The Great Han Chauvism once again

Wang Junzheng, new TAR party Secretary

In 2004, I had mentioned one of the cancers of Communist China: The Great Han Chauvinism (see post below).

 

The situation seems to be getting worst, particularly in Tibet or Xinjiang.
The Chinese media just announced  that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) had decided to nominate Wang Junzheng of Han nationality as Secretary of the Party Committee of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR); he become de facto a member of the TAR Standing Committee.

 

A Chinese website explained: "On October 19, the Tibet Autonomous Region held a meeting of leading cadres, at which Comrade Zeng Yichun, vice minister of the Central Organization Department, announced the decision of the Central Government; Zeng said that the adjustment was made by the Central Government [Beijing] in the light of the overall situation, according to the work needs and the actual construction of the leadership team of the Tibet Autonomous Region, after thorough consideration and careful study."
 

So far, not a single Tibetan or non-Han has made it to Party Secretary's seat, can you believe it?
The situation is similar in Xinjiang with the Uyghur minority being second-class citizens.

 

Seventy years after having 'liberated' the Tibetans, the latter are still slaves of the Han majority.

 

It is ironical that during the forthcoming Sixth Plenum of the Communist Party (November 8 to 11), President Xi Jinping will boast about the achievements during the 100-year rule of the Communists in China (and 70 years in Tibet).
But, he will certainly not mention the fate of the Tibetans or Uyghurs and why they are not given the top responsibility.

The Communist Party of China is in fact a racist Party, not giving any place to the minorities.

 

Can you imagine such situation in India: if West Bengal or Tamil Nadu never had a Bengali or Tamil Chief Minister since Independence?
This is the situation in Tibet, Xinjiang or Inner Mongolia.

Simply shameful.

Wang widely Sanctioned
According to The South China Morning Post, Wang is China’s highest ranking official "to be widely sanctioned over accusations of human rights violations in March, during his tenure as Xinjiang’s deputy party secretary and security chief. His boss, Xinjiang party chief Chen Quanguo, appeared only on the Donald Trump administration’s sanctions list announced last year."

The Hong Kong newspaper added: "Wang’s promotion underlines Beijing’s snub of the West’s response to its policies in Xinjiang, as well as its growing interest in the pool of officials who have been held up as examples of competence in areas with large ethnic minority populations. He served as Xinjiang’s security chief from 2019 before starting his most recent role last year as political commissar of the paramilitary Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, while retaining his post as deputy party chief."

The years to come are going to be tough for the Tibetans.

No question, of course, to negotiate anything with Dharamsala.

Wu's farewell speech
While leaving Wu Yingjie said: "I have lived on the Tibetan plateau for more than 60 years, worked for 47 years, traveled through the mountains and waters of Tibet, personally witnessed the human miracle of Tibet under the leadership of the Party in just a few decades, spanning thousands of years. Tibet is my home and the Tibetan people will always be my relatives. I feel extremely happy to be able to live here, work here and grow here, feel proud to be able to dedicate the most precious youthful years of my life here, and feel extremely honored to be able to plow, struggle and harvest together with my comrades here. Looking back on the work and life in Tibet, looking back on the unforgettable years with all of us together, remembering the instructions, thanksgiving and progress, many scenes are real, many past events are vividly remembered, all of them make me deeply moved, infinite fondness."

 

Interestingly, Wang has never been posted in Tibet. It is definitively a change of policy from the rulers in Beijing.

About Wang Junzheng

He is born in May 1963, in Linyi, Shandong Province; he has a postgraduate degree and a doctorate in management. He is currently an alternate member of the 19th Central Committee.

Chinese name: Wang Junzheng
Nationality: China
Ethnicity: Han Chinese
Place of origin: Linyi, Shandong
Birth date: May 1963
Graduated from Shandong University

Biography

• 1981.09-1985.07 Shandong University, Department of Scientific Socialism, majoring in Scientific Socialism
• 1985.07-1988.08 Master's degree in Scientific Socialism, Marxist-Leninist Institute, Renmin University of China
• 1988.08-1993.10 Section officer and deputy chief section officer of the General Office of the Ministry of Labour, chief section officer and deputy divisional secretary of the Minister's Office
• 1993.10-1994.09 Deputy Divisional Secretary and Full Divisional Secretary, General Office of Yunnan Provincial Party Committee
• 1994.09-1995.06 Deputy Secretary, Guandu District, Kunming City, Yunnan Province (at divisional level)
• 1995.06-1998.12 Secretary of Guandu District Committee of Kunming City, Yunnan Province
• 1998.12-2000.11 Standing Committee Member and Secretary of the Political and Legal Committee of Kunming City, Yunnan Province
• 2000.11-2003.10 Standing Committee Member and Director of the Organization Department of Kunming Municipal Committee, Yunnan Province
• 2003.10-2003.11 Deputy Secretary of the Kunming Municipal Committee and Director of the Organization Department, Kunming City, Yunnan Province
• 2003.11-2005.01 Deputy Secretary of Kunming Municipal Party Committee and Minister of Propaganda Department, Kunming City, Yunnan Province
• 2005.01-2007.05 Vice-President of Yunnan Provincial High People's Court
• (1998.09-2006.07 Postgraduate studies in Business Administration, School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University, PhD in Management)
• 2007.05-2007.06 Deputy Secretary of Lijiang Municipal Party Committee, Yunnan Province
• 2007.06-2007.11 Deputy Secretary and Acting Mayor of Lijiang City, Yunnan Province
• 2007.11-2009.12 Deputy Secretary and Mayor of Lijiang City, Yunnan Province
• 2009.12-2012.09 Secretary of Lijiang Municipal Party Committee, Yunnan Province
• 2012.09-2013.05 Vice Governor of Hubei Province
• 2013.05-2013.06 Vice-Governor of Hubei Province, Secretary of Xiangyang Municipal Party Committee
• 2013.06-2013.09 Standing Committee Member of Hubei Provincial Party Committee, Secretary of Xiangyang Municipal Party Committee
•  2013.09-2016.01 Member of the Standing Committee of Hubei Provincial Committee, Secretary of Xiangyang Municipal Committee and Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Municipal People's Congress
•  2016.01-2019.01 Member of the Standing Committee of the Jilin Provincial Committee and Secretary of the Changchun Municipal Committee
• 2019.01-2019.02 Standing Committee of the Party Committee of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
• 2019.02-2020.04 Standing Committee of the Party Committee and Secretary of the Political and Legal Committee of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region
• 2020.04-2020.05 Deputy Secretary of the Party Committee and Secretary of the Political and Legal Committee of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, and Secretary of the Party Committee of Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, at full ministerial level 
• 2020.05-2020.09- Deputy Secretary of the Party Committee and Secretary of the Political and Legal Committee of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, Secretary of the Party Committee and Political Commissar of Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, Chairman of the Board of Directors of China New Construction Group Corporation, at full ministerial level
• 2020.09- Deputy Secretary of the Party Committee of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, Secretary of the Party Committee and Political Commissar of Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, Chairman of the Board of Directors of China Xinjiang Group Corporation, full ministerial level 
• 2021.10- Secretary of the Party Committee of the Tibet Autonomous Region. 

The Great Han Chauvinism still in full bloom in the Middle Kingdom.

 

Here is my 2004 article

A A few years back, I wrote an article, Flag and nationalities on the issue.

The recent unrest in Tibet has generated a healthy debate in India. Some sections of the Indian society like the Kashmiri Pandits now view their plight through the Tibetan prism (the bad luck of the Pandits is that they never had a charismatic leader like the Dalai Lama, though India’s ruling family belong to their community and they have remained a divided lot).
Some others say that we should give time to China to change and progressively evolve into a decent democratic system. They are probably not aware that the ‘time’ is also clocking against India’s interests. Last year alone 3.8 millions of Chinese ‘visited’ Tibet using the railway line to Lhasa; a few lakhs of them settled on the Roof of the World. Like in the Nepal case, when we will realize that the situation is irreversible, it will be too late. And it is India which will have to suffer.
More than twenty years ago, I had asked the Dalai Lama how will Tibet regain its independence (or autonomy). He had answer: “It does not depend on us Tibetans, changes will come from within China”.
It seems also clear that he was not expecting the United States or India to offer him on a platter the most cherished dream of his people. This statement may be disappointing to those who believe that he is only banking on the Great White Chief in Washington.
He repeatedly said that the people of China will bring about changes in their own country which will give a chance to the people of Tibet to fulfill their aspirations. 

 This is a far more plausible alternative than any other, including a dead-locked dialogue between Dharamsala and Beijing. In this context, three letters addressed to President Hu Jintao by the veteran Tibetan Communist leader Phuntsok Wangyal, who had led the Chinese troops into Lhasa in September 1951, could trigger a larger debate in China once the Olympics are behind us.
Wangyal (known as Phunwang by the Tibetans) told Hu several interesting things: the Dalai Lama’s demise would only radicalize young Tibetan hardliners frustrated with his ‘middle way’ approach; he reminded the Chinese President about his own objective to establish a harmonious society; and if Hu would strive for the return of hundreds of thousands of exiled Tibetans, he could turn ‘confrontation into harmony’.
The present debate veers around the place and status of the nationalities within the People’s Republic of China.
A historical incident about the Tibetan flag gives an indication of the direction in which the question could go.
In the 80’s, I had interviewed Phuntso Tashi Takla, the Dalai Lama’s brother-in-law who was in charge of the Tibetan leader’s security when the latter visited China in 1954-55. Takla recalled: “At that time [in 1954] because the Chinese occupation of Tibet was not complete, the Chinese extended full courtesy and cooperation to the Dalai Lama. On some occasions Mao Zedong came himself to the Dalai Lama’s residence [in Beijing]. During one of the several discussions that the Dalai Lama and Mao Zedong had, they were talking on some subject, when Mao [suddenly] said: “Don’t you have a flag of your own, if you have one, you can hoist it here [on the Guest House]”.
Takla was surprised to hear Mao Zedong speaking thus.
Personally I did not immediately realize the importance of Mao’s point, but when I later read Phunwang’s biography, I understood better the incalculable implications of the Chairman’s statement.
It is worth quoting Phunwang: “One day, Mao unexpectedly came to visit the Dalai Lama at his residence… During their conversation, Mao suddenly said, "I heard that you have a national flag, do you? They do not want you to carry it, isn't that right?"
Phunwang further recalled: “Since Mao asked this with no warning that the topic was to be discussed, the Dalai Lama just replied, "We have an army flag." I thought that was a shrewd answer because it didn't say whether Tibet had a national flag. Mao perceived that the Dalai Lama was concerned by his question and immediately told him, "That is no problem. You may keep your national flag." Mao definitely said ‘national’ flag [tib. rgyal dar].
The Chairman added that in the future the Communist Party could also let Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia have their own flag. He then asked the Dalai Lama if it would it be fine for him to host the national flag of the People's Republic of China in addition to the Tibetan flag. Phunwang says that the young Lama nodded his head and said ‘yes’: “This was the most important thing that Mao told the Dalai Lama, and I was amazed to hear it” later wrote Phunwang.
His mind immediately started racing. He was not sure if Mao had discussed this with other leaders in the Politburo or if it was his own idea: “As I had always paid great attention to the Soviet Union's nationality model, I was excited because I took Mao's comment that Tibet could use its own flag to mean that China was contemplating adopting the Soviet Union's ‘Republic’ model, at least for these three large minority nationalities.”
Phunwang realized that the innocuous remark of the Great Helmsman had far reaching consequences for the future of China and particularly for the Tibetans.
Unfortunately Phuwang was arrested in April 1958; he ‘needed to cleanse his thinking'. He spent the following 18 years in solitary confinement. This gave him time to ponder about Mao’s remarks on the flag and the ‘nationalities’ issue and their place in the People’s Republic of China. His studies of Marxism led him to believe that the relationship between nationalities in a multiethnic state should be one of complete equality.
He wrote: “In socialist states, the majority nationality does not (or should not) oppress the minority nationalities. All should be equal, and there should be complete unity and cooperation among nationalities.”
The Great Han Chauvinism
Most of the problems facing China today are due to the Great Han Chauvinism. The State (or Central Government) had to guarantee the equality amongst nationalities (by not imposing Chinese language over a ‘nationality language’ such as Tibetan for example).
Phunwang was finally rehabilitated at the end of the seventies.
In the early 80’s, Phunwang managed to send a 25,000 character memo to senior Party leaders such as Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang. He stressed that the outcome of a debate on the question of nationality would have a huge impact on future work in ‘minority nationality areas’ such Tibet.
After Hu Yaobang and Deng Xiaoping instructed the officials not to remove him as a member of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, his stand seems vindicated.
In May 1980, a delegation headed by Hu Yaobang, then General Secretary of the Communist Party of China visited Lhasa. Hu Yaobang was shocked to see the level of poverty in Tibet. During a meeting with the Party cadres, he asked “whether all the money Beijing had poured into Tibet over the previous years had been thrown into the Yarlung Tsangpo [Brahmaputra] river”. He said the situation reminded him of colonialism. Soon hundreds of Chinese Han cadres were transferred back to China and Tibetan language rehabilitated. Tibet witnessed a few years of glasnost.
The debate started by Mao’s remark more than fifty years ago and reignited by Phunwang twenty years later, is still on. Will Hu Jintao and his colleagues listen to Phunwang’s point on the issue of nationalities or will the Great Han Chauvinism prevail once again?
The fate of Tibet depends on which side the wind will blow in Beijing not on CIA operations?
In the meantime, it is not advisable to go around Lhasa with a national Tibetan flag: Mao’s Thought has not percolated that much in China.

Death of a Communist

Phunwang (2nd from left) with Basu (2nd from right) in India

My  article Death of a Communist appeared in The Statesman today.

Here is the link...

What is interesting to note is that Bapa Phunwang Wangye was a Communist during his entire life, but remained a Tibetan (and a Buddhist) in his heart and till the time of his death. His last wish is to follow the traditional practices.  It does not bode well for the Party  to ‘liberate’ the population of the Land of Snows as the people hold on to their Tibetan-nessThe Life and Time of Bapa Phunwang Wangye

On March 29 early in the morning, Reuters announced the death of Bapa Phuntso Wangye (also known as Phunwang). The veteran Tibetan Communist leader, who often dared to criticize Beijing's hard-line policies towards the ‘regional nationalities’, was 91.
His son, Phunkham told the agency “He left this morning. Before his death, he was a Communist Party member. After his death, we have invited lamas to pray (for his soul) according to traditional Tibetan culture."
Though Phunwang was the founder of the Tibetan Communist Party, he became a good friend of the Dalai Lama in the mid-1950s.
His biography, “A Tibetan Revolutionary: The Political Life and Times of Bapa Phunwang Wangye” by the American scholar Melvyn Goldstein makes fascinating reading. It recounts the remarkable life of the young Communist who participated in the so-called ‘liberation’ of Tibet.
Phunwang was born into a middle-class farmer family in the small town of Batang (‘Bapa’ means ‘from Batang’ in Tibetan) in the Kham province of Eastern Tibet. At that time, Batang was ruled by Liu Wenhui, a Chinese warlord from Sichuan.
The unusual thing about Batang was the missionary school; local children could learn Tibetan, Chinese and a few words of English. It was quite a rarity in Tibet in those days. At the age of 7, Phunwang joined the school; he was a bright student, always keen to learn.
A significant incident marked his school days. A friend of his father, Kesang Tsering, an official of the Guomintang regime tried to overthrow Liu Wenhui to establish a self-ruled Kham province. The attempt badly failed but it brought Phunwang into contact with a new social philosophy, ‘Three People's Principles’ of Sun Yatsen.
Later, Phunwang thought to become a pilot. He and a friend decided to seek the recommendation of the Governor of Hunan province to join the Air Force school. Without any money, the duo boarded a train to Changsha, the province’s capital; the two penniless students roamed like beggars in the streets in search for food. Passing in front of a restaurant where rich people were dining, Phunwang had an experience which would influence his entire life: he was confronted with the deep contrast between the rich eating and living well and the famished poor sleeping in the street. They did not get admitted into the Air Force, but Phunwang decided to start studying Marx, Hegel and Lenin. His readings convinced him to start the first association of Tibetan students in Nanjing which led to his expulsion from the Institute a few months later.
He spent the next couple of years in Chongqing with an uncle. He deepened his studies of Communist theory and repeatedly contacted the Soviet Embassy and the CCP without any success. His dream was to organize a revolutionary movement in Eastern Tibet.
During the following years, he managed to meet several ‘progressive leaders’ in Kham where he attempted to organize a movement to unify the different parts of Eastern Tibet. His objective was to establish a society where all citizens would be equal. One of the main obstacles was the ‘Great Han Chauvinism’ of Chiang’s regime. With the passing months, his activities began to be known to the Guomintang authorities and he had no alternative but to take refuge in Central Tibet.
Once in Lhasa, he spoke to several aristocrats and influential people of his vision of a new Tibet and the necessity to overthrow the Nationalist warlord of Sichuan: “The key of Tibet’s future was major reform of her political system — a change that at the very least would get rid of the abuses and inequalities of the current system,” he told his biographer.
He tried to enroll young educated Tibetans who ‘wanted a change’ and started an association called Tibetan People’s Unified Alliance. At that time, he was careful not to say anything about his Communist links.
In 1944, Phunwang decided to visit India and contact the CPI; he wanted the support of the Indian Communists. As he arrived in Calcutta, he met one Comrade Basu (not Jyoti), the then Party boss in Bengal. Phunwang requested the Indian Communists to help him to go Moscow (via Kashmir and Xinjiang) or to support some guerilla warfare in Kham against the Nationalist regime. He was finally told that ‘the time had not come’ to carry out such a movement.
He returned to Lhasa in 1945, but was now labeled as a Communist and all the doors shut on him. He returned to Eastern Tibet to try once more to organize a rebellion and then again to Lhasa from where he was expelled in July 1949 along with all the Chinese living in the Tibetan capital. He was accompanied to the Indian border and eventually flew back to China.
Soon after, the tide changed in China; one province after another fell under Communist control and on October 1, Mao declared the People’s Republic of China. Phunwang decided to found the Chinese Communist Party of Kham and the Tibetan Border Area affiliated to the CCP.
In May 1951, he was instrumental in brokering a deal (known as the 17-Point Agreement) between the ‘local’ government of Tibet and the ‘central’ government in Beijing.
A few months later, when the PLA entered the Tibetan capital, Phunwang rode with 2 Chinese generals in front of the troops. Between 1951 and 1954, he worked hard to make the Tibetan government accept the fait accompli: Tibet was a Communist province of China.
Though he became very close to the central leadership in Beijing, particularly Mao, he soon discovered that some Chinese officials suffered from the same disease as the Nationalists: The Great Han Chauvinism. This disturbed him a great deal.
When the Dalai Lama visited China for a few months (in 1954/1955), Mao ordered Phunwang to accompany the Tibetan leader everywhere. During his long talks with the young Dalai Lama, Phunwang somehow convinced him of his sincerity and love for Tibet and that a dose of ‘Communism’ was a good thing for Tibet.
Phunwang continued to work for the CCP as the main advisor for Tibetan affairs during the next four years. His dream to see a modern and socialist Tibet in his life time seemed to be coming true when one day in April 1958, he was unexpectedly arrested and told that he needed to ‘cleanse his thinking’.
During the following 18 years, he was interrogated, tortured and jailed in the most atrocious conditions. The horror of these years cannot be described. He was accused of being a ‘local nationalist’.
During his 18 years in jail (including 9 more years in solitary confinement), he did not receive a single visitor nor was he informed about from his wife and children. The only way to not lose his mental balance was to study. As he was allowed Communist literature only, he took the opportunity to deepen his knowledge of the Marxist theory and became a great expert on the subject of ‘nationalities’ within the PRC. 
He was finally rehabilitated at the end of the seventies when Deng Xiaoping took over China.
What is interesting to note is that he was a Communist during his entire life, but remained a Tibetan (and a Buddhist) in his heart and at the time of his death; his last wish is to follow the traditional practices.
It does not bode well for the Party which has been tried for more than 60 years, to ‘liberate’ the population of the Land of Snows as the people hold on to their Tibetan-ness.

Is Religion a Positive Factor or a Poison?

Bapa Phuntsok Wangye (Phunwang)

I am reposting another article on Phunwang who passed away on Sunday morning in Beijing.
Though he lived his entire life as a communist, Phunwang wanted 'lamas' to pray for his smooth passage on the 'other side'.
It is interesting.

As I mentioned in another post a couple of weeks back, Yu Zhengsheng. the newly-elected member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo will probably replace Jia Qingling as the Chairman of Central Working Coordination Small Group on Tibet.
Yu has started overlooking the activities of the United Front Department.
While meeting major 'national religious groups' in Beijing this week, Yu called religion a 'positive force'.
He particularly mentioned the usefulness of religion in promoting economic and social development. He said that "efforts are needed to make religion conducive to national development and the improvement of religious adherents' material and spiritual lives".
It is a long way since Mao told to the Dalai Lama that 'religion is a poison'.
Is there a meeting point between the Chinese point of view and the Dalai Lama's?
At the end of the 1970s, beginning of the 1980s, there was certainly a possibility of dialogue. One example is the encounter by the old Tibetan Communist leader Bapa Phuntsok Wangyal and the Dalai Lama's representatives in Beijing in 1979/80.
Phuntsok Wangyal [Phuntso Wangye for the Chinese] wrote a "Summary of Talks Between Phuntso Wangye (Chinese Communist Party Member) and the Delegation of Returning Tibetans and Personages".
On September 2O, 1980, it was published Materials for the Study of Theory (The Theory Study Office of the Central Party School). Here is an extract:

I mentioned that I came to understand the Dalai Lama over many years of acquaintance, and he also understands me. Although we have different world views, we both eagerly hope that our backward Tibetan nation will prosper and the people will be happy along with other nationalities. Although we have lived apart for more than twenty years, I am convinced that his wish has grown stronger and more determined. He not only enjoys traditional prestige and has the most devout belief in the eyes and hearts of the Tibetans. …(Mr. Phuntso Tashi interrupted: The fact that we were warmly welcomed by the people and that the Dalai Lama was warmly received by Mongolians in Outer Mongolia is evidence of this.) Personally, I respect the Dalai Lama, as mentioned above, because he can elevate himself above extremely high secular prestige and has lofty beliefs. For these reasons, when his second-eldest brother, Mr. Gyalo Thondup, visited Beijing the last time and solicited my advice on his behalf, I analyzed the situation both at home and abroad and frankly suggested, "You should put an end to the isolation from the government of the PRC, initiate dialogues, and send some people back to look around and listen. It wouldn't hurt even if the Dalai Lama himself comes back to look around and listen sometimes." Any choice should be based on an understanding of the basic conditions and entire situation. I heard that the Dalai Lama's third-eldest brother, Lobsang Samden, had visited Hong Kong and explained to the central government about the Dalai Lama's attending the Peace Conference in Mongolia via the Soviet Union. I am very happy that you are here and that you all are major leaders. I have heard about your trip to the Tibetan areas. The enthusiasm of the masses provides answers to many questions that deserve to be pondered. I heard that when they met with you again yesterday, Vice President [of the United Front Department] Li Xiannian and Vice Chairman Ulanhu said, "There are flaws and mistakes in our work in Tibet, and we will correct them." I personally think that the remarks are sincere and responsible to the interests of the people, including our Tibetan people, as well as you. I believe that you can correctly understand the meaning and spirit of the talks of central government leaders.

If Yu Zhengsheng truly believes that religion can play a positive role for China's development, he should invite the Dalai Lama in Beijing and discuss a closer cooperation between the Tibetan Buddhist leader and the Chinese State.
Will he have the courage to take this Great Leap Forward?

Bapa Phuntsok Wangyal and Xi Zhongxun

Gyalo Thondup (Dalai Lama's brother),
the Panchen Lama and Phuntsok Wangyal

Here again an old piece on Bapa Phuntsok Wangyal republished.

Bapa Phuntsok Wangyal, alias Phüntso Wangye, alias Phünwang was the first Tibetan Communist in the 1930’s. He was arrested and accused to be a ‘local nationalist’ in 1958 and rehabilitated at the end of the 1970’s. 
In 1980, he decided to participate to the redrafting of the Chinese Constitution. During his 18 years in confinement, he had become extremely knowledgeable about the issue of ‘nationalities’ of the People Republic of China. Unfortunately, his report did not please everybody.
In 1982, he was called by Li Weihan who had been the first principal of the Party School of the Central Committee in the 1930’s and headed the Chinese delegation during the Seventeen-Point Agreement (1951) with Tibet.
Li was a senior Party Leader involved in nationalities affairs.

This excerpt of A Tibetan Revolutionary — The Political Life and Times of Bapa Phüntso Wangye is fascinating. It shows:
1- The inner-Party  manipulations, even at a time when Communist China was opening up.
2- The functioning of the Party at the highest level of the hierarchy and the way to find solutions to tricky ideological issues.
3- The important role of Xi Zhongxun, father of Vice-President Xi Jinping in 'Tibetan' and 'nationalities' affairs.
I have given a short description of the persona between [].

[Excerpts of A Tibetan Revolutionary — The Political Life and Times of Bapa Phüntso Wangye]
Before long, Li Weihan came in, helped by two people. He was eighty-six and not in good health (he was living in a hospital and would die two years later, in August 1984). He had been attacked and demoted during the Cultural Revolution, and this was the first time he had been at the United Front Work Department since his rehabilitation. I was moved when I saw him and immediately rose, shook his hand, and told him how sorry I was to have been the cause of his having to come today.
Then we all sat down, and the meeting started.
"Phünwang," Li Weihan began, "thirty-one years ago you made a great contribution by helping to bring about the Seventeen-Point Agreement and the return of Tibet to the great motherland. But recently, people are saying that your understanding of Marxist theory is seriously flawed. I have examined what you said and have written a report about it. Have you seen that report?"
"Yes," I said, "I received the document and I have looked at it." Then I took out the statement I had prepared and read it.
I could tell from their expressions that Yang Jingren [head of the State Nationalities Affairs Commission in the early 1980’s] and the others were displeased when I said that I would not respond to Li's criticisms at this time. I directed my next remarks to Li.
"Director Li," I said, "you have just said that thirty-one years ago I made a great contribution. Do you know what happened to me after that?"
"No. Please tell me."
"Not long after my great contribution," I said, "I was accused of being a 'local nationalist' and imprisoned for eighteen years."
"Were you really imprisoned for eighteen years?" he asked. "You must have suffered terribly." He seemed stunned and said he hadn't known. At that time, he himself had been under attack, so probably he hadn't heard about any of it.
Yang Jingren and the others didn't like this turn of events at all, and Yang interrupted.
"Phünwang," he said sharply, "you promised to prepare a detailed written response. When, may we ask, will that be?"
"You have written a ten-thousand-character document," I said coolly.
"It will take me some time to study it and respond."
"It will take some time, will it?" Yang hissed angrily. "You don't seem to realize that you have not been accused of minor mistakes. Li Weihan is a famous Marxist theoretician. He is the one who has criticized your ideas, and so your mistakes are extremely serious. Moreover, it is Deng Xiaoping who is really confronting you today. He was too busy to come himself, so he asked Xi Zhongxun [vice chairman of the National People's Congress and father of Xi Jinping] to handle the matter for him, and Xi is the one who chose Li Weihan to examine your writings."
I did not lose my composure. I simply said, as if it were the most obvious thing in the world, that it would be difficult to specify a time when I would be finished with my detailed response. "Director Li has thought carefully about his criticisms, and his points deserve equally careful examination."
At that, they all spoke at once, all trying to criticize and attack me, until finally Li intervened.
"Listen, everyone, please!" he said with some emotion. "I believe Phünwang should be given time to write his opinions in full. He may criticize my report or even rebut it, and he should be given all the time he needs to do it."
He paused and then smiled, saying, "I am pleased today. When I came, I thought I would have to argue with Phünwang, but we got along very well. Now let's all go to eat."
He took my hand as we left the room, and I sat beside him at the meal.
My strategy had worked. They had wanted to attack me at the meeting and afterward report either that I accepted my mistakes or that I tried to argue back. I would have lost either way. If I had accepted my errors, they would have said that I was persuaded of my mistakes by Li Weihan.
If I hadn't, they would have said that Li Weihan advised me kindly and tried his best to educate me, but I stubbornly refused to listen. However, because Li himself made the suggestion that I be given more time and clearly seemed to have affection for me, there was nothing they could do, and so the meeting was concluded.
A week after the meeting, I sent a letter to Hu Yaobang [Secretary General of the CCP]. By then, I had begun my detailed response, and I estimated now that it would take some weeks to finish. So I sent Hu something brief to explain that Li's report had many points that were not factually accurate, and to request that the Central Committee investigate it carefully. I wanted to buy myself some more time, and I didn't want the only voices he heard to be those of my enemies.
It took several more weeks to finish my response, which ended up containing twenty-five thousand characters. I sent it to Li Weihan and also to Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, Xi Zhongxun, and others because I was afraid that Yang Jingren wouldn't allow my comments to be passed along. I therefore thought that I had assured myself a fair hearing at the highest levels. I soon found out differently.
On July 27 1982, Li Weihan sent a letter to Deng Xiaoping, along with a brief summary of our meeting, his ten-thousand-character document, and my one-page response-but not my full-length rebuttal. I learned that Deng Xiaoping himself saw all these documents and sent them to Hu Yaobang with a note saying, "Comrade Li Weihan has made a good presentation. Please distribute these documents to each member of the Central Committee and to the officials of the Secretariat of the Central Committee.” Hu did so, in accordance with Comrade Deng's order.
I was, of course, upset because the documents now being distributed at the highest levels did not contain my full-length response to Li's criticisms. I subsequently wrote letters requesting that my complete response be read together with Li's comments, and I went to visit Li in the hospital, because I had suspicions I hoped to confirm.
I found him sitting on a sofa. I shook his hand, sat down next to him, and said, "Director Li, you knew me well. I served under you in 1951 and in 1953. I have the greatest respect for you. If I had made mistakes in my thoughts and you had critiqued me honestly, I would have listened to you. I believe, however, that the ten-thousand-character critique was made by the people who put me in prison in the past. Now they want to attack me again. They are using your name to attack me, and I believe that you never saw all of the things I wrote. Therefore, I felt I had no choice but to respond strongly to your critique. But I want you to know that my comments are not aimed at you but at them." He didn't say yes or no, he just nodded his head.
Then things got worse. The packet of materials-again without my response-was sent to Yin Fatang, the head of the party in Tibet [between 1980 and 1985]. Yin immediately distributed it to the members of the TAR Party Leaders Committee and called a big meeting to discuss it. Many Tibetan and Han officials criticized me strongly at this meeting. Only Yangling Dorje did not follow the party line [born in 1931 in Kham, Yangling Dorjee became a member of the Communist Party at the age of eighteen. In the 1980s, he rose to levels of Party to which few Tibetans have access; he however continued to make forthright remarks about the system]. I was told later that he stood up and said, "If Director Li is correct, then Phünwang has made a serious mistake. However, in the one-page letter Phünwang submitted, he said that many things in Li's essay are not factually correct and that he will submit a detailed written argument that responds to these inaccuracies. I think we need to read Phünwang's response to know the whole story."
Yin Fatang did not appreciate Yangling Dorje's interference, calling his attitude ambiguous and later accusing him of being my ‘representative’ in Tibet. Yin went on to distribute the materials to officials at the county level, where more meetings were held to attack me. It was a smear campaign, and it was extremely troubling.
In Beijing, I wrote several letters to the Central Committee telling them that I had written a twenty-five-thousand-character response to Li Weihan's ten-thousand-character essay and suggested that they ought to be evaluating the two arguments because this was not a trivial debate. Until now, I said bluntly, there had been no comparable debate in the party on nationality affairs. I stressed that the outcome was likely to have a huge impact on future work in minority nationality areas, and I therefore requested that the Central Committee set up a small investigation group to evaluate both Li's and my arguments. I sent letters making the same request to Deng Xiaoping and Hu Yaobang.
While waiting for an answer and preparing to attend the Sixth National People's Congress (which was to start in mid-1983), I got another shock. One day, quite by accident, I met Wang Guangmei, the widow of Liu Shaoqi [former PRC President]. She told me that my name was not on the list of Sichuan delegates. I didn't pay this much attention, since what she said seemed impossible, but the following week, I met her again and she reiterated that she had checked and my name was not on the list. "You should pay attention to this," she said. This time I did.
Since I was a deputy party secretary of the Nationalities Committee of the National People's Congress, I had access to the list of representatives. As she had warned, I found that my name was missing and realized that this was another attempt to push me aside. Angry and frustrated, I immediately called Xi Zhongxun and asked for a meeting.
Xi, who was one of the top leaders in the party and a member of the Politburo, didn't know what I was talking about.
"No changes have been planned," he said. "You are still a member of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and a deputy party secretary of the Nationalities Committee."
"Then why has my name been dropped from the list of Sichuan representatives?" I asked.
Instead of responding, he turned to the lists, I think to show me that my fears were groundless. But the lists were so long-filling between ten and fifteen volumes that while I sat sipping a glass of tea, he stopped searching through them and called Yang Jingren directly.
"What happened to Phünwang's status as a delegate to the National People's Congress from Sichuan?" he asked bluntly. "Did you forget to put his name on the list?"
"I reported this to you some time ago," Yang said smoothly. "That report was so long I didn't read it all. Can you tell me what happened?"
"As you know," said Yang, "Phünwang has been accused of being one of three people harming the party's work in Tibet. Then there were his comments about adding nationality clauses to the constitution, and finally there was the debate with Li Weihan. For these reasons, I have withdrawn him from the coming National People's Congress and instead have placed him as a candidate for membership on the Standing Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference."
"Why didn't you discuss such an important thing with me first?" Xi said angrily. "And why did you bury an important decision like this under thousands of names on your endless list?" He paused, and continued, "You made a big mistake. Phünwang's position should not be changed. I am going to report this to Hu Yaobang! You must reinstate Phünwang immediately. Do you understand?"
After the phone call, I had a serious talk with Xi.
"Till now," I said, "I have never asked for a personal favor. However, as you can plainly see, the people who attacked me before are attacking me again. I have a right to be a delegate for the Tibetan people to the National People's Congress. You said just now that you will report this matter to Hu Yaobang. I will also report this to Hu-and to Deng Xiaoping himself if necessary-and I will fight to represent the Tibetan people."
After I left Xi, I did write letters, and so, I believe, did Xi. And before long, Hu Yaobang and Deng Xiaoping sent a message informing me that they had instructed Yang Jingren not to change my position as a member of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. The decision meant a great deal to me, and soon my fortunes began to improve on another front.
My detailed criticisms of Li Weihan's report posed a difficult problem for the party. Li had made his judgments on behalf of the Central Committee, which in a sense meant that he represented Deng Xiaoping. Thus, if the Central Committee said I was right, it meant Li-and by extension Deng-was wrong. They came up with an interesting solution.
At the National People's Congress, Xi Zhongxun, representing the Central Committee, made a speech introducing the members of the Standing Committee. When he introduced me, he praised me as a party member who had done good revolutionary work for many years. "He has made a great contribution," he said, and then he added, "In our party, there are different thoughts on ideology, and according to the party's constitution, one has the right to hold different views." He didn't mention my name, but what he was talking about was clear to those who knew of the dispute. And it was now clear to me what the Central Committee had done. Indirectly and cleverly they had declared that Li Weihan and I had the right to hold our different views. It was not necessary to decide whether one was right and one wrong. I wasn't declared right, but in this battle of criticism and debate, I felt I had won a victory against enormous odds. Not only had the party leadership declined to support the attack on my views, but they also sent a message that people in the party like me were free to speak their minds.
I also had an impact on the constitution al front. I didn't get the specific clauses I had suggested accepted, but I was able to persuade Peng Zhen, Politburo member and chairman of the National People's Congress (and de facto head of the Constitution Revisions Committee), to phrase a section of the preamble so that the word "equality" preceded the words "unity" and "cooperation." I thought this made a big difference in orientation because without equality first there cannot be unity. The final version approved on December 4, 1982, said, "The People's Republic of China is a unitary multinational state created jointly by the people of all its nationalities. Socialist relations of equality, unit y, and mutual assistance have been established among the nationalities and will continue to be strengthened." [The previous 1978 constitution had said only, "The unit y between all nationalities of the country should be strengthened.")
On the other main front-the "three enemies of the party" campaign against me-I also eventually was vindicated.
In spring 1984, a number of TAR officials (including Yin Fatang, Ragdi [later Executive Deputy Secretary of the Tibet Communist Party and the highest ranking Tibetan in the Tibet Autonomous  Region in the1990’s], and Yangling Dorje) came to Beijing. During this visit, Yangling Dorje met with Premier Zhao Ziyang, whom he knew well from their days together in Sichuan. At their meeting, Zhao asked him about Tibet, and Yangling Dorje told him frankly, "After the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Party in 1978, the whole nation shifted its priority away from political struggle to issues concerning economic development. However, Yin Fatang and others in Lhasa continued to proceed on the assumption that in Tibet the priority was political struggle. They have said that the primary targets of this political struggle are the Dalai Lama, the Panchen Lama, and Phünwang. They also criticized Phünwang's views on nationality theory without even reading his response to Li Weihan."
"What is going on in Tibet is wrong," Zhao said. "Economic development is the work priority for the nation-including Tibet. Phünwang and the Panchen Lama are both our people, and we are trying to win over the Dalai Lama. Therefore, it is wrong to make them objects of political attack."
The next day, Yangling Dorje went to see Hu Yaobang, and when Hu heard what he had to say, he became angry. "Economic development is the priority of the whole nation," he said. "Because of class struggle, our country has had very hard times. If we do not pay attention to economic development in Tibet and improve the people's living conditions there, we will never achieve the kinds of political results we want." He also said that it was wrong to single out three people and make them targets of political struggle.
I didn't know about any of this until one afternoon when there was a knock on my door. It was Yangling Dorje, and he was smiling broadly.
"A rag, he said [a rag is a term of greeting that means roughly "my friend" in Khampa dialects), "I no longer need to be afraid to visit." (He meant, of course, that while I was under political attack, it was a risk for anyone to seem too close to me.)
"Today," he continued, "I bring two swords in my hands. One is from Hu Yaobang, and the other is from Zhao Ziyang. They are the ones who have asked me to visit you." He then proceeded to tell me about Hu's and Zhao's responses.
Not long after these events, the Central Committee actually criticized Yin Fatang publicly for his attack on the "three enemies," and then one day in early April 1984, Yin Fatang, Ragdi, Yangling Dorje, and Dorje Tseden [a top Tibetan cadre in the TAR government] unexpectedly came to see me. They came to tell me that the Central Committee had told them their campaign against me was wrong. They had visited the Panchen Lama yesterday, and today they had come to apologize to me. They admitted they had made a mistake!
It was more than I ever dreamed would happen.
Finally, in the fall of 1985, I also got closure on the status of our Tibetan Communist Party. When I had contacted the Chinese Communist Party in Yunnan in 1949, the local party leader agreed to accept me and the others in my party as members of the CCP but said that the date when our party membership should start would have to be decided later by the Central Committee. It was the mid-198os now. Many of our members were close to retirement, and there was still confusion about the date at which their party membership had begun. Therefore, the United Front Work Department and the State Nationalities Affairs Commission conducted an investigation and reported their results to the Central Committee.
In a document that was signed by Xi Zhongxun, Hu Qili [from 1982 to 1987, director of General Office and a member of the Political Bureau of CPC Central Committees], and others, the Central Committee determined that after I met with Ye Jianying [Army general, Ye assisted Liu Bocheng in directing the crossing of the Yangtze River at Anshunchang and Luding Bridge during the Long March; he was appointed director of the offices that liaised with the KMT after 1936. Later he became Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress from 1978 to 1983] in Chongqing in 1940, I established a Communist Party in Tartsedo and Lhasa and enrolled many members. My revolutionary work therefore officially began in 1940. I thought that they should consider my relationship with the Chinese Communist Party to have started when I met with Ye Jianying in 1940, but they said that because Ye Jianying, who was then in his nineties, could not remember our meetings, they did not accept us as part of the CCP until 1949, when I arrived in Yunnan. I decided not to contest this. I was satisfied that they had officially recognized our Tibetan party as a Communist Party, and it did not matter to me whether it belonged to the Soviet Communist Party or the Chinese Communist Party or was its own Tibetan party.
And so events had finally come full circle. I had not only been rehabilitated, but now my revolutionary work since 1940 had been accepted. The terrible years in prison could not be wiped away, but the historical record was now clean.

Tibetan Flag and Phunwang

Phuntso Wangye, the veteran Tibetan Communist leader, an outspoken critic of Beijing's hardline policies towards Tibet died yesterday in Beijing.
He was 91.
"Phuntso's son, Phunkham, told Reuters "He left this morning. Before his death, he was a Communist Party member. After his death, we have invited lamas to pray (for his soul) according to traditional Tibetan culture."
The Dalai Lama was probably immediately informed of the death of his former translator.


A couple of years ago, I wrote an article on an interesting story about the Tibetan flag. It is reproduced below: 

Reuters recently published a fascinating piece of information. Phuntso Wangye, a veteran Tibetan Party leader would have written a series of three letters to President Hu Jintao. Wangye is not an ordinary Tibetan; in the forties, he was the first Tibetan Communist and in September 1951, he led the Chinese troops into Lhasa.
In his letter Phunwang told Hu that Beijing was mistaken to believe that the Tibetan issue will be solved with the death of the present Dalai Lama: "Any notion of delaying the problem until after the 14th Dalai Lama dies a natural death is not only naive, it is also unwise and especially tactically wrong."
On the contrary, he warned the Chinese leadership who read his letters that the Tibetan leader’s demise would only radicalize young Tibetan hardliners frustrated with his ‘middle way’ approach.
He reminded the Chinese President about his own objective to establish a harmonious society. If he strived for the return of hundreds of thousands of exiled Tibetans, he could turn ‘confrontation into harmony’.
Phunwang concluded: "wrong leftist policies continue on ethnic and religious issues, especially in Tibet… it should cease.”
This reminded me of a talk that I had some 10 years ago with Phuntso Tashi Taklha who was the Kusum Depon, in charge of the Dalai Lama’s security when the Tibetan leader visited China in 1954. Taklha told me: “At that time [in 1954] because the Chinese occupation of Tibet was not complete, the Chinese extended full courtesy and cooperation to the Dalai Lama. On some occasions Mao Zedong came himself to the Dalai Lama’s residence [in Beijing]. During one of the several discussions that the Dalai Lama and Mao Zedong had, they were talking on some subject, when Mao [suddenly] said: “Don’t you have a flag of your own, if you have one you can hoist it here”. Mao Zedong spoke like that. This I never told anybody before.”
I must admit that I did not immediately realize the importance of Mao’s point, but when I later read Phunwang’s biography, I understood better the incalculable implications of the Chairman’s statement.
It is worth quoting Phunwang: “One day, Mao unexpectedly came to visit the Dalai Lama at his residence… During their conversation, Mao suddenly said, "I heard that you have a national flag, do you? They do not want you to carry it, isn't that right?"
‘They’ were Zhang Jingwu, Zhang Guohua and Fan Ming, senior Chinese officials involved in Tibetan Affairs
Phunwang recalled: “Since Mao asked this with no warning that the topic was to be discussed, the Dalai Lama just replied, "We have an army flag." I thought that was a shrewd answer because it didn't say whether Tibet had a national flag. Mao perceived that the Dalai Lama was concerned by his question and immediately told him, "That is no problem. You may keep your national flag." Mao definitely said ‘national’ flag [tib. rgyal dar]. "In the future," he said, "we can also let Xinjiang have their own flag, and Inner Mongolia, too. Would it be okay to carry the national flag of the People's Republic of China in addition to that flag? Would that be all right?" The Dalai Lama nodded his head yes. This was the most important thing that Mao told the Dalai Lama, and I was amazed to hear it.
The Tibetan communist continued: “My mind was racing. I didn't know whether Mao had discussed this with other leaders in the Politburo or whether he mentioned it on his own. As I had always paid great attention to the Soviet Union's nationality model, I was excited because I took Mao's comment that Tibet could use its own flag to mean that China was contemplating adopting the Soviet Union's ‘Republic’ model, at least for these three large minority nationalities. That's why I thought it was something new and very important.”
This remark had a deep impact on Phuwang who one day of April 1958 was unexpectedly arrested; he was just informed that he needed to 'cleanse his thinking'. During the following 18 years, he was interrogated, tortured and jailed in the most atrocious conditions. He was finally rehabilitated at the end of the seventies.
After his rehabilitation, he continued to ponder on the isuues of nationalities within the People’s Republic of China. His personal belief was that the relationship between nationalities in a multiethnic state was supposed to be one of complete equality.
He thought: “from the Marxist standpoint, the struggle of minority nationalities against oppression by the majority nationality is correct and justified because there is no equality. In the absence of true equality, ‘splittism’ is a valid response for minority nationalities.” He had himself experienced for years of ‘Great Han Chauvinism’.
His contention was: “In socialist states, the majority nationality does not (or should not) oppress the minority nationalities. All should be equal, and there should be complete unity and cooperation among nationalities.”
This had a serious corollary for Tibet and other nationalities: the State had to guarantee the equality amongst nationalities (among other things, by not imposing Han language over ‘nationality language’ such Tibetan).
In the 80’s, when he elaborated on his theory, he again got into trouble. For several years, he was severely ‘criticized’ by leading members of the Party; Li Fatang, then Party Secretary in Tibet was one of them. Finally he managed to send a 25,000 character note to senior Party leaders such as Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang and Li Weihan (who had signed the 17-Point Agreement with Tibet). While stressing that the outcome of a debate on the question of nationality would have a huge impact on future work in ‘minority nationality areas’ such Tibet, he told bluntly the leaders: “there had been no comparable debate in the party on nationality affairs.”
While many in the Party wanted to show him the door, Hu Yaobang and Deng Xiaoping instructed the officials not to remove him as a member of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. In a way, his stand was vindicated and in December 1982, he felt proud that the new Chinese Constitution stated: “Socialist relations of equality, unity, and mutual assistance have been established among the nationalities and will continue to be strengthened."
Slowly China became less rigid and in 1984, Zhao Ziyang told the Tibetan Party leaders: "Economic development is the work priority for the nation - including Tibet. Phunwang and the Panchen Lama are both our people and we are trying to win over the Dalai Lama. Therefore, it is wrong to make them objects of political attack."
Hu Yaobang, the Party boss agreed with Zhao: "Economic development is the priority of the whole nation… our country has had very hard times. If we do not pay attention to economic development in Tibet and improve the people's living conditions there, we will never achieve the kinds of political results we want."
He also said that it was wrong to single out three people (the Dalai Lama, the Panchen Lama and Phunwang) and make them targets of political struggle.
The debate started by Mao’s remark more than fifty years ago and reignited by Phunwang twenty years back, is still on. Will Hu Jintao and his colleagues get Phunwang’s point on the issue of nationalities or will the Great Han Chauvinism prevail once again? Perhaps the fate of the Dalai Lama’s ‘middle path’ approach and his representative’s dialogue with the United Front Department depends on which side the wind will blow in Beijing?
But it is still not advisable to go around the Bakhor with a Tibetan flag: Mao’s Thought has not percolated as yet in Tibet.

Will Beijing allow the Dalai Lama's return

[standing] Phuntsok Tashi, Panchen Lama, Ngabo, Phunwang, Juchen Thubten Namgyal

The 92-year-old Bapa Phunsok Wangye (alias Phunwang) is again in the news. His new book, published by New Century Press in Hong Kong has just been released.
Earlier, the CCP’s General Secretary Zhao Ziyang’s memoirs had also been distributed by the same firm.
In his autobiography titled A Long Way to Equality and Unity, Phunwang apparently pleads with Beijing to compromise with Dharamsala and to allow the Dalai Lama’s return to Tibet.
According to The South China Morning Post, the book says: “Phunwang appealed to former President Hu Jintao and several members of the Communist Party Politburo Standing Committee to allow the hundreds of thousands of exiled Tibetan compatriots headed by the Dalai Lama to return home, live and work in peace”.
Similar appeals were ignored by Beijing in the past.
In a chapter titled, ‘We cannot walk the road towards a Chinese Empire’, Phunwang warns the Chinese government that it should not rely on violence and economic development to rule over Tibet.
The Publisher in Hong Kong explained that Phunwang’s health has been deteriorating quickly. “He couldn’t proofread the book anymore, this is why we have to publish the full version of the book as it is.”
A return of the Dalai Lama to Tibet is a Dream, but not a Chinese Dream.

On July 28, 1981, while in Beijing, Gyalo Thondup, the Dalai Lama brother, met the CCP General Secretary Hu Yaobang who gave him the parameters of future negotiations.
The Chinese issued a policy statement: only the status of the Dalai Lama and his future role in case he returned to the ‘motherland’ can be discussed. Here is the text of the 1981 Five-Point Communiqué from Beijing:

1. The Dalai Lama should be confident that China has entered a new stage of long-term political stability, steady economic growth and mutual help among all nationalities.
2. The Dalai Lama and his representatives should be frank and sincere with the Central Government, not beat around the bush. There should be no more quibbling over the events in 1959.
3. The central authorities sincerely welcome the Dalai Lama and his followers to come back to live. This is based on the hope that they will contribute to upholding China's unity and promoting solidarity between the Han and Tibetan nationalities, and among all nationalities, and the modernization programme.
4. The Dalai Lama will enjoy the same political status and living conditions as he had before 1959. It is suggested that he not go to live in Tibet or hold local posts there. Of course, he may go back to Tibet from time to time. His followers need not worry about their jobs and living conditions. These will only be better than before.
5. When the Dalai Lama wishes to come back, he can issue a brief statement to the press. It is up to him to decide what he would like to say in the statement.

Nothing was said about the Tibetan people and the legal status of Tibet.
A couple of years later, when the Dalai Lama expressed the wish to visit Tibet, this was rejected by Beijing.
Here are excerpts of my book: The Negotiations that never were.
It shows that Phunwang’s wishes may not materialize soon, though the Dalai Lama has since then dropped the idea of ‘independence’.
You can also read my article on Phunwang and the Tibetan Flag.

The First Political Contacts
In April 1982, a delegation comprising Juchen Thubten Namgyal, the senior most ministers of the Kashag, Phuntsok Tashi and Lodi Gyari left for Beijing for preliminary talks with the Chinese authorities. Their first demand was the reunification of the three traditional provinces of Tibet (Kham, Amdo and U-Tsang) under a common administration.
…Juchen Thubten Namgyal [later] explained: “We discussed with three Chinese officials of the United Front Work Department. One of the objectives was to enquire about the letter sent by the Dalai Lama to Deng.”
The three fact-finding delegations went to Tibet on the basis of 1978 Deng Xiaoping’s 1978 statement (“It is better to see once than to hear a hundred times”), while the purpose of the visit of Juchen Thubten and his colleagues to Beijing was to hold discussions on the future of Tibet.
The Envoys first discussed the nine-point offer from the Communists to the Kuomintang regime in Taiwan. Beijing had proposed that 3 important issues politics, finance and defense could remain with the Formosans. All other subjects could be shared. When the Tibetan representatives raised the ‘one-country, two-system’ formula that Beijing was ready to grant to Taiwan and Hong Kong, the Chinese bluntly refused and said that it was not applicable to Tibet which had already been ‘liberated’ by the 17 Point Agreement.
Namgyal recalls that many believed at that time that the ‘Taiwan’ formula, providing local autonomy, could be the basis for a solution to the Tibet issue.
This formula was a proof that Beijing did not want to impose a communist regime on the rebel island. Namgyal recalled: “At a time the Taiwanese people (themselves Chinese by race) were granted this by the Communist regime; we, as [non-Chinese] asked logically for more liberties for the people of Tibet.”
The Tibetan delegates insisted on the reunification of the 3 provinces: “I made this point very clear to the Chinese officials, the way of thinking and the way of acting of the Communist government of China is not correct. The Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) has a population of 1,700,000 and Karze (located outside the TAR in Kham province), has a population of 800,000 people. They have been [administratively] forced to join with [mainland] China who are 1 billion people. This is not correct. The Tibetan people are poles apart from the Chinese, they are totally different and they are forced to stay together under the Sichuan [administration]. Why should they stay together?”
The Chinese answered: “Taiwan has to be liberated, you cannot argue by using the case of Taiwan. Tibet has already been liberated 33 years ago and decisions have already been made. It is because Taiwan has not been liberated, that we made this nine-point offer. It is not the case for Tibet.”
The ‘negotiations’ lasted more than a month. At the end the Chinese asked: “Are you taking these positions because you are representatives of the Dalai Lama or as representatives of the Tibetan Government in exile? If you are saying all this as representatives of the Tibetan Government in exile, we have nothing to say to you?”
Clearly, the Chinese authorities wanted to stick to the 5-point plan for the Dalai Lama and did not want to discuss the fate or rights of the Tibetan people. The Chinese have kept the same position since then, even today more than 27 years after the first dialogue [my book was published in 2009]. Beijing does not recognize the existence of the Tibetan government in exile or the Tibetan Assembly.
…Around that same time, General Secretary Hu Yaobang came more and more under the conservatives’ pressure. This appeared in the agenda of China's Second Work Forum on Tibet, held in Beijing in March-April 1984. Hu Yaobang had to announce that Beijing had decided to encourage Hans to settle in Tibet. Hu further confirmed that there would no change in the "Five-point Policy toward the Dalai Lama". It was obvious that the leadership in Beijing was no longer interested to see the Dalai Lama back in China.
A month later, the Tibetan Autonomous Region's Party boss Yin Fatang accused the Dalai Lama of treason. If he wanted to return, he would have to admit his ‘mistakes' first.
In October 1984, the same Tibetan delegation returned to Beijing. In the meantime the Dalai Lama had expressed his wish to visit Tibet in 1985. Though the 1984 talks were the follow-up of the 1982 visit, the main subject of the discussions was the proposed visit of the Dalai Lama to his native land.
During the talks, Juchen Thubten Namgyal and his colleagues asked that the Tibetan people should be given the right of self determination. Their argument was the Tibetan people enjoy all the qualifications for the purpose. The Tibetans told their Chinese interlocutors that the Communist Party had passed a resolution in 1931 stating that all minorities, especially the Mongolians and the Tibetans had the right, either to stay with China or to get self determination or even to secede and get independence. They pointed out that in 1946 Mao Zedong had repeated the same proposal.
Regarding the Dalai Lama’s visit to Tibet, the Chinese told the Tibetans that he was most welcome, though no foreign press people should accompany him. Moreover, they could not invite him in 1985. There was “a lot of construction inside Tibet at that time, there were 42 sites of construction in 6 districts”. Further, the preparations for the 20th anniversary of the Tibetan Autonomous Region were going on in full swing. The Chinese authorities in Tibet were too busy to receive the Dalai Lama!
About self-determination, they pointed out that though it was true that a resolution was passed in 1931, at that time the Communist Party was a small child. Now the Party had grown and the circumstances had changed. Further in 1931, the resolution was passed under some external pressure. A final decision had been taken during a Congress meeting held in Nanjing in 1957. The problems of the minorities were discussed; the Chinese officials added that some Tibetan representatives were even present.
…The final conclusion from the Tibetan envoy was: “We can see today that the Tibetans are not happy in Tibet, though you have done a lot to improve their condition, you have not taken care of their [deeper] aspiration. In this, you have failed.”

Thirty years later, nothing much has changed.

Phunwang on Autonomy

Gyalo Thondup, the Panchen Lama and Phunwang

When Chinese President Hu Jintao met with Tibetan so-called deputies during the Fifth Session of the 11th National People's Congress (NPC) on March 9, he once again stressed "national integrity, ethnic unity and social stability in Tibet".
Hu Jintao told the delegates: "Stability and harmony should be maintained in Tibet, while social management being enhanced and improved."
He has probably his own understanding of 'social management', but the real question remains: is President Hu ready to implement the Constitution of the People's Republic of China?
As pointed by Bapa Phuntsok Wangyal, the 'first' Tibetan Communist in this Wikileaks cable: "a high level of autonomy is perfectly consistent with the PRC Constitution".
The present leadership will probably continue to stick to its guns and use repression as the best mean for 'social management'.
Will the new leadership (who will take over in October.November) be different?
A billion yuan question.

SUBJECT:TIBET COMMUNIST PARTY FOUNDER DECRIES REJECTION OF AUTONOMY PROPOSAL
DATE 2008-11-14 00:00:00
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
ORIGIN: Embassy BeijingXT:

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor
Aubrey Carlson. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
-------
1. (C) Phuntsok WANGYAL (protect), the founder of the Tibetan Communist Party, decried the lack of progress in talks between Chinese officials and envoys of the Dalai Lama in a November 7 meeting with PolOff. The Chinese government, he argued, should not be so quick to denounce Tibetan proposals for autonomy as an attempt to achieve "covert independence." A high level of autonomy is perfectly consistent with the PRC Constitution, he said. Phuntsok WANGYAL predicted that, despite the stalemated talks with China, Tibetan
exiles will decide to maintain the Dalai Lama's "Middle Way" approach at their conference in India later this month. Conditions for Tibetans in China, he added, have become difficult since the March 14 riots, and discrimination against minorities reached new highs during the Olympic Games. End Summary.

Background
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2. (C) PolOff spoke November 7 with Tibetan Communist Party Founder Phuntsok WANGYAL (protect), who is popularly known by the short form of his name, "Phunwang." As a young revolutionary, Phunwang assisted in China's "peaceful liberation" of Tibet and from 1951 to 1958 was the top Tibetan cadre in the region. Following the Tibetan uprising in 1959, Phunwang was imprisoned in solitary confinement in Beijing for 18 years for the crime of "local nationalism," a label given to ethnic minority leaders suspected of secretly plotting independence. After his release from jail, Phunwang was "rehabilitated" and he still receives some perks typical of high-level retired officials, including a government-appointed secretary. However, his outspokenness on Tibet makes him a sensitive person, as evidenced by the authorities desire to keep him out of Beijing during the Olympics (see para 6).

"Autonomy Does Not Equal Independence"
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3. (C) Phunwang expressed disappointment at the lack of progress made during the latest round of talks between the Communist Party's United Front Work Department (UFWD) and representatives of the Dalai
Lama (reftels). He was especially critical of the Chinese side's outright rejection of the Tibetans' proposal for genuine autonomy. A high level of autonomy is possible under the Chinese Constitution, Phunwang argued, and "autonomy" does not equal "independence." Phunwang criticized a November 6 press statement in which United Front Work Department (UFWD) head Du Qinglin, the chief PRC representative to the talks, denounced the Tibetan autonomy proposal by saying China would never accept "Tibet independence, half independence, or covert independence." "When you see statements like this," Phunwang said, "it is easy to tell which side is lying."

Written Language in Danger
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4. (C) Phunwang said Tibet should enjoy stronger autonomy in areas such as education and language. While Tibetan youth can generally speak Tibetan, he observed, the written language is under threat because fewer and fewer Tibetans can read and write fluently.

Independence "Not an Issue"
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5. (C) Phunwang told PolOff the majority of Tibetans want to see the Dalai Lama and the Chinese Government "come back together." Asked for his views on the conference of Tibetan exiles that will take place later this month in India, Phunwang predicted that the Tibetans will not give up the Dalai Lama's "Middle Way" approach, primarily because there is no alternative. Independence for Tibet is "simply not an issue." "It makes little sense to even debate independence since it is so clearly impossible." Most ethnic minorities, whether in China or elsewhere, wish to have their own independent state. Such sentiment is "natural" among minorities, Phunwang said, but it is unfeasible in the case of Tibet.

"Hard Time for Tibetans"
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6. (C) Since the outbreak of widespread unrest in Tibetan areas of China in March, Phunwang said, "things have been hard for Tibetans." He criticized continuing discrimination faced by Tibetans and other minorities. As an example, he noted that Tibetans were excluded from most Beijing hotels during the Olympics. Phunwang revealed that he and his wife were forced to leave the capital during the Games. Phunwang said he recently wrote an extensive letter to President Hu Jintao regarding the situation in Tibet.  Though unwilling to provide details of the letter to PolOff, Phunwang said the contents would be publicized in the near future.

[Ambassador] RANDT

Autonomy vs Repression

Marshal Chen Yi, the Dalai Lama, the Panchen Lama with the Tibetan Flag in 1956

A debate is raging is China: should 'nationalities' continue to enjoy the autonomy offered to them by the Constitution of the People's Republic of China?
As mentioned a few days ago, Zhu Weiqun, Lodi Gyari's interlocutor believes that the 'nationalities' should be divested of their special privileges to achieve 'national cohesion'.

In another posting this week, I quoted Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek about the possibility of ‘independence' for Tibet. In 1945, Chiang announced in the Chinese Parliament that his Government desired to allow the ‘frontier racial groups’ to attain independence, if capable of doing so. He affirmed: “I solemnly declare that if the Tibetans should at this time express a wish for self-government our Government would, in conformity with our sincere traditions, accord it a very high degree of autonomy. If in the future, they fulfill economic requirement of independence, the nation’s Government will, as in the case of Outer Mongolia, help them to attain this status”. 
In the early days of the Chinese Revolution, the Communists also believed in giving a large autonomy to the Nationalities.
As Tsering Woeser states in her blog:  "After the Red Army had firmly settled in Yan’an, Mao Zedong told the American journalist Edgar Snow: 'the Red Army’s only external debt is that it took away the food from the outer ethnic minorities and now owes them, one day, we must repay this debt.' But what does this 'external debt' mean? Does this not refer to owing a foreign country? It shows that at the time, Mao Zedong did not consider Tibet a part of China."
Bapa Phuntsok Wangyal, the 'first' Tibetan Communist in the 1940's has extensively worked (while in confinement) on the issue of nationalities, regional autonomy and Marxism in the People's Republic of China.
In 2004/2005, he wrote a series of letters to CCP's General Secretary Hu Jintao.
The first letter sent in 2004, is posted on my website as well as excerpts from A Tibetan Revolutionary: The Political Life and Times of Bapa Phüntso Wangye by Melvyn C. Goldstein, Dawei Sherap, William R. Siebenschuh on the issue of 'nationalities'.
Here is Phuntsok Wangyal's (Phunwang) second letter to to General Secretary Hu Jintao sent on April 12, 2005:

Phunwang with Panchen Lama and Gyalo Thondup

Respected General-Secretary Hu Jintao, My greetings!

On 29 October last year I presented a long letter to you and the leaders of the NPC Standing Committee. On 26 February this year - according to comrade Sheng Huaren from the NPC Party Group who presided over the forum attended by Wang Yunlong, Secretary of the Party Group of the NPC Department of Administration, Zhu Weiqun, Deputy-Director of the United Front Department and. Sithar, Director of the Tibet Bureau entrusted by the Central Government and on behalf of the Party Group my letter was discussed, emphasising the need for consistency with the Central Government on the "Tibetan issue inherited from the past". And I was told to think the matters over carefully to put forward my opinions. Since this happened to be the time of ‘two meetings’ (the, National People's Congress and, the National People’s Consultative Meeting), this was delayed until 4 April. With regard to that letter, I made some statements and requested the NPC Standing Committee to report my opinions to the Central Government. I am now presenting a summary of those statements below:

1 The letter I presented to General-Secretary Hu Jintao and to the NPC Standing Committee is in line with the spirit of the Central Government's initiatives to build a harmonious and stable socialist society, which can be proven by the entire contents of that letter, and so it is needless to restate this.

2 The key concern in the overall question is: Whether or not it is good for the religious leaders of Tibetan Buddhism - with the Dalai Lama as the head - and the exile Tibetan Government, including around a hundred thousand Tibetan compatriots, to return to the nation or remain abroad. Strategically this is a question which needs to be carefully considered and deliberately decided. It is necessary to understand that those Western anti-China elements are trying to ensure that they [the Dalai Lama and his exile Tibetan Government] remain abroad, so as to keep on playing the 'Tibet card' for the sake of their own interests. Therefore, keeping them abroad is politically shortsighted and irresponsible in terms of history - creating endless troubles in the future. On the contrary, working towards the Dalai Lama's return to the nation will transform passivity to activity, antagonism to harmony.
Foreign diplomacy is the continuation and extension of domestic affairs; therefore the policy towards the overseas Tibetan compatriots should unquestionably be based on the guiding principles of the Central Government that advocate 'harmony and stability'. For over a thousand years, in the day-to-day life of devoted Tibetan Buddhists the intangible has superceded the tangible in their spiritual sphere; whether or not the hearts of the people are peaceful and at rest cannot be ignored and underestimated, especially the general will of the masses is the most important factor which can play a decisive role at a very critical moment. Therefore, we must channel our actions according to the situation and avoid being at a disadvantage.
Forgive my being straightforward. The comments made by the leaders of the United Front Work Department - let's not talk about other things - are not with the basic spirit of the Central Government's initiatives to build a 'harmonious and stable' socialist society. The Central Government emphasises the importance of 'friendship' as the national policy. So far as the policy towards Taiwan is concerned - the policy emphasises never censuring past mistakes under the premise of One China. Nevertheless, the United Front Department, in line with the 'leftist struggle', has stressed too much on the 'Tibet issue', with 'peace' on one side and 'struggle' on the other. It even adopts 'delaying tactics' to play for time with the Dalai Lama, waiting until his death. This is apparently a continuation of the wrong-thinking 'leftist' line over nationality and religious work - especially on the 'Tibet issue'. Everybody is aware that this wrong line of 'leftism' has brought disastrous consequences to the Party, the nation and the people. That is why it has been negated by Party decision-making.

4- Unquestionably, I myself and many others who understand the facts are extremely dissatisfied with this wrong-thinking line of 'leftism' and the mistakes made by it. Let's just forget other things, merely as far as the above-mentioned matters are concerned, people make various comments, such as: Ignoring good advice, they landed themselves in the trouble of 'two Panchens' today; the two great Buddhist leaders whom the Central Government used to care about, and who attract world attention - the Seventeenth Karmapa and Agya Rinpoche, the abbot of Kumbum Monastery - were also forced to flee overseas; playing for time, and intending to produce 'two Dalais' will create greater trouble in the future at home and abroad. However, the question of the Dalai Lama's health, and how long he will live, will not be decided according to the timetable of others. And regarding such questions, people have further comments, such as: The Karmapa is likely to be the successor to the Dalai Lama after his passing, in case of a period of vacuum of leadership. Although all the heads of Tibetan Buddhism, from the Gelug, Nyingma, Sakya, Kagyud and Bonpo, have fled abroad one after another, they are still the inheritors of the Buddhist doctrines and are playing an important role, directly and indirectly.
Of course, those mistakes are not related to the leaders from the United Front Work Department. The question is related to the Party line, not to the individuals. Therefore, in order to improve and intensify the friendly relations between brotherly nationalities such as the Han and Tibetans - and for the prosperity and stability of the nation and the people - this residual 'leftist' line should not be continued; it is time to bring it to an end.

5- The letter I presented to the Central Government is concerned with the entire Tibetan nationality and peace and stability across te Tibetan regions in the Land of Snow, which occupies a quarter of the total area of the nation, and is related to a far-sighted, long-term strategic policy that needs to be sensibly considered and carefully decided, rather than being a question of seeking advice on current policy and concrete matters. Some people who are responsible for the relevant departments, who ignore the actual situation and don't care about the wishes of the masses, will not think deeply about their attitudes and words; they will not even undergo self-censure. Therefore I sincerely request the NPC Party Group to hand over [my letter] to the Central Government - headed by General-Secretary Hu Jintao - and forward it to the Central Institute of Political Research for their practical, objective suggestions based on the principle of seeking truth from facts. All decisions will then be up the Central Government.
With regard to the comments made by the United Front Work Department, besides the general tone that they adopted, they strayed from the point when mentioning my "talk" with Li Weihan in 1982, and criticised me for adhering to the so-called "consistently incorrect point of view", my view on "the greater Tibetan regions". But that was actually a plot attributed to Old Li [Weihan] by some specific leaders who had me sent to prison for eighteen years and have never admitted their mistakes. Old Li, aged eighty six, is now in hospital; those people have not even seen his articles, so what is the value of their comments?
I wrote a letter of twenty thousand characters to the leaders of the Central Government, and particularly wrote a letter to comrade Deng Xiaoping and General Secretary Hu Yaobang appealing to the Central Government to form a study team to clarify the arguments on the theoretical principles of nationality. Fortunately, after the Central Government looked into this, their summing up was that 'according to the regulations of the Party it is permitted to hold different points of view', and the case was held over indefinitely, with some statements made by comrade Zhong Xun.
Therefore, after twenty three years, referring to the talk with Old Li is unnecessary and of no significance.

6- As early as the 1940s I was the main person responsible for all kinds of revolutionary activities of was the only Tibetan among the members of the Party Committee for the PLA's Lhasa advance troop and of the CCP Tibet Work Committee during the '50s. For the sake of the Party, the people and history, and following the principle of being a communist who must be open and above-board, and must not hide any opinions, I present this letter to the leaders of the Central Party, and send it to some Tibetan comrades for reference.
I believe that this letter has fully reflected the expectations and wishes of ordinary Tibetans on the restoration of relations between the Central Government and the Dalai Lama. Many Tibetan comrades have directly or indirectly expressed their agreement to my views. 'Bitter medicine is good for ailments, good advice is unpleasant to the ears'. My letter cannot be supposed to be good medicine, but having a clear conscience and from the bottom of my heart - I sincerely state the views that people feel uncomfortable talking about, dare not talk about to protect themselves, and the questions that are sensitive to some people. Whether or not the views will be adopted is entirely up to the Central Government's decision-making. As an individual I am powerless. But time will prove all and history will make a fair evaluation

7 Any Communist Party member or citizen has the right to offer various kinds of opinions to the Central Government, and those opinions can also be passed on to other comrades for reference. But of course, it is without question that before the views in the letter can be accepted they must be consistent with the opinions currently carried by the Central Government. But if some relevant departments make comments as they wish with regards to the letter, I will reserve my right to correspondingly give explanations.

Comrade Hu Jintao,
I completely understand that the leaders of the CCP Standing Committee, headed by you, are deeply occupied with the affairs of State. Nevertheless, the question of the Tibet issue today is the most important of our entire nation's nationality works. Though I am in sound health, clear-minded, and able to write and give lectures, time does not spare people. I am now eighty three years old and have no ambition for fame and repute. I have spoken the truth from facts, and this is all purely in the interests of the State and nationalities.
Looking forward to understanding if there is anything inappropriate herein.
With regards
Phunsok Wangyal

The debate will continue, but one can only regret that Han Chauvinism has increased over the years. 
It is not a good omen for the regime.

The Used Geta Rinpoche

Tsering Woeser

By Tsering Woeser
September 28, 2011,
Lhasa
After we arrived in Kardze at the end of July, I suddenly noticed a street sign attached to an electricity pole at the side of the road, which read: “Memorial Hall for the Commander in Chief, Zhu De and the 5th Geta Rinpoche”. Had this been built in recent years? I followed the sign, was slowly guided out of the city and finally found a tightly closed red door with a Chinese-style building behind it and verdant trees and lush flowers surrounding it; the hall name was an eye-grabbing piece of calligraphy created by Jiang Zemin.
Afterwards I found on the internet that the construction of this hall began in 1991 and was completed in 1993, becoming the “base for patriotic education” from Kardze County and Prefecture all the way to Sichuan Province.
According to the introduction, “the hall features the detailed descriptions of the 5th Tulku’s entire life, accounts of how the Red Army passed through Kardze during the Long March as well as revolutionary relics”. I noticed that among them were “paintings and photos of the establishment of the first ethnic minority region during the Soviet Tibetan Bopa Government; and also images of Geta Rinpoche, the Vice President of the Bopa Government and its other Tibetan members”.
How did the name of “Bopa Government” come about? It is quite a complicated story, just as the Communist Party admits, on its Long March, the Red Army established two “Republics”, namely the Gyarong Republic and the Bopa People’s Republic. These regimes were all established on Tibetan territory, the former where today’s Gyarong area of Rongdrak county is located and the latter in today’s Kham Region (Kardze and other counties); their declarations did by no means go against the native population’s political and religious authority, instead they determined the following: “all Tibetan territory will always be administered by the regional Bopa Government. We swear to oppose Han Chinese aggressors, KMT officials and warlords that have put in place politics of annexation for thousands of years and we firmly stand for the course of liberating and making an independent Bopa”; “Our flag is one of an independent Bopa, our current mission is to revive Tibet and extinguish Chiang Kai-shek.”
Let us look back at what happened more than 70 years ago, relevant comments conclude that the Communist Party’s minority policies did initially support “self-determination” and even “independence”, but today are against “ethnic splittism”. However, for the fleeing Red Army, their so-called assistance to establish a “Bopa Government”, at the time, was in fact only an expedient and temporary measure and was by no means a “‘solemn commitment’ to the Tibetan people”. In actual fact, during its 12,500 km Long March, regardless of whether they passed by Chinese, Tibetan, or other minority areas, from the facts that have been revealed today, we know that the Red Army’s journey was one of empty promises and swindle.
The Tibetans had to pay for the assistance to “revive Tibet and extinguish Chiang Kai-shek” and to establish an independent political entity. According to Party documents, during the 16 months before and after the Red Army passed through Ngaba Prefecture, the Gyarong Government had to provide 5 million kilos of staple foods as well as 100,000 cows, sheep, horses, pigs and other livestock; when the Red Army passed through the northern Kham region, the Bopa Government had to provide 2.25 million kilos of staple foods. After the Red Army had firmly settled in Yan’an, Mao Zedong said to the American journalist Edgar Snow: “the Red Army’s only external debt is that it took away the food from the outer ethnic minorities and now owes them, one day, we must repay this debt.” But what does this “external debt” mean? Does this not refer to owing a foreign country? It shows that at the time, Mao Zedong did not consider Tibet a part of China.
As for Geta Rinpoche of Beri Monastery in Kardze County, together with other Tibetan elite such as Jago Tobdan, Pangta Tobgyel, Gompo Tsering, Tashi Wangchuk, he formed the leadership of the Bopa Government and they jointly formulated a programme that included the guiding principles, including “ethnic independence, the establishment of an independent Bopa Soviet Government, and its own Bopa territory” as well as “the unification of the red Army and all groups and individuals that support the independence of Bopa”; they firmly believed that “all the people, countries, governments and armies that support and sympathise with Bopa are also Bopa people’s friends”; however, in the end, they were ridiculed by historical events for exactly this naivety.
If we want to justly evaluate historical figures such as Geta Rinpoche, we must admit that essentially, they were all Tibetan nationalists rather than repeatedly used by the Communists; he pursued the title of the “Red Tulku” of the “unified ancestral land”. Some people say that if Geta Rinpoche had lived until the Red Army became the Liberation Army, he would probably sooner or later have been thrown into prison, just as it happened to Phuntsog Wangyal. But just as the Liberation Army launched its “Chamdo military campaign”, he suddenly died a violent death, and thus became the justification for why the Communists violated or forgot their “solemn commitment”.