Fan Changlong is coming to India

J-20s taking off from Shigatse

My article  Fan Changlong is coming to India appeared in NitiCentral.

Here is the link...

During the month of November, India will receive two important visitors from China; both are members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.
First, Chinese Vice-President Li Yuanchao is scheduled to arrive in India on November 3. Lu Kang, one of the spokespersons of the Chinese Foreign Ministry announced that Li is coming at the invitation of Vice-President Hamid Ansari: “it is another major interaction between the two sides, which will help inject new momentum to bilateral ties,” said Lu.
The spokesperson added: "With concerted efforts strategic partnership of cooperation between China and India for peace and prosperity has seen sound and stable development. The two sides have deeper exchanges of cooperation and maintained sound coordination on regional and international affairs.”
Lu also said that the leaders of both countries have agreed to deepen their cooperation and have even closer partnership for development.
Does it mean a common position at the 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference, known as COP 21, in Paris later this month?
It won’t probably go that far, though the issues to be discussed at the Conference will certainly be on the agenda of the Chinese Vice-President when he meets Indian leaders.
Perhaps more importantly, General Fan Changlong, the senior vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), the highest uniformed official in the Middle Kingdom, is due to visit Delhi later this month.
Xinhua published a terse statement on October 29: “Fan Changlong, vice chairman of China's CMC, will visit Pakistan and India in mid-November.”
During his monthly Press Conference, Senior Colonel Yang Yujun, spokesman for the Ministry of National Defense (MND), answered three questions related to India.
Yang was first asked about the Line of Actual Control (LAC).
The questioner noted: “The Indian and Chinese military officials held talks on the Working Mechanisms for Cooperation and Coordination (WMCC), especially relating to the border issues early this month. [During] the last press conference, the PLA spokesman had stated that the Indian military had actually violated the consensus reached as far as certain border stand-offs are concerned. Has this issue been discussed at that WMCC meeting?”
The Senior Colonel spoke about the discreetly-held WMCC meeting in Beijing on October 8 and 9; he said: “both sides gave a review of the border situation between China and India and the promotion of mutual trust in the past year; they also had an in-depth exchange of views on issues concerning the peace and stability along the border.”
Nothing offensive for a change!
He did not want to comment further on the unpleasant Burtse incident in Ladakh which witnessed a confrontation between the 2 Armies. At that time, The Global Times, quoting Jiang Jingkui, director of the Department of South Asian Languages at Peking University had affirmed: “this is not the first time that Indian media has reported 'confrontations' that do not exist in the Sino-Indian border area. These [type of] news are often untrue, negative, misleading and aimed at provoking public opinion."
Only the future will tell us if the WMCC fine-tuning can help avoid such incidents in the future. However, as General Fan will be in India, it will certainly be a good occasion to question him on the regular PLA incursions across the high-altitude border and his views on the LAC.
It may also be a good occasion to ask the powerful general to show the Chinese ‘perceptions’ on a map.
The second question related to the recently concluded counterterrorism exercises (‘Hand-in-Hand’) by China and India in Kunming in Yunnan province: “what are the prospects for any joint anti-terrorism operation in the neighborhood if and when it is required?”
The answer was rather vague, but indicative of the seriousness of the ‘terrorist’ threat for Beijing, even if it is sometimes mixed up with the aspirations of the Tibetan and Uyghur minorities for more freedom from the Han domination.
Yang Yujun said: “terrorism is the common enemy of the international community and the Chinese side is against all forms of terrorism. We are committed to the international cooperation against terrorism. The PLA shoulders the responsibility of counter-terrorism and we will do our work according to the arrangement of the Chinese government.”
The last question on India was about General Fan’s visit.
The Senior Colonel explained that according to this year's plan for foreign military exchange, General Fan should pay an official visit to Pakistan and India: “The purpose of this visit is to implement the consensus reached by the state leaders of both sides, enhance friendly exchanges between the Chinese military and its foreign counterparts, and to jointly maintain regional peace and stability.”
Let us not that forgot that over 50 PLA officers with rank of major general and above, were shown the door (of the prison) during the last 2 years and Fan has not only been President Xi Jinping’s reliable ally in his fight against corruption, but a fire fighter, when things are getting too hot.
In June, Fan was sent to Washington to meet US Defence Secretary Ash Carter to prepare Xi Jinping’s trip to the US. At a time when the US called for a halt to land reclamation in the South China Sea, General Fan declared that China was committed to developing “a sustained and substantive US-China military-to-military relationship”.
It eventually helped the Xi-Obama Summit to reach a consensus on a memorandum of understanding to reduce the risk of accidents when the two navies operate in close proximity.
According to Sina.com, an official Chinese web portal, Fan Changlong recently stated that China has always advocated handling disputes through peaceful means; Beijing will not use force recklessly, even for issues related to territory and sovereignty. China’s neighbours were probably happy to hear this, even if they are not fully convinced.
While addressing the sixth Xiangshan Forum, a bi-yearly defense experts’ exchange in Beijing, Fan asserted that China always insists on sorting out disputes through friendly negotiations with parties directly involved; Beijing “will try its best to avoid unexpected conflicts,” he said.
The article, republished in The Global Times, quotes the CMC’s vice-chairman noting: “China has settled land and border issues with a majority of neighboring countries through consultation.”
Of course not with India, through the ‘consultations’ are on for the past 55 years.
Regarding growing concerns over the construction on reefs in the South China Sea, Fan affirmed “the construction, mostly for civilian purposes, would improve marine navigation and provide public services.”
Nobody may have believed this in Washington, but in the meantime, the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled that it had jurisdiction over 15 submissions by Manila, including one that calls into question the validity of China's claims based on the nine-dash line under international maritime law as defined by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), a Convention ratified by China.
The South China Morning Post said: “The decision came as China's navy chief warned his US counterpart encounters between their forces could spiral into conflict, two days after a US destroyer sailed close to Beijing's artificial South China Sea islands.”
This clearly shows the contradiction between what General Fan says and Beijing’s actions on the South China Sea where the Chinese Navy increases its control over territories claimed by The Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei.
For India, it is a sign that as long as Delhi does not dispute Beijing’s stand in Ladakh or Arunachal, China is ready ‘to settle land and border issues through consultation’.
But as India does not accept China’s claims, can the border remain peaceful?
Fan should be asked to give some assurance.

Chinese Incursions: 60 years ago

The way to Shipki La

Following the recent Chinese incursion in Burtse in Ladakh and the quick ‘answer’ from the Indian forces who dismantled the structure built by the Chinese, it is interesting to look at what happened nearly 60 years ago at Shipki La, the pass between Himachal Pradesh and Tibet.
At that time too, it started with some Chinese incursions.
Soon after the PLA entered for the first time on Indian territory, a Note Verbale was given to the Chinese Charge d’Affaires in India on September 8, 1956. The Note said:

The Government of India have received a report that on the 1st September 1956, a party of about 10 Chinese Army personnel entered and took up position about 2 furlongs [1/2 kilometre] from Hupsong Khad on the Indian side of Shipki La Pass. The Party withdrew after the Officer-in–Charge of the Indian Border Police pointed out to the Captain in command of the Chinese Military Personnel that the Indian territory extends up to the Shipki La Pass.
The crossing of the Shipki La Pass by the Chinese Army Personnel without visaed Passports violates the Sino-Indian Agreement of April 29, 1954, in which the Shipki La Pass has been recognised as the border between India and Tibet region of China at that place. The Government of India presume that the Chinese Army Personnel crossed into Indian territory by mistake and not deliberately.

In fact, the Chinese troops had deliberately crossed the pass and soon after they started claiming areas located a few kilometres, south of Shipki La as Chinese territories.
Let us remember that according the Article IV of the Panchsheel Agreement of 1954 ('Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet region of China and India'):

Traders and pilgrims of both countries may travel by the following passes and route:
(1) Shipki La pass, (2) Mana pass, (3) Niti pass, (4) Kungri Bingri pass, (5) Darma pass, and (6) Lipu Lekh pass.
The agreement also mentioned the Ladakh route: “the customary route leading to Tashigong along the valley of the Shangatsangpu (Indus) River may continue to be traversed in accordance with custom.

The intrusions meant that for China, passes such as Shipki La were not border passes, but located within China’s territory. Beijing’s interpretation of Article IV was: ‘the passes are only an indication of the route through which traders could enter India”.
Amazing logic!
Let us continue with the story.
On September 24, Delhi had go a step further and send an Aide-Mémoire to China:

Since the handing over of the last informal note to Charge d’ Affaires Fu Hao on the 8th September, the Government of India have received two reports of serious situations that recently developed between the Chinese and Indian border patrols in the region of Shipki La Pass on the Indo-Tibetan border.

It then gives some details about the incidents:

On 10th September, when a party of Indian border Police on its way to the Shipki La Pass sighted a party of Chinese military personnel on the Indian side of the frontier. The Chinese Party was commanded by a Captain and consisted of at least ten persons. The Indian Patrol signalled the Chinese Party to withdraw, but the latter did not do so. Thereupon, on the Indian Patrol trying to advance, the Chinese personnel threw stones at it and threatened to use their grenades.
Towards the evening, the Indian Party approached and held conversations with the Chinese. During this conversation, the Chinese commander intimated that he had ‘received instructions from the Tibetan Government that the border extended up to Hupsang Khad and that Indian Personnel should accordingly not advance beyond Hupsang Khad’.”

Note that, like many other parts of the Indo-Tibetan frontier, the Chinese hid behind so-called earlier Tibetan claims
The note continues:

The Indian Patrol Commander pointed out that the border was in fact situated at the Shipki La Pass and suggested that the Chinese should accordingly withdraw. However, it does not appear that the Chinese troops withdrew, as the following morning (11th September) they were again soon on the ridge above the roadway on the Indian side of the Pass. The Position remained the same on the 12th September.

Delhi reacted, what the Chinese had done was not nice:

The Chinese Government will no doubt agree that in throwing stones and threatening to use hand grenades, the Chinese patrol offered such provocation as could easily have resulted in serious and regrettable incidents. However, a development even more likely to cause an ugly situation was soon to follow.

A worse incident occurred on September 20 (see White Paper No 1)
Delhi was ‘pained and surprised’: "It is not difficult to visualise that the natural and direct result of such attitudes, if continued in, may be one of clash of arms.”
The Indian Government reminded the Chinese of the Panchsheel Agreement: “Shipki La is clearly the border and is acknowledged as such in the Sino-Indian Agreement of 29th April 1954, the Government of India consider any crossing of this border pass by armed personnel as aggression which they will resist."

Nehru was in a dilemma: how to react?
He wrote to the Foreign Secretary: "I agree with [your] suggestion …it would not be desirable for this question to be raised in the Lok Sabha at the present stage."
Nehru decided to keep the matter secret but discretely mention it to the Chinese officials: "I think that if this question is raised in our Parliament at this stage, this might prove embarrassing from the point of view of the negotiations between Burma and China."
The Indians MPs being unpredictable, they may raise a hue and cry, better to keep it secret and eventually ‘speak’ to Beijing.


A Meeting to discuss the issue
A meeting was however held on October 3, 1956 to consider how to handle the Chinese incursion.
It was chaired T.N. Kaul, then Joint Secretary in the MEA. His colleagues Col. P.N. Luthra, Special Officer Frontier Areas and Dr. Gopalachari, the Deputy Director of the Historical Division were in attendance.
So were H.C. Sarin, the Joint Secretary in the Ministry of Defence; he was accompanied by Maj Gen M.S. Wadalia, Chief of General Staff and Brig. K.H. Katoch, Director of Military Operations. The Home Ministry was represented by a Joint Secretary (N. Sahgal) and a Deputy Secretary (Rajkumar).
The Chief Secretary to the Government of Himachal Pradesh and the Inspector General of Police had also come.
Kaul gave a brief account of the events. He said:

The Prime Minister had directed that this was a serious matter and that it was not enough to lodge a protest with the Chinese. He had instructed that specific directions should be given to the Government of Himachal Pradesh to be passed on to the border checkposts and that these checkpost personnel should on no account withdraw from their present position.

The representatives from Himachal Pradesh informed the meeting that the Chinese had withdrawn due to the coming winter season, but they were likely to return in 1957: “it was necessary to formulate a definite line of action to meet eventualities in the spring.”The meeting discussed:

1. the desirability of sending some troops in adequate strength to Namgia and if possible to Shipki La Pass before the pass closes;
2. the question of making arrangements for the next spring so that our border security force are in position in Shipki La Pass before the Chinese come, and
3. the building of certain aluminum huts, cave shelters and other allied matters were then discussed in detail.

The Himachal Pradesh government was in favour of “a permanent police outpost at Namgia [below the pass] and some cave shelters and aluminium huts were constructed as near Shipki La as possible before the next spring.”
The meeting therefore recommended:

• Since the Chinese troops had withdrawn it was not necessary at present to send our troops to this area, but a few Army Officers may be sent to make a reconnaissance right up to Shipki La and suggest ways and means of meeting a possible threat from Chinese troops next spring and draw up plans accordingly.
• A permanent police outpost should be established at Namgia with increased strength.
• Our personnel should be in physical possession of Shipki La pass before the 1st of April next and earlier, if possible. For this purpose, a permanent party, even though of a very small size, should be posted at the pass itself, or, if that is not possible, as close to the pass as possible. Construction of cave shelters and aluminium huts should be taken in hand immediately and these should be ready before March 1957.
• Constant patrolling from Namgia up to the pass should be done from now on as often as possible, weather permitting.
• The Himachal Pradesh representatives raised the question of increase in the strength of the border police and also the issue of rations to them. It was agreed.

And what happened then?
Four days later, on October 10, the Prime Minister sent a note to the Foreign Secretary. It reads:

There is no question of sending any troops to the Shipki La now. In fact, even in the spring next year, I do not envisage the necessity of sending troops. The fate of Shipki La is not going to be decided by fighting or by a large show of force.

Nehru however agreed: “It might be desirable, however, for some Army officers to reconnoiter and see the place at a suitable time now or early next year.”
Just compare with what happened in Burtse in Ladakh, where the Indian forces dismantle the Chinese structure and send them back on their side of the LAC and only then, discussed the issue during 2 flag-meetings (after the Chinese said that nothing had happened) and what happened in Shipkila in 1956.
The moral of the story is that a 'show of force' always helps to prepare 'talks' with Chinese. It may be unfortunate, but it is a fact.
The Indian Army (and their political bosses) seem to have understood the lesson during the past decades.

Mirage in the High Himalayas

Same Senior Colonel (ext. left) with General Zhang Yang
in Ngari a few days earlier
Was General Zhang informed about Burtse?

After a swift victory, Julius Caesar is said to have bragged in the Roman Senate: “Vini, Vidi, Vici” (I came, I saw, I conquered). These historic words need to be adapted for the recent intrusion of the Chinese Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) in Ladakh: “they came, they saw, they built a tower, but they did not come.”
It is at least what Hong Lei, Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ spokesman affirmed in Beijing: "As far as I know, there is no such 'face-off' between China and India in the border area."
And of course, he added, China is committed to maintaining peace and tranquility on the border area.
Let us look at the facts from this side of the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

Indian officers with Chinese Senior Colonel
during flag meeting on September 8

As it happened before the visit of Premier Li Keqiang to India in April/May 2013 and also when President Xi Jinping arrived in Ahmedabad in September 2014, on September 11, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) intruded on India’s territory.
The next day, it was reported in the Indian press that a face-off had occurred in Burtse area, a few miles east of Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO), where the 2013 confrontation had occurred.
According to The Times of India, “the bone of contention is a surveillance structure being erected by the PLA very close to the LAC.”
The Indo-Tibetan Border Police apparently objected to the construction of the structure and, with the help of the Army, stopped the PLA. Subsequently, the PLA called for reinforcements, followed by a massing of more Indian forces in the area.
On September 12, The Times of India said: “The two forces are still locked in an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation and efforts are being made to defuse the situation.”
The nationalist Chinese newspaper, The Global Times, quoting Jiang Jingkui, director of the Department of South Asian Languages at Peking University counterattacked: “this is not the first time that Indian media has reported 'confrontations' that do not exist in the Sino-Indian border area. These news are often untrue, negative, misleading and aimed at provoking public opinion, and are harmful to the relationship between China and India."
Such media accusations are unreasonable, as Chinese troops have never intruded, he said. In other words, the PLA did not come, they not did see anything, they did not erect a tower.
Jiang added that this type of information always come from “a certain group of people, including the military, who are hostile towards China.”
Conclusion: the Indian side must have been victim of a high-altitude mirage.
Not only were the local Indian troops fooled by the visual phenomena (they quickly rushed reinforcements), but the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and other Long-Range Reconnaissance and Observation System, mistakenly saw the PLA troops entering Indian territory near Burtse, erecting a tower and later massing troops.
A more serious aspect has however not been mentioned in the Indian press.
Just a day before the stand-off in Ladakh (which never was, according to the Chinese!), a senior member of the Chinese Central Military Commission (CMC) visited the region.
A coincidence, you may think?
Or a mirage?
On September 9 and 10, a member of the all-powerful CMC visited Ngari Prefecture, which borders Ladakh, in Western Tibet. General Zhang Yang, Director of the PLA’s Political Department was in Tibet to ‘celebrate’ the 50th anniversary of the creation of the Tibetan Autonomous Region.
At the end of the grandiose function held in Lhasa, the ‘Central’ delegation split into different groups.
Yu Zhengsheng, chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, who headed the delegation, went to Shigatse and visited the Tashilhunpo, seat of the Panchen Lamas.
Vice-Premier Liu Yandong, also a member of the Politburo, headed towards Shannan (Lhoka) Prefecture, while Jampa Phuntsok, an old Tibet-hand ‘inspected’ Nagchu. Another ‘sub-delegation’ led by Du Qinglin, one of the CPPCC’s Vice-chairpersons went to Nyingchi, north of Arunachal Pradesh.
On September 7 in Lhasa, Yu Zhengsheng personally met the Army and the Armed Police; he urged them “to crack down on separatist forces and be ready to fight a protracted battle against the 14th Dalai [Lama] clique.”
Yu also asked the defence forces “to improve their abilities of governing Tibet according to law [sic], specifically cracking down on the separatist forces.”
The defence forces should uphold the correct ‘political direction’ and exert a larger role for safeguarding border stability and ethnic solidarity, he said.
Does it help to ‘safeguard border stability’ by crossing over to the neighbour’s side?
And this happened a day after General Zhang Yang spent 2 days in Ngari Prefecture. Officially, he came to convey the ‘loving care’ and the ‘deep feeling’ of the CPC Central Committee, the State Council, and the Military Commission to the ‘cadres and masses of all nationalities’, affirms the Chinese press.
Like his colleagues in other parts of Tibet, General Zhang brought along a banner carrying President Xi’s words, ‘Strengthen National Unity and Construct a Beautiful Tibet’. Interestingly, though Ngari depends upon Xinjiang Military District (MD), Zhang was accompanied by Lt Gen Xu Yong, commander of the Tibet MD and not Lt Gen Peng Yong, the Commander of Xinjiang MD.
A day earlier, speaking at the grand function in Lhasa, Lt Gen. Xu Yong had asserted: “During these 50 years in the same boat, the troops stationed in Tibet and police staff always depended on the Party to write [the history] of the bloody battles to defend Tibet.”
What ‘bloody battles’ does General Xu refer to? Battles in Ladakh during the 1962 conflict with India? We will probably never know.
Also in the delegation to Ngari, was Wang Yongjun of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI). A year ago, WantChinaTimes had reported that the CCDI’s boss, Wang Qishan had started ‘parachuting’ CCDI officials into key posts around China in order to strengthen the party's anti-graft campaign and bring new blood to certain regions.
Wang’s presence may be an indication that heads could soon roll on this front too. Let us not forget that a ‘bloody’ battle against corruption, particularly in the PLA, is raging in the Middle Kingdom; more than 50 generals have already lost their jobs.
Apart from the customary photo sessions with the ‘cadres and the masses’, (i.e. herders, farmers, toilers, etc.), General Zhang Yang and his delegation “made a special trip to lay a wreath on the revolutionary martyrs’ cemetery,” said the Chinese press. Which martyrs? Of 1962 War again?
One line also mentions that Zhang 'visited the troops'.
This raises an important question: was the CMC’s member informed that the PLA was planning to build a structure in an area considered by India to be within her territory?
Let us presume that Zhang was not informed, it means that the PLA has a serious problem of command. A free for all in the PLA?
If he was informed, it is a serious issue for India (despite Beijing’s denial).
By the way, why did a Division Commander (Maj Gen Joshi) need to participate in a flag meeting if nothing had happened?