Xi in India: a thorny route at home?

There are two ways to look at an event, especially a State visit by a foreign dignitary: it can be described as a resounding success, a game-changer, or it can be seen as a missed opportunity, a failure.
President Xi Jinping’s visit to India was a bit of both.
Before his arrival at Ahmedabad, the Chinese president Xi wrote an op-ed in The Hindu: “As the two engines of the Asian economy, we need to become cooperation partners spearheading growth. I believe that the combination of China’s energy plus India’s wisdom will release massive potential.”
Unfortunately, things did not go as scripted.
First an extraordinary event, (a real scoop not noticed by the India media) occurred a day before the President’s arrival: Wei Wei, the Chinese Ambassador to India was suddenly transferred. He was replaced by Le Yucheng, earlier posted in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing.
To change the ambassador a few days before his Head of State arrives in the country must be a first in diplomatic annals.
What was behind this abrupt move? We may never know, though it happened at a time when speculations are rife about the fate of the Chinese Ambassador to Iceland, who apparently was too close to the Japanese; he has ‘disappeared’ somewhere in China.
There is probably no link between the 2 issues, but Wei Wei’s sudden ‘departure’ is rather strange.
The second issue which did not go according to the planned program is the worsening of the situation in Southern Ladakh.
Everyone knows that there are different ‘perceptions’ about where the Line of Actual Control (LAC) lies, particularly in this area; but as Xi arrived in Ahmedabad, hundreds of Chinese troops from the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the People's Armed Police Force crossed the LAC and stood a few meters away from the Indian jawans.
Why this show of force when Xi Jinping, who is also Chairman of the Central Military Commission was trying to do business in India? Was there a better way to sabotage the presidential visit?
Last year, at the time of the Depsang incident, I wrote that Chinese intrusions were probably due to the unfortunate initiatives of some local PLA commanders; I was then told: "It can't be. The PLA's generals are a disciplined lot and Chairman Xi is fully in command."
This came back to my mind when I read in The Business Standard, Shrikant Kondapalli, the JNU professor and expert on China affairs asserting: "this could be a message given by the Chinese troops to its President, Xi Jinping, that no fruitful discussion on the boundary issue be held with the Indian leadership during his official trip."
Were some very senior PLA generals unhappy about the thaw between India and China? Or perhaps disturbed about Xi’s fight against corruption?
What is strange is that Chumur, located north of Himachal Pradesh, has historically never been claimed by Tibet (and consequently, by China). It is a totally new claim with no serious basis. The intrusions in Chumur are pure land-grabbing by China; you can call it, ‘expansionism’.
Does it mean that Xi Jinping, the Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) does not have full control over his generals?
An indication that everything may not be rosy for Xi is the recent visit of General Fan Changlong, the CMC’s Senior Vice Chairman to Tibet.
On August 17, Xinhua reported that General Fan, who had come “to inspect the forces stationed on the snow-covered plateau, the loyal soldiers defending the frontiers,” asked the troops “to thoroughly study and implement President Xi’s series of important speeches about the situation in the Party” (read the corruption cases against former security tsar Zhou Yongkang and others ‘tigers’).
The South China Morning Post later reported that: “proceedings [against Zhou] could start as early as next month. …These will pave the way for a possible public hearing for Zhou, who could become the highest-ranking party official to face trial.”
While in Lhasa, General Fang pointed out that combat training is an important task for the preparation for military struggle; it is the basic starting point. Interestingly, Chinese media reports did not mention which units he visited, how long he stayed in Tibet, where he went.
But it appears that he was accompanied by no less than three Military Region (MR) Commanders, Lt. Gen. Liu Yuejun, Lanzhou MR, Lt. Gen. Zhao Zongqi, Jinan MR and General Li Shiming, Chengdu MR.
What was the Commander of Jinan MR doing around is not clear, though having been earlier posted in Tibetan Military District, Zhao certainly understands the ground reality.
Xinhua reported that General Fan told the army to firmly obey the command of President Xi Jinping and the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee.
Are they not always obeying Chairman Xi? This could be an indication that something is rotten in the Middle Kingdom.
A month earlier, China Military Online had reported that Xu Qiliang, the second CMC’s vice chairman had inspected some garrisons in Xinjiang and Tibet: " General Xu Qiliang visited the officers and men in frontier areas, and held talks with the leaders of the units garrisoning in Hotan [near the Aksai Chin],Ngari [near Demchok] and Lhasa areas.”
Xu Qiliang also paid a visit to Shenxianwan (north of the Karakoram Pass and the Depsang Plains) at the altitude of 5,380 meters and the Khurnak Fort (opposite the Indian troops posted on the Panggong tso) where he inspected a speed-boats squadron and inquired “about the soldiers’ work, study and life.”
What is the signification of these visits? It is difficult to give a definitive answer, except that the senior-most generals are aware of the situation on the Indian front.
But regarding the recurring intrusions, Narendra Modi has enunciated the response: “I also suggested that clarification of Line of Actual Control would greatly contribute to our efforts to maintain peace and tranquility and requested President Xi to resume the stalled process of clarifying the LAC. We should also seek an early settlement of the boundary question.”
In military jargon: 'let us exchange the bloody LAC maps'.
When he answered, Xi spoke of border agreement only, not about the LAC. It is telling.
‘Exchange of maps’ was not mentioned in the Joint Statement too.
As mentioned in a previous column, the choice of Nathu-la, located far from the Kailash-Mansarovar area, in place of Demchok in Ladakh, which is the natural port of entry for the pilgrimage, also demonstrates that the PLA/PAP are not keen to normalize the situation on the Ladakh border.
Apart from that, everything went smoothly and hopefully we shall soon travel at high speed in Chinese bullet trains (though I still think the French TGVs are safer and more comfortable).
Back in China, Xi might have some homework to do.

DBO: a First Trial Balance

This article appeared in the Edit Page of The Pioneer under the title Some countries just cannot be trusted.

The latest Chinese infiltration in Ladakh, even if the issue has been ‘successfully' resolved by both diplomacies, will remain for years a scar on the Sino-Indian relations

Hua Chunying, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman was at her elusive best when she announced ‘progress’ in the Sino-Indian ‘stand-off’ in Ladakh: “So far as I know, relevant departments of the two countries have made positive progress in their friendly consultations."
According to Xinhua, she stated: “I believe that both sides have the will and capability to properly resolve this incident as soon as possible and jointly maintain the healthy and stable growth of China-India relations."
‘Will to resolve’ the issue, clearly means that it is not solved.
Even if the troops’ withdrawal remains shrouded in vagueness, it is important to take an initial trial balance of the incident in the High Himalayas.
A first point to be noticed: Delhi was taken by surprise; India was not ready to tackle the situation, whether militarily, diplomatically or at the PR level.
There is no doubt that the terrain favours China: after months being posted in Western Tibet, Chinese jawans and officers are usually well acclimatized; it is relatively easier for them to go on a ‘camping’ outing like the present one at Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO).
In his memoirs, Colonel Chewang Rinchen, the brave Ladakhi soldier who was twice awarded the Maha Vir Chakra (in 1948 and 1971) for his exploits in the region, recounts: “The entire area between Murgo, which is known as 'Gateway to Hell', and DBO is notorious for treacherous weather and snow blizzards. …After crossing Saser La, we proceeded towards DBO. On the way, we came across skeletons of human beings and animals lying scattered all along the track.” Interesting, he added: “On September 3, 1961, I proceeded with a patrol party, along the Chip Chap river, …I noted the hoof marks of camels and horses and, a little further, tyre marks of a three-ton vehicle. It clearly indicated the possible presence of the Chinese in that area.”
While the toughest soldiers of the Indian Army took more than a week to reached DBO, the Chinese could drive in a 3-ton! And it was in 1961.
The topography and the difficulty to survive in the area was obviously known to the Indian Army and intelligence agencies, but they did not envisage that the Chinese would plant tents in what Beijing considers to be its side of the LAC.
From the Chinese side, everything seemed to have been programmed to the minutest details, including the ‘withdrawal’, if withdrawal it is.
For future bilateral relations, one worrying issue is that China is ready to break formal treaties or agreements when it suits its interests.
On September 7, 1993, India and China signed an “Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas”. Amongst other things, it is stipulated: “Neither side shall use or threaten to use force against the other by any means. Pending an ultimate solution to the boundary question between the two countries, the two sides shall strictly respect and observe the line of actual control between the two sides. No activities of either side shall overstep the line of actual control.”
The DBO episode is clearly a breach of the 1993 agreement. Delhi should remember this in the future.
On the positive side, India has discovered that she had so many experts on China, though so far nobody could explain why Beijing took the risk of provoking a clash at this particular point in time. If China had some grievances against India (which may be valid or not), they could have first taken them up at one of the scheduled bilateral meetings (Salman Khurshid in Beijing or Li Keqiang in Delhi). A visit of A.K. Antony to China is also planned later this year. There were at least 3 forthcoming occasions to solve pending issues and make ‘positive progress in their friendly consultations’.
There is also a routine mechanism at the level of the Joint Secretary (East Asia) whose phone must have become hot during the past 3 weeks. This could been used.
By the way, did you notice that China had only one speaker for the issue? The Central Military Commission, the PLA, the State Council, the Party all kept quiet. Apart from the spokeswoman, the websites of The PLA Daily, The People’s Daily, The Global Times, etc. remained extremely discreet.
It was not the case in India, where officials from different ministries and branches of the government gave their take on the issue, sometimes ‘officially’, often ‘off’. Another good lesson to learn for India!
India and China are very different nations: the former is the largest democracy in the world with a free press; the latter is ruled by a single party heavily depending on censure of the Press.
Interestingly, some in India seem to regret the Indian ‘open’ system. The Global Times in one rare comment said: “Some Indian officials caution that China should pay no heed to the radical voices among some Indian media which sensationalize news.”
Still, living in an open society does not mean that the Indian public is well informed. In fact, it appears that even ‘experts’ are abysmally lacking basic knowledge of the situation on the ground, particularly the respective claims of both India and China. The present DBO incident and the subsequent flurry of articles/programs may help the general public to understand better the actual stakes.
It is perhaps high time that the Government of India starts publishing White Papers like it had done between 1959 and 1965 (15 White Papers disclosed the correspondence between Delhi and Beijing on the border issue). China is bound to object, but India does not need to follow Beijing’s diktat when it goes against its professed principles of transparency and openness.
If India has a case, and I believe that is has a strong one, it should be known and understood by the common man.
Now, what has China gained from its DBO excursion?
Many theories have been propounded: some say that the Chinese leadership wanted to show its displeasure on the new coziness between Delhi and Tokyo. But is it not putting the cart before the horse? Indeed, such Himalayan happenings are bound to draw US, Japan and India closer, not the other way around.
What about China’s displeasure at the infrastructure that India has been building on this side of the LAC? Was it worth this drama? Was it not possible to discuss this issue at the already scheduled ministerial meets?
‘Experts’ will argue that according to the Art of War, it is the Chinese way to get what they want. This is not certain, because the issue has for China serious negative collaterals.
They may have ‘marked their territory’ by ‘camping’ for 3 weeks in the ‘Gateway to Hell’, but they have not earned goodwill from India.
This incident, even if it is ‘successfully’ solved by both diplomacies, will remain for years a scar in the Sino-Indian relations which had just started looking up.
When Chinese scholars visit India, they like to say that both countries should sincerely work on the mutual trust deficit. It is clear the Chinese ‘camping’ has pushed back for years the earlier progress in closing the ‘trust’ gap.
A last issue: since he came on the Middle Kingdom’s throne, the new Emperor has proclaimed the Great Dream of China: “The China Dream will bring blessings and goodness to not only the Chinese people but also people in other countries?”
Where do the last intrusions fit in the Chinese Dream?
It is clear that Xi’s pet slogan has taken a beating in the process.
But there is always the possibility that DBO ‘stand-off’ has made some PLA’s Generals dream and this without the blessings of the Emperor. Who knows?