Why China is eying Ladakh

My article Why China is Eying Ladakh appeared in Mail Today.
A few years ago, a Ladakhi friend recounted a telling story; one evening he was invited at the Chinese embassy in Delhi. In the course of the party, he enquired with an official that he would like one day to visit Tibet. His interlocutor immediately answered that “there is no problem, everything can be arranged”. My friend was delighted; then he asked: “What about my visa?” The Chinese official retorted: “You don’t need one, you are one of us”.
You can imagine his surprise; I don’t think he applied to go to Tibet thereafter.

An Old Dispute
We can give the Chinese diplomat the benefit of the doubt, he was perhaps not aware of all the bureaucratic niceties, but the story came back to mind after the Chinese ambassador at the United Nations recently gave a press conference, after China distastefully decided to support Pakistan against the abrogation of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution.
Zhang Jun, China’s Permanent Representative to the UN, started by saying that the Kashmir issue should be resolved through peaceful means in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the relevant Security Council resolutions, but he added that India had changed the status quo in Kashmir, causing tensions in the region.
Zhang argued that India had challenged China's sovereignty interests: “I wish to emphasize that such practice by India is not valid in relation to China, and will not change China's exercise of sovereignty and effective administrative jurisdiction over the relevant territory."
Does it mean that Beijing has some sovereign rights over Ladakh?
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi is said to have brought up the same issue with his Indian counterpart, Dr Jaishankar, who adequately answered that no status-quo was changed.
The Chinese ambassador may have opened a Pandara Box: India is now free to speak on the human rights in Tibet, the fate of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang or the aspirations of the Hong Kong population, it however raises another issue: does China consider Ladakh as its territory?
On March 23, 1954, after three months of tough negotiations, the Indian and Chinese representatives were still far from an agreement on trade between India and Tibet (a month later, it would become the infamous Panchsheel ‘accord’, which saw India surrendering all its rights in Tibet without getting anything in return, not even an agreed border).
That day, Ambassador N. Raghavan cabled Delhi that the Chinese had objected to keeping open the old traditional route via Demchok in Ladakh. The Indian diplomat could not understand why.
A month later, on April 24, Raghavan informed Delhi about a fight which took place between him and Zhang Hanfu, his Chinese counterpart: “It was royal fight from beginning to end;” in the process, the Indian diplomats discovered that China had a big problem with Ladakh; it virulently objected to the Ladakh route being included in Agreement; Zhang quoted an oral understanding “[China] would not like in writing even by implication to have any reference to Ladakh,” cabled Raghavan to Delhi. Why?

Passport Wangling
Simply because the mountainous region was considered a ‘disputed’ region, with China claiming part of it; the route has never been reopened since then.
Two years later, Kushok Bakula, the Ladakhi leader expressed his interest to visit Tibet. Being a minister in the J&K government, Bakula had to travel on a diplomatic passport. China objected; in a note, the Ministry of External Affairs explained: “Kushok Bakula occupies an important official position in one of our states and we wish him to be given not only ordinary facilities as a pilgrim but also courtesies due to a Deputy Minister in one of our states.” Delhi had a doubt: did China accept India’s relationship with Kashmir and Ladakh? The affair went on for weeks. TN Kaul, the Indian Charge d’Affaires in Beijing was aware of Beijing’s ambivalence on J&K …and Ladakh: “The Chinese authorities are unwilling to accord any kind of tacit recognition to Ladakh's status as an integral part of India.” After threats to retaliate, Bakula was finally authorized to travel on an Indian passport.


Impasse Prevails
Some may say that it could be ‘coincidences’, but in 2010, the denial of a visa to Lt Gen BS Jaswal who headed the Northern Command looking after J&K, (including Ladakh) was another sign that China still had a problem with the region.
Then another ‘coincidence’, in October 2018, the Army Headquarter invited the defence and military attachés based in Delhi for a tour of Ladakh, including some areas close to the Line of Actual Control (LAC) “in order to familiarise them with the prevailing situation in the forward areas”.
The Chinese Defence Attache declined the invitation without explanation; a year later, his successor happily accepted to join his foreign colleagues in Sikkim and even visited Nathu-la, the border post with China, where he hugged the local Chinese commander. The only difference between the two visits is that Sikkim is not ‘disputed’.
It would worth testing the Chinese again; why can’t Jamyang Tsering Namgyal, the young well-educated MP of Ladakh, apply for a visa for China? Let us then watch Beijing’s reaction.
All this does not augur well for the ‘informal’ meet between President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Modi in Varanasi in October and before that, for the next round of boundary talks between the Special Representatives, NSA Ajit Doval and Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi.
While Wang already announced that China was looking at ‘early harvest’ in the negotiations and that he had sent some ‘proposals’ to the Indian government, it is difficult to envisage a solution to the vexed issue in the present tense atmosphere entirely created by China.
Is China really interested to find a solution to the border issue?
How to envisage anything positive in the present situation?
China needs to choose either to continue supporting terror in Pakistan, claim Ladakh or solve the boundary dispute.

Reopening the Old Borders

Indus river in the vicinity of Dumchele

We are often hearing questions about what could be suggested as possible Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) between India and China.
I give here a few suggestions for the border in East Ladakh.
One could add joint patrolling in 'semi' disputed areas; by 'semi' disputed, I mean areas where both parties agree on the area disputed (which is often not the case).  

Reopening Demchok
A way forward could be to do what was not done in 1954 during the negotiations for the so-called Panchsheel Agreement: open the Demchok route for the pilgrims visiting Kailash-Manasarovar.
Of course, that would be a first step; the next one being to reopen the border for trade; it could also be done the other way round (first trade, then yatra), if both countries find it more acceptable.
Remember the skirmishes in Sikkim at the end of the 1960s !
When the Nathu-la pass was officially reopened to trade in July 2006, it had the effect of ‘fixing’ the border, drastically reducing the tensions in the area.
Considering the ‘Nathu-la’ effect; reopening Demchok route could be an excellent CBM between India and China in Ladakh.
For years, the people of Ladakh have asked for the reopening of the ancient route.
Why is Beijing, constantly speaking of Old Silk Roads, so reluctant to let people and goods flow again over the Himalaya? 
Why can’t China allow trade and the devotees keen to go to Kailash-Manasarovar to use the easiest route via Demchok?

An alternative to Demchok
If China refuses to open Demchok, for whatever reasons, an alternative would be Dumchele.
Very few in India have heard of Dumchele, a place located east of the Indus river, on the Chinese side of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) between India and China; it used to be marked as a ‘grazing ground’ on old maps of the British Raj.
A couple of months after the 1962 border war, Dumchele appeared for the first time in the correspondence between India and China. On January 4, 1963, Delhi complained that China had an “intemperate and blatantly aggressive attitude”.
One of the examples given was that on October 22, 1962, the Chinese forces had attacked Indian posts at Chang-la, Jera-la and Demchok and occupied “fresh Indian territory upto Dumchele, east of Fukche.” Fukche was then an advanced Landing Ground (ALG) then used by India, West of the Indus.
Since then, the situation has stabilized and the Indus river has become a more or less agreed LAC till Demchok, located some 50 km South of Dumchele.
Though Dumchele is one of the 12 places where India and China have a difference of perception on the location of the LAC, this is not an insurmountable difficulty; The Hindustan Times recently mentioned the opening of a trading post which “could open as soon as the end of the year”.

From Smuggling to Trading
If the political leadership decides so, Dumchele could also become a new Border Personnel Meeting (BPM); presently the meeting points between the Indian and Chinese armies in Ladakh are located at Chushul and Daulat Beg Oldi (known as DBO).
Though Demchok, the historical landport would temporarily be set aside in favour of Dumchele which was the main smuggling center between India and China in Ladakh till 2016, when it was stopped for security reason.
The opening of Demchok or Dumchele would boost the local economy (both sides) and satisfy the local Indian sarpanches …and one day, one can dream of a new route (without crossing a single pass) to Mt Kailash. It would then become the fastest and easiest access to the holy mountain.
It could be an important step on the path of peace and would show China’s sincerity to open its frontiers with its neighbours.
Practically, it would mean, building a bridge over the Indus and build a tar road from Dungti to Dumchele. Technically, it is not a very difficult proposition.

Another possibility
Another feasible alternative would be to give Indian pilgrims access to Gunsa Ngari (Ali) airport.
Recently a two-day meeting between the representatives of the aeronautical authorities of Nepal and China was held to discuss issues pertaining to bilateral air transportation under an Air Services Agreement signed by the two countries.
According The Global Times: “As per the MoU signed between the two sides today, the Chinese side has agreed to designate eight more destinations in China for flights operated by Nepali Airlines, in addition to the existing seven destinations viz., Beijing, Shanghai, Lhasa, Guangzhou, Kunming, Chengdu and Xi’an.”
But more interesting for our purpose, the Chinese tabloid notes: “The two sides also reached a common understanding that after the development of adequate technical facilities at Gunsa Airport in Tibet, flights of Nepalese airlines would be allowed to land at that airport while circumnavigating Mt. Kailash as part of mountain flight.”
Then only a few hours will be necessary for the yatris to reach the base camp of the pilgrimage (via the beautiful G219 highway).
Opening Gunsa airport to Indian flights could be a serious alternative for the Kailash-Manasarowar yatris (especially old ones); the Indian pilgrims could fly from Dehra Dun (Uttarakhand) or Leh (Ladakh) airports after proper acclimatization in the lines of the ones, organized by the Government of India in Pittoragarh district for the Lipulekh-la route or near Gangtok for the Nathu-la one.
This would give a boost to the economy on both sides of the frontier, and show China’s goodwill.