declared a week later: "Army is updated about latest position there. Whenever these kinds of incidents happen in the local areas, they are handling it.” Mr Antony added: “India can protect its national interests. India is not the India of the past.”
The nation is reassured!
Many will however be disappointed that Mr. Li’s Indian visit brought no concrete progress on the border issue. The Joint Statement just “expressed satisfaction over the work done so far by Special Representatives” and “encouraged them to push forward the process of negotiations and seek a framework for a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable settlement.” The usual stuff, as if nothing had happened in April
Dr. Manmohan and his Chinese counterpart only reiterated the existence of different mechanisms, they “noted with satisfaction that the meetings of the India-China Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on Border Affairs held till date have been fruitful.”
Not a word to explain the Chinese PLA’s intrusions in Depsang Plains, just five weeks earlier. Is the Indian public not entitled to know what has happened? Apparently no!
The common man shall probably never be told why the Chinese came, camped on Indian soil and left. Why was the incident taken so lightly by India? It will remain a secret for the sake of Sino-Indian friendship.
From the start, Mr. Li probably knew that nothing would happen on the border front. A proof, he left his main ‘negotiator’ at home.
Yang Jiechi, State Councilor and Special Representative on the border issue (far senior to the Wang Yi, the Foreign Affairs Minister who was in Delhi) was meeting the Mexican Foreign Minister and the Mongolian Deputy Prime Minister in Beijing while Li was enjoying Indian food.
Why was Yang not in the Premier’s plane? Simple, it is not in China’s interest to work out a border agreement with India right now. The marine disputes in the South China and East China Seas are far more important.
Another serious issue between India and China is the trade imbalance.
Both countries have fixed an ambitious target of US$ 100 billion as the trade turnover by 2015
The Joint Statement says: “the two countries agreed to take measures to address the issue of the trade imbalance. These include cooperation on pharmaceutical supervision including registration, stronger links between Chinese enterprises and Indian IT industry, and completion of phytosanitary negotiations on agro-products.”
Last financial year, India's exports to China reached only $ 13.52 billion while its imports were $ 54.3 billion. A trade deficit of $ 40.78 billion is not paltry! Here again, though China professed that it is keen to solve the issue, in action Beijing does not seem interested.
The Times of India reported from Beijing that the companies represented in Li Keqiang’s business delegation “seem bent on selling instead of buying in the Indian market.”
The newspaper explained: “Only five of the 73 Chinese companies in the list of Fortune 500 are represented in the business delegation, providing an interesting reality check to the Indian industry.”
Who was represented? Mainly companies wanting to enhance their sales in India such as crane manufacturers (Sany), power machinery (Shanghai Electric), telecom equipment giants (Huawei and ZTE), aluminum industry equipment (Dalian Cimm), items for lightening (China National Township Enterprises) or art and craft goods (China Artex).
The strangest is that the Indian National Security Council (NSC) had warned the Government that Telecom imports from China could pose significant national security risks to the country.
Sanjeev Nayyar wrote in The Business Standard: “Part of the NSC's justification for this claim is that Huawei and ZTE have links to Programme 863 of the Chinese government, which was administered by the People's Liberation Army.”
Even if it rings alarm bells in the Indian intelligence circles, the Government does not seem to be much bothered.
In an interview in New York, EU Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht alleged that Huawei and ZTE violated anti-dumping and anti-subsidy guidelines; he said the cheap capital ‘created a distorted playing field’.
The South China Morning Post pointed out that “cheap finance from China's state-backed banks is increasingly regarded by the EU and the United States as an unfair subsidy that breaks global trade law.” What about for India?
It is doubtful if Commerce Secretary S R Rao who will be leading a team of Indian government officials to China can change anything in the present stakes.

Tourists and Trespassers?

Another irritant: why to always club a visit to Delhi with a trip to Islamabad? The Chinese leader ended up praising Pakistan so much , that it became embarrassing for Delhi. In an interview, Li Kequiang declared: “When it comes to Pakistan, the first word that comes to the mind of the Chinese is ‘iron brother’. To us Chinese, Pakistan is always a trustworthy friend who is as solid as iron. Actually, Chinese netizens refer to Pakistan as Iron Pak.”
Beijing is free to choose its ‘iron’ partners, but this choice should not be associated with India.
From China’s point of view, Li’s foreign tour was certainly a success. He showed an affable face of the Middle Kingdom and many thought that the new leadership is different. It remains to be seen in acts.
Regarding the Three Idiots, the story does not say if Ms Li, the Premier’s daughter gave her father a pirated version or an original DVD. But Mr. Li certainly enjoyed seeing the blue shores of the Panggong Lake with the majestic mountains of Ladakh as a background, it is however no reason to build a road on the opposite shore on Indian territory.

Himalayan blunder to Himalayan handshake

My article Himalayan blunder to Himalayan handshake appeared in the Edit Page of The Pioneer today.

Click here to read...

India should demand concrete gestures from China. Then we shall see whether Beijing is ready to match its words with deeds, and agrees to exchange the border maps pertaining to the Eastern and the Western sectors

I  am confused. Is Mr Li Keqiang, the new Chinese Premier, a sincere person or is he, like his illustrious predecessor Zhou Enlai, only a smooth-talker? Indeed, he speaks sweetly. In an Op-Ed in a national newspaper, he says: “China and India are destined to be together. They should work hand in hand if Asia is to become the anchor of world peace”. That sounds great. He also says: “We live in an age of change, but there are always certain things that are enduring, forever refreshing and attractive. India is such a nation, at once old and young. …[India and China] represent the two pillars of the civilisation of the East.” But when he states: “Today, the handshake across the Himalayas is even stronger”, is it really true after the border incident in Ladakh?
For Mr Li, the present problems are left-overs from ‘history’. One can’t deny this; for centuries the towering Himalayas, as the Chinese Premier calls the border, were ruled by the Dalai Lamas in Lhasa, and the Emperors of the Middle Kingdom had, except for very short periods, little say on the Roof of the World. For India, the ‘left-over of history’ is the Chinese invasion of Tibet in 1950.
Stranger is when Mr Li speaks philosophy to stress the importance of making friends with neighbours: “Do not do unto others what you do not want others to do unto you”, he says. Then why did he order his troops to plant their tents on Indian territory? Was he expecting India to do the same to China? Who is the real Mr Li? The one who nostalgically speaks of his student days when he visited India? Or the powerful leader of an authoritarian regime which has disputes with most of its neighbours?
Assuming that China had some grievances against India, why could these not be taken up at one of the scheduled bilateral meetings (External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid’s visit to Beijing or Mr Li’s present trip to India)? Visits to China by the Union Minister for Defence and the Indian Prime Minister are also planned for later this year. There were at least four occasions to solve pending issues, so why take the extreme step of setting up a camp on Indian territory, creating bitterness and distrust? The strangest thing is that Mr Li did not mention any serious grievance against India (at least publicly) during his stay in India.
One reason could be that one arm of China (the State Council) did not know what the other (the PLA) was planning. It is not easy to prove, but it remains a strong possibility with scary implications. Is this why Mr S Jaishankar, the Indian Ambassador to China, referred to the Chinese incursion in Ladakh as ‘very unusual’? This is a charitable way to explain the two faces of the Chinese leadership.
What does not help is that opposite the young and affable-looking Chinese Prime Minister is his shy Indian counterpart. Take the dams under construction on the Yarlung Tsangpo/Brahmaputra in Tibet. In his Joint Statement with Mr Li, Mr Manmohan Singh said: “It would be useful for the mandate of our Expert Level Mechanism to be expanded to include information sharing on upstream development projects on these rivers.” Why say “would be useful”, and not just that India demands a legal mechanism/agreement to access the upstream developments on the Brahmaputra. Small mercy, the Joint Statement does not utter the ‘One China’ policy or mention that “Tibet is an inseparable part of China”. In any case, it has been said ad nauseam.
Regarding the border, the Joint Statement suggests: “Pending the resolution of the boundary question, the two sides shall work together to maintain peace and tranquility in the border areas in line with the previous agreements.” What does “in line with the previous agreements” mean? As seen in the Depsang Plains in Ladakh, the Chinese are ready to break all existing agreements when it suits them. This is not unusual for China which often professes something and does something else.
In the Joint Statement, India and China reaffirm their opposition to weaponisation and an arms race in outer space. A week earlier, Reuters mentioned that China had launched a rocket into the space and that later the object re-entered the earth’s atmosphere. For Washington, DC, this was the first test for a new interceptor that could be used to destroy a satellite in orbit. Apparently, the Chinese rocket reached 10,000 km above Earth, the highest suborbital launch since 1976. Is this launch not contributing to the arms race in the outer space? Why get India to reaffirm its commitment when China simply does what it wants?
In the present circumstances, what can be done? The Prime Minster of India announced that the Special Representatives will soon meet to seek an “early agreement on a framework for a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable boundary settlement”. India should ask for concrete gestures from China; it is the only way for Mr Li to show that China is ready to match its words with its deeds. The first and most important action is for India and China to exchange maps of all sectors of their common border. It has apparently already been done in the Middle Sector (Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand); it should be done without prevarication in the Western and Eastern Sectors as well. It is the minimum that one can expect from ‘a friend and a partner’.
But a mere exchange of maps is not enough; the respective ground positions should be made public. Citizens are entitled to know what is happening on their nation’s borders. The Depsang incident has shown that even ‘experts’ lack basic knowledge of the situation on the ground. The blame should be squarely put on the Indian Government whose responsibility it is to inform the Indian public. It is high time that the Government of India publishes a White Paper on its border with China, as was done in the past by the Ministry of External Affairs (between 1959 and 1965, as many as 15 White Papers on the border issue were tabled in Parliament). A well-informed Indian public could eventually provide tremendous support to protect the borders against unwanted intrusions.
 Another meaningful gesture would be the re-opening of Demchok, the traditional pilgrimage route to Kailash. Though the Joint Statement says that China will provide greater facilitation to Indian pilgrims for the Gang Renpoche [‘Kang Rinpoche’ is wrongly spelt in the Statement] which is the Kailash-Manasarovar Yatra, the only route which make sense for a large number of Indian pilgrims is the Ladakh road via Demchok which would make the journey considerably shorter and more comfortable. Of course, like most of the places near the Tibetan border, Demchok is claimed by China (though occupied by India).
But if China’s Line of Actual Control perceptions could be put aside on this small area, it would create tremendous goodwill in India and make tens of thousands of pilgrims realise the dream of their life. Chinese leaders like to speak of China’s Dream; they should let Indians dream too. Let Demchok be re-opened, Mr Li! China’s image will receive a tremendous boost.

The border according to China

Customary Border?

My article The border according to China appeared yesterday in NitiCentral.com.

Click here to read...

During the year 1960, long negotiations were held between India and China over their ‘disputed’ border.
The background of these talks was the visit to Delhi of Zhou Enlai, the Chinese Premier, early that year and his offer to ‘solve’ the issue.
Zhou Enlai was in Delhi for nearly one week (April 19 to 25, 1960) “to discuss certain differences relating to the border areas which had arisen” between the two countries.
The Nehru-Zhou talks however failed. According to a communique, the two Prime Ministers “decided that officials of the two Governments should examine the factual materials in the possession of the two Governments in support of their stands.”
The ‘officials’ led by Jagat Mehta for the Indian side met for several months, but could not arrive at an agreement.
The proceedings of their meetings were published by the Ministry of External Affairs’ ‘Report of the Officials of the Governments of India and the Peoples’ Republic of China on the Boundary Question’.
Please note that 50 years ago, the Indian Government was far more ‘transparent’ than it is today. It regularly informed common men about the happenings on the border. Today the common man is probably considered too stupid by the MEA Mandarins to grasp the intricacies of a customary border, a watershed, one (or several) LAC(s), etc.
The old report of the officials makes fascinating reading. It helps ‘common men’ to better understand the Chinese (and Indian) mindset.
At one point during the discussions, the ‘Indian side’ argued that because China had not mentioned earlier the contentious issue, Delhi was under the impression that there was no border issue.
The Chinese answer is worth reading: “The Indian side also contended that according to international law, if one side does not raise an issue when it has an opportunity to do so, it has no longer the right to set forth its views on the issue. The Indian side attempted to use this contention to prove that the Sino-Indian boundary question did not exist and that the Chinese side had no right to raise this question any more. … Is it that the boundary question must be raised even at occasions not at all meant for discussing the boundary question? Is it that the Chinese side must raise the Sino-Indian boundary question on all occasions; otherwise it would imply that the Chinese side has acquiesced in the assertion that there is no question about the Sino-Indian. … The contention that silence means acquiescence reflects not at all the accepted principles of international law. Can it be said that a sovereign state has no right to reserve its proposition concerning questions of its own sovereignty and to raise it on uitable occasions?”
This is what China has always done, raising the issue when the occasion is suitable to them! It is what they did on the ground in Daulat Beg Oldi in Ladakh on April 15. If they decide to not talk about the border when Premier Li Keqiang visits Delhi, it is only because it will not be ‘suitable’ to them.
The 1960 Chinese negotiators continue their argument: “China has never recognised the alignment now claimed by India; it has always held that only the boundary as maintained by China is the true traditional customary line. Whenever the Chinese Government refers to the Sino-Indian boundary, it can only be the traditional customary line as maintained by China, and not the other.”
This brings to mind the quote of Dr RC Majumdar, the great historian: “It is characteristic of China that if a region once acknowledged her nominal suzerainty even for a short period, she should regard it as a part of her empire forever and would automatically revive her claim over it even after a thousand years whenever there was a chance of enforcing it.”
The Middle Kingdom’s mindset has not changed much.
According to an article of The South China Morning Post, Luo Yuan, a People’s Liberation Army general recently claimed Okinawa Island as Chinese.
The General reacted to an article in The People’s Daily in which Zhang Haipeng and Li Guoqiang, two scholars of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences wrote: “Unresolved problems relating to the Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa is the biggest of the Ryukyu Islands) have reached the time for reconsideration.”
The fact that Okinawa is home to major US Air Force and Marine bases and has a population of 1.3 million Japanese nationals did not deter the scholars from claiming that the islands were a ‘vassal state’ of China before Japan annexed the islands in the late 1800s.
For General Luo: “Japan could not rightfully claim sovereignty over the islands, because they had started paying tribute to China half a millennium before they had done so to Japan.”
You could argue, he is a mad general, just forget him!
The most interesting is however China’s official reaction: when she was asked if China considered Okinawa part of Japan, Hua Chunying, the Foreign Ministry spokeswoman stated that the Chinese “scholars had long studied the history of the Ryukyus and Okinawa.”
A sibylline statement with implications for the Indian border!
It may not be ‘suitable’ for Premier Li Keqiang to talk about the border during his visit, but be sure that China will not forget or forsake its claim in DBO and elsewhere in the Himalayas.

Was the Chinese intrusion really a PLA strike against Xi Jinping?

My Rediff.com Article
 
Could some frustrated Chinese generals have decided to teach India a lesson to sink Xi Jinping's world dream, asks Claude Arpi.

What has China gained from its Daulat Beg Oldi excursion?
Many theories have been propounded: Some say the Chinese leadership wanted to show its displeasure on the new coziness between Delhi [ Images ] and Tokyo. But is it not putting the cart before the horse?
Indeed, such Himalayan happenings are bound to draw the US, Japan [ Images ] and India closer, not the other way around.
What about China's displeasure at the infrastructure that India has been building on its side of the Line of Actual Control? Was it worth this drama? Was it not possible to discuss this issue at the already scheduled ministerial meets?
'Experts' will argue that according to the Art of War, it is the Chinese way to get what they want. This is not certain, because the issue has serious negative collaterals for China.
They may have 'marked their territory' by 'camping' for three weeks in the 'Gateway to Hell,' but they have not earned goodwill from India.
This incident, even if it is 'successfully' solved by both diplomacies, will remain for years a scar in Sino-Indian relations which had just started looking up.
When Chinese scholars visit India, they like to say that both countries should sincerely work on the mutual trust deficit. It is clear the Chinese 'camping' has pushed back for years the earlier progress in closing the 'trust' gap.
Perhaps a more important issue which has escaped the analysts: What about the Chinese Dream?

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Chinese incursion will affect the already dwindling border trade

My article Chinese incursion will affect the already dwindling border trade
appeared yesterday in DNA.
 
Although for centuries, the Himalayas were a natural barrier between the Tibetan plateau and the Indian subcontinent, it was also a space of exchange. It witnessed a constant flow of knowledge, traditions and goods transiting up and down from far-away places in Central Asia, China or Mongolia to the entire subcontinent.
In October 1950, China invaded Tibet and soon after the Liberation Army began occupying the high plateau; exchanges gradually stopped.

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DBO: a First Trial Balance

This article appeared in the Edit Page of The Pioneer under the title Some countries just cannot be trusted.

The latest Chinese infiltration in Ladakh, even if the issue has been ‘successfully' resolved by both diplomacies, will remain for years a scar on the Sino-Indian relations

Hua Chunying, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman was at her elusive best when she announced ‘progress’ in the Sino-Indian ‘stand-off’ in Ladakh: “So far as I know, relevant departments of the two countries have made positive progress in their friendly consultations."
According to Xinhua, she stated: “I believe that both sides have the will and capability to properly resolve this incident as soon as possible and jointly maintain the healthy and stable growth of China-India relations."
‘Will to resolve’ the issue, clearly means that it is not solved.
Even if the troops’ withdrawal remains shrouded in vagueness, it is important to take an initial trial balance of the incident in the High Himalayas.
A first point to be noticed: Delhi was taken by surprise; India was not ready to tackle the situation, whether militarily, diplomatically or at the PR level.
There is no doubt that the terrain favours China: after months being posted in Western Tibet, Chinese jawans and officers are usually well acclimatized; it is relatively easier for them to go on a ‘camping’ outing like the present one at Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO).
In his memoirs, Colonel Chewang Rinchen, the brave Ladakhi soldier who was twice awarded the Maha Vir Chakra (in 1948 and 1971) for his exploits in the region, recounts: “The entire area between Murgo, which is known as 'Gateway to Hell', and DBO is notorious for treacherous weather and snow blizzards. …After crossing Saser La, we proceeded towards DBO. On the way, we came across skeletons of human beings and animals lying scattered all along the track.” Interesting, he added: “On September 3, 1961, I proceeded with a patrol party, along the Chip Chap river, …I noted the hoof marks of camels and horses and, a little further, tyre marks of a three-ton vehicle. It clearly indicated the possible presence of the Chinese in that area.”
While the toughest soldiers of the Indian Army took more than a week to reached DBO, the Chinese could drive in a 3-ton! And it was in 1961.
The topography and the difficulty to survive in the area was obviously known to the Indian Army and intelligence agencies, but they did not envisage that the Chinese would plant tents in what Beijing considers to be its side of the LAC.
From the Chinese side, everything seemed to have been programmed to the minutest details, including the ‘withdrawal’, if withdrawal it is.
For future bilateral relations, one worrying issue is that China is ready to break formal treaties or agreements when it suits its interests.
On September 7, 1993, India and China signed an “Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas”. Amongst other things, it is stipulated: “Neither side shall use or threaten to use force against the other by any means. Pending an ultimate solution to the boundary question between the two countries, the two sides shall strictly respect and observe the line of actual control between the two sides. No activities of either side shall overstep the line of actual control.”
The DBO episode is clearly a breach of the 1993 agreement. Delhi should remember this in the future.
On the positive side, India has discovered that she had so many experts on China, though so far nobody could explain why Beijing took the risk of provoking a clash at this particular point in time. If China had some grievances against India (which may be valid or not), they could have first taken them up at one of the scheduled bilateral meetings (Salman Khurshid in Beijing or Li Keqiang in Delhi). A visit of A.K. Antony to China is also planned later this year. There were at least 3 forthcoming occasions to solve pending issues and make ‘positive progress in their friendly consultations’.
There is also a routine mechanism at the level of the Joint Secretary (East Asia) whose phone must have become hot during the past 3 weeks. This could been used.
By the way, did you notice that China had only one speaker for the issue? The Central Military Commission, the PLA, the State Council, the Party all kept quiet. Apart from the spokeswoman, the websites of The PLA Daily, The People’s Daily, The Global Times, etc. remained extremely discreet.
It was not the case in India, where officials from different ministries and branches of the government gave their take on the issue, sometimes ‘officially’, often ‘off’. Another good lesson to learn for India!
India and China are very different nations: the former is the largest democracy in the world with a free press; the latter is ruled by a single party heavily depending on censure of the Press.
Interestingly, some in India seem to regret the Indian ‘open’ system. The Global Times in one rare comment said: “Some Indian officials caution that China should pay no heed to the radical voices among some Indian media which sensationalize news.”
Still, living in an open society does not mean that the Indian public is well informed. In fact, it appears that even ‘experts’ are abysmally lacking basic knowledge of the situation on the ground, particularly the respective claims of both India and China. The present DBO incident and the subsequent flurry of articles/programs may help the general public to understand better the actual stakes.
It is perhaps high time that the Government of India starts publishing White Papers like it had done between 1959 and 1965 (15 White Papers disclosed the correspondence between Delhi and Beijing on the border issue). China is bound to object, but India does not need to follow Beijing’s diktat when it goes against its professed principles of transparency and openness.
If India has a case, and I believe that is has a strong one, it should be known and understood by the common man.
Now, what has China gained from its DBO excursion?
Many theories have been propounded: some say that the Chinese leadership wanted to show its displeasure on the new coziness between Delhi and Tokyo. But is it not putting the cart before the horse? Indeed, such Himalayan happenings are bound to draw US, Japan and India closer, not the other way around.
What about China’s displeasure at the infrastructure that India has been building on this side of the LAC? Was it worth this drama? Was it not possible to discuss this issue at the already scheduled ministerial meets?
‘Experts’ will argue that according to the Art of War, it is the Chinese way to get what they want. This is not certain, because the issue has for China serious negative collaterals.
They may have ‘marked their territory’ by ‘camping’ for 3 weeks in the ‘Gateway to Hell’, but they have not earned goodwill from India.
This incident, even if it is ‘successfully’ solved by both diplomacies, will remain for years a scar in the Sino-Indian relations which had just started looking up.
When Chinese scholars visit India, they like to say that both countries should sincerely work on the mutual trust deficit. It is clear the Chinese ‘camping’ has pushed back for years the earlier progress in closing the ‘trust’ gap.
A last issue: since he came on the Middle Kingdom’s throne, the new Emperor has proclaimed the Great Dream of China: “The China Dream will bring blessings and goodness to not only the Chinese people but also people in other countries?”
Where do the last intrusions fit in the Chinese Dream?
It is clear that Xi’s pet slogan has taken a beating in the process.
But there is always the possibility that DBO ‘stand-off’ has made some PLA’s Generals dream and this without the blessings of the Emperor. Who knows?

China’s great dream smells of resentment

The moving LAC

My article China’s great dream smells of resentment appeared in NitiCentral.com. 

The Chinese have withdrawn; all’s well that ends well. Delhi can continue its routine ties with the Dragon.
Many things have, however, not been explained.
Why did the Chinese troops sneak in Ladakh in the first place, especially after the new Emperor had proclaimed the Great Dream of China: “The China Dream will bring blessings and goodness to not only the Chinese people but also people in other countries?”
Since he accessed the Middle Kingdom’s throne, President Xi Jinping kept speaking about China’s Dream.
What about the PLA’s Chinese Generals, did the Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) episode made them dream during three weeks?
It is true that during the last months, they did not often have the occasion to dream: on the contrary, there has been a strong resentment of many senior local Commanders against recent decisions taken by Xi Jinping to ‘rejuvenate’ the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
On December 21, 2012, Xinhua reported: “The military [read Xi] declared that receptions for high-ranking officers will no longer feature liquor or luxury banquets. The receptions will also be free of welcome banners, red carpets, floral arrangements, performances and souvenirs. …The regulations also prohibit commission officials from staying in civilian hotels or military hotels specially equipped with a luxury accommodation during inspection tours.”
The Central Military Commission (CMC) issued ten regulations requiring PLA’s officials to cut the number and length of inspection tours, overseas visits, or unnecessary meetings. Military speakers should avoid empty talk, while PLA officials are requested not to attend “ribbon-cutting and cornerstone-laying ceremonies, celebrations or seminars unless they have the CMC’s approval.”
Further, the new rules say: “The use of vehicles equipped with sirens will be rigorously controlled during official visits in order to prevent public disturbances.”
It may sound familiar to our babus, but it is not for the poor (or rich) Chinese Generals, “Officials are also required to discipline their spouses, children and subordinates and make sure they do not take bribes.”
That is a tough one; ‘officials’ may not all be ‘Generals’ at home.
The South China Morning Post recently reported that Xi, China’s Commander-in-Chief, issued another order making the lives of the Chinese generals and senior officers, even more difficult. They will “have to serve as the lowest-ranking soldiers for at least two weeks per year”. Apparently, President Xi Jinping wants to ‘shake up the military and boost morale’.
Is the ‘camping’ party at DBO also organised to ‘boost the morale’ of the local commanders?
To cancel the banquets, the bribes and then force the senior officers to live with jawans is clearly difficult to swallow for certain generals.
The Hong Kong newspaper explains: “It dictates that officers with the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel or above must serve as ‘privates’ — the lowest-ranking soldier — for not less than 15 days in a year. Generals and officers will have to live, eat and serve with junior soldiers during the period. They need to provide for themselves and pay for their own food.”
Even the periodicity of the ‘training’ for senior most officers is detailed: “Division and Army [Commander] level commanders must serve once every four years. Top leaders from army headquarters and military districts will do so once every five years.”
Further horror, all military vehicles must be given new car plates; blacklisted sedans include Mercedes-Benz, BMW, Lincoln, Cadillac, Bentley, Jaguar and Porsche and a few others. In other words, the Great Proletarian Revolution for the PLA!
One can imagine the resentment in the senior scale of the PLA; for some generals, it may look more like a Nightmare than a Dream.
Antony Wong Dong, a Macau-based veteran military expert told The South China Morning Post: “The lack of discipline, the rampant corruption and the gap between the officers and soldiers are so commonplace, it has compromised the battle-effectiveness of the PLA. Many Generals and senior officers today have never experienced hardship. They are promoted to their position because of their connections or other reasons.”
But Chairman Xi wants them to be ready for any situation.
Others are also resentful. Take General Chang Wanquan; in October 2012, a few weeks before the 18th Congress, The South China Morning Post affirmed that he “appears to have the cards stacked in his favour.”
Everyone thought that he would become one of the two powerful vice-chairmen of the CMC. Though a protégé of former President Hu Jintao, General Chang did not make it; he was superseded by General Fan Changlong, the Commander of the Jinan Military Region (MR).
A question has been asked: does Xi Jinping have the full control over the PLA?
Some Generals today propound the theory that “boosting national defence construction can only give a significant push to economic and social development.” It is a dangerous game which can lead to conflict with the neighbours.
Willy Lam in an article in the China Brief says: “Moreover, the PLA top brass seems keen on interpreting the China Dream in such a way as to justify its lobbying for more economic resources and a greater say in national affairs. In a recent editorial, The PLA Daily indicated that the defence forces would “struggle hard for the fulfillment of the dream of a strong China and a strong army.”
Why did the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Sigh say that the Ladakh episode was just ‘an isolated mishap’? Did he mean that the intrusions are ‘isolated’ because they do not have the blessings of all in China?
This would explain why the official website of The PLA Daily (under the CMC, whose Chairman is Xi Jinping) while daily commenting on the conflict with Japan in the East China Sea, did not mention the DBO ‘camping’ for more than two weeks.
These are facts to ponder upon. In any case, the ‘peaceful rise of China’, dear to President Hu Jintao, seems to have been forgotten.

The Orginal Sin: Closure of the Indian Consulate in Kashgar

Formerly the Indian Consulate

Looking at the recent incident at Dalaut Beg Oldi, near the Karakoram pass, the gate to Kashgar and Central Asia, one could ask, what went wrong?
I personally believe that the 'original sin'' was the closure of the Indian Consulate in Kashgar in 1953.
This Indian mission was looking after the trade between  India and Central Asia, mainly through the Karakoram pass; by its closure the only observing post which could have checked on the Chinese advances in the Aksai Chin and the construction of a road, which was about to start across the Indian territory, was no more.
In a debate in Rajya Sabha on December 24,  1953 on the 'Indo-Tibetan Frontier Issue', the issue was discussed. The transcript of the debate is available in the Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru (Series II, Volume 24, page 579).
Nehru, as often, answered by making fun of his colleagues who had raised the question, he said:

Mr. Chairman, I shall only endeavour to say a few words in regard to some of the points raised in the course of the debate.  An honourable Member, Mr. C.G.K. Reddy, said many things which to some extent answer themselves, because he has the habit, in the course of a few sentences, of contradicting himself many times. It is not really necessary for me to add anything in reply to that bundle of contradictions, but I do wish to understand what is meant by the phrase 'national foreign policy' which is being bandied about. I am all for a national foreign policy. I would gladly consult as many people and as many groups as possible and also the leaders of groups, whenever an opportunity arises. But first of all a national foreign policy must necessarily mean some measure of agreement on that policy, on the broad principles of that policy. Of course, consultations there may be. I find in the honourable Mr. Reddy’s speech a very great gap between his way of thinking and mine on this question. Does a nation lie somewhere in between the honourable Mr. Reddy and myself, and where does it lie? Do we go half way or if I give up something… [C.G.K. Reddy interjected: “I do not ask him to consult me and I don’t think he will condescend to do so.”]

The Prime Minster continued: "He also said, I mean the honourable Mr. Reddy, I did not quite get his words – something about our Consul is Sinkiang being withdrawn. I don’t quite know if the honourable Mr. Reddy knows anything about recent history." 

The Indian government and particularly Nehru were not ready to look beyond the Chinese rhetoric and Zhou’s assurance of friendship, though many ominous signs could already be seen on the horizon. The most serious of them was the closure of the Indian Consulate in Kashgar.
Here again, as in several other cases, Nehru justified the Chinese aggressive actions without taking any retaliatory measures or even protesting. India’s interests were lost to the ‘revolutionary changes’ happening in China. He declared in the Parliament:

Some major changes have taken place there [Kashgar]. As a result of those changes, which have nothing to do with India at the moment… our Consul went there – I speak from memory – probably in 1948, maybe even later, in 1949. But when these changes, revolutionary changes took place there, it is perfectly true that the Chinese Government, when they came to Tibet, told us that they intended that they wanted to treat Sinkiang as a closed area. They told other State Government, too. Well, nothing happened. Our Consul remained there. But because of those changes, because of many factors – among them being what happened in Kashmir – the trade ceased... Kashgar is important to us as a trade route. The trade went over the Karakoram, passed though Ladakh and Leh on to Kashmir. Various factors, including developments in Kashmir led to the stoppage of that trade... The result was, our Consul remained there for some time, till recently… but there is now no work to be done. So we advised him to come away and he did come away. 

China had played the trick well by first stopping the traditional trade with India, rendering the Consulate 'inactive'.
India had been trading with Central Asia and more particularly Kashgar and Yarkand for millennia. Just because ‘revolutionary changes’ had occurred, the Government of India accepted the closure of its trade with Sinkiang as a fait accompli. The reference to Kashmir is not relevant. Since the winter of 1948, India controlled the Zoji-la pass as well as Ladakh. At that time, the Karakoram Pass was still open to the caravans.

I quote here from by book 'Born in Sin: The Panchsheel Agreement':

More Reports
Another indication came during the negotiations for the Panchsheel Agreement (or Agreement between the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China on Trade and Intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India). Instead of the planned three or four weeks, the talks went on for four months. One of the objections by the Chinese was the mention of Demchok as the border pass for traders between Ladakh and Western Tibet. Very cleverly, Chen, the main Chinese negotiator ‘privately’ told T.N. Kaul, his Indian counterpart, that he was objecting because they were not keen to mention the name ‘Kashmir’ as they did not wish to take sides between India and Pakistan. This argument is very strange and though Kaul could see through the game, the Indian side gave in once again. Later Kaul wrote:

However, their real objection was, I believe, to strengthening [their] claim to Aksai Chin (in the Ladakh province of Kashmir) which they needed for linking Sinkiang with Western Tibet. An agreed formula "the customary route leading to Tashigong along the valley of the Indus river may continue to be traversed in accordance with custom was worked out and Delhi approved it.

This formulation would have very serious consequences, instead of using the opportunity to clarify the already contentious border issue, the Chinese were allowed to walk away with a vague statement which was open to future dispute. It was indeed a great victory for Beijing while they were building the road in the Aksai Chin. It seems as though the Indian side was just not aware of the reality on the ground.
More authors have mentioned the building of the Aksai Chin road and the fact that it was known during the mid-fifties to the Ministries of Defense and External Affairs. In his book The Saga of Ladakh,  Maj. Gen Jagjit Singh mentions that in 1956, the Indian Military Attaché in Beijing, Brig Mallik received information that China had started building a highway through Indian territory in the Aksai Chin area. Mallik had reported the matter to Army Headquarters in New Delhi and a similar report was sent by the Indian Embassy to the Foreign Ministry.
D.R. Mankekar gave similar information. He said that Brig S.S. Mallik, the Indian Military Attaché in Beijing made a first reference to the road-building activities of the Chinese in a routine report to the Government as early as November 1955. Five months later, in a special report to Delhi, the Military Attaché drew pointed attention to the construction of the strategic highway through Indian territory in Aksai Chin. Simultaneously, he also sent a copy of the report to the Army HQ.
The Official Report of 1962 War states: “The Preliminary survey work on the planned Tibet-Sinkiang road having been completed by the mid-1950’s, China started constructing motorable road in summer 1955. The highway ran over 160 km across the Aksai Chin region of north-east Ladakh. It was completed in the second half of 1957. Arterial roads connecting the highway with Tibet were also laid. On 6 October 1957, the Sinkiang-Tibet road was formally opened with a ceremony in Gartok and twelve trucks on a trial run from Yarkand reached Gartok. In January 1958, the China News Agency reported that the Sinkiang-Tibet highway had been opened two months earlier and the road was being fully utilised.”
Another interesting account about how the Indian army already knew in 1955 that the Chinese were building a road across Indian territory, has recently been published in the UK.  In 1955, Wignall, a British mountaineer went on an expedition inside Tibet with the knowledge of Indian Military Intelligence. The Army Chief, General K.S. Thimayya seriously suspected that the Chinese were building a road on Indian territory. Wignall was asked to get proof of it.
He was eventually caught by the Chinese Army, interrogated and kept as prisoner for several weeks. He was later released in the midst of winter in a high altitude pass. The Chinese thought he would never survive the blizzard or find his way back to India. After an incredible journey, he managed to reach India and was able to report about the road to the army authorities who, in turn, informed the Prime Minister and V. K. Krishna Menon, the Defense Minister.
Wignall was later told by his army contact:

Our illustrious Prime Minister Nehru, who is so busy on the world stage telling the rest of mankind how to live, has too little time to attend to the security of his own country. Your material was shown to Nehru by one of our senior officers, who plugged hard. He was criticised by Krishna Menon in Nehru's presence for ‘lapping up American CIA agent-provocateur propaganda.’ Menon has completely suppressed your information.”

'So it was all for nothing?' I [Wignall] asked. 'Perhaps not,' Singh  responded. 'We will keep working away at Nehru. Some day he must see the light, and realise the threat communist Chinese occupation of Tibet poses for India.
The Government of India has never acknowledged that it had information about the Aksai Chin road as early as 1954-55. It will be discussed for the first time in the Lok Sabha only in August 1959.
General Thimayya, the Indian army chief who was forced to retire in 1961, one year before the Chinese attacked India, is supposed to have said in his valedictory address to the Indian Army Officer Corps: “I hope that I am not leaving you as cannon fodder for the Chinese communists.”

The Opening of the Road
On October 6, 1957, a Chinese newspaper Kuang-ming Jih-pao reported:

The Sinkiang-Tibet – the highest highway in the world – has been completed. During the past few days, a number of trucks running on the highway on a trial basis have arrived in Ko-ta-k’e in Tibet from Yehch’eng in Sinkiang. The Sinkiang-Tibet Highway… is 1179 km long, of which 915 km are more than 4,000 meters above sea level; 130 km of it over 5,000 meters above sea level, with the highest point being 5,500 meters.
Thirty (“liberation” model and Chissu 150) heavy-duty trucks, fully loaded with road builders, maintenance equipment and fuels, running on the highway on a trial basis, headed for Ko-ta-k’e from Yehch’eng. In addition two trucks fully loaded with Hami melons, apples and pomegranates, all native products of Sinkiang, headed in the same direction. These fruits were gifts brought specially by the road builders of Sinkiang for the people of various nationalities.”

The loop was closed. The two newly-acquired western provinces of Communist China were linked. It took nearly two more years for the news to become public. In August 1959 Nehru dropped the bombshell in Parliament: what the Chinese called the ‘Tibet-Sinkiang highway’ was built through the Indian territory.
It appears that one cause for the delay to make the news public was that for a few years, New Delhi had doubts on how to react. Already in 1957, when the Indian Ambassador to China and his Military Attaché  had been invited to a special function to celebrate the opening of the road, they politely refused. They had refused to fall into the Chinese trap and give the stamp of the Indian Embassy to the event.
It took another year for the Nehru Government to officially complain to Beijing about the ‘intrusion’. In an Informal Note given by the Foreign Secretary to the Chinese Ambassador on 18 October 1958, New Delhi finally decided to take some action:

The attention of the Government of India has recently been drawn to the fact that a motor road has been constructed by the Government of the People’s Republic of China across the eastern part of the Ladakh region of the Jammu Kashmir States, which is part of India. This road seems to form part of the Chinese road known as Yehchang-Gartok or Sikiang-Tibet highway, the completion of which was announced in September, 1957.
The road enters Indian territory just east of Sarigh Jilgnang, runs north-west to Amtogar and striking the western bank of the Amtogar lake runs north-west through Yangpa, Khitai Dawan and Haji Langer which are all in indisputable Indian territory. Near the Amtogar Lake several branch tracks have also been made motorable.

2. The India-China boundary in the Ladakh sector as in others is traditionally well-known and follows well marked geographical features. The territory which the road traverses has been part of the Ladakh region of India for centuries and the “old established frontiers” have been accepted by the Chinese in the treaty of 1842 as the International boundary... 
The Indian Government here refers to the Treaty signed  between the Jammu and Kashmir State of Gulab Singh and Ladakh. The contradiction is that Tibet, forgotten in the Panchsheel, is used in this case when it is convenient for the Indian argument. The Note concluded that it was a matter of ‘surprise and regret’ that the Chinese Government had built a road through “indisputably Indian territory without first obtaining the permission of the Government of India and without even informing the Government of India”.

The Note continued, raising a strange point: it accused the Chinese officials, workers and travelers using the road to “enter India territory without proper travel documents and visas.” It stated: “No applications for visas from Chinese personnel working on the road or from Chinese travelers traversing this road have ever been received by the Government of India.”
In conclusion, the Note stated: “the Government of India are anxious to settle these petty frontier disputes so that the friendly relations between the two countries may not suffer. The Government of India would therefore be glad for an early reply from the Chinese Government.”
The ‘petty dispute’ is still not solved today and the issue has become even knottier.
At the end of the letter, another issue was raised: for some time an Indian patrol had been reported missing. Delhi wanted to know if the Chinese had seen “an Indian party consisting of three Military Officers and four soldiers together with one guide, one porter, six pony owners and thirty-four ponies … out on a normal patrol in this area near Shinglung in Indian territory.”
Indeed, they had been seen and captured by the Chinese border guards on Indian soil. Beijing admitted immediately that they were in their custody, but according to the local Chinese commanders the Indian jawans had trespassed on Chinese side of the frontier at the time of their arrest .
This was the first of a long series of incidents. Hundred of letters and notes would be exchanged on the subject.