The planet is passing through difficult times. Even the most optimistic are aware that the environment is degrading fast and it may be difficult to stop the ecological downfall; at the same time, one has rarely seen so much tension among nations.
There are however solid reasons to hope that global solutions can be found through dialogue. One such occasion is the yearly G20 (or Group of Twenty).
Collectively, the G20 economies amount for some 85% of the gross world product, 80% of world trade and two-thirds of the world population.
The G20 came into existence during the 2008 planetary financial crisis, when the world leaders had no choice but to collectively address issues.
Before his departure for Buenos Aires, Prime Minister Narendra Modi stated: “The G-20 seeks to promote multi-faceted cooperation among the twenty largest economies of the world. Through the ten years of its existence, G-20 has strived to promote stable and sustainable global growth.”
Though the theme of the Summit was “Building Consensus for Fair and Sustainable Development”, the world press was mainly excited about the ‘Dinner’.
Chinese President Xi Jinping was sharing a supper with his mercurial US counterpart, who has given him sleepless nights since several months, trying to ‘rebalance’ the world economy and principally the trade between the two largest world economies.
The South China Morning Post wrote: “Chinese and American officials may have spent weeks preparing for the high-stakes summit between Xi Jinping and Donald Trump, but any hopes of resolving the current trade war may ultimately hinge on their personal chemistry.”
The ‘successful dinner’ was the first face-to-face meeting between the two leaders since Trump started a trade war with China.
More than the Summit itself, it is perhaps the sideline encounters which had to be watched, they could ultimately help redesigning the political geography of the planet.
One was of particular significance for India as well as Asia.
Narendra Modi met Donald Trump and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe for their first trilateral exchange to discuss major issues of global. It assumed significance at a time China is flexing its muscles in Asia, now known as the Indo-Pacific region.
After the meeting, Modi asserted that the three nations will "continue to work together on shared values. …If I put it diffirently, Japan, America, and India is ‘JAI’, meaning success. We are making a new beginning. …I believe, [JAI] will play a big role in promoting world peace and prosperity.”
While the Indian Prime Minister spoke of the convergence of vision between the three nations, Abe affirmed that he was happy to participate in the ‘first ever JAI trilateral’; as for Trump, he appreciated India's growth story.
The three leaders noted their cooperation on all global issues such as better connectivity, sustainable development, counter-terrorism and maritime and cyber security.
As another strong message to China, the JAI leaders spoke in a free, open, conclusive and rule-based order in the Indo-Pacific region, based on respect for international law and peaceful resolution of all differences.
Let us remember that China claims almost all of the South China Sea, rejecting the counterclaims of Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan.
It is today crucial for Delhi to ‘balance’ China, who has shown strong hegemonic tendencies, particularly in the South China Sea …and on Indian borders.
Modi, Trump and Abe have now agreed to cooperate in various ways and they stressed the importance to continue with the ‘Trilateral Format’ at multilateral conferences.
Incidentally, a RIC (Russia, India and China) meeting also took place and Modi had earlier a good meeting with Xi Jinping.
Delhi bats for pragmatic multilateralism, while defending its own interests.
Showing posts with label Shinzo Abe. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Shinzo Abe. Show all posts
Monday, December 3, 2018
Jai Jai Jai
Labels:
G-20,
India,
Japan,
Modi,
Shinzo Abe,
Trump,
United States
Monday, January 30, 2017
The important India-Japan Relations
On New Year’s Eve, President Xi Jinping issued a stern warning to China’s neighbours: "We adhere to peaceful development, and resolutely safeguard our territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests. Chinese people will never allow anyone to get away with making a great fuss about it.”
Not only were Japan, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam and Taiwan clearly targeted, but India too, with more than 4,000 km of land border with the Middle Kingdom.
The dual aspects of the relations
It is what Prime Minister Narendra Modi probably had in mind when he paid his maiden visit to Japan in August-September 2014; Delhi and Tokyo have a common ‘competitor’ in Beijing.
In November 2016, during the Indian PM’s second visit to the Land of the Rising Sun, the Joint Statement first pointed to another aspect, namely the ancient cultural links between the two nations. The two PMs “appreciated the deep civilisational links between the people of the two countries, including the common heritage of Buddhist thought,” it asserted, though there is more to the relationship; the two leaders: “underscored their shared commitment to democracy, openness, and the rule of law as key values to achieve peaceful co-existence. They welcomed the high degree of convergence in the political, economic and strategic interests of the two countries that provides an enduring basis for a long-term partnership.”
The cultural and geostrategic aspects may force the two nations to work even closer together in the future.
India-Japan cultural ties through history
The cultural and spiritual dimension will continue to remain the foundation of the relationship.
Not only Swami Vivekananda, Rabindranath Tagore or Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose, but many other Indians have been associated with and have been admirers of Japan. It is not a coincidence that the Japan-India Association, set up 113 years ago, is the oldest international friendship body in Japan.
Since civilisational contacts between India and Japan began some 1400 years ago (Buddhism was introduced to Japan in 538 CE), the two countries have never been adversaries. Bilateral ties have been singularly free of any kind of dispute – ideological, cultural or territorial.
During a lecture in Tokyo in 1916, Rabindranath Tagore told a Japanese audience: “the welcome… which flowed towards me, with such outburst of sincerity, was owing to the fact that Japan felt the nearness of India to herself, and realised that her own heart has room to expand beyond her boundaries and the boundaries of the modern time.”
Visva-Bharati was eventually the first Indian university to introduce Japanese language courses.
This setting will remain the backbone of the bilateral relations.
To come back to Modi’s first visit, Clint Richards wrote in The Diplomat: “While both leaders are keen to play up both their personal relationship and the size of the cooperation between the two countries, final agreement on key deals expected from the summit were lacking. While this does not mean the bilateral meeting was a failure, it does indicate that the two sides have a longer way to go.”
This visit was more a seed for the future, but the factor which accelerated the deepening of the partnership has been external: it is the irredentist presence of China in the neighbourhood.
The Chinese Factor
For long, Japan has been China’s favorite whipping boy.
When Tokyo published a Defence White Paper in 2015, Xinhua immediately asserted that the objective of the exercise was to “increasingly stir up the ‘China threat’ and create a tense atmosphere so as to strengthen its security policies, develop its defence system, and find an excuse for a closer Japan-U.S. military alliance.”
A Xinhua article noted: “Unlike previous years, this year's white paper placed the China 'threat' in a prominent position. …making the accusation that China's unilateral action is undermining the principle of freedom of navigation.”
It is unfortunately a fact.
It has been remarkably shown by Dr Monika Chansoria in her book Steering Asia to stability, China, Japan, and Senkaku Islands. She writes: “Changing the territorial status quo has been the unfinished business of the People’s Republic of China since its founding in 1949, when it set out to forcibly absorb the sprawling Xinjiang and Tibetan plateau - actions that increased the landmass of China by 44 per cent.”
The scholarly author continues: “Underlining the fact that China does not apply the rule of law at home, its ingenious principle to covet neighbours' territories is: ‘what IS ours is ours and what is yours is negotiable’.”
India has been at the receiving end of China’s attitude since Independence particularly in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh.
Chansoria quotes Maj Gen Zhang Zhaozhong of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), who mentions the ‘cabbabe’ strategy; it involves “asserting a claim, launching furtive incursions into the coveted territory, and erecting - one at a time - cabbage-style multiple layers of security around a contested area to deny access to a rival.”
In other words, you grab what you want or what you need for your security, cover it with a few ‘security layers’ and then offer ‘friendly’ discussions to the opposite party.
Beijing’s attitude has certainly brought Japan and India closer.
The November 2016 Visit: Multiple Partnerships
As Modi was leaving for Japan for his second visit, he tweeted that it would not to be an ordinary visit: Narendra Modi and his Japanese counterpart were to undertake a comprehensive review of the Special Strategic and Global Partnership outlined in the ‘India and Japan Vision 2025’ which was set forth in December 2015 during Abe’s visit to India. Modi has then tweeted “India is all set to welcome its great friend & a phenomenal leader, PM@AbeShinzo. His visit will further deepen India-Japan.”
The Joint Statement mentions myriad diverse projects with the ‘partnership’ in the background; the different sections emphasize ‘Synergising the Partnership’, ‘Building a Stronger Partnership for Safer and Stable World’, ‘Partnership for Prosperity’, ‘Working together for a cleaner and greener future’, ‘Laying the Foundation of a Future-oriented Partnership’, ‘Investing in People for a Durable Partnership’.
The partnership should take a very concrete shape with ‘the Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy’, the highlight of the visit. It reflects “a new level of mutual confidence and strategic partnership in the cause of clean energy, economic development and a peaceful and secure world,” says the Statement.
On the ground, it may take time to materialize (like the US and French ‘nuclear deals’), but the symbolic foundation is now set.
When the two leaders reaffirmed their commitment “to work together for India to become a full member in the remaining three international export control regimes”, including India’s entry in the Nuclear Suppliers Group, Beijing was not pleased, but is it not legitimate for India and Japan to see their own interests first?
It is possible that this move triggered a harder line from China, especially the last section of the Statement which talks of “Working Jointly for Strengthening Rules-based International Order in the Indo-Pacific Region and Beyond,” but this is part of the Great Game of geopolitics.
The results of the US elections may have also played a role in the coming together of Japan and India. Former Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal wrote: “The Modi-Abe summit in Tokyo was important in itself for consolidating bilateral ties, but gained value as it took place in the shadow of Donald Trump's election to the American presidency.”
The Modi visit occurred soon after Donald Trump was elected as the next US President. Trump’s arrival on the world scene brings a lot of uncertainties and may open the doors to deep changes in the political equation in Asia (incidentally, Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, was the first foreign leader to rush to meet Trump, probably to get reassurance from Japan’s first ally). There is no doubt that in the new era of incertitude, Japan will need to work closely with India.
The Future of the Relationship
Even if only a few of the ‘partnerships’ mentioned earlier, materialize in the next couple of years, it will be a great step forward.
Defence is certainly an area were the collaboration could go a step deeper.
The two defence framework agreements on the transfer of defence equipment and technology and on security measures for the protection of classified military information can now be implemented.
The most promising development for India is the purchase US-2 amphibian planes from Japan to improve the Indian Navy’s surveillance capabilities. Modi noted that it symbolizes the high degree of trust between the two countries.
According to The Financial Times (FT): “The US-2 amphibian planes are known not only for their prowess in search and rescue operations, but also as a great addition to any country’s Navy in terms of surveillance.”
Developed by ShinMaywa of Japan, it is claimed to be the world’s best short takeoff and landing (STOL) amphibian aircraft, which can land on rough seas with a metre high waves. The FT added: “it will deepen the strategic partnership with Japan, but also it would send a message to China.”
The $1.65 billion defence deal needs now to be cleared by the Defence Acquisitions Council (DAC).
This type of defence collaboration should be encouraged and developed further.
Infrastructure Development
Japan has pledged to support India in its ambitious plan to develop infrastructure in the North-East.
The Official Development Assistance (ODA) provides bilateral aid consisting of concessional loans and grants, to developing countries.
The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), which coordinates the ODA’s projects has pledged for India an amount of 242.2 billion yen (some Rs 14,000 crores), out of which 67.1 billion yen are earmarked as loan assistance to the North East Road Network Connectivity Improvement Project.
The ODA projects are to identify technologies, infrastructure, and strategies to facilitate development. Tokyo has also agreed in principle to fund many critical Greenfield highway projects in Northeast India. The JICA is involved in a 400 km highway stretch in Mizoram between Aizawl and Tuipang; a 150 km highway in Meghalaya; two projects in Manipur; and one each in Tripura, Nagaland and Assam.
Could this scheme be extended to other Indian borders such as Arunachal, Sikkim and Ladakh? It would be an interesting collaboration which would bring an even brighter prospect to future bilateral relations.
During his visit to India in January 2015, Fumio Kishida, the Japanese Foreign Minister said that Tokyo considered Arunachal Pradesh as a part of India. The Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Hong Lei saw red, "We are seriously concerned about this and have lodged serious representation with the Japanese side. We hope Japan can fully understand the sensitivity of China-India border issues."
A few months later, in response to a question about the JICA financing projects in Arunachal Pradesh, Shinya Ejima, JICA’s chief representative in India asserted: "It depends upon the decision first by the Indian government and also the government of Japan. But, as far as JICA is concerned, I don't think there's any problem in Arunachal."
An enlarged collaboration in this field would make great strategic and technical sense.
Bhutan
Other small actions could be envisaged; just to cite one, the deepening of the relations between Bhutan and Japan could indirectly enhance the Indo-Nippon partnership. Japan through the JICA has been supporting the concept of Gross National Happiness (GNH). This type of support could be widened.
Though Japan has no official embassy in Thimphu, year 2016 marked the 30th anniversary of the establishment of relations between Japan and Bhutan.
India should encourage Bhutan and Japan to work out a greater collaboration for the sustainable development of the ‘happy’ Himalayan kingdom.
There are numerous areas of Indo-Japan collaboration; and fortunately, the profound trust between India and Japan, probably due to great civilizational and geopolitical convergences, will translate into a very special partnership in the future.
The fact that the present Foreign Secretary is married to a Japanese could be the symbol of this blooming relationship.
Not only were Japan, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam and Taiwan clearly targeted, but India too, with more than 4,000 km of land border with the Middle Kingdom.
The dual aspects of the relations
It is what Prime Minister Narendra Modi probably had in mind when he paid his maiden visit to Japan in August-September 2014; Delhi and Tokyo have a common ‘competitor’ in Beijing.
In November 2016, during the Indian PM’s second visit to the Land of the Rising Sun, the Joint Statement first pointed to another aspect, namely the ancient cultural links between the two nations. The two PMs “appreciated the deep civilisational links between the people of the two countries, including the common heritage of Buddhist thought,” it asserted, though there is more to the relationship; the two leaders: “underscored their shared commitment to democracy, openness, and the rule of law as key values to achieve peaceful co-existence. They welcomed the high degree of convergence in the political, economic and strategic interests of the two countries that provides an enduring basis for a long-term partnership.”
The cultural and geostrategic aspects may force the two nations to work even closer together in the future.
India-Japan cultural ties through history
The cultural and spiritual dimension will continue to remain the foundation of the relationship.
Not only Swami Vivekananda, Rabindranath Tagore or Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose, but many other Indians have been associated with and have been admirers of Japan. It is not a coincidence that the Japan-India Association, set up 113 years ago, is the oldest international friendship body in Japan.
Since civilisational contacts between India and Japan began some 1400 years ago (Buddhism was introduced to Japan in 538 CE), the two countries have never been adversaries. Bilateral ties have been singularly free of any kind of dispute – ideological, cultural or territorial.
During a lecture in Tokyo in 1916, Rabindranath Tagore told a Japanese audience: “the welcome… which flowed towards me, with such outburst of sincerity, was owing to the fact that Japan felt the nearness of India to herself, and realised that her own heart has room to expand beyond her boundaries and the boundaries of the modern time.”
Visva-Bharati was eventually the first Indian university to introduce Japanese language courses.
This setting will remain the backbone of the bilateral relations.
To come back to Modi’s first visit, Clint Richards wrote in The Diplomat: “While both leaders are keen to play up both their personal relationship and the size of the cooperation between the two countries, final agreement on key deals expected from the summit were lacking. While this does not mean the bilateral meeting was a failure, it does indicate that the two sides have a longer way to go.”
This visit was more a seed for the future, but the factor which accelerated the deepening of the partnership has been external: it is the irredentist presence of China in the neighbourhood.
The Chinese Factor
For long, Japan has been China’s favorite whipping boy.
When Tokyo published a Defence White Paper in 2015, Xinhua immediately asserted that the objective of the exercise was to “increasingly stir up the ‘China threat’ and create a tense atmosphere so as to strengthen its security policies, develop its defence system, and find an excuse for a closer Japan-U.S. military alliance.”
A Xinhua article noted: “Unlike previous years, this year's white paper placed the China 'threat' in a prominent position. …making the accusation that China's unilateral action is undermining the principle of freedom of navigation.”
It is unfortunately a fact.
It has been remarkably shown by Dr Monika Chansoria in her book Steering Asia to stability, China, Japan, and Senkaku Islands. She writes: “Changing the territorial status quo has been the unfinished business of the People’s Republic of China since its founding in 1949, when it set out to forcibly absorb the sprawling Xinjiang and Tibetan plateau - actions that increased the landmass of China by 44 per cent.”
The scholarly author continues: “Underlining the fact that China does not apply the rule of law at home, its ingenious principle to covet neighbours' territories is: ‘what IS ours is ours and what is yours is negotiable’.”
India has been at the receiving end of China’s attitude since Independence particularly in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh.
Chansoria quotes Maj Gen Zhang Zhaozhong of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), who mentions the ‘cabbabe’ strategy; it involves “asserting a claim, launching furtive incursions into the coveted territory, and erecting - one at a time - cabbage-style multiple layers of security around a contested area to deny access to a rival.”
In other words, you grab what you want or what you need for your security, cover it with a few ‘security layers’ and then offer ‘friendly’ discussions to the opposite party.
Beijing’s attitude has certainly brought Japan and India closer.
The November 2016 Visit: Multiple Partnerships
As Modi was leaving for Japan for his second visit, he tweeted that it would not to be an ordinary visit: Narendra Modi and his Japanese counterpart were to undertake a comprehensive review of the Special Strategic and Global Partnership outlined in the ‘India and Japan Vision 2025’ which was set forth in December 2015 during Abe’s visit to India. Modi has then tweeted “India is all set to welcome its great friend & a phenomenal leader, PM@AbeShinzo. His visit will further deepen India-Japan.”
The Joint Statement mentions myriad diverse projects with the ‘partnership’ in the background; the different sections emphasize ‘Synergising the Partnership’, ‘Building a Stronger Partnership for Safer and Stable World’, ‘Partnership for Prosperity’, ‘Working together for a cleaner and greener future’, ‘Laying the Foundation of a Future-oriented Partnership’, ‘Investing in People for a Durable Partnership’.
The partnership should take a very concrete shape with ‘the Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy’, the highlight of the visit. It reflects “a new level of mutual confidence and strategic partnership in the cause of clean energy, economic development and a peaceful and secure world,” says the Statement.
On the ground, it may take time to materialize (like the US and French ‘nuclear deals’), but the symbolic foundation is now set.
When the two leaders reaffirmed their commitment “to work together for India to become a full member in the remaining three international export control regimes”, including India’s entry in the Nuclear Suppliers Group, Beijing was not pleased, but is it not legitimate for India and Japan to see their own interests first?
It is possible that this move triggered a harder line from China, especially the last section of the Statement which talks of “Working Jointly for Strengthening Rules-based International Order in the Indo-Pacific Region and Beyond,” but this is part of the Great Game of geopolitics.
The results of the US elections may have also played a role in the coming together of Japan and India. Former Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal wrote: “The Modi-Abe summit in Tokyo was important in itself for consolidating bilateral ties, but gained value as it took place in the shadow of Donald Trump's election to the American presidency.”
The Modi visit occurred soon after Donald Trump was elected as the next US President. Trump’s arrival on the world scene brings a lot of uncertainties and may open the doors to deep changes in the political equation in Asia (incidentally, Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, was the first foreign leader to rush to meet Trump, probably to get reassurance from Japan’s first ally). There is no doubt that in the new era of incertitude, Japan will need to work closely with India.
The Future of the Relationship
Even if only a few of the ‘partnerships’ mentioned earlier, materialize in the next couple of years, it will be a great step forward.
Defence is certainly an area were the collaboration could go a step deeper.
The two defence framework agreements on the transfer of defence equipment and technology and on security measures for the protection of classified military information can now be implemented.
The most promising development for India is the purchase US-2 amphibian planes from Japan to improve the Indian Navy’s surveillance capabilities. Modi noted that it symbolizes the high degree of trust between the two countries.
According to The Financial Times (FT): “The US-2 amphibian planes are known not only for their prowess in search and rescue operations, but also as a great addition to any country’s Navy in terms of surveillance.”
Developed by ShinMaywa of Japan, it is claimed to be the world’s best short takeoff and landing (STOL) amphibian aircraft, which can land on rough seas with a metre high waves. The FT added: “it will deepen the strategic partnership with Japan, but also it would send a message to China.”
The $1.65 billion defence deal needs now to be cleared by the Defence Acquisitions Council (DAC).
This type of defence collaboration should be encouraged and developed further.
Infrastructure Development
Japan has pledged to support India in its ambitious plan to develop infrastructure in the North-East.
The Official Development Assistance (ODA) provides bilateral aid consisting of concessional loans and grants, to developing countries.
The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), which coordinates the ODA’s projects has pledged for India an amount of 242.2 billion yen (some Rs 14,000 crores), out of which 67.1 billion yen are earmarked as loan assistance to the North East Road Network Connectivity Improvement Project.
The ODA projects are to identify technologies, infrastructure, and strategies to facilitate development. Tokyo has also agreed in principle to fund many critical Greenfield highway projects in Northeast India. The JICA is involved in a 400 km highway stretch in Mizoram between Aizawl and Tuipang; a 150 km highway in Meghalaya; two projects in Manipur; and one each in Tripura, Nagaland and Assam.
Could this scheme be extended to other Indian borders such as Arunachal, Sikkim and Ladakh? It would be an interesting collaboration which would bring an even brighter prospect to future bilateral relations.
During his visit to India in January 2015, Fumio Kishida, the Japanese Foreign Minister said that Tokyo considered Arunachal Pradesh as a part of India. The Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Hong Lei saw red, "We are seriously concerned about this and have lodged serious representation with the Japanese side. We hope Japan can fully understand the sensitivity of China-India border issues."
A few months later, in response to a question about the JICA financing projects in Arunachal Pradesh, Shinya Ejima, JICA’s chief representative in India asserted: "It depends upon the decision first by the Indian government and also the government of Japan. But, as far as JICA is concerned, I don't think there's any problem in Arunachal."
An enlarged collaboration in this field would make great strategic and technical sense.
Bhutan
Other small actions could be envisaged; just to cite one, the deepening of the relations between Bhutan and Japan could indirectly enhance the Indo-Nippon partnership. Japan through the JICA has been supporting the concept of Gross National Happiness (GNH). This type of support could be widened.
Though Japan has no official embassy in Thimphu, year 2016 marked the 30th anniversary of the establishment of relations between Japan and Bhutan.
India should encourage Bhutan and Japan to work out a greater collaboration for the sustainable development of the ‘happy’ Himalayan kingdom.
There are numerous areas of Indo-Japan collaboration; and fortunately, the profound trust between India and Japan, probably due to great civilizational and geopolitical convergences, will translate into a very special partnership in the future.
The fact that the present Foreign Secretary is married to a Japanese could be the symbol of this blooming relationship.
Tuesday, September 2, 2014
India, Japan, China and the National Interest Triangle
My article India, Japan, China and the National Interest Triangle has appeared on NitiCentral.
Here is the link...
In the past, Delhi would have prevaricated and made sure that both Beijing and Tokyo were kept happy. Modi makes clear advances.
The Chinese edition of The People’s Daily recently published an Op-Ed by Shen Dingli, Deputy Director of the International Affairs Institute of Fudan University, who recommended that Beijing should define its enemies, allies, and friends on the basis of China’s national interests. This seems a logical proposition.
After Independence, many foreign observers thought that when it came to strategic thinking, there was something wrong with India’s DNA. Nehru’s India lived in nebulous ideals, incapable to define and implement the country’s national interests, while preaching about the ‘largest interest of world peace’.
There is nothing wrong with world peace, but the Indian approach has often created more mess (take the stoppage of the military operation in Kashmir in 1947-1948 or the non-intervention in Tibet in 1950-1951) and ultimately, more chaos, war and suffering followed.
Hopefully, under the Narendra Modi Government, a genetic mutation is taking place and India will slowly be able to ‘egoistically’ think about her own interests; a position which will eventually command much greater respect from the country’s friends and foes …and bring peace.
China had never had existentialist problems like India.
As Shen Dingli explains in the above–mentioned Op-Ed, the most practical way to define one’s own interests, is to distinguish between enemies and friends in international relations. Using the US as an example, Shen asks: Should America be classified among friends, allies, or foes? Then, he defines China’s most important core interests such as “national sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity, and national unity”.
Each country must define its own ‘core interests’; obviously, India’s interests are different from China’s.
The fact that the US dares to sell weapons to Taiwan and threatens to use force to interfere in China’s internal affairs [i.e. China’s claims in the South China and East China Seas], makes the US go straight into the ‘enemy’ category.
However, according to Shen, because ‘sustainable social economic development’ is also one of Beijing’s core interests and due to the close economic cooperation with the US during the past 30 years, Washington could also come under the ‘friend’ category. As a result, the US will be treated by China as a friend in certain domains and as an ‘enemy’ in others.
Shen believes that Japan’s relationship with China fits in the same categories as the US. He does not however mention India.
Now, take Narendra Modi’s visit to Japan. In one way, it is simpler: Japan is a ‘friend’. The ‘genetic’ novelty of India’s position is that Modi is not shy to say it, it is even heard (and not appreciated) by Japan’s powerful neighbour.
On the eve of his departure for Tokyo, the PM wrote:
“I am keenly looking forward to my three-day visit to Japan at the invitation of my good friend, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, for the Annual Summit between India and Japan.”
‘My good friend’ is clearly a message to Beijing. In the past, Delhi would have prevaricated and made sure that both Beijing and Tokyo were kept happy.
Now Modi clearly says:
“Japan is one of our closest partners in political, economic, security and cultural realms. It is a key regional and global partner for us. Between our countries, there is only goodwill and mutual admiration. Buddhism from India has inspired Japan for over a millennium. We in India similarly draw inspiration from Japan’s vanguard role as the fountainhead of Asia’s modernization, resurgence and rejuvenation.”
The relation with Tokyo is important to Delhi, and today it is clearly enunciated:
“We will explore how Japan can associate itself productively with my vision of inclusive development in India, including the transformation of India’s manufacturing, infrastructure sectors, energy and social sectors. We will discuss how to boost our defence and security cooperation, including in defence technology, equipment and industry.”
In the past, Delhi would have been shy to preeminently display the importance of this relation, so as not to ‘upset’ China. That is not the case anymore.
China does the same. On August 29, the website China Military Online reported that General Fan Changlong, the vice chairman of the Central Military Commission and China’s senior most Army General participated in a symposium on the occasion of the 120th anniversary of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. He stressed the importance:
“to deeply summarize and rethink the historical lessons of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 and undertake the historical responsibility of building a powerful Chinese military.”
He added that the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 left a profound trauma in China. It brought pain and sorrow to the Chinese nation and shame on the Chinese military:
“It is necessary to analyze the historical lessons of this war in an objective and dialectical way.”
China has always chosen its friends (and foes) according to its own economic or strategic interests. India too should ‘deeply summarise and rethink the historical lessons of the 1962 Sino-Indian War’.
China continues to select its ‘friends’ according to its interests. Between August 24 to 29, China hosted a ‘Peace Mission 2014’ with other States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Held at Zhurihe training base in Inner Mongolia, it is the largest joint military drill ever organised by China, according to Yang Yujun, a Chinese Defense Ministry spokesperson.
China is clearly looking for new friends in the region. It believes that it will help revive the ‘spirit’ of the New Silk Road, initiated by President Xi Jinping for “promoting economic cooperation, culture exchanges and friendly relationships” …and securing energy for China.
According to Xinhua, the proposal of ‘one belt and one road’ has brought new vibrancy to the cooperation among pan-Asia, Asia and Europe. But behind the rhetoric, the economic relations with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan are crucial to the Middle Kingdom’s energy policy.
Though Wang Ning, deputy chief of the PLA general staff and responsible for the drill, clarified that exercises are the sign of a new military alliance, it remains that Beijing needs the Central Asian States’ friendship to run its economic machine.
Officially, the drill only aims at countering ‘terrorist forces’, particularly the East Turkistan Islamic Movement, based in Xinjiang (and trained in Pakistan).
Yang stated that the exercise played an important role in deterring the ‘three evil forces’ of terrorism, separatism and extremism, safeguarding regional peace and stability and improving the military’s ability to coordinate the fight against terrorism.
The visit of Narendra Modi to Japan must be seen in this perspective: India, instead of the usual goody-goody attitude has for the first time decided to assert its national interests. It is crucial before President Xi’s visit to Delhi later this month.
In the meantime, President Xi Jinping has asked China’s military to think of technical and strategic ‘innovations’; he told his Politburo’s colleagues that the PLA must:
“strive to establish a new military doctrine, institutions, equipment systems, strategies and tactics and management modes for information warfare that had become central to modern combat.”
China will always be ready, similarly India should be.
By the way, is Islamabad a ‘friend’ or a ‘foe’ for Beijing? Difficult question, Mr Xi may be scratching his head!
Here is the link...
In the past, Delhi would have prevaricated and made sure that both Beijing and Tokyo were kept happy. Modi makes clear advances.
The Chinese edition of The People’s Daily recently published an Op-Ed by Shen Dingli, Deputy Director of the International Affairs Institute of Fudan University, who recommended that Beijing should define its enemies, allies, and friends on the basis of China’s national interests. This seems a logical proposition.
After Independence, many foreign observers thought that when it came to strategic thinking, there was something wrong with India’s DNA. Nehru’s India lived in nebulous ideals, incapable to define and implement the country’s national interests, while preaching about the ‘largest interest of world peace’.
There is nothing wrong with world peace, but the Indian approach has often created more mess (take the stoppage of the military operation in Kashmir in 1947-1948 or the non-intervention in Tibet in 1950-1951) and ultimately, more chaos, war and suffering followed.
Hopefully, under the Narendra Modi Government, a genetic mutation is taking place and India will slowly be able to ‘egoistically’ think about her own interests; a position which will eventually command much greater respect from the country’s friends and foes …and bring peace.
China had never had existentialist problems like India.
As Shen Dingli explains in the above–mentioned Op-Ed, the most practical way to define one’s own interests, is to distinguish between enemies and friends in international relations. Using the US as an example, Shen asks: Should America be classified among friends, allies, or foes? Then, he defines China’s most important core interests such as “national sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity, and national unity”.
Each country must define its own ‘core interests’; obviously, India’s interests are different from China’s.
The fact that the US dares to sell weapons to Taiwan and threatens to use force to interfere in China’s internal affairs [i.e. China’s claims in the South China and East China Seas], makes the US go straight into the ‘enemy’ category.
However, according to Shen, because ‘sustainable social economic development’ is also one of Beijing’s core interests and due to the close economic cooperation with the US during the past 30 years, Washington could also come under the ‘friend’ category. As a result, the US will be treated by China as a friend in certain domains and as an ‘enemy’ in others.
Shen believes that Japan’s relationship with China fits in the same categories as the US. He does not however mention India.
Now, take Narendra Modi’s visit to Japan. In one way, it is simpler: Japan is a ‘friend’. The ‘genetic’ novelty of India’s position is that Modi is not shy to say it, it is even heard (and not appreciated) by Japan’s powerful neighbour.
On the eve of his departure for Tokyo, the PM wrote:
“I am keenly looking forward to my three-day visit to Japan at the invitation of my good friend, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, for the Annual Summit between India and Japan.”
‘My good friend’ is clearly a message to Beijing. In the past, Delhi would have prevaricated and made sure that both Beijing and Tokyo were kept happy.
Now Modi clearly says:
“Japan is one of our closest partners in political, economic, security and cultural realms. It is a key regional and global partner for us. Between our countries, there is only goodwill and mutual admiration. Buddhism from India has inspired Japan for over a millennium. We in India similarly draw inspiration from Japan’s vanguard role as the fountainhead of Asia’s modernization, resurgence and rejuvenation.”
The relation with Tokyo is important to Delhi, and today it is clearly enunciated:
“We will explore how Japan can associate itself productively with my vision of inclusive development in India, including the transformation of India’s manufacturing, infrastructure sectors, energy and social sectors. We will discuss how to boost our defence and security cooperation, including in defence technology, equipment and industry.”
In the past, Delhi would have been shy to preeminently display the importance of this relation, so as not to ‘upset’ China. That is not the case anymore.
China does the same. On August 29, the website China Military Online reported that General Fan Changlong, the vice chairman of the Central Military Commission and China’s senior most Army General participated in a symposium on the occasion of the 120th anniversary of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. He stressed the importance:
“to deeply summarize and rethink the historical lessons of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 and undertake the historical responsibility of building a powerful Chinese military.”
He added that the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 left a profound trauma in China. It brought pain and sorrow to the Chinese nation and shame on the Chinese military:
“It is necessary to analyze the historical lessons of this war in an objective and dialectical way.”
China has always chosen its friends (and foes) according to its own economic or strategic interests. India too should ‘deeply summarise and rethink the historical lessons of the 1962 Sino-Indian War’.
China continues to select its ‘friends’ according to its interests. Between August 24 to 29, China hosted a ‘Peace Mission 2014’ with other States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Held at Zhurihe training base in Inner Mongolia, it is the largest joint military drill ever organised by China, according to Yang Yujun, a Chinese Defense Ministry spokesperson.
China is clearly looking for new friends in the region. It believes that it will help revive the ‘spirit’ of the New Silk Road, initiated by President Xi Jinping for “promoting economic cooperation, culture exchanges and friendly relationships” …and securing energy for China.
According to Xinhua, the proposal of ‘one belt and one road’ has brought new vibrancy to the cooperation among pan-Asia, Asia and Europe. But behind the rhetoric, the economic relations with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan are crucial to the Middle Kingdom’s energy policy.
Though Wang Ning, deputy chief of the PLA general staff and responsible for the drill, clarified that exercises are the sign of a new military alliance, it remains that Beijing needs the Central Asian States’ friendship to run its economic machine.
Officially, the drill only aims at countering ‘terrorist forces’, particularly the East Turkistan Islamic Movement, based in Xinjiang (and trained in Pakistan).
Yang stated that the exercise played an important role in deterring the ‘three evil forces’ of terrorism, separatism and extremism, safeguarding regional peace and stability and improving the military’s ability to coordinate the fight against terrorism.
The visit of Narendra Modi to Japan must be seen in this perspective: India, instead of the usual goody-goody attitude has for the first time decided to assert its national interests. It is crucial before President Xi’s visit to Delhi later this month.
In the meantime, President Xi Jinping has asked China’s military to think of technical and strategic ‘innovations’; he told his Politburo’s colleagues that the PLA must:
“strive to establish a new military doctrine, institutions, equipment systems, strategies and tactics and management modes for information warfare that had become central to modern combat.”
China will always be ready, similarly India should be.
By the way, is Islamabad a ‘friend’ or a ‘foe’ for Beijing? Difficult question, Mr Xi may be scratching his head!
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