Showing posts with label Hu Jintao. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Hu Jintao. Show all posts

Thursday, May 9, 2019

Fading Memories

A Forgotten Student Revolution
My article Fading memories appeared in the Edit Page of The Pioneer


Here is the link...

While remembering the events of 1919 and seeking to better integrate the spirit of May 4 into the party’s narrative, the student revolt of 1989 has been completely blacked out
China is suffering from a strange disease, a sort of selective amnesia — certain things from the past are clearly remembered, while other events seem to have been completely erased from the nation’s collective memory (or at least from the party’s annals). Take the May Fourth Movement, which was recently celebrated with much fanfare in every corner of the Middle Kingdom. In this case, the memory of the event, which occurred a hundred years ago, is absolutely clear.
Following the 1911 Revolution in China, the Manchu (Qing) dynasty disintegrated, triggering the fall of imperial rule. Eight years later, the May Fourth Movement took place in the Chinese capital where students started protesting against the nationalist Government’s weak response to the Treaty of Versailles, allowing Japan to control the territories surrendered by Germany in Shandong.
On the morning of May 4, 1919, student representatives from 13 different local universities met in Beijing and drafted five resolutions, in particular, to oppose the granting of Shandong to the Japanese and the creation of a Beijing student union. Later in the afternoon, some 3,000 students of Beijing University marched to Tiananmen Square, shouting slogans such as “struggle for the sovereignty externally, get rid of the national traitors at home” and “don’t sign the Versailles Treaty.”
Nobody can deny that it was a true revolution. Hundred years later, Chinese President Xi Jinping affirmed that patriotism was the core spirit of the 1919 event. He added that the May Fourth Movement inspired the ambition and confidence of the Chinese people and the nation to realise national rejuvenation. “It was also a great enlightenment and new cultural movement of disseminating new thought, new culture and new knowledge,” Xi said.
The President urged Chinese youth “in the new era” to love the country, the party and adhere to the leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC)…by the way, where was the party in 1919? Seventy years later, another student revolution took place on Tiananmen Square in Beijing and the Communist Party has no remembrance of it.
The aspiration of the students may have been very similar: A craving for a fairer world, more freedom for the youth to express themselves, a more democratic system (termed the ‘Fifth Modernisation’) and greater transparency and participation in the state’s affairs. A power struggle at the top of the party ended with the decision to send tanks on to the Square on June 4, 1989, which  resulted in the death of some 3,000 youths.
The Tiananmen papers, prefaced by a Chinese scholar, Andrew Nathan, gave a clear picture of the decision process inside the Politburo, which led to the massacre. Nathan wrote: “For the first time ever, reports and minutes have surfaced that provide a revealing and potentially explosive view of decision-making at the highest levels of the Government and party in the People’s Republic of China (PRC)…the protests were ultimately ended by force, including the bloody clearing of Beijing streets by troops using live ammunition. The tragic event was one of the most important in the history of communist China and its consequences are still being felt.”
This has completely been blacked out by Beijing. In May 1968, students in France and elsewhere in Europe also dreamt of a better world, but the two-month revolution, often violent, did not result in any casualty, neither from the students nor the police side.
Wang Xiangwei, a former editor-in-chief of the South China Morning Post, wrote an editorial piece for the Hong-Kong newspaper. After mentioning the similarities between the student movement in 1919 and 1989, he commented: “But the Government will disregard the 30th anniversary of another student demonstration in 1989 that preceded its bloody crackdown on June 4. The latter protest may be less seminal in China’s modern history, but its core spirit should not be obscured.”
Wang also noted that before the beginning of the May 4 celebrations, Xi chaired a meeting of the Politburo “to discuss ways to enhance study into the movement’s history and significance. The President seeks to better integrate the spirit of May 4 into the party’s narrative that only it can lead the country’s youth to his goal of national rejuvenation.”
The sad fact is that today, China is probably worse off than in 1989. Sycophancy and repression have reached new heights. Recently, the regime re-established an alliance of nine colleges, called the “Yanhe University Talent Training Alliance,” in order to perpetuate what is called the Yan’an Red DNA. Yan’an was the place where the Long March ended; it later became the centre of the Chinese communist revolution. In the early years, nine university institutions were set up to train the next generation of communist cadres. It was called the ‘Red DNA college’, responsible for spreading the “fire of the Chinese revolution” to the whole country.
Another instance, during the cultural revolution, party committees in universities made the students report on the anti-party faculty members.
After the 1989 Tiananmen massacre, the regime systematically established student informants in key Chinese universities. In 2005, the arrangement was expanded to almost every university and even some high schools explained the well-informed site Chinascope: “Although on the surface, the purpose is to collect information on academic activities, the student informants are the ears and eyes of the communist party authorities in the universities.” One could multiply the examples. One can just guess that China’s freedom-loving students will again revolt one day.
Incidentally, in 1989, the Indian Government ordered the state television to pare down the Tiananmen coverage to the barest minimum. Analyst C Raja Mohan explained: “The Government’s monopoly over television helped Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi signal Beijing that India would not revel in China’s domestic troubles and offer some political empathy instead.”
Rajiv Gandhi had travelled to China barely six months earlier. Sometimes, it is easier to be Alzeimerish.

Thursday, June 7, 2018

China's Secret Story

My article China's Secret Story appeared in Mail Today and DailyO

Every year during the first week of June, the thoughts of millions turn towards China and more particularly the Tiananmen Square, where 29 years ago thousands of young students lost their lives …while China lost a chance to become a ‘normal’ State.
Today the Middle Kingdom, under an ‘Emperor for life’, has become so powerful that very few dare to officially talk about ‘human rights’ and even less about the massacre of youngsters dreaming of freedom and democracy.
A publication dealing with China, Global Voice recently explained: “At the time, the Chinese Red Cross estimated that 2,700 civilians were killed, but other sources point to a much higher toll. A confidential US government document, revealed in 2014, reported that a Chinese internal assessment estimated that 10,454 civilians had died. Recently, a different report written by the then-British ambassador to China was declassified; it quotes a source from China's State Council who said that the minimum estimation of civilians killed is 10,000.”
What is amazing is that we still know very little about what really happened during those fateful weeks of 1989. Nearly 30 years later, the Chinese State pretends to have no knowledge of the events which changed the face of China which took a radical turn towards authoritarism.

Right to Kill
Even less known is the fact that a ‘rehearsal’ took place in Lhasa, the Tibetan capital three months earlier.
More than a year after the events, The Observer in London mentioned the massacre on the Bakhor, the circumambulation road around the Jokhang Cathedral in Lhasa: “On 5 March [1989], the People's Armed Police [PAP] had been given the right to kill. China's paramilitary force was marching into the centre of Tibet's capital, Lhasa, to begin a massacre that continued for days, leaving more than 450 monks, nuns and civilians dead.”
Tang Daxian, then a Chinese reporter working for a Mainland organization, told the British paper: “They knew the Tibetans were not armed and they knew they were free to kill them;” Tang had in his possession secret reports, proving that a massacre took place in Lhasa
According to Tang, the tragic events were provoked by members of the PAP dressed as Tibetans: “The disguised police - whose purpose is to crush civil disorder - attacked and burned shops, offices, and stores, providing the authorities with the excuse.” ‘Hooligans’ had threatened the civil order; martial law would subsequently be declared. At that time, a young cadre had recently taken over as Tibet's Communist Party Secretary; his name was Hu Jintao. The carnage would greatly benefit his career.
Qiao Shi, then China's security boss and one of the five-member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, had in 1988 warned Tibetan dissidents of ‘merciless repression’.
It was probably the death of the Panchen Lama under mysterious circumstances in his Tashilhunpo monastery in January which triggered the March events: “the atmosphere in Tibet had become extremely tense; with disturbance throughout the region,” observed Tang.
The events leading to the massacre began early on February 7, when “the people of Lhasa woke up to see fluttering above the Jokhang the flag of the snow lions and the snow mountains, the forbidden symbol of Tibetan nationalism.”
Apparently, this act of defiance was brought to the attention of supreme leader Deng Xiaoping, the Party boss Zhao Ziyang and other leaders in Beijing; the same persons would play the leading roles three months later in Beijing.

Temple Siege
During the next two days, the PAP occupied the Jokhang temple, where the flag had already disappeared; 20 monks were arrested.
The situation worsened on March 2 when a crowd began to circumambulate the Jokhang, chanting slogans, ‘Dalai Lama back to Tibet’ or ‘Power back to the Tibetans’; the number of the protesters rapidly increased. Soon, a scuffle broke out between the crowd and 200 plainclothes police; but it ended up without violence.
Tang’s documents said that from dawn on March 3 to midnight the next day, party cadres and military leaders discussed the deteriorating situation. For many, the worsening was due to the PPA’s ‘lack of discipline’ while no officials “had heeded to the complaints of the people.”
The PAP sat quietly throughout the meeting; it had received instructions from Qiao Shi to “avoid discussions and debate over details...your function in Tibet cannot be performed by others.”
On March 5 in the morning, the PAP commander, General Li Lianxiu ordered to create the excuse: "The Special Task force should immediately produce 300 people dressed as ordinary citizens and monks. They are to co-operate with the plainclothes police to complete the task of creating a provocative atmosphere along the Bakhor.”
The orders were to be “kept secret from other co-operating units involved. Anyone violating these orders is to be severely punished.”

Grisly Episode
On March 6, with most of the foreigners parked in the Holiday Inn and with no witness around, the PAP struck: “The trap was sprung. Police appeared on the roofs overlooking the narrow Xuanjing alley with automatic weapons and blazed away. Within 10 minutes, 300 people had been shot," said Tang. During the next hours 450 people were killed and more than 3,000 arrested.
The next evening, Hu Jintao proclaimed that “the Armed Police, following the instructions of the Central Committee had maintained the unity of the motherland.” Hu warned that the majority of Tibetans who had joined the disturbance...must be made to feel guilt and promise they would never do so again. As a result of his strong action, Hu Jintao would soon be promoted to the Politburo.
One can only hope that Beijing will one day have to explain the Tiananmen and Bakhor episodes. It would be good for China too, if it wants exorcise its past.

Wednesday, June 4, 2014

The Tiananmen Square massacre: a rehearsal in Tibet

There was a rehearsal for the Tiananmen incident which saw the Army taking over the Square and killing hundreds of students.
It happened in Lhasa, Tibet three months before the Square's crackdown; a young Party Secretary then demonstrated to the Elders in Beijing that he had the capacity to handle the most difficult situations.
He was suitably rewarded; a few years later, he became General Secretary of the Party and President of the People's Republic of China.
I am reposting here an article written in 2002 for Rediff.com.
As you can see, it pays to be tough in China.
At the Tiananmen's incident, I like the remarks made yesterday by Bill Bishop in his Newsletter Sinocism. He wrote:
I first came to China 25 years, to spend the second semester of my junior year at Peking University. We arrived in late January and I stayed until the third week of June. No one who was in Beijing then will ever forget the Beijing Spring and subsequent crackdown.
The one lesson I took away from those first few months in China is that it is always a mistake to underestimate what the Party will do to stay in power.
That lesson, which has held up very well over the last quarter century, is why I continue to believe that Xi Jinping is very serious about both economic reforms and reining in corruption. There is no shortage of people, inside and outside China, who believe Xi's efforts will fail without said political reform, but Xi and his colleagues appear to disagree. Political reforms in any Western or liberal sense seem even less likely now than they have in decades. 

China is not going to change soon and China will remain aggressive.
Te problem is that Beijing still believes that all its problems are due to her 'bad' and 'provocative' neighbours.
On May 30, The People’s Daily reported that Fu Ying, the Chairperson of the National People’s Congress Foreign Affairs Committee, suggested during a TV show that "all issues in the seas around China were caused by the provocative behavior demonstrated by China’s neighboring countries". 
She, of course, mentioned that Japan which 'faces the question of whether it will continue on the path of being a peaceful nation or not".
After saying that China will not give up on peaceful resolutions, Fu added that "however, strong responses are necessary when facing challenges. This position is also needed to maintain the peaceful and stable order in the entire region".
India too will have to cope with these strong 'peaceful' responses from Beijing.
 
From Roof of the World to Top of the Party
Claude Arpi
Rediff.com
December 10, 2002

The suspense ended on the last day of China's 16th Communist Party Congress in Beijing when the nine chosen ones emerged in the Great Hall of the People. Hu Jintao, freshly appointed general secretary of the party, was leading his eight comrades. China had a new leadership. Hu's presence was not much of a surprise as the world knew he had been groomed for years by his mentor and China's last emperor Jiang Zemin. However, there was speculation about who Hu, the 'grey man of the party,' really was.
Most international media repeated that very little was known about China's new boss. However, one part of his life is quite well documented: the period before he ascended to the standing committee of the CCP's Politburo in 1992.
At that time, the 'core leader of the Forth Generation' was for four years party secretary of the Tibet Autonomous Region in Lhasa. It is interesting to have a closer look at the way Hu used his post in Tibet as a stepping stone to reach the top rung of the Middle Kingdom.
Hu always knew that to 'seek fame' does not help to climb the party's ladder. That is probably why he never liked to be in the limelight or give interviews to the foreign press. One can closely follow his steps by his declaration either on Lhasa television or through the official organs of the party.
Of his earlier years, we know little except that one of his best friends was Zhang Hong, who later became Deng Xiaoping's son-in-law. As a mechanical engineer, Hu was posted at different sites throughout China, but in 1980, he was noticed by Song Ping, the party boss in Gansu province and was rapidly promoted. He finally joined the Young Cadre Course at the party school in Beijing in 1981. It was there that he is supposed to have met Hu Yaobang, general secretary of the CCP, who became his first mentor.
The elder Hu was certainly one of the most remarkable leaders of modern China and a great reformer. Remember it is his funeral, after his sudden death during a meeting of the Politburo, which triggered the Tiananmen student revolution.
One of the most remarkable facts about the Elder Hu was that when he visited Tibet in 1980, he was so moved by the suffering of the Tibetan people under Communist rule, that he decided to address 5,000 officials assembled in Lhasa. He publicly admitted that the party 'has let the Tibetan people down' and he added: 'the life of the Tibetan people has not been notably improved' after the Chinese invasion in 1950.
When the Elder Hu tried to introduce reforms in China in the early eighties, he was violently opposed and criticized by conservative forces within the party. During this period, it seems Hu Jintao, who was first secretary of the Communist Youth League, defended him.
However, by the mid-eighties, the direction of the wind had begun to change in Beijing. This is when the Younger Hu showed he was already a Grand Master.
With the balance of power slowly shifting, the Elder Hu began losing to the most conservative elements led by Li Peng and Qiao Shi, and the Younger Hu realigned himself dexterously.
The changes in the party were reflected on the Tibetan question. After the Elder Hu's visit to Tibet in 1980, Beijing had for a few years an open Tibet policy. The Dalai Lama was allowed to send four fact finding delegations and two negotiating teams to Tibet and China. Discussions were held on the Dalai Lama's future role in Tibet. But in 1985, due to the changes in Beijing, the opening came to a sudden halt and a visit to Tibet and China by the Tibetan leader was cancelled.
Sensing the wind, Hu Jintao began leaning towards his new mentor Qiao Shi who was in charge of internal security in the Chinese cabinet.
In Tibet, events took a turn for the worse in September 1987 when some monks demonstrated in Lhasa against Chinese rule. During these days, hundreds of visitors and media persons were present in the Tibetan capital and the images of the repression which followed were reported the world over. In the following months, incidents continued to occur and several Tibetans lost their lives.
Beginning 1988, the Chinese leadership became more and more nervous as they felt they were losing face in the world's eyes. The monks, the very same people they were supposed to have 'liberated' from the clutches of the clergy, were now revolting against the 'motherland.' But worse for Beijing: if the situation was allowed to drift, China could follow the Soviet Union on the way to disintegration.
Something had to be done.
The first scapegoat was Wu Jinghua, the Elder Hu's protégé who lost his job as party secretary in Lhasa. Officially he had a heart attack during a meeting in June 1988 'due to a frigidly cold climate and the lack of oxygen, plus being overloaded with work for a long time.' His mistake was that he had scrupulously implemented the Elder Hu's policies towards Tibet.
In Beijing, Hu Yaobang was replaced by Zhao Ziyang who would be purged after the Tiananmen Square events.
The strong men in the Politburo were Li Peng and the Younger Hu's new mentor Qiao Shi who visited Tibet in July 1988. It is probably at that time that it was decided to appoint Hu Jiantao to replace Wu Jinghua as Tibet chief. It was to be the crucial turn in Hu's career. He probably knew he had to show results in very short time to repay the confidence placed in him by Qiao Shi. Hu knew he could not afford to fail. Had not Qiao Shi threatened of 'merciless repression' if the demonstrations were not immediately stopped?
The Younger Hu took over the rebellious region on January 12, 1989.
A Hong Kong paper Kuang Chiao Ching wrote at that time: 'If he can stabilize the situation in Tibet that would, of course, be the first step towards a rapid rise in Hu Jintao's political fortunes… If he rules Tibet successfully, perhaps the question on everyone's mind in the near future could be: Will Hu Jintao become a superstar on China's political stage?'
On January 19, Hu had a meeting with the People's Liberation Army. During his speech, he spoke about the 'the CCP Central Committee's new instructions on work in Tibet.' Referring to the PLA's role: indeed it was a bad omen for Tibetans, especially after Hu told the army: 'We must strengthen control of monasteries and temples.'
A week later a Beijing newspaper Zhongguo Xinwen She published an interview with Hu in which he described his two main tasks in Tibet: 'To safeguard the unification of the motherland, adopt a clear-cut stand to oppose separatism, and stabilize the situation in Tibet,' and then: 'to continue to carry out economic construction, make redoubled efforts to develop the commodity economy.' This would later be known as Hu's strategy of 'grasping with both hands.'
From that day, events moved very fast.
On January 23, Hu visited the Tashilhunpo monastery in Shigatse. He was accompanied by the Panchen Lama, the second highest ranking Tibetan Lama after the Dalai Lama. The official occasion was the consecration of a stupa containing the mortal remains of one of the previous Panchen Lamas. To everyone's surprise, during the function, the Panchen Lama denounced the Communist Party's role in Tibet: 'although there had been developments in Tibet since its liberation, this development had cost more dearly than its achievements. This mistake must never be repeated.'
Four days later, he passed away in mysterious circumstances. Though Tibetans believed he was murdered, it has never been proven. It is said the Panchen Lama had a serious quarrel with Qiao Shi just before he left for Tibet. Whether this was true or not, the stage was cleared for 'merciless repression.'
When a demonstration erupted on March 5, the People's Armed Police quickly took control of the situation. Chinese journalist Tang Daxian, who had connections in the party and witnessed some of the events, later wrote in London's The Observer that many events were stage managed by the PAP. Beijing had ordered repression. His information was that on March 6 alone, 387 Tibetans were massacred around the Central Cathedral in Lhasa.
The next day, Hu declared that 'the PAP following the instructions of the Central Committee (read Qiao Shi) had maintained the unity of the Motherland… the majority of Tibetans who had joined the disturbance… must be made to feel guilty and promise they would never do so again.'
Martial law was clamped on March 8. The tragic events in Lhasa seem to have been a rehearsal for an even more important episode: the student rebellion on Tiananmen Square three months later.
Hu Jintao told Xinhua news agency a few days after the events: 'We should maintain vigilance against possible activity by the handful of separatists and strike them with relentless blows. We should mete out more severe punishment to those who would start troublemaking after the declaration of martial law.' His ruthless implementation of his bosses' orders and the subsequent replay of Lhasa events at Tiananmen Square proved he was a leader who could be relied upon. When, after the massacre at the Square, Jiang Zemin replaced Zhao Ziyang, he remembered this.
Hu was to stay on for four more years in Tibet, though the job was done in three months. Hu never liked Tibet. He once told a journalist he 'disliked Tibet's altitude, climate and lack of culture.' During the following months and years, he began shuttling between Lhasa and Beijing where the real power was. There was a common joke about Hu amongst Tibetan cadres: 'Where is Hu?' The answer was: 'Hu is in Beijing Hospital.' He had to officially report sick each time he was going to Beijing!
In the following months, Hu further stabilized the situation by targeting Tibetan cadres 'harbouring separatist thoughts.' He believed the main 'evil' was religion, and particularly the monasteries which were 'using feudal and superstitious beliefs to swindle and harm people,' thereby delaying the 'socialist spiritual civilization' heralded by Jiang Zemin.
On April 30, 1990, martial law was finally lifted. Hu used his remaining years as party secretary to completely reverse the Elder Hu's policies. Instead of providing support to the Tibetans to safeguard their culture, the Younger Hu tried to assimilate it into Han culture. While the Elder Hu wanted the Tibetans to be autonomous and take their future into their own hands, he created schemes to bring in more Han officials and colonizers to the Roof of the World, further destroying Tibetan uniqueness.
During a visit to Tibet in 1990, Jiang Zemin echoed Hu's views: 'It is necessary to strengthen education in patriotism and socialism in the light of conditions in China and Tibet, so as to make the students know from childhood that Tibet is an inalienable sacred part of the big family of the motherland, and that there will be no socialist new Tibet if there is no CCP.'
It appears that during Jiang Zemin's visit to Tibet, a close relationship was established between the general secretary and his future protégé.
There is no doubt that the events of the three first months in Tibet earned Hu the admiration of many in Beijing. While the Chinese empire was on the verge of disintegrating and could have followed the example of the Soviet Union, his firm handling of the situation and obedience to party orders were rewarded in 1992 by a seat on the standing committee. It was the next step towards the summit.
It is probably true that in 1989 Hu saved China which could have plunged into the 'chaos' so feared by the Chinese emperors. Had Tibet been lost, no doubt other provinces such as Xinjiang would have followed in quick succession.
Now that the Younger Hu has reached the top, will he continue to 'grasp China with two hands' and tighten security to economically develop China? In many ways, China faces more serious problems now than 1989: unemployment, wild capitalism, corruption, regional aspirations, pollution, food problems are some of the issues the Younger Hu will have to tackle. For this, will he use force as his party elders had instructed him to do in Tibet, or will he choose the path of the Elder Hu, open up the system and ultimately give more power to the people, with all the risks it implies?
Only the future will tell, but he will certainly need more than two hands to grasp the future of the People's Republic.

Tuesday, March 25, 2014

President Xi in Paris

As President Xi Jinping arrives in Paris, I wonder if he will  receive a reception like his predecessor, Hu Jintao got during Sarkozy's presidency.
Watch this video.
Can you believe it?
And don't say France is poor country!

Wednesday, March 6, 2013

Chinese Hans from 'Tibet'

Dr. Ding Zhongli of the Chinese Academy of Science
A Chinese official publication yesterday asserted: "Tibet, the snow-covered holy land in southwest China, topped a survey of residents’ sense of happiness in Chinese inland areas, with the most satisfying index of air condition."
This was found during a survey, 'China Happiness Index Map', conducted by Tencent.com together with 34 local media involved 10 million voters from 34 provinces, cities and autonomous regions.
The outcome of the survey was: "Tibet was graded with 6.7 points (full marks for 10 points), followed by the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region with a score of 6.2 points and three other provinces including Hainan, Liaoning, Jiangsu Fujian ranking third with the same score of 6.0 points. While Guizhou, Beijing, Shanghai and Guangdong, with 5.0 points, became the least happiness areas of Chinese inland."
The website added: "Happiness index shows social systems and people’s life, and it is also the indicator of the social development and people's opinion. The survey clearly showed that the 'happiness map' was affected by the pace of life, environment and many other factors a city."
So, why so much resentment against the Central Government of China, if Tibet is such happy place. One could give a long list of reasons. 
Look at this one!
As the Two Meetings are being held in Beijing, I came across the list of delegates from Tibet to the National People's Congress (NPC). 
Tibet is entitled to a meager quota of 20 delegates on nearly 3000 members 'elected' to the rubber-stamp Parliament.
You may be under the impression that the 20 'Tibetan' delegates are born and live on the Roof of the World. You are wrong! 
Amongst them are many Han Chinese as the Bloomberg article posted below shows.  
What is the connection between Chang Xiaobing, the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of China Unicom Hong Kong Ltd, a company dealing in wireless carrier and Tibet?
It is a billion yuan question.
And Prof Ding Zhongli, Vice President of the Chinese Academy of Sciences?
Though Ding is certainly aware of the environmental problems facing the Himalayas as a Board Member of ICIMOD, the Kathmandu-based organization, is it a criteria for representing Tibet?
According to Prof Ding's CV:
Ding Zhongli, Professor at the Institute of Geology and Geophysics, Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), was born in Shengzhou, Zhejiang Province in 1957. He was elected as Academician of CAS in 2005, as Chairman of the Chinese National Committee for the International Geosphere-Biosphere Programme (CNC-IGBP) in January 2008, and as a member of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC) of China in March 2008. He became Vice-President of the Chinese Academy of Sciences in January 2008, following nearly seven years as Director of the CAS Institute of Geology and Geophysics. For the past two decades, Professor Ding has focused his research on the Quaternary climate change and associated forcing mechanisms, and made systematic observations and a pedostratigraphic correlation of the loess sequences over the Chinese Loess Plateau, laying a foundation for later study. For the fi rst time, he established a 2.6-Ma orbital timescale of stacked grain-size records for Chinese loess that is highly compatible with the marine isotope record. He found that the East-Asian
winter monsoon intensity registered in the loess grain-size was in phase with the Milankovitch cycles, particularly the 100 ka eccentricity cycle, and that the winter monsoon intensity is closely related to global ice volume changes. A recipient of many awards, his achievements and many innovative results have been published in numerous highly-ranked international journals and are widely cited. He has also contributed to textbooks that have been published in America and England. Professor Ding has a PhD in Quaternary Geology from the Institute of Geology, Chinese Academy of Sciences and a Master of Science in Geochemistry from the Institute of Geology, Chinese Academy of Sciences.
Well, he could perhaps help to suggest measures to stop the melting of the glaciers and as a geologist, he could advise his colleagues in Beijing about the danger of building too many dams on the Tibetan plateau.
Another  'Tibetan' is Wang Huning, mentioned a couple of times on this blog.
He is one of the rising star of the Party and recently accompanied Xi Jinping in in his 'inspection tour' in Gansu province.
Already a member of the Politburo, he will probably make it to the Standing Committee in 2017.
Wang Huning
I had thought that he would become a 'super' Foreign Minister in Li Keqiang's government, but now it appears that Yang Jiechi, the present Minister will be promoted as State Councilor and will seat in Dai Bingguo's chair, while Wang Yi, a former China's ambassador to Japan from 2004 to 2007 will take Yang's place in the ministry.
Can Wang Huning, with his proximity to Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping do good to Tibet? It has to be seen.
Other Han 'Tibetans' are Chen Quanguo, who was appointed Party Secretary of the Tibet Autonomous Region in 2011 and Wu Yingjie, the Deputy Secretary of Tibet Autonomous Region.
By the way, Hu Jintao himself used to be a member of the Tibet delegation.
No comment!

China Unicom Chief Joins Congress as Tibet Representative
Bloomberg News
March 4, 2013
China Unicom Hong Kong Ltd. (762), the nation’s second-largest wireless carrier, said Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Chang Xiaobing has joined the National People’s Congress as a member of the Tibet delegation.
Chang is not ethnically Tibetan, and China Unicom has no information on why he was chosen for that delegation, Zhou Xiaoke, Unicom’s Hong Kong-based director of investor relations, said in an e-mailed response to questions today. Chang has previously served on the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, which advises the legislature, he said.
“Many large state-owned enterprises are headquartered in Beijing and their heads cannot be all elected to the Beijing delegation,” Zhou said in the e-mail. “There is some mechanism to allocate the qualified candidates to other delegations.”
Chang joins the Tibetan delegation at a sensitive time as a rising number of activists from the region are setting themselves on fire to protest Chinese rule. Chang is part of the nation’s ethnic Han majority and is from the northern province of Hebei that surrounds Beijing, according to a biography posted on the online encyclopedia Baike run by Baidu Inc., the nation’s largest search engine.
Last year, 83 Tibetans died after setting themselves ablaze, and at least three more died in January, the Tibetan government-in-exile said in a Jan. 25 statement.
The Dalai Lama, the Tibetan spiritual leader, has lived in northern India since fleeing in 1959, when China’s military took over the region. China accuses the Dalai Lama of waging a campaign for independence while the spiritual leader says he is seeking autonomy for Tibet.

Sunday, March 3, 2013

Promoting Corruption in China

Ling Jihua
Xi Jinping will soon be President of the Peoples’ Republic of China; it is not an easy job. Xi, who was elected Party boss at the end of the 18th CCP’s Congress last November, will have to tackle myriad problems; the first being the  corruption within the Communist Party.
As the ‘advisory parliament’, the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) started its deliberation in the Great Hall of the People, Xi appealed to the Communist delegates to fight this pervasive plague in the Middle Kingdom.
Since he assumed the top job in the Party (as well as the chairmanship of the Central Military Commission), it has been Xi's leitmotiv.
On the occasion of the CPPCC’s opening, Xi told the delegates: "the Communist Party would be able to mark its 100th birthday in eight years time, only if officials can learn from the selfless sages of the past".
Though the Communist Party is scheduled to celebrate its centenary a year before the end of the second of Xi’s two five-year terms, will the Party still exist?
Today, it is the question that many China watchers ask.
In a speech marking the 80th anniversary of the Central Party School, Xi asserted a few days earlier: "Only if the capabilities of all party members unceasingly continue to strengthen, can the goal of ‘two 100 years’ and ‘the dream’ of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese people be realised.”
That is the theory. The reality is different.
Take Ling Jihua, a former close collaborator of President Hu Jintao: he did not get a seat in the coveted Politburo in November because he tried to cover-up his son's death in a Ferrari accident which occurred on March 18, 2012. Ling's son is said to have died in his car while having sex with two women.
The New York Times quoting party insiders reported: "Before dawn on March 18, a black Ferrari Spider speeding along Fourth Ring Road in Beijing ricocheted off a wall, struck a railing and cracked in two. Mr. Ling was killed instantly and the two young Tibetan women with him were hospitalized with severe injuries. One died months later, and the other is recovering."
Ling made the mistake of trying to hide his son's accident. Though the families of the two women are said to have received hefty sums of money from China’s largest state oil company to “to make sure they shut up,” unfortunately for Ling, microbloggers are extremely active in China these days; as a result the entire story went around the Net.
As The South China Morning Post put it, the accident was "an embarrassment for the ruling Communist Party, sensitive to perceptions that children of top party officials live rich, privileged lifestyles completely out of touch with the masses.”

At the same time, there were rumors that Gu Liping, Ling’s wife had benefited from Youth Business China, a well-endorsed charity that she was running.
As a result Ling Jihua was ‘demoted’ and appointed head of the United Front Work Department, a less influential position, though overlooking the ‘minorities’ and Taiwan affairs.
Ling did not remain in the purgatory for long; he has now been promoted as one of 10 Executive Chairmen of CPPCC; in a few days he will automatically become a Vice-Chairman of the august body.
Nobody will believe that Xi Jinping is serious about fighting corruption when officials like Ling are promoted, even if only to a honorific position.
It is not just the question of covering up his son's misdeeds, but the Party should also explain how the son of a close collaborator of the country’s president acquired a Ferrari.
Ling has perhaps been a good 'fixer' for Hu Jintao, but the fact remains that a tainted official has now been relegated to a ‘smaller’ job, looking after the 'minorities', in particular, the Tibetans and the Uyghurs. It is worrying for the future of China, which could implode under the weight of its own contradictions.
Chen Ziming, an independent analyst told The South China Morning Post: "Considering that Ling was an important member of Hu Jintao's camp, Hu may have pushed to retain his protégé's influence."
In fact, Ling's promotion in the CPPCC is probably part of a deal: Hu Jintao wanting to keep an eye on Tibet; he may give a free hand to Xi Jinping on other issues.
Another Tibet ‘expert’, Du Qinglin, Ling’s predecessor at the United Front Department’s has now become a member of the Secretariat of the CCP's Central Committee and Secretary General of the CPPCC's session.
In China, it seems rewarding to look after 'minorities'. Let us remember that the Dalai Lama’s envoys had to resign after 10 years of unfruitful talks with the United Front.
Though some will argue that the post of CPPCC Vice-chairman is mostly honorific, it still carries the rank of minister, with all perks and respect attached.
Xi Jinping may want to fight corruption, but can he resist the pressure of the apparatchiks who are all keen to reward their respective friends?
In these circumstances, it is extremely doubtful if the Party can survive till its Centenary.

Wednesday, November 21, 2012

The same old thing in Tibet?

Ragdi escorted Hu Jintao into the Great Hall of the People
A relatively large contingent of Communist leaders posted in Tibet have made it to CCP's Central Committee (CC) (full-fledged or alternate).
Nobody, of course, was promoted in the Politburo, though eight leaders posted in Tibet are now members of the Central Committee.
  • Chen Quanguo (TAR Party Secretary) promoted from Alternate to Full CC membership
  • Padma Choling knows as Pema Thinley (TAR 1st Deputy Party Secretary) promoted to Full CC membership
  • Lobsang Gyaltsen (Deputy Chairman of TAR Government) promoted to Alternate CC membership
  • Hao Peng (2nd Deputy Party Secretary of TAR), promoted to Alternate CC membership
  • Qin Yizhi (Deputy Chairman of TAR Government and ex-Party Secretary of Lhasa) promoted to Alternate CC membership
  • Jin Shubo (TAR Standing Committee member with 36 years of Tibet experience) was re-elected to the Central Discipline Inspection Committee
More interesting Lt. General Yang Jinshan, the PLA Commander of the Tibet Military District has been promoted to Full CC membership, while Gongbo Tashi, the head of the TAR United Front Department was promoted Alternate CC member.
However, Jampa Phuntsok (Qiangba Puncog), former Chairman of the government of Tibet Autonomous Region from 2003 until January 2010 and later Chairman of the Standing Committee of the People's Congress of the Tibet Autonomous Region is out (retired).
It has also to be noted that Zhu Weiqun, the Executive Deputy Minister of the United Front, who in the past handled day to day Tibetan affairs is not a member of the CC anymore.

Tibetan hardliner Ragdi, who has no official position any longer escorted Hu Jintao into the Great Hall of the People to meet and spend an hour with the TAR delegation after the opening of the 18th Congress.
Hu Jintao will probably keep a finger in the Tibetan pie through his protege Ling Jihua, the new boss of the United Front Work Department. Though Ling did not make it to the Standing Committee of the Politburo (due to his son's Ferrari accident, he was found found naked and probably dead with 2 'ethnic' girls), Ling remains a powerful force.
Du Qinglin, the former Director of the United Front has switched place with Ling in the Secretariat of Central Committee.
Tibet policy is not going to change soon.
Regarding the Central Military Commission (CMC), the passing of power was apparently smooth, but no 'Tibet' experts seem to be amongst the 10 uniformed members.
However, the strengethning of the Air Force with the appointment of  General Xu Qiliang, the former PLA Air Force Chief as Vice-Chairman of the CMC may provide new 'air' opportunities for the Chinese defense forces in case of a conflict with India.

Xi Jinping commands special military commission meeting
South China Morning Post
Minnie Chan
At a special meeting of the Central Military Commission, Hu Jintao gives ringing endorsement of his successor's ability to unite comrades
Xi Jinping has shown the world that he is now in charge of the People's Liberation Army - chairing a special meeting of the Communist Party's Central Military Commission (CMC) a day after being put in charge.
And President Hu Jintao, who on Thursday passed the chairmanship of the body that controls the PLA, along with the leadership of the Communist Party, gave his ringing endorsement to his successor at Friday's meeting.

The incoming and outgoing top brass were all present.
Hu told the special meeting that Xi was "a competent party general secretary and CMC chairman", and highlighted his successor's experience.
"Comrade Xi Jinping can, for sure, shoulder the great responsibility of being chairman of the Central Military Commission, and uniting and leading the commission to fulfil great and historic missions," state media quoted Hu as saying yesterday.
Xi told his audience that Hu's own decision to step down as CMC chairman with immediate effect had "shown his foresight as a Marxist statesman and strategist, and his broad mind and noble character".
Hu's predecessor Jiang Zemin remained chairman of the military commission for two more years after handing over the post of party chief in 2002.
Xu Guangyu, a senior researcher at the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association in Beijing, said: "[Hu and Xi] were telling all retired leaders not to cling to power any more and to trust the next generation of leaders."
The speech also marked another major departure from the past. When Hu inherited the top military post from Jiang in 2004, he stressed in his inaugural speech that under the PLA's "political principle" it "would make no promise to give up the use of force" to secure reunification with Taiwan.
Eight years later, Xi's inaugural address sidestepped the Taiwan issue completely.
"Cross-strait relations have improved since Ma Ying-jeou came to power in 2008 - it's unnecessary to mention such a sensitive issue to provoke Taiwanese compatriots," Xu said, adding that Xi had spent 17 years in Fujian , just across the strait from Taiwan, and was clearly confident on the subject.
"Xi also realised that the real knotty problem now is in the East and South China seas, which need both Beijing and Taipei to work together to defend our national sovereignty," Xu said, referring to territorial disputes over various islands.
Taipei-based political commentator Lin Baohua, also known as Ling Feng, said Xi also wanted to show Japan and the US that he would continue to use economic means to solve the Taiwan problem. "Xi realises that if he uses military force to liberate Taiwan, the cost would be much higher than the use of economic forces," he said.
Hu and Xi also reiterated the army's absolute loyalty to the party. Xi made it clear senior officers should set examples for troops in anti-corruption campaigns.

Monday, October 22, 2012

Rough weather in the Middle Kingdon

Former President Jiang Zemin's latest appearance in public
This article in The Epoch Times, a Falun Gong Group publication is fascinating.
The newspaper has not always been accurate in its prediction, but even if 50% of the information contained in the article are correct, it demonstrates the intense power struggle in the Middle Kingdom.
Of course, The Epoch Times had several times announced the death of former President Jiang Zemin though the old man has bounced once again on the political stage.
According to The South China Morning Post:
Former president Jiang Zemin made yet another high-profile foray into the public eye ahead of the Communist Party's key congress next month, as the octogenarian sent congratulations to his former middle school, in Yangzhou, Jiangsu, on its 110th anniversary.
Jiang, 86, wrote a calligraphy couplet on Thursday to mark the anniversary of his alma mater, Yangzhou Middle School, and to highlight contributions that the school has made in the nation's development, by nurturing various talents over the years, according to a report yesterday in the Xinhua Daily, a Nanjing -based newspaper affiliated with the Jiangsu provincial party committee.
The gesture was the fourth high-profile public activity the former top leader has participated in during the past month., 
The presence of Jiang is an important factor on the Chinese internal political scene. The fact is that the transition does not seem to be very smooth.
It is not that the Indian democratic process is smooth, but it has the advantage to 'consult' the common men. It is not the case in China.

Exclusive: Why Bo Xilai Fell and Xi Jinping Disappeared
Epoch Times
Lin Feng
On October 11, 2012
The attempted defection by former Chongqing police chief Wang Lijun set in motion a chain of events exposing and inflaming the Communist Party’s internal strife, which has come to a head presently. The once powerful Bo Xilai is facing criminal charges, and the man Bo was to succeed as the powerful domestic security czar, Zhou Yongkang, has been stripped of real power.

A 13-year power struggle at the top of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has come to a head, and the leaders of the CCP have now arrived at a moment of decision.
The sense of expectation is widespread. As the Wang Lijun-Bo Xilai affair has played out, with one revelation after another laid bare before the Chinese people, they have started to awaken and now seek to know the truth that lies behind events.
The Study Times, the publication of the CCP’s Party School—the place leaders of the Party are trained, wrote in an article on July 2 that China is facing “major changes never seen in the past three thousand years.”
At this moment, all eyes are looking to the trial of Bo Xilai to see how he will be punished. The situation is intricate. Relying on sources familiar with discussions at the highest levels of the Party, The Epoch Times reports this developing story.
Bo Xilai was the Party head of the province-level city of Chongqing in central-western China and a leader of the left-wing in the Party. Wang Lijun was Bo’s deputy mayor, police chief, and henchman. When Wang informed Bo of the guilt of Bo’s wife, Gu Kailai, in the murder of the British businessman Neil Heywood, Bo demoted Wang and rounded up those close to the police chief, killing a few of them.
Fearing for his life, Wang fled to the U.S. Consulate in Chengdu on Feb. 6. His attempted defection exposed to the Chinese people the struggles going on at the top of the CCP’s leadership.
Punishment for Bo soon followed. On March 15 he was removed from his Party posts and then subjected to the abusive Party interrogation called shuanggui. After months of suspense and conflicting signals, on Sept. 28 the state-run media reported Bo would be stripped of his Party membership and tried in a criminal court for “serious discipline violations” relating to corruption and sexual improprieties.
The publicly announced charges are a gambit by a divided leadership still not ready to settle things. The top Party leaders know what Wang revealed after Chengdu: Bo, along with domestic security czar Zhou Yongkang, had planned a coup to grab power from presumptive next head of the Party Xi Jinping. The Party leaders also know that Bo is a key figure behind a mass atrocity: the forced, live organ harvesting from Falun Gong practitioners.
The fate of Bo is the crux of the long-running struggle between the current Party chief Hu Jintao, Premier Wen Jiabao, Xi Jinping and their supporters on the one hand and the faction formed by former CCP head Jiang Zemin on the other. That battle now involves all current high-level CCP officials and retired statesman.

Avoiding Accountability
Jiang Zemin’s decision to persecute the spiritual practice of Falun Gong (also known as Falun Dafa) is the core issue that has led to today’s Party struggle.
Falun Gong was first publicly taught in northeastern China in May 1992. The practice involves doing slow-motion, meditative exercises and living according to teachings based on the principles of truthfulness, compassion, and tolerance. It became wildly popular. By 1999, state authorities estimated that between 70 and 100 million people had taken up Falun Gong—more than there were members of the CCP.
When Jiang launched the campaign to eradicate Falun Gong in July 1999, he expected it to be over in three months. By the time he was scheduled to retire in 2002, though, Falun Gong showed no signs of being wiped out.

Chinese Regime in Crisis

This posed a problem. Jiang’s campaign had put the CCP at war against approximately one in twelve Chinese. Millions had been sent to labor camps, where they were tortured and brainwashed. Thousands of those had been murdered by the abuse. Thousands more had been killed through forced, live organ harvesting.
If Jiang or those loyal to Jiang were not in power, then the crimes committed in the persecution would be exposed and the members of Jiang’s faction would be held accountable. The struggles behind the scenes surrounding the 16th Party Congress in 2002, the 17th Party Congress in 2007, and the upcoming 18th Party Congress have all turned around the attempt by Jiang’s faction to hold onto power and so avoid being called to account.
In 2003 Hu Jintao became the General Secretary of the CCP, but for a long time he would not hold real power. Jiang Zemin, as Chairman of the Central Military Commission, still called the shots.
In addition, with Jiang’s longtime fixer Zeng Qinghong as vice-chair of the CCP, Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao had difficulty getting their writ to extend beyond the walls of the Party compound of Zhongnanhai.
After Jiang completely retired in 2004 and Hu became the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, Hu only had authority to promote Major Generals.

Regarding Falun Gong, Hu and Jiang had different views.

To sustain the persecution against Falun Gong practitioners, the CCP has spent huge amounts of money and has brought the Chinese legal system to the point of collapse.
Former deputy director of the Police Bureau Liu Jing said that during one meeting in 2001 Jiang wanted to add a 610 Office (the 610 Office is an extra-constitutional Party organ established by Jiang to carry out the persecution of Falun Gong. It has authority over every level of the Party and the state) at every level of the police system.
Hu said, “adding 610 Offices will add many people and cost a lot.”
Jiang became furious and yelled at Hu in a remark that revealed Jiang’s fear of the peaceful spiritual practice, “Falun Gong is about to usurp your power, and you are talking about personnel and budget?” Hu stayed quiet after that.
After an assassination attempt on Hu in 2006, the balance started to turn in Hu’s favor.
In May 2006, Hu Jintao went to the Yellow Sea to inspect the fleet. During the inspection, machine guns from two warships opened fire on the guided missile destroyer Hu was on, killing five seamen.
The destroyer fled the area at top speed. To avoid further assassination attempts, Hu didn’t return to Beijing, but flew to the southwestern province of Yunnan. He only returned to Beijing a week later.
Afterward, Hu Jintao started to solidify his control over the military, starting from Beijing, then to the Central Military Commission, and then to Chongqing.

Struggle Over Xi

In the high-stakes game being played between Jiang and Hu, the next key moves involved determining the makeup of the Politburo Standing Committee—the body of nine men who run the CCP— and who would be Hu’s successor, both to be announced at the 17th Party Congress in 2007.
Bo’s stalwart Zeng Qinghong was forced to retire from the Standing Committee. Hu Jintao favored bringing on Li Keqiang, then the head of the CCP in Liaoning Province, and Xi Jinping, then the head of the CCP in Zhejiang Province. Hu got both onto the Standing Committee and wanted Li Keqiang named as his successor.
Jiang and Zeng continued to block Hu Jintao and were unwilling to let Li Keqiang step up to power. Jiang did not have anyone on the Standing Committee he could name in Li’s place, and so he reluctantly put forward Xi Jinping.
Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao had no problem accepting Xi Jinping, as they shared a common outlook. All three considered themselves students of Hu Yaobang, the Party General Secretary who helped bring economic reform to communist China, and who favored political reform.
Jiang’s nomination of Xi, however, was a ploy. Jiang was playing for time.
Jiang’s real hopes were pinned on Bo Xilai. Bo had developed the “Chongqing Model,” a political program that claimed to improve law and order by cracking down on gangs and to revive the status of the CCP by encouraging Maoist expressions of devotion to the Party.
Jiang’s faction planned to have Bo named at the 18th Party Congress as the successor to domestic security czar Zhou Yongkang on the Politburo Standing Committee and as Zhou’s successor as head of the Political and Legal Affairs Committee (PLAC). The PLAC controls the judiciary, the procuratorate, the Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of State Security, Ministry of Justice, the People’s Armed Police and other relevant departments and agencies.
Jiang and Zhou had increased the budget and scope of the PLAC, making it a second center of power in the Party. With Bo in charge of the PLAC, he could, when the time was ripe, use the 1.5 million strong People’s Armed Police to depose Xi and seize power. The persecution of Falun Gong could then be maintained.
The groundwork for this plan had been laid, but then Wang Lijun fled to Chengdu.

Targeting Jiang and Zhou

In preparation for the 18th Party Congress, Hu Jintao tested the waters of Jiang Zemin’s viability. He arranged for a Party official to leak to the Hong Kong media the news of Jiang’s death. He wanted to see how the members of Jiang’s faction and the Chinese people would react to the news, and force Jiang to come out into the public, where Hu could get a better idea of Jiang’s health.
The Chinese people set off firecrackers to celebrate the news of Jiang’s death, while the response of Jiang’s faction did not suggest strength.
When the Wang scandal broke, Hu was prepared to seize the opportunity and use the scandal to undo Bo Xilai. Hu Jintao was aiming at Jiang by bringing Bo down.
Meanwhile, Hu and Wen begin putting restraints on Zhou Yongkang and attempted to use the blind activist lawyer Chen Guangcheng to help weaken Zhou further.
Around April 27, Chen Guangcheng, whose family had been held under a suffocating house arrest by the PLAC in Linyi City in Shandong Province, suddenly entered the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, hundreds of miles away.
In a video, Chen said the PLAC under Zhou was lawless, and Chen listed the abuses he had suffered over several years. Chen directed to Wen Jiabao the question: are the local officials breaking the law on their own or are they directed to do so by central government officials? Chen said, directing his remark to Wen, “I think you should give a clear answer to the people soon.”
Chen’s video put a great deal of pressure on the CCP regarding Zhou.
Chen’s escape from Linyi was not luck or coincidence. Senior Party officials had secretly helped make it happen.
Just as all sides began focusing on Zhou, Hu Jintao encountered resistance.

Push Back
Zhou used the Global Times and other news outlets controlled by him to accuse Hu of inviting “U.S. interference in China’s internal affairs.”
The United States and China had reached an agreement after six days for Chen’s exit from the Embassy, but Zhou disrupted it, and forced Chen to choose exile abroad. At the same time, Zeng Qinghong also started encouraging CCP veteran leaders to pressure Hu and Wen to stop taking down Zhou Yongkang.
Prominent among the Party elders whom Zeng appealed to were the Ye brothers,Ye Xuanping and Ye Xuanning. They are the sons of Field Marshall Ye Jianying, one of the founders of the CCP, and each is powerful in his own right.
Ye Xuanning is regarded as the spiritual leader of the princelings—the children of the founding generation of the Party. Ye Xuanning has controlled China’s military spy system for a long time and has a lot of influence among the military.
The Ye family’s major concern was that if Zhou were taken down, the CCP would collapse.
Hu decided to abandon the idea of arresting Zhou Yongkang and sought to deal with him in another way.
In early May this year, 200 senior CCP officials attended a meeting held at the Jingxi Hotel, which Reuters described as having been called to “shore up unity and advance preparations for the 18th Party Congress.”
According to a source familiar with the meeting, Hu set the following guidelines: Zhou must totally retire. After handing over power, he’ll also lose the power of appointing his successor to the PLAC. Zhou would be allowed to cut ties from Bo’s case, and would be allowed to stay in office until after the 18th Party Congress
Those attending reached the agreement that Zhou could still keep a high-profile in public, creating a harmonious, stable appearance in order to ensure a smooth transition of power.
At the same time, an agreement was reached that included the hardliners, led by propaganda minister Li Changchun and Zhou Yongkang, to agree to Wen Jiabao’s proposals for political reform. Although the agreed reforms were to be very limited, they were to include what were described as “high-level free elections.” Guangdong Province was to take the lead with a pilot program.
These agreements seemed to chart a path forward for the divided Party. They would all soon be changed.

Wednesday, September 5, 2012

Negotiations with a demoted leader

The media mentions again of the 'demotion' of Ling Jihua, Hu Jintao's protégé following the car accident of Ling's son, (I briefly mentioned it yesterday).
Now The South China Morning Post writes: "The car - a Ferrari according to some of the sources - crashed in Beijing on March 18 in an embarrassment for the ruling Communist Party, sensitive to perceptions that children of top party officials live rich, privileged lifestyles completely out of touch with the masses. ...The car crash, the details of which are still shrouded in mystery, reportedly involved the son of Ling Jihua, 55, who state media said was dropped at the weekend as head of the party's General Office of the Central Committee. It is a powerful post, similar to cabinet secretary in Westminster-style governments. Ling is very close to Hu."
The article added: "Over the weekend, Ling Jihua was appointed head of the Communist Party's United Front Work Department, a less influential position than his current post, in a move that was viewed as a setback for President Hu's efforts to retain major influence in the next administration."
It also means that when the Tibetan Administration in Dharamsala speaks of reopening the negotiations with Beijing, they have to realize that they will have to deal with Ling and his deputy.
It is doubtful that a 'demoted' leader can deliver the goods. 
But in China, we never know.

Tibetan govt in exile to give fresh push to talks with China
PTI Sep 2, 2012,
SHIMLA: The Tibetan government in exile is hoping to give a fresh push to the stalled dialogue with China this December, once the leadership change takes place in Beijing.
To continue the dialogue process, the Tibetan Task Force on Negotiations will meet in December after the new Chinese leadership will assume office, the government-in-exile said in a statement issued here on the 52nd anniversary of Tibetan Democracy Day.
The dialogue was stalled since 2010 and two special envoys of Tibetan spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, in talks with Beijing since 2002, had resigned in June citing the 'deteriorating' conditions in Tibet and frustration over lack of positive response from Chinese side to the dialogue process.
The statement said the Tibetan 'Kashag' and Parliament has decided to hold the second special general meeting of Tibetans in Dharamshala from September 25 to 28 to discuss ways and means to address the "urgent and critical situation" in Tibet.
Advocating middle-way policy and resolving Tibet issue peacefully through dialogue, the government-in exile said, "Both for Dharamshala and Beijing, this is a win-win proposition and we also welcome the US secretary of state Hillary Clinton's recent call on the Chinese government to resume serious dialogue with the Tibetan leadership."
It asserted that the Tibetan spirit and their quest for freedom "cannot be crushed by China's military might."
"Under the continued occupation and oppressive polices of the Chinese government, 51 Tibetans have set themselves on fire and sadly, 42 have died," the statement said.
"To understand the self-immolations, it is crucial to know that no space exists in Tibet for freedom of speech and other conventional forms of protest and even participant in a simple demonstration could face arrest, torture and even death. These conditions help explain the terribly high number of self-immolations in Tibet," the statement said.
The government asked Tibetan people to remain vigilant to counter the hard line Chinese leaders efforts to undermine the Tibetan cause.

Monday, September 3, 2012

A new boss for the United Front Work Department

The appointment of Ling Jihua as the boss of the CCP's United Front Work Department has an interesting collateral. 
It means that even after retirement, President Hu Jintao will continue to keep his fingers in the Tibetan pie through his protégé.
Contrary to what the Reuters article quoted yesterday believes, Xi Jinping may not be in a position to give a new lead in the Beijing-Dharamsala relations.
Due to his closeness with the Chinese President, Ling has helped tailoring China's Tibet policy for many years (first as a Director of the Central Policy Research Office and later as Hu’s Secretary in the General Office of the Central Committee). 
Both have always shared theirs views on the subject.
As CCP's General Secretary, when he attended the annual meetings of the National People's Congress and The Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, Hu had to be attached to a regional or Central organization.
For seven years, Hu was a member of the delegation from Tibet. 
Three years ago, he was replaced by Ling Jihua and Wang Huning, till yesterday Secretary of Party's Central Secretariat (he is still the Director of Policy Research Office).  
Of course rumours have circulated that Ling had become close to Zhou Yongkang, the powerful member of the Standing Committee when Ling's son was killed in a car accident on March 18. Ling's son is said to have been died in his car while having sex with two young women — an account never proven. 
A Taiwan publication said that  "Ling needed Zhou's support to cover up the embarrassing story. Ling would have promised to convince Hu to allow Zhou to remain in his position on the standing committee and stop any investigation against Zhou in connection with the Bo Xilai affair in exchange for help with the cover-up."
This story, true or false, has no connection with China's Tibet Policy, though it may explain Lings' relative demotion.
We have to wait to see how the future unveils.
Many issues will probably depend of the balance of power in the next Standing Committee of the Politburo.
 
Blow for president Hu Jintao as key ally's route to Politburo is blocked
Choi Chi-yuk
South China Morning Post
September 1, 2012
Blow for president as trusted aide he hoped to see promoted to Politburo's supreme Standing Committee is shuffled out of key positions
President Hu Jintao's most trusted aide, Ling Jihua has been appointed to lead the party's United Front Work Department - a strong indication that scandals have damaged the rising star's hopes of securing a seat on the powerful Politburo this year.
Another Hu ally, Li Zhanshu , will succeed Ling as director of the General Office of the Communist Party's Central Committee.
The moves, announced yesterday, are the first of several reshuffles expected before top posts change hands at the 18th party congress this autumn. The transfer suggests that Ling's career has been capped, since none of his three predecessors in the United Front post, Wang Zhaoguo , Liu Yandong and Du Qinglin , were elevated to the Politburo during their tenures.
While an obvious setback for Ling, the move could also be seen as a blow to Hu, who had shepherded his rise over the previous two decades and was widely believed to be pushing for his promotion to the Politburo's supreme Standing Committee.
Analysts believe Ling, 56, lost an intense behind-the-scenes fight for a better post, such as succeeding Liu Qi as Beijing party boss or Li Yuanchao as the head of the party's Central Organisation Department, because of scandals widely publicised on the internet and in overseas media.
The scandals - including the death of his only son in the crash of an expensive sports car in Beijing in March, in which two women were also seriously injured - made it harder for the party to justify giving him a more high-profile position.
"Ling's political prospects apparently suffered a blow from the widespread speculation over the past couple of months," said political analyst Chen Ziming . "This speculation is not entirely groundless."
Nonetheless, the transfer suggests that Hu could help his long-time secretary find a reasonably soft landing as minister in charge of the party's united front work. Ling's new portfolio includes Hong Kong affairs, negotiating sensitive cultural and religious issues in places such as Xinjiang and Tibet and engaging non-communist political organisations.
Ling has been a secretary to Hu since 1999. He has long been seen as a key ally the president was grooming for high office to help him retain political influence once he gives up the reins of power.
Ling appeared primed for advancement in 2007, when he was appointed director of the General Office, which has been a springboard for rising stars. Premier Wen Jiabao served in the office from 1986 to 1993.
A source familiar with Beijing's affairs in Hong Kong said Ling knew the city well, as he had assisted Vice-President Xi Jinping and his predecessor, Zeng Qinghong , with Hong Kong affairs since 2004.

Monday, April 16, 2012

Longing for Greater Autonomy

During an interview with the Dalai Lama’s Representative who headed the Tibetan fact-finding delegation in Tibet in 1979, he recalled his arrival on the Roof of the World: “The Chinese definitively did not expect that we would be received with so much enthusiasm”.
In fact, they Chinese were bewildered by the reception offered to the delegation some thirty years after the so-called Liberation of Tibet during which “the Chinese administration had done everything to denounce and put down the Dalai Lama, the Chinese authorities thought that the Tibetan people had lost their faith in their leader”.
The Tibetan official continued: “When we arrived in Tibet, the Chinese thought that the people might spit on us because we were the Dalai Lama’s representatives, or throw stones at us”. The Chinese authorities had forbidden the Tibetans to do so.
As they arrived in Tibet, the Tibetan delegates were mobbed; people waited for hours or days to have their darshan, to touch them or to grab a piece of their dress as a relic. The Chinese officials were utterly shocked.
Another delegate recounted that the local Tibetans even collected the dust from the tyre prints of the envoys’ car, to keep it as prasad.
These delegations from Dharamsala in the early 1980’s helped the leadership in Beijing to realize that the Tibetans, like the Mongols or Uyghurs, had their own identity; trying to eradicate it could only be counterproductive.
As a result, after CCP General Secretary Hu Yaobang visited Tibet in May 1980; ‘softer’ policies were introduced. Unfortunately, Hu was soon sidelined by the ‘leftist’ hardliners who re-imposed the harsh assimilation policies of the 1960’s.
Nearly 30 years later, in 2008, the resentment which had simmered underground, resurfaced through a series of demonstrations/riots all over Tibet (including areas administered by Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu and Qinghai provinces.) The unrest lasted nearly two months and once again, severe repression was the only answer that the Party could find to solve the issue. It only exacerbated the situation further.

A new way to express resentment: Immolations
In 2011, it started again, this time, mainly in Eastern Tibet. A series of self-immolations began on March 16, 2011 when Phuntsog, a 21-year old monk of Kirti Monastery set himself on fire in Ngaba. It continued on 15 August with Tsewang Norbu of Tawu Nyatso Monastery. Since then more than 23 cases of self-immolation have been reported.
If one looks at the profiles of those who did the supreme sacrifice, one is surprised to see how young some of these monks or nuns were; for example, Tenzin Choeden who immolated herself on February 11 was a young 18-year old nun of Ngaba (Eastern Tibet).
All these ‘protestors’ had not witnessed the uprising of 1959, the Martial Law in Tibet in 1988/89 or the Tiananmen Square events a few months later.
So where does the problem come from?
Sonam Wangyal Sopa Rinpoche, a Senior Lama who immolated himself recorded a message to his countrymen to explain his gesture: “I am giving away my body as an offering of light to chase away the darkness, to free all beings from suffering, and to lead them …to the Amitabha, the Buddha of infinite light. My offering of light is for all living beings… I offer this sacrifice as a token of long-life offering to our root guru His Holiness the Dalai Lama and all other spiritual teachers and lamas.”


The Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (TCHRD) which follows closely the human rights situation in Tibet, gave a rationale for the extreme step taken by these monks and nuns: “Movement is controlled and religious practices are either limited or completely forbidden. Several laws and policies are specifically aimed to control Tibet’s Buddhist institutions.”
The Dalai Lama commented: “these incidents of self-immolation are very very sad. The leadership in Beijing should look into the ultimate cause of these tragic incidents. These Tibetans have faced a tremendously desperate situation, otherwise nobody will commit such drastic acts”. He requested the Chinese leadership to pay serious attention to their minority policies: “Relying on force is counter-productive. Force can never bring unity and stability.”
But is Beijing’s leadership ready to listen?
The renowned dissident and poetess Tsering Woeser (now under house-arrest) recalled on her blog that in 1963, Quang Duc Thich, a Vietnamese monk burnt himself in Saigon. Woeser said that the 67-year-old monk’s last words were, “before closing my eyes and moving towards the vision of the Buddha, I respectfully plead to the Vietnamese President to take a mind of compassion towards the people of the nation and implement religious equality.”
Woeser believes that similar aspirations and feelings pushed Tibetan monks and nuns to set themselves on fire.

What do the Tibetans want?

On June 18 1988, the Dalai Lama dropped a bombshell in Strasbourg. Addressing the Members of the European Parliament, he declared: "I have taken the initiative to formulate thoughts which we hope, may serve as a basis for resolving the issue of Tibet.” He elaborated: “The whole of Tibet should become a self-governing democratic political entity founded on law by agreement of the people for common good and the protection of themselves and their environment, in association with the People's Republic of China."
From that day, he stopped claiming independence for his country, pleading only for a genuine or meaningful autonomy.
Thus was born the “Middle Path” approach.
What were the reasons which motivated the Dalai Lama to walk on this unpopular (for his people at least) Middle Path?
Being a Buddhist monk, it seems logical that the Dalai Lama emulates his Master who was the first to propagate the ‘middle path’.
A more immediate reason was a meeting that Gyalo Thondup, the Tibetan leader’s elder brother, had with Deng Xiaoping in 1979. China’s new boss told Thondup that "the door to negotiations remains wide open… except for the independence of Tibet; all other questions can be negotiated".
This encounter between Deng and the Dalai Lama’s emissary triggered the rapprochement: as already mentioned, it translated into the visit of the fact-finding delegations from Dharamsala who travelled through the three main provinces of Tibet and later by two rounds of talks with officials of the United Front Work Department in Beijing.
Another reason which pushed the Dalai Lama to choose the ‘Middle Path’ was what he himself called the ‘vast seas’ of Chinese migrants who “threaten the very existence of the Tibetans as a distinct people”. In 1985 in an article in The New York Times, he had explained: “In the eastern parts of our country, the Chinese now greatly outnumber Tibetans. In the Amdo province, for example, where I was born, there are, according to Chinese statistics, 2.5 million Chinese and only 750,000 Tibetans. Even in the so-called Tibet Autonomous Region (i.e., central and western Tibet), Chinese government sources now confirm that Chinese outnumber Tibetans.”
Since then, the situation has considerably deteriorated and especially after the arrival of the railway line to Lhasa in July 2006.
However his ‘Middle Path’ approach has never been accepted by the Chinese leadership. In April 2008, when Chinese President Hu Jintao met the visiting Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, he told him: “Our conflict with the Dalai clique is not an ethnic problem, not a religious problem, nor a human rights problem… It is a problem either to safeguard national unification or to split the motherland.”
He however reiterated that Beijing was “ready to meet the Dalai Lama, but only if he met certain pre-conditions, such as desisting from trying to split the motherland". A meeting is no longer on the cards today.
It is worth mentioning that the Chinese leadership has not always been so rigid on the question of autonomy.
Phuntsok Wangyal, a veteran Tibetan Party leader who was the first Tibetan Communist in the forties recounts: “One day in 1955 in Beijing, Mao unexpectedly came to visit the Dalai Lama at his residence… During their conversation, Mao suddenly said, ‘I heard that you have a national flag, do you? They do not want you to carry it, isn't that right’?" Phunwang continues: “The Dalai Lama just replied, ‘We have an army flag’. Mao perceived that the Dalai Lama was concerned by his question and immediately told him, ‘That is no problem. You may keep your national flag.’ This remark had a deep impact on Phuwang who was arrested in April 1958; to 'cleanse his thinking'. During the following 18 years, while he was tortured and jailed in the most atrocious conditions, he continued to ponder over the issues of the ‘nationalities’ issue and their place within the People’s Republic of China. His personal belief was that the relationship between nationalities in a multiethnic state was supposed to be one of complete equality and autonomy.

What has been India’s position on the question of autonomy?
At the time of independence in 1947, the Government of India considered Tibet as an independent nation and dealt directly with Lhasa without referring to China which had a ‘vague and hazy’ suzerainty over it. But the situation changed after the Chinese invasion of Tibet in October 1950. Nehru was rather embarrassed. In a Note attempting to define India’s Tibet policy, he wrote that after the entry of the PLAs on the Roof of the World, for the Tibetans the “autonomy can obviously not be anything like the autonomy, verging on independence, which Tibet has enjoyed during the last forty years or so.”
Over the years, the Government of India’s position has evolved and today, Delhi does not even insist on an ‘autonomous’ status for the TAR or traditional Tibet.

The Poisonous Arrow: the situation in Tibet
This issue has a strategic side.
The present leadership probably remembers that before the start of the Cultural Revolution, resentment was at its peak in Tibet. In January 1962, during a speech at an important Party Forum, Mao brought up the issue of the Panchen Lama and the situation in Tibet. The Tibetan Lama who had been made Chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region when the Dalai Lama left for India in 1959, had dared to criticize the Party policies in Tibet.
Mao’s physician, Dr Li recounted: “[After the 1959] crackdown, the Panchen Lama, ordinarily subservient to Beijing, was now arguing that Beijing's so-called ‘democratic reforms’ had moved too far to the left.”
The Tibetan issue became a factor which impeded longer military operations against India at the end of 1962; discontent was indeed brewing on the Roof of the World through which passed all supply lines for the border.
In the 70,000-character petition, (dubbed by Mao as a “poisonous arrow’) sent by the Panchen Lama to Zhou Enlai and Xi Zhongxun (the father of Vice-President Xi Jinping) in April 1962, the Panchen Lama listed several problems such the ‘suppression of the Rebellion’ in 1959.
This had serious military consequences.
On October 6, 1962, during a meeting summoned to decide to go to war against India, General Lou Ruiqing, the Chinese Chief of General Staff was authorized by Mao to start ‘a fierce and painful attack on Indian forces. …you should not only repel them, but hit them fiercely and make them hurt"
When the PLA started to work on the details of the military operations, they soon realized that the campaign could not be sustained for a long time. It was therefore decided to terminate the war “with a unilateral Chinese halt, ceasefire, and withdrawal”.
Historian Shi Bo believes that in view of “practical difficulties associated with China's domestic situation”, the PLA, after achieving its military objectives, had to “quickly disengage and end the fighting as quickly as possible”
‘China's domestic situation’ is obviously referring to the power struggle within the Party and the situation in Tibet.

Is there a way out?
Ultimately, the degree of autonomy that the Tibetans are given depends on the leadership in Beijing.
Today, the hardcore leftists are still at the helm, trying to impose policies reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution.
For example, during the 5th Tibet Work Forum  in January 2010, it was apparently decided to send 21,000 Han and Tibetan Party officials in teams of four to each of the TAR’s 5,453 administrative villages; they had to remain for a period of 4 years. Each team member could rotate to a new location after 12 months, but was assigned to the same village for at least 25 days per month.
The objectives seem to be five‐fold:
(1) to strengthen the Party organization at the local level,
(2) to promote stability by persuading villagers to join the struggle against the Dalai Lama’s splittist activities and independence plans,
(3) to improve the economy of each village and create new jobs for the village youth,
(4) to educate the locals to appreciate and be grateful to the motherland and the Party, and
(5) to get each village to begin to more effectively carry out the plans and policies of the Party.
In addition teams are sent from the TAR to each of the seven prefectures “to oversee that prefecture’s work teams, receive their work reports and monitor their success or failure”.
The scale of the scheme, said to the largest since the Cultural Revolution can only bring further rancor and resentment.
To make things worse, an article written by Zhu Weiqun, the Deputy Director of CCP's United Front Work Department in The Study Times (Xuexi Shibao) raises the possibility of abolishing special privileges and preferential policies offered to minority nationalities, taking the nationality name off all IDs cards and passports and removing nationality names from provinces.
Zhu, who is the interlocutor of the Dalai Lama's Envoys in the so-called Beijing-Dharamsala negotiations, argues that China must change some aspects of its present political and educational system in order to achieve 'national cohesion'.
This would be a radically new policy bringing along fresh tensions on the Tibet plateau which could have serious strategic implications for India.

Wednesday, March 28, 2012

An Open Letter to President Hu Jintao

This montage/picture appeared on iTél in 2011
Dear President Hu Jintao,

I am wondering if you believe in the Law of Karma.
You may not use that term in Marxist jargon, but you will admit that since the time you were elevated to the three highest posts of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), you have been very closely ‘connected’ with Tibet.
It started on the last day of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s memorable visit to China (December 23, 1989); on that day you were nominated Party Chief of the Tibetan Autonomous Region. It was the beginning of your long association with the Land of Snows.
During the preceding few months, the Party had been nervous about the situation in Tibet: monks and nuns had begun to revolt against their 'motherland’.
On December 10, 1988, riots occurred in Lhasa (according to official sources one person died; unofficial sources speak of twelve).
Many must have thought: if the situation is allowed to drift, China could follow the Soviet Union on the way to disintegration. Something had to be done.
It is why, you, a promising young cadre, were sent to Lhasa as Party Chief. You had a tremendous challenge in front of you; you had to show results in very short time to repay the confidence placed in you by the Politburo.
You reached the rebellious province on January 12, 1989. Soon after on January 23, you paid a visit the Tashilhunpo monastery in Shigatse. The respected 10th Panchen Lama, the second highest ranking Tibetan Lama after the Dalai Lama, accompanied you; the official occasion was the consecration of a stupa containing the mortal remains of one of the previous Panchen Lamas. To everyone's surprise, during the function, the Panchen Lama denounced the Communist Party's role in Tibet: “although there had been developments in Tibet since its liberation, this development had cost more dearly than its achievements.” It must have been such a shock for you. Four days later, the Lama passed away in mysterious circumstances.
When a demonstration erupted in Lhasa on March 5, 1989, you asked the People's Armed Police to take control of the situation. Eyewitnesses later said that on that day, hundreds of Tibetans were killed around the Jokhang Central Cathedral in Lhasa. It has never been verified by independent sources.
Three days later, with the blessings of the Central leadership, you decided to clamp down Martial Law in Tibet; it was to last an entire year. It was like a rehearsal for another momentous event: the student rebellion on Tiananmen Square in April/May/June’ 89.
Your actions in Tibet were perhaps an inspiration for the Elders who decided to save China from the 'chaos' in which the country was plunged.
In November 2002, you were finally anointed General Secretary of the Party. Many observers believe that your karmic ‘connection’ with Tibet helped you to become the 'core leader of the Fourth Generation'.
Since then, you have been the CCP’s ‘Tibet expert’.
A few weeks before you took over the helm of the Middle Kingdom, news agencies carried the news that a Tibetan team led by Lodi Gyari, the Dalai Lama's Special Envoy, had left for Beijing to ‘talk’ with your government. Though it was described as private visit and “a chance for exiled Tibetan leaders to see the progress in their homeland”, it created great hopes in China and India where more than a lakh of Tibetans live as refugees.
A year earlier, a Tibet Policy had been put in place during the Fourth Tibet Work Forum under the Chairmanship of President Jiang Zemin. It was planned to give a strong impetus to economic and social development, while preserving the ‘stability’ of the region.
Though development was brought to Tibet (particularly with the opening of the railway line to Lhasa in 2006), stability was never achieved. Worse, in March/April 2008, unrest erupted again all over Tibet. It must have sent a shock wave through the spines of your Politburo colleagues who do not have your knowledge of the ground situation in Tibet.
It is unfortunate that despite 9 rounds of talks since 2002 between your United Front Work Department’s officials and the Dalai Lama’s representatives, no breakthrough could be achieved and no acceptable formula for the future of Tibet could be found.
During your tenure, you always insisted on three points: the peaceful rise of China, scientific development and internal stability. The importance of stability was reiterated during the recent National People’s Congress (NPC).
When you had convened The Fifth Tibet Work Forum in January 2010, (attended by the 300 senior-most Party cadres, PLA generals and your Politburo Standing Committee’s colleagues), you declared: “We must also soberly understand that Tibet’s development and stability are still faced with many difficulties and challenges and have encountered many new situations and new issues.”
Though stability was the core of your Tibet policy, you have not achieved any significant results in the minority nationalities areas. In recent months, agitation has taken a novel form: self-immolation by monks and nuns (some 30 in less than a year) and large scale demonstrations.
Tibet Daily said that when you talked to a Tibetan delegation who called on you during the NPC’s Conference; you encouraged them to promote the ‘old Tibetan Spirit’. You explained “it would be necessary to be firm on anti-secession”. You said that the Party in Tibet authorities must “concentrate on keeping 'migrant monks and nuns' in line, clean up and regulate religious activities, strengthen the development of Tibet's Buddhist institutes, tighten management of the reincarnation of living Buddhas, build a long-term management system for monasteries, push forward the regulation and legalization of the management of monasteries, unite patriotic monks and nuns, and reduce disharmonious factors in society.”
You also told them that you wanted to recruit and train Party leaders who are “politically reliable, capable of safeguarding national unity, firm on anti-secession, and who dare to fight against the Dalai Lama group.”
When you speak of ‘stability’, it seems to me that you entire policy is aimed at denigrating the Dalai Lama.
Your website China Tibet Online published a number of postings purportedly attributed to Chinese Netizens: “If the Dalai Lama could hire others to set themselves on fire, why doesn’t he burn himself?” How does it help?
Already in 2008, Zhang Qingli, the then Party Chief in Lhasa had called the Tibetan leader, a “wolf in monks’ garb”; more recently, he was painted as a nazi in official publications.
Will this atrocious propaganda help dissipate the Tibetans’ resentment against repressive measures? In my opinion, the answer is ‘no’.
But when the time will come to prepare your ‘balance sheet’ as China’s Core Leader, it will be counted as your personal failure, you, the Party’s Tibet expert.
If you are unable to quickly change the tide, your leadership will go down in history as the darkest in relations with the ‘minorities’. This will remain in the annals of the People’s Republic of China.
You have 6 months to change this.
One way out would be to personally meet the Dalai Lama and threadbare discuss the situation with him. Do not forget that he remains the key to any solution for the Tibetan issue.
Both of you could certainly find a solution to the thorny issue of ‘autonomy’ in Tibetan areas. Is it not written in your own Constitution?
As a first step, you could jointly request young Tibetans to stop immolating themselves.
I sincerely hope that you will boldly take a step forward; it could save your Presidency and gave a brighter future to the People’s Republic of China.
In India one believes that Karma can be changed.
Yours sincerely
Claude Arpi