Double Standards with Chinese Characteristics

My article Double Standards with Chinese Characteristics appeared in Chanyaka Forum

Here is the link...

June 15 is a special day in the Middle Kingdom; it is the birthday of the Secretary General of the Communist Party of China.
In 2020, probably wanting to please China’s new emperor, an officer of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) tried to change the boundary in the Galwan sector and advance the Line of Actual Control (LAC).
A day before, some Chinese soldiers led by Col Qi Faobo, erected tents and an observation post on the LAC in contravention of an agreement arrived a week earlier.
Soon after, Colonel Santosh Babu, Commanding Officer (CO) of 16 Bihar regiment was ordered to make sure that the PLA vacate the post which had previously not been under their possession. He was brutally attacked and killed. The jawans of 16 Bihar decided to take revenge; thereafter followed a free for all.
India immediately admitted to 20 casualties while the Chinese did not acknowledge any (later they said four soldiers had been ‘martyred’). According to different sources (Indian and foreign) some 40-45 Chinese died that day (an investigative report by the Australian newspaper The Klaxon recently said that 38 Chinese troops were for sure drowned in the early stages of the face-off).

Do you think that any remorse has been expressed by the Chinese leadership over the incident?
No, and two years later, China still denies the undeniable facts, while Beijing still hides the number of Chinese casualties; Qi Fabao has now become a decorated hero in China. He was one of the torchbearers for the Winter Olympics 2022 and promoted Senior Colonel and Political Commissar of the Ngari Sub-Military District, opposing India in Eastern Ladakh.

China Celebrates
On the occasion of the second anniversary of the Galwan clash, the China Central Television’s military channel released a video of Chen Xiangrong, “one of the martyrs who sacrificed his life for the defense of the Chinese territory during the border standoff with India in 2020.”
The propaganda article says: “Chen Xiangrong died at the age of 19, and the fighting slogan ‘My pure love is only for China’ written by Chen inspires thousands of millions of Chinese people. After two years, many expressed their remembrance for those young heroes.”
On June 15, 2022, the Southern Xinjiang Military District commemorated its four ‘border defense heroes’ in order to “inspire officers and soldiers to train and prepare for war,” says The Global Times.
Wang Zhuoran, another of the martyrs “who sacrificed his life to safeguard national sovereignty and territory in the clash, shared the story of the hero [Chen], inspiring other officers and soldiers to learn from him, practice skills, and fight for the motherland and the people.”
What about the thirty-five or so other casualties? Not a word. The Chinese propaganda does not speak of them; they do not exist.
A reenactment of the battle was even staged showing how the ‘heroes’ defended the country, Beijing reiterating: “Four Chinese officers and soldiers sacrificed their lives, and one was seriously injured during the incident.…In desperation, the border guards resolutely fought back the aggression, achieving major victories and effectively safeguarding national sovereignty and territorial integrity.”
As often in Middle Kingdom, truth is the first casualty.

The Sino-Indian Relations Today
If one was to reduce the Sino-Indian relations to one fundamental issue, it could be that China has (and will) never take the blame for any wrongs it did in 1962, in 2017 or 2020.
On the contrary since two years, Beijing has constantly blamed New Delhi for starting the standoff along the LAC in Eastern Ladakh. It is what China’s Defence Minister, General Wei Fenghe did again at the recently-held Shangri-la Dialogue in Singapore.
Wei, who is also State Councilor, affirmed: “China and India are neighbours. Maintaining a good relationship meets the interests of both countries and that is what we are working on.…But on frictions along the border areas, the merits of the issue is clear.”
General Fenghe went on to say that India and China have held 15 rounds of Corps Commander level negotiations and the two sides are “working for peace” in the region.
‘Working for peace’ without admitting the wrong, is not conducive to a sustainable solution.

About Taiwan
Regarding Taiwan, Wei sent the ‘strongest warning’ to US, saying that Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy will fail to divide the region; according to The Global Times, “the Chinese armed forces will fight to the very end if anyone dares to split Taiwan from China.”
Wei affirmed that the island was part of China and “the Taiwan question is China’s internal affair. China will definitely realize its reunification.”
Quoting experts The Global Times noted: “it is necessary to send a clear warning to the US, and even if the US ignores the warning and continues its dangerous moves or even crosses the red line, China is ready to solve the Taiwan question once and for all, whether the process is peaceful or by force.”
After his speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue, Gen Wei declared: “Let me be frank. China’s policy on nuclear power is consistent. We use it for self-defense, we will not be the first to use nuclear power.…We develop nuclear capabilities to protect the peaceful hard work of the Chinese people and to protect our country from the scourge of war, particularly nuclear war.”

China is indeed a very peaceful nation!

Preaching for a Global Community with a Shared Future
In recent times, Xi Jinping has repeatedly pleaded for “a global community with a shared future.”
In January 2022, Wang Yi, China’s Foreign Minister asserted: “[Xi] is personally involved in the planning and successful conduct of head-of-state diplomacy. …The endeavor to build a community with a shared future for mankind, a vision radiating the light of truth in a changing world, made progress across the board, from Latin America and the Caribbean to the Middle East, from BRICS to the United Nations (UN), and from ecological conservation to digital governance.”
Incidentally, since 2018, the phrase “a community with a shared future for mankind” is now enshrined in the preamble of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China.
Those who believe that a quick solution could be found in Ladakh, should think of this; China is constantly engaged in plain double talk.

The Refusal to Admit the Facts
All this does not augur well for the 16th round of talks to be soon held between the Senior Army Commanders in Moldo/Chushul. It is clear that China will not admit its guilt and therefore will refuse to disengage, particularly in Depsang and Hot Springs, especially a few months before the 20th Congress in Beijing which may witness tsunamic changes in China.
The refusal to admit historical facts has another aspect: if China admitted to have crossed the line in Ladakh, the Emperor would lose face and would be forced to acknowledge that he acts contrary to his own preaching about the ‘peaceful rise of China’.

The Case of 1962
Take the 1962 border war with China, which, in a few months, is going to be celebrated in a grandiose way in Beijing, by putting the entire blame on India; it has already been announced that Zhang Xiaokang, the daughter of Gen Zhang Guohua, the commander of the Tibetan Military Region in 1962 is planning to publish a book: One Hundred Questions on the Self-Defense Counterattack on the China-India Border.
The book is based on interviews with veterans who participated in the War; Zhang is said to have collected “first-hand information, reflecting the counterattack in a panoramic manner, especially telling the heroes, meritorious soldiers, martyrs, wounded and other [stories].”
An introduction to the book says: “Although a sixty years has passed since this war, it has not been forgotten with the passage of time, and generations of soldiers and military fans have always been interested in this counterattack. She will explain “how could [China’s] army wipe out more than seven brigades of the Indians’ most elite ace force in just a few days when they did not have much advantage in terms of strength and firepower?”
Unfortunately, the leadership in Delhi does not see the interest for India to highlight the glorious battles fought by the Indian Army on the Namkha chu (2 Rajput), in Walong, Rezang-la or elsewhere.

It probably means another battle won for the Chinese propaganda.

About the Land Dispute with Nepal

Survey of India map (1943)

On May 8, 2020, an argument erupted between India and Nepal; the immediate reason which triggered the debate was an 80 km road between Darchula to Lipulekh, the border pass near the trijunction with Tibet and Nepal, inaugurated by Defence Minister Rajnath Singh.
The road is to be used by the Indian pilgrims visiting Kailash-Mansarovar, located some 90km from the pass, as well as the local traders; Lipulekh being one of the three landports between India and China. Strategically, this road is also crucial for India.
PTI then explained: “The Lipulekh pass is a far western point near Kalapani, a disputed border area between Nepal and India. Both India and Nepal claim Kalapani as an integral part of their territory.”
Kathmandu handed over a diplomatic note protesting against the construction of the road to Vinaya Mohan Kwatra, the Indian Ambassador to Nepal; Kwatra was subsequently called by Pradeep Kumar Gyawali, Nepal’s Foreign Minister, who lodged a protest.
It is only very late that the Nepali realize that there was a dispute. 

In 1998, the CPN-ML faction led by Bam Dev Gautam started claiming some Indian territory in the vicinity of Kalapani as Nepalese; one of the main actors was Buddhi Narayan Shrestha, the former Director General of the Land Survey Department. According to him, the ‘Kali River’ is in fact the Kuthi Yankti river that arises below the Limpiyadhura range and not the one earlier accepted by India, China and Nepal.
It is how Nepal began claiming an entire area of Kumaon up to the Kuthi Valley, some 400 km2 in total.
But up to 2000, the Nepalese government kept quiet and did not push for these demands.
In a statement to the Indian Parliament in 2000, the Indian foreign minister Jaswant Singh suggested that Nepal had questioned the source of the Kalapani river, while denying that it was a dispute.
Unfortunately, on May 20, 2020, Nepal for the first time released a map incorporating the Maoist claims; it showed the entire area to the east of Kuthi Yankti river as part of their territory. To make it worse, on June 13, a bill seeking to give legal status to the new map was unanimously approved by the lower house in the Nepal Parliament.

The Road to Kailash
In May 2020, India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) denied that the road was crossing Nepal’s territory: “The recently inaugurated road section in Pithoragarh district in the state of Uttarakhand lies completely within the territory of India. The road follows the pre-existing route used by the pilgrims of the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra,” said South Block.
Already in November last year, Kathmandu had protested, “unilateral decisions on border issues won’t be accepted,” it was in reference to the new Political Map of India published by Delhi after two new Union Territories - Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh - came into existence on October 31.
Kathmandu formally protested over the inclusion of the Kalapani area in the new map.
What is strange is that the new Indian map is exactly the same than the one published in 1954 in the Atlas of the Northern Frontiers of India, which is the official reference till today for India’s boundaries. Kathmandu did not protest against the old map and apart from the new UTs, there was nothing new in the 2019 maps.
The case is complicated by different factors; amongst them the political struggle within the ruling party in Nepal and also the fact that there has been no historical consistency in Kathmandu’s position.
Let us look at the history.

Tracing the History
After a War between British India and Nepal in 1814, the Nepalis were sent back across the Kali River in May 1815 and subsequently the Segowli Treaty was signed on March 4, 1816. Article 5 of the Treaty stated: “The Rajah of Nepaul renounces for himself, his heirs and successors, all claim to or connexion with the countries lying to the West of the River Kali, and engages never to have any concern with those countries or the inhabitants thereof.”
Unfortunately, there was no map attached which could have authoritatively shown the exact alignment and the source of the Kali River.
In any case, at that time, no scientific survey worth the name could be carried out; it was only by mid-19th century that the Himalayan border was first surveyed by the Great Trigonometrical Survey of India (a precursor of the Survey of India), in a more scientific manner.

General Conwan’s Take
General Sam Cowan, a retired British general, studied Nepal through his British Gurkha connections and his extensive trekking in the country, wrote in 2015 a well-researched article. There is no doubt that due to his long service with the Gurkhas, Conwan’s sympathies lies with Nepal; his arguments are interesting nevertheless.
Long before the issue of Kalapani erupted, he observes: “A further major complication for Nepal is that India rejects the claim that the river from Lipu Lekh is the renamed Kali River. It asserts, and claims that it has maps and diagrams to prove it, presumably based on the 1879 map, that the river Kali begins from the junction of the river that flows from Lipu Lekh and a stream that flows from springs in Kalapani. Hence, the earlier quote from the Indian pilgrim that “Kalapani …is supposed to be the origin of River Kali.”
According to Conwan: “The date on which this Kalapani stream first appeared on maps is disputed, but, whatever the maps show or do not show, the ground reality is that Indian security forces occupy the area of Kalapani to the east of the river, which traditionally has been regarded as the Nepali side.
We shall come back to this.

The 1879 Survey of India Map

The general says: “What is the value of doing so? There is evidence that the Indians first used Kalapani simply because it was the only piece of flat land in the area to establish a rudimentary camp to cover the approach to Lipu Lekh. At a later stage they must have come to realize that under the complexities of riparian water rights their claim to control the headwaters of the Mahakali River would be strengthened by their occupation of Kalapani. At the military and security level, answers can only be speculative, but presumably the thinking is that an Indian security presence there helps to balance the Chinese security force presence in Taklakot just a short distance away over Lipu Lekh. There may also be an intelligence advantage.”
The British ‘Gurkha’ general brings another issue; the realignment of the border with the watershed; he points out: “There is one other significant consequence of India’s occupation of Kalapani. As the map shows, India has used its argument on the origin of the Kali river, and its occupation of the site, to claim a frontier line which corresponds to the 1879 map, in following a ridge line (‘Kali river watershed’ on map) that runs from just south of Kalapani to a point slightly to the west of Tinker Pass, which is about 5 kilometers east, southeast of Lipu Lekh. Tinker Pass is the location of Pillar Number 1 of 79 marking the Sino-Nepal Border. Nepal maintains that the tri-junction should be at Lipu Lekh, where Pillar Number 0 should be placed. However, for the present, the reality is that the India-Nepal-China tri-junction is de facto just to the west of Border Pillar Number 1.”

The Watershed at Kalapani

He comments on a Google map: “the top red line, which follows the river up from Kalapani to Nabhidhang toward Lipu Lekh, shows the border that appeared in maps after the 1860s and in the Panchayat era. The lower red line, which follows a watershed from Kalapani to a tri-junction on the main ridge to the north, indicates India’s view of where the border runs. An 1879 map shows this border, as does a map produced by the Government of Nepal in 1960. This shows in more detail where India considers the India-Nepal-China tri-junction should be, just to the west of the Tinker Pass. Lipu Lekh is 5 kilometers further west along the ridge.”
However Conwan can only admit: “Nepal’s case for Kalapani has been badly undermined by long years of silence on the issue by the country’s leaders. Some key related questions make that clear. When did India first occupy Kalapani? Who in Kathmandu knew what, and when? What did they do about it?”
The British general also mentioned the historic trading pass of Urai Lekh “with Nepal and the Seti gorge on the right and the trail into Tibet on the left. It is the site of Border Pillar Number 2.” He said that Sydney Wignall (see my article on Sydney Wignall) used this pass when illegally entering Tibet in the late autumn of 1955. They were forced to return by the same route in winter.”

The Border in the 1950s
Interestingly, in the early 1950s, the Indian police already manned a check-post at Kalapani. In his diary, Lakshman Singh Jangpangi, the Indian Trade Agent in Gartok wrote: “July 10, 1955. I could not start on 9th, as my clerk suddenly ran a very high temperature and was unable to leave his bed. I called local Ayurvedic doctor who gave him some medicine. The Compounder was sent with the advance party on 6th. This clerk was today better and fit to travel, I started and camped at Kalapani near Police Post. A section of P.A.C. [Provincial Armed Constabulary] under Subedar Sher Singh has been stationed here since 28th June 1955. This post is about 8 miles below the pass and a patrol party occasionally goes up to the pass. There is plentiful supply of firewood and water here. They are living in two single-fly tents and Subdear has constructed a small mud but for himself which leaks very badly in rainy weather. The Garbyang villagers have cultivated land close to the post. Besides passing caravans they have no other company or activities. I saw them keeping busy in collecting firewood and making Subedar’s hut livable.”
Due to heavy rainfall “which continued more than 14 hours starting from 2 am to 5 pm,” Jangpangi stayed one more day at the check-post.
The police post had probably been set in 1952 by the Uttar Pradesh’s government.
There was then no question of dispute, especially after the "Agreement on trade and intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India", was signed on April 28, 1954 in Beijing: “Pilgrims customarily visiting Lhasa may continue to do so in accordance with custom. Article IV Traders and Pilgrims of both countries may travel by the following passes and route : (1) Shipki La pass, (2) Mana pass, (3) Niti pass, (4) Kungri Bingri pass, (5) Darma pass and (6) Lipu Lekh pass.”
There was no doubt about it.

Pillar No 1 corresponds to the India stand

The 1961 Sino-Nepal Treaty
Interestingly, the “Boundary Treaty between the People's Republic of China and the Kingdom of Nepal” signed by President Liu Shaoqi of China and King Mahendra of Nepal on October 5, 1961 shows the Kali river as per the Indian stand: “The Chairman of the People's Republic of China and His Majesty the King of Nepal, being of the agreed opinion that a formal settlement of the question of the boundary between China and Nepal is of fundamental interest to the peoples of the two countries,” said the preamble.
Article I (1) defined the China-Nepal boundary line which “starts from the point where the watershed between the Kali River and the Tinkar River meets the watershed between the tributaries of the Mapchu (Karnali) River on the one hand and the Tinkar River on the other hand…”
Even more telling are the precise maps attached to the Treaty and signed by both parties; Kathmandu seems to have forgotten that the location of river on the maps of the Sino-Nepali treaty matches with the Indian one, which implies that the road is on Indian territory.
What is however disputed and needs to be negotiated is the area south of the river, where the British (and later Indian) cartographers have taken into account, like everywhere else on the frontiers, the watershed principle as well as the land revenues of Gunji village on the Indian side.
More of such examples of Kathmandu’s inconstancy could be cited.
What presently compounds the issue is the rift within the ruling party’s leadership in Nepal and the role played by China through Hou Yanqi, Beijing’s Ambassador to Kathmandu, the new ‘Queen’ of Nepal, who is credited to have arranged a rapprochement at the top level of the ruling Nepal Communist Party.

The Sino-Nepal Treaty reinforcing India's Stand

Mao’s Blessings
A Nepali author, Birat Anupam cites historical documents in an article entitled “Nepal-China Boundary Treaty: An example of peaceful Himalayan frontiers;” he quotes a discussion between Mao Zedong and King Mahendra of Nepal. Here is the exchange:
The author notes that it was “a snippet of the candid conversation between founding father of People’s Republic of China and Nepal’s the then king Mahendra on the historic Nepal-China Border Treaty day of 5 October 1961.”
The conversation on the Treaty goes like this:

Mao and King Mahendra in 1961

Chairman Mao: How is everything with Your Excellency? Have all the problems been solved?
King Mahendra: Everything is settled.
Chairman Mao: Fair and reasonable?
King Mahendra: Yes. We all agree.
Chairman Mao: It is good that we agree. There is goodwill on both sides. We hope that will get along well, and you hope we shall get along well too. We do not want to harm you, nor do you want to harm us.
King Mahendra: We fully understand.
Chairman Mao: We are equals; we cannot say one country is superior or inferior to the other.
King Mahendra: We very much appreciate the way of speaking.

This conversation was published in a book titled ‘Mao Zedung On Diplomacy’.
It was a propaganda work compiled by The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China and published by Foreign Languages Press in Beijing in 1998; it however shows that the 1961 Treaty had the blessings of the Great Helmsman.
The Nepali author, forgetting that the 1961 Treaty coincides with India’s stand on the dispute, writes: “This conversation, from the verbatim records, speaks volumes about the level of trust and the height of friendship between two neighbors Nepal and China.”

King Birendra’s visit to China in 1978
King Birendra, Mahendra’s son visited China in 1978.
On May 14, 1978, at the State banquet, the King asserted: “I recall with particular satisfaction, Your Excellency, the wide and cordial exchange of views with you at Chengtu in 1976 and the recent discussions and exchanges with His Excellency Vice-Premier Teng Hsiao-ping [Deng Xiaoping] when he paid a visit to Nepal, earlier this year: I believe these exchanges have gone a long way to deepen friendship between our two countries, a friendship which has its roots in history as well as-in the great efforts that the late Chairman Mao, the late Premier Chou En-lai and, my august father, the late King Mahendra made with far-sighted statesmanship…”
At that time, both countries were working to demarcate the border with 76 pillars.
On September 27, 1978, Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping gave a speech in honour of the vaster Nepalese Prime Minister KN Bista. His words were probably directed at the US: “Anybody who attempts to disrupt the peace and stability of this region will only end up by crushing his own toes with the rock he picks up to throw at others. So long as the people of all countries heighten their vigilance, strengthen their unity and persevere in struggle, they will certainly frustrate the aggressive and expansionist schemes of the superpowers.”
Nepal was then trying to promote the Zone of Peace, dear to the Nepalese King; Bista answered Deng: “His Majesty King Birendra who is firmly committed to development has realised the vital connection between development and peace for a small country like Nepal. For this reason, we have supported the idea of peace zones in critical areas and have ourselves suggested that Nepal be declared a zone of peace. We appreciate your understanding and support of this basic policy of ours.”
There was no question about the border.
In August 1979, King Birendra visited again China. A People's Daily editorial said: “China and Nepal have long been good friends and neighbours. The friendly and good neighbourly relations between China and Nepal set an example for what may be achieved in the relations between countries. His Majesty King Birendra himself has visited China on many occasions…”
The editorial praised the government and people of Nepal for their adherence to the principle of maintaining independence and state sovereignty and for the successes they have achieved under the leadership of King Birendra in developing agriculture and small and medium scale industry.
During the same visit, the border agreed and demarcated in 1961 was ratified and therefore the Indian stand was confirmed.
At the banquet given in honour of King Birendra on August 27, the Chinese Premier Hua Guofeng praised Nepal “for the positive contribution she had made to the non-aligned movement as a founding member of the movement. He said: "We are happy to note that persisting in opposing imperialism, colonialism, racism and all forms of foreign domination and hegemony and supporting the efforts of the small and weak nations to take their destiny into their own hands, the non-aligned movement has played an important role in international affairs and its ranks have kept expanding.”
Hua added: “Sino-Nepalese friendly relations and cooperation have become a model of good-neighbourly relations based on the five .principles of peaceful coexistence.
He then mentioned the border: "We are most appreciative to His Majesty King Birendra for the important contributions he has made to promote Sino-Nepalese friendship. Over the past year or so, our two countries have completed the joint inspection and have thus further consolidated our common boundary of peace and friendship. The border inhabitants on both sides of the boundary line have lived in amity for generations with frequent contacts between them. We are sure that through the joint efforts of our two sides, Sino-Nepalese friendship will grow stronger and develop steadily…”

The 1961 Line agreed by China and Nepal

The border as shown in 1961 map was officially confirmed.
On November 21, 1979, the China-Nepal border protocol was signed.
In reply to a question whether the Nepal-China boundary had been settled finally, Huang Hua said that "in fact the boundary question was settled long ago. But now the joint boundary inspection committee had perfected the understanding of the line so that it is the more accurate basis."
The signing of the boundary protocol further proves that there existed peace on the boundary and friendship and cooperation between the two countries.
Hua described the border protocol as "adding something new to the annals of Sino-Nepalese friendship and setting once again a good example of how bilateral ties could be developed through friendly consultations on the basis of equality and cooperation. Protocol is a significant document achieving accurate demarcation of the boundary line between Nepal and China."
He said China would support just causes of the people of all countries in safeguarding their national independence and sovereignty, in opposing foreign interference, domination and hegemonism and in defending world peace. China appreciated and supported all efforts of the government of Nepal in up-holding the cause of peace."
Does China deny today that these exchanges took place?
The border has been the traditional frontier for decades and it has never been objected by China or Nepal.

Other proofs in favour of India’s Stand
Shyam Saran, who was the Indian Ambassador to Nepal from 2000 to 2004, cited the case of the then Prime Minister of Nepal Kirti Nidhi Bisht, who in 1969, demanded that India military personnel manning 17 villages along the Nepal-Tibet border since the early 1950s should be withdrawn. According to the National Panchayat record, Bisht said: “The Minister informed that the check posts manned by the Indian nationals exist in seventeen villages — Gumsha, Mustang, Namche Bazar, Lamabagar, Kodari, Thula, Thumshe, Thulo, Olanchung Dola, Mugu,Simikot, Tin Kar, Chepuwa, Jhumshung, Pushu, Basuwa and Selubash.” Saran rightly pointed out: “If Lipu Lekh and Kalapani were on Nepali territory then why were they omitted from the list?”
The former Foreign Secretary added: “I have pointed out earlier that the argument that the omission was due to Nepali ‘magnanimity’ taking into account India’s security concerns vis-à-vis China is laughable. The withdrawal of Indian military personnel from the Nepal-Tibet border was precisely to win brownie points with China.”
The Memorandum between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Resumption of Border Trade signed on 13 December 1991, and Protocol on Entry and Exit Procedures for Border Trade, signed on July 1, 1992 are other example; it confirms that China agreed to the border in this area.
The Trade Protocol between the two countries provided for expansion and diversification of trade between the two countries. “...Both sides have agreed to encourage direct trade between the two countries. They have also agreed to promote the exchange of delegations in specific areas and to encourage their respective trade organisations and traders to explore possibilities of promoting bilateral trade through various forms of trade and cooperation.” It was the first time that a pass reopened after the 1962 Indo-China war and the subsequent shutting down of the Himalayan borders.
For China, the border pass was (and still is today) Lipulekh.

New Map of Nepal rejected by India

Some other evidences
Why was the 'dispute' not solved earlier with India and Nepal having a joint commission to sort out the issue?
Many feel that Nepal is not confident enough about the veracity of its claim. Shyam Saran noted: “While I was in Nepal as ambassador, a request was made to put the issue on the agenda of the foreign secretary level talks held in 2003 but without any expectation of actual discussion. When we conveyed our readiness to have a substantive discussion on the treaty revision, the agenda item was dropped by the Nepali side. The purpose was to merely show that the Nepali side was taking up the issue seriously with India.”
Maj Gen Vinaya Chandran, who is doing a PhD on Nepal and earlier served in Military Operation Directorate, further commented for stratnewsglobal: “Historical and geographical facts are inconclusive, as is the case in many international boundaries, that are colonial legacies. Only way out appears to be an adjudication by the ICJ [International Court of Justice] and that can happen only if both India and Nepal agree to take the matter to the ICJ and also accept the verdict even if it doesn’t conform to their respective claims. An analysis of legal standing of the issue, puts the Indian claim on a stronger ground.”
Some of India’s strong arguments have been listed.

What is the Issue?
The river Kali does not seem the real issue, but the area south of the river. General Chandran wrote: “Even if both sides accepts Lipulekh as the origin of Kali River, they need to resolve the issue of the start point of the boundary, which now is on the highest point of the Eastern shoulder of Lipulekh Pass. This is also the point from where the China – Nepal boundary starts. The India – Nepal boundary marked on Indian maps, run South from this point along the watershed and Joins the Kali River, South of Kalapani. The boundary in effect is running along the watershed and not along Kali River. This is an issue that need to be resolved bilaterally by India and Nepal.”
There is no doubt about the location of the river and the fact that the new road is inside Indian territory; it is however in Delhi’s interests to find an amicable solution with Nepal for the areas for which there is no agreement; it could avoid China poking its nose into the bilateral affairs between Delhi and Kathmandu in the future.

CIA Map of 1965

When Nehru meets the Dalai Lama

A circular of the Cabinet Secretary asking Indian ministers and officials not to attend a function for the Dalai Lama in Delhi, has been in the news.
While the controversy (and the MEA's kowtowing to China) continues to rage, it is interesting to look at the transcript of a talk between the Dalai Lama and Jawaharlal Nehru, the Prime Minister on India.
The encounter took place on April 16, 1961.
KL Mehta, Joint Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs took the notes.
A couple of weeks later (May 2), in a debate in the Lok Sabha, the Prime Minister was asked:

(a) whether the Dalai Lama visited New Delhi on the 15th April, this year for having some discussions with him; and
(b) if so, what were the subjects discussed?

During the course of the debate, Nehru stated:

It is the normal practice that when asylum is granted, it is done so subject to any condition that the country may think it necessary. The condition is that the soil of their country should not be used for any purposes opposed to them, which might get the country into trouble. It is a normal practice.

This is still valid today, though there are ways and ways to put this in practice.

Here is the transcript of the talks as published in the Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru (Volume 68, Series II). The subtitles are mine.

When Nehru meets the Dalai Lama

Introduction
The Prime Minister received His Holiness the Dalai Lama at P.M.'s House on Sunday April 16 and the talks lasted for over 90 minutes.
The Secretary General [RK Nehru ] was present.
Having thanked [the] P.M. for inviting him to Delhi, the Dalai Lama said that he had come to the conclusion that the only hope of preservation of Tibetan culture and religion now lies in those Tibetans especially children who have come to India.
The object of his visit to Delhi, therefore, was to discuss with the Prime Minister the various important problems dealing with the rehabilitation of Tibetan refugees with special reference to the drawing up a suitable programme for the education of young people, both boys and girls below 16 years in age.
The Dalai Lama added that as for the rest, broadly speaking, only two schemes have so far been finalised which cater for the rehabilitation of refugees as agriculturists.
One of these was being implemented in Mysore and the other in NEFA.

Nehru Speaks
The Prime Minister said that he wanted the Tibetans to grow up as an integrated community with due safeguards for the maintenance of their tradition, culture and religion.
He added that in order to make a proper assessment of the problem of rehabilitation, it was necessary to consider it in two or more parts.
He was himself specially interested in the education of the young people, and this, therefore, must assume topmost priority.
The Prime Minister wanted to make it clear that the Government of India had the responsibility to provide education to every Tibetan child of school-going age. The programme of education did not include just primary education, but also secondary education, and for those who would benefit from it, University education.
He had no doubt that the future of the Tibetans in India depended on the quality of education given to them, and it would be entirely artificial to lay down an upper limit in regard to the number of young people to the educated.
The Prime Minister emphasised that the education should be good, with due regard to the traditional background of Tibetans, and at the same time modem.
It was important to realise that whereas separate schools will be provided for primary education, and also at the secondary stage, the syllabus would have to be designed in such a way as to enable the students to join Indian polytechnics, and those likely to benefit from it also Indian Universities.
We could not obviously provide separate polytechnics and separate Universities for Tibetan children only.
Indeed having completed their secondary stage, it would not even be right for the Tibetan children to remain cut off from the rest of India.
The Prime Minister added that arrangements to provide religious instruction to Tibetan boys even at the University stage could be made separately, if the Dalai Lama so wished.
It must be understood, however, that the educational programme for Tibetans should be drawn up to ensure development of the Tibetan children along the lines of their genius, and also to ensure that the actual education given was fully modem in the sense that it equipped the boys and girls to join Indian Universities and Polytechnics in due course.

The Dalai Lama speaks
The Dalai Lama said that he was in full agreement with the sentiments expressed by the Prime Minister. He added that there were 3,000 Tibetan refugee children below the age of 16 in India at the moment. Arrangements have so far been made to provide education to only some 500 amongst them. He added that the help of the State Governments concerned such as Mysore, UP and Punjab would be necessary in running the schools, but at the same time it was essential that there should be a common approach in running all the Tibetan schools irrespective of where they happened to be situated.
After some discussion and after taking note of the fact that the Nursery School [started by Tsering Dolma, the Dalai Lama’s sister] at Dharamsala is now running on the whole satisfactorily, and that the UK ‘Save the Children Fund’ Project, recently discussed in Delhi by Lady Alexandra Metcalfe [daughter of Lord Curzon, former Governor-General of India] is to be started shortly, the Prime Minister felt that the entire question of drawing up of a programme of education for Tibetan children including the opening of schools, the drawing of syllabus, the production of text books and other such details, should be made the responsibility of a Committee to be set up in New Delhi.
The membership of the Committee would consist of a representative each from the Ministries of External Affairs and Education, and representative of the Dalai Lama.
To these, representatives of the State Governments concerned, viz. Mysore, UP, Punjab, Himachal Pradesh, NEFA and J&K would be invited as may be necessary from time to time.
This Committee will make policy, have a wide discretion, and take necessary steps to ensure that the decisions of the Government of India in such matters as the opening of schools, the training of teachers are being carried out according to the approved programme.
The Committee will have a Special Officer on a whole-time basis as its Secretary. This officer will go round looking after the schools, liaising with the Dalai Lama, and the State Governments concerned, and generally to assist the Committee in seeing that the decisions are being carried out.

The discussion
The Dalai Lama expressed himself wholly willing to give his fullest co-operation to the Committee and to nominate his representative on it.
The Prime Minister directed me [KL Mehta] to call on the Education Minister to inform him with the list of discussion that had taken place and also to seek his advice in regard to the constitution of the proposed Committee.
The Prime Minister emphasised that this policy Committee will consider the problem as a whole. The Committee will also consider that what to do with Tibetan refugees in the age group of 16-20 to which the Dalai Lama made a special reference. It might for example be possible to train them as technicians while others may be found jobs in factories and elsewhere.

To create a trust
In this connection, a reference was made to the Dalai Lama's offer to make available a sum of Rs 20 lakhs for being spent on the education of Tibetan refugees during the next 4 years.
The Prime Minister asked the Dalai Lama to consider whether he should not create a trust fund for the education of Tibetan refugees and generally towards the rehabilitation of these people. This would ensure that the funds are properly invested, and incidentally, this would also mean that the profits would be free from income-tax.
The Dalai Lama promised to consider this advice and added that as soon as this 4-year period was over, he hoped to earmark the profits of a pipe making factory in Bihar, which he has already started in Bihar, in co-operation with Indian businessmen and on the advice of an expert from Chicago.

[A question was asked in the Rajya Sabha on May 1, 1961: “The Government understands that the Dalai Lama has invested some money in a Cast Iron Spun Pipe factory but have no knowledge of the extent of the investment.”
The Prime Minister gave an oral answer: “It is quite possible that unscrupulous people will try to take advantage of any position like that. But I have no particular knowledge of any particular set of unscrupulous persons doing that. The Government have given him general advice suggesting that he should invest his savings or whatever he has in reliable undertakings. That is all the Government has done. But, as has been said, the Dalai Lama has started a cast iron pipe concern for producing cast iron pipes somewhere in the Hazaribagh district in Bihar and he has invested some money in it.]

The Dalai Lama expressed his heartfelt thanks to the Prime Minister for his views on the education of Tibetan refugees and expressed himself in whole-hearted agreement with the PM's views.

Settlement of the refugees
The Prime Minister then touched upon the question of settlement of refugees, who would not be covered by the education programme.
He said that we should go ahead with the settlement of 3,000 refugees in Mysore, and when this has been completed take up with the Mysore Government the question of settling another 2,000 if not more refugees in the forest areas nearby.
The Prime Minister gave his approval to the suggestion that a few more schemes on the lines of the Bhalukpung Scheme [A forest settlement for 500 Tibetan refugees about 40 miles from Tezpur] should be drawn up and implemented in other parts of NEFA. Similarly, we should re-double our efforts in settling refugees in Ladakh away from the border.
A reference was made to a recent suggestion from the Sikkim Durbar that they would rehabilitate 1,000 to 1,500 as agriculturists and tea-growers in Western Sikkim.
The Prime Minister enquired whether the promised scheme had been received from Sikkim.
The Prime Minister approved the suggestion that efforts should be made with the Government of Bhutan to settle refugees already in Bhutan and necessary financial and administrative help given to the Government of Bhutan.
[KL Mehta intervened] Rukmini Devi [Arundale, Rajya Sabha MP] told me some time ago that the Government of Madras would like to help in the task of rehabilitating Tibetan refugees. Enquiries may be made from that Government whether they are in a position to make land available for the settlement of Tibetan refugees.

Look after ourselves
Finally the Dalai Lama made a reference to the old and the infirm who do not depend on anyone and who should be looked after.
The Prime Minister felt that statistics of such people should be obtained and steps taken urgently to provide a home for them. This should be progressed further in consultation with the Dalai Lama.
The Prime Minister concluded by saying that it would greatly help in the understanding and solution of the question of rehabilitation of Tibetan refugees if the entire number, viz. 28,000 to 30,000 now in India are divided in various categories to determine how many amongst them would be absorbed in schools, in handicraft centres, as agriculturists, as workers on our road programme (and for how long) etc.
The lamas amongst the 28,000 to 30,000 refugees number 5,000.
The Dalai Lama said that of them 1,700 are already being looked after by Government. I mentioned that the required information under various head was available and that this would be further checked up and brought up- to-date in consultation with the Dalai Lama.
Separately the Prime Minister told me [KL Mehta] that he was dissatisfied with the progress achieved in implementing the programme of education for Tibetan children. He added that he attached the utmost importance to this question and wanted it to be known that the education to be given must be of good quality.

A letter to KN Katju, the Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh
On April 24, Nehru wrote to KN Katju: “There was one matter I wanted to talk to you about, but forgot to do so."

The Dalai Lama was here for a number of days discussing with us the question of rehabilitating the Tibetan refugees in India. There is no chance, as far as one can see, of their being able to return, to Tibet. I am particularly interested in the boys and girls receiving good education. Probably in the future these Tibetans who are now in India will be the only real Tibetans left.
We are making special arrangements for the education of those boys and girls. So far as the Lamas are concerned, they are being settled in two or three places near monasteries and the like.
The Dalai Lama has been anxious to have agricultural colonies of Tibetans. With the help of the Mysore Government, we have got a good place on the uplands near Coorg, about 3,000 feet high, for such a colony of 3,000 persons. Over a thousand have moved there already; others will go as soon as arrangements have been made. Possibly we might be able to increase this number to 5,000 in Mysore. I think this is likely to be a good colony.
But this does not exhaust the Tibetan agriculturists, and something more has to be done for them in the shape of colonies. The Dalai Lama particularly mentioned to me the possibility of some of them going to Madhya Pradesh. I told him that I would enquire
I want to know from you if there is any possibility of this.
It has to be remembered, however that they cannot be settled anywhere and everywhere. They cannot stand the great heat of our plains. They must, therefore, go to a place at a fair altitude where the heat is not very great. Mysore has suited them more or less because it is 3,000 feet high. Also it is no good sending very small numbers of them anywhere. The minimum number for some kind of a community life in a colony would be about 250 families, making a total of approximately 1,000 persons.
I should like to know if you think this is at all feasible anywhere in Madhya Pradesh where these two conditions can be satisfied. So far as the expenditure on such a project is concerned, that will be set entirely by the Central Government.

Report of the Officials of India and China on the Boundary Question (1961)

Map of the Central Sector (1900)

In order to better understand the long-pending border issue between India and China, I have posted on my website the Chinese part of the Report of the Officials of the Governments of India and the Peoples’ Republic of China on the Boundary Question of 1961.
I had earlier posted the Indian section that I had divided in 4 parts (to avoid to have to download too heavy files).
In the next few weeks, I will post the remaining sections of the Chinese report.
Part 1, Part 2 and Part 3 have been uploaded so far.

The last chance to avoid War?

As a way to better understand the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict, I am posting here a Memorandum of Conversation between Zhang Wenji, Director in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China and and the Indian Ambassador to China, G. Parthasarathy. 
This exchange, of a series of 3, occurred in Beijing in July 1961.
It will be the last serious discussion on the border issue last before the War, a year later.
This document comes from the Chinese archives (India still keeps the archival material related to the conflict close to its chest). 
It has been made available in the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (Collection: Sino-Pakistani Relations in the Cold War).

Memorandum of Three Conversations Between Director Zhang Wenji
and the Indian Ambassador. 
Secret Document 574  (Foreign Ministry Document)
File number: 105-01056-03
17 July 1961

Addressed are the future of Sino-Indian relations, Sino-Indian border issues, and India's focus on such issues as Bhutan, Sikkim and Pakistan 
Time: 17 July 1961, 9 a.m. – 12 p.m. Location: Shanghai Peace Hotel Translator: Chen Hui Stenographer: Li Danan

Zhang: Yesterday the Premier suggested to the Foreign Secretary that the two of us continue talks. Even though [this], as an informal, candid conversation between friends, cannot resolve issues, it too has advantages and is helpful in seeking solutions. The Ambassador has been in China for three years; [he] is conscientious about [his] work, and a person of integrity. During these three years, there have unfortunately been setbacks in the two countries’ relations; this is not [due to] personal factors. Before long the Ambassador will return to his country, and by coincidence the Foreign Secretary has come to China and the two sides have held talks. Now there are still a few days left: the Ambassador can have contact with the Foreign Ministry side, and exchange views and seek solutions. When the next ambassador comes, we hope we can also have more contact [with him]. Although things did not go as hoped during the Ambassador’s term, [he] has still made contributions toward cooperation between the two sides. Based on yesterday’s conversation, [our] initial impression is that, although there are frank and intense disagreements, there are several points on which [we] completely agree or are close to agreement, and these are:

1. Both countries have expressed the need for friendly [relations], and from a long-term point of view, friendship between the two countries will still prevail.
2. The situation over the last few years has been unsatisfactory, and both sides have differing views as to the cause, but both think we should adopt a positive attitude and improve relations with constructive steps, and at the very least not add to the difficulties or make the situation get worse.
3. In order to seek solutions and advance understanding together, the two sides both hope that each can feel and understand the other’s predicament; at the same time, each also need to put themselves in the other’s shoes and make allowances for them.

In today’s informal, friendly conversation, if the Ambassador has views he wishes to be conveyed to my countries’ leaders, [I] will be certain to report them faithfully and make [sure] that both sides have a correct understanding.

Parthasarathy: [I] welcome Director Zhang’s opening remarks. I am in almost total agreement with your assessment. The Foreign Secretary and I both consider the two sides’ free, candid talks to be the most beneficial ones. Although the disagreements have been somewhat intense, it is still better to speak what is on our minds. This is a vital matter involving the friendship of one billion people. We have a responsibility to promote the restoration of relations, [and] it is no good to not speak what is in our hearts. We have divided the issues into two aspects. One aspect is specific, predominant issues; [these] can be boiled down to border issues. Another aspect is other factors that have caused the two countries’ relations to worsen these two years. We feel that the Chinese leaders’ sentiments toward India lack understanding in some aspects. For example, on such issues as Bhutan, Sikkim, Pakistan, and criticism in the newspapers, the difference of opinions between the two sides has widened. China’s leaders gave a fairly lengthy explanation on the issue of criticism in the newspapers, making mention of their views and the reasons for criticism. What worries me are not the criticisms themselves, but whether they signify a change in [China’s] assessment of India. We two countries have different social and political systems, but [their] goal is still the same; it is only that the methods [we] use to attain that goal differ, that’s all. The reports in Chinese newspapers cause people to feel that there have been major changes in India’s domestic and foreign policies, as if India has become reactionary, no longer progressive. This is a lack of respect for India. It is very difficult to bring the two countries’ relations back to normal.
There are major differences of opinion on border issues, and it will require some time to be able to get agreement. Until then [we] should try to keep [our] differences of opinion on other fronts from widening. [We] must be in contact more, cooperate more, eliminate misunderstandings, and create a favorable atmosphere. Yesterday’s conversation was somewhat sharp, but that’s not at all to say that [the sides] did not consider the other side. [I will] now raise two or three points:
(1) Bhutan and Sikkim issues. Premier Zhou said, The Sino-Sikkimese borders were stipulated in a treaty in 1890, it is not a problem. But the Chinese side has not recognized India’s right to represent Bhutan and Sikkim[2]

Zhang: I very much appreciated the way you put it; there are disagreements, but [we] must consider things as a whole. As long as we [do so] for the sake of honesty, there is nothing to fear in talks being somewhat sharp. This is much better than mutual criticisms in official letter exchanges and in public opinion. [We] must not create public tension; the governments both feel pressured, [and it] runs counter to both sides’ desire for improvement. [As for] criticism in the newspapers, India’s criticisms far outnumber [China’s]; we don’t attach much importance to it. Our newspapers have also carried some news about India that is entirely of a reporting nature, [with] almost no comment. The Ambassador said that China has changed its assessment of India and holds that India has become reactionary. Yesterday the Foreign Secretary said India’s foreign policy has not essentially changed for the past 15 years. We welcome this promise. If one is to speak of any changes in both sides’ estimation of the other, one must first say that it is India that feels there has been a great change in China’s domestic and foreign policy. China’s national leaders have not voiced any objections whatsoever to India’s domestic and foreign policy. The Indian side says it does not know what changes there have been to Indian foreign policy. But judging from actual behavior, one cannot help but feel that there has been a change. When Sino-Indian relations were good, India held that China was interested in peace. But since last year, India’s leaders have repeatedly implied that China is keen on [having a] cold war. An Indian leader even said he did not know of any country that loved peace as much as a certain country does, nor did he know of any country that loves peace less than China does. As for China’s domestic policy, the deputy head of India’s Foreign Ministry, Mrs. Menon, once said that China is a concentration camp, a Hitler-style totalitarian regime. China’s leaders do not want to make direct criticisms of India. Yesterday, Vice-Premier Chen Yi raised the point that both sides should [try to] lessen the differences of opinion and do their best to find common points, reducing differences and preventing them from surfacing. The Ambassador says that the main focus should be on border issues; when Premier Zhou visited Delhi last year, it was in the very hopes that it would lead to a resolution of border issues. Over the past two years we have negotiated about borders with Burma and Nepal, and achieved resolution through friendly consultation. There has been development in relations with both [these] parties, as the Ambassador also knows.

Parthasarathy: I still do not have a precise enough understanding of some of the issues discussed yesterday. India has a right and a responsibility to represent Bhutan and Sikkim in handling foreign affairs; what is China’s attitude toward this?

Zhang: Yesterday, the Foreign Secretary raised this question under the subject of border issues. There are no problems between China and Sikkim in terms of borders. There are already stipulations [regarding them] in a late 19th-century agreement. With the exception of a small area south of the McMahon Line, there is not much disagreement on the Sino-Bhutanese border, either. I will say it again: [China] does not cross the McMahon Line - the problem is in fact nonexistent. The Ambassador raised the [subject] of India’s right to represent Bhutan and Sikkim in diplomatic negotiations; this went beyond the scope of border issues. The Foreign Secretary says India has a special relationship with Bhutan and Sikkim; [I] don’t know what this refers to.

Parthasarathy: This was stipulated on the basis of a treaty. Based on two-way treaties, Bhutan and Sikkim agreed to accept India’s guidance on foreign relations and to have India handle foreign affairs. What are the implications in China’s saying it respects “proper” Indian relations with Bhutan and Sikkim?

Zhang: This is a general expression, and it is also not limited to this issue; it is common in international affairs. I personally do not quite understand why India wants to treat Sikkim as a protectorate; this kind of practice is rare in Asian and African countries. We have no ambitions regarding the territory of any country, and we do not carry out subversive activities [against foreign regimes]. In an official letter, the Indian side made a reference to Chinese leaders in Tibet stating that Bhutan, Sikkim and Ladakh are parts of China, [and we] want to recover them. This does not merit a response. China’s leaders have never said this kind of thing. India has a general consulate and other agencies in Tibet; they can find out that there is no such talk or activities. India is just basing itself on reports from Western news agencies; it is not worth taking seriously. That we did not reply does not mean we affirming this.

Parthasarathy: We were not basing ourselves on Western reports, but on our own intelligence. It is said that you broadcast this news. We consider this to be a serious matter, [so] we brought it up with you. Now you say this didn’t happen, but it is also possible that irresponsible people did say such things; you can also investigate. We would not criticize you based solely on Western reports. As for [your] saying, “protectorate,” this is not a very accurate term (A LOOSE TERM)[3] . This is, in fact, a historical relationship; based on the stipulations in the treaty, they ask us to offer guidance in foreign diplomacy. China’s saying that it respects a “proper” relationship has made people doubtful as to whether you respect the India-Bhutan and India-Sikkim treaties, or whether you recognize India’s right to represent Bhutan and Sikkim in foreign diplomacy.

Zhang: You say India’s criticism is based on Tibetan broadcasts, but you have never supplied specific information. Your letter was very vague, [and] you have long since made general statements that there was no such thing [happening].
Regarding [India’s] traditional relationships with Bhutan and Sikkim. India says that based on the treaty, only India has the right to handle their foreign relations. But Bhutan and Sikkim are also in communication with Tibet. For the moment [we] won’t speak of the historical relationships; in recent years, there have also been communications. For example, they have representatives stationed in Tibet. Their representatives have remained there following the India-Bhutan and India-Sikkim treaties; this is a fact. It is very clear what we mean by saying we respect India’s relations with Bhutan and Sikkim; we are very cautious, and unwilling to damage China’s relations with Bhutan or Sikkim. We also do not [want to] damage China’s relations with India. The two countries have not, in official meetings (unterm.org: “????”) discussed Sino-Bhutanese or Sino-Sikkimese border issues, because at the time the two countries’ premiers were only authorized to discuss Sino-Indian border issues; nor did India in any way believe Bhutan or Sikkim to be part of India. As regards the Indo-Bhutanese treaty, India and Bhutan’s explanations are mutually contradictory; Bhutan believes they have the right to handle foreign affairs. In any case, we do not have any diplomatic contacts with them.
Generally speaking, the tension in [our] two countries’ relations over the past two years has concerned Sino-Indian border issues. [China] has made great efforts to alleviate [tensions] and seek ways of resolution. You say that India is doing this, too. That’s good, but now India tends to sideline Sino-Indian border issues and instead focus discussions on the issues of Bhutan, Sikkim and Pakistan, etc; this will not serve to narrow [our] differences of opinion – rather, it will broaden [our] differences of opinion. This does nothing to help resolve the issues. Our chief consideration should be Sino-Indian border issues; there is definite danger with this aspect, and none at all with the other issues. Yesterday the Foreign Secretary said that the borders ought to be considered as a whole, starting with Kashmir and ending with Burma. Here one should not overlook the fact that there also exist third-party nations, such as Nepal. We respect India’s relations with Bhutan and Sikkim and have done nothing to damage [them]. We recognize the Sino-Sikkimese border and do not see any necessity for further mention of this issue. If [India] has ulterior motives [in raising this issue], then at the very least they lack understanding. We cannot confuse primary [issues] with secondary ones.

Parthasarathy: I am personally surprised that the issue is getting bigger. It was our hope that the issue could be limited to the scope of Sino-Indian border issues. But the difficulty lies with your use of this term “proper relations”. During Sino-Indian official meetings, you also refused to discuss the Sino-Bhutanese and Sino-Sikkimese borders. We should first discuss issues of substance. [We] would like to ask whether the Chinese side would agree to talk if Bhutan entrusted India with discussing Sino-Bhutanese border issues. This is the crux of the issue. As for the Kashmir issue, India is very sensitive about it. You are discussing border issues with a country that has no right to negotiate; it is impossible not to consider this hostile. Yesterday Premier Zhou raised some practical issues, but from a legal standpoint, two countries cannot discuss the territory of a third country; [they] ought to be mindful of popular opinion.

Zhang: India believes China has a hidden agenda concerning Bhutan and Sikkim and is expanding the issue; this idea is strange and hard to understand. China has done nothing in this aspect over the past two or three years. Our relations with Bhutan and Sikkim have not increased - they have decreased. The main disagreement over the Sino-Bhutanese border map is [the area] south of the McMahon Line. Currently the two sides are at an impasse on the McMahon Line. India’s submission of a letter demanding discussion of the Sino-Bhutanese border, and also touching on the McMahon Line, only expanded the quarrel – [it was for this reason] we did not reply.
As for the Kashmir issue, Premier Zhou has repeatedly discussed, in clear-cut terms, our position and predicament. There is nothing to add. The Ambassador recognizes that China can, when necessary, be in temporary contact with the local authorities. This is also a recognition that there are practical problems that must be handled. But this idea of the Ambassador’s still cannot resolve the practical difficulties. We could not wait until after bloodshed occurs to talk; this would create new tensions and be detrimental to our relations with neighboring countries. This will only cause the imperialist elements intent on destroying China’s relations with neighboring countries to clap their hands for joy.
As regards the Sino-Indian border issue, the Foreign Secretary spoke well; after the Sino-Indian officials’ reports were released, none of the three possible methods could be used, [so] we should consider a kind of fourth option – which is, both sides reconsider [the issues]. We set great store by this important statement [when it] made by an official so sincere as the Foreign Secretary. We welcome this suggestion, and agree that we should consider issues on this foundation. [We] should talk about facts that should be ascertained – which ones [we] can accept, and which we could consider. I am very interested in how the Indian government views this. If it is believed that the facts supplied by the Indian side are all unassailable, and the facts supplied by the Chinese side are all incorrect and worthless, not only could I personally not agree, any fair-minded person would not agree. The concluding section of India’s report even said the Chinese side’s information can prove that India’s traditional line is correct. This statement not only disregards the facts, it is also an insult to me personally. I have held in the proper respect, and maintained personal friendship with, Indian representatives such as Mehta and Gopal; I know this is not an issue between individuals, but guided by Indian government policy. This statement from the Indian side does not hold water at all. Of course it is difficult for the two sides to have total consensus on the facts, but this is no barrier to seeking resolution on practical problems provided it does not harm the interests of either side. Both sides [can] yield to and forgive the other – this is also the normal way [of doing things]. Officials’ reports from both sides deserve regard, but one cannot get tangled up in the details. The relationship between our two countries is too important; we should view it from a greater distance, from an elevated height, considering the big picture, and seek resolution. The two sides will not necessarily agree on specific views, but should understand the overall spirit.

Parthasarathy: This is a difficult problem. For the two sides to have consensus on the facts is difficult. In truth, what the officials presented was not one report, it was two reports. The officials were assigned to examine and double-check the [written] information, determining the points [we] agree on and those we do not, but the result was completely divergent viewpoints. How are the two countries’ premiers to consider [the issues] with two piles of completely opposing facts? [My] personal view is, might it be possible to seek a solution starting with ascertaining those points that require further clarification?

Zhang: After India issued the officials’ report, Premier Nehru flatly stated that there could be no discussion unless India’s requirements were accepted. Under these circumstances, China prefers not to state its stance for the time being, unless we are prepared to squabble. Regarding the officials’ reports, I believe that besides the differing points, there are certain portions on which [we] agree or are relatively close. Our side once suggested writing this, but the Indian side refused. As for China’s border negotiations with Burma and Nepal, there is some experience that can serve as a reference. Ordinarily speaking, when there is disagreement on the facts, there are two possible methods of resolution: (1) If the two sides both have definite grounds [for their stance], following an earnest, objective comparison, [they] can determine which side has somewhat greater grounds, and consider from a political standpoint which [country] finally getting the [land] would do more for peace and the two countries’ relationship. (2) If the two sides’ views differ greatly and it is impossible to bring them into line, each can keep to its own position and consider, from a political standpoint, what kind of resolution would be more beneficial. Of course, the differences of opinion between China and India are somewhat greater, but the importance of Sino-Indian friendship is also far greater; both can continue to think about whether there is anything else to consider. The two sides should meet halfway - it is possible to resolve the issues. China and India cannot stay locked in long-term mutual confrontation; there must eventually be peace and friendship. As long as both sides have the desire, the question of method is an easy one to resolve. [I] won’t speak of the past; yesterday’s talks prove that we are willing to resolve the issues.