A New Roadblock for India & Nepal

The 1961 map signed by Nepal and China showing the proper alignment of the Kali river
at tallies with Indian claim

My Article A New Roadblock for India & Nepal appeared in Mail Today/DailyO

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An argument has recently erupted between India and Nepal, after a 80km new road between Darchula to Lipulekh, the border pass near the trijunction with Tibet and Nepal, was inaugurated by Defence Minister Rajnath Singh. The road is expected to be used by the Indian pilgrims visiting Kailash-Mansarovar, located some 90km from the pass, as well as the local traders, Lipulekh being one of the three authorized landports between India and China.
PTI explained: “The Lipulekh pass is a far western point near Kalapani, a disputed border area between Nepal and India. Both India and Nepal claim Kalapani as an integral part of their territory.”

Kathmandu handed over a diplomatic note protesting against the construction of this vital road to Vinaya Mohan Kwatra, the Indian Ambassador to Nepal; who was subsequently called by Pradeep Kumar Gyawali, Nepal’s Foreign Minister.

Issues at Hand

India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) denied that the road was crossing Nepal’s territory: “The recently inaugurated road section in Pithoragarh district in the state of Uttarakhand lies completely within the territory of India. The road follows the pre-existing route used by the pilgrims of the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra,” said South Block.
Already in November last year, Kathmandu had protested, “unilateral decisions on border issues won’t be accepted,” it was in reference to the new Political Map of India published by Delhi after two new Union Territories - Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh - came into existence on October 31.
Kathmandu formally protested over the inclusion of the Kalapani area in the new map.
What is strange is that the new Indian map is exactly the same than the one published in 1954 in the Atlas of the Northern Frontiers of India, which is the official reference till today for India’s boundaries. Kathmandu did not protest against the old map and apart from the new UTs, there was nothing new in the 2019 maps.
The case is complicated by different factors; amongst them the political struggle within the ruling party in Nepal and also the fact that there has been no historical consistency in Kathmandu’s position.

Let us look at the history.

Tracing the History

After a War between British India and Nepal in 1814, the Nepalis were sent back across the Kali River in May 1815 and subsequently the Segowli Treaty was signed on March 4, 1816. Article 5 of the Treaty stated: “The Rajah of Nepaul renounces for himself, his heirs and successors, all claim to or connexion with the countries lying to the West of the River Kali, and engages never to have any concern with those countries or the inhabitants thereof.”
Unfortunately, there was no map attached which could have authoritatively shown the exact alignment and the source of the Kali River.
In any case, at that time, no scientific survey worth the name could be carried out; it was only by mid-19th century that the Himalayan border was properly surveyed by the Great Trigonometrical Survey of India (a precursor of the Survey of India).
But more interesting is the “Boundary Treaty between the People's Republic of China and the Kingdom of Nepal” signed by President Liu Shaoqi of China and King Mahendra of Nepal on October 5, 1961: “The Chairman of the People's Republic of China and His Majesty the King of Nepal, being of the agreed opinion that a formal settlement of the question of the boundary between China and Nepal is of fundamental interest to the peoples of the two countries,” said the preamble.
Article I (1) defined the China-Nepal boundary line which “starts from the point where the watershed between the Kali River and the Tinkar River meets the watershed between the tributaries of the Mapchu (Karnali) River on the one hand and the Tinkar River on the other hand…”
Even more interesting are the precise maps attached to the Treaty and signed by both parties; Kathmandu seems to have forgotten that the location of river on the maps of the Sino-Nepali treaty matches with the Indian one, which implies that the road is on Indian territory.
What is however disputed and needs to be negotiated is the area south of the river, where the British (and later Indian) cartographers have taken into account, like everywhere else on the frontiers, the watershed principle as well as the land revenues of Gunji village on the Indian side.
More of such examples of Kathmandu’s inconstancy could be cited.

What presently compounds the issue is the rift within the ruling party’s leadership in Nepal and the role played by China through Hou Yanqi, Beijing’s Ambassador to Kathmandu, the new ‘Queen’ of Nepal, who is credited to have arranged a rapprochement at the top level of the ruling Nepal Communist Party.

Future Impact

An Op-ed in The Indian Express noted: “Shedding its image of being a reluctant player in the internal politics of Nepal, China has been playing an active role these past few days in Kathmandu’s power games.”
Ms Hou Yangqi brokered a truce, with KP Sharma Oli keeping his prime ministerial seat; it is said that President Xi Jinping had a 40-minute phone conversation with Nepal counterpart Bidhya Devi Bhandari, “ostensibly to promise all support to fight the COVID-19 pandemic.”
According to onlinekhabar, on May 12, “In contrast to his foreign affairs minister’s statement that the government was aware of India constructing a link road to Manasarovar encroaching on the Nepali territory in Kalapani region, Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli says he was not told about it.”
There is no doubt about the location of the river and the fact that the new road is inside Indian territory. It is however in Delhi’s interests to find an amicable solution with Nepal for the areas for which there is no agreement; it could avoid China poking its nose into the bilateral affairs between Delhi and Kathmandu in the future.

Neighbour’s border envy

My article Neighbour’s border envy appeared in the Edit Page of The Pioneer.

Here is the link...

While China has undertaken multiple development projects near the Indian border, Delhi has been very slow and remains hesitant to see tourists in restricted areas

Recently, the Indian media was agog with news about the latest  deployment of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) close to the Indian borders. One website, the Indian Defence News, affirmed: “China strengthening military base near Uttarakhand’s Lipulekh Pass,” which is located near the tri-junction between Nepal, Tibet and India. It explained: “The new base has 20 parking hangars and also maintenance hangars. Medium-lift helicopters for the local Army aviation brigade have also been spotted… There are signs of a military build-up opposite Lipulekh Pass on the northeastern tip of Uttarakhand.” It cited some intelligence sources saying that the PLA had built a helipad close to the pass and also “installed two surveillance cameras, a Long Range Reconnaissance and Observation System (LORROS) and a solar panel.”
Some other reports mentioned model villages being built by Beijing near the Indian border. This is not new, though the scale should worry New Delhi. The information about Lipulekh Pass is probably linked to the new airport coming up near Purang (Taklakot); it will serve the Kailash/Manasarovar area.
On June 9, 2018, the Civil Aviation Administration of China and the Tibetan Autonomous Region’s (TAR) provincial government announced that Tibet would soon have three new airports. An official communiqué stated: “Construction of the three airports, all above the altitude of 3,900 metres, should begin in 2019.” The new airports are to be located in Lhuntse county in Lhoka (called Shannan by the Chinese) area, north of the Upper Subansiri district of Arunachal Pradesh; the second will be between Tingri and Lhatse counties of Shigatse City, north of Zangmu, the border post with Nepal, and the last in Purang, near Lipulekh.
It was then announced: “The airports should be completed in 2021; by then, there will be eight airports in TAR.” The news agency added: “At present, the preparatory work for the three airports is under way. The preferred sites have been determined;” the idea is “to consolidate the border and to promote the deep integration of the military and the people.” While tourism and “cultural” industries remain the pillars of the so-called stabilisation, defence is also vital for the Chinese authorities — one of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s pet projects is the Military Civilian Integration (or “fusion”).
Another of Xi’s favourite schemes is to make “patriotic” Tibetans “the protectors of their sacred homeland.” The last two years have seen the mushrooming of model villages near the Indian border; they are known as “Xiaogang” or “moderately well-off villages.” The pretext for building more than 100 such border villages is “poverty alleviation.” Tibetans need to be pulled out of poverty (incidentally, is it not strange that 70 years after the arrival of the communists on the plateau and the so-called liberation of Tibet, the populations still lives in such pitiable conditions?).
But “poverty” is not the only motivation. Xi once famously declared: “Govern the nation by governing the borders; govern the borders by first stabilising Tibet; ensure social harmony and stability in Tibet and strengthen the development of border regions.” These villages are following the “double-support model city”, which translates into full military and civilian integration.
The authorities have started implementing the theory of their boss by providing decent housing to the villagers and enticing the local recalcitrant Tibetan population to their side. Local satraps have a new leitmotif, the inhabitants of China’s borders (with India) should be “the protectors of the sacred homeland and the builders of happy homes.” The construction of “model” villages on the Tibetan side of the Indian border, mainly north of Arunachal Pradesh and also in Himachal and Ladakh, is the outcome of this. Several senior communist leaders have visited these new villages, either north of Kibithu in the Lohit valley; in Metok, north of Upper Siang district; in Yume (also written Yumai), north of Takshing in Upper Subansari or in Lepo, Marmang and Tsona, north of Khenzimane and Tawang.
Take Metok County, for example. China Tibet News reported that there are 46 administrative villages (including one multi-ethnic inhabitation area consisting of Monpa, Lhopa, Tibetan or Han) with a total population of 13,725: “In 2018, the county’s GDP has reached 606 million yuan ($99 million); farmers and herdsmen’s per capita disposable income and cash income have reached 10,380 yuan ($1,687) and 8,833 yuan ($1,486) respectively.”
In October, 133 villagers belonging to 29 households moved into their new houses. Reports said how “all the township’s residents are living in free houses provided by the Government,” in Puma Changthang township, north of the Bhutan border. “Sharing a 25-km border with Bhutan, where the average altitude tops 5,300 metres above sea level, the Puma Changthang township is in Nagartse county; it is renowned as the world’s highest township.”
The report explained: “Resettlement in new housing provided by the Government is part of its efforts to ensure the entire population lives comfortably in border areas… Project construction includes villagers’ houses, party’s committee offices, village clinics, water supply and roads” and, of course, these “multi-ethnic” villages will welcome Han Chinese.
Take another example. It was reported that Tibetans in Bayi village of Nyingchi City, north of Arunachal Pradesh, have come together and jointly “built a beautiful hometown as well as a better life.” Incidentally, places called Bayi (or 8-1 for August 1, the PLA anniversary) are usually under the Army’s management.
The article said that by the end of 2016, 16 impoverished villagers were lifted out of poverty through pairing assistance (ie, with the support of a mainland province), through participation in the collective economy and self-employment: “Bayi Village improved farmers and herdsmen’s cultural living standards, supported the construction of a “cultural” square, a village library and also organised various cultural and sports activities such as Tibetan circle dance, tug of war, lifting stones or archery.”
But at the same time, a review committee in Tsona county warned: “All townships and villages must come together to improve the village rules and regulations [of the party], standardise the daily behaviour of the villagers and strengthen the rural revitalisation strategy goals.”
“Standardise the daily behavior” is ominous. On the Indian  side, everything moves slowly as usual. A welcome exception is the Sisseri River bridge in the Lower Dibang Valley of Arunachal Pradesh, recently inaugurated by Defence Minister Rajnath Singh. It will cut down travel time from Pasighat to Roing by about five hours. But the Government remains hesitant to see tourists in “restricted” areas. China does not have this problem.

Roads to the Border?

My article Roads to the Border appeared in The Statesman

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Is the Indian Government slowly waking up from its slumber?
It seems so, but it is wise to not celebrate too early.
Union Road and Transport Minister Nitin Gadkari announced that his government was “hopeful of completing by next April the construction of highways through Uttarakhand for Kailash-Mansarovar to make it easy for people to visit the abode of Lord Shiva. “
The Minister told PTI: “Kailash-Mansarovar is the identity of our rich ancient culture and heritage. …We are cutting rocks through Himalayas to make a new alignment of highways through Uttarakhand for going to Mansarovar.”
Though this sudden interest in India’s borders is welcome, it is not clear if the minister is aware that ‘Shiva’s abode’ is not located in India, but in China; Mr Gadkari claimed: "We can reach Mansarovar directly through Uttarakhand,” it is not certain that Beijing, in its present mood, will agree to receive hordes of Indian pilgrims.
Though it did not receive the same publicity than the Lipulekh road, the Jammu & Kashmir government last month ‘approved’ the construction of the 150 km long Chushul-Demchok road. It was a positive move, though the proposal has now been sent to National Board for Wildlife for clearance!
And as usual in India, ‘final clearance’ may take years …and the construction decades.
In 2013, Thuptsan Chhewang, the MP for Ladakh, had advised Delhi: “If we say Ladakh is our territory then why anyone who wants to go beyond Pangong, has to get permission from New Delhi.” He had suggested that Demchok, the border village with Tibet, should be opened for tourists: “That would make our claim strong and help in the development of border areas.”
It would certainly go a long way to improve the lives of the local population.
But has Delhi the guts and foresight …and simply the time, to look into the issue?
The Echo of India, being a daily publication from Siliguri, understands better the reality of the border issue. In an editorial, it points out: “Chinese troops making occasional incursions into Arunachal Pradesh and then going back on their own is not something new. Each time such an incursion took place, whether under the UPA rule or under the NDA rule, the official explanation of New Delhi was that it was a matter of ‘perception’ of the line of actual control and where exactly it lies.”
Early this month, ‘transgressions’ happened again in the Kameng district of Arunachal and one minister stated that it was not so serious: after being involved in a ‘hand-to-hand fight’ with Indian soldiers, some 250 Chinese troops distributed chocolates. The Government seems satisfy with the chocolates distribution.
The Daily concludes: “New Delhi must spell out its policy clearly: whether it wants to avoid a military confrontation with China anyhow, or whether it intends to defend the territorial integrity of the country, come what may. A policy of appeasement will only tempt China to be bolder and more aggressive.”
To solve the problem, there is one solution: to build proper infrastructure to the border.
During a visit in Uttarakhand, Union Home Minister Rajnath Singh declared that all-out efforts should be made to ensure prosperity in the State by “creating employment opportunities for the local youth so that the growing ‘forced migration’ from the resource-crunched state could be checked.”
Singh also spoke of the mountain region’s sensitivity as a border state: in other words, build road, provide telecom facilities, open schools and hospitals.
It is what Nehru had understood and planned to do in the early 1950s.
Unfortunately nothing happened during the following decades.
One can only hope that it will be different this time, but it is not obvious.
For example, it was recently announced that some 73 roads in border areas are ‘way behind schedule’.
While the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) has recently approved 27 new roads to the border (at an estimated cost of Rs 1,937 crore for a length of 805 km), the Ministry of Defence has given its ‘operational clearance’ for 55 roads.
According to The Deccan Herald (DH), both the home and defence ministries are finding it tough “to complete the roads already approved by the government following the recommendations of the China Study Group under the Prime Minister’s Office, which identified 73 such roads.”
The Border Roads Organisation was asked to build 61 of the 73 roads with a total length of 3,417 km; they were to be completed by 2012, but the completion schedule has now been pushed back to 2020: “The roads to be constructed are located in high altitude areas between 9,000 to 14,000 feet. Oxygen depletion limits working capacity of labourers. Other constraints are air support, hard rock, natural calamities and limited working season,” says the document accessed by the DH.
What is making India’s situation more critical is that on the other side of the Himalayan slopes, a deluge of Chinese tourists are arriving. Last year, more than 20 million visited the Tibetan Autonomous Region.
According to Lhasa’s Tourism Bureau, this year Lhasa received 176,100 tourists during the May Day holiday (April 30-May 2).
Bayi, located north of the Indian border of Arunachal Pradesh, received more than 174,000 tourists from January to March in 2016, up by 53 percent. Incidentally, Bayi (or ‘8-1’) means that the area belongs to the People’s Liberation Army whose anniversary falls on 8-1 or August 1.
At the same time, Western Tibet (opposite Ladakh) has seen a five-fold increase in visitors over a year.
In order to welcome millions of tourists, Beijing develops at a fast pace the infrastructure on the plateau.
The Economist recently wrote: “A COLOSSAL roller-coaster is how a senior engineer described it. He was talking about the railway that China plans to build from the lowlands of the south-west, across some of the world’s most forbidding terrain, into Tibet.”
Xinhua also mentions the importance of Chinese ‘tourism’ to defend the borders with India; about National Highway 219, known in India as ‘the Aksai Chin road’ it speaks of a ‘heavenly road bringing the high life to Tibetan Plateau’.
Xinhua remarks: “It is the melon season in neighboring Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, fresh fruit is stacked up at the roadside, waiting to be ferried through the Kunlun Mountains and up to the plateau along the Xinjiang-Tibet Highway.”
This road has not only linked the two most strategic (and restive) provinces of China (Tibet and Xinjiang) but also helped to tremendously cut the cost of the PLA ‘defending the Indian border’.
According to the Chinese news agency: “With a safe, modern highway, transportation costs from Yecheng [in Xinjiang] to Ngari [in Tibet] have fallen by 55 percent, leading to cuts of about 40 percent in the price of commodities in the Tibetan town. Better yet, the number of tourists in Ngari has surged five-fold.”
In other words, China’s ‘Indian front’ will get its supplies faster and cheaper.
Border infrastructure is particularly important at a time when China has undertaken deep military reforms; one of the most important is that the two fronts facing India (in Ladakh and Arunachal), have been merged into one Western Theater Command (formerly Lanzhou and Chengdu Military Regions), greatly improving the management of the borders with India.
But all this does not deter the Indian Government from its archaic policies: an antiquated ‘Inner Line Permit’ dating from the Raj still prevails in border areas; will this ever change? It was recently announced that it may change soon, but here again, one has to see it to believe it.

Kailash via Nathu: not a Big Thing

150,000 Chinese visitors in Sakya in 2014

A few days ago, when Sushma Swaraj, the Indian foreign minister was in China to prepare the visit of Narendra Modi to Beijing in May (and rebalance India’s foreign policy after the visit of President Obama to Delhi), PTI reported: “India and China exchanged notes on modalities for opening the second route for people undertaking the Kailash-Manasarovar Yatra in Tibet via Sikkim, expected to benefit Indian pilgrims.”
The Indian news agency added: “The route through Nathu La Pass will facilitate comfortable travel for Indian pilgrims by buses.”
The same day, Syed Akbaruddin, the spokesperson of the Ministry of External Affairs tweeted (he is a great tweeter): “India-China exchange notes on modalities for additional route for Kailash Manasarovar Yatra in 2015.”
Swaraj had earlier stated that the opening of the new route would be a ‘big thing’.
The MEA presently takes 700/800 yatris (in 18 batches for a 22-day journey) via Lipulekh Pass in Pittoragarh district of Uttarakhand. This route is often subject to bad weather and floods like in 2013.
Always optimistic Indian Officials had announced that the number of pilgrims could rise considerably once the new route via Nathu-la is opened.
It was what was expected after the fanfare announcements and great tweets.
Unfortunately on February 2, the Sikkim Government clarified: “because of sufficient and inadequate infrastructure on both sides, only four batches comprising 50 yatris, five supporting staff and a nodal officer would be allowed.”
The statement added that this year, the Kailash Manasarovar yatra, via Sikkim through Nathula, would commence from June and end in September.
The Chinese authorities had earlier mentioned that several thousand pilgrims would be allowed to travel on the new route.
What a climb-down!
Merely 200 pilgrims between June and September!
Let us recall that the Sikkim government was given the responsibility of putting in place all the required infrastructure, as well as transport, accommodation, medical facility, acclimatization centres for the yatris.
The Sikkim government's statement also announced the MEA would soon invite applications from candidates for the yatra.
Before the arrival of President Xi Jinping for his maiden visit to India in September 2014, PTI had said that, as a ‘political gesture’, the Chinese President was to announce during his visit, the opening of a new route for Indian pilgrims wanting to go on the Kailash/Mansarovar yatra.
At that time, I questioned: “The question which needs to be asked: is it a ‘great gesture’ from Beijing or only a self-serving one?
According to the Indian news agency, the proposal was under serious consideration for some tome: “All announcements including the quantum of investments China plans to make in India are expected to be announced during Xi's visit.”
Earlier, Prime Minister Narendra Modi had requested Xi to offer an alternative to the Lipulekh pass in Pittoragarh district of Uttarakhand for the Kailash yatra. Either Demchok in Ladakh, or Shipki-la in Himachal Pradesh was expected to be the new port.
It made sense in terms of access and 'comfort'.
During Xi's September visit, it was officially announced that Beijing had decided to open Nathu-la border point in Sikkim. PTI says: “The new route, though longer, takes pilgrims from Nathu La to Shigatse … [and] from there the pilgrims could comfortably travel to Mansarovar and Kailash using well laid out highway.”
It was obviously the Chinese argument as it will clearly take the Indian pilgrims for a long (and expensive) ride.
The news agency then added: “It would be part of the big gesture of friendship not only to strike chord with Modi but also the people at large, specially the Hindus and Buddhists considering its religious importance.”
I then asked: "But is it a gesture of friendship or a decision driven by self-interest?"
The Chinese foreign ministry had told PTI that “lodging and boarding facilities for pilgrims have been improved with new hotels and additional beds with additional investments. Pilgrims also can have access to over 2300 vehicles.  ...Indians pilgrimage to Tibet is an important content of bilateral relations. China's willingness is in accordance with the spirit of the agreement which has been signed by both parties...”
Merely two hundred pilgrims in 2015 shows that the new India-China friendship has not matured as yet.
It is difficult to believe that infrastructure is the issue.
The Chinese government announced in January that “The recently upgraded Shigatse city of Tibet wants to boost the tourism industry of Sakya county.”
The famous Sakya monastery is en route between Chumbi Valley (on the Tibetan side of the Nathu-la) and the Kailash area.
Zhang Xiuwu, vice-mayor of Shigatse and Party chief of Sakya county recently announced: “Sakya offers great opportunities for tourism right now along with Shigatse developed into a city. Sakya county has been called the second Dunhuang of China, and it is listed as one of the two Chinese historic cities in Tibet autonomous region.”
Zhang Xiuwu added: "Tourism is very useful for rural residents, and we look forward to welcoming more tourists in the future. Sakya is enriched with plentiful tourism resources, and he believes that tourism can generate big profits in a short period of time.”
Guess how many visitors Sakya received last year?
Zhang said: “Statistics show that the county mainly receives pilgrims and academic researchers, and it welcomed an average of 400,000 pilgrims annually in the past three years.”
In 2014, the county received 146,000 tourists, and tourism revenue reached US $ 2.6 million.
According to The China Daily, Ngari, where the Kailash is located, received 470,000 visitors ,during the Year of Horse (last year): an increase of more than 50 percent over the previous year.
It is said that an integrated tourist center in Sakya can provide a tour guide, tickets to attractions, banks, post office, communications facilities and a specialty shopping center.
Infrastructure is enough to receive 150,000 Chinese tourists in Sakya, 400,000 in Ngari and just 200 Indians to Kailash?
What to conclude?
That this Indian pilgrimage is not a Big Thing for Beijing!

Reopening of the Himalayas

During a seminar on "Tibet's Relation with the Himalayas" organized by the Foundation for Non-Violent Alternatives and the Sikkim University in Gangtok, a debate took place: should the natural barrier between the Tibetan plateau and the Indian subcontinent be called ‘Himalayas’ or ‘Himalaya’.
The debate can continue amongst scholars and academicians, but the fact is that for centuries (or millennia) this formidable mountain range has not been a ‘barrier’, but a space of exchange; this is no longer the case today.
The Dalai Lama always surprises when he says that there is no such thing as ‘Tibetan Buddhism’, even less ‘Lamaism’. The so-called ‘Tibetan Buddhism’, was entirely borrowed from India, he says; more precisely from Nalanda. How?
Because, by a twist of fate, Tibetan monks and lamas, as well as abbots and pundits from the Indian viharas, criss-crossed the high mountain passes and transferred India’s knowledge to the Roof of the World.
Santarakshita, the Abbot of Nalanda, not only introduced the Buddha dharma to the Land of Snows, but also ordained the first monks.
For more than a thousand of years, the Himalayas witnessed a constant flow of knowledge, experiences, traditions and goods transiting up and down from far-away places in Central Asia, China or Mongolia to the entire subcontinent.
Then, China invaded Tibet and as the ‘Liberation Army’ began to occupy the high plateau, the passes were gradually closed.
Already in 1954, the infamous Panchsheel Agreement, which for the first time denied the existence of Tibet as a separate identity, designated only 6 passes (in Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh) as the sole Himalayan land ports; myriad other routes were hastily closed. The last stroke was the short border war between India and China in 1962. All bridges were then cut between the plateau and the Indian plains; the passes have been blocked ever since.
As I attended the seminar, a question came to me: how to soften the traditional borders again? Can the age-old relation between the Tibetan plateau and India be revived? The process has started, though it is extremely slow.
In 1991, a Memorandum on Resumption of Border Trade was signed by India and China; in a first phase, an overland trade route was reopened between the Tibet Autonomous Region and Lipukekh pass in the Pithoragarh district of (today’s) Uttarakhand; since then, a mart is annually permitted for a few months. In 1994, the same facilities were extended to Shipki pass in Kinnaur district in Himachal Pradesh and later to Nathu-la (‘la’ means pass in Tibetan) in Sikkim. A series of trade agreements between India and China allowed residents of Tibet and Indians from the border districts to export goods from a selected list of 29 items such as blankets, textiles, coffee, tea, vegetable oil or gur while raw silk, yak tails, goats or readymade garments, etc could be imported from China.
In 2006, India and China decided to resume the border trade through the historic Nathu-la, located 4,545 metres above sea level and 54 kilometers from Gantok; it had been closed for the past 44 years. With Jelep-la (via Kalimpong), the pass was traditionally the most important trade passage between Tibet, China and India.
The bilateral move had also a strategic implication as analysts believed that it signaled Beijing’s implicit recognition of Sikkim as part of India. This is debatable.
Incidentally, when I applied to visit the pass, I was told that I could not go due to my ‘foreign’ origin. This is typically foolish babu-thinking: to allow visitors from India or abroad to have a quick darshan of Chumbi valley on the Tibetan side, would be the best proof that the place is a part the Indian territory, under New Delhi’s control. Security checks should of course go alongside the permission. Babus are often unable to think in India’s interests.
In 2006, it was hoped that the border trade route would give a major boost to local economies and smoothen the bilateral relations between India and China. This has not really been the case for different reasons. The border trade remains rather small in volume, though smuggling of commodity goods is flourishing.
It is perhaps time to think to reopen the Himalayan passes without restrictions. Common men can only benefit from it.
After President Xi Jinping met the Indian Prime Minister on the occasion of the BRICS meet in Durban, the Chinese leader stated that he regarded “ties with India as one of the most important bilateral relationships”. According to him, an important issue was “enhancing people-to-people exchanges and cooperation, and broadening youth exchanges.”
Why can’t both governments agree to remove the restrictions on border trade and later open the Himalayan passes to tourism?
Foremost in my mind is the Demchok route in Ladakh which would allow Indian pilgrims to reach the Kailash-Mansarovar area in a relatively short time and in fairly comfortable conditions. Is it not worth it?