An African Electoral Campaign?

My article An African Electoral Campaign? has been published by Geopolitics. It is available online by clicking here.

If France can intervene in Libya, why not in China

At the end of April, when President Sarkozy completed four years in office, his website published a series of reports entitled: 'Four years of Action'.
One of these reports, dedicated to the French Foreign Policy, says: "The foreign policy conducted over the past four years has helped make France stronger and more influential on the international stage. France is fully committed to peace and world security. ...France plays a lead role in tackling the major global challenges. Everywhere, she defends the interests of France and the French."
But, what are the interests of France?

Take the case of Africa
Since the beginning of the year, world events have taken an unexpected turn. Until recently, nobody had ever imagined popular revolutions in the Arab world. Who could have expected a year ago that Presidents Ben Ali or Mubarak would be thrown out by 'common men'?
Events went so fast that the French Government was caught on the wrong foot. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alliot-Marie had gone holidaying to Tunisia, enjoying the hospitality from a close associate of President Ben Ali who till then was a great friend of France.
Alliot-Marie had eventually to resign for not having sensed the change of wind, but for President Sarkozy the episode was a serious reminder that the Presidential elections were barely 14 months away; his popularity had reached a historical low with a large majority of French disapproving of his policies and Marine Le Pen, the extreme right candidate, doing better than him in the surveys for the 2012 Presidential elections.
Was he not defending the interests of the French people? It is probably why he decided to take a more belligerent stand.
The grim situation in Ivory Coast was the first occasion for Sarkozy to show La Grandeur (greatness) of France. The Libyan 'revolution' against a 'tyrant' was the next.
In Libya, the situation was more complicated than in the Western African country and the (oil) stakes are higher.
Remember 2007. Gaddafi had planted his tent not far from the Elysees Presidential Palace; the Libyan leader was said to be 'a bastion of secularism in the Arab world' and 'a great friend of France'.
When Rama Yade, the junior minister of Foreign Affairs said that "tyrants were wiping their bloodied boots on the doormats of France", she was severely reprimanded by the Presidency and eventually dismissed.
The President probably had this in mind (as well as the Alliot-Marie Tunisian blunder) when he decided to push for a UN resolution on Libya. If the French President's advisors thought it would be easy, they were wrong.
On 17 March 2011, the United Nations Security Council agreed to Resolution 1973 introduced by France and UK. It was passed by a 10-0 margin and five abstentions (the BRICS nations, minus South Africa and Germany abstained). Resolution 1973 imposed a no-fly zone over Libya and authorized the use of all necessary means, except a 'foreign occupation force', to protect civilians and civilian-populated areas.
Already many doubted that it would be easy to dislodge Gaddafi and some warned that the new coalition could get bogged down in a new Iraq or Afghanistan-like War. But Sarkozy and Cameron were too impatient in wanting to take revenge on the 'tyrant'.
Sarkozy was in so such of a hurry that military actions are said to have informally started two days before the UN Resolution when a French plane opened fire and destroyed an armed vehicle on Libyan soil. To stop Gaddafi seemed a child's game at that time.
Unfortunately for the Allies, the Libyan troops faithful to the Colonel adapted and soon after the destruction of their main air-defense system; they began to use guerilla warfare with ordinary vehicles indiscernible by the NATO satellites.
While the pro-Gaddafi troops have a leader and a military tactic, it is often not the case for the insurgents. Six weeks after the first strikes, Gaddafi is still around.
Despite the grand show and tall claims of Bernard-Henri Levy, the self-styled French philosopher-turned war advisor of Sarkozy, the 'rebels' are not a homogenous group and do not represent all the Libyans.
A French defence expert wrote on his blog: "We, French have too much contempt for our enemies. Did we expect that they will just run away after the first passage of a fighter plane in the sky?"
The other difficulty is that the coalition is extremely fragile, with the United States having partly abandoned the boat and others increasingly reluctant to go after Gaddafi.
Since then, Sarkozy, the Chef de guerre has become more lonely; though the British and the Italians are still on board, other coalition members play a minor role, while nations such as the BRICS are dead against any intervention (though the Indian PM asked his BRICS' colleagues to remember that recent events in the Arab world 'represented a shift of power to the ordinary citizen').

The Military operations
In this nightmarish situation, there is a positive aspect for Paris. The Rafale has done quite well, somehow better than the Typhoon (also known as Eurofighter), its remaining rival in the 126 MMRCA tender of the Indian Air Force.
The Eurofighters often remained on their bases; they were not 'polyvalent' enough according to some French defence sources (being more a combat aircraft than a 'bomber').
A French defence blogger analyzed: "The timing of the warlike adventure against Gaddafi is perfect, just a few days before the announcement of a short list for the MMRCA contact."
It did not probably influence the IAF which had completed its assessment much earlier, but there is no doubt that the outcome of the 'Libyan war' will be studied closely in Delhi as curiously both the planes involved in the Libyan operations have been preselected by the IAF for 126 MMRCA, the 'contract of the century'.
With the French and the British taking the main lead, one of the main issues was that they could soon run out of bombs. An article in The Washington Time (NATO runs short on some munitions in Libya) affirmed: "Less than a month into the Libyan conflict, NATO is running short of precision bombs, highlighting the limitations of Britain, France and other European countries in sustaining even a relatively small military action over an extended period of time."
This demonstrates the limits of the ability by European nations to conduct a sky-war. The problem was summed up by the same newspaper: "Although the United States has significant stockpiles, its munitions do not fit on the British and French-made planes that have flown the bulk of the missions."
These are some of the difficulties that an unprepared operation can face. One of the reasons offered for President Sarkozy's present unpopularity is his 'impetuosity'. Libya is a typical case.
The Libyan situation will probably not end soon. Gaddafi has still many supporters amongst tribal chiefs in Libya while several African heads of State who have been 'sponsored' by him in the past still respect him. This shows the limit of an 'interventionist' policy.
Further, there are plenty of tyrants on the planet, which one to chose? Should Western democracies also intervene in Syria, in Yemen, in Iran? And why not in China where the Tibetans are badly treated? President Sarkozy's advisors should have thought about this earlier.
For the French President the real issue is: How can he come out of the quagmire without losing face and points in the surveys?
It is nearly impossible, if the war goes on.

Chances of toppling Qadhafi are better than ever

The National Security Archives Blog publishes some 'historic' documents on Qadhafi.
Two days ago, I wrote about the poor 'intelligence' of the French (soon former) Minister of Foreign Affairs who went on a 'private' visit to Tunisia when the popular revolution had already started.
The assessment of the US Directorate of Intelligence demonstrates that the Americans, like the French can be totally wrong in their assessment about an actual situation.
Twenty five years ago, the CIA believed that the chances of toppling Qadhafi (see below for the 53 different spellings) were excellent. What has happened then?
The problem is perhaps that the Western powers prefer to work with Ben Alis or Qadhafis or even ISI's generals in Pakistan or even a Politburo in China than with a democratic elected government. 
Dictators, tyrants, military rulers are considered more 'stable'. 
Take India for example. it is so difficult to understand who is ruling and who should be 'influenced' to get a decision through. 'Democracy' seems to confuse great powers.
Another moral of the story: a 'sage' said that God will come when wisemen eat and sleep (and they will not notice God), so perhaps the tyrants will fall when the CIA or the DGSE sleeps and the ministers  enjoy their lives.

CIA Assessed: “Chances of Toppling Qadhafi at Better than Even” …More than 25 Years Ago!
National Security Archives Blog
February 25, 2011
by Nate Jones
In 1985, a CIA Directorate of Intelligence Report entitled, “Qadhafi’s Prospects for Survival” painted a bleak picture for Colonel Qadhafi’s continued rule of Libya.  The report concluded that if dissidents and the military joined forces, “we assess their chances of toppling Qadhafi at better than even.“  I guess being 26 years off isn’t sooo bad.
Glad I didn't take that bet.
Of course, Qadhafi outlived the CIA’s projection.  In fact, after taking power in his 1969 coup, he is currently the longest-serving non-royal ruler in the world.  (Paul Biya, of Cameroon, is next in line for the title –should things keep going the way they are.)
Before I get too far along, I guess I should explain that I am spelling Qadhafi this way because that’s how his name comes up in the CIA reports.  He’s actually quite tricky to research because each agency spells his name differently –Department of State spells it Gaddafi– making full-text searches a tough task.   The Library of Congress lists 53 alternative spellings for his name.  His personal website – down at the moment – is algathafi.org.  There are rumors that he signed a letter to a bunch of Minnesota second graders, “Moammar El-Gadhafi.”  But I digress, we’re going with “Qadhafi” in this blog post.
Qadhafi’s four-decade reign has not been uninteresting.  Upon seizing power after his coup, Qadhafi promoted himself from captain to colonel, but no higher.  Following the example set by of Egypt’s Gamal Nasser, Qadhafi claimed that he did not need a grandiose title since Libya was actually ruled by the people.   Of course Qadhafi later took the meek mantle: “Brother Leader and Guide of the Revolution.”  He also eventually established what is referred to as an “Amazon Guard” of reportedly elite, beautiful women soldiers.  Thanks to wikileaks, we know he is reliant upon Galyna, his “voluptuous blond” Ukrainian nurse.
After Nasser’s death, the pan-Arabist Qadhafi tried establish a “Federation of Arab Republics” between Libya, Egypt, Syria, and Sudan.  After working on if for five years (1972 to 1977) the Federation finally fizzled.  Qadhafi was initially an ardent supporter of the Palestinian Liberation Organization and shunned countries (including Egypt) who warmed to the west.  Libya eventually allied with the Soviet Union.  It was the first county outside the Soviet bloc to receive the USSR’s supersonic MiG-25.
Qadhafi was a well-known supporter of liberation movements – and terrorism.  He financed the Black September Movement which killed 12 at the 1972 Munich Olympics, collaborated with Carlos the Jackal, was accused of selling arms to the Provisional IRA and FARC, and was behind the 5 April 1986 discotheque bombing in West Berlin that killed two US officers and a Turkish woman, and injured more than 200 people, many of whom were US soldiers.
Which brings us back to the 1985 CIA intelligence report proclaiming Qadhafi’s weakness.  After the discotheque bombing, Reagan publicly proclaimed that Qadhafi – who was supporting the US adversary Iran in the Iran-Iraq War – was the “mad dog of the Middle East.” Days later, the President authorized  Operation El Dorodo Canyon, a 15 April 1986 joint US Marine, Navy, and Air strike against five sites in Libya, including Bab al-Aziza, where Qadhafi and his family lived.
No doubt Reagan’s National Security Counsel was aware of the CIA assessment that implied Qadhafi’s grip on power was tenuous as it recommended the attack.  The strike missed Qadhafi, but did kill his adopted daughter.  A 2008 report claimed that Qadhafi fled his home at Bab al-Aziza minutes before the attack after receiving a phone call from the Prime Minister of Malta warning that US planes were heading toward Libya.
A second, 17 May 1986, CIA Directorate of Intelligence Report entitled “Qadhafi’s Political Position Since the Airstrike” argued that the strikes had further damaged the Libyan people’s support for Qadhafi.  The report stated that continued international pressure could “further erode Qadhafi’s already diminished sense of self-esteem since the strike.”
To bolster its arguments, the report cited:
    * That “the funeral procession in Tripoli for those killed in the US strike attracted only several thousand marchers out of a local population of about 900,000.”
    * That “many Libyans hope US pressure will eventually result in Qadhafi’s removal.”  (The sources for this statement are redacted.)
    * And that Qadhafi chose to give a 11 June speech on television, rather than in public, “almost certainly because he feared assassination.”
The report concluded that Qadhafi probably had “only a slightly better than even chance of staying in power through the end of this year.“  The report did not speculate who his successor would be, or if his successor would be better or worse for US interests.
So long?
If the Reagan administration’s goal was regime change in Libya (it did after all bomb Qadhafi’s home), I posit that Operation El Dorado Canyon may have had the opposite effect.  Qadhafi may have manipulated the threat of a western invading force to cause the population of Libya to rally around – or at least acquiesce to – his leadership.  As seen in Mao’s China, the Kims’ Korea, the Ayatollahs’ Iran, Mugabe’s Zimbabwe, and Saddam’s Iraq, despots often utilize the threat – real or imagined– of the United States to solidify their power.
After outliving the odds presented by the CIA briefers, Qadhafi also outlived the Soviet Union.  After the  Cold War ended Qadhafi began working to improve his relations with the west.
    * Libya eventually agreed to pay more than 2 billion dollars to compensate some victims of terrorism – including families of victims of the 1986 discoteque and 1988 Pan Am 103 bombings.
    * In 2003 Libya disclosed and dismantled its WMD program.  The US  removed it from the list of state sponsors of terrorism.
    * In 2007 Libya signed a lucrative – and controversial – oil deal with British Petroleum.
    * In September 2008 US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited Libya and lauded Qadhafi’s “strategic changes.”
    * And in February 2011, the International Monetary Fund praised Libya for its “ambitious reform agenda,” and lauded the “strong macroeconomic performance and the progress on enhancing the role of the private sector.”  Wow. Well, I guess he was financially savvy enough to turn down an offer from Bernie Madoff.
As Libya burns, it’s clear that Libyans were not satisfied with Qadafi’s – to quote the IMF – “ambitious reform agenda.”  What isn’t clear is whether or not the US campaign to isolate –and militarily  attack– Libya ultimately helped prop up Quadafi for four decades.  Perhaps isolation is the despot’s brier patch.
At any rate, I’ll give “better than even odds” that Qadhafi’s 42-year reign is about to end.  I wonder what the CIA thinks.