Today’s India in not the India of the 1950s

Gen Zhao Zongqi with the Indian Army Chief

Gen Zhao Zongqi is a rising star of the People’s Liberation Army. He spent most of his military carrier in Tibet where he occupied different posts before being transferred as chief of staff of the Jinan Military Region (MR) in December 2007. Later he commanded the MR where he got promoted to the rank of full general. On February 1, 2016, he returned to the Indian borders, now called the Western Theater Command, regrouping the erstwhile Lanzhou and Chengdu MRs, which face India from Ladakh to Arunachal.
As Gen Zhao arrived in Delhi, it is interesting to have a look at the latest developments in the fields of defense in China …and in India.
A year ago President Xi Jinping undertook in-depth military reforms.
Beijing often speaks of the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation in which military power will play a crucial role.
On December 31, 2015, new services were created, namely, the PLA Army, the PLA Rocket Force and the PLA Strategic Support Force and a few weeks later, the seven erstwhile Military Regions were regrouped into five PLA Theater Commands.
On December 5 in Beijing, President Xi Jinping, who is also Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) attended a two-day meeting during which he called for “a smaller army with better combat capability and optimized structure.” Some 230 high-ranking military officials as well as the 11 CMC members were in attendance.
Xinhua remarked: “China has entered a key stage of transforming itself from a big country to a strong power, which calls for greater courage in advancing military reform.”
The creation of a PLA Strategic Support Force is a plunge into the future as it will deal with cyber and space warfare, probably the keys of tomorrow’s conflicts.
This reminded me ‘reforms’ undertaken by India in the 1950s. During a Defense Council meeting on July 3, 1953, Nehru decided that “the Army was to reduce its strength yearly by a minimum of 10,000 personnel for the next five years.” The Indian leadership wanted a smaller army  …without better combat capability!
The Army Headquarters had to work out a rundown programme of approximately 11,500 per year. The proposals envisaged a 5% reduction in establishments spread over the first two years and the disbandment of a certain number of units during the following three years.
According to a note prepared by by Major General J.N. Chaudhuri, the Chief of General Staff (later Army Chief) and passed by Prime Minister Nehru: “The opinion of Army Headquarters is that while the 5% cut spread over two years will not materially affect the effectiveness of the Army, there will certainly be a loss of morale if approximately 23,000 personnel are sent out and establishments reduced while aid to Pakistan is being discussed.”
The US was then actively supporting a stronger Pakistani Army.
A year later, M.K. Vellodi, the Defense Minister agreed to implement the proposal: “The budget for the next year has been framed on the basis that there will be a reduction of the order of 10,000 men next year as decided by Government already.”
It added: “this reduction should be effected not by disbanding any unit but by effecting about 2 ½ % reduction in the strength of units.”
The same month, the infamous Panchsheel Agreement was signed.
Today, things have changed; the old pacifist mindset has gone. India’s leadership has realized that the best way to bring peace is to be ready for any situation. A few examples will show the importance of preparedness as a deterrent to war.
In August 2016, Delhi decided to deploy the 4th regiment of BrahMos Missile in Arunachal Pradesh. The Cabinet Committee on Security approved the raising of a new regiment of an advanced version of the missile to be deployed in the north-eastern State at a cost of Rs. 4300 crore. The regiment is to be equipped with five autonomous missile launchers with command post and 100 BrahMos missiles. This does not amuse the Chinese who have taken note.
A month earlier, T-72 Russian-origin tanks were inducted in Eastern Ladakh facing China: “This adds a new dimension to any future war in the area that is marked by an average height of 14,000 feet, where oxygen is scarce,” says The Tribune. According to The Daily Excelsior published from Jammu, for the Indian Army “the move is part of the winter drill to validate the capability of the tanks at such heights and is not an inimical move against China.”
On November 8, for the first time, the Indian Air Force successfully carried out a test landing and take-off of C-17 Globemaster-III at Mechuka’s Advanced Landing Ground (ALG) in Arunachal Pradesh. Mechuka is strategically located just 29 km from the border.
After the upgradation of Mechuka's ALG, the giant Boeing C-17 could land. It should eventually ensure transport of men and material in the remote border village of West Siang district, which was invaded by the Chinese in 1962.
Arunachal will soon have seven ALGs in Walong, Mechuka , Vijaynagar, Tuting, Pasighat, Ziro and Aalo and later one in Tawang.
Other good news: India did not back down when confronted by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is Demchok village in South-East Ladakh. The national press reported that the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) and the Indian Army were caught for three days in an eyeball to eyeball situation with PLA on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Demchok. In April, the residents of Demchok had appealed to the Deputy Commissioner in Leh for their resettlement elsewhere in the district because of continuous obstructions to any developmental work in the area by the Chinese troops.
This time India did not blink.
We could multiply the examples.
These are important messages for General Zhao to take back home: today’s India is not the same as in the 1950s.

Intrusions, trangressions and a line of perception

Local herders are always the sufferers

My article Intrusions, trangressions and a line of perception appeared yesterday in the Edit Page of The Pioneer

Here is the link...

No matter how you define it, the fact is that China has become aggressive along the Line of Actual Control. Indian troops and citizens on the border have to be equipped to deal with the challenge

‘There is nothing like that’, said the new Chief of Army Staff, General Dalbir Singh Suhag, when asked if it was true that Chinese troops had entered deep into Indian territory in Burtse sector, near Daulat Beg Oldi in north Ladakh. The media had earlier reported an intrusion by the People’s Liberation Army. Members of Parliament were explained that there was no Chinese ‘intrusion’ in Ladakh. On August 13, in a written reply to a question, Union Minister of State for Home Kiren Rijiju stated: “No intrusion has been reported or taken place on India-China border, including Sikkim, during the last five years, However, there are cases of transgression due to difference of perception of the Line of Actual Control.”
A couple of years ago, the terminology was different; ‘intrusions’ were called ‘perceptional’, now Mr Rijiju describes the Chinese walking around with banners that read ‘this is our territory’, as simple ‘transgressions’. Even if only attributed to a “mere difference in perception of the LAC between the two sides”, the Government of India admits that there has been a total 1,612 such ‘transgressions’ between January 1, 2010 and August 4, 2014. The young Minister also gave the MPs a crash course on the subtleties of both armies’ reckoning: “While ‘intrusion’ would mean that the Chinese troops crossed over to Indian side of the LAC and stayed put, ‘transgression’ implied that they had entered Indian territory only to eventually retreat to the Chinese side.”
Fine, we can adopt the new terminology, though according to Mr Rijiju, 334 cases of ‘transgression’ had taken place this year alone up until August 4, as compared to 411 in the whole of 2013, 426 in 2012, 213 in 2011 and 228 in 2010. It is clear that the number has increased over the years, though the Government has remained silent on Uttarakhand, where the phenomenon regularly occurred (in Barahoti area particularly). Does this practically means that when the Chinese cross the Indian LAC, they just ‘transgress’ it, because according to their own perceptions, they are in China? As a result, do we have two ‘perceptional’ LACs?
This raises another question: Have maps of the different ‘perceptions’ been exchanged? Apparently, the Chinese are reluctant. The question will hopefully be asked by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, when Chinese President Xi Jinping visits New Delhi next month. Mr Modi should insist: “At least, give us maps of ‘your’ LAC”.

1959 Line, today forgotten

This situation is relatively new. In the past, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai provided India a map of Chinese claims. On December 17, 1959, after Jawaharlal Nehru asked that the Ladakh sector be treated separately, Zhou argued: “The Chinese Government is very much perplexed by the fact that Your Excellency [Nehru] put forward a separate proposal for the prevention of clashes in the sector of the border between China and India’s Ladakh.” The Premier added: “There is no reason to treat this sector of the border as a special case. The line up to which each side exercises actual control in this sector is very clear, just as it is in the other sectors of the Sino-Indian border. As a matter of fact, the Chinese map published in 1956, to which Your Excellency referred, correctly shows the traditional boundary between the two countries in this sector.”
Three years before the 1962 border war, Beijing’s positions were clear, while today it refuses to provide a map of its claims (which over the years, have obviously expanded in China’s favour). By keeping the situation unstable on the ground, the PLA can continue to prick the Indian Army as well as the local population in Ladakh.
Gen Suhag’s ‘nothing like that’ remark is certainly not good for the morale of the Ladakhis who have to face Chinese ‘transgressor’ on a daily basis; the best proof of is comes from the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson herself. Ms Hua Chunying delightedly stated: “China today appreciated the Indian Army’s response on recent reports of incursions by the PLA in Ladakh... China has noted relevant reports and the Indian position. The Indian position reflects the objective understanding and rational attitude towards the special situation.” She added that for a long time, the Indian and Chinese “have exercised restraint and have maintained peaceful coexistence.” Well, everything is relative.
But there are other issues which, though not directly related to the position of the LAC, are worrying. The Times of India recently reported: “Forces guarding the Sino-Indian border have for years been suffering lack of optimum technological, infrastructural and logistical support — something available aplenty across the border to Chinese troops.”
The article lists several aberrations such Indian GPS sets showing the Indian soldiers in Chinese territory even when the Indian troops are well within their border. Why? Because the Indo-Tibetan Border Police uses US satellite data which does not reflect Indian ‘perceptions’. On the Arunachal border, the situation is often worse as Indian troops have to walk for days without proper all-weather shoes and suitable tents, to reach the LAC. Can the Modi sarkar change this?
Another issue is the recurrent harassment of local herders and villagers by ITBT personnel who regularly stop them on one pretext or another. It is said to be one of the main reasons for migration towards Leh, Itanagar and Delhi.  In an interview to Rediff.com, Mr Rijiju had rightly pointed out: “If we manage to strengthen our forces along the border, I’m sure that it can take care of the local fear. But if we are unable to provide basic necessities to the people living the border areas, then definitely people will run away. [Today], people need basic amenities; if these basic facilities such education, health, roads, communication services, drinking water supply are not made available, people will migrate. These basic facilities should be available to those areas; if we don’t do it, someday the whole border area will be without any civilian population.”
An extreme case occurred in the Pin valley of Spiti in Himachal Pradesh where residents stated that they were not adverse to seeking help from China, if the State and Union Governments did not do something for the area. Apparently, a flood in June 2012 had damaged a bridge which connects several villages of Pin valley. Even after two years, nothing has been done by the Governments to fix it. The president of Sagnam panchayat, Mr Lobsang Tandup, (who since then has been arrested for sedition) had raised the slogan ‘Chalo China’. He told the Press: “If our Government has nothing to do with the pain and problems of its citizens, then we will not be averse in seeking help from China.”
This may be an aberration, but it reflects the unease of the local population against what they perceive as neglect by India. This should be changed on a war-footing. Let us hope that Delhi will go beyond rhetoric and start acting.

A Two-Two as Army Chief

General Dalbir Singh Suhag

General Dalbir Singh Suhag, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, VSM has yesterday taken over as the 26th Indian Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), following the retirement of General Bikram Singh.
General Dalbir Singh Suhag is from the Gorkha Rifles.
Earlier in his career, he served as a Commandant (Inspector General) of the Special Frontier Forces (SFF), the Tibetan Army based in Chakrata, Uttarakhand.
The SSF is not directly under the Army, but operates under the Cabinet Secretariat.
The SSF is also know as 'Establishment 22', or simply the ‘Two-twos', because its first Inspector General Maj. Gen. Sujan Singh Uban earlier in his career had commanded the 22 Mountain Brigade.
On the occasion of a 'Two-two' assuming the highest post in the Indian Army, I repost an article published 2 years ago in The Pioneer.
I am not sure, if, as Army Chief, General Suhag will sing the 'Vikasi' song.

[Repost]
My article on the Tibetan Two-twos, Consigned to the dustbin of history appeared in the Edit page of The Pioneer.

The ‘unacknowledged' brave men of the Tibetan Army’s Special Frontier Forces fought well in wars which were not theirs. They remain ready to defend India. The least one can do is remember them next November 14

For most Indians, November 14 means the birthday of Jawaharlal Nehru. It is not my purpose to comment here on the first Prime Minister of India, I just would like to mention another anniversary, an ‘uncelebrated’ one, occurring on the same day.
The second one has for long been kept secret: I am speaking of the creation of the Special Frontier Forces, the Tibetan Army (also known as the two-twos) which was founded a week before China’s unilateral cease-fire in the 1962 conflict. There is little doubt that the two events (Nehru’s birthday and the SSF’s creation) are linked, as sycophancy prevailed in India during those days.
Why was the formation of the Tibetan Army initiated on October 14? BN Mullik, the then Director of the Intelligence Bureau (and one of the main culprits of the 1962 fiasco) probably wanted to please Nehru on his birthday by telling him that he ‘had found a solution’ to China’s military superiority. The Tibetans would themselves ‘liberate’ Tibet!
But Mullik realised he would need help for this; and he looked towards the United States.
On November 19, the day Nehru sent panicky two letters to the US President, a crucial meeting to answer Nehru was held in the White House. The then Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara, the Secretary of State Dean Rusk, as well as his Assistant for Far Eastern Affairs, Averell Harriman, a most respected diplomat and politician, were present. The CIA bosses were also in attendance.
The declassified US archives tell us: “McNamara urged that the first move be to find out what the real situation was. If we were to put our prestige and resources at risk, we must find out the score. He proposed sending a small high-level military mission immediately to Delhi. …McNamara again urged getting a high level mission out to Delhi, including State and Intelligence people in order to concert a plan of action with the Indians.”
Kenneth Conboy and James Morrison in their book The CIA’s Secret War in Tibet recounted: “Also mentioned (during the meeting) was the possibility of using the CIA’s Tibetan guerrillas. John McCone, a wealthy and opinionated Republican chosen by Kennedy to replace CIA Director Dulles after the Bay of Pigs, was on hand to brief the president on such covert matters. Joining McCone was Des FitzGerald, the Far East chief.”

During Bangladesh Operations

McNamara’s delegation arrived in India three days later; during their stay, the CIA officials held lengthy discussions with BN Mullik. According to Convoy who quotes from David Blee, the CIA station chief in India: “The Indians were interested in the Tibet program because of its intelligence collection value…Mullik was particularly interested in paramilitary operations.” Mullik and his deputy ML Hooja made a special request during a session with FitzGerald and Blee. “They made us promise that our involvement would remain secret forever.”
By the end of the Harriman mission, the CIA and IB had arrived at a division of tasks; the IB with CIA support would train a 5,000-strong tactical guerrilla force; the CIA’s Far East Division would create a strategic long-range resistance movement inside Tibet and the Tibetan freedom fighters in Mustang (Nepal) would remain under the CIA’s control.
The honeymoon with the CIA did not last long and the Tibetan Force would eventually be built with purely Indian inputs under the supervision of Maj Gen Sujan Singh Uban (The SSF became later known as ‘Establishment 22’ or ‘Two-twos’ because Uban had earlier served as commander of the 22 Mountain Brigade).
Many are not aware that the Tibetan force participated in the liberation of Bangladesh in 1971.
Under the cover of the Mukti Bahini, the Tibetans infiltrated East Pakistan (soon to be Bangladesh) a few weeks before the beginning of the war. They conducted raids to destroy bridges and communication lines deep inside Pakistan’s eastern province. The operation was so secret that most Generals of the Indian Army’s Eastern Command in Calcutta did not know about the activities of 3,000 Tibetan jawans commanded by two Tibetan Dapons (equivalent to brigadiers in the Indian Army, also known as ‘Political Leaders’).
Though Major General SS Uban, (his designation was Inspector General) wrote his memoir The Phantoms of Chittagong, he only obliquely refers to his troops as Tibetans.
Ratuk Ngawang who was a ‘Dapon’ at the time of the Liberation of Bangladesh recalled: “The Force was established in 1962, after the Indo-China War. The main objective of the regiment was to fight the Chinese army with the help of the Indian Army. The plan was to engage the Chinese army in a military conflict within 5 or 6 months of the Force’s creation. But the Indo-China war came to an abrupt end (on November 22), and due to severe international pressure to maintain peace, no further military engagements occurred with China. Therefore, the services of Establishment 22 regiment were not used as planned.”
When asked who ordered the SFF to take part in the 1971 war, Ratuk Ngawang answered: “A special army meeting was held in New Delhi (probably under RN Kao, the RAW Chief); later we heard that General Uban had volunteered to lead the Establishment 22 regiment in the Bangladesh war. It was SS Uban and my colleague Dapon Jampa Kalden who voluntarily decided to take part in the war.”
Ratuk Ngawang added: “When the regiment was established, there was a mutual agreement that we would fight the Chinese. This did not happen. However, I told General Uban and Jampa Kalden that if we were to get a formal order from the Indian government then we could join the operations.” They did.
The website Bharat Rakshak provides more information on the SFF’s achievements in Bangladesh: “After three weeks of border fighting, the SFF divided its six battalions into three columns and moved into East Pakistan on 03 December 1971.”
By the time Pakistan surrendered, the SFF had lost 56 men, nearly 190 were wounded, but it is said that they blocked a potential escape route for East Pakistani forces into Burma and would have halted Pakistan’s 97 Independent Brigade in the Chittagong Hill Tracts.
As they did not ‘exist’ officially for the Government of India, nobody could be decorated. However, some brave Tibetan commandos were awarded cash prizes by the Indian Government.
It is also necessary to mention some of the many operations in which the SFF participated: An attempt to plant a nuclear-powered sensor on the Nanda Devi in 1965, a regular presence on the Siachen Glacier or in the Turtuk sector during the Kargil conflict.
Though the SFF have in some cases been replaced by the Ladakh Scouts and other local troops who can also acclimatise easily for high altitude warfare, they remain ready to fight to defend India’s frontiers.
I still remember a poem written in Hindi by a Tibetan SFF jawan who had participated in the Kargil operations; the song of the poet-jawan described joy, sorrow and emotion by expressing his gratitude to his second motherland and to the people of India who had given refuge, protection and education to his countrymen.
It is difficult to say today what is the future of the two-twos, but one can at least acknowledge that they fought well in wars which were not theirs and if the new leadership of China were to choose adventurism as its new policy and walk in the footsteps of Mao, one can be certain that the two-twos will be here to defend India. One should not forget them next November 14.

We are the Vikasi
The Chinese snatched Tibet from us
and kicked us out from our home
Even then, India
kept us like their own
One day, surely one day
we will teach the Chinese a lesson
Whenever opportunities arise
we will play with our lives In the Siachen glacier
we got our second chance
Our young martyrs
have no sadness whatsoever
Whether it is Kargil or Bangladesh
we will not lose our strength
Whenever opportunities arise
we will play with our lives
Where there is our Potala Palace
and lovely Norbu Lingka
The throne of the Dalai Lama
was dear even then
Remember those martyrs of ours
who sacrificed with their lives
Let’s sing together
Hail to our Tibet!
Hail to our Tibet!
Hail to our Tibet!