Dalai Lama in the US: 5 Burning Questions | in conversation with Claude Arpi | News9 Plus Show

My interview with News9

Dalai Lama in the US: 5 Burning Questions | in conversation with Claude Arpi | News9 Plus Show
 
The US on June 12, 2024, passed the Resolve Tibet Act that urges Beijing to re-engage with Tibetan leaders for a peaceful resolution with China. The Act is awaiting President Joe Biden's signature. Will there be fresh tensions between the US and China over Tibet? Analysing the scenarios are News9 Plus Editor Sandeep Unnithan along with Claude Arpi, a Tibetologist. Watch this topical discussion and don’t forget to like, share and subscribe for more such geopolitical discussions.

The border according to China

Customary Border?

My article The border according to China appeared yesterday in NitiCentral.com.

Click here to read...

During the year 1960, long negotiations were held between India and China over their ‘disputed’ border.
The background of these talks was the visit to Delhi of Zhou Enlai, the Chinese Premier, early that year and his offer to ‘solve’ the issue.
Zhou Enlai was in Delhi for nearly one week (April 19 to 25, 1960) “to discuss certain differences relating to the border areas which had arisen” between the two countries.
The Nehru-Zhou talks however failed. According to a communique, the two Prime Ministers “decided that officials of the two Governments should examine the factual materials in the possession of the two Governments in support of their stands.”
The ‘officials’ led by Jagat Mehta for the Indian side met for several months, but could not arrive at an agreement.
The proceedings of their meetings were published by the Ministry of External Affairs’ ‘Report of the Officials of the Governments of India and the Peoples’ Republic of China on the Boundary Question’.
Please note that 50 years ago, the Indian Government was far more ‘transparent’ than it is today. It regularly informed common men about the happenings on the border. Today the common man is probably considered too stupid by the MEA Mandarins to grasp the intricacies of a customary border, a watershed, one (or several) LAC(s), etc.
The old report of the officials makes fascinating reading. It helps ‘common men’ to better understand the Chinese (and Indian) mindset.
At one point during the discussions, the ‘Indian side’ argued that because China had not mentioned earlier the contentious issue, Delhi was under the impression that there was no border issue.
The Chinese answer is worth reading: “The Indian side also contended that according to international law, if one side does not raise an issue when it has an opportunity to do so, it has no longer the right to set forth its views on the issue. The Indian side attempted to use this contention to prove that the Sino-Indian boundary question did not exist and that the Chinese side had no right to raise this question any more. … Is it that the boundary question must be raised even at occasions not at all meant for discussing the boundary question? Is it that the Chinese side must raise the Sino-Indian boundary question on all occasions; otherwise it would imply that the Chinese side has acquiesced in the assertion that there is no question about the Sino-Indian. … The contention that silence means acquiescence reflects not at all the accepted principles of international law. Can it be said that a sovereign state has no right to reserve its proposition concerning questions of its own sovereignty and to raise it on uitable occasions?”
This is what China has always done, raising the issue when the occasion is suitable to them! It is what they did on the ground in Daulat Beg Oldi in Ladakh on April 15. If they decide to not talk about the border when Premier Li Keqiang visits Delhi, it is only because it will not be ‘suitable’ to them.
The 1960 Chinese negotiators continue their argument: “China has never recognised the alignment now claimed by India; it has always held that only the boundary as maintained by China is the true traditional customary line. Whenever the Chinese Government refers to the Sino-Indian boundary, it can only be the traditional customary line as maintained by China, and not the other.”
This brings to mind the quote of Dr RC Majumdar, the great historian: “It is characteristic of China that if a region once acknowledged her nominal suzerainty even for a short period, she should regard it as a part of her empire forever and would automatically revive her claim over it even after a thousand years whenever there was a chance of enforcing it.”
The Middle Kingdom’s mindset has not changed much.
According to an article of The South China Morning Post, Luo Yuan, a People’s Liberation Army general recently claimed Okinawa Island as Chinese.
The General reacted to an article in The People’s Daily in which Zhang Haipeng and Li Guoqiang, two scholars of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences wrote: “Unresolved problems relating to the Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa is the biggest of the Ryukyu Islands) have reached the time for reconsideration.”
The fact that Okinawa is home to major US Air Force and Marine bases and has a population of 1.3 million Japanese nationals did not deter the scholars from claiming that the islands were a ‘vassal state’ of China before Japan annexed the islands in the late 1800s.
For General Luo: “Japan could not rightfully claim sovereignty over the islands, because they had started paying tribute to China half a millennium before they had done so to Japan.”
You could argue, he is a mad general, just forget him!
The most interesting is however China’s official reaction: when she was asked if China considered Okinawa part of Japan, Hua Chunying, the Foreign Ministry spokeswoman stated that the Chinese “scholars had long studied the history of the Ryukyus and Okinawa.”
A sibylline statement with implications for the Indian border!
It may not be ‘suitable’ for Premier Li Keqiang to talk about the border during his visit, but be sure that China will not forget or forsake its claim in DBO and elsewhere in the Himalayas.

The only solution for Tibet issue

My article The only solution for Tibet issue appeared in the DNA today.

The Dalai Lama is in town. I was to travel to Bangalore when I heard that the Dalai Lama would be in the city for 2 days. Immediately, I thought I should try to have his Darshan; the easiest way was to attend his lecture on ‘science and religion’ held at the Christ University.
In recent years, each time I have attended a public discourse by the Tibetan leader, I have been astounded by his immense popularity; some observers have spoken of a ‘pop star’ phenomenon. It is not the correct definition, as he lacks the ‘ego cult’ of the pop stars; on the contrary, he has remained a ‘simple monk’.
When he arrived at the venue, despite the security measures taken by the University staff and the police, the crowds went crazy. The photographers were the worst; I always marvel at his security personnel managing to keep their cool in the melee.
The 2000-seat Auditorium which was packed to the brim suddenly went silent as he began talking. The Tibetan leader started with a small survey. He asked how many in the auditorium were less than 20-years old; very few arms went up. Then, between 20 and 25, most of the hands were up. He continued, above 60? A few honorable professors, acknowledged their seniority. Then, he lifted his arm to indicate that he was more than 70. A couple of ‘senior’ members of the faculty and the Vice-Chancellor admitted being in the last category. He started laughing and said: “the world does not belong to us, because we belong to the past century; most of the present problems (he particularly cited environmental issues) have been created during the past century by us, ‘old people’; it is up to you to now rectify these predicaments. He continued: “The 21st century belongs to you, it is your duty to change the world; do not think that your lonely voice can’t do anything; you should and can do it”.
Once again, he cited environment pollution, corruption, violence, hatred or social inequality as the main issues to ‘change’.
He insisted that change it can only happen through love, compassion and understanding of the ‘others’. He told the audience an anecdote: one day, a Cuban refugee came to see him and told him that she was a Christian and everyday she was praying that Fidel Castro should depart from this world; but in her prayer, she requested the Lord to find a place for the Leader Maximo in Paradise. It was the correct way, explained the Dalai Lama; “you should pray that even your enemy’s life ends peacefully”.
I thought to myself that it would be a good way to sort out the Tibetan issue, if all the leaders of the Communist Party of China were sent to Heaven. But with my less-compassionate mind, I immediately thought that leaders like Jiang Zemin or Li Peng would certainly continue to pull some strings from their (Marxist) Paradise.
The students were spell-bound. At last here was someone who spoke to their latent idealism and higher aspirations for a better world; and this, in simple words.
The ever-increasing popularity of the Tibetan leader in India and abroad raises the issue of the situation in his homeland. One can’t stop thinking: what would happen if the Dalai Lama was allowed to return to Tibet (even for a brief visit)? One still has in mind the riotous scenes when 3 fact-finding delegations from Dharamsala visited Tibet in 1979-1980.
Huge crowds assembled wherever they went, even in the most remote nomadic areas; they surrounded the delegates to get a close darshan of the envoys of the ‘living god’ (or more rightly, the incarnation of Avalokiteshvara, the Bodhisattva of Compassion); the hair of the poor delegates were pulled to be kept as relics, their chubas (Tibetan traditional dress) were torn; local nomads ate the dust of the tyres of the envoys’ vehicles as prasad. Considering that most of the 85 Tibetans who have immolated themselves, left notes before their fatal gesture asking for their leader’s return, one can imagine what would happen in Tibet.
At the same time, the Dalai Lama is the only leader which can stop Tibet burning and China disintegrating. How many in the Politburo realize this? Perhaps, the soon-to-be President Xi Jinping does; but will he be able to take along his colleagues on the reconciliation ‘middle path’? Some probably still think in terms of using yet more force to repress the ‘restive minorities’? But has force worked since 1959? Is there then a realistic solution?
Yes, Xi Jinping, whose father Xi Zhongxun knew the Dalai Lama well in the 1950’s and early 1960’s, should personally meet the Tibetan leader in a Chinese (or Indian) embassy abroad and have a preliminary discussion with the Dalai Lama to prepare a road map to stop the immolations and bring about a genuine reconciliation between Tibet and China.
Will Xi Junior have the courage to take this step? Will he be allowed by his new Politburo? What other choice does China have?
Like the Cuban refugee, let us pray to God (or Buddha) that He supports a win-win solution for all the parties concerned. It is not an easy task, even for God.

The last chance to avoid War?

As a way to better understand the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict, I am posting here a Memorandum of Conversation between Zhang Wenji, Director in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China and and the Indian Ambassador to China, G. Parthasarathy. 
This exchange, of a series of 3, occurred in Beijing in July 1961.
It will be the last serious discussion on the border issue last before the War, a year later.
This document comes from the Chinese archives (India still keeps the archival material related to the conflict close to its chest). 
It has been made available in the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (Collection: Sino-Pakistani Relations in the Cold War).

Memorandum of Three Conversations Between Director Zhang Wenji
and the Indian Ambassador. 
Secret Document 574  (Foreign Ministry Document)
File number: 105-01056-03
17 July 1961

Addressed are the future of Sino-Indian relations, Sino-Indian border issues, and India's focus on such issues as Bhutan, Sikkim and Pakistan 
Time: 17 July 1961, 9 a.m. – 12 p.m. Location: Shanghai Peace Hotel Translator: Chen Hui Stenographer: Li Danan

Zhang: Yesterday the Premier suggested to the Foreign Secretary that the two of us continue talks. Even though [this], as an informal, candid conversation between friends, cannot resolve issues, it too has advantages and is helpful in seeking solutions. The Ambassador has been in China for three years; [he] is conscientious about [his] work, and a person of integrity. During these three years, there have unfortunately been setbacks in the two countries’ relations; this is not [due to] personal factors. Before long the Ambassador will return to his country, and by coincidence the Foreign Secretary has come to China and the two sides have held talks. Now there are still a few days left: the Ambassador can have contact with the Foreign Ministry side, and exchange views and seek solutions. When the next ambassador comes, we hope we can also have more contact [with him]. Although things did not go as hoped during the Ambassador’s term, [he] has still made contributions toward cooperation between the two sides. Based on yesterday’s conversation, [our] initial impression is that, although there are frank and intense disagreements, there are several points on which [we] completely agree or are close to agreement, and these are:

1. Both countries have expressed the need for friendly [relations], and from a long-term point of view, friendship between the two countries will still prevail.
2. The situation over the last few years has been unsatisfactory, and both sides have differing views as to the cause, but both think we should adopt a positive attitude and improve relations with constructive steps, and at the very least not add to the difficulties or make the situation get worse.
3. In order to seek solutions and advance understanding together, the two sides both hope that each can feel and understand the other’s predicament; at the same time, each also need to put themselves in the other’s shoes and make allowances for them.

In today’s informal, friendly conversation, if the Ambassador has views he wishes to be conveyed to my countries’ leaders, [I] will be certain to report them faithfully and make [sure] that both sides have a correct understanding.

Parthasarathy: [I] welcome Director Zhang’s opening remarks. I am in almost total agreement with your assessment. The Foreign Secretary and I both consider the two sides’ free, candid talks to be the most beneficial ones. Although the disagreements have been somewhat intense, it is still better to speak what is on our minds. This is a vital matter involving the friendship of one billion people. We have a responsibility to promote the restoration of relations, [and] it is no good to not speak what is in our hearts. We have divided the issues into two aspects. One aspect is specific, predominant issues; [these] can be boiled down to border issues. Another aspect is other factors that have caused the two countries’ relations to worsen these two years. We feel that the Chinese leaders’ sentiments toward India lack understanding in some aspects. For example, on such issues as Bhutan, Sikkim, Pakistan, and criticism in the newspapers, the difference of opinions between the two sides has widened. China’s leaders gave a fairly lengthy explanation on the issue of criticism in the newspapers, making mention of their views and the reasons for criticism. What worries me are not the criticisms themselves, but whether they signify a change in [China’s] assessment of India. We two countries have different social and political systems, but [their] goal is still the same; it is only that the methods [we] use to attain that goal differ, that’s all. The reports in Chinese newspapers cause people to feel that there have been major changes in India’s domestic and foreign policies, as if India has become reactionary, no longer progressive. This is a lack of respect for India. It is very difficult to bring the two countries’ relations back to normal.
There are major differences of opinion on border issues, and it will require some time to be able to get agreement. Until then [we] should try to keep [our] differences of opinion on other fronts from widening. [We] must be in contact more, cooperate more, eliminate misunderstandings, and create a favorable atmosphere. Yesterday’s conversation was somewhat sharp, but that’s not at all to say that [the sides] did not consider the other side. [I will] now raise two or three points:
(1) Bhutan and Sikkim issues. Premier Zhou said, The Sino-Sikkimese borders were stipulated in a treaty in 1890, it is not a problem. But the Chinese side has not recognized India’s right to represent Bhutan and Sikkim[2]

Zhang: I very much appreciated the way you put it; there are disagreements, but [we] must consider things as a whole. As long as we [do so] for the sake of honesty, there is nothing to fear in talks being somewhat sharp. This is much better than mutual criticisms in official letter exchanges and in public opinion. [We] must not create public tension; the governments both feel pressured, [and it] runs counter to both sides’ desire for improvement. [As for] criticism in the newspapers, India’s criticisms far outnumber [China’s]; we don’t attach much importance to it. Our newspapers have also carried some news about India that is entirely of a reporting nature, [with] almost no comment. The Ambassador said that China has changed its assessment of India and holds that India has become reactionary. Yesterday the Foreign Secretary said India’s foreign policy has not essentially changed for the past 15 years. We welcome this promise. If one is to speak of any changes in both sides’ estimation of the other, one must first say that it is India that feels there has been a great change in China’s domestic and foreign policy. China’s national leaders have not voiced any objections whatsoever to India’s domestic and foreign policy. The Indian side says it does not know what changes there have been to Indian foreign policy. But judging from actual behavior, one cannot help but feel that there has been a change. When Sino-Indian relations were good, India held that China was interested in peace. But since last year, India’s leaders have repeatedly implied that China is keen on [having a] cold war. An Indian leader even said he did not know of any country that loved peace as much as a certain country does, nor did he know of any country that loves peace less than China does. As for China’s domestic policy, the deputy head of India’s Foreign Ministry, Mrs. Menon, once said that China is a concentration camp, a Hitler-style totalitarian regime. China’s leaders do not want to make direct criticisms of India. Yesterday, Vice-Premier Chen Yi raised the point that both sides should [try to] lessen the differences of opinion and do their best to find common points, reducing differences and preventing them from surfacing. The Ambassador says that the main focus should be on border issues; when Premier Zhou visited Delhi last year, it was in the very hopes that it would lead to a resolution of border issues. Over the past two years we have negotiated about borders with Burma and Nepal, and achieved resolution through friendly consultation. There has been development in relations with both [these] parties, as the Ambassador also knows.

Parthasarathy: I still do not have a precise enough understanding of some of the issues discussed yesterday. India has a right and a responsibility to represent Bhutan and Sikkim in handling foreign affairs; what is China’s attitude toward this?

Zhang: Yesterday, the Foreign Secretary raised this question under the subject of border issues. There are no problems between China and Sikkim in terms of borders. There are already stipulations [regarding them] in a late 19th-century agreement. With the exception of a small area south of the McMahon Line, there is not much disagreement on the Sino-Bhutanese border, either. I will say it again: [China] does not cross the McMahon Line - the problem is in fact nonexistent. The Ambassador raised the [subject] of India’s right to represent Bhutan and Sikkim in diplomatic negotiations; this went beyond the scope of border issues. The Foreign Secretary says India has a special relationship with Bhutan and Sikkim; [I] don’t know what this refers to.

Parthasarathy: This was stipulated on the basis of a treaty. Based on two-way treaties, Bhutan and Sikkim agreed to accept India’s guidance on foreign relations and to have India handle foreign affairs. What are the implications in China’s saying it respects “proper” Indian relations with Bhutan and Sikkim?

Zhang: This is a general expression, and it is also not limited to this issue; it is common in international affairs. I personally do not quite understand why India wants to treat Sikkim as a protectorate; this kind of practice is rare in Asian and African countries. We have no ambitions regarding the territory of any country, and we do not carry out subversive activities [against foreign regimes]. In an official letter, the Indian side made a reference to Chinese leaders in Tibet stating that Bhutan, Sikkim and Ladakh are parts of China, [and we] want to recover them. This does not merit a response. China’s leaders have never said this kind of thing. India has a general consulate and other agencies in Tibet; they can find out that there is no such talk or activities. India is just basing itself on reports from Western news agencies; it is not worth taking seriously. That we did not reply does not mean we affirming this.

Parthasarathy: We were not basing ourselves on Western reports, but on our own intelligence. It is said that you broadcast this news. We consider this to be a serious matter, [so] we brought it up with you. Now you say this didn’t happen, but it is also possible that irresponsible people did say such things; you can also investigate. We would not criticize you based solely on Western reports. As for [your] saying, “protectorate,” this is not a very accurate term (A LOOSE TERM)[3] . This is, in fact, a historical relationship; based on the stipulations in the treaty, they ask us to offer guidance in foreign diplomacy. China’s saying that it respects a “proper” relationship has made people doubtful as to whether you respect the India-Bhutan and India-Sikkim treaties, or whether you recognize India’s right to represent Bhutan and Sikkim in foreign diplomacy.

Zhang: You say India’s criticism is based on Tibetan broadcasts, but you have never supplied specific information. Your letter was very vague, [and] you have long since made general statements that there was no such thing [happening].
Regarding [India’s] traditional relationships with Bhutan and Sikkim. India says that based on the treaty, only India has the right to handle their foreign relations. But Bhutan and Sikkim are also in communication with Tibet. For the moment [we] won’t speak of the historical relationships; in recent years, there have also been communications. For example, they have representatives stationed in Tibet. Their representatives have remained there following the India-Bhutan and India-Sikkim treaties; this is a fact. It is very clear what we mean by saying we respect India’s relations with Bhutan and Sikkim; we are very cautious, and unwilling to damage China’s relations with Bhutan or Sikkim. We also do not [want to] damage China’s relations with India. The two countries have not, in official meetings (unterm.org: “????”) discussed Sino-Bhutanese or Sino-Sikkimese border issues, because at the time the two countries’ premiers were only authorized to discuss Sino-Indian border issues; nor did India in any way believe Bhutan or Sikkim to be part of India. As regards the Indo-Bhutanese treaty, India and Bhutan’s explanations are mutually contradictory; Bhutan believes they have the right to handle foreign affairs. In any case, we do not have any diplomatic contacts with them.
Generally speaking, the tension in [our] two countries’ relations over the past two years has concerned Sino-Indian border issues. [China] has made great efforts to alleviate [tensions] and seek ways of resolution. You say that India is doing this, too. That’s good, but now India tends to sideline Sino-Indian border issues and instead focus discussions on the issues of Bhutan, Sikkim and Pakistan, etc; this will not serve to narrow [our] differences of opinion – rather, it will broaden [our] differences of opinion. This does nothing to help resolve the issues. Our chief consideration should be Sino-Indian border issues; there is definite danger with this aspect, and none at all with the other issues. Yesterday the Foreign Secretary said that the borders ought to be considered as a whole, starting with Kashmir and ending with Burma. Here one should not overlook the fact that there also exist third-party nations, such as Nepal. We respect India’s relations with Bhutan and Sikkim and have done nothing to damage [them]. We recognize the Sino-Sikkimese border and do not see any necessity for further mention of this issue. If [India] has ulterior motives [in raising this issue], then at the very least they lack understanding. We cannot confuse primary [issues] with secondary ones.

Parthasarathy: I am personally surprised that the issue is getting bigger. It was our hope that the issue could be limited to the scope of Sino-Indian border issues. But the difficulty lies with your use of this term “proper relations”. During Sino-Indian official meetings, you also refused to discuss the Sino-Bhutanese and Sino-Sikkimese borders. We should first discuss issues of substance. [We] would like to ask whether the Chinese side would agree to talk if Bhutan entrusted India with discussing Sino-Bhutanese border issues. This is the crux of the issue. As for the Kashmir issue, India is very sensitive about it. You are discussing border issues with a country that has no right to negotiate; it is impossible not to consider this hostile. Yesterday Premier Zhou raised some practical issues, but from a legal standpoint, two countries cannot discuss the territory of a third country; [they] ought to be mindful of popular opinion.

Zhang: India believes China has a hidden agenda concerning Bhutan and Sikkim and is expanding the issue; this idea is strange and hard to understand. China has done nothing in this aspect over the past two or three years. Our relations with Bhutan and Sikkim have not increased - they have decreased. The main disagreement over the Sino-Bhutanese border map is [the area] south of the McMahon Line. Currently the two sides are at an impasse on the McMahon Line. India’s submission of a letter demanding discussion of the Sino-Bhutanese border, and also touching on the McMahon Line, only expanded the quarrel – [it was for this reason] we did not reply.
As for the Kashmir issue, Premier Zhou has repeatedly discussed, in clear-cut terms, our position and predicament. There is nothing to add. The Ambassador recognizes that China can, when necessary, be in temporary contact with the local authorities. This is also a recognition that there are practical problems that must be handled. But this idea of the Ambassador’s still cannot resolve the practical difficulties. We could not wait until after bloodshed occurs to talk; this would create new tensions and be detrimental to our relations with neighboring countries. This will only cause the imperialist elements intent on destroying China’s relations with neighboring countries to clap their hands for joy.
As regards the Sino-Indian border issue, the Foreign Secretary spoke well; after the Sino-Indian officials’ reports were released, none of the three possible methods could be used, [so] we should consider a kind of fourth option – which is, both sides reconsider [the issues]. We set great store by this important statement [when it] made by an official so sincere as the Foreign Secretary. We welcome this suggestion, and agree that we should consider issues on this foundation. [We] should talk about facts that should be ascertained – which ones [we] can accept, and which we could consider. I am very interested in how the Indian government views this. If it is believed that the facts supplied by the Indian side are all unassailable, and the facts supplied by the Chinese side are all incorrect and worthless, not only could I personally not agree, any fair-minded person would not agree. The concluding section of India’s report even said the Chinese side’s information can prove that India’s traditional line is correct. This statement not only disregards the facts, it is also an insult to me personally. I have held in the proper respect, and maintained personal friendship with, Indian representatives such as Mehta and Gopal; I know this is not an issue between individuals, but guided by Indian government policy. This statement from the Indian side does not hold water at all. Of course it is difficult for the two sides to have total consensus on the facts, but this is no barrier to seeking resolution on practical problems provided it does not harm the interests of either side. Both sides [can] yield to and forgive the other – this is also the normal way [of doing things]. Officials’ reports from both sides deserve regard, but one cannot get tangled up in the details. The relationship between our two countries is too important; we should view it from a greater distance, from an elevated height, considering the big picture, and seek resolution. The two sides will not necessarily agree on specific views, but should understand the overall spirit.

Parthasarathy: This is a difficult problem. For the two sides to have consensus on the facts is difficult. In truth, what the officials presented was not one report, it was two reports. The officials were assigned to examine and double-check the [written] information, determining the points [we] agree on and those we do not, but the result was completely divergent viewpoints. How are the two countries’ premiers to consider [the issues] with two piles of completely opposing facts? [My] personal view is, might it be possible to seek a solution starting with ascertaining those points that require further clarification?

Zhang: After India issued the officials’ report, Premier Nehru flatly stated that there could be no discussion unless India’s requirements were accepted. Under these circumstances, China prefers not to state its stance for the time being, unless we are prepared to squabble. Regarding the officials’ reports, I believe that besides the differing points, there are certain portions on which [we] agree or are relatively close. Our side once suggested writing this, but the Indian side refused. As for China’s border negotiations with Burma and Nepal, there is some experience that can serve as a reference. Ordinarily speaking, when there is disagreement on the facts, there are two possible methods of resolution: (1) If the two sides both have definite grounds [for their stance], following an earnest, objective comparison, [they] can determine which side has somewhat greater grounds, and consider from a political standpoint which [country] finally getting the [land] would do more for peace and the two countries’ relationship. (2) If the two sides’ views differ greatly and it is impossible to bring them into line, each can keep to its own position and consider, from a political standpoint, what kind of resolution would be more beneficial. Of course, the differences of opinion between China and India are somewhat greater, but the importance of Sino-Indian friendship is also far greater; both can continue to think about whether there is anything else to consider. The two sides should meet halfway - it is possible to resolve the issues. China and India cannot stay locked in long-term mutual confrontation; there must eventually be peace and friendship. As long as both sides have the desire, the question of method is an easy one to resolve. [I] won’t speak of the past; yesterday’s talks prove that we are willing to resolve the issues.

They missed an opportunity for 'wider considerations'

The Special Representatives of India and China have began their 15th Round of talks on the border issues.
The discussions were postponed when Beijing objected to the participation of the Dalai Lama in the Global Buddhist Congregation in December.
Shiv Shankar Menon, India's National Security Adviser, and Chinese State Councillor Dai Bingguo are leading the two delegations.
This round should cover "the range of long-standing territorial disputes and other issues" an official communique said.
Dai said: "While working hard to develop itself, China is fully committed to developing long-term friendship and cooperation with India ...there does not exist such a thing as China's attempt to 'attack India' or 'suppress India's development'".
I am posting here a chapter of my book, Born in Sin, the Panchsheel Agreement. In the early 1950's India lost an opportunity of solve the border issue when she had all the cards in her hands, the Indian politicians then decided to give these cards away to show her great magnanimity. 
At that time, Delhi was only interested by 'larger issues'.
India still pays for the foolishness of its leaders.

Born in Sin
Chapter 7  

In September 1952, before his transfer to Cairo, Panikkar had several meetings with Zhou Enlai who told the Ambassador that the downgrading of the Lhasa Mission was only the first step to pave the way for negotiations on ‘all outstanding problems’.
During the first months of 1953, Nehru may have felt that the situation was settling down in Tibet and slowly the Tibetans were accepting the invasion of their country by the Liberation Army as a fait accompli.
In September 1953, Nehru wrote to his Chinese counterpart that India was anxious to come to a final settlement about “pending matters so as to avoid any misunderstanding and friction at any time”. Quoting a letter sent one year earlier, he said that “No further steps have been taken since then to negotiate a settlement”.
It appears that different visitors and informants were briefing Nehru about the situation inside Tibet. It was reported that everything was quiet on the Roof of the World. In early December 1953, Nehru mentions that, he had received a letter from George Roerich, the Russian painter and scholar living in Kulu giving him more information.  After admitting that “our Intelligence has looked upon them [the Roerich] with some slight suspicion although they have never had anything to get hold of,” Nehru told T.N. Kaul, the Joint Secretary in the China Desk in the Ministry of External Affairs:
His [Roerich] general report to me has been that things are very calm in Tibet and both the people and the Lama hierarchy have adjusted themselves to the new order. This is chiefly so because the Chinese have refrained from interfering in anything. The Tibetans are, therefore, not so apprehensive as they used to be. 
As we have seen in the case of food supply to the Chinese troops and the sacking of the Tibetan Prime Ministers , the report was not completely true. The Chinese had begun interfering actively in the life of the Tibetans. In fact, they started meddling in the internal affairs of Tibet almost immediately after the signature of the 17-Point Agreement.
In the same letter Nehru requested Kaul to meet Roerich  “to gain some information about conditions in Tibet, the Dalai Lama, the Panchen Lama, etc.”
Nehru considered that the time had come to renegotiate the old Simla Convention signed in 1914 between the British and the Tibetans. He therefore decided to take the initiative and propose negotiations to resolve ‘all outstanding issues’. The talks were to begin in December 1953 in Beijing and were schedule to last a maximum of six weeks. Unfortunately, they would take four months to reach a conclusion. Kaul, one of the main negotiators in Beijing  described the preparations for the Conference thus:
Many meetings and discussions were held and it was decided to sound the Chinese. Not unexpectedly they welcomed the idea. It was decided to send a small delegation to Peking to discuss the matter and reach an agreement, if possible. The spade work had already been done by Panikkar, Raghavan and me in Peking. The new Indian Ambassador to China, N. Raghavan, was appointed the leader and I the deputy-leader of the Indian delegation. Director, Historical Division, External Affairs Ministry, the late Dr. Gopalachari, was a member. His knowledge of history and facts of the Sino-Indian border was an asset. We were authorised to co-opt such other members of the Embassy as we found necessary. It was a small delegation, as delegations go, but convenient and closely knit.
Most of the correspondence or instructions during the following months will be routed through Kaul, one of Nehru’s Kashmiri blue-eyed boys.

The Instructions
In early December, the Secretary General put up a Note  in which he defined the main points for discussions at what became known as the Beijing Conference. These points were:
1.    The question of India’s frontier with Tibet,
2.    Indo-Tibetan trade and trade agencies,
3.    Freedom of movement of Indian and Tibetan traders and pilgrims,
4.    Passports and visas,
5.    Telegraph, post office and hospitals
6.    Security guards and escorts and
7.    Special position of Bhutan.
On 3 December 1953, Nehru replied to this Note giving the framework for negotiations to be held in Beijing regarding the relations between India and China and India’s interests in Tibet. He clarified the position to be adopted by the Indian delegation during the Beijing Conference. More particularly on the border question, though he generally agreed with the points made by the Secretary General, he chose to remain faithful to the Panikkar doctrine: “remain silent about the border”:
We should not raise this question. If the Chinese raise it, we should express our surprise and point out that this is a settled issue. Further, during the last two years or so, when reference was frequently made about Indo-Chinese or Indo-Tibetan problems, there has never been any reference to this frontier issue and it is surprising that this should be brought up now. Our delegation cannot discuss it.
Though Panikkar had been transferred more than a year earlier to Cairo, Nehru was still keen to consult him on China’s affairs. The former Ambassador had suggested a step further, he had written: “if China insisted on reopening  the whole issues of the frontier, the Indian delegation could walk out of the conference and break off the negotiations.” Nehru was not as extreme as Panikkar, he did not recommend walking out of the Conference, his instructions were: “We should avoid walking out unless the Chinese insist on taking up this question. If such an eventuality occurs, the matter will no doubt be referred to us.”
To agree to discuss the border issue was for Panikkar an admission that there was a problem.   But can wishful thinking take away an issue?
Nehru objected to the inclusion of some parts in Pakistan occupied Kashmir in the discussions. He pointed out that India was not in possession of these territories .
He also believed that it was important to keep the trade marts alive as he envisioned an increase in the commercial exchanges with Tibet in the future. He wrote: “Tibet is our natural market and we should develop it normally.” He was in favour of keeping the trade agencies functional: “Gartok is important. Yatung especially, and, to some extent, Gyantse are likely to become more important as trade between India and Tibet increases. They are on the main route. Therefore, it is eminently reasonable that we should have some trade agents there or at least at Yatung.”
The Prime Minister noted the case of a small village/principality called Minsar which was under the suzerainty of the Maharaja of the Jammu & Kashmir State . This principality located near Mount Kailash was supposed to provide the revenues to maintain the temples around the sacred mountain and the holy lakes. Being inside the Tibetan territory, Nehru thought that India should renounce her rights as a gesture of goodwill. He wrote:
Regarding the village of Minsar in Western Tibet, which has belonged to the Kashmir State, it is clear that we shall have to give it up, if this question is raised. We need not raise it. If it is raised, we should say that we recognize the strength of the Chinese contention and we are prepared to consider it and recommend it.
But the matter will have to be referred to the Kashmir Government. The point is that we should not come to a final agreement without gaining the formal assent of the Kashmir Government. 
However, it does not appear that the Chinese raised the question and no reference seems to have been made to the Kashmir government.
The Indian rights to this small town were inherited from the Peace Treaty between Ladakh and Tibet signed in Tingmosgang in 1684. Apart from the confirmation of the delimitation of the border between Western Tibet and Ladakh, the Treaty said:
But the king of Ladakh reserves to himself the village of Minsar in Ngari-khor-sum, [Western Tibet] that it may be independent there; and it sets aside its revenue for the purpose of meeting the expense involved in keeping up the sacrificial lights at Kang-rin [i.e., Kailash], and the Holy lakes of Mansarowar and Rakshas Tal.
The note of the Ministry also mentioned some disputed areas in Hunza which is located in the part of Kashmir occupied by Pakistan. Nehru indicated that India could “hardly discuss these with them [the Chinese] and we can point out that all this area is under dispute with Pakistan.”
As for trade, Nehru felt that it should be restricted to the trade between India and Tibet. This remark once more proves that the purpose of the Beijing Conference was mainly to ‘update’ the Trade Regulations of 1914. We have to add that the Commerce Ministry had agreed with Nehru about the restriction of the Agreement to the trade with Tibet. Nehru noted that Tibet was India’s ‘natural market’ and that it should be developed. But here again, as in the case of food supply, he was ready to bargain:
As regards prohibited articles, this prohibition should generally continue. But we might be a little more generous in regard to petrol, etc. A few thousand gallons does not make any difference to us, nor does it make any great difference on the other side from the military points of view. But, as a bargaining counter, we might agree to relax our rules to a small extent.
A point was then raised by the Prime Minister: the right of Free Transit. According to a Convention signed in Barcelona in 1921, Tibet and China could claim free transit for goods from India. Nehru commented that the question of free transit of foreign goods from India hardly arise because China hardly purchases foreign goods. However, he thought that it would be interesting if China claimed the right under the Barcelona Convention of 1921: “That itself would slightly weaken China’s attempt to bypass or reject old conventions and customs.”
The Sikkim road, as we saw earlier, had been used for carrying food grains to the PLA. The interesting point here is: were the Chinese ready to recognize old treaties and conventions? In fact, the raison d’être of the Beijing Conference was that the Chinese  were refusing to recognise the Simla Convention which they considered an ‘imperialist’ (or ‘unequal’) treaty signed on behalf of India by the British Empire.
It is perhaps Nehru’s perception that old treaties or conventions could be discarded or sent to scrap which most weakened the Indian stand. It is certainly a wrong interpretation in international law  and it made it easy for the Chinese to tell their Indian counterparts “look here, McMahon was an imperialist, McMahon line is an imperialist fabrication, it is illegal ”.
On the one hand, India was ambiguous about the rights and obligations that she had inherited from the British and on the other hand she wanted the McMahon line to be recognised as the international border.The Indian stand lacked logic: in accepting that Tibet was only ‘a region of China’ and that China was entitled to discuss the Tibetan issue, without even referring the matter to the Tibetan authorities , India was not only nullifying the role and presence of the Tibetans during the Simla Convention, but also invalidating the main outcome of the Convention namely the McMahon Line. The disastrous consequences of this stand can still be seen nearly fifty years later .
Regarding the Karakoram High Road , Nehru held a pessimistic view, he thought that it was ‘exceedingly unlikely’ that India regain the territories annexed by Pakistan: “I do not know that it will serve any useful purpose for us to ask for the restoration of the old trade route between Sinkiang and Kashmir. That route passes through territory held by Pakistan. It is exceedingly unlikely that we shall get back this territory. However, there is no harm in mentioning this.”
Regarding Bhutan, Nehru did not want anything to be mentioned but in case the matter was raised by the Chinese, he directed the negotiators to make it  “clear that External Affairs of Bhutan are under our direct guidance,” the Chinese will have to deal with us in regard to External Affairs relating to Bhutan.”
This was the framework for the Beijing Conference.

India’s Wider Considerations
The briefing as retold by Kaul is very different from the Note sent by Nehru to the Secretary General of the Ministry of External Affairs. While we just saw that the Note dealt with down-to-earth problems of trade, pilgrimage or even the border question, Kaul mentioned only what he calls ‘broad guidelines’ for negotiations which is in fact a very vague general policy. Whom should we believe? What was the true briefing of the negotiators? We should perhaps have look at Kaul’s guidelines before tentatively answering this question.
In his book “Diplomacy in War and Peace” , Kaul wrote: “Before our departure for Peking, the following broad guidelines were formulated.”
Kaul then began explaining that Nehru's idea was “to evolve a method of peaceful and friendly co-existence with the Peoples' Republic of China, in spite of our different political, social and economic systems.” For the Indian diplomat, it was the first time in history that ‘a modus vivendi between a communist and a non-communist country’ was to be worked out and in very specific terms.
He continued by quoting Lenin’s idea of ‘peaceful co-existence’, the Charter of the UNO, the Kellog Pact  and other documents which were ‘general declaration’ of intentions.
Nehru wanted to go a step further: it is what Kaul considered unique in the negotiations. For the first time, a bilateral agreement between two sovereign independent countries was to be signed insisting on peaceful co-existence. One can seriously question the interpretation of Kaul. These five principles are the plain and ordinary principles on which normal relations between independent nations are based, but for Kaul considered that Nehru was the first world statesman to formulate these ideas and ideals into a code of conduct governing bilateral relations and that it was remarkable that these principles could apply to two countries with different social ideologies and forms of government.
The negotiations lasted from the last day of 1953 till the end of April 1954. If we analyze Kaul’s report, we see that his contention that a consensus evolved week after week, seems more an after-thought than a hard reality.
What was supposed to be merely a trade agreement, to replace the Simla Convention and Anglo-Tibetan Trade Regulations of July 1914, took a disproportionate magnitude and became a full-fledged philosophical and ideological exercise of diplomatic idealism .. Nevertheless, we should not forgot that the primarily purpose of the Beijing Conference was to regulate the trans-border trade and traffic between India and Tibet and replace the earlier Trade Regulations which were, for Nehru and Mao, ‘imperialist’ in nature.
Ideologically Kaul gave his own justification for the ‘briefing’ before the Agreement:
In India, one school looked upon China as the main threat to India's security in the North and North-East. It was further developed by some into a thesis that India should align herself with America and the West to meet this threat, as she could not meet it alone. 
In Kaul’s opinion, this thesis however firstly overlooked the fact that it was not easy for the Western powers to get involved in a war between China and India, and for them to provide help to the Indian subcontinent. Secondly, “it also ignored the fact that a country like India, with its tradition, history, culture, policy of non-alignment, and its size and potential, could not become the client-state of any other power.”
The main argument was that as the world was living in the middle of the Cold War, India should not ‘push’ China further into the Russian camp. On the contrary, an alliance between the Asian giants could augur a loosening of the Cold War, creating the space for a third ‘neutral’ block. But this theory does not consider the fact that Mao’s China was not interested in creating a third pole. Though they had strong divergences with Moscow , Beijing nevertheless always remained in the socialist world.
General Samuel B. Griffith, the famous expert in Chinese warfare  wrote an interesting analysis of Communist military strategy:
Chinese political dogma postulates certain axioms fundamental to long-term grand strategy. Principal among these is the stereotyped concept of a bipolar world in which the forces of ‘imperialism’ are inexorably arrayed against the forces of ‘socialism’. This concept specifically excludes the possibilities of ‘non-alignment’ and neutralism. There can be no middle way, no third road, no fence straddling. A nation must, in Mao’s word, ’lean’ to one side or the other.
As Panikkar had wished few years earlier, it was perhaps Kaul’s intention to ‘convert’ Mao. Once more, one wonders at the connection between this naive and romantic diplomacy and the trade regulations for Tibet. But Kaul continued with another argument which is more difficult to follow:
They [the proponents of the first school of thought] forgot the facts of geography and geo-politics that India was physically much closer to China and Russia and their combined hostility could prove a much more serious threat to India than only China's or that of the West… 
He then described the other trend in the Indian politics:
The other school was represented by the doctrinaire wing of the Indian communists who saw in the liberation of China the panacea for India's troubles, and therefore, wanted India to go the Chinese way. They wanted to have an alliance with both China and Russia and go communist. They were supported by some camp followers and fellow travellers who waxed eloquent on the sentiment of Asian brotherhood and "Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai.”
It is surprising that Kaul could analyze the situation as though the Communists in India were the only proponents of the Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai policy.  Kaul concluded that: “Nehru belonged to neither school of thought. He was a realist, proud of India's heritage and conscious of its destiny.” But history is witness that none else than Nehru and his advisors fathered the Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai policy which ballooned into incredible proportions in the mid-fifties before being punctured in October 1962.
Kaul said that he had tried to recapture Nehru's thoughts and added that Nehru: “believed in non-alignment because his pride in India would not allow any other country or group of countries to dominate our policies.” Unfortunately this attitude was not supported by the necessary strength and consistency  and ultimately collapsed on the slopes of the NEFA.
The historian Parshotam Mehra in a well-researched book Negotiating with the Chinese: 1846-1987 brings forward another aspect of the India’s China policy when he quotes J.S. Grant, the Acting British High Commissioner in Delhi:
A perceptive contemporary British observer of the Indian scene who called New Delhi's attitude towards China as 'the most complex piece in the puzzle of Indian foreign policy' was convinced that 'fear is really their [Indians'] basic motive.' New Delhi, he argued, was 'horrified at the possibility of war' and was determined 'at all costs to avoid any involvement in any clash with China: In the event, it had resolved 'to cultivate and retain friendly relations with China' for achieving which it was prepared to pay 'almost any price .'
As indicated earlier, in its wish to align with China, India could not remain non-aligned. Thus one often comes across a violently anti-American stance in Nehru’s writings (and even more in Krishna Menon’s). Both had probably many good reasons to hold such views, particularly when they realized the biased attitude of the West on the Kashmir issue, but to be caught in a vicious circle of reaction and counter-reaction could certainly not be the basis of a foreign policy. The more Nehru’s government reacted to the West, the more the West tended to believe that Pakistan was a surer bet and a safer ally.
Around that time, South Block saw the Beijing Conference as an opportunity to ‘break’ the alliance between the Soviet and the Chinese, thereby creating a third ‘neutral’ pole. The Indian diplomats were certainly presumptuous to presume that India could break the axis Moscow-Beijing.
The theory of a non-aligned movement and more particularly the motivations behind India’s move to come closer to China to counterbalance the two blocks (preventing China from leaning towards Russia) can now be seen as a myth.
One can accuse China of many things, but as long as Mao was alive, the communist ideology remained unwavering. In spite of its own ‘fraternal’ problems with Russia. China never considered India a natural ally, the Chinese leaders had too much contempt for India to do so.
Kaul may have thought: ”Mao's China, though communist, had its own brand of communism which had not yet become dogmatic as in Stalin's Russia,” but movements like the Great Leap Forward or the Cultural Revolution have proven him wrong.
Another of Nehru’s motivations for signing an agreement with China was that it would be the first of long series of bilateral agreements between the various free nations of Asia. Burma and Indonesia were the next in Nehru’s mind. Slowly, the scope of the movement would increase. He thought that it would eventually bring peace which would spread, first in Asia and then in the world. A movement of peaceful coexistence of which he would represent a sort of radiating centre.
While Indian diplomats seemed obsessed with ‘broader perspectives’ and ‘larger issues’, in contrast, the Chinese were very down to earth with their problems: they had objectives which had to be reached, and no philosophy or emotion was involved. This reminds us of the message written by a Chinese Emperor on a Stone Pillar in Lhasa after a war between Tibet and Nepal: the Emperor wrote : “If a people abandon military pursuits and make literature their chief object, they become unable to safeguard their former position. This should be known.”
The Indian diplomats never understood that the Chinese could think or react differently from them. To convert them to Indian philosophy was a mere utopia. Again Kaul confused the issues, putting thereby the Indian side in a position of inferiority vis-à-vis China:
Negotiations would be restricted to trade and cultural inter-course between India and the 'Tibet region of China’. However it was important not to lose sight of the broader perspective and larger interests of putting Sino-Indian relations on a proper footing.
The border question was not to be raised by us. We would not express any doubts about the border. If the Chinese raised it we would affirm that the border was traditional, historical and well defined by treaties, geographical and other features. 
The Beijing Conference was to redraft the Simla Convention and the Trade Regulation of 1914, but the border which was the direct and main outcome of this Convention was not to be raised as an issue!
We can conclude that though this general policy vis-à-vis China may have been discussed informally, it seems clear from the detailed instructions of the Indian Prime Minister that the Beijing Conference was about the regulation of trade with Tibet. It is another matter that, in delaying an early agreement, the Chinese managed to derail the main purpose of the Conference and sidetrack it onto the vague level of eternal friendship (or brotherhood) between India and China.
Here again we quote again General Griffith:
Generally, the Chinese are predisposed to indirect, rather than direct, means, an approach summarized in the phrase “sheng tung; chi hsi” (“Uproar in the East; Strike in the West”). This was a basic ingredient in the successful operations carried on by the Eight Route Army and its predecessor and successor armies. Obviously, the principle is not confine to tactical application.
For Mao and Zhou, there was only one struggle. Diplomacy and armed struggle were two aspects of the same combat. In the case of the Beijing negotiations, the Indian delegation themselves were creating the ‘uproar’ with their ‘wider’ issues, China would strike on the only point which mattered to it at that time: official recognition of Tibet as a ‘region’ of China.

India and the larger perspectives
In early 1953, Nehru had once again explained to the Lok Sabha his decision to press for the recognition of China by the UN as it was: “not a question of any one of us liking or disliking the present Government in China or approving or disapproving of China's revolution, but it is a question of one of the biggest countries in the world not being represented there, not being recognised there.”
Since Mao’s take over of China at the end of 1949, Nehru had constantly, in all fora, been the champion of the recognition of Communist China’s status. Many in Nehru’s circle thought that this kindness would be repaid one day and that China would return the help and support given by India. Nehru’s first ‘confirmation’ of this view came in June 1953, when an agreement was concluded in the Korean war between the UN and the Northern Command on the repatriation of the prisoners of war in Korea. The resolution, finally accepted by China was very similar to the one proposed earlier by New Delhi. The fact that under the Armistice Agreement it was at the insistence of China that India was named Chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission vindicated Nehru’s view that China had now become India’s friend.
The Indian Communists pushed harder than anybody in North Korea’s and China’s favour. During a debate in the Lok Sabha on 23 December 1953, a communist member, Hiren Mukherjee urged the Government to provide as much help to the Chinese and the North Koreans as possible in order to enable them to gain their objective [to take over the South]. But many dissident voices were heard both from the socialist benches as well as the Hindu Mahasabha.
V. G. Deshpande  criticized India's unnecessary interest in the Korean question and observed: "So far as Korea is concerned we had been warning the Prime Minister that he should not ... go out of his way to please or displease other countries so that China may be recognized..."
The nomination of India as Chairman of the Neutral Commission for Korea encouraged South Block to see the situation very positively; China’s attitude towards India was changing. Kaul view of the situation was optimistic:
The Tibet problem was, for the moment, out of the way. India's attitude on Korea and refusal in the UNO to brand Peking as aggressor had made an impact on the Chinese leaders. India's leading role in repeatedly pressing for the right of the Peking Government to represent China in the UNO was a principled and consistent stand which China appreciated. India's efforts to bring about a cease-fire in Korea impressed China of India's helpful and positive role in international affairs. 
With Tibet and Korea out of the way: wider perspectives could now be tackled.
Kaul had another argument: he thought that the only way to stop China from dominating her neighbours, was to have a formal agreement with China. Unfortunately, history has shown that China has never been too attached to pieces of papers or agreements. If Mao considered the atom bomb a ‘paper tiger’, one can imagine what a mere piece of paper was!
Kaul analyzed the situation differently:
… there was danger of a strong, united, isolated and expansionist communist China dominating her neighbours. India would be the main obstacle in this. But Nehru argued that if India and China could work out a modus vivendi of respecting each other's sovereignty and integrity and non-interference in internal affairs, it would be a step away from the cold war and prevent its penetration into Asia.
China had more urgent tasks ahead than to take on India, but Beijing did use the Beijing Conference as a unique opportunity to formalize its occupation of Tibet. Another Chinese interest was the ‘non-interference’ provision: it could help them to keep the Americans away in the Indochinese peninsula.
Kaul concluded: “This was the best time to make a rapprochement with China. It might still be possible to reach a tacit understanding on our border and other problems peacefully.”
We should not forget that though Tibet had been ‘liberated’ , the treaty signed between the British and the Tibetan government in Simla in 1914 was still in force. It had to be replaced by new one where the ‘ownership’ of China would be accepted once and for all by India. Once again, the situation demonstrates the confusion and incoherence of the Indian side. On the one hand Nehru said that there was no border problem and the issue should not be mentioned and on the other hand, Kaul said that it was the occasion to reach an understanding on the border.
The Indian diplomat further analyse: “It seemed there were also two main trends of thought in China. One, represented by Chou En-lai, hoped for a peaceful, cooperative co-existence with India. The other represented by the so-called "radicals" wanted to humiliate India. Mao was perhaps, somewhere in the middle.”
Kaul was also certainly wrong in his analysis of the political currents within the Chinese leadership. Mao was the supreme leader and the other members of the Politburo merely executed his strategy.
As for the negotiation, it had been decided that if there were any doubts during the course of the talks, these would be referred to Delhi for final decision.

Report of the Officials on the Border

Though the last round of the Special Representatives of India and China on the border issue was postponed by Beijing on the lame pretext that the Dalai Lama was to address the Global Buddhist Conference in Delhi, the fact remains that the intricacies of the border issue are generally not well understood in India (and in China, I presume ). 
To get a better understanding, one can read the 1960 Report of the Officials of the Governments of India and the Peoples’ Republic of China on the Boundary Question.
I am posting here the Introduction.
The first part of the Report published in 1961 by the Ministry of External Affairs is posted on my website.During the coming days, other parts will be online.
The reading of this Report along with The Notes, Memoranda and letters Exchanged and Agreements signed between The Governments of India and China. known as The White Papers (some are also posted on my site) helps to understand why after more than 50 years of 'talks', very little progress has been made on the border issue.

Introduction

1. The Prime Minister of India and the Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China met in Delhi from the 19th of April to the 25th of April 1960 to discuss certain differences relating to the border areas which had arisen between the Government of India and the Government of the People's Republic of China. The two Prime Ministers explained fully the respective stands of the two Governments and as a result, there was a better appreciation of the points of view of the two Governments. The talks, however, did not resolve the differences that had arisen and the two Prime Ministers decided that officials of the two Governments should examine the factual materials in the possession of the two Governments in support of their stands.

2. The Joint Communiqué issued on the 25th of April 1960 at the conclusion of the talks of the Prime Ministers in Delhi embodied their decisions and served as a broad directive for the official teams who were to undertake the examination envisaged by the Prime Ministers. The Joint Communiqué inter alia stated as follows:
The two Prime Ministers, therefore, agreed that officials of the .two Governments should meet and examine, check and study all historical documents, records, accounts, maps and other material relevant to the boundary question, on which each side relied in support of its stand, and draw up a report for submission to the two Governments. This report would list the points on which there was agreement and the points on which there was disagreement or which should be examined more fully and clarified. This report should prove helpful towards further consideration of these problems by the two Governments.
It was further agreed that the officials should meet from June to September, 1960, alternately in the capitals of the two countries. The first meeting should take place in Peking and the officials would report to the two Governments by the end of September, 1960. During the period of further examination of the factual material, every effort should be made by the parties to avoid friction and clashes in the border areas."

3. The two Governments accordingly designated the following teams of officials to meet and study the documentary materials in accordance with the decisions of the two Governments:

INDIA
1. Shri J. S. Mehta, Director, China Division, Ministry of External Affairs (Leader)
2. Dr. S. Gopal, Director, Historical Division, Ministry of External Affairs.
3. Shri V. V. Paranjpe, Adviser.
4. Shri T. S. Murty, Adviser.
5. Shri G. N. Rao, Adviser.

CHINA
1, Mr. Chang Wen-chin, Director, First Asian Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Leader).
2. Mr. Yang Kung-su, Director, Tibet Bureau of Foreign Affairs.
3. Mr. Chien Chia-tung, Adviser.
4. Mr. Liao Teh-yun, Adviser.

In addition, the Indian team was assisted by Dr. K. Gopalachari as an Adviser during the Delhi Session. Similarly, the Chinese team was assisted as Advisers by Mr. Tu Kuo-wei and Mr. Chu Chen-chi during the Peking session and by Mr. Ho Ta-chi during the Delhi and the Rangoon sessions.

4. The officials of the two teams have held three sessions in fulfillment of the assignment given to them. In accordance with the communique, the first session of the meeting of officials took place in Peking from the 15th June to the 25th July during which 18 formal meetings were held. At this session the agenda pattern was discussed and determined, and the first item of the agenda (Location and Natural Features of the boundary) was completed.
The second session was held in Delhi from the 19th August to the 5th October during which 19 formal meetings were held. At this session discussions on the second item of the agenda (Treaties and Agreements; Tradition and Custom) and the third item (Administration and Jurisdiction) were completed, thereby concluding the entire substantive work of examining the factual material in the possession of the two sides.

5. The Joint Communique envisaged that the officials should complete their assignment by the end of September, but the two teams realised that despite their determined efforts, the assignment given to them, because of its size and scope, could not be completed within the stipulated period. Therefore, on the 24th of September the leaders of the two official teams dressed a joint message to the Prime Ministers of the People's Republic of China and the Republic of India requesting them to extend the prescribed time-limit to the minimum extent necessary. The two teams agreed to continue in session to complete the substantive work in Delhi and suggested that after a short break a third session might be held for the purpose of completing the work and finalising the report for submission to the two Governments.

6. The Prime Ministers of the two countries were pleased to agree ~o this extension and, after mutual consultations between the two Governments, it was decided that the third session be held in Rangoon. The Burmese Government were good enough to agree to the request of the two Governments and made the necessary arrangements for holding the meeting in their capital.

7. The third and final session of the talks started at Rangoon on the 7th of November and after 10 formal meetings concluded today with signing of this report.

8. The task assigned to the officials, though limited to the study of the evidence and the documentary material in support of the stands of the two Governments, was nevertheless voluminous and difficult. Moreover, the Sino-Indian Boundary question has an obvious bearing on the friendly relations between the two neighbouring countries. The two teams were fully conscious of the complexity as well as the importance of the assignment which had been entrusted to them. The following report embodies the earnest and sustained labours of the Chinese and the Indian official teams spread over a period of nearly six months. During the discussions, each side not only furnished factual material to' substantiate and elaborate the stand of their own Government but endeavoured to explore the viewpoint and evidence of the other Government. It is hoped that the report will enhance the understanding of the facts relating to the Sino-Indian boundary and prove helpful to the further consideration of the boundary question by the two Governments.

9. The report is formulated in accordance with the framework which was agreed upon after consultations between the two teams. The first part of the report is an introduction summarising the discussions which led to the adoption of the agreed Agenda and the commencement of the substantive examination of the evidence. The second and third parts contain the summary of the factual material and comments brought forward by the Indian and the Chinese sides respectively in support of the stands of the two Governments. It will be observed that the statements and comments of each side in the report were drafted by the side concerned and faithfully explain each side's understanding of the factual material furnished and the discussions held during the meetings. The actual pattern within the' substantive part of the report corresponds to the framework of the agreed Agenda.

10. The two teams would like to record that notwithstanding the difficulties of the assignment and the differences in the understanding of the facts relating to the question, they worked in harmony and in a spirit of cordiality and co-operation throughout these meetings.

Sd. Chang Wen-chin, Director, First Asian Department Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of China.
Sd. Yang Kung-su, Director, Tibet Bureau of Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of China

Sd. J. S. Mehta Director, China Division, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India.
Sd. S. Gopal, Director, Historical Division, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India.
RANGOON
12 December 1960, Saka 21 Agrahayana 1882

Death of the first negotiator

Tashi Phuntsok, Panchen Lama, Ngabo, Phuntsok Wangyal, Juchen Thupten Namgyal 
standing, Lobsang Samten, the Dalai Lama's younger brother is in front right  (1979, Beijing)

Former Kalon Tripa Juchen Thupten Namgyal was a remarkable Tibetan official.
I still remember interviewing him in the 1990's, he had such a sharp memories: he could remember the minutest details of the first 'negotiations'  with the Chinese of officials in 1982 and 1984 in Beijing.
He had earlier been the head of the first fact-finding delegation who visited China and Tibet in 1979. This historic photo was taken on this occasion.
On the same occasion, Juchen Thupten Namgyal had also met Xi Zhongxun, Xi Jinping's father.
He had a great sense of history, which is not always the case with Tibetan officials.
Here is the transcript of a series of interviews on his encounters with the Chinese officials (he was accompanied by Phuntsok Tashi, the Dalai Lama's brother-in-law and a young Lodi Gyari Rinpoche). Click here for transcript.

Former Kalon Tripa Juchen Thupten Namgyal passes away
Phayul
September 01, 2011
DHARAMSHALA, September 1: Former Kalon Tripa (Prime Minister) and Speaker of the Tibetan Parliament-in-exile Juchen Thupten Namgyal passed away yesterday evening in Delhi, India. He was 82.
Born in Meshong, Derge eastern Tibet, Juchen Thupten Namgyal joined the Tibetan resistance force and fought the invading People’s Liberation Army. In March 1959 when China started shelling the residence of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, Juchen Thupten Namgyal was the leader of a team of voluntary soldiers guarding the Norbulingka Palace in Lhasa.
After escaping into exile he took up community leadership in the biggest Tibetan settlement of Bylakuppe.
Juchen Thupten Namgyal was elected to the Tibetan Parliament-in-exile then known as the Commission of Tibetan People’s Deputies in 1972 and served as its Chairman for two years. On May 11, 1976 he was appointed as a member of the fifth Kashag (Cabinet) and served as the Minister of Information for the Central Tibetan Administration.
Juchen Thupten Namgyal then served as Kalon Tripa for two consecutive terms in the sixth and the seventh cabinet.
In 1979, Juchen Thupten Namgyal led the first fact-finding delegation to Tibet during which he spent four months touring all three provinces of Tibet, meeting people and investigating the ground realities of Tibet. During the trip he also met with the late 10th Panchen Lama and other Tibetan officials.
As representative of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, in 1982 and 1984, Juchen Thupten Namgyal led negotiation teams to Beijing and discussed many important issues with the Chinese officials including the right to self-determination of the Tibetan people.
The Central Tibetan Administration in a condolence message today “expressed deep sadness,” remembering Juchen Thupten Namgyal for his “prominent service as resistant fighter against Chinese invasion in Tibet and later as the Speaker of the Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile from 1974-76 and in the Kashag for 15 years.”
He is survived by his five daughters and grandchildren.

Negotiations with Chinese Characteristics

In my book,The Negotiations that never were, I have shown how difficult it is to negotiate with China.
Thirty years after the beginning of the exercise between Dharamsala and Beijing, the Chinese side has not moved an inch forward.
This article published in China Review News candidly explains why: before starting the 'negotiations', the Chinese side asks their interlocutors to fully accept their position.
Yesterday, Dr. Dramdul, a deputy director-general of China Tibetology Research Center, who is heading a delegation of Chinese Tibetologists and so-called Tibetan Living Buddhas to Japan declared in Tokyo: "The newly-elected leader of the illegal Tibetan 'government-in-exile' [Dr Lobsang Sangay] is not qualified for negotiations with the Chinese central government".
Dr. Dramdul said that he has learned that the newly elected Kalon Tripa was willing to negotiate with the Chinese government 'any time, anywhere'. 
His answer was: "China already made it very clear a few years ago that the central government is open to talks with personal representatives of Dalai Lama, not representatives from the government-in-exile. The negotiation will never be about the status of Tibet, but about the future of Dalai Lama and the people around him. This policy has not changed."
Beijing has already decided the outcome of the 'negotiations'. The Chinese leadership even decides who can represent the Tibetan side.
This is called 'negation with Chinese characteristics'.

A Precondition to Discussing the South China Sea Conflict: Sovereignty Belongs to China 
China Review News, 
August 27, 2011    
In responding to divergent views about the South China Sea conflict, Qiushi Theory, the online version of Qiushi Journal, published a commentary stating that the precondition to any discussion is that China has sovereignty over the area. After that is agreed upon, there can be discussions among the countries involved on putting aside conflicts and collectively exploring resources.
Recently, there have been different views in China on how to handle the South China Sea conflict. One side thinks China should exercise self control and continue to find the strategic opportunity, while the other side thinks China should stand firm with the option of resorting to war. The commentary stated, “To those who disagree that sovereignty belongs to China, no matter who they are, China should hold a firm position and maintain its options, including war, to guard China’s rights. … For China to exercise self-control does not help to solve the problem.”
The commentary also stated, “China is firmly against those countries who are not part of the conflict getting involved. China is also against any action that will spread the conflict further in international society.”

http://gb.chinareviewnews.com/doc/1018/1/3/1/101813174.html?coluid=169&kindid=0&docid=101813174&mdate=0827002412

A move from Beijing through Moscow

It is clear from this article of the People's Daily that the move to offer Moscow's services for mediating between Dharamsala and Beijing has been made in consultation with Beijing.
The trick is that if the Dalai Lama accepts, he will have to even renounce 'genuine autonomy' for Tibet. No politics, says Lavrov.
And Beijing "has highly praised Russia's position", says the People's Daily.


Russian Foreign Minister calls Dalai Lama symbol of 'Tibet independence'
The People's Daily online
May 21, 2010 
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov held two discussions during the recent week on Russia's position on the Dalai Lama issue, noting that Russia is opposed to linking religious issues with politics, according to a report by the Global Times on May 21.
The foreign minister held the talks because there has been some domestic controversy on whether Russia should contact the Dalai Lama after the Russian Foreign Ministry refused a visit application from the Dalai Lama to its Republic of Kalmykia.
Lavrov said the Dalai Lama has always attempted to take advantage of his religious role to meet goals that have nothing to do with religion. In the eyes of numerous foreigners, the Dalai Lama has become a symbol of the "Tibet independence."
In response to Lavrov's remarks, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Ma Zhaoxu said on May 20 that as China's strategic partner, Russia has always firmly supported China's positions and principles on Tibet-related issues. China has highly praised Russia's position.
According to a report by Russia-based Interfax on May 20, Lavrov said on May 19 at the State Duma, the lower house of the Federal Assembly, that the normalization of relations between China and the Dalai Lama mainly depends on the Dalai Lama's stance.
"China has sufficient reasons not to resume contact with the Dalai Lama as long as he continues to make provocative statements and engage in political activities," Lavrov said.
Whether the Dalai Lama acknowledges this or not, he has become a symbol of "Tibet independence."

Tibetans lack political backing and China is unbending

The second part of review of my book on the Negotiations that never were, written by Madhuri Sondhi appeared in The Organiser. Click and read.

New Talks in Beijing

This follows the Special Meeting on Tibet chaired by President Hu Jintao on January 8. Hu spoke of a Tibet with 'Chinese characteristics and Tibetan flavor'. A bit frightening. It is doubtful if this ninth round of talks can bring any substantial progress, particularly after the recent posting of a tough administrator with PLA background  as Governor of Tibet.  

Press Statement
January 25th 2010
His Holiness the Dalai Lama’s Special Envoy Lodi G. Gyari and Envoy Kelsang Gyaltsen will arrive in China tomorrow for discussions with the representatives of the Chinese leadership. This is the ninth round of dialogue. The Envoys are visiting China after a gap of 15 months in the process that began in 2002.
They will be accompanied by senior assistants Tenzin P. Atisha, Bhuchung K. Tsering, both members of Tibetan Task Force on Negotiations, and Jigmey Passang from the Secretariat of the Tibetan Task Force.
At a two day meeting of the Tibetan Task Force in Dharamsala chaired by Kalon Tripa, Prof. Samdhong Rinpoche, the Tibetan delegation finalised their preparations for the discussions in Beijing. On January 22, 2010 the Kalon Tripa and the two Envoys briefed His Holiness the Dalai Lama and sought his guidance.
The delegation is expected to return to India at the beginning of next month. 
Chhime R. Chhoekyapa
Secretary to His Holiness the Dalai Lama

Glimmer of hope for Tibetans

The Pioneer published in his Edit Page some extracts of my book The Negotiations that never were.
Here is the link.


The Pioneer
January 8, 2010 |
Glimmer of hope for Tibetans
As we enter a new decade of the 21st century, can there be “understanding and far-sightedness” on the part of the regime in Beijing towards resolving the Tibetan dispute? The three-decade-long history of ‘negotiations’ between Dharamsala and Beijing is indicative of China’s intentions. The traffic has been one-way. The more the Dalai Lama has tried to arrive at a compromise with China, the more the Chinese have held to their position or even backtracked (as in the case of “everything except independence”).
So, is there any hope for Tibetans in Tibet and those living in exile? The only change in view is a change inside China. Interestingly, a report prepared by a Chinese think-tank, Open Constitution Initiative or Beijing Gongmeng Consulting, on the 2008 riots in Tibet is an eye-opener. It entirely contradicts the Chinese Communist Party’s official version. The authors, Li Kun, Huang Li, Li Xiang and Wang Hongzhe, are lawyers “committed to building a modernised China and promoting human rights, democracy, and rule of law in China.”
Their research team spent a month in Tibet “interviewing Tibetan monks, nomads, farmers, scholars, migrants, artists, and business people”. Their objective was to come into personal contact with voices which can give “a clear and objective outline of ordinary people’s living conditions in Tibetan areas”.
The lawyers have pointed out “major errors in Government policy” after the March-April 2008 protests. One was ‘over-propagandising of violence’; another, encouragement of racist sentiment towards Tibetans: “The excessive response of the Government all over Tibet was to regard every tree and blade of grass as a potential enemy soldier.”
According to them, this has further strained the relations between the local Tibetans and the Han immigrants. One of their conclusions is: “Understanding is a precondition for discussion, unity and development. If the promotion of healthy development in Tibetan areas is truly desired then there must be a change in thinking and an adjustment in thinking behind the current nationality theories and policies.”
‘Stability in ethnic areas’ has for a long time been essential to the Central Government policies. The leadership in Beijing (and probably even more the PLA) has emphasised the importance of stability to ‘defend China’s borders’. Soon after the Tiananmen massacre, in October 1989, the Summary of the Central Politburo Standing Committee’s Forum on Tibet Work pointed out two main issues ‘to firmly grasp the Tibet work’: Stability of the political situation and economic development. Since then the dual mantra has been constantly repeated, though ‘stability’ has never been achieved. The lawyers’ report has tried to find out why.
According to them, one of the issues which makes Tibet (and China) so unstable is the emergence of a new aristocracy. The Chinese Revolution is supposed to have wiped out the old aristocracy and emancipated the masses. This has not happened.
The report has found that in Tibet, the difficult terrain has created “locally fixed power networks, which inevitably lead to a high incidence of corruption and dereliction of duty”. For the Chinese lawyers, this new aristocracy, which is ‘legitimised by the Party’, is even more powerful than the old one.
The report analyses in detail the rapport between the new aristocracy and the masses: “There is a lack of any effective supervision over the local officials. …’Foreign forces’ and ‘Tibet independence’ are used by many local officials as fig leaves to conceal their mistakes in governance and to repress social discontent… elevating everything to the level of splittist forces in order to conceal their errors.” The final conclusions are not far from the Tibetan diaspora’s views: “Earnestly listen to the voices of ordinary Tibetans and respect and protect each of the Tibetan people’s rights and interests.”
Regarding ‘stability’, the lawyers’ conclusions are lucid: “Due to the special nature of the political environment in Tibetan areas, ‘stability’ in the state’s Tibet policies has special significance. The Centre considers that, ‘If there is not a stable social environment, then all talk of development is empty.’ Even though ‘development and stability’ are the two trains of thought for Government work in ethnic areas, in the actual exercise of power, ‘stability’ takes on an overwhelming importance.”
The problem, according to the report, is that “there are many people who have learned how to use stability to protect themselves”. A similar conclusion was arrived at in the 70,000-character petition sent by the previous Panchen Lama to Premier Zhou Enlai in 1962, for which the former spent 17 years in jail.
Negotiations are complicated by the fact that a solution for Tibet would have to apply to the 55 other nationalities of the People’s Republic of China. Beijing is clearly not ready to take the jump.
During the ‘General Meeting’ called by the Dalai Lama in November 2008 to assert the opinion of the Tibetans on the future of negotiations with China, a majority were said to be ready to follow the Tibetan leader in his ‘Middle-Path Approach’. But it appears that the Dalai Lama is now trying another strategy: As the present authoritarian regime in Beijing has not shown any signs of “understanding and far-sightedness”, he has begun to enlarge his personal contacts with the people of China.
In this context, a first Sino-Tibetan Conference called ‘Finding Common Ground’ was organised between August 6 and 9 last year in Geneva. In his address, the Dalai Lama pleaded with the Chinese participants: “I have two appeals to our Chinese brothers and sisters who are participating in this conference. First, I seek your advice and frank opinions on what steps to take in future to solve the Tibetan problem. Secondly, I request your help in carrying a message to the Chinese people that we Tibetans harbour no hatred against our Chinese brothers and sisters, and that we Tibetans are neither anti-Chinese nor anti-China.”
The conclusions of the conference, attended by Chinese and Tibetan scholars, educators, writers and human rights advocates, were hopeful: “The common wish of this Sino-Tibetan conference is for the Tibetan people to regain freedom and to prevent the extinction of Tibetan culture. We share a fundamental belief: Freedom is the highest value; Tibetan culture is a precious treasure among the many cultures of humanity. Without freedom for Tibet, there will be no freedom for China. The extinction of Tibetan culture would not only be a tragedy for the Tibetan people, but would be a disgrace for the Chinese people and an irreplaceable loss for the whole of humanity.”
Will this new strategy work better than the previous one?