'Comprehensive' infrastructure development on the Roof of the World

The Mainling Airport, north of the LAC

While the Tibetan Diaspora continues to debate which paths to take for future Tibet (Independence or the Middle Path), China is building up at mad pace its infrastructure on the Roof of the World: whether it is expansion of existing airports, new highways or railway lines.
And there is no question of debate or discussions for China, Beijing is just forging ahead rapidly.
I have already mentioned the roads to the border in a recent post.

Expansion of airports
China Tibet Online announced a few days ago that, on March 15, the construction of an expansion project for Mainling County Airport in Nyingchi (Nyingtri) Prefecture, north of the Indian border of Arunachal, has started.
That is not all, the Lhasa Gongkar Airport and Chamdo Bangda Airport are also being expended “to ease the pressure of increasing passenger traffic coming in and out of Tibet.”
Let us remember that 15 million Chinese tourists visited the Roof of the World (TAR only) in 2014.
The reports says that Mainling/Nyingchi Airport is located in the Yarlung Tsangpo (Brahmaputra) valley at an attitude of 2,900 meters (it is the ‘lowest’ airport in Tibet).
China Tibet Online adds that this is part of China's “efforts to raise Tibet’s civil aviation capacity and safety standards, while also supporting Tibet’s economic and social development.”
In other words, the policy to ‘invade’ Tibet with tourism will continue.
The website states that “At the start of the second half of 2014, 800 million yuan (US$ 130 million) were invested in ‘airport expansion projects’ in Lhasa, Chamdo, and Nyingchi.
Wang Dasong, director of the Mainling Airport explained that the project had been officially sanctioned in June 2014: “[it] was based on the need to meet estimated passenger traffic of 750,000 people and a targeted cargo handling capacity of 3,000 tons by the year 2020.”
It will include a new 10,360-square-meter terminal, a 3,000-square-meter 'comprehensive' [everything is 'comprehensive these days in China] safe house, a new fire station and some pump stations; the restoration of the old terminal will cost 270 million yuan (US$ 45 million).
This airport is the most strategic airport vis-a-vis the Indian border in Arunachal as it is located a few kilometers north of the McMahon line (LAC) only.

Lhasa Gongkar Terminal

For the Lhasa airport, the 12th Five-Year Plan  allotted 170 million yuan for the relocation of the Gongkar Airport air traffic control tower. The work started in March 2015.
While in Chamdo, the construction of a second runway has begun in November 2014.
A Chinese official website explains: “In recent years, the growth rate of tourists entering Tibet has been comparatively large, especially during the peak tourism season, due to the rapid development of tourism in Tibet as well as increasingly strong international ties. So much so, that it is often the case that ‘one plane ticket is hard to get’, which prompted a need for Tibet Airlines to increase their transportation capacity.”
For Beijing, this is always good as these airports can also be used for military purposes, if need be.
The number of flights is also expanding. On March 19, Xinhua announced the opening of a new flight between Guangzhou Baiyun Airport and Nyingchi Mainling Airport.
China Southern Airline will now fly non-stop between Guangzhou and Nyingchi on every Tuesday, Thursday and Saturday. The flight time is about three and a half hours. Comparatively, it used to take a night and two days for the same travel. "The new line is more convenient and efficient", says Xinhua.

Railway lines
An indication of what is coming in terms of railways could be heard during the Two Sessions recently held in Beijing.
The same China Tibet Online reported: “During the ongoing national ‘Two Sessions', a proposal submitted by Losang [Lobsang?] Sherdun, a CPPCC member from western Tibet's Ngari Prefecture, highlighted how the locals in his region have expectations for a railway.”

Lhasa Railway Station

Losang said: “Though a number of projects have consistently lead to a higher quality of life, where the people of Ngari lag behind is in transportation infrastructure, which has had an impact on the regional economic and social development.”
Losang/Lobsang is said to be Vice Chairman of the regional CPPCC of Ngari Prefecture.
For Beijing, it is an indirect way to announce the forthcoming railway line: one ‘deputy’ requesting the Central Government to help the masses.
In turn, it will help the masses  ...of Chinese tourists and ...the PLA posted near the Ladakh border.
The Tibetan deputy affirmed: “with the rapid development of tourism in Ngari and the progress of China's Western Development plans, passenger and freight volume in and out Ngari have been rising annually by an average of 45 percent. But the major means of transportation in the region remains road transportation, with support from air transportation [Ngari airport], which in itself is very limited and hinders the exports of locally produced goods.”
Losang’s 'proposal' is likely to be 'accepted' by the Central Government in Beijing: extension of the Southern Xinjiang Railway and Lhasa-Shigatse Railway to Ngari will ‘provide a rare opportunity for Ngari’, commented the website.
But that is not all. The Sichuan delegation at the National People's Congress made a similar request: “thee Sichuan-Tibet railway [lines] should be incorporated into the country's next five-year plan.”
The delegation requested Beijing for a special fund allotted for the 1,800-kilometer line which will connect Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan province, to Lhasa, the capital of the Tibet Autonomous Region. It will cost some 200 billion yuan (US $32 billion).
As mentioned earlier, the construction of Lhasa to Nyingchi and the Chengdu to Ya'an lines started last year.
The delegation was particularity keen on 2 sections, i.e. Ya'an to Kangding and from Kangding to Nyingchi. It should start during the current year, they requested.
The Chinese website concluded: “After completion, the railway will form a ring with the Qinghai-Tibet line, which began operation in 2006. …The 13th Five-Year Plan will cover 2016 to 2020. By the time it gets underway, Sichuan will have nearly 7,000 kilometers of railway.”
Wei Hong, Sichuan's Governor affirmed during the Beijing Meet that the railway will improve regional transportation capacity and integrate Tibet more closely with other parts of China and …it will play an important role for the proposed Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, ‘promoting ethnic unity and stability.’
How the railway lines in the landlocked Sichuan will help the Maritime Silk Road is however not clear?
Any excuse is probably good to get funds in China.

Developments of Roads and Highways
Same tactic for the roads and highways: Beijing asked the ethnic faces to make a ‘request’ for the masses.
Gyare Lozang Tenzin, a Vice Chairman of the Tibet Autonomous Region declared in Beijing: "The length of highways opened to traffic in Tibet reaches 70,591 kilometers, but there is still no expressway in the real sense in Tibet."
China Tibet Online commented: “In July 2014, China's Ministry of Transport reported that China aims to extend highways in the Tibet Autonomous Region to 110,000 kilometers, expand railways to 1,300 kilometers, and increase travel by civil aviation to seven million passenger journeys by 2020.”
Xinhua reported that Tibet had invested 16.1 billion yuan (3 billion US $) into road construction in 2014, opening 4,332-kilometer new roads to traffic.
This is in addition to the Lhasa-Shigatse railway which was inaugurated in August 2104.
Xinhua admited: “Even though Tibet's transportation has seen leapfrog development in recent years, the conditions and networks in remote agricultural and pastoral areas still need further improvement.”
And as mentioned earlier on this blog, more and more roads leading to the Indian border are being built: “In recent years, road traffic rapidly develops in Nyingchi prefecture, especially in rural areas. Data shows that the total length of road up to 5,351 kilometers in Nyingchi Prefecture, and the rate of road access in towns and villages respectively occupy 96.3 pct. and 95.7 pct."
On the Indian side, the Border Road Organisation (BRO) is still struggling against inertia, bureaucracy, corruption, difficult terrain and other difficulties.

A consoling news?
The Chinese Defence Ministry recently affirmed that a road linking a village on border with Vietnam to Chinese city 100 km away would 'definitely be serious threat to national defence and security'.
The South China Morning Post reported: "China’s People’s Liberation Army halted a city government’s road construction project on the border with Vietnam last month because of fears it could be used as a shortcut for a 'Vietnamese invasion'."
A PLA officer in charge of border affairs in Fangchenggang city, in Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region said that if finished, the road would “definitely become a serious threat to national defence and security”.
The two-lane road would have linked the village of Tansan, on the border with Vietnam, to the centre of Fangchenggang city, about 100 km away.
The PLA warned the residents of Tansan about the rationale of the move: "If war broke out between the nations, Vietnamese troops could use the road to launch an attack on the Chinese army."
Well, I always thought that it is an old Indian theory, held in the 1950s by the Indian ministry of Defence and External Affairs: "let us not built roads in NEFA, the Chinese can use them!!".
China even steals India's War Theories now!

The Ethnic Faces of China

China's Panchen Lama and Hong-Kong-based
Master Kuan Yun

My article The Ethnic Faces of China appeared in NitiCentral.

Here is the link...

The third session of China's 12th National People's Congress (NPC) opened with fanfare at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on March 5, 2015. Two days earlier, the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) had started its deliberations.
The Two Meetings (or Two Sessions) have always been an occasion to see new faces and hear people who are not always in the news.
This is particularly the case for the ‘ethnic faces’.
Padma Choling, (alias Pema Thinley), Chairman of the Tibet Autonomous Regional People's Congress and only ‘ethnic’ Tibetan member of the CCP’s Central Committee, has recently been used by Beijing to create a flutter, widely reported in the world press; he declared: “it's not up to the Dalai Lama [to decide about his own reincarnation].”
The Tibetan official objected to the Dalai Lama’s announcement that ‘his traditional religious role should cease with his death’. Padma Choling affirmed that it was against “the Tibetan Buddhism tradition as the soul of a senior lama is reincarnated in the body of a child on his death. …[as] the move is expected to upset the reincarnation system that has been honored for hundreds of years in Tibet and destabilize the Buddhist region.”
The Central Committee member added that the process: “should follow strict historical conventions and required religious rituals of the Tibetan Buddhism …and be approved by the central government.”
For Beijing, it is for the Communist Party of China to ‘decide’ who will be the next Dalai Lama.
An atheist Party, which has unexpectedly become expert in ‘religious matters’, believes that the Dalai Lama’s claims to stop his lineage (more correctly, the institution of the Dalai Lamas) “is blasphemy against the Tibetan Buddhism.”
Poor Marx must have turned in his tomb, if he heard the uttering of his Tibetan follower? Does Padma Choling realize that when he speaks of ‘soul reincarnation’, it is a serious Marxist blasphemy?
Beijing has a few other ‘ethnic faces’, who are regularly seen (often in traditional costume) during the NPC/CPPCC deliberations.
This is also true for the People's Liberation Army (PLA), though no ‘ethnic’ officer has ever made to it to the powerful Central Military Commission or the Central Committee.
However, Beijing realizes that these 'faces' (Tibetans, Uyghurs, Mongols, Huis, etc.) are very useful to support China’s pretense of 'regional autonomy'.
In March 2014, when 33 people were killed and 130 wounded when a group of attackers dressed in black went on the rampage in Kunming railway station, we heard the voice of Saimati Muhammat.
In an interview to Xinhua, Saimati affirmed that counter-terrorism in Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region had the strong backing from the PLA: “Xinjiang is at the front line struggle against 'The Three Forces’, namely terrorism, extremism and separatism,” said Saimati, a Uygur ethnic and member of the NPC.
Saimati Muhammat who is one of the first Uyghurs to be promoted as a Major General in the PLA, is presently Deputy Commandant of Lanzhou Military Command Area (MAC).
Tibet is also represented in the PLA delegation to the NPC.
Major General Ngawang (Ang Mong) Sonam, born in Jyekundo in today’s Qinghai province is today Deputy Commander of Qinghai Military District, also of Lanzhou MAC. A Chinese publication noted: “These [officers] bring pride to the rugged western China [Tibet and Xinjiang], they are absolutely honest and have defended the country's frontiers with their blood; they feel from their heart for the people,” adding: “Minority officers are dedicated to a strong army and China’s steadfast dream.”
In the religious field too, Beijing has its ‘ethnic faces’.
On March 5, China Tibet Online reported the visit of a ‘Buddhist’ delegation from Tibet to Bangladesh. Can you believe it?
Quoting the Chinese Embassy in Bangladesh, the website said: “At the invitation of the Buddhism Association of Bangladesh, the China Tibetan Buddhism delegation, led by Rinpoche Dupkang Tupden Kedup, visited Bangladesh from February 21 to 25.”
Dupkang, though Chairman of the Tibet Branch of Buddhist Association, is an nameless religious figure outside Tibet.
But, he has now been awarded the ‘2015 Atisha Peace Gold Award’ by the Buddhism Association of Bangladesh (BAB). The fact that Dupkang is not a monk anymore does not seem to have bothered the BAB.
His visit to Bangladesh however raises very serious questions for Delhi (and Dharamsala).
Why has the Dalai Lama been unable to visit Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Thailand (he went once in the 1970s) or Sri Lanka? Most of these countries (apart from Bangladesh) have a large Buddhist population. Why should a Communist rinpoche like Dupkang, non-existant in the Buddhist hierarchy, be ‘honoured’ with the ‘Atisha Award’, when the Tibetan leader has never been able to visited Bangladesh?
In Tibet, Beijing is fully using Gyaltsen Norbu, China’s Panchen Lama for political purpose. On March 4, Xinhua reported the young Lama (25) spoke about "Cultivating talent, making Tibetan Buddhism better adapted to a socialist society."
Gyaltsen Norbu is today the main ethnic face of Buddhism in China. There is no doubt that in the years to come, Beijing will continue to fully play the ‘Panchen Lama card’ and he will probably be seen around South Asian capitals as the representative of the Buddha.
Madam Cui Yuying is one of the few ‘ethnic’ Tibetans who today serves in a high position in the Central government in Beijing, thereby helping China in its ‘ethnic equality’ propaganda.
After occupying different junior posts in Tibet, she has become Deputy Director of the Publicity Department of the CPC Central Committee, an important post.
But often the ethic faces are more Chinese than the Hans.
Last year, Madam Cui opened the infamous ‘2014 Forum on the Development of Tibet, China’, organized in Lhasa and attended by a few foreign fans of the Communist Party, who had no choice, but to agree to the terms dictated by the Party in Beijing. One can’t bite the hand which feeds you!
Cui Yuying, while inaugurating the ‘Forum’, used the old Communist argument that Beijing only wants modernity for Tibet. The same argument was used in the 1950s, when Mao and his colleagues pretended that the Dalai Lama did not want ‘reforms’ and therefore Tibet needed to be ‘liberated’.
Like for the PLA ‘ethnic’ officers and religious figures, the presence of ‘ethnic’ Party cadres in the government in Beijing does not help much to find a solution to the Tibetan issue, on the contrary!
It is sad, especially at a time when photos and videos have appeared in the social media networks, showing heavy security presence at the annual Monlam Prayer Festival at Kumbum monastery, in Qinghai province; the 500-old Festival is traditionally dedicated to social harmony and world peace.
Voice of America reported: “The heavy security presence with armored vehicles and troops with automatic weapons doing drills and marching through one of the major Tibetan monasteries appears to have deeply hurt the feelings of the Tibetan people in the area.”
Unfortunately, the few ‘ethnic faces’ can’t do anything about the hardening of the situation on the ground in the minorities’ areas. It is tragic.

Wang Qishan drops by at Tibet Meet

Left to right: Padma Choling, Jampa Phuntsok, Wang Qishan,
Wang Huning, Chen Quanguo, Lobsang Gyaltsen

A few days before the opening of the yearly grand messe, aka the National People’s Congress (NPC), China Tibet Online speculated: “You may wonder what China’s top leader will say [this year] about Tibet?”
The website affiliated to Xinhua answered by quoting the previous interventions of President Xi Jinping, when he met with the Tibet Delegation at the NPC in 2013 and 2014.

According to the website:
On March 9, 2013, attending a discussion held by the NPC’s Tibet Delegation, Xi Jinping stressed the need to "unswervingly consolidate ethnic unity and create a long-term mechanism to ensure such unity is upheld".
Xi further spoke of its strategy for ‘comprehensively building a moderately prosperous society’.
On March 4, 2014, Xi Jinping attended a meeting involving ethnic minorities of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), China’s political advisory body. He emphasized that terrorism must be fought according to law in order to consolidate ethnic unity, social stability and national unification. The message was probably addressed to Xinjiang.
Yu Zhengsheng met the Tibet delegation on March 10, 2014.
China Tibet Online concluded: “The above provides some clues as to what one can expect of Xi Jinping regarding Tibet during the Two Sessions”.

Wang Qishan arrives in the Tibet 'room'

The 2015 Two Sessions
The Chinese government's work report (something like the State of the Union in the US) delivered by the Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, during the Third Session of the 12th National People's Congress included some ‘highlights’ about the Tibetan-inhabited areas (note that the Chinese Premier did not refer to the Tibetan Autonomous Region alone, but to all the ‘Tibetan-inhabited areas’. This remains one of the main bones of contention between the Dalai Lama’s Administration in Dharamsala and Beijing).
Li Keqiang affirmed that Beijing would like:

• To celebrate the 50th anniversary of the founding the Tibet Autonomous Region
• To protect the source of the three major rivers - the Yangtze, Yellow and Lancang [Mekong] River in Qinghai Province
• To adhere to the policy of Regional Ethnic Autonomy
• To protect the intangible cultural heritage and the rich resources that Tibet boasts of

The 'deliberations'

This year, the Tibet delegation did not get the CPC’s General Secretary’s visit, but the all-powerful Wang Qishan, the supreme boss of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection’s (CCDI) and member of the Standing Committee of the CPC’s politburo, paid a visit to the Tibet delegation and ‘participated in the deliberations’.
Xinhua (Chinese language) published a report.
On March 12 at 3 pm, Wang Qishan entered the room allotted to Tibet in the Great Hall of the People. He was received by some Tibetan delegates (Pub Tsering, Sonam Phuntsok and two monks) with a khata (ceremonial scarf) and escorted to the meeting room.
Here is rough translation of the article on Wang’s visit.
Wang Qishan participated in the deliberations of the second session of the Tibet delegation to the NPC meet.
A photo appeared along with the article. It shows Wang surrounded by Wang Huning (director of the Central Policy Research; member, politburo and close confidant of Xi Jinping), Jampa Phuntsok (Vice-Chairman, NPC's Standing Committee), Chen Quanguo (Tibet’s Party Secretary), Padma Choling (Chairman, TAR’s regional Congress), Lobsang Gyaltsen (head of the TAR’s government) and Wu Yingjie (Party’s Deputy Secretary).

According to Xinhua:
After listening to Qiangba (Jampa Phuntsok), Lobsang Gyaltsen, and other representatives, Wang pointed out that the pursuit of wealth and civilization is the eternal quest in the history of human development.
The CPC's ‘two hundred years’ goal is to meet the people's growing material and cultural needs. You should maintain close ties between the Party and the masses; you should strengthen national unity and safeguard the stability of the society, he said.
Party members and cadres should not forget the party's fine tradition and [work?] style; you should keep serving the people wholeheartedly and never mind having close ties with the masses. Implement the spirit of the eight provisions [?] with perseverance; improve your [life] style; this is a solemn commitment of the Party Central Committee; it is the ardent desire of the masses.
Correct the 'Four Winds': it is a struggle one cannot afford to lose; if we do, we will lose the trust of the people, causing in turn greater damage to the Party.
Wang said that the new word cannot forget the old word, improve your style.
Chen Quanguo presided over the meeting. He said that Wang Qishan’s speech was important as it provided China with an overall strategic focus, and helped thinking deeply. As for Tibet, according to Chen, Wang reaffirmed the importance of the development work for the future and this, under a stable and honest government.
At first sight, nothing very exciting or new in Wang's words, except for his insistence of the 'fine tradition of the Party' and the life style of its members.
Interestingly, Wang Qishan did not mention the new theory of Xi Jinping, ‘The Four Comprehensives’. Does it mean that it is not agreed by all in the Politburo?
It may be an issue, because The South China Morning Post reported “an apparent slip in the rhetoric led to a tough question about President Xi Jinping's political theory: quite how many ‘comprehensives’ are involved in the so-called ‘Four Comprehensives’ theory?”.
The Hong Kong newspaper explained: “The answer's not so obvious. …Yet surprisingly, copies of the work report of Premier Li Keqiang for delegates and the press contained no reference to ‘strict enforcement of discipline in the party’ [the forth comprehensive].”
One comprehensive was missing in action. The ‘error’ was later rectified.
During his speech to the Tibet delegation, Wang did not mention any ‘comprehensives’ (it would be very surprising, if he had mentioned it and it had not been reported,).
Why Wang and not Xi Jinping or Yu Zhengsheng (who usually monitors the United Front Work and 'drop by' last year) visited the Tibet delegation?
Perhaps a question of heavy schedule!
But it could also be that Wang’s visit to the Tibet Delegation is a prelude to a more active role of the CCDI in Tibet, in the months to come. In which case, some heads will roll down.
It is not easy to answer this question too.
The presence of Wang Huning, who is a member of the 'Tibet' delegation (don't ask me why!) is interesting, due to his closeness with Xi Jinping.
Last point, the Dalai Lama’s name was apparently not mentioned. It might be a sign of ‘softening’, but softening …with Chinese characteristics, which often translates into ‘no softening at all’.

Fighting with hands tied behind the back

Chairman Xi meets PLA delegates during NPC meet

My article Fighting with hands tied behind the back  appeared yesterday in the Edit Page of The Pioneer.

Here is the link...

It is routine to compare India’s defence capabilities with those of China, given that the two countries are engaged in resolving border disputes. But also look at the difference in their defence budgets

The 2015 Chinese defense budget has been the focus of attention during the annual Two Meetings of the National People's Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) which opened in Beijing on March 3 and 5 respectively.
A few days before the event, the Taiwanese website WantChinaTimes quoted Jin Canrong, a professor at the School of International Studies at Renmin University of China, saying: “a sustained double-digit growth of China's defense budget would most likely be based on its strategies for coping with any changes in its relations with the United States.” The Defence expert added: “If China increases its military budget by double-digits this year, it would signal that the country is boosting its combat preparedness in response to perceived potential challenges.”
Last year, China’s ‘official’ budget was 808.2 billion yuan (US$129 billion), an annual increase of 12.2% compared to the previous year.
On March 4, 2014, during a news conference, the NPC’s spokeswoman, Fu Ying announced that this year’s defense budget would be increased by about 10 percent.
Fu further explained: “Compared with great powers, the road of China's defence modernisation is more difficult. We have to rely on ourselves for most of our military equipment and research and development.” She added that China's defence policy is defensive in nature.
A battery of Chinese experts justified Beijing’s decision to go again for a double-digit raise. Major General Xu Guangyu, senior consultant to the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association commented that the present increase in military spending is ‘basically reasonable’, adding that the $145 billion budget ‘only’ represents 1.4 percent of the country’s GDP, far below world average.
General Xu also argued that China's per capita military spending remains low, about US $ 57,000/soldier (divided among the 2.3 million officers and soldiers). He did not miss the opportunity to compare with the figure of the Japanese ($ 210,000) or American troops ($ 430,000). His conclusion was: “[China’s] current military spending is still very insufficient and cannot fully meet the needs of China's national defense.”
Though Xi Jinping introduced a new theory, the 'Four Comprehensives', which promotes ‘building a moderately prosperous society, deepening reform, governing the country according to rule by law, and enforcing strict party discipline’, the budget of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is not caught in rhetoric as China remains pragmatic (and secretive) about its defence spending.
While Xi’s proclaimed objective is to make the troops able to ‘fight and win wars’, the PLA’s main battle is today against rampant corruption. As the annual Meetings started in Beijing, a group of 14 officials of Major General rank were placed under investigation. The most prominent is Guo Zhenggang, former deputy political commissar of the Zhejiang Military Command and son of a former CMC Vice-Chairman.
The resolute fight against corruption, at all the levels of the PLA, has one ‘budgetary’ collateral, as all military officials should only rely on their salaries. If the ‘customary’ sources of income are cut, how will Xi control the generals and built a ‘Chinese Dream Army’?
The PLA Daily quoted President Xi saying that “military officers can only rely on their salaries for income. Any unapproved income or illegal gains will be investigated and punished.” Easier said than done, though as a result, the CMC will probably have to increase PLA’s salaries (a third of the military budget is for the salaries of the PLA's 2.3 million personnel).
One of the reasons for this year slightly lower budgetary increase is that China faces serious economic problems, with an annual growth of 7.4%, the slowest in 24 years; a further slowdown to around 7% being around the corner. It may seriously hamper larger defence spending.
Moreover, a report prepared by the Rand Corporation for a US congressional committee argued that China’s military is not ready to win wars despite spending heavily.
The report says: “The PLA suffers from potentially serious weaknesses that could limit its ability to conduct operations required to fight and win future conflicts. …Although the PLA’s capabilities have increased dramatically, its remaining weaknesses increase the risk of failure to successfully perform the missions the Chinese Communist Party leaders may task it to perform.”
The PLA is said to have an outdated command structure, poor quality personnel, to lack professionalism and be held back by corruption, the report added.
The main question remains: does the budget announced by Beijing reflect the reality? It certainly does not!
Take an example, The Global Times reported that China has begun upgrading its Type 094 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine. The Chinese Navy may need five or six of the submarines, capable of carrying 16 ballistic missiles, a great improvement on the original model which could only carry 12 missiles which can be fitted with JL-2 intercontinental-range ballistic missiles with a range of 8000 km.
Is the amount of R&D required for this ‘improvement’, taken into account the defence budget? It is anybody’s guess.
What about the construction of a second aircraft carrier?
The US-based Duowei News, quoted Ding Haichun, a deputy political commissar of the PLA Navy, who acknowledged that China's second aircraft carrier is currently under construction and will be more advanced than the country's first carrier, the Liaoning.
When asked how many carriers China plans to have, Liu Xiaojiang, a former PLA Navy political commissar said that it would ultimately depend on how much research and development funding is available.
In India, the 2015-16 Defence Budget disappointed many. Finance Minister Arun Jaitley has ‘only’ announced a raise of about 10 percent to Rs 2,46,727 crore (40 billion US $), which is Rs 23,357 crore more than the revised estimates for the current financial year (Rs 2,22,370 crore).
Defence experts have unanimously argued that this inadequate allocation will not provide the necessary boost for the country’s military modernization, particularly if it wants to catch up with China.
Though Jaitley affirmed in the Parliament: “Modernisation of the armed forces is critical to enable them to play their role effectively”, Brig Gurmeet Kanwal, former Director of the Centre for Land Warfare Studies wrote in The Indian Defence Review that it is not enough considering “the Army has begun the raising of 17 Corps, designated as a mountain strike corps, which is expected to cost Rs 64,000 crore over seven years.”
One has to add initial payments for 126 MMRCA planes, 197 light helicopters, 145 Ultra-light Howitzers, 15 Apache attack helicopters and 22 CH-47F Chinook medium lift helicopters, C-17 heavy-lift aircraft, etc. It is mathematically impossible to cover these urgent requirements.
One can always argue that despite the shortcomings of the Indian defence budget, a stable and democratic India is perhaps not so badly off compared to China, however there is no question of catching up with the Middle Kingdom in the years to come.

The Chinese Communist Party new expertise: reincarnations

Padma Choling showing his knowledge about 'reincarnation'

On the sideline of the National People’s Congress in Delhi, Padma Choling, (alias Pema Thinley), Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Tibet Autonomous Regional People's Congress and only ‘ethnic’ Tibetan member of the CCP’s Central Committee, created a flutter when he said:“It's not up to the Dalai Lama [to decide about his own reincarnation].”
Though Padma Choling also stated that the door for a dialogue with the 14th Dalai Lama is ‘always open’, he added: "how the dialogue would be held and what to discuss [will] totally depend on the Dalai Lama's attitude.”
The Tibetan official objected to the Dalai Lama’s announcement that ‘his traditional religious role should cease with his death’. Padma Choling affirmed that it was against “the Tibetan Buddhism tradition as the soul of a senior lama is reincarnated in the body of a child on his death. …[as] the move is expected to upset the reincarnation system that has been honored for hundreds of years in Tibet and destabilize the Buddhist region.”
The Central Committee member added that the process: “should follow strict historical conventions and required religious rituals of the Tibetan Buddhism …and be approved by the central government.”
For him, “it's not up to the Dalai Lama [to decide].”
For Beijing, it is for the all-powerful Communist Party of China to do so.
An atheist Party, which has unexpectedly become expert in ‘religious matters’, believes that the Dalai Lama’s claims to stop his lineage (more correctly the institution of the Dalai Lamas) “is blasphemy against the Tibetan Buddhism.”
It is clear that Padma Choling has no clue about ‘reincarnation affairs’; it is logical as he is only a Marxist politician (perhaps with a great knowledge in Karl Marx’ theory).
Don’t you thing that Marx must have turned in the tomb, if he heard the uttering of his Tibetan follower?
When Padma Choling speaks about ‘soul reincarnation’, isn’t it a Marxist blasphemy?
The minimum that Beijing should have done was to file their Panchen Lama to speak about ‘reincarnation’; it would have sounded more logical, even if not very plausible.
The issue of reincarnation is complicate, it has too many ‘inner’ intricacies that a Communist leader to can’t really understand; therefore Padma Choling and his colleagues should have the modesty not to argue about it.
The problem for Beijing is that Gyaltsen Norbu, their designated Panchen Lama is perhaps not ready to speak against the Dalai Lama, as he may have some clue about Buddhist philosophy.
In any case, how can the complexed issue of ‘reincarnation’ be rigidly ‘regulated’ by a political Party?
Take the case of Tsangyang Gyatso, the 6th Dalai Lama, born in India (Tawang district of Arunachal Pradesh).
On June 28 1706, Lhazang Khan, a Mongol leader deposed the young Dalai Lama and enthroned another person, Ngawang Yeshe Gyatso as the ‘true’ Sixth Dalai Lama; while Tsangyang Gyatso was arrested, the usurper was installed in the Potala Palace.
Suddenly, at the behest of Lhazang Khan, Tsangyang Gyatso received an invitation to the Imperial Palace in Beijing; he was therefore taken away from Lhasa under Mongol escort, to China.
According to the official history, Tsangyang Gyatso died from fever on the way, at Kunganor on November 15, 1706.
But according his ‘Secret Biography’, he escaped the Mongols, who had planned to kill him and secretly left for Mongolia where he first became a wandering monk and then settled in Alashan, today located in Inner Mongolia.
His ‘Secret Biography’ said that Tsangyang Gyatso passed away in 1746, forty years after his official death. He built a large number of monasteries and had thousand of disciples. Only a very few knew who he really was.
A website 'Treasury of Lives’ explains:

In Alashan, one of the Sixth Dalai Lama's principal patrons was Gushri Khan’s grandson Abo who, with his wife, also became one of his most constant lay students. From this connection, he developed good relations with representatives of the Manchu Emperor, who were keen to have him occupy a position of importance within the Buddhist hierarchy. In addition to his involvement with Jakrong, he became the abbot of thirteen monasteries.

The Dalai Lama's last poem before his presumed death is known by all. It announced his return as the VIIth Dalai Lama.

Oh White Crane!
Lend me your wings
I shall not fly far
From Lithang, I shall return

Two years later a young boy Kalsang Gyaltso was born in Lithang (Eastern Tibet) who would soon be recognised as the VIIth Dalai Lama.
And the story goes on...
The Thirteenth Dalai Lama once told Sir Charles Bell, the British Political Officer in Lhasa: "He (the Sixth) did not observe even the rules of a fully ordained monk; he drank wine habitually. And he used to have his body in several place at the same time, e.g. in Lhasa, in Kongpo (a province seven day's journey east of Lhasa), and elsewhere. Even the place whence he retired to the Honourable Field (i.e. died) is uncertain; one tomb of his is in Alashan in Mongolian where there is another in Drepung monastery. One if his bodies used to appear in the crowd in the Reception Hall of the Seventh Dalai Lama. One is said to appear also at my receptions, But I am unable to say whether this is true or not".
I am recounting this story just to say that ‘reincarnation’ has many esoteric aspects that a Communist Party’s cadre can’t grasped and even less regulate (he can only understand the political aspect like Lhazang Khan).
Unfortunately, Beijing sees only the latter aspect of the issue.
Presume that one day The Communist Party would ‘discover’ its own ‘Dalai Lama’, does it mean the spirit of the Tibetan people will be tamed?
Certainly not, on the contrary!
Tibetans are no fools!
Their only alternative for Beijing is to deal with the present Dalai Lama, who is the most reasonable person that can be found and if the Party is really interested in a long-lasting solution to the Tibetan issue.
But the problem of the leaders in Beijing is that they don’t know what is good for them.

Roads to the Border ...and tourism

While we regularly come across articles about the Border Road Organization (under the Ministry of Defence) struggling to build roads in Arunachal Pradesh and Ladakh, China is going faster and faster on the other side of the border/LAC.
The Economic Times gave yesterday a partial explanation for the slow development on the Indian side: “the delay in execution of the ambitious Trans Arunachal Highway (TAH) project is mainly because of the compensation issue with the affected people and delay in final forest clearance by the Union ministry of Environment and Forest.”
It is what Arunachal Pradesh PWD Minister, Gojen Gadi stated in the Arunachal Assembly.
Gadi gave the example of the Ziro-Koloriang portion of the TAH: “though the cost of the project in that stretch was Rs 48 crore, the compensation sought was Rs 135 crore.” Apparently the Union Ministry of Road Transport and Highway (MoRTH) objected and the construction of the road is presently stopped.
In Itanagar, according to the same The Economic Times, while the initial compensation claim was Rs 195 crore, it is now Rs 334 crore and the ministry had to reduce the width of the road from 45 meters to 18 meters.
This is how India functions.
The situation is much worst for the projects close to the border, (though they do not require environmental clearance anymore).
Other issues (bureaucracy, corruption, lack of manpower and materials, difficult terrain, etc.) are hampering a faster development of the infrastructure.
China does not seem to be facing such problems.
China Military Online announced that “The highways leading to six frontier defense units in Tibet has been under construction, according to relevant departments of the PLA Chengdu Military Area Command (MAC).”
These frontier units are located opposite the Indian posts, north of the LAC (i.e. the McMahon Line).
The Chinese website continued: “The six frontier defense troop units are the last ones in the PLA Tibet Military Command which haven't no access to the highways. Many frontier defense companies and sentry posts in Tibet are stationed in forests, valleys or in snowy mountains, it is very difficult and costly to build highways in these places with adverse terrain conditions. Without highways, it is a headache for the frontier defense troops to hold maneuvers, replenish materials and have a vacation leave.”
It is true that the headache is more acute on the Indian side, where the terrain is in many cases extremely difficult.
For example, one of the reasons why the road between Limeking and Taksing (near the LAC) in Upper Subansiri district takes so much time, is the terrain.
Though China’s overall defence budget has ‘only’ been increased by 10% this year, during the 3 last Five-Year Plan (from the 9th to the 11th), the Chinese government “continuously increased investment in the construction of frontier defense installations, as a result, the number of frontier defense units in Tibet without traffic has decreased to six from 19,” says the military website, adding that the construction of the six (last) highways which started successively in 2014 is scheduled to be completed this year.
Another article on VTIBET.com explained that in recent years, “road traffic rapidly develops in Nyingchi [or Nyingtri] prefecture, especially in rural areas. Data shows that the total length of road up to 5,351 kilometers in Nyingchi Prefecture, and the rate of road access in towns and villages respectively occupy 96.3 % and 95.7 %.”
Nyingchi, located north of Arunachal, is one of the 7 prefectures of the Tibetan Autonomous Region.
The website added: “At present, Nyingchi basically forms a transportation network that centers on Parkyip County [this county does not exist, the author perhaps means Mainling], and links with all towns and villages of Nyingchi. All these achievements cannot be achieved without the hard work of road constructors and maintenance workers.”

In another article, Wangdu, commissioner of Nyingchi Prefecture and a member of the 12th NPC stated on the sideline of the Conference: "In Nyingchi Prefecture alone, the tourism sector employs 350,000 people and the number of family inns has risen to 213."
Tashi Yangjen, his colleague from Doyul Township in Lhoka Prefecture added: "The environment in my hometown is quite similar to Nyingchi. We have already built a model ecological village. Our next step is to develop the tourism industry with a strong Lhopa flavor. ...Like Nyingchi, we focus not only on economic progress, but also environment protection.”
According to the deputy, the annual per capital income in Doyul reached 10,000 yuan (1,597 US dollars): "The town now has access to hospital, school, plaza, and training center [thanks to tourism]," he said.
On the same site, some photos show an artillery regiment under the Tibet Military Command (MC) stationed in the Tibet Autonomous Region undertaking a 'long distance maneuver training'.
It demonstrates the dual (military and civilian) use of the infrastructure in the area.
One difference between India and China, is that while India keeps a tight Inner Line Permit system in place, China invites millions of tourist to visit the area north of the McMahon Line/LAC.
The amount invested in roads is therefore recovered extremely fast by the revenue earned from tourism.
A few months ago, China Tibet Online affirmed: “In recent years, Nyingchi [Nyingtri] Prefecture has attracted countless tourists for the unique beautiful scenery of Qinghai-Tibet plateau. Nyingchi Prefecture is expected to receive 2.8 million tourists in 2014, with tourism income of 2.6 billion yuan [US $ 450 millions]. The tourism industry has driven related industries realize the added value of 3.69 billion yuan, accounting for 38% of Nyingchi Prefecture’s GDP.”
Why can’t the construction of the roads in Arunachal be given to the private sector and tourism opened on a large scale (a quick registration for foreigners could be arranged when the visitor crosses the border with Assam, like in Rangpo, in the case of Sikkim).
A few lakhs of Indian and foreign tourists could bring a good revenue to the State and help financing the development required to receive them well. Further, it will be the best proof that Arunachal belongs to India and will always remain so.
A few photos from the Tibetan side of the LAC. The river is the Yarlung Tsangpo, which becomes the Siang and then the Brahmaputra.
The landscapes are not very different on the Indian side.

 

 

 

 

 

 

The ‘Ethnic’ Religious Faces of China

Dupkang Rinpoche received the 'Atisha' Award

In continuation with my posts on the ‘ethnic faces’ in the PLA and the Communist Party, I will today deal with the ‘ethnic religious faces’ who help Beijing in its endeavor to progressively takeover the leadership of the Buddhist World (in Asia at least).
On March 5, China Tibet Online reported the visit of a ‘Buddhist’ delegation from Tibet to Bangladesh. Can you believe it?
Quoting the Chinese Embassy in Bangladesh, the website said: “At the invitation of the Buddhism Association of Bangladesh, the China Tibetan Buddhism delegation, led by Rinpoche Dupkang Tupden Kedup, visited Bangladesh from February 21 to 25.”
I have often mentioned this ‘political’ rinpoche on this blog (particularly the rinpoche's visit in Kalmikya Republic of Russia).
Dupkang, who is close to the Communist Party, is vice chairman of the CPPCC Tibet Committee and Chairman of the Tibet Branch of Buddhist Association.
It appears that he has been awarded the ‘2015 Atisha Peace Gold Award’ by the Buddhism Association of Bangladesh (BAB).
The fact that Dupkang is not a monk does not seem to have bothered the BAB.

Dupkang Rinpoche in Bikrampur

Atisha Dipamkara Srijana was a Buddhist teacher from Bengal, who lived during the 11th century (at the time of the Pala Empire). He was one of the major saintly figures who spread Mahayana and Vajrayana Buddhism in Asia and particularly in Tibet; he is still revered as one of the great religious gurus in Tibet and India (and apparently in Bangladesh).
The Dupkang delegation from Tibet is said to have exchanged views with local Bangladeshi Buddhists and visited the Atisha Memorial Hall and the Buddhist ruins in . A reception was hosted for the Tibetans by Ma Mingqiang, the Chinese Ambassador to Bangladesh.
China Tibet online says that Buddhism is the third largest religion in Bangladesh with about 0.7 percent of the population (they mainly live in the Chittagong hills); they followed the Theravada tradition.
This visit raises a very serious question and the Tibetan Administration in Dharamsala should ponder upon it.
Why has the Dalai Lama been unable to visit Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Thailand (he went once in the 1970s, I think) or Sri Lanka? Most of these countries (apart from Bangladesh) have a large Buddhist population? Why should a Communist rinpoche like to Dupkang, relatively junior in the Buddhist hierarchy, be ‘honoured’ with the ‘Atisha Award’, when the Dalai Lama has never been able to visited Bangladesh.
One should not also forget that that the Tibetan Army (SSF) actively participated to the Liberation War in 1971; and this, at the cost of many Tibetan jawans’ and officers’ lives.
Why the Dalai Lama is not welcome in all these countries?
It is often due the Chinese political pressure, but also inter-school rivalry (the Drukpa Kargyu tradition in Bhutan, for example) or the great Mahayana/Theravada divide.
But are the differences so insurmountable?
An intra-Buddhist dialogue seems the need of the hour.
The time has perhaps come for Dharamsala (the Central Tibetan Administration or the Office of the Dalai Lama) to create a South Asian Bureau for Buddhists Affairs. A respected Buddhist figure (Tibetan or India) could visit the South Asian countries (including Baltistan in Pakistan) and start establishing contacts with local Buddhists.
This could eventually pave the way to a visit by the Dalai Lama. It is something that the Modi Sarkar should strongly support, (the Prime Minister could start discretely mentioning this during his forthcoming visit to Sri Lanka).

Gyaltsen Norbu, the Chinese-selected Panchen Lama

In the meantime in Tibet, Beijing is fully using Gyaltsen Norbu, China’s Panchen Lama for its political purpose.
On March 4, Xinhua reported: “As the youngest member of the Standing Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) National Committee, the Panchen Lama, donning a red cloak, joined in discussions among religious members of the Third Session of the 12th CPPCC National Committee.”
The young Lama (25) spoke about "Cultivating talent, making Tibetan Buddhism better adapted to a socialist society."
He quoted Yu Zhengsheng, the CPPCC chairman, saying: “China supports the religious members to continue to play a unique role in carrying out targeted work in Tibet and Xinjiang and actively guide religions to adapt themselves to the socialist system."
Gyaltsen Norbu, who is the main ethnic face of Buddhism in today’s China, commented: "[Yu’s] remarks on religious work delivered clear expectations. In my opinion, Tibetan Buddhism can play an important role in national economic and social development, social harmony and maintaining stability."
There is no doubt that Beijing will continue to fully play the ‘Panchen Lama card’ in the years to come. For the purpose, in March, 2013, Norbu had been elevated to the ‘important’ (but ceremonial) post of member of the Standing Committee of the CPPCC National Committee.
On the side of the CPPCC meet, Gyaltsen Norbu explained that he daily devotes most of his time and attention “to cultivating a religious spirit in the Tibetan people. There's an urgent need to cultivate talent, which is important for Tibetan Buddhism in the present and future."
He added: “I hope to see a batch of Tibetan Buddhist talents who will unswervingly follow the path to a socialist society with Chinese characteristics." The last sentence is pure political propaganda, but has the young Lama the choice to speak differently?
Like the other ‘ethnic’ faces, probably not!

Religious ceremony at Kumbum Monastery

In the meantime, photos and videos have appeared on the social media showing heavy security presence at the annual Monlam Prayer Festival at Kumbum monastery, in Qinghai province.
Voice of America reported: “The heavy security presence with armored vehicles and troops with automatic weapons doing drills and marching through one of the major Tibetan monasteries appears to have deeply hurt the feelings of the Tibetan people in the area. In rare acts of expression on the heavily policed Chinese social media sites, one person asks, ‘Are we supposed to watch the army or watch the prayer festival’, while another laments, ‘I was so afraid that I forgot to pray’, and one person puts the armed intimidation of prayer goers in the context of China’s repeated calls for social stability by posting, ‘With this many soldiers at a prayer festival, are you working for harmony or war?’”
The 500 year old Monlam Prayer Festival is traditionally dedicated to teachers of all religious traditions, social harmony, and world peace.
In Beijing, the Chinese leaders speak of a ‘New Normal’ for China.
Is the military presence in Kumbum another ‘New Normal’?

The 'Ethnic' Faces in the PLA

Saimati Muhammat,
alias Halimulati Abdul Rehman?

The third session of China's 12th National People's Congress (NPC) opened with fanfare at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on March 5, 2015.
Two days earlier, the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference had started its deliberations.
Since the founding of the NPC, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has had the largest delegation; still today the PLA has about 9 percent of the total 2987 NPC's seats.
Unfortunately, the PLA is mainly represented by Han officers.
However, in the recent years, officers with an 'ethnic' background (read Tibetans, Uyghurs, Mongols, Huis, etc.) have come to play a more visible role. Beijing has probably realized that 'faces' were needed to support their pretense of 'regional autonomy'.
Here are a few lines on 3 senior 'ethnic' officers: one Uyghur and 2 Tibetans. 

Representing Xinjiang
One remembers that on March 1, 2014, some 33 people were killed and 130 wounded when a group of attackers dressed in black went on the rampage in Kunming railway station. The ‘terrorists’ went around indiscriminately hacking and stabbing passers-by.
According to official sources the death toll includes 29 civilian victims killed by the attackers and four assailants shot dead by riot police. Witnesses said that six men and two women used long knives to ‘crazily’ attack innocent passengers. Terrified victims ran away seeking protection.
The Legal Daily newspaper reported that the SWAT (Special Weapons And Tactics unit) arrived on the scene less than 15 minutes after the beginning of the carnage and after firing 2 warning shots; the SWAT leader gunned down a masked woman who threatened him with a knife; he later shot four of the attackers in 15 seconds.
A couple of days later, Xinhua, quoting Kunming officials, said that the initial investigations suggested the deadly attack was "planned and organised by separatist forces from Xinjiang."
The horrible Kunming massacre should be seen in the perspective of the situation in the restive Xinjiang.
For the first time on this occasion, we heard about Saimati Muhammat, a deputy commander of the Xinjiang Military Area Command. In an interview to Xinhua, he affirmed that counter-terrorism in Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region had the strong backing from the People's Liberation Army (PLA): “Counter-terrorism arrangements are in place to prevent serious incidents in Xinjiang," said Saimati.
For Beijing, Xinjiang is at the front line struggle against 'The Three Forces’, namely terrorism, extremism and separatism.
Saimati Muhammat, a Uygur ethnic and member of the NPC, said the armed forces in Xinjiang will never ease border controls: “We watch the border closely. Any oversight, which lets terrorists in or out, is unacceptable."
Saimati Muhammat affirmed that the border troops in Xinjiang, who ‘operate under extreme conditions’, have stepped up counter-terrorism training to armed forces, especially special forces: “to protect the safety of local people, the armed forces also work with the police force in patrols and training.”
Saimati further explained: “The fight against the three forces is not about ethnic issues, religion or cultural differences. They are enemies of people of all ethnic groups. The battle is complicated, harsh, fierce and cruel."
Who is General Saimati Muhammat?
As far as I could find out, he is also known as Halimulati Abdul Rehman.
He is one of the first Uyghurs to be promoted as a Major General in the PLA.He is presently Deputy Commandant of Lanzhou Military Command Area (MAC).
Born in 1961, he graduated from the PLA’s Shijiazhuang Army Command College, specializing in military high-tech military applications and management. He earlier served as Deputy Commander of South Xinjiang Military District’s Political Department.
As a Uyghur, his postings appeared more ‘political’ than operational.
He was promoted as a Major General in January 2015, along with 8 others (all Hans) serving in the Lanzhou MAC.
This year too, the Uyghur general spoke to the press on the side of the NPC in Beijing. He said that terrorist attacks will not affect the overall stability of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, nor will they can hinder its fast economic development, ethnic unity or religious harmony.
Saimati Muhammat was quoted by Xinhua: “Everyone in Xinjiang is against terrorism and expects peace. Now those few terrorists have no support there, and people just hate them."
Last May, two months after the Kunming incident, Beijing started a one-year anti-terrorism campaign in Xinjiang. Saimati commented that it has helped people realize that "terrorists are their common enemies. Everyone is obligated to battle terrorism and maintain peace."
Saimati, who has become the ‘Uyghur face’ of the PLA, noted: "Terror attacks are sometimes committed in the name of Islam, but even Muslims condemn them. These extreme activities represent a violation of Islamic doctrine. They're a crime. The [Party’s] policies protect religious needs while helping to deter extremists."
The Uyghur general has become a de facto spokesperson for the Uyghur government. It is convenient for Beijing to have an ethnic face.

Ngawang (Ang Mong) Sonam

Representing Tibet
Apart from General Saimati, there are other 'ethnic' officers who are attending the NPC (last year too, they were present at during the sessions).
Though I mention here two Tibetans, a couple of Mongols and Manchus are also attending the NPC.
Ngawang [Ang Mong] Sonam is a Deputy Commander of Military District, Qinghai Military District of Lanzhou Military Area Command. A Chinese publication noted: “These [officers] bring pride to the rugged western China [Tibet and Xinjiang], they are absolutely honest and have defended the country's frontiers with their blood; they feel from their heart for the people.”
The publication added: “Minority officers, who represent the people in ethnic minority areas in the country's highest political authority [the NPC] are dedicated to a strong army and China’s steadfast dream.”
Major General Ngawang Sonam was born in Qinghai Yushu (Jyekundo) in 1964. He decided to follow the footsteps of his elder brother and join the army.
Many Tibetans like Ngawang Sonam have a pastoral background; most of them did not even know how to use chopsticks, explained a Chinese publication; they learned the skill in the PLA: “We were also taught Chinese, we learned to write Chinese characters, as the Chinese soldiers did know how speak the minority language (Tibetan),” Sonam recalled, adding: “By the time the [Tibetan] soldiers are demobilized, they are usually proficient in Chinese and can read the local language as well.”

Jiang Yong

Another Tibetan officer is Jiang Yong which is not a very Tibetan name! (His Tibetan name might be Jamyang).
He is born in Chamdo in 1977.
Late 1990s, Jiang Yong, then a Tibetan teenager, had a dream; he wanted to join the PLA. In an interview, he explained that when the 'western development' scheme started, the Central  (Beijing) government initiated a preferential education policy for young Tibetans; Jiang Yong, who had got excellent grades in the junior high school, eventually graduated from the Tibet University. He later joined Kunming Military Academy.
Now, he serves in the Special Forces; he recalled: “I was enrolled in Special Forces selection, conditions were very tough.”
He is posted (probably as a Colonel) in Chengdu Military Region.
He is a member of the 12th NPC.

While Han and ethnic deputies will give 'important' speeches on Xi Jinping's 'Four Comprehensives', particularly
the Rule of Law in ethnic areas, nothing much will be done for a larger and truer representation of the 'ethnics'.
Though Xinhua affirns that 'as year 2015 marks the 50th anniversary of the founding of the Tibet Autonomous Region, the central government's policies on governing Tibet will attract attention from home and abroad", nothing concrete will be announced for the ethnic representation in the local governments (Lhasa or Urumqi) or the PLA.
Today, like 50 years ago, Beijing has just 'faces' (from Ngabo Nwang Jigme to Pema Thinley and Lobsang Gyaltsen).
Beijing is clearly more interested by Xi Jinping's twin babies: the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road: "it has drawn the attention of many countries around the world, especially China’s neighboring countries including India, which borders with southwest China’s Tibet Autonomous Region," said Xinhua.

India vs China: Defence spending and other factors

The Defence Budget for the Financial Year (FY) 2015-16, has disappointed many. Finance Minister Arun Jaitly has ‘only’ announced a raise of about 10 percent to Rs 2,46,727 crore (40 billion US dollars), which is Rs 23,357 crore more than the revised estimates for the current financial year (Rs 2,22,370 crore).

Defence experts have unanimously commented that this inadequate allocation will not provide the necessary boost for the country’s military modernization, particularly if it wants to catch up with China.
In July 2014, when he presented his FY 2014-15 budget, Jaitley had increased the defence allocation by 12.5 per cent over the 2013-14 allocation.
The current defence budget corresponds to a ‘meager’ (say defence experts) 1.74 per cent of India’s projected GDP for 2014-15.
Though Jaitley affirmed in the Parliament: “Modernisation of the armed forces is critical to enable them to play their role effectively in the defence of India’s strategic interests,” the fact remains that it is doubtful if this allocation can help India to bridge the gap with its Northern neighbour.
The revenue expenditure planned for 2014-15 amounts to 60% of the amount allocated; it covers amongst other things, salaries, allowances, rations, ammunition and transportation. The remaining 40%, amounting to Rs 94,588 crore, is earmarked to the capital account for the acquisition of new weaponry and equipment.
Brig Gurmeet Kanwal, former Director of the Centre for Land Warfare Studies wrote in The Indian Defence Review that it is not enough considering “the Army has begun the raising of 17 Corps, designated as a mountain strike corps, which is expected to cost Rs 64,000 crore over seven years. Major acquisitions of weapon platforms that have been pending for long include initial payments for 126 multi-mission, medium-range combat aircraft (MMRCA), 197 light helicopters, 145 Ultra-light Howitzers, 15 Apache attack helicopters and 22 CH-47F Chinook medium lift helicopters, C-17 heavy-lift aircraft and frigates and submarines.”
It is difficult to see how these expenditures will be met, though Jaitley believes that the ‘Make in India’ scheme could help save some precious resources; he cited the new FDI policy (49%) for the defence sector, which could trigger important changes.
A week earlier, the Prime Minister visited to Aero India 2015 in Bangalore; he had the opportunity to clarify: “India is ready to build an industry that will have room for everyone - public sector, private sector and foreign firms.”
The inclusion of private and foreign firms could be a game changer. It makes the ‘Make in India’ a realistic objective: “We want to develop an industry that is dynamic. It should constantly stay at the cutting edge of the global industry. …We must involve our scientists, soldiers, academia, industry & independent experts more closely in research and development,” said the Prime Minister.
But there is a long, long way to go. Though ‘Make in India’ was the central theme of the five-day fair, many observers questioned: ‘Can Modi make it in India?’
China has a different set of problems.
The 2015 Chinese defense budget was the focus of attention during the annual Two Meetings of the National People's Congress and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference which opened on March 3 and 5 respectively.
A few days before the event, the Taiwanese website WantChinaTimes quoted Jin Canrong, a professor at the School of International Studies at Renmin University of China, saying: “China's overall tax revenue dipped last year and he said that sustained double-digit growth of China's defense budget would most likely be based on its strategies for coping with any changes in its relations with the United States.” The Defence expert added: “If China increases its military budget by double-digits this year, it would signal that the country is boosting its combat preparedness in response to perceived potential challenges.”
Last year, the budget was 808.2 billion yuan (US$129 billion), an annual increase of 12.2% compared to the previous year, while the hike in 2013 was a 10.7% increase.
While the Middle Kingdom still lives in rhetoric, Beijing remains very pragmatic about its defence spending. The South China Morning Post gives a long list of the current slogans used by the Communist leadership: the Eight Regulations, Six Bans, Four Forms of Decadence (formalism, bureaucratism, hedonism and extravagance), The Synchronisation of Four Modernisations, Five in One, One Belt and One Road, etc. The defence budget is not caught in such populist sloganeering, though Xi Jinping has introduced a own theory, the 'Four Comprehensives', which promotes ‘building a moderately prosperous society, deepening reform, governing the country according to rule by law, and enforcing strict party discipline’.
Xi likes to mentions his ‘Chinese dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese people’; in the People's Liberation Army (PLA) too, the battle for ‘the dream’ is raging. While Beijing tries to take head-on the rampant corruption amongst the generals, Xi affirmed that the PLA’s main objective to make the troops able to ‘fight and win battles’.
A few days ago, a group of 14 officials of Major General rank were placed under investigation. The most prominent is Guo Zhenggang, former deputy political commissar of the Military Command of Zhejiang province, and son of a former CMC Vice-Chairman.
It also includes Zhu Heping, head of the Joint Logistics Department of the Chengdu Military Area Command.
The resolute fight against corruption, at all the levels of the PLA, has one ‘budgetary’ collateral as all military officials should now rely on their salaries only. If the ‘customary’ sources of income are cut, how will Xi control the generals and built a ‘Chinese Dream Army’.
Probably by increasing their salaries!
Let us not forget that a third of the military budget pays the salaries of the PLA's 2.3 million personnel.
Fu Ying, the spokeswoman for the National People's Congress spokeswoman announced during a news conference that the defence budget will ‘only’ increase by about 10% , while last year spending rose by 12.2% to $ US 130 billion, second only to the United States (US $ 581 billion).
Fu further explained: “Compared with great powers, the road of China's defence modernisation is more difficult. We have to rely on ourselves for most of our military equipment and research and development.” She added that China's defence policy is defensive in nature.
This is a relatively modest increase at a time China faces serious problems.
One of the reasons is that last year’s growth was 7.4%, the slowest in 24 years; a further slowdown to around 7% may be around the corner. It may hamper the larger defence spending.
But there is more, a report prepared by the Rand Corporation for a US congressional committee argued that China’s military is not ready to win wars despite spending heavily.
The report says: “The PLA suffers from potentially serious weaknesses that could limit its ability to conduct operations required to fight and win future conflicts. …Although the PLA’s capabilities have increased dramatically, its remaining weaknesses increase the risk of failure to successfully perform the missions the Chinese Communist Party leaders may task it to perform.”
The PLA is said to have an outdated command structure, poor quality personnel, to lack professionalism and be held back by corruption, the report added.
So, despite the shortcomings of the Indian defence budget, a stable and democratic India is perhaps not so badly off and let us not forget that China’s official budget is only the ‘disclosed’ portion of the real one.

Myanmar: Beijing‘s Dilemma

My article Myanmar: Beijing‘s Dilemma  appeared in NitiCentral.

Click here to read...

Beijing’s neighbours do not have it easy.
After months of conflicts with Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam and others, clashes have flared up in northern Myanmar, neighboring China’s Yunnan province.
In hardly a month, the conflict between the Burmese government and the Kokang troops have left more than 100 people dead, while some 100,000 ethnic Chinese are said to have fled across the border into Yunnan.
Who are these Kokang rebels?
Known as the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), they are based in the northern Shan state. Inhabited by ethnic Han Chinese, the area is known as the Kokang Self-Administered Zone.
Today, the rebel group prides itself of an army of about 3,000 soldiers under an ethnic-Chinese commander, Peng Jiasheng.
The MNDAA, formerly the Communist Party of Burma (CPB), a China-backed guerrilla group, signed a bilateral cease-fire agreement with the Burmese government in 1989.
The agreement collapsed in 2009 when the rebels were asked to join the paramilitary Border Guard Force under the control of Myanmar’s military; the MNDAA did not agree to the move. When government forces entered the self-administrated area, Peng escaped to China; at that time, a large number of refugees moved into Yunnan province. Peng’s return heralded fresh troubles: on February 9, serious fighting erupted in Laukkai, Kokang’s capital, between Burmese troops and the MNDAA rebel forces.
The successive US Administrations believed that Peng Jiasheng was involved in drug trafficking, first in opium and more recently in methamphetamines.
Radio Free Asia thus explains the present conflict: “While he claims to be fighting for ethnic rights, the current struggle appears to be part of a bid by the rebel leader to retake power of an area that supports lucrative trading and smuggling because of its location on the border with China,” adding “the MNDAA had been joined in the recent clashes by allies: the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Arakanese Army (AA).”
It was thus a serious issue for the Myanmar government which declared a state of emergency in the region; at the same time, it asked Beijing to prevent the rebels from using its territory to launch ‘terrorist activities’.
On February 18, quoting a Burmese official, Agence France Press reported: “Nearly 90,000 civilians in northeastern Myanmar are thought to have fled clashes …as sporadic violence hampered efforts to evacuate those still trapped in the conflict zone. …Whole towns and villages lie empty in the rugged, remote area as tens of thousands of residents have fled their homes – some on foot.”
Over half of the local population is said to be on the move.
In the meantime, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Hong Lei asserted that China respects Myanmar's sovereignty, territorial integrity and affirmed that Beijing is opposed to any acts hurting bilateral ties. Hong called for self-restraint, a cessation of conflict …affirming that China was firmly opposed to any person or organization using Chinese territory to undermine the China-Myanmar relationship.
Peng Jiasheng came to Beijing’s rescue; he told The Global Times that since 2009, his alliance has strictly forbidden Chinese citizens from entering Kokang: “We will not accept Chinese citizens participating in armed actions, as this is only harmful to us”.
An interesting aspect of the conflict is that the military regime in Myanmar suddenly became popular in its own country; it even got kudos on social media platforms such as Facebook; as Reuters puts it: “Fighting between the Myanmar army and ethnic Chinese rebels has handed the long-feared military, a public relations coup, with an explosion of praise on social media and even former political prisoners expressing grudging support.”
Mid-February, Lt. Gen. Mya Tun Oo, Myanmar's chief of military affairs security announced that the Kokang rebels were being supported ‘by former Chinese soldiers and allied minority rebel groups’.
Oo explained that his government had to defend its sovereignty; he also asserted that former Chinese officers were providing military training to the rebels.
The Associated Press also mentioned a strong Chinese ‘influence’: “China is a major political and economic supporter of Myanmar, but there is unease among many about the influence the Chinese exercise, especially in loosely controlled areas in the north.”
But Beijing sees the situation differently: the Beijing-based Sina Military believes that Myanmar has become a geopolitical battleground between China and the United States: “The ongoing strife in Myanmar, which has never really stopped in the last 60 years, is not merely an internal struggle …it has become a behind-the-scenes tussle between China and the US for greater influence in the region,” says a commentary.
Myanmar provides China with a crucial passage to the Andaman Sea and the Indian Ocean; it is an important component of Xi Jinping’s Two Silk Roads dream project (‘one Belt and one Road’).
Sina Military argues that Beijing is innocent as a conflict in the region is not in its interest: “Political stability in Myanmar is key to China's economic interests, which is why Beijing has repeatedly offered to assist in mediating peace talks.”
But the US are “keen to suppress China's rise and preventing its access to the Indian Ocean;” says Sina which quotes the new US ‘pivot’ Asian policy. To prove its point, the article says that the US strategy was to back opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi for the presidency and in order to be able to control better Myanmar; Sina particularly mentions the meetings between President Obama and the Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, explaining that it became clear that when Aung san Suu Kyi would not be able to run for the presidency - because her two children are British citizens – Washington changed its policy and used ‘civil war’ to disrupt the border stability. This is of course far-fetched.
In an interview with Voice of America (VOA) Min Zaw Oo, director of ceasefire negotiation and implementation at the Myanmar Peace Center put forth a more plausible aspect: “The involvement might not be Chinese central government policy but of some of the local government officials, even business associates, some individuals who have business interests or political interests might be involved substantially.” Oo reasoned: “Otherwise these large amounts of weapons and the large number of people recruited in a very short time would not have materialized.”
Interestingly, Beijing takes the issue seriously
According to Duowei News, the Communist Party appointed the seasoned vice commander of the Beijing armed police headquarters, Major General Li Zhigang to take over the Yunnan’s police.
The South China Morning Post reported that on February 18, on the eve of the Chinese New Year “the Yunnan party committee and provincial government visited troops stationed in Yunnan and a military hospital in the province …Vice governor Zhang Zulin visited the 14th Group Army and the Yunnan armed police headquarters, where Li Zhigang was in attendance.”
The Hong Kong daily believes that “Li's return to Yunnan may be a direct response to the heightened tensions in northern Myanmar which has seen a flood of refugees flee into Yunnan, which is threatening social stability in the province.”
One morale of the story, if China wants, as per the words of President Xi Jinping, to be a ‘normal’ State, it can’t afford anymore to take ‘revolution’ to its neighbours, like Mao did.
In the coming months, China will have to match its words and actions. It is in Beijing’s own interest.