Season of Coincidences and Change

Do you believe in coincidences?
Tenzin Gyatso, the 14th Dalai Lama reached Ladakh on July 15.
Two days later, the 16th round of Corps Commander-level meeting between India and China is to be held at Moldo/Chushul, near the Pangong tso (lake). Led by Lt Gen A Sengupta, the Fire and Fury Corps Commander, the Indian side will discuss disengagement from friction points along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Eastern Ladakh with the Chinese commander of the Kashgar Sub-Area Command of the Xinjiang Military District (XMD).
Was it a coincidence, but on July 6, Prime Minister Narendra Modi greeted the Dalai Lama over the phone on the occasion of his birthday: “Conveyed 87th birthday greetings to His Holiness the Dalai Lama over the phone earlier today. We pray for his long life and good health," PM Modi tweeted.
We can’t call everything a coincidence, but President Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) visited Urumqi, the capital of the restive Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR) two days before the Dalai Lama arrived in Ladakh. According to Xinhua, he inspected a university, an international land port area, a residential community and a museum.

The Dalai Lama in Ladakh
But let us first look at the Tibetan leader’s visit to Ladakh first.
The Chinese are not going to be happy, though they still consider the Union Territory as a ‘disputed territory’ between India and Pakistan and cannot claim it as their as they do for Arunachal Pradesh.
This reminds us the long negotiations for the so-called Panchsheel Agreement in 1954. The discussion was stuck on the issue of Ladakh and more particularly on naming Demchok a landport for the mountainous region.
On April 24, 1954, the Indian Ambassador to China, N. Raghavan, who was himself conducting the talks, informed his Foreign Secretary in Delhi (NR Pillai) that at the suggestion of Zhang Hanfu, the Chinese deputy foreign minister, the plenary sessions on the previous day had been cancelled “he and I carried on informal discussions between 12:00 and 13:00 hours and 19:00 to 23:15 hours.” Raghavan explained that it was ‘royal fight’ from beginning to end: “Zhang took a very recalcitrant attitude but finally gave in on most points,” …except for Demchok.
The Chinese virulently objected to this route been included in the Agreement; they quoted an oral understanding “they would not like in writing even by implication to have any reference to Ladakh.”
For Beijing, the mountainous region was a ‘disputed’ area.
India had taken the stand that Ladakh was part of Indian territory and the route should be mentioned, as its omission would be invidious, but the Chinese remained adamant.
Raghavan finally accepted a compromise which meant that most of the other routes between Ladakh and Western Tibet (particular via Rutok) were abandoned and the trade stopped. This anecdote shows the importance of Ladakh for Beijing (incidentally, the unresolved dispute over Demchok, dates from that day).

The PM’s Birthday Call
With regard to the one-month visit of the Tibetan leader to Leh, the spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China has so far kept quiet, but Zhao Lijian earlier protested about the Prime Minister’s phone call to the Dalai Lama: “The Indian side also needs to fully understand the anti-China and separatist nature of the 14th Dalai Lama. It needs to abide by its commitments to China on Tibet-related issues, act and speak with prudence and stop using Tibet-related issues to interfere in China's internal affairs."
External Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Arindam Bagchi immediately answered that it was “a consistent policy of the government to treat the Tibetan spiritual leader as an honoured guest and as a respected religious leader who enjoys a large following in India."
The fact that the Dalai Lama will stay for a month in Ladakh is definitively a re-assertion of India’s policy vis-à-vis the Tibetan leader.

Xi Jinping’s visit to Xinjiang and the 16th Round of Talks
Tough low-key, during his visit to Xinjiang, Xi meet with officials of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC), an organization intimately linked with the PLA. In the past, through its numerous economic activities the state-owned economic and paramilitary organization has not only built towns, farms and provided land and employment for disbanded military units, but also looked after the re-settlement of Han migrants as part of the infamous campaign of sinicization in Xinjiang.
Xi, who is Chairman of the Central Military Commission also met the top brass of the XMD, including Lt Gen Liu Lin, formerly responsible for the talks in Ladakh and now XMD’s Commander, a rising star in the PLA; they are bound to have discussed the forthcoming round of talks in Moldo/Chushul and the XMD has certainly received instructions from the Big Boss.
The 15th round China-India Corps Commander-Level Meeting had been held at the border meeting point on March 11, while the 14th round had taken place on January 12. Earlier, according to media reports, the PLA had pulled back troops from the Galwan valley, PP-15 (Patrolling Point 15) and Hot Springs in Eastern Ladakh area by 2-2.5 kms; the Indian side has consequently pulled back some of its troops and equipment from these areas.
Today it is doubtful if China will agree to a further disengagement from existing friction points in Depsang plains, Gogra and Demchok, especially a few months before the crucial 20th Congress in Beijing; too much is at stake for Xi Jinping. 

Change in India’s Policy?
Many observers see all this as a signal to China of a change in India's Tibet policy.
It is true that in the recent weeks, India has hardened its stance; for example the situation in Eastern Ladakh prominently figured in the talks between External Affairs Minister Dr Jaishankar and his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi in Bali on the sidelines of a conclave of foreign ministers of the G20 nations earlier this month (on July 6, the Dalai Lama’s birthday). During the encounter, Jaishankar strongly conveyed to Wang the need for an early resolution of the outstanding issues in Ladakh.
Back in India, Dr Jaishankar, while attending an interactive session with young voters said that India had explained: “We would like to resolve it on terms that are fair, equitable, mutually agreed upon and do justice to our claims. We can’t resolve it by having one country saying that this is the solution and for us to accept it.” This had been the case in 1954.
Here too, the tone seems to have changed.

The Season of Coincidences and Change
While entering the Season of Coincidences and Change, it is worth mentioning a bill recently introduced in US Congress. According to International Campaign for Tibet, it will be a ‘concrete action’ to resolve China’s decades-long illegal occupation of Tibet by fully recognizing Tibet’s unresolved status and faulting China for violating the Tibetan people’s right to self-determination.
The Act “Promoting a Resolution to the Tibet-China Conflict” affirms that Tibet’s legal status remains to be determined under international law, despite more than six decades of China’s illegal occupation and the Chinese government’s disinformation falsely claiming that Tibet has been part of China since ancient times.
If the legislation is passed by the Congress and the Senate, the official US policy will be that Tibetans have the right to self-determination.
Here again, the spokespersons of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing are bound to see red and be displeased.
The new policy would not only reject as ‘historically false’ China’s claim that Tibet has been part of China since ancient times, but also “make clear that Tibet includes not only the so-called Tibet Autonomous Region of China but also Tibetan areas of Gansu, Sichuan, Qinghai and Yunnan provinces.”
It is serious implications for the Tibet-India border too.
It will be interesting to see how Delhi will react in case the bill is passed.
Today, there is no doubt that the poet might have been right, “for the times they are a-changin'.”
Interesting times indeed.
 

Chinese Aggression in Maps

Map of Chinese claims of 1960

According to a Press Release from the Ministry Of Eternal Affairs, the situation in Ladakh may de-escalate  in the next few days.
On July 5, the two Special Representatives of India and China agreed that maintenance of peace and tranquillity in the India-China border areas was essential for the further development of the bilateral relations: “In this regard they further agreed that both sides should complete the ongoing disengagement process along the LAC expeditiously.”
The Statement further said: “The two Special Representatives agreed that both sides should take guidance from the consensus of the leaders that maintenance of peace and tranquillity in the India-China border areas was essential for the further development of our bilateral relations and that two sides should not allow differences to become disputes. Therefore, they agreed that it was necessary to ensure at the earliest complete disengagement of the troops along the LAC and de-escalation from India-China border areas for full restoration of peace and tranquillity.”

This will not fully change the situation on the ground and moreover, there is no doubt that China's mindset will remain expansionist and that the posts will be changed again, whenever it will suit Beijing.

Chinese Aggression
In the present context, it is interesting to look at a small booklet released in January 1963 by the Publications Division of the Government of India; it contains a series of ten maps. The publication is called “Chinese Aggression in Maps.”
These maps are fascinating, especially after the unwarranted attack by the Chinese forces in Ladakh, particularly in Galwan, Hot Springs/Gogra and the Fingers area of Pangong tso (lake).
The Introduction de the booklet explains: “Brought together in this brochure are ten maps which graphically present the extent of the Chinese occupation of Indian territory through aggression from time to time; the fraudulent nature of the three-point proposal with which China launched a peace offensive after the large-scale invasion by Chinese forces on October 20, 1962; and the minimum condition which India has insisted on for the resumption of negotiations to settle the India-China boundary question.”

Most of the maps carry explanatory notes below.

It is a cartographic demonstration how Communist China has been changing the posts and will continue to change the posts.

The Historical Background

We have already dealt with this in previous posts.

The booklet's Introduction continued: “Falsehood and deception marked the Chinese Government's policy towards India till it culminated in the massive invasion of India's northern frontier, from Ladakh in the west to the North East Frontier Agency in the east, on October 20, 1962. A perusal of the maps printed in this brochure will make it clear that falsehood and deception are the warp and woof of the peace offensive with which China followed up its armed aggression.”

It further gave a historical background: “India was among the first countries to extend recognition to the People's Republic of China which came into being on October 1, 1949. In August 1950 when the forces of the People's Republic of China came into Tibet, the Government of China declared their willingness to solve the problem of Tibet by peaceful and friendly measures and their desire to "stabilise the China-India border". On receipt of this communication, the Government of India expressed their appreciation of the Chinese Government's intentions regarding Tibet and affirmed that ‘the recognised boundary between India and Tibet should remain inviolate’.”

Delhi expounded its position further: “Close and friendly relations developed between the Government of India and the People's Republic of China in the subsequent years and on 29th April, 1954, the two Governments concluded an Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between Tibet and India under which India gave up ail extra-territorial rights and privileges enjoyed in Tibet, and recognised Tibet as a region of China.”
As our four volumes of the history of relations between India and Tibet have shown, that was pure folly, to give away the privileges without getting anything in return. But it was the Hindi-Chini bhai bhai days.

Already the Issue of the Maps
But already, the Chinese maps were showing large chunks of India’s territory; the 1963 booklet stated: “The question of Chinese maps which were showing an incorrect boundary alignment between India and China was raised by Prime Minister Nehru with Prime Minister Chou En-lai in October 1954 and again in November 1956. The Government of India were given to understand in October 1954 that the Chinese maps referred to by the Prime Minister of India were merely a reproduction of old Kuomintang maps and that the present Government had no time to revise them. In November 1956, Prime Minister Chou En-lai told the Indian Prime Minister that in the case of Burma, the Government of China bad accepted the formalisation of the boundary in 1914 (the McMahon Line) and proposed to recognise it with India also - that is the Eastern sector of the Indian alignment. Prime Minister Chou En-lai said he would consult the Tibetan authorities in this regard.”

The Aksai Chin Road
But China was not India’s friend or brother: “Surreptitious Chinese intrusions into Indian territory in Ladakh started in 1957. The clearing of the Aksai Chin Road was the first step. An Indian patrol party on its normal rounds was detained by the Chinese forces near Haji Langar in September 1958. The Government of India protested against this detention and also against the clearing of the motor road by the Government of China across the Aksai Chin area of Indian territory. These surreptitious intrusions continued in the Ladakh area and there were some other incidents between Indian patrols and the Chinese soldier. The Government of India, in the belief that these were instances of irresponsible behaviour of the Chinese local authorities, lodged protests against these intrusions and incidents.”
The fact that Delhi had been knowing for years about the Aksai Chin is not mentioned.

The Aggression Continues
The note however pointed out: “In September 1959, the Government of China, for the first time, laid a formal claim to 50,000 square miles of Indian territory in Ladakh and in the North East Frontier Agency. This led to exchange of communications at a high level, between the two Prime Ministers. The two Prime Ministers met in Delhi in 1960, and this was followed by the meeting between officials of the two sides in pursuance of the decision taken at the meeting of the two Prime Ministers. Further intrusions by the Chinese, however, continued. By 1961, the Government of India considered it necessary, in view of progressive Chinese intrusions, to take limited defence measures to contain these surreptitious Chinese advances into Indian territory.”
That was the beginning of the Forward Policy, but it was far too late, as India had occupying most of the Aksai Chin area of Ladakh.

The Final Blow
The Indian note nonetheless added: “Foiled in their attempt to take over further Indian territory in Ladakh, the Chinese started further aggression in the Eastern sector of the India-China boundary in the NEFA region on 8th September 1962. After a couple of probing attacks, Chinese forces mounted a carefully prepared and well-planned all-out attack on 20th October 1962 on Indian defence forces in the Eastern as well as Western sectors of the India-China border. Having acquired, as a result of their initial successes, a further slice of about 2,500 square miles of Indian territory, the Chinese Government started their first peace offensive-the Chinese three point proposal--on 24th October. When India refused to accept the military dictates of the aggressor, the Chinese, after re-group­ ing and further preparations, mounted another massive offensive from 15th to 19th November, 1962. On the morning of 21st November, the Chinese started their second peace offensive with the same object of retaining the gains of their calculated and cold­ blooded aggression-the so-called unilateral cease-fire and withdrawal proposals of 21st November, 1962.”

Wedded to Peace??
The conclusion was that “The Government and people of India are, by their history and tradition, wedded to the ways of peace. They have always been and are in favour of peaceful settlement of differences between nations. Peace and peaceful settlements can, however, be pursued only on the basis of decency, dignity and self-respect. It would be fatal to compromise with aggression or submit to the military dictates of the aggressor. The first essential before we can revert to paths of peace and peaceful settlements is the undoing of all the consequences of aggression. This means that at least the status quo as it prevailed before the latest Chinese aggression started on 8th September, 1962, should be restored.”
It will never be.

Map No 2
We shall just look at Map No 2 ('Line Separating Indian and Chinese Forces on September 7, 1962'), as it shows how China has always changed the posts.

The caption said: “This map depicts the three lines which have figured most prominently in the correspondence between the Governments and Prime Ministers of India and China after the massive invasion of India which was launched by Chinese forces on October 20, 1962."

The November 1959 Line

The first line shows the disposition of Chinese posts in Ladakh in November 1959.

The captions says: "It will be seen that at that time there was strictly speaking no ‘line of control’ but only a series of Chinese posts on Indian territory.”

This line joined the then Chinese posts at Spanggur Post, Khurnak Fort, Kongka Pass and Shamallungpa and ran northward, past Haji Langar, to join the Aksai Chin Road.
Another shows the line of contact between Indian and Chinese forces immediately prior to September 8, 1962, the date on which Chinese forces invaded Indian territory in the Eastern sector also. India has made the reasonable proposal that there should be a restoration of the positions along this line as the minimum condition for resumption of negotiations with China.

Finally, another line showed the limits of the further area occupied by Chinese forces after the massive aggression which they launched against India, both in the Western and Eastern sectors on October 20, 1962. China now falsely claims that this was the line of actual control by Chinese forces in November 1959. …The area between the September 7, 1962, line and the 'line of actual control of 1959' as falsely claimed by China represents the further aggrandisement of Indian territory by China as a result of its latest aggression. India insists that this area of further aggression should be vacated by the Chinese and the position of the Indian and Chinese forces prior to 8th September restored, before there can be a resumption of negotiations to settle the India-China boundary problem.

Chinese map showing the correct alignment in Galwan area

Today’ s Situation

Since the beginning of May, China has been trying to change the posts again, mainly in three places, namely, Galwan, Hot Spring and the Fingers areas of Pangong tso (lake).

Let us look at Galwan first.

According to Chinese maps, the Chinese claims stops some 10 kilometers from the confluence of the Galwan and the Shyok rivers.

The above map is very clear.

Now, China would like to annex the Indian territory till the confluence. There is no historical justification to this, but strategically, it will allow the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to obstruct the new 220-km long road between Darbuk-Shyok-DBO  ( Daulat Beg Oldie ) which is to reduce the travel time between Leh to DBO from 2 days to 6 hours.

Another Chinese map shows a similar alignment

Chinese map showing the correct alignment in Galwan area

During the 1960 meetings' of the Officials,  China defined its 'perception' of the boundary.

At that time, nobody was speaking of Line of Actual Control (LAC).
India asked: "The Indian side would like to have some heights of peaks and location
of passes on this particular ridge."

China assured:

"From 78° 5' East, the line turned south-west to a point Long. 78° l' E. and Lat. 35° 21' N., where it crossed the Chip Chap river. After this, it turned south east along' the mountain ridge and passed through two peaks Peak 6845 metres and Peak 6598 metres. The co-ordinates of Peak 6845 M were Long. 78° 12' E, Lat. 34° 57' N. The co-ordinates of Peak 6598 M were Long. 68° 13' E., Lat. 34° 54' N. After the alignment passed over the two peaks, it went south along the mountain ridge, where it crossed the Galwan river at Long. 78° 13' E, Lat. 34. 46' N. It then passed over Peak 6556 M and followed the watershed between the Khugrang Tsangpo river and its tributary the Changlung river, crossed the Changlung river at Long. 78° 53' E, Lat. 34° 22' N, and reached the Kongka Pass."

In Galvan area,  the point which has been reported on the map below. It corresponds with the Indian alignment; the small difference is due to the poor surveying tools at that time.

Google Map with the Chinese claims of 1960 in Galwan area

Chinese logic: by advancing the line towards the confluence with the Shyok, China would have had the perfect position for its howitzers to destroy the new road, when required...

Hot Spring/Gogra Area

The second site of Chinese intrusions is Hot Spring/Gogra area.

Like Galwan it was not a disputed place earlier.

The coordinates given by the Chinese in 1960 correspond to the Indian position, it is therefore clearly a new front opened by China with no historical basis.

Strategically, it allows China to block rear reinforcements to reach Galwan.

The entire operation seems to have been planned to open more disputed places in Ladakh and protect these areas.

Google Map with the Chinese claims of 1960 in Hot Spring area

Fingers at the Pangong tso (lake)

The third location of intrusions is the Fingers area on the northern bank of the Pangong tso.

Here too Chinese maps tally with the Indian position.

The reluctance of the Chinese to vacate the area from finger 4 to 8, has to historical sanction.

Chinese map showing the correct alignment in Pangong tso area

This map was published in the 1980s in Lhasa by the Communist government.

It shows clearly that the line crosses the lake in the east of the Fingers and Sirijap.

Chinese map showing the correct alignment in Pangong tso area

Same remark for the previous Chinese map.

Enlarged Chinese claims of 1960

When one enlarges the 1960 posted above, it is more difficult to say where exactly passes the Chinese claim line, but it is certainly east of the Fingers.

This map of StratNews Global (below) shows the approximate location of the Indian LAC.

It tallies with the above Chinese maps, therefore China should have no claim from Finger 4 to 8.

But today, Beijing is ready to fight a war for areas that it did not even claim before.

It is called wild expansionism.

The Fingers and Sirijap areas

Conclusions

One can only conclude that China has always changed the posts, at least since 1949, when Mao decided to annex Xinjiang (Eastern Turkestan).

India is paying today for the inaction and acquiescent attitude of the Indian government then.

It is a fact that tears after years the line has moved; it keep moving even today.

Even if Beijing accepts a disengagement today or tomorrow and partially withdraw to its April position, it will have opened new fronts in Ladakh, new 'disputed' places which were non existing earlier.

Some mad generals in Chengdu will have to be seriously reigned in by the Communist Party in Beijing if China wants to regain a semblance of trust from India's part.

Expansionist and Revisionist China

Chinese map (in Tibetan) of Pangong tso showing the Chinese claims

According to a press release of the Press Information Bureau (PIB), Prime Minister Narendra Modi travelled to Nimu, near Leh, in Ladakh to interact with the Indian troops involved with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) on the border: “[the Prime Minister] met the top leadership of the Indian Army and later interacted with personnel of the Army, Air Force and ITBP,” said the PIB.
The communiqué further reported: “Prime Minister paid rich tributes to the valour of our Armed Forces, stating that their courage and devotion to Mother India is unparalleled. He stated that Indians can go about their lives peacefully because they know that our Armed Forces are standing firm, protecting the nation.”

Modi spoke of the exemplary bravery of the Armed Forces in the recent weeks which made the world take note of India’s strength.

Expansionism

Significantly, the Prime Minister observed that that “the time for expansionism is over. We are living in an era of development.”
He recalled that it is this mindset of expansionism which had done a great harm [to the world].
In this context, it is worth mentioning two issues.
First, about ‘expansionism’.

A map (in Tibetan) published in the 1980s by the Communist Government of the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) shows the Chinese claims in the Pangong tso (lake) area lay east of Sirijap, a small plain on northern bank of the lake.

As mentioned earlier on this blog, India had established three posts in Sirijap prior to the Sino-Indian War (between April 1960 and October 1962) and a bitter battle took place around these posts in October 1962.

Today the Chinese are trying to occupy till Fingers 4, which is located more than 12 kilometers in the West. Is it not expansionism?

The Chinese map (in Tibetan) tells us about the constant Chinese ‘expansionism’; the fact that Beijing stubbornly refusing to fix posts and provides its perceptions of the Line of Actual Control (LAC), allow China to expand its territory.

Chinese Lieutenant General carving '1962' on a pillar at the border

A Repeat of 1962?

My second point is that Xi’s China is still dreaming of 1962, not understanding that India and the world have changed.
Last week, Lt Gen Zhang Xuejie, the Political Commissar of the Tibet Military Region (TMD) went to the ‘border’ and wrote in red letters ‘1962’ on a stone; it is not clear if it was north of Sikkim in Kampa la area or near the tri-junction between Tibet, Nepal and India. 
What message did not want to convey?
That China could repeat the operations of 1962?
Gen Zhang is probably not aware that the Indian Army in 2020 is not the same than in 1962.
He has certainly never heard of the battles of Walong or Rezang la where hundreds of Chinese PLA were killed by far-better Indian soldiers (but this is never told to the Chinese people).
The PLA should also remember what happened to them in 1967 in Sikkim.
Though Galwan does not come under the TMD, (it is under the command of the Southern Xinjiang Military District of the Xinjiang Military District), the TMD military leadership should study what happened on June 15 in Galwan when China lost at least 45 of its soldiers, including a Commanding Officer. It should also remember that it was Xi Jinping's birthday, that day.
Can Communist China and particularly the PLA understand that the time for expansionism is over?
It is doubtful. They live like ostriches, their heads buried in their Communist jargon and outdated ideology.

It is not a good omen for China.

Lt Gen Zhang Xuejie on the way to the 'border'

A few days later, the PLA organised a ceremony on the lake to show their presence  ...and their faith in the Communist Party.

The caption said: "A [PLA] party of the Xinjiang Military Region carried out a 'Partnership with the Party, Take the Roots in the Plateau as a Vanguard'; it was the theme of the day on the bank of Pangong Lake at an altitude of 4,300 meters."

Note the Buddhist prayer flags in the background; atheists, but believers?

How India can combat Chinese guile in Ladakh

Gurkha Rifles

My article How India can combat Chinese guile in Ladakh appeared in Mail Today and DailyO

Here is the link...

The core issue is that there is no agreed LAC today as both parties have failed to exchange maps; this leaves the space for Beijing to create problems.

We are told that the Ladakh front is more peaceful after Lt Gen Harinder Singh met Maj Gen Liu Lin, commander of the South Xinjiang Military Region, at Moldo near the Line of Actual Control (LAC) on June 6,

The troops would have started 'retreating a bit' (2-2.5 km) in 3 out of 4 sectors, namely, Patrolling Points (PP) 14 and 15 (in Galwan area) and 17 PP (near Hot Springs). However the Chinese remain adamant in the Finger 4 area, north of Pangong Tso (lake).
In the next few days, more meetings will take place at the Division and Battalion commanders' level. We can only pray and hope for the best, but it will probably take months for the issue to be sorted out, as some believe that General Zhao Zongqi, the big boss and commander of the Western Theater command overlooking the entire Indian border, is batting for a promotion to the Central Military Commission, the 'paradise' for a Chinese general; as long as he does not get what he wants, the issue may continue to remain hot.

Familiar pattern
In any case, the core issue is that there is no agreed LAC today as both parties have failed to exchange maps; this leaves the space for Beijing to create problems. It remains that the so-called LAC has drastically moved over the years. Let us go back to October 1962.
On October 20 at 4:30 am, the Chinese launched their first attack with artillery and mortar fire in the Ladakh sector; the Chinese troops advanced in different places, whose names are today familiar: Galwan, Hot Springs, Sirijap or Chushul. One of their objectives was to capture Srijap 1, a post established on the northern bank of Pangong Lake by the 1st Battalion of 8 Gorkha Rifles commanded by Major Dhan Singh Thapa. Today the Indian and Chinese are fighting for Finger 4 which is located 15 kilometres west of Sirijap 1. Over the years, the PLA has slowly, but surely moved the line westwards into Indian Territory.

An age-old strategy
In 1962, the post was strategically important for the defence of Chusul airfield; Major Thapa and his men, surrounded by far superior Chinese forces, held the post and repelled three attacks before being overrun. The Gurkhas fought so valiantly that Thapa was awarded the Param Vir Chakra; he was made a prisoner of war (PoW) in Pishan in South Xinjiang; the Army, without any news, declared him 'missing in action' and his wife 'posthumously' received the highest war-time award from the President of India in early 1963. The citation said that the post "was attacked by the Chinese in overwhelming strength after being subjected to intensive artillery and mortar bombardment. Under his gallant command, the greatly outnumbered post repulsed the attack, inflicting heavy casualties on the aggressors." When future negotiations take place in Moldo the sacrifice of this great soldier should be remembered as well as that LAC was then in Sirijap. In Pishan, Major Thapa underwent severe punishments for having killed so many Chinese and, to refuse to make statements against the Indian Army and government.
The Chinese's game-plan was to brainwash the Gurkhas, "you are like us, racially, we are not different, don't side with the Indians". In the PoW camps, the Gurkha troops were even kept separately and better treated than other Indian soldiers, but they all remained faithful to their illustrious regiment.
In Pishan, Major Thapa underwent severe punishments for having killed so many Chinese and refusing to make statements against the Indian Army and government. (Photo: Wikimedia Commons)
Sometime in April 1963, while he was still 'missing in action', Thapa was brought back from Xinjiang to Central Tibet to be repatriated along with some other 26 other senior Indian officers. But before that, they were compulsorily taken for a tour of China. What happened to Maj Thapa and his colleagues, led by Brigadier John Dalvi of the Himalayan Blunder fame, is worth recounting. Though the Chinese told the Indian Chargé d'Affaires in Beijing, Dr PK Banerjee that the officers were keen to see 'New China', the officers were taken around against their will. The Communist leadership had planned to 'parade' these officers on the Tiananmen Square on May 1 on Labour Day. When Brig John Dalvi opposed this final humiliation for his men, the Chinese had to drop their plans.
The next day, the 27 officers were allowed to visit the Indian Embassy in Beijing (part of Beijing's propaganda efforts, to show how 'liberal' China was).

Blast from the past?
According to Banerjee's memoirs: "All the members of the embassy with enthusiasm produced enormous quantities of excellent and varied delicacies from almost all of India, … the drinks included lassi, coffee and champagne."
The Indian officers heard that Chinese propaganda based on the distortion of statements was going around in India, what would happen when they returned to India? In the party, Lt Col Khera called Banerjee in a corner and pointed out to Thapa, the 'posthumous' PVC awardee: "We had another round of champagne to celebrate," recalled the Chargé later. When the officers left, Banerjee cabled Delhi suggesting giving the officers a hero's welcome when they land in India "…otherwise we would be strengthening China's pernicious propaganda about the Indian armed forces." Unfortunately, the officers were treated in a most insensitive manner.
Many things have changed, the government and the nation have more respect for the defence forces, but the fact remains that the Chinese continue with their behaviour in pushing forward the borders of India. It is probably genetic.