The Dalai Lama is an insignificant character, Deng

Gyalo Thondup and Deng Xiaoping in 1979

In my book The Negotiations that never were, I mentioned the encounter between Deng Xiaoping, China's new Paramount Leader and Gyalo Thondup, the Dalai Lama's elder brother in March 1979.
Excerpts of the book are posted below. 
We have now another side of the coin.
The US Department of State has recently released Volume XIII of the Foreign Relations of the United States (Carter Administration - 1977-80).
What is surprising is that there are very few mentions about Tibet (was not President Carter a great 'friend' of the Dalai Lama?)
One discussion is however worth citing. It took place during Walter Mondale, the US Vice-President's visit to China in August 1979. 
On August 27, 1979, Mondale met  Deng Xiaoping (then China's Vice-Premier of the State Council). 
Mondale was accompanied by Leonard Woodcock, U.S. Ambassador to China; David Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs and Denis Clift, Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs while Deng Xiaoping had Huang Hua, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Zhang Wenchin, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and Chai Zemin, China's Ambassador to the US, on his side.
During the course of the conversation Deng broached the topic of Dalai Lama.
He stated:

As for the matter of the Dalai Lama, that is a small matter. We made clear our position. It is not a very important question because the Dalai Lama is an insignificant character.

Vice President Mondale: You have awfully good housing waiting for him. Could Woodcock [the US Ambasssdor] live there? (Laughter)

Vice Premier Deng: If he wants to come back, he could still live in that house. Of course, it is an illusion on his part. The idea of wanting to have a state of Tibet. Not long ago he visited the Soviet Union, and we have confirmed information that he went there on orders of the Indian Government. Some of his important officials [the first fact-finding delegation] have recently come back and have gone to Tibet to see officials and conditions there.

Though the discussion shifted on Cambodia and Vietnam, Vice President Mondale later brought back the question of the Dalai Lama:

Concerning the Dalai Lama’s visit to the United States, he was received only as a religious leader and not as a political leader. He will not be treated as a political leader. And our position, whenever asked, is that Tibet is part of China. 

Deng's remark raises a serious question, was the Chinese leader sincere when, a few month earlier, he told Gyalo Thondup: “The door is opened for negotiations as long as we don’t speak about independence. Everything else is negotiable”.
Difficult to say!

Excerpts of The Negotiations that never were:
The first encounters
In November 1978, Gyalo Thondup met with Li Ju-sheng who was designated as ‘Xinhua Director No. 2’ in Hong Kong. They had several encounters which lasted 5 or 6 weeks. Li certainly relayed his conversations to the leadership in Beijing. It seems that the objective from the Chinese side was to build confidence to prepare an eventual visit of Thondup to China where he would meet officials.
At the beginning, Gyalo Thondup did not know that Li Ju-sheng was close to Deng Xiaoping (who was acquainted with his intelligence work in Indonesia in the 1960s). Deng had personally sent Li to Hong Kong and given him this designation (Director No 2) . After a few meetings, Li recommended to Deng that Thondup be invited to discuss the situation in Tibet.
The Dalai Lama recalled in his memoirs that around the same time:

Thirty-four prisoners, mostly elderly members of my own administration, were publicly released with great ceremony in Lhasa. These men were purportedly the last of the 'rebel leaders'. Chinese newspapers stated that, after being taken on a month-long tour of the 'New Tibet', they were to be assisted in finding jobs and even in going abroad if that was what they desired.”
The Dalai Lama was informed of the meetings between Gyalo Thondup and the Chinese emissary. He commented:
The arrival of the [Tibetan] New Year brought no let-up in this spate of extraordinary developments. On 1 February 1979, coincidentally the day that the People's Republic of China was formally recognised by the US, the Panchen Lama, in his first public appearance for fourteen years, added his voice to those calling for the Dalai Lama and his fellow exiles to return. 'If the Dalai Lama is genuinely interested in the happiness and welfare of the Tibetan masses, he need have no doubts about it, he said. I can guarantee that the present standard of living of the Tibetan people in Tibet is many times better than that of the old society’ .

A week later, this invitation was repeated by Radio Lhasa. The nomination of a special welcoming committee to receive Tibetans from abroad was announced.
The Dalai Lama continued:

This was followed just a week later by the unexpected arrival of Gyalo Thondup in Kanpur (Uttar Pradesh) where I was attending a religious conference. To my surprise, he announced that he had heard through some old and trusted friends of his in Hong Kong (where he now lives) that Xinhua, the New China News Agency, which constitutes China's official legation to the British colony, wanted to make contact with him. Following this, he had met a personal emissary of Deng Xiaoping, who explained that the Chinese leader wanted to open communications with the Dalai Lama. As a mark of his goodwill, Deng wanted to invite Gyalo Thondup to Peking for talks. My brother had refused as he wanted to seek my opinion first.
This was totally unexpected, and I did not reply immediately. The developments of the past two years all looked very promising However, as the ancient Indian saying goes, 'When you have once been bitten by a snake, you become cautious even of a rope.' And unfortunately, all my experience of the Chinese leadership suggested that it was untrustworthy. Not only did the authorities in question lie, but worse, when these lies were exposed they were not the least bit ashamed. The Cultural Revolution had been a 'tremendous success' whilst it was going on; now it was a failure — but there was no sense of humility in this admission. Nor was there anything to suggest that these people ever kept their promises. Despite the concrete undertaking of clause thirteen of the Seventeen-Point Agreement that the Chinese would 'not arbitrarily take a needle or thread' from the Tibetans, they had ransacked the whole country. On top of this, through countless atrocities, they had shown a total disrespect for human rights. It seemed that to the Chinese mind, perhaps because of the huge size of their own population, human life is considered to be a cheap commodity — and Tibetan lives to be of still less value. I therefore felt it necessary to exercise extreme caution.
On the other hand, my basic belief is that human problems can only be solved through human contact. So there could be no harm in hearing what the Chinese had to say. Hopefully we could simultaneously explain our own views. We certainly had nothing to hide. Also, if the authorities in Peking were in earnest, we might even be able to send some fact-finding missions to discover for ourselves the real situation.
With these considerations in mind, and knowing that our cause was 100 per cent just and in accordance with the wishes of the entire population of Tibet, I told my brother he was free to go. After he had seen the Chinese leaders, we would consider the next step .

The road was cleared for the first direct contacts between the Dalai Lama’s brother and the new leadership in Beijing.

The Deng-Thondup meeting
The meeting between the supreme leader of the People’s Republic of China and the Dalai Lama’s brother took place in Beijing on March 12, 1979. Immediately, Deng blamed the Gang of Four for the difficult situation in Tibet. It was then the standard excuse for all that had gone wrong in China (and in Tibet) since the mid-sixties. But Deng said that he was keen to improve the lot of the Tibetan population. He told Thondup that he would like to invite the refugees in India and abroad to return to Tibet, “It is better to see once than to hear a hundred times”.
It was during this encounter with Gyalo Thondup that Deng Xiaoping said: “The door is opened for negotiations as long as we don’t speak about independence. Everything else is negotiable”. 
Around that time, the Dalai Lama proposed to Beijing (via the Chinese Embassy in India) that a fact-finding mission from Dharamsala should be permitted to visit Tibet with a view to discovering the real situation there and reporting. Gyalo Thondup had been requested to work out the details.
It is in these circumstances that three delegations were sent by the Dalai Lama in 1979 and 1980 to visit their native land after a gap of 20 years and much suffering.

The Succession War is not over

While leaving the United States after a five-day tour, Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping stated that his visit was a ‘full success’. After completing official calls on the US President and other dignitaries, the visit ended in a relaxed way in Hollywood. Further, Xi termed his meetings with President Barack Obama and Vice-President Joe Biden as ‘fruitful’.
Before the visit, Jeremy Page in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) had correctly analyzed the future Chinese President’s personality. He spoke of his “unusual ability to get along, and to work with people across regional, ideological and functional divides—a personality trait that friends say dates back to his formative years in the village.”
A family friend of Xi told Page: “He's a very balanced character. He's not the kind to take revenge on anyone—he sees the big picture, and the importance of working with all kinds of people.”
Sidney Rittenberg, an American ex-Communist who knew Xi Jinping’s father, Xi Zhongxun, an associate of Deng Xiaoping, explained to the WSJ: “I can't help but think that some of his father's personality rubbed off on him. There's one trait common to both father and son: they never made life hard for their opponents.”
Only the future will tell us if this is true for Xi Jr., though in the case of Xi Sr., he rubbed Mao up the wrong side by being too close to Marshal Peng Dehuai, who dared criticize the Chairman after the Great Leap Forward. Xi Zhongxun was purged for 16 years for his ‘crime’.
Except for the demonstrations by Tibetan supporters protesting in different us cities against the repression in Eastern Tibet (more than 20 monks and nuns have immolated themselves), the visit went rather well, at least as far as the forthcoming succession to the top of the Communist Party is concerned.
Xi had earlier travelled to Iowa with a business delegation and agreed to buy more than US $ 4 billion of soybeans from the US; watching a NBA basketball match between the LA Lakers and the Phoenix Suns at the Staples Center in LA, further endeared him to the American public.
The situation is less euphoric in China where the succession war rages.
While the powerful Chongqing’s Party Secretary, Bo Xilai is trying hard to make it to the ultimate Paradise for a Chinese politician, the Politburo’s Standing Committee, the Wind seems to have recently changed direction.
The New York Times reported: “Here in Chongqing, the Communist Party’s secretive, stage-managed process of installing a new generation of leaders has become a more open and sometimes brutal contest, with fortunes of leaders of broadly different inclinations at stake.”
The newspaper which quotes Wang Kang, a local writer and commentator: “What’s going on in Chongqing is a battle over the future course of China. It is about how China should be run”, comments: “unlike Mr. Xi, seen as humble and deft, Mr. Bo is a tenacious fighter and showman.”
Unfortunately for Bo, his right hand man, Wang Lijun, the Police Chief of the port city had to be demoted (or did he try to defect?).
The foreign press extensively covered the incident, but it is still not very clear what happened. Everyone agrees that Wang Lijun visited the US Consulate General in Chengdu (Sichuan province) and after an over-night stay, Wang is said to have left ‘of his own volition’ (says the US spokesperson).
Had Bo conspired to spoil Xi Jinping's leadership succession prospects?
Was Wang refused political asylum to avoid derailing Xi’s visit to the US?
Did Locke consult the Chinese authorities in Beijing before taking a decision?
There are different answers to these questions.
Voice of America quoted an article of the Washington Free Beacon saying that Wang told the US Consul General in Chengdu that Bo was corrupt and maintained close ties with crime syndicates. Wang could also have disclosed tactics and strategies adopted by China's public security agencies to crack down on political dissidents.
Has Wang given any information on the power struggle in China a few months before the leadership change?
Some speculate that hardliners like Bo and Zhou Yongkang, a member of the Politburo’s Standing Committee, conspired to prevent Vice President Xi Jinping from taking over the presidency later this year.
The Chongqing municipal government issued a statement saying that Wang was on ‘vacation therapy’, being over-stressed. Nice formula!
The US-based author Xujun Eberlein has another theory, using ‘informed speculation’, she wrote that Wang Lijun was not seeking asylum in Chengdu, he simply wanted the Central Party’s protection. Wang would have used the US consulate as a safe house, where he waited until officers sent from Beijing could arrive. He then walked outside the US consulate, where seventy police vans sent by Bo Xilai had come to arrest him, but the State Security agents managed to take him away to Beijing after a short scuffle.
Whatever the truth is, this incident shows that everything is not smooth in the Middle Kingdom.
Another news piece is rather worrying and related to the October succession; hardliners are trying to impose their ‘leftist’ policies once again.
An article written by Zhu Weiqun, the Deputy Director of CCP's United Front Work Department in The Study Times (Xuexi Shibao), unnoticed by the Indian press may have serious implications.
Zhu, who is the interlocutor of the Dalai Lama's Envoys in the so-called Beijing-Dharamsala negotiations, argues that China must change some aspects of its present political and educational system in order to achieve 'national cohesion'. He expects a discussion on this issue to take place at the forthcoming annual National People's Congress and Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in March.
Zhu raises the possibility of abolishing special privileges and preferential policies offered to minority nationalities, taking the nationality name off all IDs cards and passports and removing nationality names from provinces.
Does it mean that autonomy will be deleted from the Constitution in the name of promoting a 'greater cohesion'?
This would be a radically new policy. In 2005, China's State Council had published a White Paper on Regional Autonomy for Ethnic Minorities in China which stated: "The People's Republic of China is a united multi-ethnic state founded jointly by the people of all its ethnic groups. So far, there are 56 ethnic groups identified and confirmed by the Central Government."
Zhu’s and his mentors’ move should seriously worry the Tibetans. In 2008, the Dalai Lama's Envoys had given a Memorandum to Mr Zhu; and a year later, they presented a Note on the Memorandum. The Tibetan Envoys offered amongst other things, to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the PRC and of its Constitution, as well as the Dalai Lama’s ‘full cooperation for a mutually beneficial solution’.
Zhu Weiqun rejected the Memorandum and the Note.
The latest essay of Zhu will have serious consequences for the Tibetans, Uyghurs and Mongols and other minority nationalities as they may lose their identity guaranteed by the Constitution of China.
Zhu and his bosses in the Standing Committee of the Politburo probably believe that it is a way to solve the Tibetan issue once and for all.
But this could also create more resentment amongst the people of non-Han origin and increase the circle of violence.
For India, it will also have serious implications for the border talks as Delhi has always acknowledged Tibetan autonomy (within the People's Republic of China, since 1954).
This should be followed closely; but one thing is sure, the succession war is not over.

Can China afford an external conflict?

The Route of the Dalai Lama in 1959

James Clapper, the Director of the US National Intelligence recently told a Senate Committee on intelligence that the Indian Army was strengthening itself for a ‘limited conflict’ with China: “Despite public statements intended to downplay tensions between India and China, we judge that India is increasingly concerned about China's posture along their disputed border and Beijing's perceived aggressive posture in the Indian Ocean and Asia-Pacific region."
He however added: “The Indian Army believes a major Sino-Indian conflict is not imminent.”
Is this announcement part of a US plan to rope in India in a larger containment plan? Probably!
A Report Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense recently released by President Obama, speaks of the “maintenance of peace, stability, the free flow of commerce, and of U.S. influence in this dynamic region will depend in part on an underlying balance of military capability and presence. Over the long term, China’s emergence as a regional power will have the potential to affect the U.S. economy and our security in a variety of ways.”
Washington needs Delhi on board to counter Beijing and continue its business as usual.
When Clapper warns: “Beijing may take actions contrary to that goal [of peaceful rise] if it perceives that China's sovereignty or national security is being seriously challenged," he clearly sends Delhi a message that India will have to be in the front line.
But a ‘limited conflict’ means nothing! What is a ‘limited’ conflict? Who is deciding on the ‘limitations’? First, it is doubtful whether President Hu Jintao and the outgoing leadership in Beijing would have the determination to embark on any type of conflict with India during the last months of their tenure, and more importantly a 1962-type conflict would have little chances to remain limited. Just to give an example, the Air Force was not used in 1962; it would extensively be used in a war today.
It is however true that Beijing has, in the recent months, shown a renewed aggressiveness in its dealing with Delhi.
The 15th Round of talks, which was scheduled on November 28-29, 2011, was cancelled by the Chinese were unhappy with the Dalai Lama's participation in the Global Buddhist Congregation happening in Delhi at the same time. Beijing even insisted on the cancellation of the Conference. This was obviously not acceptable to South Block.
In the meantime, the intrusions into Indian territory continued unabated. Quoting from a classified document, the weekly magazine India Today affirmed: “During the month [November 2011], there were 20 incidents of LAC violations by the Chinese. During the current year, 323 transgressions were reported: western sector 194, middle sector-9 and eastern sector-120. In the corresponding period of 2010 there were 324 intrusions: 224 in the western sector, 111 in the middle and 90 in the eastern sector in Arunachal.”
It was finally decided to hold the 15th Round on January 16 and 17, 2012.
Before his arrival in India, Dai Bingguo, China's Special Representative, affirmed that the relations between the two countries had embarked in a ‘golden era’; during the meeting however, Dai told Shivshankar Menon, his Indian counterpart, that India had to first discuss the Eastern Sector of the boundary and he further asked Menon how much territory New Delhi would be ready to part with in the Tawang region.
Beijing may insist that Tawang district is part of the People's Republic of China, but it is clearly an after-thought.
I recently came across a series of rare old photos of the Dalai Lama fleeing Tibet. The Dalai Lama entered India on March 31, 1959 crossing the Indian border at Khenzimane at the bottom of the famous Thagla ridge in the West Kameng Frontier Division of the North-East Frontier Agency (today, Tawang District).
Jawaharlal Nehru sent PN Menon, a senior officer of the Ministry of External Affairs, (and incidentally, the father of the present National Security Adviser) to receive the Tibetan leader. Menon delivered to the Tibetan leader a message from the Prime Minister: "My colleagues and I welcome you and send greetings on your safe arrival in India. We shall be happy to afford the necessary facilities to you, your family and entourage to reside in India. The people of India, who hold you in great veneration, will no doubt accord their traditional respect to your personage."
Since then, the Dalai Lama has been an 'honoured guest' in India.
In his autobiography, Freedom in Exile, the Dalai Lama remembered crossing the border on a dzomo (hybrid of a yak and domestic cattle): “…We must have been a pitiful sight to the handful of Indian guards that met us at the border - eighty travellers, physically exhausted and mentally wretched from our ordeal. I was delighted however, that an official I knew from my visit two years earlier was there to rendez-vous with us.”
At that time, Beijing did not say that the Dalai Lama and his entourage were in 'Southern Tibet' (the term used today by Beijing to define Tawang). They knew perfectly well that the Tibetan leader had taken refuge on Indian territory.
If they had really believed that the area was a part of Chinese territory, why did the Chinese not follow and arrest the Dalai Lama when he passed through in 1959?
The answer is clear, it was not Chinese territory and Mao knew it.
So, why claim the area 53 years later?
The demand of Dai Bingguo is all the more ironic as it comes at a time when China is using ferocious repressive policies against the Tibetans on the other side of the McMahon Line. Remember that under the 2005 Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question, it was agreed by Delhi and Beijing: "In reaching a boundary settlement, the two sides shall safeguard due interests of their settled populations in the border areas."
Last week, it was reported that China "has effectively sealed off a vast Tibetan area of Sichuan province, sending in troops and cutting off communications to towns where protesters have been killed by security forces in the past week."
The situation has never been so bad in Tibet. Hundreds of Tibetan pilgrims, returning to Tibet after attending the Kalachakra initiation conducted by the Dalai Lama in Bodh Gaya, were arrested by Chinese authorities and forcibly taken to undisclosed locations.
Sources based in the Dharamsala, the Dalai Lama’s headquarters say: “At around 10 am local time on January 31, Chinese security forces surrounded those Tibetans at the railway station in Tibet’s capital Lhasa and then put them in a train bound for China.”
The same source affirms that the Chinese security forces have set up 12 checkpoints between Dram, the post at the Nepal-Tibet border and Lhasa. The checkpoints, manned by the Public Security Bureau, are used to stop all the Tibetan pilgrims who visited Bodh Gaya.
Presuming that the new Chinese stand on the border would have had a historical justification (though it does not), would the local Monpa population desire to become Chinese nationals, lose their democratic rights and be treated in such way. The answer is an emphatic 'NO!'
But the Chinese continue to blow hot and cold, at least with India if not with the Tibetans. Dai’s tough posture was compensated by an “Agreement on the Establishment of a Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs” signed during the visit. But on the ground, the situation will probably not change much as long as the Chinese land-grabbing mindset reminds.

Are Indian thinking?

This article based on the "Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program" prepared by the International Relations Program of the University of Pennsylvania shows that no Indian think tank is able to make it amongst the top 30 of the world.
But are the results of the US University reliable?
The Americans have taken the habit to note themselves and everybody else. They usually top the list.
Ditto with universities and now the think tanks.
I do not want to praise for Indian think tanks (often funded by the US), there is however a political factor in the present noting.
On January 19, 2012, The People's Daily published in article entitled "The Political Factor behind the Downgrade of European Countries' Credit Ratings".
The People's Daily's commented on Standard & Poor's motivation for the recent downgrade of European countries' credit ratings. It further suggested that the downgrade increased the complexity of resolving Europe's debt crisis and that it is more than a simple financial move. 
The article stated: "Britain's debt crisis is rarely discussed in media reports, but Britain is a country heavily dependent on finances. Its debt crisis is no less severe than in any other country. However, Britain is the closest ally of the United States. Therefore, it is almost impossible to downgrade Britain's credit rating... Austria was downgraded unexpectedly, but looking at it from a political angle, Austria has been Germany's most intimate friend. Therefore, America's Standard & Poor's downgrade of Austria's credit rating can have the effect of giving Germany a warning. Downgrading France appears to be reasonable, but it is actually still politically motivated. It has very little effect on the French government's borrowing costs, but it can have a dire consequence for Sarkozy's reelection efforts."
I am not usually biding for the Chinese views, but the Communist mouthpiece has probably a point: there are indeed different views on the credit, university or think tank ratings. 
Unfortunately, it depends on who conduct the survey.
If one looks at the directions recently taken by US Foreign Policy makers, one can only conclude that they have been wrongly advised by the think tanks (in Iraq, in Afghanistan and elsewhere).
So why to invest so much in top think tanks, for such a poor harvest?

India’s Think Tank Failure
The Diplomat.com
By Jason Miks January 19, 2012
Diplomatic Courier* has released its new list of the world’s leading think tanks, which always makes for interesting reading. In top spot this year in their global list is Washington-based Brookings Institution, which also came in second overall in the United States on the specific area of international affairs, behind the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
The list is drawn up largely by the University of Pennsylvania, and this year included nominations for 5,329 think tanks around the world.
“Our rankings process, as in the past, relies on a shared definition of public policy research, analysis, and engagement organizations, a detailed set of selection criteria, and an increasingly open and transparent nomination and selection process,” said James McGann, director of the university’s think tank and civil societies program, in announcing the results.
It’s no surprise on the overall list to see organizations like Brookings, Chatham House in the U.K., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Council on Foreign Relations and CSIS making up the top five. But what is in some ways surprising is the failure of India to place a single think tank in the global top 30.
That American think tanks dominate the top 30, taking 12 spots, isn’t a surprise – they are extremely well-funded here, and there’s a long-established culture of ideas generation based around this format in Washington and elsewhere that’s boosted by the ease with which former politicians and government officials move in and out of the “circuit.” U.S. think tanks undoubtedly benefit from the U.S.-style of government, which often involves officials being appointed, serving a relatively short period in government, making contacts and then returning to the research sector. You only have to look at the staff line-up of any of the top organizations to see a host of former (often very senior) government officials making up the ranks.
This is in stark contrast to parliamentary systems such as the U.K., where cabinet positions are typically filled by members of parliament – a British Foreign Office minister whose term in government has ended returns to the back benches rather than becoming a fellow at, say, Chatham House.
But none of this explains the absence of India on the list – an absence that should trouble Indian policymakers. At their best, think tanks can be a hotbed of ideas for government to draw upon, and if India has aspirations toward looking past its neighborhood and stepping up on the global stage it will need to draw upon the vigorous exchange and debate of ideas and policy proposals that such research centers can offer. And yet clearly, in the eyes of their peers, Indian think tanks lack the rigor and influence of a Germany, Canada or indeed Kenya, at least according to the latest list.
I’m going to quote here at some length from one of our writers on this issue from a couple of years back:
“Apart from (the) persistence of endemic poverty and poor infrastructure, India faces other critical challenges in its search for great power status: its acute shortage of critical human capital. At one level, the country can justifiably claim that it has some institutions of higher education which can compete with their peers on a global basis. But these institutions are mostly confined to the realms of science, engineering and management and despite the existence of these centers of excellence, mediocrity is the hallmark of many of India’s other educational institutions.
“For example, with the possible exception of the discipline of economics, India lags woefully behind in the other social sciences such as sociology, anthropology and political science. Few, if any, significant contributions to these fields of intellectual endeavor have emerged from India in recent decades. Most scholarship in these areas is either derivative, or worse, still mostly descriptive and hortatory.”
It’s the kind of damning indictment I’ve come to expect from those engaged in the China vs India debate that rages on our site and elsewhere. And yet these words were written by one of our Indian Decade bloggers, Sumit Ganguly.
And he’s right. When we’re sourcing material for the site, too often we find Indian think tank analyses littered with basic errors, unsubstantiated claims or rehashings of long debunked theories (Flashpoints contributor James Holmes is just one of many to have expressed frustration at how a likely non-event involving the Chinese and Indian navies last summer is still treated as fact in Indian media and policy circles).
It goes without saying that India has an enormous amount to offer the international community. But there’s no excuse for its absence on a list like this.
*I mistakenly referred to this year's list as being published by Foreign Policy as it was in previous years. This year, it's being being published by Diplomatic Courier, although the report is also being hosted on Foreign Policy. My apologies for any confusion.

1971 and the Indian Nuclear Test

Site of India's first atomic reactor in Trombay

This series of documents on the 1974 Nuclear Test in Rajasthan published by the National Security Archive comes at the time when India is celebrating the 40th anniversary of the Bangladesh Liberation War.
As briefly mentioned in the introduction to the documents, the two events are deeply linked.
It is after Indira Gandhi realized that she was made a fool by the clever Bhutto at Simla that she decided to go for a test.
Let us hope that the Indian archives will one day be declassified so that the decision process for testing a nuclear device can be better understood.

The Nixon Administration and the Indian Nuclear Program, 1972-1974
U.S. Post-Mortem on 1974 Indian Test Criticized Intelligence Community Performance for "Waffling Judgments" and Not Following Up Leads
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 367
December 5, 2011

India's "peaceful nuclear explosion" on 18 May 1974 caught the United States by surprise in part because the intelligence community had not been looking for signs that a test was in the works. According to a recently declassified Intelligence Community Staff post-mortem posted today by the National Security Archive and the Nuclear Proliferation International History Project, Nixon administration policymakers had given a relatively low priority to the Indian program and there was "no sense of urgency" to determine whether New Delhi was preparing to test a nuclear device. Intelligence "production" (analysis and reporting) on the topic "fell off" during the 20 months before the test, the analysis concluded.
In early 1972, however—two years before the test—the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) had predicted that India could make preparations for an underground test without detection by U.S. intelligence. Published for the first time today, the INR report warned that the U.S. government had given a "relatively modest priority to … relevant intelligence collection activities" which meant that a "concerted effort by India to conceal such preparations … may well succeed."
The post-mortem, the INR report and other new materials illustrate how intelligence priorities generally reflect the interests and priorities of top policymakers. The Nixon White House was focused on the Vietnam War and grand strategy toward Beijing and Moscow; intelligence on nuclear proliferation was a low priority. Compare, for example, the India case with that of Iraq during 2002-2003, when White House concerns encouraged—some say even compelled—intelligence producers to cherry pick raw information to demonstrate the development of WMD by the Saddam Hussein regime.
INR prepared its India report at a time when secret sources were telling U.S. intelligence that New Delhi was about to test a nuclear device. The "small spate" of reports about a test had such "congruity, apparent reliability, and seeming credibility" that they prompted a review of India's nuclear intentions by INR and other government offices. In the end, government officials could not decide whether India had made a decision to test although a subsequent lead suggested otherwise.
According to the intelligence community's post-mortem, obtained through a mandatory review appeal to the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP), one of the problems was that intelligence producers were not communicating with each other, so the "other guy" assumed that someone else was "primarily responsible for producing hard evidence of Indian intentions." The analysis was especially critical of an August 1972 Special National Intelligence Estimate for its "waffling judgments" on Indian nuclear intentions.
Other declassified documents reproduced here from 1972 through 1974 illustrate the range of thinking on this sensitive topic:

• An INR report in February 1972 concluded that it could not "rule out a test" in the near future and it was "entirely possible that one or more nuclear devices have actually been fabricated and assembled."  All the same, "it our judgment that a decision to authorize a test is unlikely in the next few months and may well be deferred for several years."
• During March and April 1972, Canadian and British intelligence concluded that they had no evidence that India had made a decision to test a nuclear device. Nevertheless, the Canadians believed that New Delhi could produce a device in less than a year.
• In June 1972, Japanese diplomat Ryohei Murata argued that the "Indians have decided to go ahead with a nuclear test" and that the Thar Desert in Rajasthan would be the test site. While basically correct, Murata's estimate was discounted because it did not represent an official Foreign Ministry view.
• Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) 31-72 published in August 1972 also held that the Indians could produce a device "within a few days to a year of a decision to do so," but concluded that the chances that India had made a decision to test were "roughly even."
• In 1973, the Atomic Energy Commission's scientific representative in India  told the U.S. consul in Bombay (Mumbai) that several "indications" suggested that India "may well have decided" to test a nuclear device.
• Five months before the test, the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi reported that the probability of an "early test" was at a "lower level than previous years."

The rumors that India was going to test emerged in the wake of the South Asian crisis, when the Nixon White House tilted toward Pakistan, India's archrival. Relations between New Delhi and Washington were already cool during the Nixon administration which treated India as a relatively low priority.  Henry Kissinger's secret trip to China underlined India's low priority by suggesting that if New Delhi ever faced a crisis with Beijing it could not count on Washington for help.  Relations became truly frosty during the balance of 1971 when New Delhi signed a friendship treaty with Moscow and India and Pakistan went to war. Later Nixon and Kissinger wanted to improve the relationship, but India's nuclear intentions were not on their agenda. That India had refused to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty was a non-issue for Nixon and Kissinger, who had little use for the NPT and treated nuclear proliferation as less than secondary. While the State Department cautioned India against nuclear tests in late 1970, concern did not rise to the top of policy hill.
Whatever impact the events of 1971 may have had on India's decision to test a nuclear device that decision was soon to be made. According to George Perkovich, an authority on the Indian nuclear program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "it may be conjectured that support in principle for developing a nuclear explosive device was solidified by late 1971, that concentrated work on building the vital components began in spring 1972, and that formal prime ministerial approval to make final preparations for a PNE occurred in September 1972." In this context, the reports collected by U.S. intelligence in late 1971 and early 1972 about a possible test may have been good examples of the old chestnut that "where there's smoke, there's fire."
Yet, the analysts who wrote SNIE 31-72 decided that the smoke had no significance because they saw only a 50-50 chance that New Delhi had made a decision to test (even though New Delhi was closing in on a decision).

To read the documents, visit  National Security Archive's website.

Chances of toppling Qadhafi are better than ever

The National Security Archives Blog publishes some 'historic' documents on Qadhafi.
Two days ago, I wrote about the poor 'intelligence' of the French (soon former) Minister of Foreign Affairs who went on a 'private' visit to Tunisia when the popular revolution had already started.
The assessment of the US Directorate of Intelligence demonstrates that the Americans, like the French can be totally wrong in their assessment about an actual situation.
Twenty five years ago, the CIA believed that the chances of toppling Qadhafi (see below for the 53 different spellings) were excellent. What has happened then?
The problem is perhaps that the Western powers prefer to work with Ben Alis or Qadhafis or even ISI's generals in Pakistan or even a Politburo in China than with a democratic elected government. 
Dictators, tyrants, military rulers are considered more 'stable'. 
Take India for example. it is so difficult to understand who is ruling and who should be 'influenced' to get a decision through. 'Democracy' seems to confuse great powers.
Another moral of the story: a 'sage' said that God will come when wisemen eat and sleep (and they will not notice God), so perhaps the tyrants will fall when the CIA or the DGSE sleeps and the ministers  enjoy their lives.

CIA Assessed: “Chances of Toppling Qadhafi at Better than Even” …More than 25 Years Ago!
National Security Archives Blog
February 25, 2011
by Nate Jones
In 1985, a CIA Directorate of Intelligence Report entitled, “Qadhafi’s Prospects for Survival” painted a bleak picture for Colonel Qadhafi’s continued rule of Libya.  The report concluded that if dissidents and the military joined forces, “we assess their chances of toppling Qadhafi at better than even.“  I guess being 26 years off isn’t sooo bad.
Glad I didn't take that bet.
Of course, Qadhafi outlived the CIA’s projection.  In fact, after taking power in his 1969 coup, he is currently the longest-serving non-royal ruler in the world.  (Paul Biya, of Cameroon, is next in line for the title –should things keep going the way they are.)
Before I get too far along, I guess I should explain that I am spelling Qadhafi this way because that’s how his name comes up in the CIA reports.  He’s actually quite tricky to research because each agency spells his name differently –Department of State spells it Gaddafi– making full-text searches a tough task.   The Library of Congress lists 53 alternative spellings for his name.  His personal website – down at the moment – is algathafi.org.  There are rumors that he signed a letter to a bunch of Minnesota second graders, “Moammar El-Gadhafi.”  But I digress, we’re going with “Qadhafi” in this blog post.
Qadhafi’s four-decade reign has not been uninteresting.  Upon seizing power after his coup, Qadhafi promoted himself from captain to colonel, but no higher.  Following the example set by of Egypt’s Gamal Nasser, Qadhafi claimed that he did not need a grandiose title since Libya was actually ruled by the people.   Of course Qadhafi later took the meek mantle: “Brother Leader and Guide of the Revolution.”  He also eventually established what is referred to as an “Amazon Guard” of reportedly elite, beautiful women soldiers.  Thanks to wikileaks, we know he is reliant upon Galyna, his “voluptuous blond” Ukrainian nurse.
After Nasser’s death, the pan-Arabist Qadhafi tried establish a “Federation of Arab Republics” between Libya, Egypt, Syria, and Sudan.  After working on if for five years (1972 to 1977) the Federation finally fizzled.  Qadhafi was initially an ardent supporter of the Palestinian Liberation Organization and shunned countries (including Egypt) who warmed to the west.  Libya eventually allied with the Soviet Union.  It was the first county outside the Soviet bloc to receive the USSR’s supersonic MiG-25.
Qadhafi was a well-known supporter of liberation movements – and terrorism.  He financed the Black September Movement which killed 12 at the 1972 Munich Olympics, collaborated with Carlos the Jackal, was accused of selling arms to the Provisional IRA and FARC, and was behind the 5 April 1986 discotheque bombing in West Berlin that killed two US officers and a Turkish woman, and injured more than 200 people, many of whom were US soldiers.
Which brings us back to the 1985 CIA intelligence report proclaiming Qadhafi’s weakness.  After the discotheque bombing, Reagan publicly proclaimed that Qadhafi – who was supporting the US adversary Iran in the Iran-Iraq War – was the “mad dog of the Middle East.” Days later, the President authorized  Operation El Dorodo Canyon, a 15 April 1986 joint US Marine, Navy, and Air strike against five sites in Libya, including Bab al-Aziza, where Qadhafi and his family lived.
No doubt Reagan’s National Security Counsel was aware of the CIA assessment that implied Qadhafi’s grip on power was tenuous as it recommended the attack.  The strike missed Qadhafi, but did kill his adopted daughter.  A 2008 report claimed that Qadhafi fled his home at Bab al-Aziza minutes before the attack after receiving a phone call from the Prime Minister of Malta warning that US planes were heading toward Libya.
A second, 17 May 1986, CIA Directorate of Intelligence Report entitled “Qadhafi’s Political Position Since the Airstrike” argued that the strikes had further damaged the Libyan people’s support for Qadhafi.  The report stated that continued international pressure could “further erode Qadhafi’s already diminished sense of self-esteem since the strike.”
To bolster its arguments, the report cited:
    * That “the funeral procession in Tripoli for those killed in the US strike attracted only several thousand marchers out of a local population of about 900,000.”
    * That “many Libyans hope US pressure will eventually result in Qadhafi’s removal.”  (The sources for this statement are redacted.)
    * And that Qadhafi chose to give a 11 June speech on television, rather than in public, “almost certainly because he feared assassination.”
The report concluded that Qadhafi probably had “only a slightly better than even chance of staying in power through the end of this year.“  The report did not speculate who his successor would be, or if his successor would be better or worse for US interests.
So long?
If the Reagan administration’s goal was regime change in Libya (it did after all bomb Qadhafi’s home), I posit that Operation El Dorado Canyon may have had the opposite effect.  Qadhafi may have manipulated the threat of a western invading force to cause the population of Libya to rally around – or at least acquiesce to – his leadership.  As seen in Mao’s China, the Kims’ Korea, the Ayatollahs’ Iran, Mugabe’s Zimbabwe, and Saddam’s Iraq, despots often utilize the threat – real or imagined– of the United States to solidify their power.
After outliving the odds presented by the CIA briefers, Qadhafi also outlived the Soviet Union.  After the  Cold War ended Qadhafi began working to improve his relations with the west.
    * Libya eventually agreed to pay more than 2 billion dollars to compensate some victims of terrorism – including families of victims of the 1986 discoteque and 1988 Pan Am 103 bombings.
    * In 2003 Libya disclosed and dismantled its WMD program.  The US  removed it from the list of state sponsors of terrorism.
    * In 2007 Libya signed a lucrative – and controversial – oil deal with British Petroleum.
    * In September 2008 US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited Libya and lauded Qadhafi’s “strategic changes.”
    * And in February 2011, the International Monetary Fund praised Libya for its “ambitious reform agenda,” and lauded the “strong macroeconomic performance and the progress on enhancing the role of the private sector.”  Wow. Well, I guess he was financially savvy enough to turn down an offer from Bernie Madoff.
As Libya burns, it’s clear that Libyans were not satisfied with Qadafi’s – to quote the IMF – “ambitious reform agenda.”  What isn’t clear is whether or not the US campaign to isolate –and militarily  attack– Libya ultimately helped prop up Quadafi for four decades.  Perhaps isolation is the despot’s brier patch.
At any rate, I’ll give “better than even odds” that Qadhafi’s 42-year reign is about to end.  I wonder what the CIA thinks.

What a bunch of crap!!

On January 27, 2000, Congressman Frank Pallone introduced Resolution 406 in the House of Representatives, "expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that Pakistan should be designated as a state sponsor of terrorism."

The Department of State released the document with a box obliterating something on the top right of the page.

Barbara Elias, the Director of the National Security Archive’s Afghanistan/Pakistan/Taliban Documentation Project filed an appeal with the Department of State’s Appeals Review Panel to know what the US diplomacy had to hide.

What was in the text/comment in the box?  

Two years later, Elias finally won her appeal and to her surprise, she found a few words written: “What a bunch of crap!!”

The blog of the National Security Archives commented: "I had a hearty chuckle, finding it quite funny that 1) a person employed by the Department of State (I don’t know who– are there any graphologists out there?) would write “bunch of crap!!” on a copy of a House resolution, and 2) that the Department of State had tried so hard to prevent the public from knowing it had ever happened."

Well, it is telling of the US State Department's attitude towards Pakistan and terrorism. 

Is it different after September 2001? Not sure.

106TH CONGRESS 2D SESSION 
H. RES. 406

Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that Pakistan should be designated as a state sponsor of terrorism.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
JANUARY 27, 2000 Mr. PALLONE (for himself and Mr. MCCOLLUM) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on International Relations

RESOLUTION
Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that Pakistan should be designated as a state sponsor of terrorism.
Whereas reliable reports from Western media sources have cited Pakistan as a base and training ground for terrorist groups, and the Pakistani Government’s demonstrated reluctance to halt the use of its soil for terrorist organizations;
Whereas media reports have implicated Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) directly in terrorist activities, as well as the international drug trade;
Whereas a large number of terrorist organizations, such as the Harkat-ul-Ansar (later re-named Harkat-ul-Mujahideen), Lashkar-e-Toiba, Hizbul Mujahideen, Hizbe Wahdat, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Sipah-e-Mohammad Pakistan, and Al Badr are based and receive support from Pakistan;
Whereas the Harkat-ul-Ansar, a terrorist organization based in Pakistan, was declared a foreign terrorist organization by the U.S. Department of State in 1997;
Whereas the hijackers of the Indian Airlines plane in December 1999 were identified as being part of the Harakatul-Mujahideen, and among the hijackers’ demands were the release of the organization’s former General Secretary, Masood Azhar, who hails from Pakistan, and other jailed Pakistani militants;
Whereas during the December 1999 hijacking incident, it was reported that Indian intelligence intercepted satellite telephone conversations between militant groups in Kashmir that confirmed Pakistan had links to the hijackers;
Whereas it has been reported that, after the resolution of the crisis, the hijackers left Afghanistan for Pakistan;
Whereas this organization is linked to the militant movement waging a campaign of terror and violence against both military and civilian targets in an effort to end Indian governance of Kashmir;
Whereas this organization has been reported to be behind the kidnapping of four Western tourists in Kashmir, two of whom were murdered and two others, including an American, still remain missing;
Whereas the Lasjkar-e-Toiba, a terrorist organization based in Pakistan, is currently reviewed by the U.S. Department of State as a foreign terrorist organization;
Whereas Pakistan is one of three countries to recognize the Taliban in Afghanistan;
Whereas the Taliban, which has been declared a foreign terrorist organization by the U.S. Department of State, has provided refuge and assistance to Osama Bin Laden;
Whereas the U.S. Department of State has declared Osama Bin Laden and associates as a foreign terrorist organization;
Whereas Pakistan has hindered U.S. and international efforts to apprehend Osama Bin Laden;
Whereas Pakistan was placed on the U.S. Department of State’s ‘‘watch list’’ of suspected state sponsors of inter-national terrorism in 1993;
Whereas in November 1979, according to the U.S. Department of State, the Government of Pakistan allowed for the U.S. Embassy and the American Cultural Center in Pakistan to be destroyed by fire, which led to the death of two Americans;
Whereas the perpetrators of the terrorist attacks at the World Trade Center in New York and at the Central Intelligence Agency headquarters in Langley, Virginia, who were Pakistani nationals, were found in Pakistan;
Whereas three Pakistani nationals, who were closely linked to Osama Bin Laden, were arrested in 1995 in Manila, Philippines, in connection with an alleged plot to kill Pope Paul II;
Whereas Americans and other Westerners have been the victims of attacks in Pakistan, including a November 12, 1999, rocket attack on the United States Embassy in the Pakistani capital of Islamabad, and a March 8, 1995, attack in Karachi, Pakistan, in which two United States diplomats were killed and a third wounded;
Whereas Pakistan has acknowledged its ‘‘political and moral’’ support of the separatist movement in Kashmir; Whereas, pursuant to the Export Administration Act of 1979, the Secretary of State of the United States designates the governments of certain nations as having repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism; and Whereas Members of Congress have called on the President and the Secretary of State to place Pakistan on Watch List of nations which support terrorism: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the House of Representatives, That—

(1)    the Secretary of State, pursuant to the Export Administration Act should designate the Islamic Republic of Pakistan as a country, the government of which has repeatedly provided support for international terrorism; and
(2)    in addition to terrorist organizations themselves, those countries that harbor terrorist organizations or provide them with technical, financial, political or other support should also be held accountable; and
(3)    that, given the shared threat that the United States and other countries face from international terrorist organizations, the State Department is urged to explore ways to keep up U.S. co-operation with those countries in the struggle against terrorism