The History of the First Months of Establishment 22 (Special Frontier Force)

I am reproducing an old post on the history of the First Months of the Establishment 22

This post is dedicated to Gyalo Thondup. the Dalai Lama's elder brother, who played an important role in the creation of the Tibetan Force and passed away on February 8, 2025 at the age of 97.

Homage to the Vikasis!

The Song of Establishment 22

We are the Vikasi
The Chinese snatched Tibet from us
and kicked us out from our home
Even then, India
kept us like their own
One day, surely one day
we will teach the Chinese a lesson
Whenever opportunities arise
we will play with our lives
In the Siachen glacier
we got our second chance
Our young martyrs
have no sadness whatsoever
Whether it is Kargil or Bangladesh
we will not lose our strength
Whenever opportunities arise
we will play with our lives
Where there is our Potala Palace
and lovely Norbulingka
The throne of the Dalai Lama
was dear even then
Remember those martyrs of ours
who sacrificed with their lives
Let’s sing together
Hail to our Tibet!
Hail to our Tibet!
Hail to our Tibet!
The First Months of the Tibetan Army

Earlier articles on Establishment 22:

The Phantoms of Chittagong

 A War which was not theirs 

 A Two-Two as Army Chief

The History of the First Months of the Special Frontier Force

An aspect which has not often been researched but is the outcome of the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict, is the creation of a Special Frontier Force (SFF). It was to be ready to infiltrate into Tibet after six months following its creation. This did not happen, but it is worth looking at the first months of the Tibetan Army.

The Creation of the Establishment 22
For most Indians, November 14 means the birthday of Jawaharlal Nehru, but there is also another anniversary, albeit an ‘uncelebrated’ one, falling on the same day; the latter has for long been kept secret, as it marks the creation of the Special Frontier Force (SFF), the Tibetan Army (also known as Vikas Regiment or the ‘Two-Twos’). It was founded a week before China’s unilateral cease-fire in the 1962 conflict. There might have been an invisible link between the two ‘birthdays’, but we will possibly never know why the formation of the Tibetan Army was initiated on November 14.
Did BN Mullik, the then Director of the Intelligence Bureau or DIB (and one of the main culprits of the 1962 fiasco) want to please Nehru on his birthday by telling him that he ‘had found a solution’ to China’s military superiority? The Tibetans would themselves ‘liberate’ Tibet!
Mullik immediately realised he would need outside help for his project; he obviously looked towards the United States.
On November 19, the day Nehru sent two panicky letters to the US President asking for help for India,  a crucial meeting to respond to Nehru’s requests was held in the White House. The then Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara, the Secretary of State Dean Rusk, as well as his Assistant for Far Eastern Affairs, Averell Harriman, a respected diplomat and politician, were present. The CIA bosses were also in attendance.
The declassified US archives  tell us: “McNamara urged that the first move be to find out what the real situation was. If we were to put our prestige and resources at risk, we must find out the score. He proposed sending a small high-level military mission immediately to Delhi. …McNamara again urged getting a high level mission out to Delhi, including State and Intelligence people in order to concert a plan of action with the Indians.”
This is what happened.

The American Version
Kenneth Conboy and James Morrison in their book The CIA’s Secret War in Tibet  recounted: “Also mentioned (during the meeting) was the possibility of using the CIA’s Tibetan guerrillas. John McCone, a wealthy and opinionated Republican chosen by Kennedy to replace CIA Director Dulles after the Bay of Pigs, was on hand to brief the President on such covert matters. Joining McCone was Des FitzGerald, the [CIA’s] Far East chief.”
McNamara’s delegation arrived in India three days later; during their stay, the CIA officials held lengthy discussions with BN Mullik. According to Conboy, who quoted from David Blee, the CIA station chief in India: “The Indians were interested in the Tibet program because of its intelligence collection value …Mullik was particularly interested in paramilitary operations.” The DIB and his deputy ML Hooja  made a special request during a session with FitzGerald and Blee. “They made us promise that our involvement would remain secret forever.”
By the end of the Harriman mission, the CIA and IB had agreed to a division of tasks; the IB with CIA support would train a 5,000-strong tactical guerrilla force; the CIA’s Far East Division would create a strategic long-range resistance movement inside Tibet and the Tibetan freedom fighters in Mustang  would remain under the CIA’s control.
The honeymoon with the CIA did not last long and the Tibetan Force would eventually be built with purely Indian inputs under the supervision of Maj Gen Sujan Singh Uban .
Kenneth Conboy and James Morrison have written a romanticized version of these events; reading their account, it is as if it was the CIA which was entirely running the show. They explained that it was Krishna Menon  and Lt Gen BM Kaul  who decided “to create a guerrilla force that could strike deep behind Chinese lines. Because the Chinese were coming from Tibet, members of that ethnic group were the logical guerrillas of choice. Finding volunteers would not be a problem; both knew that there was no shortage of Tibetans on Indian soil, and virtually all were vehemently anti-Chinese and would not hesitate to take up arms for their own patriotic reasons.”
Putting the CIA always on the center stage, the US Spy agency wondered who could lead such a force: “They needed a senior Indian officer who could win the confidence of the Tibetans, embracing their independent nature and promoting a semblance of discipline without resort to a rigid army code. And he would need to have a bent (of mind) for the unconventional-something that was in short supply in the Indian military.”
The CIA ‘historians’ wrote: “As they scoured the roster of available officers, one name caught their eye. Brigadier Sujan Singh Uban, until recently the commander of the 22 Field Regiment in Kashmir, was in New Delhi after having just processed his retirement papers;” by their version, the CIA could pick up any officer in the Indian Army, for a particular job.
The authors argued that Uban had spent much time with mountain units and was familiar with fighting at high altitudes. Furthermore, during a stint as an artillery instructor for jungle warfare units, he had earned the nickname ‘Mad Sikh’, “this small detail was enough for Menon and Kaul” to summon the brigadier.
According to the US writers, on 26 October, 1962, Uban was given sketchy details of the proposed behind-the-lines guerrilla mission : “Working with the Tibetans would not be easy, warned Kaul. Disciplining them, he said, would be like taming wild tigers. As a sweetener, the brigadier was promised a second star in due course. Uban was hooked; he grabbed the assignment without hesitation.”
Later an emissary was sent from the Intelligence Bureau to Darjeeling to fetch the Dalai Lama's brother, Gyalo Thondup: “After years of attempting to court the Indians - who were often sympathetic but never committal - Gyalo relished the moment as he sat in front of a select group of senior intelligence and military officials in the capital.”
Thondup Gyalo told the meeting that he needed 5,000 volunteers.
The following exchange is ludicrous: “Would Gyalo prefer that the Intelligence Bureau or the Ministry of Defense be involved?”
"Not Defense," he would have said.
The story continued “The very next day , Prime Minister Nehru made an unequivocal request for US military assistance. For the tired, beaten leader, it was a humbling overture. It was an admission not only that his central belief in peaceful coexistence with the PRC was irrevocably shattered but also that his cordial relationship with the Soviet Union had proved hollow.”
This is when, according to Conboy and Morrison, the US President called the meeting already mentioned; it decided to increase US military assistance to India; also mentioned was the possibility of using the CIA's Tibetan guerrillas: “By meeting's end, it was decided that Harriman would lead a high-powered delegation to New Delhi to more fully assess India's needs. General Paul Adams, chief of the US Strike Command, was to head the military component. From the CIA, Des FitzGerald won a seat on the mission, as did the head of the Tibet Task Force, Ken Knaus.”
According to the US version: “without pause, Ambassador Galbraith ushered Harriman into the first of four meetings with Nehru. The end results of these discussions were plans for a major three-phase military aid package encompassing material support, help with domestic defense production, and possible assistance with air defenses.”
During their visit to Delhi, the CIA representatives held sessions with BN Mullik: “Both the CIA and the Intelligence Bureau were quick to seize the opportunity.” They came up with some schemes to counter China and despite the opposition from several quarters in the US Administration, on December 13, the Kennedy administration approved some training assistance to Uban's tactical guerrilla force.

A First Meeting
Ratuk Ngawang, one of the commanders  of the Tibetan force, consecrated one chapter of his memoirs  to the first days of the SFF, we shall quote from his book in Tibetan. He recalled: “One day, His Holiness the Dalai Lama’s brother Gyalo Thondup had asked Andruk Zasak  Gonpo Tashi  to visit him at his residence in Darjeeling.” Ratuk accompanied him: “In one of his messages, Gyalo Thondup mentioned that we should not believe that the military base in Lo Manthang  has strong foundation.”
Thondup explained that in a place where there were plenty of bamboos, the leaves which fall from the bamboo will move upwards when the wind blows upwards and downwards if the wind blows downwards: “there is no guarantee which side the leaves will go. His conclusion was that it was better to establish a large military academy in India.”
He then asked Gonpo Tashi’s opinion, the latter told Thondup that it would be an important military initiative which could make the Tibetan people more powerful.
When Gyalo Thondup asked the Khampa leader about his recruitment plans, Gompo Tashi said that a thousand or two thousand soldiers would not be of much benefit and that the objective should be to have as many soldiers as possible. The Dalai Lama’s brother answered that he would go ahead and speak with the IB (Intelligence Bureau) people to check if there was any possibility of finding support. Thondup told Gonpo Tashi that strict confidentiality should be maintained about the meeting.
It was suggested to go ahead and coordinate with Indian authorities; there would not be an issue with the recruitment from the Tibetan side. As the meeting ended with a mutual agreement, it was decided to proceed with the project.

Meeting the Chushi Gangdruk
It is then that Adruk  and Ratuk called for a meeting of the Chushi Gangdruk to ask the opinion of the military commanders living in Kalimpong: would the Tibetans be interested to participate and how many were likely to join if a large military training academy was established somewhere in India.
Jagoe Namgyal Dorjee and Sadu Lobsang Nyandak, two Khampa leaders agreed; they had no objection to establish a military training institution; they readily supported the idea.
It was decided to divide the Chushi Gangdruk leaders and depute them to go across India to the different Tibetans settlements to collect the names of perspective soldiers: “Every participant agreed to this suggestion and started electing their representatives”.
Ratuk Ngawang, Dhargon Taso Choezoe and Amdo Kathok were selected to collect the lists of possible recruits. Gonpo Tashi told Ratuk to first go to Dharamsala to seek an audience with the Dalai Lama and update the Tibetan leader about of the new situation. During the next few days, this was done: “We informed His Holiness about our travel plans to cover Dalhousie, Chamba area, Kullu, Upper and lower Shimla, Janakpur, Jalirung  and Mussoorie to find candidates to start the new Tibetan military establishment. …His Holiness the Dalai Lama advised us to include names of young men and women from all three regions and not to restrict amongst Chushi Gandruk  and then filter and select those whom you feel are qualified.”
He also said to the three representatives of the Chushi Gangdruk that their work would be smoother and easier, if they travelled with a recommendation letter from Kashag : “We followed His guidelines and approached the Kashag and received an official letter from Palha Dronye Chenmo  and travelled to the above places to collect names,” said Ratuk Ngawang.
When they reached Mussoorie, Gyalo Thondup had already sent a message for Ratuk to Jigme Taring, the Principal of the Tibetan school: “Ratuk Ngawang should immediately proceed to Darjeeling. The work of collecting names should be left in the hands of two remaining members and they should join later.”
Ratuk obeyed and immediately left; when he arrived in Darjeeling, he met Gyalo Thondup and Gonpo Tashi who asked for a report on the places visited so far: “I informed them about our visit to Dharamsala, the audience with His Holiness the Dalai Lama and the Kashag’s support letter,” recalled Ratuk, who also brought a first list of volunteers’ names.
Gyalo Thondup was happy with the work done and told the Khampa chieftain that he should go again to the places already visited to recruit soldiers.
Kundeling Thupten Gyaltsen, Kalsang, student of General Yeshi and elder son of Trengdong were to assist him: “You should go to Pathankot and make a phone call to Security Department in Dharamsala and inform them about your arrival and ask Security Commanding Officer to come to Pathankot. He will meet you there, you will discuss with them and you guide them where to start the recruitment.”
The travel and daily allowance of the new recruits were to be paid according to the norms decided by Ratuk’s team: “A small metal box full of hundred-rupee Indian notes, exact amount I don’t recollect, was handed over to me with instruction to keep proper records of income and expenditure,” noted Ratuk.
The officers did as ordered and went to Pathankot; the Commanding Officer of the Dharamsala Security Office was not available, but his deputy, Lobsang Yeshi came to meet them; he was keen to get guidance on how to collect the names of the required soldiers. He was told that there were about 1,000 monks from monasteries working on two separate road construction sites in Chamba Valley, some 800 of them should be able to join the force; then they could get about 400 out of about 600 Chushi Gangdruk’s members living in Dalhousie.
On the Chamba road construction, many got suspicious and two of the leaders went to Dharamsala to meet the Minister of Home, Phalha Donyer Chemo and asked his advice about joining the military force. Phala said that he had no knowledge about the recruitment, but “it is up to individuals, we can’t prevent anyone from joining or push anyone to go against his wish.”
Fearing a misadventure like it had happened to the recruits to Mustang, only 72 volunteers signed up. The recruiters did not go to Dalhousie, but asked some of the leaders to send all the volunteers from Dalhousie to Pathankot. The officer in-charge of the Tibetan Handicraft Center and the settlement officer were told that no instructions had been received from the exiled Tibetan Government and it was an individual’s decision. The recruiters informed those wanting to enroll that they should report to Ratuk Ngawang at Pathankot. Their travel fare and food expenses were to be fully covered: “everyone left saying, we had been waiting for such an opportunity when we can receive military training.” Ultimately, they recruited more than 500 soldiers.
Incidentally, one of the buses had an accident and five or six recruits suffered minor injuries, but there was no loss of life.
Suddenly, the Dalhousie settlement officer informed the Kashag that the handicraft center was empty “because Ratuk Ngawang recruited everyone into military”; he wanted to know what should he do. Kashag insisted that the handicraft center should not be closed. Pathankot’s branch of the Security Department then asked Ratuk to report immediately to Dharamsala.
None of the new recruits were interested to go back to Dalhousie, though Ratuk and his colleagues tried to explain that it was an order from the government that they should return to the handicraft center.
The Security Office in Dharamsala deputed Chamdo Jampa Kalden to Pathankot to tell Ratuk to send at least half of them back to the handicraft center: “We requested and appealed to them, but not a single soul changed their mind. …Finding no resolution, we drafted a letter saying everyone should decide on their own [to join the Army] and Chamdo Jampa Kalden returned to Dharamsala.”
Then, Ratuk send them off after disbursing their travel allowances.
The recruiters then moved to Kullu and Simla area to see if there were volunteers interested to join the force: “in total there were little more than 3,800 volunteers.” Later, they visited Musoorie, Herbertpur, Jalirung , Chhorpur  and gathered some 200 recruits more before returning to Darjeeling to present the accounts of all their expenditures: “When we reached, we were informed of the arrival of about 200 guerilla fighters in Darjeeling and 700 from Kalimpong, Gangtok and Darjeeling area.”
With the other representatives who visited other areas, there were already 6,000 recruits at the military camp. 

The above lines are part of a longer paper, available on my webiste (proper references are provided in the paper). 

Click here to read...

Interesting correspondence between the Dalai Lama and Nehru (1960)

The Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru recently published an interesting exchange of letters between the Dalai Lama, who a year earlier had taken refuge in India, and the Indian Prime Minister.
The main subject of this exchange is the Tibetan appeal in the UN and the role of Gyalo Thondup, the Dalai Lama's elder brother.
A first UN Resolution was passed in 1959 (see text) and the presence of Gyalo Thondup in New York at that time was deemed necessary by the Dalai Lama to coordinate a second resolution.
The Government of India however refused to grant an Exit (and No-Objection-to-Return) Visa to Thondup to prepare the second appeal. The reputation of Thondup and the fact that his was a Taiwanese probably compounded the issue.
The correspondence is particularly interesting because Gyalo Thondup has recently been in the news after the publication of his memoirs, The Noodle Maker of Kalimpong.
It is a fact that the Dalai Lama’s brother has always been a controversial figure, often very close to the CIA. While many saw him as a great patriot, fighting for Tibet’s independence, others believe that he was a bad influence on his brother (it is the view of the Indian Prime Minister)
At the same time, it is true that no Tibetan leader has had so close relations with the Communist leadership in China than Thondup. He is said to have travelled more than 50 times to Beijing to ‘negotiate’ his brother’s return to Tibet.
This exchange of letters also shows the difficult position of the Dalai Lama. Nehru was very much against an appeal in the UN, as he wanted to preserve for India what was left of the ‘brotherhood’ with Beijing, while the Dalai Lama believed that the international community should know what was happening in the Land of Snows and support the Tibetan people in their just struggle against Communist China.
Nehru believed (mostly after the awful Kashmir experience) that nothing can ever be ‘decided’ in the UN. He was probably right.
Since the early 1950s, Nehru had often to deal with Gyalo Thondup, more particularly in connection with the ‘melting’ of the Dalai Lama’s treasure, mentioned in Thondup’s book.
Questions had even been raised in the Indian Parliament on the 'treasure'; it was embarrassing for the Indian Prime Minister.
It should also been remembered that the Chinese Premier, Zhou Enlai had come to India in April 1960; he had 17 hours of talk with Nehru. India and China were keen to solve the border issue and at the time of this exchange of letters, the discussions between the ‘Officials’ of the 2 countries were going on in Delhi and Beijing.
Nehru did not want the ‘last chance’ to find a solution for the border to be jeopardized by a Tibetan appeal in the UN; this explains his attitude towards Thondup and the Dalai Lama.
Ultimately, a new resolution was passed in 1961, this did not help much the Tibetan cause. The border issue too was not solved and two years later, India and China clashed over what used to be the Indo-Tibet border.
There is no doubt that the Tibetan issue was at the centre of the 1962 conflict.

Correspondence between the Dalai Lama and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in 1960

Letter from the Dalai Lama to Prime Minister Nehru

July 25, 1960

Time and again you have been kind enough to express, both publicly and in private, your deep sympathy for the people of Tibet in their sad and sorry situation, and this has given strength and courage to all of us, whether living in Tibet or outside. You have generously accorded us asylum in this holy land. You have given, and are still giving, all possible help for the rehabilitation of the unfortunate Tibetans in India. I have already addressed several letters to Your Excellency in this behalf and am most grateful to you for the kind interest you are taking in the matter.
Your Excellency has also evinced abiding interest in "the cultural kinship between the people of India and the people of Tibet." We have always believed that Tibet is a child of Indian civilisation and the people of India must be vitally concerned in the preservation of Tibet's distinct personality. I have, therefore, ventured to address this letter to you. Your Excellency must be fully aware of the grim tragedy that is now being enacted in Tibet. I have been receiving with profound sorrow harrowing accounts of oppression and murder. Hundreds of Tibetans, who have recently been pouring into India and Nepal, bear witness to this sad and distressing state of affairs. There are thousands of others who cannot escape and are threatened with death and destruction. I, therefore, feel, and feel very strongly that something must be done, and done now, to save the lives of these people. As Your Excellency is aware, I have unflinching faith in non-violence and have throughout the last ten years made earnest endeavour to pursue the path of peace. Unfortunately, all my efforts have ended in failure, and I am at present not in a position to help my people in any way. I believe, however, that a wise and far-sighted statesman like Your Excellency may be able to do something to bring about a speedy end to this unnecessary and indiscriminate shedding of innocent blood and a just and peaceful settlement of the Tibetan problem.
I fully appreciate the difficult position of the Government of India in this matter and have, therefore, no other alternative than to take such steps as may be necessary to appeal once again for mediation by the United Nations. I confidently hope that even if the Government of India cannot themselves raise the issue, they will kindly agree to help us in securing the support of other countries and in prosecuting our appeal. Your Excellency, my heart is heavy with sorrow, and I have written to you frankly and freely. I have every confidence that this letter will be taken in the same spirit in which it has been written.

Gyalo Thondup (right) with colleagues
in New York for the UN Appeal

Letter from Jawaharlal Nehru to the Dalai Lama

August 7, 1960

Your Holiness,
Thank you for your letter of July 25 which reached me about a week ago. In this letter you have been good enough to express your appreciation and gratitude for the deep sympathy in India for the Tibetan refugees and for all that has been done for their rehabilitation in India. At the same time, you have expressed your profound sorrow at the state of affairs in Tibet and the plight of the people there, and your strong feeling that "something must be done, and done now, to save the lives of these people".
I can well appreciate your distress as well as your desire that something effective should be done. Unfortunately it is not always possible to give effect to our wishes and desires, and circumstances beyond our control prove limiting factors. We have, therefore, to consider all these circumstances and then come to decisions. Otherwise, any action that we may take may not only be totally ineffective but might also, to some extent, injure the very cause that we have at heart.
I am glad that you have written to me frankly about your feelings and your wishes. I think it is right that I should write to you also frankly what I think about these matters. Some of the activities undertaken on your behalf in the past have been a matter of concern to us, and we have felt that they are not rightly conceived or carried out. I have had a feeling that some of your advisers have not given you right advice. I have in mind particularly the activities of your brother Gyalo Thondup and one or two others of your entourage.
Two questions face us. One is the proper rehabilitation of the Tibetan refugees who have come to India; the other is the larger and more difficult issue of what is happening in Tibet itself. So far as the former question is concerned, it is not simple or easy of solution, but we have undertaken responsibility for it, and we shall do our utmost to rehabilitate them in India. We hope that with your help we shall succeed. The question of these refugees is an internal matter for India which has to be dealt with by the Government of India in consultation with and according to the advice of your goodself [sic]. Other countries are not concerned.
We have given asylum to more than 20,000 Tibetans in our country and the stream of such refugees has not stopped. Your Holiness knows well that this act of ours in giving refuge and asylum to all these Tibetans has created considerable friction between India and the People's Republic of China. Nevertheless, we have considered it our duty to receive these Tibetan people who have come to India and to help them to rehabilitate themselves. The only condition we have attached is that Indian territory must not be made a base for hostile propaganda or activities against the People's Republic of China. It is true that our relations with the Government of China are strained because of various reasons. That is a matter between India and China. But it would be against international convention and usage for refugees, who have taken asylum in India, to use the soil of India for any kind of hostile activities against another country.
Thus we have assumed full responsibility for these Tibetan refugees. We have not asked other countries for financial or any other kind of help for this purpose. It is true that three countries, namely, New Zealand, Australia and the United States of America, have offered financial help for rehabilitation and we have accepted these for specific schemes. But whether that help came or not, our responsibility for rehabilitation would remain.
The other question that arises is a much wider one, that is, the condition of Tibet and the fate of the people there. Any action contemplated in regard to Tibet must necessarily raise difficult and complicated international issues and has to be considered with the greatest care. We live in a world which often hovers over the brink of war, and in which what is called the cold war vitiates the atmosphere of international relations. No subject of international importance can be considered calmly or objectively in this atmosphere, and the decisions of Governments or even of the United Nations itself are governed by these international controversies and conflicts.
I fear that some of your advisers have not got all these aspects in view and have, therefore, often given you wrong and even harmful advice. I have ventured in the past to give you such advice as I thought proper. But you have not always been in a position to accept it. It has not been our desire to interfere with your judgment even though I have regretted some of the decisions our Holiness has taken.
Last year, in rather special circumstances, we gave travel facilities to your brother Gyalo Thondup and one or two others, and some amounts of foreign exchange were also made available to them to enable them to visit a number of countries and thereafter to proceed to New York. Our information is that Gyalo Thondup collected some money last year for Tibetan refugees. We do not know whether he has given full accounts for the money he had collected to Your Holiness. Our information further is that while he was abroad he spent rather lavishly and lived in expensive hotels. I do not think that in the circumstances this was fitting or desirable.
I feel that collecting money abroad in this way is not in keeping with the dignity of Your Holiness or that of the Government of India. The Government of India have not only taken the liability for this purpose, but Your Holiness has also some funds at your disposal. We have no objection to receiving help from other countries, as we have already accepted some such offers. But for individuals to go about in foreign countries begging for aid for the Tibetan refugees appears to us to be totally inappropriate. Further what guarantee is there that the money so collected would, in fact, be properly utilised?
Your Holiness may remember that there were questions in our Parliament about the treasure that was handed to you last year. We had relaxed some of our rules in this matter in our desire to be of help to Your Holiness. We had hoped that the money, as Your Holiness said, would be utilised for the rehabilitation of your people in India.
I have now received requests from Gyalo Thondup and his wife for travel documents to enable them to go abroad. Among the reasons for going abroad, they have mentioned that they would promote an appeal in foreign countries for help towards the rehabilitation of Tibetan refugees in India. For the reasons I have indicated above, we are entirely opposed to any such appeal being issued, more especially by individuals. In the circumstances, therefore, we have regretfully reached the conclusion that we should not give travel documents to Gyalo Thondup and his wife.
Similarly, we have got a request from Mr Rinchen for facilities for going abroad. I am told that he would arrange for the publication of a book which you have written. I have no idea of what this book is about, but Your Holiness, no doubt, knows that it is not necessary for one of your staff to go abroad just to arrange for the publication of a book.
Speaking generally, we have no objection to travel documents being allowed to Tibetans who wish to leave India permanently. We have, however, to consider carefully requests for endorsements which would facilitate return to India at a later date. We have to take particular care to see that facilities of easy travel between India and foreign countries by foreigners are not abused.
Your Holiness has mentioned in your letter that you are proposing to take steps to appeal once again for "mediation by the United Nations". As I have said above I do not wish to interfere in your judgment, but I do feel that I should tell you as a friend that this attempt is not likely to produce any practical results. I can very well appreciate your feelings and your desire to see something done, but my own judgment is that in view of a number of important events that have taken place during the last twelve months, any such appeal to the United Nations would have to face even greater difficulties this year than the last year. If I feel so, as I do, I can hardly be expected to encourage you to follow a course of action which I consider unhelpful and possibly harmful.
With kind regards,
Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru


Letter from the Dalai Lama to Prime Minister Nehru
August 25, 1960

Will you kindly accept my sincere thanks for your letter of the 7th instant which I received on the 11th.

2. I am very glad indeed that Your Excellency has written to me frankly and openly and for this I am grateful to you. May I, however, respectfully say that there are certain statements in Your Excellency's letter which have caused me a great deal of pain and surprise. I refer to your statement that some of the activities carried on my behalf have caused you concern, particularly the activities of my brother Gyalo Thondup and one or two members of my entourage. Your Excellency is aware that I would not permit anything to be done, which might cause you concern and if you had been good enough to draw my attention, I would have promptly attended to the matter. As it is, I am at a disadvantage, for I am not aware of any such activity by Gyalo Thondup or anyone In my entourage. I shall be grateful if you will kindly let me know the nature of the activities and the persons who are carrying on such activities.

3. May I also refer to the statements regarding my brother Gyalo Thondup and the other members of the Tibetan Delegation which had been deputed by me to the last session of the United Nations? At the outset, I should like to assure Your Excellency that there is not the slightest foundation for the information which has been reported to you. You will, I trust, allow me to state the barest facts.

4. The Delegation stayed for about a fortnight at the Atheneum Court in London en route to the United Nations. The three members of the Delegation shared one room, and one of them had to sleep on a sofa. In New York, arrangements were made for their stay at the Waldorf Astoria by some prominent Americans, who have always been keenly interested in the affairs of Tibet. They paid about thirteen dollars a day for a single room and this could not be called an exorbitantly high rate keeping in view the charges which are made at some of the leading hotels in India. However, within a short while after their arrival in New York, they left the Waldorf Astoria for a cheaper hotel, as the American friends were insisting on the payment of their expenses, and they did not wish to be under obligation to any person, however well meaning he might be. I am sure, Your Excellency will agree with me that, in the circumstances, the expenses incurred by my representatives could not be described as lavish. Nor did they spend any large sums of money on entertainment, whether official or otherwise. Indeed, within the small allotment of dollar exchange granted to them it was impossible for them to live lavishly and in expensive hotels. What was, however, expensive were the fees paid to American lawyers and others by the Delegation for the purpose of obtaining the best possible advice.

5. As regards the serious allegation made against my brother that he has been collecting money for the relief and rehabilitation of Tibetan refugees and that he may not have given full account to me, with due deference, I would like to state clearly that this is completely untrue. The members of the Tibetan Delegation did indeed pay visits to various charitable organisations, but they did so at the request of such organisations and only to thank them for the contributions they had already made to the Central Relief Committee in India and to suggest to them that they should continue to remit direct to the Committee whatever funds were available. The only contribution that was directly received by my brother was the sum of forty-one dollars handed over to him personally by a few Buddhist disciples from Inner Mongolia. All these facts can easily be verified. I may be permitted to add that we have heard of a person who has been giving currency to such reports, and have documentary evidence to prove conclusively that these reports are not in accord with facts. If necessary, I trust that, in all fairness and justice, Your Excellency's Government will be pleased to grant to my brother and his associates the opportunity to substantiate the statements which I have made. In this connection, I would also like to emphasise the fact that, in all their dealings, the members of the Tibetan Delegation have never failed to praise, as they should, the help and assistance which I and my people have always received from the Government of India. Nor have they hesitated to contradict observations prejudicial to the interests of India made by other people. I trust I have succeeded in making the position clear to Your Excellency.

6. May I, with Your Excellency's permission, also point out that there appears to be a certain amount of misunderstanding regarding the proposed visit overseas of my brother, Gyalo Thondup and his wife. It was not intended that Gyalo Thondup should go abroad for the purpose of appealing to the people of foreign countries for raising funds for the Tibetan refugees. We have received several requests from various organisations in different parts of the . world that one of my officials should be deputed to help them in raising funds for the Tibetan refugees. All that was, therefore, intended was that he should visit these foreign countries and render whatever assistance he can to the various charitable organisations, which may remit whatever they might collect to the Central Relief Committee. I am sure Your Excellency will agree with me that there is nothing objectionable in this procedure. It may also be added that he had not been instructed to collect funds for this purpose. I must offer apologies to Your Excellency that the position was not made clear to your Government. As regards Mrs. Thondup, her main purpose was to visit her mother, whom she has not seen for a number of years. I am, therefore, greatly disappointed that Your Excellency's Government has thought it fit to refuse travel documents to both Gyalo Thondup and his wife.
While agreeing with Your Excellency that the settlement of the Tibetan refugees in India is primarily the concern of the Government of India, I also consider it my duty to help the Government of India as far as it lies in my power. As for myself, I have already spent about five lakhs of rupees on the education of Tibetan children and the maintenance of Tibetan officials. I have also decided to create a trust for the Tibetan refugees in India and have been in touch with distinguished Indian nationals in order to persuade them to be trustees of the fund. My intention was that Gyalo Thondup should, as one of the Tibetan trustees, visit foreign countries and contact the various organizations, which have on several occasions offered to help us financially or otherwise.
As regards the book to which Your Excellency has referred, I would like to inform you that I had undertaken the writing of the book several months ago and, in fact, one of the chapters was very kindly revised by the officer of the External Affairs Ministry who has been deputed by Your Excellency's Government to be on duty with me. The book purports to be an autobiographical essay. As it contains a great deal of new information on Tibetan religion and religious practices, it was considered necessary that one of my officials should proceed to the United Kingdom to supervise the publication. I may add, for Your Excellency's information, that the book also contains a narrative of the recent events in Tibet. It was, and still is, my intention to seek Your Excellency's advice and suggestions in respect of the chapters, which deal with questions of a political character.
Your Excellency is fully aware that on several occasions I have clearly stated that I realise and appreciate the difficult position of the Government of India. We are all most grateful to Your Excellency for granting asylum to me and my people when we were confronted with an extremely difficult situation, and I can assure Your Excellency that I and my people will always remember with feelings of gratitude the kindness which we have received from the people and the Government of India in such a generous measure. At the same time, I cannot but frankly state that we had always assumed that the right to asylum recognised by all civilised nations presupposes the legitimate exercise of all fundamental human rights, including the right to freedom of expression. Nevertheless, I and my officials have tried our best to follow the advice given to us by the Government of India and have for several months past sedulously refrained from making any public statements of a political character or indulging in any political activity which might embarrass the Government of India. I hope and trust that the exercise of this freedom will not be denied to me. I shall, as you know, always endeavour to see that no action of mine is in any way detrimental to the interests of your great and hospitable country. I feel, and feel very strongly, that if I cannot speak, and speak for my people, my existence has no meaning or value.
I want Your Excellency to understand that it is difficult for me to express in words the gratitude that I feel for all that Your Excellency's Government has done for my people and myself. I feel, however, that I should no longer avail myself of the generous grant of Your Excellency's Government to me. The amount, if I might suggest, may be used for the relief and rehabilitation of Tibetan refugees.
I am extremely sorry to find that Your Excellency still adheres to the view that no useful purpose would be served by taking the Tibetan question to the United Nations. I have the greatest respect and admiration for Your Excellency and attach the highest value and importance to your opinion. It is, therefore, with the deepest regret that I beg to differ from Your Excellency on this issue. I am fully conscious of the fact, as Your Excellency has been kind enough to point out, that an appeal to the United Nations may produce no practical results, but this has not deterred leading nations from agitating the same issue year after year before the world forum. May I cite some instances? Your Excellency is familiar with the case of Ethiopia after its subjugation by Italians. The issues of the persons of Indian Origin residing in South Africa and of apartheid have been agitated for the last 14 years, and very rightly so, by Your Excellency's Government in the United Nations. This has been done because it is a moral issue, an issue which can rouse the conscience of the civilized world. After all these years, it appears to bear some fruit. I feel that the subjugation of my country and the travails my people are going through ought to be placed before the conscience of the world and I shall be failing in my duty if I do not do so. I am sure Your Excellency will agree with me that there is no other course open to me; there is nothing else that I can do to help my poor and unfortunate people. I, therefore feel and feel very strongly that I would be failing in my duty to God and to my people if I do not make use of the only remedy that is available to me. A subjugated people have at least the right to cry out and protest against their subjugation. With the great traditions of your country laid down by that immortal soul, Mahatma Gandhi, who stood up for all oppressed people, the traditions which you are so nobly upholding, Your Excellency will, I am sure, appreciate the stand I am taking in this matter.
Your Excellency has been kind enough to appreciate my feelings in this regard. I have no doubt that in my position Your Excellency would have taken the same action as I have decided to take. I might mention that now that, according to reports in the newspapers, Malaya and Thailand have moved to raise the question of Tibet in the United Nations Assembly and I am confident that several other countries will be supporting the move, I consider that somebody on my behalf should be in New York during the sessions of the United Nations. I therefore, request your Excellency to grant Gyalo Thondup the necessary facilities for travel. I shall shortly communicate to Your Excellency the names of other representatives, whom I propose to depute to go to New York. In the circumstances, I would earnestly beg of you and your Government to be generous with us once again and give us all possible help, particularly in the matter of travel documents and foreign exchange for the Tibetan Delegation to the United Nations. It is needless for me to add that whatever help Your Excellency decides to give us will be most welcome. I shall be grateful for an early reply.
With assurances of my highest consideration.

Why the Dharamsala-Beijing talks failed

Wu Yingjie

According to the pro-Beijing daily The Hindu, Wu Yingjie, the Deputy Secretary of the Tibetan Autonomous Region's Communist Party told a group of visiting Indian journalists that talks with the Dalai Lama were “ongoing and always smooth, but we are discussing only his future, not Tibet’s”.

Wu who, last year, spent several months fire-fighting in Nagchu prefecture, would have added: "All Tibetans, including the Dalai Lama and the people around him, can return if they accept Tibet and Taiwan as part of China, and give up ‘splittist’ efforts.”
When asked about the now-broken talks with Dharamsala, Wu affirmed that the Tibetan demands were unacceptable. “How can the Dalai Lama demand that China withdraw its army from Tibet?”
Wu is probably not aware that in the Dalai Lama's Middle Path approach, Foreign Affairs and Defense remains with the Central Government (Beijing).
Or perhaps, he just bluffed the gullible Indian journalists.
Regarding the Dalai Lama's return to Tibet, as early as 1981, the Dalai Lama had rejected the proposal as his fight was for 6 million Tibetans, not for his personal sake or future.
I quote from my book, The Negotiations that never were:

The answer of the Chinese government to the Dalai Lama’s letter to Deng came in July 1981 when Gyalo Thondup visited Beijing. He had a meeting with the CCP General Secretary Hu Yaobang on July 28, 1981 during which the parameters of the future negotiations were given.
From the Chinese side, this policy statement would guide all further talks; it only mentioned the status of the Dalai Lama and his future role in case he returned to the ‘motherland’.
Here is the text of the Five-Point Communiqué from Beijing:

1. The Dalai Lama should be confident that China has entered a new stage of long term political stability, steady economic growth and mutual help among all nationalities.

2. The Dalai Lama and his representatives should be frank and sincere with the Central Government, not beat around the bush. There should be no more quibbling over the events in 1959.

3. The central authorities sincerely welcome the Dalai Lama and his followers to come back to live. This is based on the hope that they will contribute to upholding China's unity and promoting solidarity between the Han and Tibetan nationalities, and among all nationalities, and the modernization programme.

4. The Dalai Lama will enjoy the same political status and living conditions as he had before 1959. It is suggested that he not go to live in Tibet or hold local posts there. Of course, he may go back to Tibet from time to time. His followers need not worry about their jobs and living conditions. These will only be better than before.

5. When the Dalai Lama wishes to come back, he can issue a brief statement to the press. It is up to him to decide what he would like to say in the statement.

This was not acceptable to the Dalai Lama and his exiled administration. The Tibetan leader wanted to talk about the happiness and the fate of his 6 million countrymen, not about his own status. This issue would be a recurring obstacle during the years to come.

Thirty-three years later, Beijing has not changed its stance.
It is the reason why the 'negotiations that never were' failed.

The Dalai Lama is an insignificant character, Deng

Gyalo Thondup and Deng Xiaoping in 1979

In my book The Negotiations that never were, I mentioned the encounter between Deng Xiaoping, China's new Paramount Leader and Gyalo Thondup, the Dalai Lama's elder brother in March 1979.
Excerpts of the book are posted below. 
We have now another side of the coin.
The US Department of State has recently released Volume XIII of the Foreign Relations of the United States (Carter Administration - 1977-80).
What is surprising is that there are very few mentions about Tibet (was not President Carter a great 'friend' of the Dalai Lama?)
One discussion is however worth citing. It took place during Walter Mondale, the US Vice-President's visit to China in August 1979. 
On August 27, 1979, Mondale met  Deng Xiaoping (then China's Vice-Premier of the State Council). 
Mondale was accompanied by Leonard Woodcock, U.S. Ambassador to China; David Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs and Denis Clift, Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs while Deng Xiaoping had Huang Hua, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Zhang Wenchin, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and Chai Zemin, China's Ambassador to the US, on his side.
During the course of the conversation Deng broached the topic of Dalai Lama.
He stated:

As for the matter of the Dalai Lama, that is a small matter. We made clear our position. It is not a very important question because the Dalai Lama is an insignificant character.

Vice President Mondale: You have awfully good housing waiting for him. Could Woodcock [the US Ambasssdor] live there? (Laughter)

Vice Premier Deng: If he wants to come back, he could still live in that house. Of course, it is an illusion on his part. The idea of wanting to have a state of Tibet. Not long ago he visited the Soviet Union, and we have confirmed information that he went there on orders of the Indian Government. Some of his important officials [the first fact-finding delegation] have recently come back and have gone to Tibet to see officials and conditions there.

Though the discussion shifted on Cambodia and Vietnam, Vice President Mondale later brought back the question of the Dalai Lama:

Concerning the Dalai Lama’s visit to the United States, he was received only as a religious leader and not as a political leader. He will not be treated as a political leader. And our position, whenever asked, is that Tibet is part of China. 

Deng's remark raises a serious question, was the Chinese leader sincere when, a few month earlier, he told Gyalo Thondup: “The door is opened for negotiations as long as we don’t speak about independence. Everything else is negotiable”.
Difficult to say!

Excerpts of The Negotiations that never were:
The first encounters
In November 1978, Gyalo Thondup met with Li Ju-sheng who was designated as ‘Xinhua Director No. 2’ in Hong Kong. They had several encounters which lasted 5 or 6 weeks. Li certainly relayed his conversations to the leadership in Beijing. It seems that the objective from the Chinese side was to build confidence to prepare an eventual visit of Thondup to China where he would meet officials.
At the beginning, Gyalo Thondup did not know that Li Ju-sheng was close to Deng Xiaoping (who was acquainted with his intelligence work in Indonesia in the 1960s). Deng had personally sent Li to Hong Kong and given him this designation (Director No 2) . After a few meetings, Li recommended to Deng that Thondup be invited to discuss the situation in Tibet.
The Dalai Lama recalled in his memoirs that around the same time:

Thirty-four prisoners, mostly elderly members of my own administration, were publicly released with great ceremony in Lhasa. These men were purportedly the last of the 'rebel leaders'. Chinese newspapers stated that, after being taken on a month-long tour of the 'New Tibet', they were to be assisted in finding jobs and even in going abroad if that was what they desired.”
The Dalai Lama was informed of the meetings between Gyalo Thondup and the Chinese emissary. He commented:
The arrival of the [Tibetan] New Year brought no let-up in this spate of extraordinary developments. On 1 February 1979, coincidentally the day that the People's Republic of China was formally recognised by the US, the Panchen Lama, in his first public appearance for fourteen years, added his voice to those calling for the Dalai Lama and his fellow exiles to return. 'If the Dalai Lama is genuinely interested in the happiness and welfare of the Tibetan masses, he need have no doubts about it, he said. I can guarantee that the present standard of living of the Tibetan people in Tibet is many times better than that of the old society’ .

A week later, this invitation was repeated by Radio Lhasa. The nomination of a special welcoming committee to receive Tibetans from abroad was announced.
The Dalai Lama continued:

This was followed just a week later by the unexpected arrival of Gyalo Thondup in Kanpur (Uttar Pradesh) where I was attending a religious conference. To my surprise, he announced that he had heard through some old and trusted friends of his in Hong Kong (where he now lives) that Xinhua, the New China News Agency, which constitutes China's official legation to the British colony, wanted to make contact with him. Following this, he had met a personal emissary of Deng Xiaoping, who explained that the Chinese leader wanted to open communications with the Dalai Lama. As a mark of his goodwill, Deng wanted to invite Gyalo Thondup to Peking for talks. My brother had refused as he wanted to seek my opinion first.
This was totally unexpected, and I did not reply immediately. The developments of the past two years all looked very promising However, as the ancient Indian saying goes, 'When you have once been bitten by a snake, you become cautious even of a rope.' And unfortunately, all my experience of the Chinese leadership suggested that it was untrustworthy. Not only did the authorities in question lie, but worse, when these lies were exposed they were not the least bit ashamed. The Cultural Revolution had been a 'tremendous success' whilst it was going on; now it was a failure — but there was no sense of humility in this admission. Nor was there anything to suggest that these people ever kept their promises. Despite the concrete undertaking of clause thirteen of the Seventeen-Point Agreement that the Chinese would 'not arbitrarily take a needle or thread' from the Tibetans, they had ransacked the whole country. On top of this, through countless atrocities, they had shown a total disrespect for human rights. It seemed that to the Chinese mind, perhaps because of the huge size of their own population, human life is considered to be a cheap commodity — and Tibetan lives to be of still less value. I therefore felt it necessary to exercise extreme caution.
On the other hand, my basic belief is that human problems can only be solved through human contact. So there could be no harm in hearing what the Chinese had to say. Hopefully we could simultaneously explain our own views. We certainly had nothing to hide. Also, if the authorities in Peking were in earnest, we might even be able to send some fact-finding missions to discover for ourselves the real situation.
With these considerations in mind, and knowing that our cause was 100 per cent just and in accordance with the wishes of the entire population of Tibet, I told my brother he was free to go. After he had seen the Chinese leaders, we would consider the next step .

The road was cleared for the first direct contacts between the Dalai Lama’s brother and the new leadership in Beijing.

The Deng-Thondup meeting
The meeting between the supreme leader of the People’s Republic of China and the Dalai Lama’s brother took place in Beijing on March 12, 1979. Immediately, Deng blamed the Gang of Four for the difficult situation in Tibet. It was then the standard excuse for all that had gone wrong in China (and in Tibet) since the mid-sixties. But Deng said that he was keen to improve the lot of the Tibetan population. He told Thondup that he would like to invite the refugees in India and abroad to return to Tibet, “It is better to see once than to hear a hundred times”.
It was during this encounter with Gyalo Thondup that Deng Xiaoping said: “The door is opened for negotiations as long as we don’t speak about independence. Everything else is negotiable”. 
Around that time, the Dalai Lama proposed to Beijing (via the Chinese Embassy in India) that a fact-finding mission from Dharamsala should be permitted to visit Tibet with a view to discovering the real situation there and reporting. Gyalo Thondup had been requested to work out the details.
It is in these circumstances that three delegations were sent by the Dalai Lama in 1979 and 1980 to visit their native land after a gap of 20 years and much suffering.

Longing for Greater Autonomy

During an interview with the Dalai Lama’s Representative who headed the Tibetan fact-finding delegation in Tibet in 1979, he recalled his arrival on the Roof of the World: “The Chinese definitively did not expect that we would be received with so much enthusiasm”.
In fact, they Chinese were bewildered by the reception offered to the delegation some thirty years after the so-called Liberation of Tibet during which “the Chinese administration had done everything to denounce and put down the Dalai Lama, the Chinese authorities thought that the Tibetan people had lost their faith in their leader”.
The Tibetan official continued: “When we arrived in Tibet, the Chinese thought that the people might spit on us because we were the Dalai Lama’s representatives, or throw stones at us”. The Chinese authorities had forbidden the Tibetans to do so.
As they arrived in Tibet, the Tibetan delegates were mobbed; people waited for hours or days to have their darshan, to touch them or to grab a piece of their dress as a relic. The Chinese officials were utterly shocked.
Another delegate recounted that the local Tibetans even collected the dust from the tyre prints of the envoys’ car, to keep it as prasad.
These delegations from Dharamsala in the early 1980’s helped the leadership in Beijing to realize that the Tibetans, like the Mongols or Uyghurs, had their own identity; trying to eradicate it could only be counterproductive.
As a result, after CCP General Secretary Hu Yaobang visited Tibet in May 1980; ‘softer’ policies were introduced. Unfortunately, Hu was soon sidelined by the ‘leftist’ hardliners who re-imposed the harsh assimilation policies of the 1960’s.
Nearly 30 years later, in 2008, the resentment which had simmered underground, resurfaced through a series of demonstrations/riots all over Tibet (including areas administered by Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu and Qinghai provinces.) The unrest lasted nearly two months and once again, severe repression was the only answer that the Party could find to solve the issue. It only exacerbated the situation further.

A new way to express resentment: Immolations
In 2011, it started again, this time, mainly in Eastern Tibet. A series of self-immolations began on March 16, 2011 when Phuntsog, a 21-year old monk of Kirti Monastery set himself on fire in Ngaba. It continued on 15 August with Tsewang Norbu of Tawu Nyatso Monastery. Since then more than 23 cases of self-immolation have been reported.
If one looks at the profiles of those who did the supreme sacrifice, one is surprised to see how young some of these monks or nuns were; for example, Tenzin Choeden who immolated herself on February 11 was a young 18-year old nun of Ngaba (Eastern Tibet).
All these ‘protestors’ had not witnessed the uprising of 1959, the Martial Law in Tibet in 1988/89 or the Tiananmen Square events a few months later.
So where does the problem come from?
Sonam Wangyal Sopa Rinpoche, a Senior Lama who immolated himself recorded a message to his countrymen to explain his gesture: “I am giving away my body as an offering of light to chase away the darkness, to free all beings from suffering, and to lead them …to the Amitabha, the Buddha of infinite light. My offering of light is for all living beings… I offer this sacrifice as a token of long-life offering to our root guru His Holiness the Dalai Lama and all other spiritual teachers and lamas.”


The Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (TCHRD) which follows closely the human rights situation in Tibet, gave a rationale for the extreme step taken by these monks and nuns: “Movement is controlled and religious practices are either limited or completely forbidden. Several laws and policies are specifically aimed to control Tibet’s Buddhist institutions.”
The Dalai Lama commented: “these incidents of self-immolation are very very sad. The leadership in Beijing should look into the ultimate cause of these tragic incidents. These Tibetans have faced a tremendously desperate situation, otherwise nobody will commit such drastic acts”. He requested the Chinese leadership to pay serious attention to their minority policies: “Relying on force is counter-productive. Force can never bring unity and stability.”
But is Beijing’s leadership ready to listen?
The renowned dissident and poetess Tsering Woeser (now under house-arrest) recalled on her blog that in 1963, Quang Duc Thich, a Vietnamese monk burnt himself in Saigon. Woeser said that the 67-year-old monk’s last words were, “before closing my eyes and moving towards the vision of the Buddha, I respectfully plead to the Vietnamese President to take a mind of compassion towards the people of the nation and implement religious equality.”
Woeser believes that similar aspirations and feelings pushed Tibetan monks and nuns to set themselves on fire.

What do the Tibetans want?
On June 18 1988, the Dalai Lama dropped a bombshell in Strasbourg. Addressing the Members of the European Parliament, he declared: "I have taken the initiative to formulate thoughts which we hope, may serve as a basis for resolving the issue of Tibet.” He elaborated: “The whole of Tibet should become a self-governing democratic political entity founded on law by agreement of the people for common good and the protection of themselves and their environment, in association with the People's Republic of China."
From that day, he stopped claiming independence for his country, pleading only for a genuine or meaningful autonomy.
Thus was born the “Middle Path” approach.
What were the reasons which motivated the Dalai Lama to walk on this unpopular (for his people at least) Middle Path?
Being a Buddhist monk, it seems logical that the Dalai Lama emulates his Master who was the first to propagate the ‘middle path’.
A more immediate reason was a meeting that Gyalo Thondup, the Tibetan leader’s elder brother, had with Deng Xiaoping in 1979. China’s new boss told Thondup that "the door to negotiations remains wide open… except for the independence of Tibet; all other questions can be negotiated".
This encounter between Deng and the Dalai Lama’s emissary triggered the rapprochement: as already mentioned, it translated into the visit of the fact-finding delegations from Dharamsala who travelled through the three main provinces of Tibet and later by two rounds of talks with officials of the United Front Work Department in Beijing.
Another reason which pushed the Dalai Lama to choose the ‘Middle Path’ was what he himself called the ‘vast seas’ of Chinese migrants who “threaten the very existence of the Tibetans as a distinct people”. In 1985 in an article in The New York Times, he had explained: “In the eastern parts of our country, the Chinese now greatly outnumber Tibetans. In the Amdo province, for example, where I was born, there are, according to Chinese statistics, 2.5 million Chinese and only 750,000 Tibetans. Even in the so-called Tibet Autonomous Region (i.e., central and western Tibet), Chinese government sources now confirm that Chinese outnumber Tibetans.”
Since then, the situation has considerably deteriorated and especially after the arrival of the railway line to Lhasa in July 2006.
However his ‘Middle Path’ approach has never been accepted by the Chinese leadership. In April 2008, when Chinese President Hu Jintao met the visiting Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, he told him: “Our conflict with the Dalai clique is not an ethnic problem, not a religious problem, nor a human rights problem… It is a problem either to safeguard national unification or to split the motherland.”
He however reiterated that Beijing was “ready to meet the Dalai Lama, but only if he met certain pre-conditions, such as desisting from trying to split the motherland". A meeting is no longer on the cards today.
It is worth mentioning that the Chinese leadership has not always been so rigid on the question of autonomy.
Phuntsok Wangyal, a veteran Tibetan Party leader who was the first Tibetan Communist in the forties recounts: “One day in 1955 in Beijing, Mao unexpectedly came to visit the Dalai Lama at his residence… During their conversation, Mao suddenly said, ‘I heard that you have a national flag, do you? They do not want you to carry it, isn't that right’?" Phunwang continues: “The Dalai Lama just replied, ‘We have an army flag’. Mao perceived that the Dalai Lama was concerned by his question and immediately told him, ‘That is no problem. You may keep your national flag.’ This remark had a deep impact on Phuwang who was arrested in April 1958; to 'cleanse his thinking'. During the following 18 years, while he was tortured and jailed in the most atrocious conditions, he continued to ponder over the issues of the ‘nationalities’ issue and their place within the People’s Republic of China. His personal belief was that the relationship between nationalities in a multiethnic state was supposed to be one of complete equality and autonomy.

What has been India’s position on the question of autonomy?
At the time of independence in 1947, the Government of India considered Tibet as an independent nation and dealt directly with Lhasa without referring to China which had a ‘vague and hazy’ suzerainty over it. But the situation changed after the Chinese invasion of Tibet in October 1950. Nehru was rather embarrassed. In a Note attempting to define India’s Tibet policy, he wrote that after the entry of the PLAs on the Roof of the World, for the Tibetans the “autonomy can obviously not be anything like the autonomy, verging on independence, which Tibet has enjoyed during the last forty years or so.”
Over the years, the Government of India’s position has evolved and today, Delhi does not even insist on an ‘autonomous’ status for the TAR or traditional Tibet.

The Poisonous Arrow: the situation in Tibet
This issue has a strategic side.
The present leadership probably remembers that before the start of the Cultural Revolution, resentment was at its peak in Tibet. In January 1962, during a speech at an important Party Forum, Mao brought up the issue of the Panchen Lama and the situation in Tibet. The Tibetan Lama who had been made Chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region when the Dalai Lama left for India in 1959, had dared to criticize the Party policies in Tibet.
Mao’s physician, Dr Li recounted: “[After the 1959] crackdown, the Panchen Lama, ordinarily subservient to Beijing, was now arguing that Beijing's so-called ‘democratic reforms’ had moved too far to the left.”
The Tibetan issue became a factor which impeded longer military operations against India at the end of 1962; discontent was indeed brewing on the Roof of the World through which passed all supply lines for the border.
In the 70,000-character petition, (dubbed by Mao as a “poisonous arrow’) sent by the Panchen Lama to Zhou Enlai and Xi Zhongxun (the father of Vice-President Xi Jinping) in April 1962, the Panchen Lama listed several problems such the ‘suppression of the Rebellion’ in 1959.
This had serious military consequences.
On October 6, 1962, during a meeting summoned to decide to go to war against India, General Lou Ruiqing, the Chinese Chief of General Staff was authorized by Mao to start ‘a fierce and painful attack on Indian forces. …you should not only repel them, but hit them fiercely and make them hurt"
When the PLA started to work on the details of the military operations, they soon realized that the campaign could not be sustained for a long time. It was therefore decided to terminate the war “with a unilateral Chinese halt, ceasefire, and withdrawal”.
Historian Shi Bo believes that in view of “practical difficulties associated with China's domestic situation”, the PLA, after achieving its military objectives, had to “quickly disengage and end the fighting as quickly as possible”
‘China's domestic situation’ is obviously referring to the power struggle within the Party and the situation in Tibet.

Is there a way out?
Ultimately, the degree of autonomy that the Tibetans are given depends on the leadership in Beijing.
Today, the hardcore leftists are still at the helm, trying to impose policies reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution.
For example, during the 5th Tibet Work Forum  in January 2010, it was apparently decided to send 21,000 Han and Tibetan Party officials in teams of four to each of the TAR’s 5,453 administrative villages; they had to remain for a period of 4 years. Each team member could rotate to a new location after 12 months, but was assigned to the same village for at least 25 days per month.
The objectives seem to be five‐fold:
(1) to strengthen the Party organization at the local level,
(2) to promote stability by persuading villagers to join the struggle against the Dalai Lama’s splittist activities and independence plans,
(3) to improve the economy of each village and create new jobs for the village youth,
(4) to educate the locals to appreciate and be grateful to the motherland and the Party, and
(5) to get each village to begin to more effectively carry out the plans and policies of the Party.
In addition teams are sent from the TAR to each of the seven prefectures “to oversee that prefecture’s work teams, receive their work reports and monitor their success or failure”.
The scale of the scheme, said to the largest since the Cultural Revolution can only bring further rancor and resentment.
To make things worse, an article written by Zhu Weiqun, the Deputy Director of CCP's United Front Work Department in The Study Times (Xuexi Shibao) raises the possibility of abolishing special privileges and preferential policies offered to minority nationalities, taking the nationality name off all IDs cards and passports and removing nationality names from provinces.
Zhu, who is the interlocutor of the Dalai Lama's Envoys in the so-called Beijing-Dharamsala negotiations, argues that China must change some aspects of its present political and educational system in order to achieve 'national cohesion'.
This would be a radically new policy bringing along fresh tensions on the Tibet plateau which could have serious strategic implications for India.