Constantly Changing Posts

This map appeared in a booklet entitled "Chinese Aggression in Maps", published in 1963 by the Publication Division of the Government of India. 

It shows China's moving claims in the Western Sector of the Sino-India boundary (formerly, the Eastern Turkestan-India frontier).
A quick look at the correspondence between Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Premier Zhou Enlai of China, as reprinted in the “Notes, Memoranda and letters Exchanged and Agreements signed between The Governments of India and China” (also known as 'White Papers') for the period between September to December 1959 is shockingly telling about today’s Chinese intentions in Ladakh.
The White Papers, published by Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, show that the Chinese were already masters at changing the posts ...and they continue despite the 'humanitarian' speeches of the New Helmsman, Xi Jinping.

September 8, 1959
The Chinese Premier wrote to the Prime Minister of India and referred to a letter from Nehru dated March 22, 1959.

Zhou said: “I find from your letter that there is a fundamental difference between the positions of our two Governments on the Sino-Indian boundary question. This has made me somewhat surprised and also made it necessary for me to take a longer period of time to consider how to reply to your letter. The Sino-Indian boundary question is a complicated question left over by history.”
It was the first time that ‘differences’ were admitted. 

Let us remember that between March and September 1959, tens of thousands of Tibetans had followed the Dalai Lama in exile in India. This partly explains China's new belligerence.

Zhou said: “I would like now to further explain the position of the Chinese Government in connection with the questions raised in Your Excellency's letter and in conjunction with the recent situation along the Sino-Indian border."
He started by the boundary separating China's Sinkiang [Xinjiang] and Tibet regions from Ladakh:

"Regarding the 1842 Peace Treaty between Ladakh and Tibet, Zhou argued that the Chinese Central Government did not send anybody to participate in the negotiations nor did it later ratify the treaty,  ...Moreover, this treaty only mentioned in general terms that Ladakh and Tibet would each abide by its borders, and did not make any specific provisions or explanations regarding the location of this section of the boundary.”

The Premier admitted: 

Map mentioned by Zhou Enlai (1854), though it did not represent the post-independence
Indian position, was 'fairly close' to the Chinese map, according to Zhou

 

“The marking of this section of the boundary on the map of "Punjab Western Himalaya and Adjoining Parts of Tibet" compiled by British John Walker by order of the Court of Directors of East India Company (which was attached to the British Major Alexander Cunningham's book ‘Ladakh’ published in 1854) corresponded fairly close to the Chinese maps,” but Zhou complained that later British and Indian maps “included large tracts of Chinese territory into Ladakh [Aksai Chin]. This was without any legal grounds, nor in conformity with the actual situation of administration by each side all the time.”

Details of the map above (around Pangong tso)

The remarks of the Chinese Premier refers to the Aksai Chin; but according to him, the dispute had begun with “the outbreak of the rebellion in Tibet, the border situation has become increasingly tense owing to reasons for which the Chinese side cannot be held responsible. Immediately after the fleeting of a large number of Tibetan rebels into India, Indian troops started pressing forward steadily across the eastern section of the Sino-Indian boundary.”
It was easy to put it on the Tibetans.
In conclusion, Zhou wrote: “I hope that Your Excellency and the Indian Government will, in accordance with the Chinese Government's request, immediately adopt measures to withdraw the trespassing Indian troops and administrative personnel and restore the long existing state of the boundary between the two countries.”
India had to stop trespassing into Indian territory.

September 26, 1959
Nehru replied on September 26, he noted: “I was greatly surprised and distressed to read it. You and I discussed the India-China border, and particularly the eastern sector, in 1954 in Peking and in 1956-57 in India.”
After referring to the McMahon Line, the Indian Prime Minister said: “when I received your letter of January 23, 1959, I had no idea that the People's Republic of China would lay claim to about 40,000 square miles of what in our view has been indisputably Indian territory for decades and in some sectors for over a century.”
It is rather surprising as Nehru knew that the Chinese had built a road across the Aksai Chin.

However, the Prime Minister gave his own rationale, Delhi had just been nice with China: 

“We did not release to the public the information which we had about the various border intrusions into our territory by Chinese personnel since 1954, the construction of a road across Indian territory in Ladakh, and the arrest of our personnel in the Aksai Chin area in 1958 and their detention. We did not give publicity to this in the hope that peaceful solutions of the disputes could be found by agreement by the two countries without public excitement on both sides.”

It is not necessary here to go into the other sectors of the boundaries touched upon by Nehru.
A Note on The Border Disputes was attached to the Prime Minister’s letter in which he complained about an Indian patrol being arrested: “Aksai Chin is a part of Ladakh. The Chinese Government have now admitted that in 1956 they built a highway from Tibet to Sinkiang, running for about a hundred miles through this territory. In September 1957, it was announced that this road had been completed. The next year Indian personnel [an army party under Lt Iyengar from the Madras Sappers] carrying out routine patrol duties were arrested near Haji Langar in north-east Aksai Chin, taken to Suget Karol and detained for five weeks. The leader of the Indian patrol was placed in solitary confinement, and all documents were seized.”

November 7, 1959
Zhou replied to Nehru’s letter of September 26, 1959; though in a meantime (on October 21)  a serious incident had taken place  within Indian territory, south of the Kongka Pass and 10 CRPF personnel had been killed.
In this communication, Zhou offered that each party should withdraw 20 kms from where they were: “to maintain effectively the status quo of the border between the two countries, to ensure the tranquility of the border regions and to create a favourable atmosphere for a friendly settlement of the boundary question.”
It was suggested that the armed forces of China and India “undertake to refrain from again sending their armed personnel to be stationed in and patrol the zones from which they have evacuated their armed forces.”
The innocuous proposal came back recently in the news, when Beijing planted a story in an Indian newspaper, mentioning that China had offered the fixation of a LAC in this very letter. There is of course no map attached to this proposal.

November 16, 1959
Nine days later, Nehru replied, mentioning that Delhi had given a note to the Chinese Ambassador in Delhi on November 4, with full details of the international boundary in Ladakh and the Konka-la incident.
Nehru agreed “that the two Governments should come to an agreement without delay, which would eliminate risks of border clashes.”
The Prime Minister went on: “you have suggested that the armed forces of China and India should withdraw twenty kilometers from the lines which they occupy at present. This, in your view, would effectively prevent any border clashes.”
Nehru, after mentioning the Central and the Eastern Sectors, pointed out: “Unfortunately, we do not yet know with any precision where the frontier line lies according to the claims of the Chinese Government. This is a matter for surmise based on small scale maps published in China. These maps themselves have not always been consistent, and different lines are sometimes indicated in them. I regret I cannot accept the contention that you have been in occupation of the area up to the frontier line shown in your maps. On the contrary, the Government of India have exercised jurisdiction up to the frontier line specified by them.”
Therefore, in the Ladakh area, both Governments should agree to the following interim measure: 

Map of 1956 showing the Chinese claims in Ladakh
The Line was reported on the GOI  map above

“The Government of India should withdraw all personnel to the west of the line which the Chinese Government have shown as the international boundary in their 1956 maps which, so far as we are aware are their latest maps.” At the same time the Chinese troops should withdraw their personnel to the east of the international boundary which has been described by the Government of India.”

Practically, it meant that the Indian troops could patrolled up to the Kunlun range, north of the Aksai Chin; Nehru added: “The area is almost entirely uninhabited. It is thus not necessary to maintain administrative personnel in this area bounded by the two lines on the east and the west.”
This was obviously not acceptable for Beijing who wanted to continue using the Aksai Chin road.

December 17, 1959
The next day Zhou replied. One could ask, why such a hurry?
China was probably nervous about India patrolling till the Johnston Line.
Zhou said that he was anxious to know if the proposal to stop patrolling in some areas only was: “to apply to the entire Sino-Indian border." he affirmed that "no different measure should be adopted in the sector of the border between China and India's Ladakh.”
Now comes the interesting part. After saying that was no reason to treat this sector of the border as a special case: “The line up to which each side exercises actual control in this sector is very clear, just as it is in the other sectors of the Sino-Indian border. As a matter of fact, the Chinese map published in 1956, to which Your Excellency referred, correctly shows the traditional boundary between the two countries in this sector, except for the Parigas area [Chinese name for Demchok] by the Shangatsangpu [Indus] River, India has not occupied any Chinese territory east of this section of the traditional boundary.” See map above by the brown arrows.

The letter continued to argue about the different sectors of the border.

December 21, 1959
Four days later, Nehru replied to say that he “deeply regret that you have not accepted the very reasonable proposals contained in my letter of 16th November.”
The Prime Minister affirmed: “I am always ready to meet and discuss with your Excellency the outstanding differences between our countries and explore the avenues of settlement. How can we, Mr. Prime Minister, reach an agreement on principles when there is such complete disagreement about the facts?”

December 26, 1959
A Note was given by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Indian Embassy. 

For the first time, Beijing’s position was clarified in some details, though without maps.
Beijing reiterated that “China and India are two peace-loving, big countries with a long history of mutual friendship and with many great common tasks both at present and' in the future. Friendship between China and India is in the interests not only of the two peoples, but also of world peace, particularly of peace in Asia.”
It answered into some details a set of questions, again without provided any map.

•    Has The Sino-Indian Boundary Been Formally Delimited?
•    Where Is The Traditional Customary Sino-Indian Boundary Line?
•    What is the Proper Way To Settle The Sino-Indian Boundary Dispute?

The Chinese note pointed out: “The Indian Government has also referred to the talks between the two Prime Ministers in Peking in October 1954, expressing the view that Premier Chou En-lai's remarks about Chinese maps implied that the Chinese Government would revise its maps in accordance with Indian maps, that is to say, the Chinese Government had accepted the Indian Government's claim regarding the boundary.”
The Note argued that Zhou had never said that, ditto for the McMahon Line.
To conclude, the note answered the question: 

“Whether China wants to engage in aggression and expansion?” 

The Noted said: “Centering around the Sino-Indian boundary question, there has recently appeared in India a great deal of anti-Chinese pronouncements, which in cold war language slander China as ‘imperialism’, ‘expanding into India’ and ‘committing aggression’.' The Chinese people cannot but feel deep regret at such malicious attacks against China, which simply fly in the face of facts. …But at no time in future will China become a threat to its neighbouring countries, just as China does not believe that India, after it has grown strong as China fervently hopes, would become a threat to China; to say that the growth of China's population and industry would constitute a threat to its neighbours is utterly incomprehensible to the Chinese people.”
It strongly asserted: “So far as the question of boundary is concerned, China absolutely does not want one inch of another country's territory. There are undelimited boundaries between China and many of its neighbouring countries, but China has never taken, and will never take, advantage of this situation to make any changes in the actually existing state of affairs on the borders by unilateral action.”
A few weeks later, a map of Chinese claims will finally be published by Beijing. It would engulf large parts of India’s territory.
The question which remains: has China changed?

Outrageously changing the post once again (1960)