The Tibet Factor in India-China Relations

Seventy Years Ago: Tibet Invaded
October 7, 2020 marks the 70th anniversary of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) crossing the Upper Yangtze and entering into the territory controlled by Lhasa.
While invading Eastern Tibet, Beijing asserted that it was ‘liberating’ the Land of Snows. Today, seven decades later, the Tibetans, particularly the first ‘liberated’ populations of Eastern Tibet, still disagree with this interpretation. Tragically, in the process, India lost a peaceful border shared with a Buddhist nation.
The Battle of Chamdo, the first and only encounter between the Tibetan and Chinese forces, is interesting to look at for several reasons.
Tibet, a Buddhist nation was not military and tactically ready to oppose the seasoned troops of Mao (and some of China’s brilliant commanders). From the start, The Land of Snows stood no chance, especially without outside support from India or the West.
Further, many in Tibet still believed that increasing the number of japa (recitation) or parikramas (circumambulations) around the monasteries and stupas of Kham, would be sufficient to make the Truth Prevail. As Robert Ford, the British radio operator posted in Chamdo, remarked ‘The gods are on our side’ was the mantra most oft-repeated in the town, “but it seemed to me that something more Churchilian was needed.”
For the Chinese, it was a well-prepared operation (a ‘police operation’ would have said Marshal Peng Dehuai) in 2 stages: the fall of Chamdo, the capital of Kham province during the Fall of 1950 and then the advance to Lhasa during the next season.
India was fooled into believing that Communist China wanted a ‘negotiated’ settlement with the Tibetans: it was never the case. Marshal Liu Bosheng in a message in August 1950 made it clear that he was going to ‘liberate’ Tibet.
Opposite the Chinese strategists was Ngabo Shape , the Tibetan Commissioner for the Kham province, a weak leader, ready to surrender; he was obviously not the military chef de guerre that Tibet needed at that point in time to coordinate the defence of the different border posts.
It has to be noticed that Mao Zedong entered the Korean campaign on the same day  as the PLA crossed the Yangtze and started its operations in Tibet. It shows the confidence the Communist leadership had in the local PLA commanders.
The PLA summary of the battle and the recommendations distributed by the PLA after the Battle of Chamdo tend to show that it was an excellent preparation for the Chinese troops for another battle 12 years later on the Himalayan slopes. Against India this time!

Emergence of a ‘Liberated’ World
Looking back into the fifteen-year period before the India-China War (1947-1962), one can see that the world witnessed earth-shaking changes: India became independent; China did its own revolution, resulting in the arrival of a new regime, more brutal in its approach, especially towards the periphery of the Middle Kingdom; most of the African and Asian nations were decolonized. However, at the same time, a de facto independent nation came under the yoke of Communist China; hardly two months after the founding of the People’s Republic of China, Xinjiang was annexed, opening the door to Western Tibet which would be occupied a few months later, thereby changing the status of India’s Northern frontiers.
An unprepared and peaceful Land of Snows became part of the Chinese ‘Motherland’ in a two-pronged strategic move, i.e. the military fall of Chamdo and Eastern Tibet in October 1950 and then in May 1951, a ‘diplomatic’ coup, forcing a 17-Point Agreement on a weak and disunited Tibetan nation. Mao was indeed a master strategist.
Tibet lost its independence and India’s serene northern frontier vanished. Even though at that time, India had some excellent strategic thinkers, the Government in Delhi decided not to use their competence; their conclusions and recommendations were not accepted by the then Prime Minister.
The tumultuous last six months of 1950 saw the emergence of two factions in India: one led by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and KM Panikkar, his ambassador in Beijing, both obsessed with an imaginary friendship with New China and fixated on the ‘larger implications for World Peace’ for any decision concerning Tibet; the other, which immediately saw the strategic implications for India, if Delhi let Tibet down, was led by Sardar Patel, the Deputy Prime Minster with Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, the Secretary General of the Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations as his main adviser, but also comprised President Rajendra Prasad, C. Rajagopalachari, KM Munshi and others. They were fed with reports ‘from the ground’ by Harishwar Dayal, the Political Officer in Sikkim and Sumul Sinha, the Head of the Indian Mission in Lhasa, two sincere and far-sighted civil servants. At that time, India had a full-fledged Mission in Tibet as well as three Trade Agencies in Gyantse, Yatung and Gartok.
This tragic dichotomy between the officers on the ground with first hand information and the ‘visionaries’ in Delhi continued throughout these fifteen years.
Today China speaks of ‘poverty alleviation’ for the Roof of the World, but what has the Communist regime been doing since they entered Lhasa in September 1951, if the Tibetans have remained poor 70 years later?
The truth is that Mao was only interested in the strategic assets of Tibet; China gained not only a huge landmass, but the access to the ‘water tower of Asia’, large mineral resources and a strategic position dominating the subcontinent. The Tibetan masses were nowhere in China’s periscope.
At that time, the Indian government decided to ignore the Tibetan issue, probably due to a lack of vision and courage, despite the warnings of Sardar Patel and his colleagues. This move would have tremendous consequences; some that continue to be felt even 70 years later, for example, on the Northern borders of India, particularly in Eastern Ladakh.

The Tibetan appeal at the UN
On the same day that the Deputy Prime Minister Patel, wrote his prophetic letter to Nehru , a well-drafted appeal sent from Kalimpong  pointed to the fact that “the Tibetans were racially, culturally and geographically far apart from the Chinese.” It also made a parallel with the situation in the Korean peninsula: “The attention of the world was then riveted on Korea where aggression was being resisted by an international force.
Similar happenings in Tibet were taking place with the world covering its eyes: … [The problem is] largely the outcome of unthwarted Chinese ambitions to bring weaker nations on her periphery within her active domination,” said the Appeal, which continued: “As a people devoted to the tenets of Buddhism, Tibetans had long eschewed the art of warfare, practised peace and tolerance and for the defence of their country, relied on its geographical configuration and on non-involvement in the affairs of other nations.”
It added that the Chinese, in their natural urge for expansion, “have wholly misconstrued the significance of the ties of friendship and interdependence that existed between China and Tibet.”
Some twenty years ago, Claudia Johnston, an independent researcher in International Law at the University of Victoria, Canada, wrote a fascinating paper, Tibet: The International Mistake of the Century.
The outcome of her research was that the Tibetan Appeal was still a pending matter in the UN …waiting to be reopened: “The UN and individual Member States, have been conducting their decisions based on the false assumption that Tibet is not a ‘State’, but ‘an internal affair’ of China. UN official records show this to be a mistake.” Tibet was then a legal State.
As a result, “the issue of Tibetan Statehood remains unconsidered by the United Nations. United Nations mechanisms for ‘States’ to employ peaceful solutions to ‘Disputes’ have not been utilised.”
All this was done …at the request of India.
From the start, Nehru was pessimistic about the outcome of the UN appeal: “We doubt whether a discussion of Tibetan problem in General Assembly or in Security Council will yield any useful result,” wrote the Prime Minister. The friendship with China was already too important to be sacrificed for the fate a weak neighbour like Tibet.
The Prime Minister frankly admitted that though Beijing had repeatedly expressed itself in favour of Tibetan autonomy “but of course we do NOT know what their idea of autonomy is.”
He thought: “We do NOT think that legal argument will be helpful or that [General] Assembly should attempt more than appeal to two parties to come to a peaceful settlement. Condemnation of China will NOT help Tibet; and neither Security Council nor Assembly is in any position to render physical aid to Tibet.”
As a result China was not condemned and could complete its task of entering Lhasa without hindrance; in Sun Tzu’s jargon, ‘liberating Tibet without waging war’.
In the course of the discussions at the UN in New York, most of the representatives indicated that India was the nation most concerned and that they would follow India’s lead. In a note, Nehru sadly asserted: “I think it may be taken for granted that China will take possession, in a political sense at least, of the whole of Tibet.”  
He further admitted that for the Tibetan people the “autonomy can obviously not be anything like the autonomy, verging on independence, which Tibet has enjoyed during the last forty years or so.”
His final words were: “We cannot save Tibet, as we should have liked to do so, and our very attempts to save it might bring greater trouble to it. It would be unfair to Tibet for us to bring this trouble upon her without having the capacity to help her effectively.”
The strange argument was: if we do anything to help Tibet, it will upset the Chinese and the fate of Tibet would be worse.
The case was eventually ‘put in abeyance’ at India’s demand.
Let us remember that Sardar Patel was by then a dying man and nobody else could stand up to Nehru.
But today China stubbornly continues to occupy Indian territory in Ladakh; however if the Western Theatre Command generals manage to convince President Xi Jinping that India should be taught more lessons, there are plenty of old issues for India to reopen; the UN appeal is one of them.

The Panchsheel Agreement: a Turning Point
One of the most immoral actions of the Indian Government was to ignore the existence of the Tibetan Government during its dealing with the new masters of the Roof of the World, particularly during the talks for the 1954 Tibet Agreement. It was wrong of the government to be vociferous about the decolonization of Africa or Asia, while at the same time ignoring the occupation by force of Tibet, a gentle neighbor at its gates, which enjoyed what the Indian Prime Minister himself described as ‘verging on Independence’.
The “Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet region of China and India”, remembered as the Panchsheel Agreement, was signed on April 29, 1954 in Beijing. At the end of 1953, negotiations started for an accord on Tibet, taking into account the new situation, i.e. China’s occupation of the plateau. The talks were to be settled in a couple of weeks; it would take four months to arrive at a settlement …but forgetting the border.
The Panchsheel Agreement resulted in the unhindered advance of the Communist ideology and Mao’s army on the Tibetan plateau. Having received the green light from Nehru, the Communists imposed a new way of life, less compassionate, less enlightened over the Roof of the World.
The Chinese officials in Tibet did not look favorably upon the Dalai Lama’s aspiration to radically change the Tibetan society while still maintaining its 2,000-year old tradition. This would have cast a shadow on the Communist Party.
It is however true that many senior Indian politicians and diplomats, educated in ‘modern’ ideas, thought the ‘old Lama hierarchy’ should go and Tibet become a ‘modern’ country; they believed that the Chinese invasion was a chance to make a clean sweep of the old superstitions, beliefs or rituals.

The Slow Take-over of the Plateau
Soon after the Tibet Agreement was signed, the Chinese leadership took a radical approach towards Tibet, though, for a couple of years, the main emphasis was the building of the infrastructure needed to ‘stabilize the revolution’ on the plateau.
This period was marked by a general deterioration of the situation in Central Tibet and the slow take-over of the institutions by the PLA and the representatives of the Communist Party’s Central Committee.
The Tibetans were at a loss, should they collaborate with the Communists or revolt against the Chinese occupation? Interestingly, it was the poorer sections of the society who started to rebel, while the high clergy and the aristocracy were not unhappy with the Chinese ‘largesse’ (which often included collaboration).
Over the years, the situation slowly changed with the Chinese getting bolder and establishing themselves by force, imposing their law on the local Tibetan officials as well as the Indian representatives. The pilgrims to Mt Kailash and the traders from the Himalayan region and Ladakh started to face harassment. It was only a beginning.
As the situation in Lhasa and elsewhere in Tibet continued to deteriorate, strengthening the Indian borders was imperative. For the purpose, an Indian Frontier Administrative Service was created and several ex-Army officers were recruited. This was one of the positive outcomes of the exacerbated tensions on the borders. These remarkable officers performed miracles on the frontiers. One wishes that the government would today recreate such a service.
By 1955, the construction of the Tibet-Sinkiang Highway cutting across Ladakh, had started and the roads heading towards the NEFA (now Arunachal Pradesh) and Sikkim had already been completed. The significance of these moves was ignored by Delhi; we are seeing the consequences today in Ladakh.

The Nehru-Zhou Talks in 1956
The visit of the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama to India in 1956-57 should be seen in this perspective. The former was hesitant to return to Lhasa. He finally decided to return and give a chance to the Communists to ‘reform’ Tibet in a peaceful manner. It was not to be.
In 1956, during bilateral talks with his Indian counterpart , Zhou Enlai gave his rationale for invading Tibet ‘only’ in 1950: “The Ching [Manchu] Emperor appointed Governors to Tibet and troops were also stationed in Lhasa. The British wanted to go into Tibet under the pretext that Russia wanted to get into Sikang . Russia also made the same pretext, namely, that Britain was trying to get into Tibet, to get into Sikang. Exactly because of this rivalry and balance of power, Sikang and Tibet were never taken actually [by China].”
This is a strange argument; the truth was that the Tibetan nation was an independent country with all the attributes of a sovereign State (a government, a language, a script, a flag, a (weak) army, coins, stamps, etc); further, for centuries, the Land of Snow had close relations with India, first and foremost in the cultural and spiritual domains (Tibetan Buddhism originates from Nalanda, let us not forget), but also politically and economically with countless ‘silk’ roads across the Himalaya; in other words, there was a deep kinship.
Zhou continued to explain: “But there are many still who are not acquainted with these facts. Even the Pakistan Prime Minister recently  told me that he always thought Tibet to be independent. Even the Simla Conference admitted Chinese suzerainty over Tibet.”

Zhou did not know about the McMahon Line
The Chinese Premier then tried to justify China’s new claims in the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA), i.e. the McMahon Line: “People like me never knew about it [the Line] till recently. The then Chinese Government, namely, the warlords in Peking and the KMT naturally knew about it. Perhaps U Nu might have told Your Excellency [Nehru] that we studied this question and although this Line was never recognised by us, still apparently there was a secret pact between Britain and Tibet and it was announced at the time of the Simla Conference. And now that it is an accomplished fact, we should accept it. But we have not consulted Tibet so far.”
The clever Chinese statesman then mentioned the Panchsheel Agreement: “In the last agreement which we signed about Tibet , the Tibetans wanted us to reject this Line; but we told them that the question should be temporarily put aside. I believe immediately after India's independence, the Tibetan Government had also written to the Government of India about this matter. But now we think that we should try to persuade and convince Tibetans to accept it. This question also is connected with Sino-Burmese border and the question will be decided after Dalai Lama's return to Lhasa. So, although the question is still undecided and it is unfair to us, still we feel that there is no better way than to recognise this Line.”
The Indian Prime minister gave a nehruvian answer, with the consequences that India experiences on the border today: “The border is a high mountain border and sparsely populated. Apart from the major question, there are also small questions about two miles here and two miles there. But if we agree on some principle, namely, the principle of previous normal practice or the principle of watershed, we can also settle these other small points. Of course, this has nothing to do with the McMahon Line.”
His Chinese counterpart answered: “Yes, the question can be solved and we think it should be settled early.” That was in 1956.
Nehru then ‘excused’ some Indian mayors who wanted ‘to make out Tibet as an independent country’, he said: “Reference by a Mayor has no significance. He does not know much politically and probably very little about China and Tibet. They would generally only know about the great religious significance of Tibet to Indians and that is all that they must be stressing.” The Prime Minister concluded: “Our policy has been to deal with the Chinese Government about Tibet …We are naturally interested in what happens in Tibetans one of our near neighbours but we don't want to interfere. Our main interest is from the point of view of the pilgrims not only Buddhist pilgrims but Hindu pilgrims too for whom Kailash and Manasarovar are sacred places and abodes of God.”
The Indian Prime Minister’s last words were: “Your Excellency [Zhou Enlai] has said that Tibet is backward and cut off. But it cannot remain long that way. They are a deeply religious people and they are naturally afraid that their religion and customs would be upset. I myself personally think that changes are inevitable in Tibet, but I would like Tibetans to feel that they themselves have brought about the changes. As Your Excellency has said, Tibet is a part of China but with full autonomous powers. Then I don't understand why there should be any trouble in Tibet at all.”
Severe troubles had already started in Eastern Tibet.

The Events of March 1959: the Background
On June 1, 1959, Maj SL Chibber sent his report for the months of March, April and May 1959  to the Political Officer in Gangtok and the Ministry of External Affairs in Delhi; he reported about the crucial months in the life of the Tibetan nation which witnessed the uprising of the Tibetan population in Lhasa and the departure of Tibet’s temporal and spiritual leader in exile. This is a unique and remarkable document as it is the only eye-account by a ‘foreigner’.
Before going into the details of those historic months, Maj Chibber gave the background of the events of March 1959 in the Tibetan capital: “The nationalist movement in Tibet, the climax of which was reached on 10th March, 1959, had started sometime in 1955 in Kham, Eastern Tibet and then spread to west in Amdo region and north-east in Golok areas. In 1955 and 1957, it took shape of an open revolt against the Chinese regime in these areas. These people though did not succeed but they were a constant headache to the Chinese who had to resort to aerial bombing and deploy large number of forces to subjugate the local inhabitants.”
Chibber described the happenings in Kham: “During [the] operations, number of monasteries was destroyed and the local people suffered heavy losses. Due to absence of proper means of communication and security measured adopted by Chinese to suppress the information the correct news of happenings in these areas-seldom reached out-side world. However, whatever little news trickled through traders and travelers contained horrible accounts of atrocities committed by the Chinese against the people of these areas, especially against the lamaseries. This naturally had an effect on the minds of Tibetans elsewhere and a stage had reached that some among these Tibetans who had thrown their lot with the Chinese previously, many became apprehensive and doubted Chinese promises of respect for religion and internal autonomy.”
The Consul said that the Khampas finding, it difficult to face frontal attacks from the Chinese troops resorted to guerilla tactics and “moved towards the south where the Chinese garrisons were few and far between and the difficult terrain suited to hit and run type of war.”
He remarked that at the beginning the Chinese did not take any action against these Khampa, “except on one or two occasions but pressed the Tibetan Government to suppress them.”
Under pressure from the Chinese authorities, the Tibetan Government tried to reach a compromise by sending some Peace Missions of monks and lay officials to Kham and Lhoka areas, but this did not help, according to the Consul “most Tibetan Government officials did not like the presence of Chinese in Tibet.”
The rejection of the Chinese occupation by the Tibetan populations was the turning point in the history of Modern Tibet.

The Events of March 1959
The first-hand account of Maj Chibber is important, because the Chinese propaganda would like us to believe that during these dramatic weeks of March 1959, they ‘emancipated’ the serfs. But in fact, the opposite happened; recounting the events that he witnessed in Lhasa, Chibber observed: “In the history of movement for free Tibet the month of March, 1959, will be most historic as during this month Tibetans high and low, in Lhasa, capital of Tibet, openly challenged the Chinese rule in Tibet. They set up an organisation called ‘Pho Mimang Ranchen Chi Chog’, meaning, ‘Tibetan Peoples Independent Organisation’; renounced the Sino-Tibetan Agreement of 1951; staged demonstrations to give vent to their anti-Chinese feelings and demanded withdrawal of the Chinese from Tibet.”
The Indian Consul General first reported about the Might of Chinese People’s Liberation Army, “who on 20th March, 1959, started an all out offensive against the ill-organised, ill-equipped, untrained-Tibetans with artillery, mortars, machine guns and all types of automatic weapons.”
The revolt was short lived: “His Holiness the Dalai Lama, smelling danger, left Lhasa secretly on the night of the 17th March, 1959, with important members of his personal staff, three Cabinet Ministers and members of his family for Lhoka area (south of Lhasa), where at that time Khampas had full sway and from where it was easier for him to escape to India if need arose. Many other important and un-important-Tibetans followed him when the actual trouble started on the night of 19th March, 1959,” noted Chibber.
On March 28, 1959, the State Council dissolved the ‘local’ Tibet Government; the Kashag was no more and its functions and powers were transferred to the Preparatory Committee for the Tibetan Autonomous Region.
A Chinese communiqué announced that the Panchen Lama would be Acting Chairman, “for the period the Dalai Lama was held in duress .”
A Military Control Commission was established in Lhasa on March 23, 1959. Chibber also remarked that the Chinese Transport Department’s passenger service between Yatung, Shigatse, Gyantse and Lhasa had been stopped several months earlier. A dusk to dawn curfew was promulgated, while meetings to criticize the former Tibetan Government, the ‘imperialists’ and the Indian ‘expansionists’ were organized to denounce their interference in the internal affairs of Tibet.
Military Control Commissions were also installed in other areas in Tibet. Soon after the events of March, the Preparatory Committee held two meetings, one under the Chairmanship of the Panchen Lama and the other under General Zhang Guohua as the Panchen Lama had gone to Beijing to attend the Second National People’s Congress Session.
The Consul General commented: “the booms of Chinese guns and fire from their weapons, which destroyed number of buildings including religious places, large scale killing of Tibetans followed by mass arrests, departure of Dalai Lama and high-ranking Tibetan officials from Lhasa completely shattered the morale of Tibetans in general and they were left with no other alternative but to bow before the Chinese.”
Today, the Tibetans in exile still celebrate March 10 as their Uprising Day. Will the Day be commemorated one day in Lhasa by the Tibetans?
It is impossible to answer.
In March 1959, India could only witness the events, without taking an active part.
A couple of weeks later, the Dalai Lama took refuge in India, creating a new narrative in the India-China relations.

What can be done to untie the past knots?
Delhi should officially start a dialogue with the Tibetans in exile. One possibility is to immediately set-up a mechanism with the Dalai Lama’s representative in Delhi , to discuss the issues of mutual interests. It should not be done in a hushed-up way.
Some general principles should dictate the new policy.
First, India should look after her own interests and the security of the people living on the borders; it seems obvious, but it has not always been the case.
Another principle is that India’s policies or actions should not be dictated by what others will think or say, particularly how China will react to a particular decision. This tendency has lasted too long with no tangible gain for the country; for example, the 2018 notice circulated to all ministries/departments ordering that no Indian officials should meet the Dalai Lama, had serious counter-productive effects.
It is unfortunate but it is a fact that India faces a country which still believes that power comes from the barrel of a gun; without emulating China, India needs to quietly and forcefully look after her own interests and be straightforward about it; a closer kinship between Delhi and Dharamsala is in the country’s interests.
Whatever over-all policy is adopted by the Government at a later stage, one element is critical: coordination. In view of the individualistic tendencies of the Indian bureaucracy, this is crucial in order to achieve the targeted aim of the policy between the different shakeholders (Ministries of External Affairs, Defence, Home Affairs, Education, Culture, intelligence agencies, etc).
Without proper coordination, it will be just one more futile new policy.
The creation of a Department, coordinating the different aspects of the Tibet policy would be the first step to strengthen the relations with Tibet; India should use the goodwill of the Tibetans towards India; the rest will follow. But undoing the knots of the past will take time.
It is however necessary if India wants to play a role of leader in the world affairs and have peace and prosperity on her frontiers.

US and the Cartography of Ladakh

The Indian Government has asked US social media giant Twitter to explain within five working days why it showed Leh as part of Jammu and Kashmir instead of a separate Union Territory.
In case Twitter’s answer is not ‘satisfactory’, the government will proceed further: “we can block access to Twitter under the Information Technology Act, and a police case can be filed with up to six-month imprisonment,” said a government source.
In a notice to the micro-blogging platform owned by Jack Dorsey, the government said that they viewed the matter as “a deliberate attempt by Twitter to undermine the will of sovereign Parliament of India”, which had declared Ladakh as a Union Territory of India with its headquarters in Leh.
A Twitter spokesperson was vague, "Twitter remains committed to partnering with government of India and Ministry of Electronics and IT to serve the public conversation. Duly responded to the letter and as part of our correspondence, shared a comprehensive update with latest developments regarding geo-tag issue."
Earlier, Twitter had also shown Leh as part of China, after which the secretary of the Electronics and Information Technology Ministry had written to Jack Dorsey. In response, Twitter had made changes though it has not yet corrected the map to show Leh under the Union Territory of Ladakh; Leh still appears as part of Jammu and Kashmir.
For unknown reasons, the government has remained silent on Google maps showing Arunachal Pradesh as part of Shannan Prefecture of the Tibet Autonomous Region.
Why was no action taken?
Both the US firms should be punished according to the laws, if they refused to show properly the Indian territory.

Projection of the International Map of the World (1950)

It is not new, the United States have  published maps wrongly depicting the borders of India in the past.
For example, a "Projection of the International Map of the World" in 1950 shows Demchok in Ladakh as Tibetan territory and not Ladakhi.
Another map of "Tactical Pilotage Chart" published by the Director, Defence Mapping Agency in the US (Fairfax, Virginia) in 1995, also shows the entire Ladakh range (and Demchok) in Tibet.

 

 

 

 

 

Tactical Pilotage Chart (1995)

At the same time, maps of Tibet published by historian Tseton Shakabpa and former British diplomat HE Richardson show correctly the Kailash range south of Fukshe, being the frontier between India and Tibet (and not the Ladakh range).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Hugh Richardson's map (1962) showing correctly the Kailash range

It is particularly important at a time rumours are floating around that the government is ready to compromise and vacate the heights on the Kailash Range, South of the Pangong lake.
The 1960 Chinese claim line (some authors call it 1959 Line), does not follow any geographic or historical (customary or administrative) principles. It suddenly cut across from the Kailash to the Ladakh range without any basis (perhaps because the Chinese had never visited the area before 1962).

Tsepon Shakabpa map (1962) showing correctly the Kailash range

It is obviously regrettable that the US have mapped the area without any knowledge of the historical background or even consulting the Government of India.
Unless the Indian Government strictly deals with Twitter and Google, the farce will continue.

Chinese 1960 claim crosses from the Kailash to the Ladakh without any historical reason

Incidentally, there was no dispute between Ladakh (J&K) and Tibet in this area.
Richardson in his Précis mentioned the only disputed place which is Drokpo Karpo, north of Pangong tso.

The diplomat-historian wrote:

The Boundary
The area under dispute [Drokpo Karpo] is high, uninhabited, grazing land. It appears that the boundary, as in most grazing countries, had never been fixed. The claims of both sides, which neither would relax, are shown on the accompanying sketch map. No decision was possible. The Government of India did not think that the Kashmir Durbar's claim was likely to succeed, and suggested a graceful concession, but the Durbar declined.
In 1929, the government of India decided that the matter, which was of no real practical importance should be allowed to drop, and this hope has so far been fulfilled, although the Tibetan Government did touch on the question in 1937.

The issue was not solved at the time of Independence.
Anyhow, the Kailash range was clearly the border between Ladakh and Tibet in the South and Demchok was the last Ladakhi village, while Tashigang was the first Tibetan one.

The only disputed place between Ladakh and Tibet (Drokpo Karpo)

According to Google "Bumla, Cona [Tsona], Shannan, Arunachal Pradesh"

Tsona (Cona) is a county of Shannan City/Prefecture of the Tibet Autonomous Region

India’s big blunders and China changing the posts

My article India’s big blunders and China changing the posts appeared in The Daily Guardian

Here is the link...

The border dispute with China since May 2020 seems to be a repeat of the episode which took place in the 1950s. The then Indian leadership made a mistake by keeping it away from the public and the media. What remains to be seen now is whether Delhi has learnt its lesson and will do better this time.

One of the greatest tragedies of post-Independence India is having let China occupy the Aksai Chin plateau and with barely any protest. The nation still suffers the consequences of this blunder today in Ladakh.

The fact that China occupied this part of north Ladakh and built a road on Indian territory was known to the Indian leadership as early as 1952, when the first surveys were conducted by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The Chinese started to build the road sometime in 1954, but the issue only came up for discussion between Jawaharlal Nehru and Zhou Enlai, the Chinese Premier, in September 1959, more than two years after the road was inaugurated.

A year earlier, on 18 October 1958, Foreign Secretary Subimal Dutt had sent a feeble protest to Beijing: “It had come to the Government of India’s [GoI] notice that a road had been constructed by the PRC [People’s Republic of China] across the eastern part of the Ladakh region of the J&K State, which is part of India.” The note continued: “It is a matter of surprise and regret that the Chinese Govt should have constructed a road through indisputably Indian territory without first obtaining the permission of the GoI and without even informing the Government of India.” The note sounded more as an encouragement to go ahead than anything else.

In September 1959, the Prime Minister, who knew that the Chinese had built the road, explained India’s rationale to his Chinese counterpart: “We did not release to the public the information which we had about the various border intrusions into our territory by Chinese personnel since 1954, the construction of a road across Indian territory in Ladakh, and the arrest of our personnel in the Aksai Chin area in 1958 and their detention. We did not give publicity to this in the hope that peaceful solutions of the disputes could be found by agreement by the two countries without public excitement on both sides.”

 Delhi did not want ‘to make things worse’, probably fearing a violent reaction from Beijing, but what can be worse than the 1,00,000 troops facing each other now, in the harsh winter of Ladakh. One can’t rewrite history but we can learn from it: Had the Indian public and media known about the road in 1953-54, India might not have been facing China in Ladakh today!

However, is the mindset of today’s babus different from what it was in the 1950s and 1960s? Undoubtedly, it is more difficult to keep such secrets today, but the babus’ modus operandi and motto remain the same: Keep everything secret. They probably feel that they derive their power from the fact that they control the information, forgetting that silence and secrecy have often, as in the case of the Aksai Chin, endangered the interests of the nation.

I am particularly thinking of the fact that since the beginning of the India-China Special Representatives’ process in 2003, the public has never been informed that the Line of Actual Control (LAC) was a myth and that there were actually two Lines of Perception, and that anything could happen in between. Why was the Indian public not informed that the Chinese had refused to provide maps of their ‘perceptions’?

Beijing has no scruples in changing the posts, whenever it is convenient. The correspondence between Nehru and Zhou Enlai for the period between September and December 1959 brings some light on the treacherous intentions of the Chinese in Ladakh today. On 8 September 1959, Zhou Enlai wrote to his Indian counterpart: “I find from your letter that there is a fundamental difference between the positions of our two Governments on the Sino-Indian boundary question.” Two weeks later, Nehru replied that he was ‘greatly surprised and distressed’ to be told that there was a dispute on the border: “[in January 1959], I had no idea that the People›s Republic of China would lay claim to about 40,000 square miles of what in our view has been indisputably Indian territory.”

It is true that no Chinese had ever set foot in the area in the early 1950s. It is unfortunate that today, Beijing continues to change, despite speeches of the New Helmsman, Xi Jinping, about a community of “shared future for mankind”.

In September 1959, Zhou explained: “The Punjab Western Himalaya and Adjoining Parts of Tibet compiled by British John Walker by order of the Court of Directors of East India Company (published in 1854) corresponded fairly close to the Chinese maps.” This line, though not acceptable by India, was mid-way between the present Chinese claims and India’s traditional boundary, coinciding with the Kunlun watershed.

On 21 October 1959 a serious incident took place within Indian territory, south of the Kongka Pass and 10 CRPF personnel were killed—that was a turning point.

With the situation fast deteriorating on the border, on 7 November, Zhou offered that each party should withdraw 20 km from where they were: “to ensure the tranquillity of the border regions and to create a favourable atmosphere for a friendly settlement of the boundary question.” Less than two weeks later, Nehru replied: “Unfortunately, we do not yet know with any precision where the frontier line lies according to the claims of the Chinese Government. This is a matter for surmise based on small scale maps published in China. These maps themselves have not always been consistent, and different lines are sometimes indicated in them.” China would refuse to exchange maps and kept publishing maps with different alignments, though the lines kept moving more and more inside India’s territory.

On 16 November, the Prime Minister suggested the Indian troops withdraw “all personnel to the west of the line which the Chinese Government has shown as the international boundary in their 1956 maps which, so far as we are aware are their latest maps.” At the same time the Chinese troops should return north of the Aksai Chin. This was obviously not acceptable for Beijing who wanted to continue using the newly-built road. Zhou replied the next day: “The line up to which each side exercises actual control in this sector is very clear… As a matter of fact, the Chinese map published in 1956, to which Your Excellency referred, correctly shows the traditional boundary between the two countries in this sector;” clearly confirming that China stood by the 1956 Line, faraway from Beijing’s claims in the area today. A few weeks later, China advanced further its line, engulfing large parts of India’s territory.

The situation since May 2020 seems to be a repeat of the Chinese advances in 1959. The question which remains here is: Has India learnt its lesson? Let us hope that it has.

The Tibet watcher

Political Officer Apa Pant and Indian Consul General Chibber
with the Dalai Lama in Lhasa (1957)

A book review of my Volume 4 appeared in The Week. It is entitled The Tibet watcher

Here is the link...

For Tibetologist Claude Arpi, border issues can go hand in hand with a spiritual life
Sneha Bhura By Sneha Bhura November 15, 2020 17:07 IST

Claude Arpi does not much care for Twitter. The 71-year-old Tibetologist, is convinced that the ongoing India-China border dispute cannot be discussed in 280 characters. The Frenchman has also been resisting invitations for webinars and virtual panels. But, he could not avoid the virtual event on October 16—the release of the last part of his quadrilogy on India-Tibet relations (1947-1962); Tibet: The Last Months of a Free Nation (2017), Will Tibet Ever Find her Soul Again? (2018), Tibet: When the Gods Spoke (2019) and The End of an Era, India Exits Tibet. Arpi dug into difficult-to access archival material to spotlight India’s Tibet policy then, the blunders therein and how it complicated boundary relations leading to the 1962 Indo-China War.

For over 10 years Arpi has used his blog to offer incisive takes on the geopolitics of Tibet, China and the Indian subcontinent. Arpi has often received alerts like “the state is monitoring your emails” on Gmail. “But at least Google is informing you,” he wryly remarks.

Today, the author and historian, who graduated as a dental surgeon in France, is quoted in most Indian newspapers, magazines and defence journals as one of the foremost Tibetologists living in India. He holds the Field Marshal K.M. Cariappa Chair of Excellence at the United Service Institution of India for research on India-Tibet relations. From how China lost a friend in Ladakh to lessons from Galwan to the origins of the secretive Special Frontier Force (SFF), Arpi’s 40-year-passion for all things India-China-Tibet is most resonant now.

It was in the early 1970s that a young, college-going Arpi first saw French filmmaker Arnaud Desjardins’ two-part documentary The Message of the Tibetans—believed to be the first ever filming of the Tibetan community-in-exile to be allowed by a young Dalai Lama back in 1960s Dharamshala. Intrigued by their struggle for independence and their eventual escape, Arpi wanted to meet the sages and the great living masters of the Tibetan people shown in the documentary. He made his first trip to India in 1972 and by 1974, after an adventurous trip across France, Italy, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and the foothills of the Himalayas, Arpi decided to settle in the “universal city” of Auroville, Pondicherry. The doctrine of sanatana dharma, as espoused by Sri Aurobindo, was more appealing than settling in Dharamshala where the Dalai Lama’s sister had once insisted he work as a dentist in the Tibetan Children’s Village, says Arpi.

For Arpi, border issues, war and tactical calculations can go hand in hand with a spiritual life. “Whether it is the Gita or Buddhism, both say that dharma has to be defended,” he says. “Young Tibetan jawans in the SFF—of which company leader Nyima Tenzin was killed in a landmine blast in the border standoff this year—are all Buddhists,” he says. “Even in the Kargil War, the Ladakh Scouts unit against Pakistani forces were all Buddhists. The night before their takeover of Pakistani posts they went to meet the Dalai Lama, who was in Ladakh, to seek his blessing.”

Emotionally, Arpi says, the Tibetans are very much on the Indian side on the border issue and hopes that in the current crisis, the Dalai Lama and India are on the same page. “I hope they are talking even if it does not come out in public,” he says. “Because you cannot speak with a country like China, especially if they want something. China jumped into this Ladakh adventure without understanding the implications. China did not expect India to resist. Now, if they come back defeated, Xi Jinping will have questions to answer. He cannot afford to lose face.”

Arpi dismisses the notion that there might be a common engagement ground for India, China and the Dalai Lama to de-escalate border tensions, that there is possibility of a ‘Tibet Card’ at the negotiating table, that the Dalai Lama is the last hope for friendly border relations between India and China. “The Dalai Lama has no chance to sign a deal with China,” he says.

Arpi is hopeful that more files from the ministry of external affairs will be declassified for Indian scholars and researchers. “The main issue with archiving is how so few files are transferred from the MEA to the National Archives, even the ones pertaining to the 1950s and 1960s,” he says. “It makes it difficult to study the past. I have complained and written letters to every foreign secretary. It is just laziness, lack of competence and human resources at the MEA. Most files can be declassified; there is no big secret after 35 to 40 years.”

Today, it is hard to define who a Tibetologist is, in the absence of declassified documents, a competent grasp of the Tibetan language and an inclusive knowledge of Tibetan cultural history among “experts”. Says Tenzin Lhadon, a research fellow at Tibet Policy Institute, “Most Indian scholarship and public discourse on Tibet is largely driven by India-China conflict.”

Arpi got special permission to access the Nehru Papers—letters, speeches, reports and other correspondences of Jawaharlal Nehru—at the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, for writing his quadrilogy. But access was not enough. Arpi struggled through some 1,500 unindexed volumes, often spending two to three hours to get to one letter. He says that people are reluctant to spend time on original documents. “You need a passion to do this; there is no money or quick celebrity,” says Arpi, whose typical day starts at 4am, scanning Chinese newspapers on Google Translate.

He lives with his Punjabi Indian wife, Abha Tewari, and their 30-year-old daughter, Smiti, in Auroville, where he has lived for more than 40 years. Arpi has not gone back to France for four or five years now. India is home. “It is a stupid generalisation. But, I certainly feel people here live in their heart,” he says. “In the west, they live in their head.”

Trouble Brewing Over the Middle Kingdom

The Ladakh Misadventure for Chairman Xi

This article has been published by the IANS

Here is one of the links...

Is China doing well?
The Fifth Plenum of the 19th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was held between October 26 and 29 at Beijing’s Jingxi Hotel; if one is to believe the Xinhua statement, China is doing very well.
A message the CCP wanted to convey: the 360 or so attendees wore no masks, an indication of confidence to show that the Middle Kingdom has tamed the homemade Covid-19.
One of the outcomes of the Plenum is that Xi Jinping vowed to build a fully modern army by 2027: “The four-day plenum in Beijing wraps up with a statement that says it has entered a period of ‘strategic opportunity’ for development” said the South China Morning Post, while plans for next 15 years “highlight key role for technological development and importance of boosting domestic markets.”
Despite the usual rhetoric, mainly directed to the internal audience, one could asked what has President Xi Jinping achieved by hiding for weeks the spread of the deadly virus which originated in Wuhan and later by sending the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to grab Indian land in Ladakh.
To understand better, let us answer a few questions, including about the logic of the Chinese armed intervention in Ladakh.
Will India’s strategic road Darbuk–Shyok–DBO Road, which seems to have greatly bothered the generals in the Western Theater Command in Chengdu, be stopped? The answer is ‘no’; it will soon be completed allowing the Indian Army to bring reinforcement in a much shorter time to these remote areas.
Has the Chinese attack forced Delhi to drop its claim on Gilgit-Baltistan being India’s territory? No.
Will Gen Zhao Zongqi, the big PLA boss who already was responsible for the Doklam episode in 2017, be rewarded by a seat in the over-powerful Central Military Commission? It is now extremely doubtful as Zhao has not achieved anything militarily, especially after the Tibetan/Indian commandos occupied the ridges South of the Pangong tso (lake).
Has the PLA gained any meaningful strategic advantages in Ladakh since May? Perhaps minimally in Depsang and in the Fingers area, but it is balanced by losses in South Pangong tso.
India has been the taget of an intense Information Warfare’s firing by the specialized agencies in China, particularly the United Front Work Department; this has worked to some extent, with some Indian publications faithfully reporting the Communist version of the events, in exchange for some advertisements in their newspapers, but over-all it is limited and the Indian public has not been intimidated, on the contrary; President Tsai Ing-wen of Taiwan, has now become one the favorite Heads of State of the Indian public, due to China’s aggressive tactics.
Has Chairman Xi’s prestige been enhanced in India and elsewhere in the world? Not at all, once again on the contrary; in India, Xi has lost the goodwill earned after his encounters with Prime Minister Modi, i.e. the Wuhan Consensus and the Chennai Connect. There will be no such meetings for years to come.
Has the prestige of PLA, as a fighting Army, grown? Certainly not; despite its might (on paper at least), the PLA was unable to grab significant Indian territory.
Recently the Pew Research Center, a nonpartisan think-tank working on issues and trends shaping the world, conducted a public opinion on China with 14 countries. It found that unfavorable views of China reach historic highs in most of the countries surveyed: “a majority in each of the surveyed countries has an unfavorable opinion of China. And in Australia, the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United States, South Korea, Spain and Canada, negative views have reached their highest points since the Center began polling on this topic more than a decade ago.”
One can only conclude that the trend will continue with the belligerent attitude shown during the Fifth Plenum prevailing.
Has China made economic gains during the last one year? Again no; many flagship companies such as Huawei, the giant telecom company, are in difficulties in most Western countries; it is a question of time that its 5G services will also be banned in India. It is clear that Xi Jinping has lost face all-over, with the exception of ‘sponsored’ nations like Pakistan.
The situation is so bad that Beijing does have much alternative to come out the self-created imbroglio; the Party is caught in a vicious circle, with the only way out being more repression towards Hong Kong, Taiwan, the Uyghurs or the Tibetans, or sponsoring rogue States.
Interestingly, for many Taiwan has become a model of a Chinese democratic system, which everyone hopes will one day be adopted in the Mainland.
Further, Xi Jinping’s main achievement has been to unite many nations against China.
After the last meeting of the Quad which took place on October 7 in Tokyo, Principal Deputy Spokesperson Cale Brown stated that the foreign ministers of US, Japan, Australia and India had reaffirmed their collective efforts towards a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific: “they pledged to continue regular consultations to implement their vision of a peaceful, secure, and prosperous Indo-Pacific.” Nations like France have already shown their interest to join.
More recently, the third India-US 2+2 Dialogue took place in Delhi.
Dr Jaishankar, the Indian Foreign Minister observed: “the performance of our relationship in the last few years has been exceptionally positive. Political consultations and cooperation have grown, defence exchanges and trade too, economic interactions and commerce are up, the partnership in science, technology and innovation is stronger and our energy security clearly enhanced.”
There are more examples of positive developments triggered by China’s hegemonic attitude.
According to a report of the Yomiuri Shimbun, it was announced on October 30 that “the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force was planning to hold a large-scale exercise of 140,000 people next year; almost all Japanese troops will participate in response to the ‘Taiwan affair’ (Beijing’s attitude towards Taiwan). The last time such a large-scale exercise was conducted in Hokkaido against a hypothetical Soviet invasion in 1985.”
After promising to ‘stand with’ India in its confrontation against China in Ladakh, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo used strong words against China during his visit to the Maldives and Sri Lanka; during an encounter with President Ibrahim Mohamed Solih, he announced the opening of an embassy in the archipelago.
It means that India’s neighbours are slowly turning their back on Beijing.
A top Indian diplomatic source told The Print that Pompeo’s visit to Sri Lanka is “obviously going to help in reducing China’s influence in the region,” the source added: “All these countries which Pompeo is visiting — Sri Lanka, Maldives and Indonesia — are key for the success of Indo-Pacific. India is seeking to establish robust and resilient supply chains with them.”
With or without the US, the pro-China equation is progressively changing in the region.
The forthcoming visit of General MM Naravane, the Indian Army Chief (COAS) to Nepal, even if it does not solve the border dispute planted by China, is bound to rekindle the ancient kinship and deep cultural, religious and economic closeness between India and Nepal.
There is no doubt that Xi Jinping’s reckless and arrogant attitude has not helped China to achieve anything towards Beijing’s declared objectives to work for the Community of Nations, on the contrary.

Constantly Changing Posts

This map appeared in a booklet entitled "Chinese Aggression in Maps", published in 1963 by the Publication Division of the Government of India. 

It shows China's moving claims in the Western Sector of the Sino-India boundary (formerly, the Eastern Turkestan-India frontier).
A quick look at the correspondence between Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Premier Zhou Enlai of China, as reprinted in the “Notes, Memoranda and letters Exchanged and Agreements signed between The Governments of India and China” (also known as 'White Papers') for the period between September to December 1959 is shockingly telling about today’s Chinese intentions in Ladakh.
The White Papers, published by Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, show that the Chinese were already masters at changing the posts ...and they continue despite the 'humanitarian' speeches of the New Helmsman, Xi Jinping.

September 8, 1959
The Chinese Premier wrote to the Prime Minister of India and referred to a letter from Nehru dated March 22, 1959.

Zhou said: “I find from your letter that there is a fundamental difference between the positions of our two Governments on the Sino-Indian boundary question. This has made me somewhat surprised and also made it necessary for me to take a longer period of time to consider how to reply to your letter. The Sino-Indian boundary question is a complicated question left over by history.”
It was the first time that ‘differences’ were admitted. 

Let us remember that between March and September 1959, tens of thousands of Tibetans had followed the Dalai Lama in exile in India. This partly explains China's new belligerence.

Zhou said: “I would like now to further explain the position of the Chinese Government in connection with the questions raised in Your Excellency's letter and in conjunction with the recent situation along the Sino-Indian border."
He started by the boundary separating China's Sinkiang [Xinjiang] and Tibet regions from Ladakh:

"Regarding the 1842 Peace Treaty between Ladakh and Tibet, Zhou argued that the Chinese Central Government did not send anybody to participate in the negotiations nor did it later ratify the treaty,  ...Moreover, this treaty only mentioned in general terms that Ladakh and Tibet would each abide by its borders, and did not make any specific provisions or explanations regarding the location of this section of the boundary.”

The Premier admitted: 

Map mentioned by Zhou Enlai (1854), though it did not represent the post-independence
Indian position, was 'fairly close' to the Chinese map, according to Zhou

 

“The marking of this section of the boundary on the map of "Punjab Western Himalaya and Adjoining Parts of Tibet" compiled by British John Walker by order of the Court of Directors of East India Company (which was attached to the British Major Alexander Cunningham's book ‘Ladakh’ published in 1854) corresponded fairly close to the Chinese maps,” but Zhou complained that later British and Indian maps “included large tracts of Chinese territory into Ladakh [Aksai Chin]. This was without any legal grounds, nor in conformity with the actual situation of administration by each side all the time.”

Details of the map above (around Pangong tso)

The remarks of the Chinese Premier refers to the Aksai Chin; but according to him, the dispute had begun with “the outbreak of the rebellion in Tibet, the border situation has become increasingly tense owing to reasons for which the Chinese side cannot be held responsible. Immediately after the fleeting of a large number of Tibetan rebels into India, Indian troops started pressing forward steadily across the eastern section of the Sino-Indian boundary.”
It was easy to put it on the Tibetans.
In conclusion, Zhou wrote: “I hope that Your Excellency and the Indian Government will, in accordance with the Chinese Government's request, immediately adopt measures to withdraw the trespassing Indian troops and administrative personnel and restore the long existing state of the boundary between the two countries.”
India had to stop trespassing into Indian territory.

September 26, 1959
Nehru replied on September 26, he noted: “I was greatly surprised and distressed to read it. You and I discussed the India-China border, and particularly the eastern sector, in 1954 in Peking and in 1956-57 in India.”
After referring to the McMahon Line, the Indian Prime Minister said: “when I received your letter of January 23, 1959, I had no idea that the People's Republic of China would lay claim to about 40,000 square miles of what in our view has been indisputably Indian territory for decades and in some sectors for over a century.”
It is rather surprising as Nehru knew that the Chinese had built a road across the Aksai Chin.

However, the Prime Minister gave his own rationale, Delhi had just been nice with China: 

“We did not release to the public the information which we had about the various border intrusions into our territory by Chinese personnel since 1954, the construction of a road across Indian territory in Ladakh, and the arrest of our personnel in the Aksai Chin area in 1958 and their detention. We did not give publicity to this in the hope that peaceful solutions of the disputes could be found by agreement by the two countries without public excitement on both sides.”

It is not necessary here to go into the other sectors of the boundaries touched upon by Nehru.
A Note on The Border Disputes was attached to the Prime Minister’s letter in which he complained about an Indian patrol being arrested: “Aksai Chin is a part of Ladakh. The Chinese Government have now admitted that in 1956 they built a highway from Tibet to Sinkiang, running for about a hundred miles through this territory. In September 1957, it was announced that this road had been completed. The next year Indian personnel [an army party under Lt Iyengar from the Madras Sappers] carrying out routine patrol duties were arrested near Haji Langar in north-east Aksai Chin, taken to Suget Karol and detained for five weeks. The leader of the Indian patrol was placed in solitary confinement, and all documents were seized.”

November 7, 1959
Zhou replied to Nehru’s letter of September 26, 1959; though in a meantime (on October 21)  a serious incident had taken place  within Indian territory, south of the Kongka Pass and 10 CRPF personnel had been killed.
In this communication, Zhou offered that each party should withdraw 20 kms from where they were: “to maintain effectively the status quo of the border between the two countries, to ensure the tranquility of the border regions and to create a favourable atmosphere for a friendly settlement of the boundary question.”
It was suggested that the armed forces of China and India “undertake to refrain from again sending their armed personnel to be stationed in and patrol the zones from which they have evacuated their armed forces.”
The innocuous proposal came back recently in the news, when Beijing planted a story in an Indian newspaper, mentioning that China had offered the fixation of a LAC in this very letter. There is of course no map attached to this proposal.

November 16, 1959
Nine days later, Nehru replied, mentioning that Delhi had given a note to the Chinese Ambassador in Delhi on November 4, with full details of the international boundary in Ladakh and the Konka-la incident.
Nehru agreed “that the two Governments should come to an agreement without delay, which would eliminate risks of border clashes.”
The Prime Minister went on: “you have suggested that the armed forces of China and India should withdraw twenty kilometers from the lines which they occupy at present. This, in your view, would effectively prevent any border clashes.”
Nehru, after mentioning the Central and the Eastern Sectors, pointed out: “Unfortunately, we do not yet know with any precision where the frontier line lies according to the claims of the Chinese Government. This is a matter for surmise based on small scale maps published in China. These maps themselves have not always been consistent, and different lines are sometimes indicated in them. I regret I cannot accept the contention that you have been in occupation of the area up to the frontier line shown in your maps. On the contrary, the Government of India have exercised jurisdiction up to the frontier line specified by them.”
Therefore, in the Ladakh area, both Governments should agree to the following interim measure: 

Map of 1956 showing the Chinese claims in Ladakh
The Line was reported on the GOI  map above

“The Government of India should withdraw all personnel to the west of the line which the Chinese Government have shown as the international boundary in their 1956 maps which, so far as we are aware are their latest maps.” At the same time the Chinese troops should withdraw their personnel to the east of the international boundary which has been described by the Government of India.”

Practically, it meant that the Indian troops could patrolled up to the Kunlun range, north of the Aksai Chin; Nehru added: “The area is almost entirely uninhabited. It is thus not necessary to maintain administrative personnel in this area bounded by the two lines on the east and the west.”
This was obviously not acceptable for Beijing who wanted to continue using the Aksai Chin road.

December 17, 1959
The next day Zhou replied. One could ask, why such a hurry?
China was probably nervous about India patrolling till the Johnston Line.
Zhou said that he was anxious to know if the proposal to stop patrolling in some areas only was: “to apply to the entire Sino-Indian border." he affirmed that "no different measure should be adopted in the sector of the border between China and India's Ladakh.”
Now comes the interesting part. After saying that was no reason to treat this sector of the border as a special case: “The line up to which each side exercises actual control in this sector is very clear, just as it is in the other sectors of the Sino-Indian border. As a matter of fact, the Chinese map published in 1956, to which Your Excellency referred, correctly shows the traditional boundary between the two countries in this sector, except for the Parigas area [Chinese name for Demchok] by the Shangatsangpu [Indus] River, India has not occupied any Chinese territory east of this section of the traditional boundary.” See map above by the brown arrows.

The letter continued to argue about the different sectors of the border.

December 21, 1959
Four days later, Nehru replied to say that he “deeply regret that you have not accepted the very reasonable proposals contained in my letter of 16th November.”
The Prime Minister affirmed: “I am always ready to meet and discuss with your Excellency the outstanding differences between our countries and explore the avenues of settlement. How can we, Mr. Prime Minister, reach an agreement on principles when there is such complete disagreement about the facts?”

December 26, 1959
A Note was given by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Indian Embassy. 

For the first time, Beijing’s position was clarified in some details, though without maps.
Beijing reiterated that “China and India are two peace-loving, big countries with a long history of mutual friendship and with many great common tasks both at present and' in the future. Friendship between China and India is in the interests not only of the two peoples, but also of world peace, particularly of peace in Asia.”
It answered into some details a set of questions, again without provided any map.

•    Has The Sino-Indian Boundary Been Formally Delimited?
•    Where Is The Traditional Customary Sino-Indian Boundary Line?
•    What is the Proper Way To Settle The Sino-Indian Boundary Dispute?

The Chinese note pointed out: “The Indian Government has also referred to the talks between the two Prime Ministers in Peking in October 1954, expressing the view that Premier Chou En-lai's remarks about Chinese maps implied that the Chinese Government would revise its maps in accordance with Indian maps, that is to say, the Chinese Government had accepted the Indian Government's claim regarding the boundary.”
The Note argued that Zhou had never said that, ditto for the McMahon Line.
To conclude, the note answered the question: 

“Whether China wants to engage in aggression and expansion?” 

The Noted said: “Centering around the Sino-Indian boundary question, there has recently appeared in India a great deal of anti-Chinese pronouncements, which in cold war language slander China as ‘imperialism’, ‘expanding into India’ and ‘committing aggression’.' The Chinese people cannot but feel deep regret at such malicious attacks against China, which simply fly in the face of facts. …But at no time in future will China become a threat to its neighbouring countries, just as China does not believe that India, after it has grown strong as China fervently hopes, would become a threat to China; to say that the growth of China's population and industry would constitute a threat to its neighbours is utterly incomprehensible to the Chinese people.”
It strongly asserted: “So far as the question of boundary is concerned, China absolutely does not want one inch of another country's territory. There are undelimited boundaries between China and many of its neighbouring countries, but China has never taken, and will never take, advantage of this situation to make any changes in the actually existing state of affairs on the borders by unilateral action.”
A few weeks later, a map of Chinese claims will finally be published by Beijing. It would engulf large parts of India’s territory.
The question which remains: has China changed?

Outrageously changing the post once again (1960)

 

The soldier who won India's first Param Vir Chakra

Maj Som Nath Sharma, PVC on his way to Kashmir

On November 3, 2006, I wrote this piece on Maj Som Nath Sharma, PVC for Rediff.com
It was entitled The soldier who won India's first Param Vir Chakra.
On the anniversary of Maj Sharma's death, I republish the article

Lately many pleas have been made that Mohammed Afzal Guru's execution should be stayed because his death 'could fuel separatism in Jammu & Kashmir.'
The state chief minister himself has been an ardent advocate for clemency for the terrorist who attacked the Indian Parliament in December 2001 (and nearly provoked a war between India and Pakistan).
The 'secular' protagonists claim that his execution will make a martyr of Afzal. I will not enter into these fallacious arguments, but the time has perhaps come to remember a true martyr: Major Som Nath Sharma who on November 3, 1947 saved Srinagar airport (and Kashmir) at the supreme cost of his life.
Had he not sacrificed his life, Afzal's defenders would not today make front page news in the Indian press, for the simple reason that they would be Pakistani citizens living under a military dictatorship.
Our story starts during in the early days of October 1947 when Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru received a message from a former deputy commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan [one of the province's main districts] in the North West Frontier Province.
The bureaucrat warned of 'a scheme to send armed tribals from Pakistan to the Pakistan-Kashmir border; some of them had already moved towards the area in transport provided by the Pakistan government. Arms confiscated from non-Muslims had been supplied to these tribals.'
As Maharaja Hari Singh of Kashmir was reluctant to sign the Instrument of Accession to India, Nehru refused to take any action. Two weeks later a large contingent of Afridis, Mahsuds, Wazirs, Swathis and regular soldiers of the Pakistan army 'in mufti' began to enter Kashmir.
During the night of October 22, the 'raiders' burnt the town of Muzaffarabad. They then overran Uri and captured Mahura, the electric power station, fifty miles from Srinagar. The city of Srinagar was plunged in darkness.
In these dramatic circumstances, V P Menon, Sardar Patel's faithful collaborator, went to Jammu and got Hari Singh's signature on the printed Accession Form. He rushed back for the historic meeting in Delhi with India's governor general, Lord Mountbatten in the chair.
A young army colonel named Sam Manekshaw, who attended the meeting, recalled: 'As usual Nehru talked about the United Nations, Russia, Africa, God Almighty, everybody, until Sardar Patel lost his temper. He said, 'Jawaharlal, do you want Kashmir, or do you want to give it away?' He [Nehru] said, 'Of course, I want Kashmir.' Then he [Patel] said: 'Please give your orders.'
Everything then moved very fast.
Early the next morning, the first troops and equipment were airlifted from Palam airport [in Delhi] to Srinagar. A young major was sent on his first assignment to Kashmir. He was responsible for the logistic. His name was S.K. Sinha (today the governor of Jammu and Kashmir).
He later wrote about the first Indian jawans reaching Srinagar: 'It was indeed inspiring to see grim determination writ large on their faces. They were all determined to do their best, no matter what handicap they had to contend with. I had never before seen such enthusiasm and fervour for duty.'
They knew that all eyes in India were focused on them. At Srinagar airfield, just before returning to Delhi, Sinha met an old friend, Major Som Nath Sharma of 4 Kumaon. He had come a day earlier from Delhi with a broken arm.
Sinha found him 'rather disgusted with life.' With his 'wretched hand in plaster,' no one would give him 'an active assignment in Delhi.'
His company had now been posted to Kashmir, but he was looking to be relieved soon from his present job and given 'something really active.' His company's duty was 'only' to protect the airport.
Sinha tried to impress on Som Nath 'the vital importance of the airfield to us and in that context the importance of the task The Reconnaiassance by companies of 1 and 4 Kumaon, 3 November, 1947assigned to him,' but says the governor this 'sermonising could do little to fulfill his desire for being sent further forward.'
After spending an hour discussing and sipping a mug of tea reclining on his kitbag, Sinha left for Delhi. 'Little did I then know that within the next forty-eight hours, he was to die a hero's death and earn great renown, fighting most gallantly in very close proximity to where we then lay talking so leisurely.'
But let us spend a moment on Som Nath Sharma's life.
He was born as the eldest son of an army family. His father General A.N. Sharma, who retired as the first director general of the Armed Medical Services after Independence, was often in non-family postings.
Som, as his friends and family called him, used to spend time with his maternal grandfather Pandit Daulat Ram in Srinagar. His favourite pastime was listening to his grandfather's on the Bhagavad Gita. This influence of Krishna's teachings to Arjun were to remain with Som Nath till his last breath.
At the age of 10, Som enrolled at the Prince of Wales Royal Military College in Dehra Dun and later joined the Royal Indian Military Academy. As a young lieutenant, he chose to join the 8/19 Hyderabad Infantry Regiment.
His maternal uncle Captain Krishna Dutt Vasudeva who belonged to this regiment had died defending a bridge on the River Slim in Malaya against the Japanese. His bravery had made it possible for hundreds of his jawans to cross over to safety. The example of his uncle greatly influenced him during his career.
Som Nath fought in World War II under Colonel K S Thimmayya (later the army chief) in Burma with the British Army. An anecdote speaks tellingly about the character of the young officer.
One day, Sharma's orderly Bahadur was badly wounded in action and was unable to return to the camp. Sharma lifted Bahadur on his shoulders and began walking. When Thimmayya found his officer lagging behind under the weight of his orderly, he ordered him -- 'Leave this man, Som and rush back to the camp.'
Som Nath retorted, 'Sir, it is my own orderly that I am carrying; he is badly wounded and bleeding, l will not leave him behind.' He eventually managed to carry Bahadur back, saving his life. He was awarded a 'Mention in Dispatch' for this act of bravery.
After the Japanese surrender in Kuala Lumpur in September 1945, Som Nath returned from Malaya via Calcutta. Before landing, a small incident occurred when the British Military Police came aboard to check for contraband.
Som had an unauthorised pistol unofficially presented to him by some Japanese officer in addition to a Samurai sword (officially allotted to each officer). Som Nath refused to lie or invent a story to bluff the British officer, he immediately threw the pistol into the sea through a porthole. Such was his straightforwardness!
Two years later, India became independent, but fell prey to mad communal fighting. With his Kumaonis, Som Nath was dispatched to aid the civil administration. From his headquarters at Parliament Street police station, he spent his time extinguishing fires between the two communities -- both well armed.
To complicate the matter, streams of refugees were pouring in wave after wave to the capital. The Kumaon Regiment rose to the occasion, doing their duty honestly and impartially towards both communities. At that time, Som Nath was moving around with his broken arm and a plaster from the wrist to the elbow.
When his company was ordered to move to Srinagar, Som Nath, though technically 'unfit for active duty in war' insisted that he had to lead his company.
Before leaving for Srinagar, he spent his last night in Delhi with Major K K Tewari, his best friend and Burma companion, at the Queen Victoria Road bachelor Officers' Mess in Delhi.
They chatted late into the night. Som Nath remarked at one point that he was going to war again but alone this time (without his friend). Having probably some premonition, he asked for a memento from Tewari who told him that he could take whatever he wanted from the room. Som Nath went straight to the cupboard and took his automatic pistol, a German Luger. Quite upset, Tewari had no choice but to honour his promise.

The next morning Som Nath Sharma landed in Srinagar (where he met S.K. Sinha). The situation was fast deteriorating.
Two days later on November 3, the 'raiders' reached Badgam a few miles away from the Srinagar airfield. Brigadier 'Bogey' Sen, the commander in Srinagar, immediately dispatched Sharma and his company to Badgam.
At 2:30 pm, supported by 3-inch and 2-inch mortars, a 700-strong tribal force attacked the Indian jawans. Being outnumbered by 7 to 1, Sharma immediately sent a request to Brigadier Sen for reinforcements.
He knew that if the enemy advanced any further, the airport would be lost and Kashmir would become a province of Pakistan; the airfield was the only lifeline between the Valley and the rest of India.
His last wireless message to the headquarters stated: 'The enemy are only 50 yards from us. We are heavily outnumbered. We are under devastating fire. I shall not withdraw an inch but will fight to the last man and the last round.'
Soon after, Som Nath Sharma was killed by a mortar.

Param Vir Chakra

By the evening, when reinforcement reached Badgam; it was too late. The Kumaonis had suffered over 50 per cent casualties though they had inflicted much heavier losses to the 'raiders' who lost 200 men and the airport and Kashmir.
Major Som Nath Sharma was awarded the first Param Vir Chakra, the highest Indian gallantry award (the Indian equivalent of the Victoria Cross).
The citation read: 'Keeping his nerve, he skillfully directed the fire of his section into the ever-advancing enemy. He repeatedly exposed himself to the full fury of enemy fire and laid out cloth airstrips to guide our aircraft onto their targets in full view of the enemy. His leadership, gallantry and tenacious defence were such that his men were inspired to fight the enemy outnumbering them. Major Sharma set an example of courage and qualities seldom equaled in the history of the Indian Army.'
Three days later, Sharma's body was recovered. Though mutilated beyond recognition, a few pages of the Gita that he always kept in his breast pocket and the empty leather holster of Tewari's pistol helped to identify the body. The pistol was gone.
During the last chat with his friend before flying to Kashmir, Som Nath had joked that either he would die and win the Victoria Cross or become the army chief. It is his younger brother V.N. Sharma who in 1988 became chief of army staff.
Today, the world has gone topsy-turvy: true heroes are forgotten and terrorists become martyrs.

A nation without a memory is a dead nation

by Shankar, November 5, 1950
US President Truman and Secretary of State Acheson
when the Chinese entered Tibet

I wrote for Friends of Tibet about The Importance of Memory

October 7, 2020 marked the 70th anniversary of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) crossing the Upper Yangtze, entering into the territory controlled by Lhasa and advancing towards Chamdo, the capital of Kham province. While invading Eastern Tibet, Beijing asserted that it was ‘liberating’ the Land of Snows.
It was indeed a great tragedy for the Tibetan Nation, but perhaps worse is the fact that today the world seems to have completely forgotten what befell the Land of Snows.
Since the beginning of the 20th century, His Holiness the Dalai Lama’s native country had all the attributes of a sovereign State (a government, a language, a script, a flag, a (weak) army, coins, stamps, etc); for centuries, the Land of Snow also had unhindered relations with India, first and foremost, in the cultural and spiritual domains (Tibetan Buddhism originates from Nalanda), but also economically with countless ‘silk’ roads across the Himalaya; in other words, there was a deep kinship between the two nations.
This has been forgotten by many.

A nation without a memory is a dead nation
That is why one can only welcome the initiative of Friends of Tibet to open a Research Page on their website; in their own words, their objectives are: “to conduct and publish research on the unique heritage, legacy and history of Tibet, before and after Chinese occupation.”
To keep the memory alive, research is necessary.
Let me give a personal example.
Lost memory is what motivated me to record the history of the relations between India and Tibet between 1947 and 1962; Why? Today, the world is facing China’s formidable propaganda machinery, which is able to paint in white what is black and vice-versa. I have already mentioned the ‘liberation’ of Tibet which, in fact, was its enslavement.
To give a more precise example, the last volume of my four volumes (1958-1962) witnessed the most dramatic events not only for the Tibetan nation, but also for the bilateral relations between India and Tibet; it first saw the consolidation of the Chinese military presence on the plateau facing the Indian borders, then the Uprising of the Tibetan masses in March 1959, which prompted His Holiness the Dalai Lama to flee to India, where the Tibetan leader and tens of thousands of his followers became refugees: the Chinese propaganda projected the March 1959 events as the ‘emancipation of the serfs’, though the reality was the exact opposite.
Very few today remember the Indian Trade Agents in Gartok, Gyantse and Yatung or the Consul General of India in Lhasa who played such an important role in the life of the Himalayan nation and the silk roads with India. More than ever, it is necessary to remember the past to understand the present.
During the last two years before the 1962 border war, many realized that an era was coming to an end; Mao’s China did not want any Indian presence in Tibet, China’s ‘new colony’. A sense of jealousy towards India prevailed; Beijing clearly resented the existence of an age-old civilizational relation between India and Tibet;, it wanted to erase all traces of Indian presence in Tibet. It is what the Communists did.
Trying to reconstitute what happened from the few sources available is always a hard job, but ultimately a satisfying one.
Using new sources, I managed to uncover some not-too-well known aspects of the 1962 China-India war, in particular, the five-year ‘training’ of the PLA during the Tibetan insurgency which greatly helped the Chinese forces in becoming familiar with the terrain and other logistic difficulties on the plateau.
In a previous volume, I quoted Apa Pant, the Political Officer in Sikkim, saying that the Chinese officers were not interested “in harmony and compassion but in power and material benefit”; Pant spoke of the confrontation of two different worlds: “The one so apparently inefficient, so humane and even timid, yet kind and compassionate and aspiring to something more gloriously satisfying in human life; the other determined and effective, ruthless, power-hungry and finally intolerant. I wondered how this conflict could resolve itself, and what was India’s place in it.”
An ancient world disappeared in 1962 and in the process, India lost a friend, a kind neighbour and a peaceful border.

The Relations between India and Tibet
Cultural relations between India and Tibet are as old as the Himalayas.
Historically, the first contact occurred when Nyatri Tsenpo was enthroned as the first king of Tibet (Yarlung dynasty) in 127 b.c. The king is said to have belonged to the Sakya clan (Buddha’s family) and to have ‘landed’ in Central Tibet from India with the help of a legendary ‘sky-rope’.
However, modern research in the pre-Buddhist Tibetan civilisation have revealed the presence of a highly developed culture on the Roof of the World, the Bon faith, long before Buddhism was introduced. This culture, which flourished in the kingdom of Shangshung (Western Tibet) had constant contacts with India as well as Central Asia; its script (Mar-yig) probably derives from an old brahmi script.
The relations with the Roof of the World took a new turn during the period known as the First Propagation of the Buddha Dharma in Tibet (VII-VIII century A.D.). Many great Indian Masters such Padmasambhava and Sankarakshita visited Tibet and Buddhism became the religion of the court. The present Tibetan script and grammar were brought from India by a Minister of King Song-Tsen-Gompo in order to translate Buddhist scriptures,
The Second Propagation (X-XI century) is considered by many scholars as the Renaissance in Tibet. The temples and gompas (viharas) of Tholing and Tsaparang in Western Tibet (as well as Alchi and Tabo in the Indian Himalayas) witnessed an extraordinary explosion of Buddhist Art, Literature, Architecture and Spirituality. The origin of this renaissance was India.
The Indian source of inspiration dried up with the Muslim invasion of North India (XII-XIII century). All remnants of Buddhist culture and knowledge disappeared from the sub-continent. Tibet had to turn towards Mongolia and then China to seek protection. Eventually the Tibetan Lamas became the gurus of the Mongolian Khans and the Manchu Emperors.
However for Tibet, India remained the Sacred Land: Aryabhumi.

The Tibetan medicine
Many aspects of Tibetan history and civilization need to be researched and recorded. I particularly think of the necessity to preserve the Tibetan System of Medicine or Sowa Rigpa (‘The Art of Healing’). If not done, China will do it …with Chinese characteristics.
Beijing recently applied to get the UNESCO Intangible Cultural Heritage status for the Tibetan Art of Healing; it has submitted an application to the Paris-based UNESCO.
China says that Tibetan medicine, which originated from the ‘Qinghai-Tibet Plateau’ in the 7th century is one of the world's four traditional medicines: “It has been well known in neighboring countries such as Nepal, Mongolia, Russia, Bhutan and India as well as European countries in the 8th century.”
The age-old connection with the Indian medicinal systems such ayurveda has been relegated to just be “well known in neighboring countries.”
I am happy that Friends of Tibet has already started posting research papers on Sowa Rigpa in this section.
The possible research topics are countless, whether in the religious and spiritual realm, in art, poetry, painting, architecture, or sociology; it has never been so important to record the rich heritage of the Tibetan nation, even if world politicians, in their egoism and their eagerness ‘to do business with China’ are still reluctant to admit that there is such a thing as a Tibetan Nation.
I have to add that some fifteen years ago, it was a real pleasure for me to work with Friends of Tibet and write the text giving the background of a number of exceptional cartoons on Tibet.
The survival of the Land of Snows depends today on the research on Tibet’s past as well as a vision for the future; this needs to be looked into with a modern and scientific mind. Hopefully, the world will soon change for the better and His Holiness the Dalai Lama’s Land of Snows will be able to play again a role in the Concert or Nations; in the meantime, it is crucial to preserve of the Memory of this unique nation.
Let us hope that the initiative of Friends of Tibet will be emulated.