When India was feeding the PLA

I am posting below an article that I had written several years ago for a Tibetan journal; it is about India feeding the Chinese troops in Tibet.
It came back to my mind when I read a report published yesterday by Xinhua: Transportation regiments of Qinghai-Tibet Corps of PLA.
Yesterday's report shows 'trucks park for being loaded with cargoes at a troop's warehouse of an army service station on the Qinghai-Tibet Highway.'
The photos were taken on September 25, 2014.
The caption says:

The transportation regiments of the Qinghai-Tibet Corps of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) has been undertaking cargo transportation for PLA troops in Tibet region since 1954. For 60 years, they conveyed more than 800 metric tons of materials, accomplishing about 80 percent of troop transportation task in the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau.

In 1952, in his annual report to Delhi, the Indian Consul General in Lhasa, A.K. Sen mentions the 'feeding' incident. Sen links it to the absence of roads between Tibet and China:

The Chinese Government had requested the Government of India for an agreement allowing facilities for the transport of food and other supplies through India. While pointing out the transport problems involved in the proposal, Government of India expressed their willingness to consider it together with all outstanding issues regarding their position in Tibet. Later the Chinese Government, as a special case, asked for transit facilities for 10,000 tons of food grains through India. The Government of India, after careful consideration, agreed to allow the transit of about 3000 tons of rice to Tibet.
Any estimate of the total number of Chinese troops in Tibet during the period under review could only be a guess. In reply to a query once made by the Tibetan Government (Tibetan Government having agreed to provide fresh supplies for one year) the Chinese stated that for reasons of security they could not disclose the number of their troops but added, it was their original intention to bring an Army of 50,000 troops in Tibet, but had to revise their plans due to lack of supplies. They, however, felt more troops would be required to guard the borders of Tibet. The estimate in Tibetan circles put the total figure between 20,000 and 25,000. But if the road workers were included (as part of the Liberation Army) the number would be considerably more.

Road construction. There is no doubt that thousands of Liberation Army men were engaged in road construction work viz., Kantse - Chamdo Road, Giamda – Lhasa Road, Nathula – Phari and Gyantse Road. Of these, the Kantse – Chamdo Road was said to have been completed by the end of November and was open to wheeled traffic. Peking Radio announced the arrival of the first Car at Chamdo after Liberation amidst enthusiastic jubilations of the local people. The Giamda - Lhasa road was also nearing completion. The Nathula – Phari Road was kept in constant repair to bear the mule traffic carrying rice from Gangtok.

By 1954, the Chinese will not need Indian rice anymore.
Today, the times have obviously changed, but the 'feeding' of the PLA shows the importance of a reliable infrastructure (railway, roads, airports) on the Plateau.

Here is my old article
On September 9, 1951, several thousand Communist troops of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) entered Lhasa under the command of General Wang Chi-Mei. Subsequently 20,000 troops began to occupy the most strategic points on the Tibetan Plateau.
The years which followed, saw one of strangest upshots of the so-called ‘liberation’ of Tibet and the nascent ‘eternal’ friendship between India and China, the supply by India of grain for the Chinese troops stationed in Tibet.
There is no doubt that the grain was intended to help sustain the Chinese Liberation Army troops. Before the arrival of the Chinese army on the Roof of the World in the early 50’s, very few Tibetans had ever eaten rice; roast barley, known as tsampa, had been the staple food for centuries.

The liberation of Tibet was a well-planned operation and the PLA were quite well organized. For example, for the first time in Tibet, motor-vehicle, of which some were even air-lifted to reach their destinations were used by the troops.
The Chinese strategy had been prepared with scientific perfection by Mao’s army commander, Lui Pocheng, and Deng Xiaoping, the Political Commissar for Western China. After having forced the 17-Point Agreement on the Tibetan government in May 1951, the PLA began to consolidate their military position on the high plateau before the year was out.
The first skirmishes with the Indian troops  date from this period.
The next step for Beijing was to subdue the Indian government with a well-orchestrated propaganda of ‘eternal friendship’ (followed by ‘brotherhood’ or Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai) between the two Asian giants.
Once the military take-over of Tibet had been ‘legalized’ by the 17-Point Agreement, the communist plans unfolded. With very little objection from the Government of India to the take-over of Tibet, Mao wanted the supremacy of the PLA to be established on the ground and proceeded to built motorable access roads to the new ‘borders’ of China.
The influx of fresh troops brought with it the first real problem in the new co-existence between the Chinese occupants and the Lhasa government. The first test arose over the availability of food. It was the most important logistical problem.
The Chinese army commanders had drafted very strict rules for the troops: “You must obey orders. You cannot take even one needle from the masses, you must turn over to the government things acquired from the enemy.” The young Chinese soldiers had “The Eight Things to Keep in Mind” which included advice such as: “You must speak gently, you must buy and sell honestly, you must return the things you borrow, you must not tease or bother females, you may not abuse prisoners of war.”
On the ground, however, the situation was different. In Tibetan government circles, one question kept recurring: “will the Chinese implement the 17-Point Agreement without disturbing the existing social and environmental balance in Tibet?” They did not have to wait long to get an answer.
Soon after its arrival in Lhasa, the military command began requisitioning food supplies for its troops and land for its army camps. It has to be pointed out that Tibet had for centuries practised sustainable development and had been self-sufficient in food. Starvation was unheard of on the Roof of the World. For the first time in its history, the arrival of the PLA produced a breakdown of the Tibetan economy and it soon became difficult for the Tibetan (and the Chinese) Government to deal with the problem.
For a few months, Lukhangwa, the courageous Tibetan Prime Minister attempted several times to raise the matter with the Chinese authorities; he argued that it was unfair to put such a burden on the Tibetan poor and that it was not necessary to keep so many troops around Lhasa. He even tried to point out that the actions of the Chinese military command were against the 17-Point Agreement. One day, after the Prime Minister had sent a petition to the Chinese General Chang, the latter became so furious that he requested the Dalai Lama to immediately remove Lukhangwa from Office since he "was obstructing their welfare program”.
Chang told the Dalai Lama that the Tibetans had signed an agreement which mentioned that "Chinese forces should be stationed in Tibet ” and he added that the Tibetan Government was “therefore obliged to provide them [the Chinese] with accommodation and supplies”. He added that the Chinese “...had only come to help Tibet ... to protect her against imperialist domination and that they would go back to China…. when you can stand on your feet, we will not stay here even if you ask us to.”
The Dalai Lama had no alternative but to dismiss Lukhangwa:
… to oppose and anger the Chinese authorities could only lead us further along the vicious circle of repression and popular resentment...Our only hope was to persuade the Chinese peaceably to fulfil the promises they had made in their agreement. Non-violence was the only course which might win us back a degree of freedom in the end, perhaps after years of patience. That meant co-operation whenever it was possible, and passive resistance whenever it was not.
It was the first breach of the Agreement, which stipulated that the Chinese would maintain the existing political system and the status and powers of the Dalai Lama. Removing the Prime Minister as an intermediary between the Dalai Lama and the Cabinet resulted in the young Dalai Lama having subsequently to deal directly with the Cabinet and the Chinese.
The last resistance had fallen, but could it have been otherwise? Non-violence and passive resistance had no meaning for the Chinese invaders. During the course of her history, China has shown more respect for power and force (the barrel of the gun) than for anything else. While China had to request food from India, it has to be mentioned here that India was having very serious problems of food grain supply at that time and Nehru’s government had no alternative but to import food grain. China readily agreed when he asked it to export rice to India, this help was not without a price.

On April 5, 1952 Panikkar, the Indian Ambassador to China, called on Zhou Enlai, the Chinese Prime Minister, who clearly told him that in his view “for many years Tibet would have to depend on India for several daily necessities and desired facilities for transportation of food supplies to Tibet via Calcutta”.
It was ironic that the Indian side immediately succumbed to the argument, they should have known (in fact most probably they did know) that Tibet had always been self-sustainable in food and the extra demand was coming only from the Chinese troops. But at that time it was not too hard to fool the Indian Ambassador.
Zhou Enlai  went a step further: he wanted to know “India’s attitude to the construction of a road connecting India with Lhasa”. The clever Chinese Prime Minister added that China had “agreed to continued supply of foodgrains to India for the whole year in exchange for certain commodities”.
At that point in time, a controversy erupted when Roche Victoria, the Food Minister of Madras declared that at a meeting of the Food Ministers on 22 March, 1952, it was said that China had refused to send any more food grains to India.
One month later, Roche Victoria was no longer a minister in the Madras cabinet, and K.M. Munshi, the Union Food Minister, clarified that the government had only said that unlike the previous year, when the Chinese had helped India by sending food grains, this year they might not be able to send any rice due to their own difficult food position.
A few days later, Nehru replied in detail to Panikkar’s telegrams.
Rice supplies. Government of India are grateful to the Chinese Government for offer of 100,000 tons of rice. Food Ministry is communicating with you on this subject directly. This question should be kept entirely separate from provision of transit facilities to Tibet through India.
The Indian Prime Minister was more clear-minded than his ambassador, he immediately saw the difficulties, but did he realize that the grain needed by China was for the troops who were building strategic roads to the Indian border?
Nevertheless, Nehru knew that logistically it was not an easy proposition to transport food grains or any other merchandise from India through the Sikkim road to Lhasa and then eventually to China. Nehru told his ambassador:
We should distinguish between continuance of old border trade between India and Tibet and new proposals of trade in bulk between China and Tibet passing through India. Latter raises important problems of transit which have to be considered by several Ministries. Burden on our transport system is already heavy and we have to consider carefully any additional burden. It must be remembered also that direct route from Calcutta to Darjeeling now passes through Pakistan territory [now Bangladesh], and this leads to political complications and is causing us continuous trouble. Any other route is a roundabout one. Indeed it has only recently become feasible by opening of narrow Assam railway link which is not enough even for our present requirements.
In the same telegram, the political implications were pointed out. In fact, when the deal was finally concluded, a senior Chinese officer had to be posted in Gangtok to oversee the trans-shipment through the Chumbi valley. In view of the strategic importance of the place (Kalimpong had been for centuries the observation post for the Himalayan region), it was certainly an added advantage for Chinese intelligence. With one stone, Beijing killed many birds: they were feeding their troops who were building roads leading to India; they were releasing the pressure on the Tibetan population which was becoming restive due to the shortage of commodities; and they were also posting an intelligence officer to keep an eye on the gate to Tibet.
Nehru quite rightly wrote:
The other proposal of China trade passing through India to Tibet raises, as we have pointed out above, very difficult problems of transport. Apart from this it has certain political implications. It would probably involve Chinese agencies operating transit and other arrangements at several points inside India. It means modifying existing patterns of trade and grant of transit facilities on a large and continuous scale. We are prepared to examine this matter but this would be a concession which we should retain as a bargaining counter for negotiations for an overall settlement between China and us. It is not advantageous to us to accept such proposals piecemeal and yet have no general settlement.
Here again Nehru as in the case of the downgrading of the Lhasa Mission to a Consulate General and other matters, Nehru spoke about a bargaining counter, but eventually everything would be given away for the sake of ‘brotherhood’ at the time of the negotiations for the Panchsheel Agreement in 1953-54.
We have to point out that Nehru was not that innocent and had clearly understood the destination of the rice bags. Here is the conclusion of his letter:
Presumably these food supplies are meant for Chinese army in Tibet which, from all accounts, is in great need of them. We are not particularly anxious to facilitate movement and retention of large numbers of Chinese troops in Tibet.
Panikkar informed Nehru that it had been made clear to the Chinese that India could guarantee transit of only a limited quantity of food grains, though he promised that the Indian government would try its best to transport five hundred tons per month. This was of course subject to weather conditions and availability of mules from Tibet. The transport would be done at the Chinese government’s risk.
Panikkar suggested that India might offer to transport 3,500 tons of rice by the end of 1952.
On May 24, Nehru replied:
We have agreed to grant transit facilities for food grains up to end of 1952 at the rate of 500 tons a month. Subject to weather and availability of mules we are willing to work for transport of target figure of 3,500 tones. We see little prospect, however, of achieving this, since first shipment is not likely to reach India before some time next month and bad weather may interrupt transit for a month on land journey. Two thousand five hundred tons is, therefore, the probable attainable target and it might be worthwhile explaining this to the Chinese so as to avoid future misunderstanding.
However Nehru was not too happy with the deal. He saw that India had some cards in its hand and though Tibet could not be saved, India should use the Tibetan card to settle the newly arisen border problem with China. But these cards were also eventually surrendered a few months into the emerging Bhai-Bhai policy. No benefit was obtained from showing favour to Beijing.
Early in 1952, however, Nehru could still see the advantages of India’s position and was keen to preserve them:

We have told you that any permanent or semi-permanent arrangements can be discussed only as a part of general settlement of our interests in Tibet. (These interests, as you know, are not confined to trade relations but involve political interests such as affirmation of the Frontier.) It would be preferable not to mention this in your proposed note. We had really intended this for your information only.

But the Chinese were becoming greedier, they now wanted the rice to be delivered at Phari instead of Yatung.
John Lall, a former Dewan of Sikkim, was posted in Gangtok when the supply of rice was in transit; he could witness the long caravan of mules leaving in the direction of Nathu-la. In his book on Aksai Chin, he recalled:

But suddenly all was sweetness and light. The reason became apparent when a request was made for shipment of Chinese rice through India and Sikkim to their troops in Tibet. This could, and indeed should, have been made the occasion for a settlement of the major problems with China as a prelude to the altogether unprecedented help requested from the Government of India It simply did not occur to anyone in Delhi, and which caution as I advised was brushed aside. Released from anxiety on accounts of supplies, the Chinese and local Tibetan labour were able to press ahead with the vitally important task of creating a network of communications to defend frontiers of China with India.

Soon after the matter became public. Suddenly Nehru had to explain how it was that India could supply rice to the Chinese occupying Tibet. During a press conference in New Delhi, he was asked: “Is it a fact that you allowed rice to be sent to Tibet?”
Nehru explained his policy:

Not in big quantities. We did allow a small quantity of rice, relatively small quantity, as an exceptional case. You know, it is a very difficult route; it is not easy to go to Tibet from Calcutta-mule tracks, difficult mountain terrain and the rest of it. It is not an easy matter, but because of their great need, we have allowed some quantity of rice to go through. And, as you know, China sent us one lakh tons of rice.  That is not a very great figure, but it merely was a generous gesture of the Chinese Government especially as this year has been a difficult year for them from the point of view of food. It was not easy for them to spare even this for us, nevertheless they did it.

When asked if the arrangement was on an ad hoc basis, he answered 'completely'.
But it was not to be a one-time affair: negotiations continued for the supply of more rice during the following years. On 12 April 1953, during a meeting with Raghavan, the new Indian Ambassador to China, Zhou Enlai said that he was “anxious for friendly relations with India and had offered help in transport of various articles to Tibet via India”.
On April 19, Nehru cabled his Ambassador:

As we have told you, we are prepared to allow the 1,000 tons of Chinese rice which are already in India to be sent to Tibet, subject to transport arrangements. But, it must not be taken for granted that this is a normal procedure. This transport business gives us a lot of trouble.
I might inform you that our rice position is much better now and we are not in terribly urgent need of it. But if we can get rice from China on reasonable terms, we will be prepared to take it for future use.

When the Panchsheel Agreement was signed in April 1954, it was considered by many as Nehru’s final capitulation to communist China.
In surrendering without any compensation or even guarantee the century-old buffer that was Tibet, the doors of North India were open wide to the communist Chinese. However Nehru still considered it the best thing he had ever done.
The ‘friendship’ or the ‘foolishness’ reached a new height when on October 20, 1954 it was announced that although China had enough rice, India had decided to supply again rice to the PLA stationed in Tibet. It was a first in military annals that the government of a country supplied food to enemy troops! But of course, at that time nobody thought of China as an enemy.
As quoted in an article in The Hindu:

Mr. Kung Yuan, leader of the Chinese trade delegation announced the conclusion of another agreement for the purchase of 1,500 tons of Indian rice by China for supply to Tibet and that the negotiations were in progress in regard to the purchase of one other 1,000 tons.

…Rice which China would buy was intended exclusively for Tibet and only difficulties of transport has necessitated this purchase by China.

India was supplying rice to the Chinese troops, engaged in building a road on Indian territory!  Not just ordinary roads, it has now been proved that the Aksai Chin road, which cuts through Indian territory in Ladakh, was already under construction.  The road was be completed and inaugurated by Zhou Enlai in 1957.
The first recorded intrusions on Indian territory occurred just a few months after signing the Panchsheel Agreement. The Chinese accused Indian border patrols of having crossed Niti-la in western UP, while in fact it was the Chinese officers who had tried to assert possession of this part of the Indian territory called Hoti, southeast of the Nita-la border pass. The correspondence between the Government of India and China which began in July/August 1954 marks the beginning of hundreds of letters, notes and memoranda exchanged on the border issue during the following eight years.
But at that time, euphoria over the newly- found ‘brotherhood’ was too great for anyone to realize the strategic and other implications for India’s security.
In October 1954, the Indian Prime Minister went to Peking to celebrate the ‘friendship’. One newspaper wrote: “The meeting of Nehru and Mao may change history.” During the banquet Nehru “spoke in Hindustani was applauded at the end of each sentence,” though nobody understood Hindustani!

Photos published by Xinhua:

 

 

 

 

 

 

When India had a consulate general in Lhasa

Indian Trade Agency in Yatung (Tibet)

Here is my article in Rediff.com...

China has just turned down India's proposal for an Indian consulate in Lhasa, Tibet. Claude Arpi reveals how India once had a full-fledged consulate general office in Lhasa, which was shut down after the 1962 war.

The Nepalese newspaper The Republica recently reported: 'China has turned down India's proposal to establish its consulate general office in Lhasa, Tibet.'
The proposal was presented by Sujatha Singh, India's foreign secretary, during the 6th China-India strategic dialogue held in Beijing earlier this month.
According to The Republica, after meeting her Chinese counterpart, Deputy Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin, Singh told reporters that 'India will now plan a decisive talk with China in this regard.'
It probably signifies that the government is ready to drop the idea of reopening the Lhasa consulate. Nepal is today the only country to have a consulate general office in Lhasa.
Why? Simply, because the idea of having an Indian consulate general irritates the Chinese; it reminds them of the days when Tibet managed its own affairs.
Otherwise, the Sino-Indian bilateral situation is rosy. Liu affirmed that China is ready to work with India to advance the partnership to a new level, while Singh explained 'All political parties in India share a common ground on advancing India-China strategic cooperative partnership.'
Xinhua added: 'He (Sujatha Singh!!!) reiterated the Indian government's view of attaching high priority to its relations with China. He (!!!) said the Indian government is working to consolidate the strategic cooperative partnership that is oriented to peace and prosperity.'
Regarding the opening of a new consulate, it appears that Delhi would be satisfied with another consulate general in Chengdu (Sichuan) or Kunming (Yunnan province) instead of Lhasa.
This remains to be confirmed.
While Beijing is extremely keen to open an office in Chennai, Delhi thought it made sense to reopen the old mission in Tibet. India currently has two consulate general offices in Shanghai and Guangzou.
Let us not forget that India had a full-fledged mission in Lhasa between 1947 and 1952 when it was foolishly downgraded (under Chinese pressure) by then prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru into a consulate general.
After the 1962 Sino-Indian War, the Indian consulate general in Lhasa (and the three trade agencies in Yatung, Gyantse and the 'seasonal' one in Gartok) were closed.
In this context, a letter from P N Kaul, the consul general in Lhasa between 1959 and 1961, gives an interesting historical perspective. It is addressed to Kaul's successor Arvind Deo.

Click to continue...

The Famous Five that broke India’s back

My article The Famous Five that broke India’s back appears in The Pioneer's Edit Page this morning.

Here is the link...

Let alone the people, even foreign policy experts in the country continue to gush over the ‘visionary’ preamble to the Panchsheel agreement between India and China, but gloss over the contents that damaged New Delhi

On April 29, India will ‘celebrate’ 60 years of the Panchsheel Agreement with China. But is there anything to celebrate?
What Acharya Kripalani once called an ‘agreement born-n-sin’, is the worst blunder Jawaharlal Nehru ever committed. The 1962 border war was only a consequence of that original ‘sin’.
Nehru is often eulogized for having introduced the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence into foreign policy; he shouldn’t be.
Several years ago, at a Conference in an Indian University, the Chief Guest, a senior Indian diplomat who had served at the UN, pontificated on the inclusion of the Five Principles; he said that it was Nehru’s greatest gift to humanity. That gentleman probably had no clue about what the agreement really signified for India and Tibet.
The ‘Panchsheel’ was the last nail in the coffin of a 2000 year-old nation.
The signature of the Agreement between India and China marked the tail-end of events set in motion by the entry of Chinese troops in Tibet in October 1950.
Signed after months of negotiation between Delhi and Beijing, the agreement does not talk about ‘principles’, but buries India’s ancient cultural and economic links with Tibet. The objective of the 'Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet region of China and India', as its title indicates, was to regulate bilateral trade and the visit of Buddhist sites on both side of the Himalaya. It was a historic victory for Beijing, as for the first time, India, in the title itself, acknowledged that Tibet was merely a 'Region of China'.
Though the agreement only dealt with Tibet, the Lhasa government was shamefully kept unaware of its content.
This put a legal end to Tibet’s existence as a distinct nation, with incalculable consequences for India and the entire Himalayan region.
Though the agreement itself lapsed in June 1962, India still pays dearly today, 60 years later; to give one example the cultural and trade exchanges which existed for centuries between Tibet and India are no more.
Unfortunately the Indian public, like the ambassador quoted earlier, still remember the ‘visionary’ preamble (the Five Principles) and have long forgotten the content.

US President Truman
and Secretary of State Acheson
in the early 1950s (Illus. Shankar)

The preamble too played a role in the destruction of the ancient Tibetan culture. It speaks of non-interference in the other's affairs and respect for the neighbour's territorial integrity; since India had agreed (in the title itself) that Tibet was part of China, thereafter whatever happened inside Tibet ‘was none of India’s business’, as Delhi was repeatedly told.
A spiritual civilization was turned into a Communist realm without the possibility of any legal resort. Simultaneously, the Agreement opened the doors to China's military control over the Roof of the World. The Machiavellian Zhou Enlai was of course delighted; he declared, “Let the Panchsheel shine like a sun over the universe”.
The ‘friendship’ reached such a height that on October 20, 1954, it was reported that India had decided to supply rice to the PLA stationed in Tibet. Can you believe it! Delhi offered food to the Chinese troops engaged in building a road (crossing the Aksai Chin) on Indian territory!
The Agreement, which was to be the bedrock of an ‘eternal’ friendship between the two nations specified some points of entry into Tibet: “Traders and pilgrims of both countries may travel by the following passes and route: Shipki-la pass, Mana pass, Niti pass, Kungri Bingri pass, Darma pass, and Lipulekh pass.” India wishfully, but erroneously believed that by signing the Agreement the border was being defined (in the Central sector at least). A few months later, the Chinese said: “these passes are in China, the border is located in the south. There are just points of entry for the traders into China.”
Apart from the full-fledged Mission in Tibet, which, for no-reason was downgraded into a Consulate General in 1952, India had three Indian Trade Agencies (ITA), two in Gyantse and Yatung (in Chumbi Valley, near the Sikkim border) and a seasonal one in Gartok (Western Tibet). The ITAs in Gyantse and Yatung were entitled to a military escort. The Post and Telegraph Service, a chain of rest-houses and the principality of Minsar (near Mt Kailash) were also under the Indian Government’s control.
Though the status of the Consulate General and the Trade Marts was confirmed in the Agreement, all the other privileges enjoyed by India were surrendered; the escort was repatriated, the P&T abandoned. All this was ‘offered’ to the Chinese without any compensation or even an attempt to obtain a fair settlement on the border issue in return.
Chinese authorities even confiscated the wireless sets of the ITA in Gartok.
After 1954, the Indian Government found it increasingly difficult to manage the Consulate and Agencies on the ground. An example, after the 1954 flash floods in Gyantse, the ITA building was destroyed; on one pretext or another, the Chinese never allowed its reconstruction.
Till the border was definitively sealed in 1962, Indian visitors and traders were constantly harassed by the Chinese authorities.
The border posts are still closed today.
Even for Indian officials, the situation became more and more untenable over the years and after Dalai Lama took refuge in India in March 1959; the situation turned from bad to worse with Beijing constantly accusing Delhi of interfering in China’s internal affairs.
In early 1960, a note from the Indian Trade Agent in Yatung says, “Just before the outbreak of disturbances in Tibet [March 10, 1959 uprising in Lhasa] there were 50 Indian shops at Yatung and 22 at Phari but now there are 18 Indian shops at Yatung including one panwalla and 2 cobblers and none at Phari”. Several such examples could be given.
When the Panchsheel Agreement lapsed in April 1962, there was no point in renewing it. The Trade Agencies were then closed and China asked the Indian officials to vacate the premises.
Sixty years later, China still refuses to reopen an Indian Consulate in Lhasa.
I recently came across some ‘personal’ letters written by Indian officers posted on the frontiers in the early 1950s. These missives are telling. In December 1950, a few weeks after the PLA entered Tibet, Harishwar Dayal, a senior ICS officer then posted in Gangtok as Political Officer responsible for Tibet, Sikkim and Bhutan, while discussing the Chinese advance towards the McMahon Line with his ITA in Gyantse, informed the latter of Sardar Patel’s death, “It is a heavy blow. He was the one person in this Government who had strong realistic view of things, including on foreign relations. Now, we are left at the mercy of the visionaries.”
Let us hope a new ‘realistic’ prime minister will be able to remind President Xi Jinping these few facts when he visits India later this year.

When India had a Consulate in Lhasa

The Nepalese newspaper, The Republica reported that "China has turned down India's proposal to establish its Consulate General Office in Lhasa of Tibet."
The  proposal was made by Sujatha Singh, the Indian Foreign Secretary during the 6th China-India strategic dialogue held in Beijing last week.
Nepal remains the only country to have a Consulate General Office in Lhasa.
According to The Republica, after meeting her Chinese counterpart, Deputy Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin, Singh told the reporters that "India will now plan a decisive talk with China in this regard."
What does it mean?
India is ready to drop the idea of reopening the Lhasa Consulate?
Let us not forget that India had a full-fledged Mission between 1947 and 1952; in 1952, it was foolishly downgraded by Nehru into a Consulate General(under Chinese pressure).
After the 1962 Sino-Indian War, the Indian Consulate General in Lhasa (and the 3 Trade Agencies in Yatung, Gyantse and the 'seasonal' one in Gartok) were closed.
It appears that the outgoing Indian government is backing out of its earlier demand and would now be satisfied  with another Consulate General in Chengdu (Sichuan) or Kunming (Yunnan province) instead of Lhasa.
This remains to be confirmed.
Today, India has 2 Consulate General Offices in Shanghai and Guangzou.
At the same time, China is extremelly keen to open an Office in Chennai.
In this context, I am posting a letter from P.N. Kaul, the Consul General in Lhasa between 1959 and 1961. It is addressed to his successor Arvind Deo, who is to take over soon.
Note that in 1961 already, the Chinese were putting pressure on India to reduce the activities of the Consulate, particularly the trade.

Personal D.O. [Demi-Official Letter]
P.N. Kaul, IFSA [Indian Frontier Administrative Service]
Consul General
Lhasa, Tibet

To Shri A.R. Deo
Consul General Nominate
Camp Mumbai

September 15th, 1961

I was informed by the Ministry a month ago of your posting here as my replacement. I expected a communication from you for seeking clarifications on any minute details, but did not hear from you – obviously because you are on leave. Yesterday’s [diplomatic] bag (incidentally Bag comes here on every 4th, 14th and 24th of the month from Gangtok) brought in a few notifications regarding you from which I learnt your leave address.

2- You must personally have gone through the latest Note on Living Conditions in Lhasa; I enclose a copy to be on the safe side. The Note deals with most aspects. There are a few things, however, which you personally may be interested to be informed about:

a-    The work here is very little indeed since March, 1959. Social life outside our Consulate General is nil; there being the Chinese Foreign Bureau and the Royal Nepalese Consulate General with whom you have only occasional formal social contacts. The new Royal Nepalese Consul General, Yak Thumba, arrived a week back and has been ill ever since – he is, however, recovering fast.
b-    We have clerical staff of one Sikkimese Head Clerk (Local rank of Vice Consul) [Gyatso Tshering?], two “Sikkim-based” clerks, one Kalimpong boy as Tibetan Translator-cum-Librarian, one “Sikkim-based” Wireless Operator, One Cypher Assailant from Delhi and another assistant from Delhi just posted in replacement who functions as Confidential Assistant-cum PA; he also knows some Chinese having been student in Peking for three years on a scholarship. Besides there we have one Assistant Civil Surgeon I as our Medical Officer. All the above staff until recently had their families with them but the new Vice Consul and the newly posted assistant from Delhi are without their families here at present. My only worthwhile recreation has been sporting in a mediocre game of tennis with my staff in the evening.
There is no Indian Community in Lhasa.
c-    The staff and the local Class IV servants are not overworked. Until recently I had an Indian personal bearer-cum-cook with me but I was compelled to send back as he created problems! I have since been able to easily to cope with one Gurkha Class IV as my cook on payments during off hours, there being hardly much entertainment to outsiders. He is a reasonably fair cook but has no knowledge of cooking of South and West Indian dishes. One of the Class IV, since I sent away my own servant, has been doing my bearer in spare time on payment. A personal bearer or a bearer-cum-cook would however, be useful but the snag is that they remain idle most of the time.
In the balance it would be worthwhile having one Indian servant with you. Please treat this as purely personal informal advice.
d-    You do not need to bring any furniture or crockery with you. Rice (inferior), Atta, Dalda, sugar, etc., it is advisable to purchase and dispatch from Gangtok itself and the shopkeepers do all the needful. It is advisable to avail of your entitled maundage [?] to save on transportation charges later on. Fine rice, papars, pickles and the like should be brought with you from India. Electricity is available here since two years and pressure cookers, heaters, firewood stoves, (bukkaries) are available in the Consulate; you need to bring one electric iron for your use.
There is a radiogram and a radio in your residence; there only two dozen long playing records though, you can order more later on. The living quarters are tolerable enough for Lhasa. Needs of clothing, etc. have been fully explained in the Note on Living Conditions.
There is a Toshakhana [literarily treasure-house, in this case for food and liquor] grant of about Rs. 4000- per annum for entertainment. Stocks of liquor, cigarettes, sausages, cheese and the like are adequate in the Toshakhana. I have been purchasing my par needs from it, though it has been objected to by the A.G.C.R. [Auditor General & Central Audit] You can order for yourself from Calcutta drinks, imported tinned items like milk, Kraft cheese, sausages and bacon duty free from Calcutta. There will be hardly be any vegetables during winter and you are coming towards the beginning of winter season. I have however, got some tomatoes dried for you, besides you will be able to get fresh cabbage and turnip preserved in hot house and the universal potato.
There is one Consulate Willys Station Wagon [Jeep] mainly for your use, the second one is on its last leg and its replacement should materialize through D.G.S.D. [Directorate General of Supplies & Disposals] in three to four months time. If you have time in Delhi you may see Mr. Shrinivasan, Under Secretary (TG) and expedite its mataerializing.
a-    No foreign exchange problems are involved here. You get your pay in rupees; market exchange rupee-yuan is favourable to us. Rupees remittance facilities through Bank Drafts issue by the Office exists.
Our mail takes 10 to 15 days to reach here. Telegrams at India rates can be sent over the Chinese P&T channels.
b-    Most of our things of necessity are not available locally. On an average one truck on hire for our stores and rations materialize from Yatung to Lhasa monthly. One has to furnish requirement indent to Chinese one month in advance.
c-    The Consulate care will fetch you and your essential baggage from Yatung. A truck will be indented for to bring your heavy baggage and any stores lying at Yatung. Your baggage should be made into 35 seers leads as it has to travel from Gangtok to Yatung by ponies/porters. An odd heavier essential package is, however, managed by porters at higher rates.

In case you have any further clarifications to seek please send a signal over tour Delhi-Lhasa Wireless link, or a telegram if advisable.

Please do let us know you exact date of arrival in Gangtok and Yatung. I suggest you spend four days at Gangtok, although I am quite anxious to leave soon.

You may consult Mr. A.K. Sen and Director S. [Sumal] Sinha for further details as both were Ex-C.G. in Lhasa

With my very best wishes and Regards

Yours

(P.N. Kaul) IFAS

Source: National Archives of India
Shri P.N. Kaul, I.F.A.S., Consul-General for India, Lhasa, Progs., Nos. 5(3)-L, 1961, C.G.I. LHASA TIBET, 1961

Trading business against human rights

China says that the Foreign Trade of the Tibetan Autonomous Region is progressing well.
Obviously, this is not thanks to the trade exchanges with India. 
The border trade has been stagnating for years.
In the article on China Tibet Online, He Gang, a researcher with Tibet Academy of Social Sciences states that "Tibetan foreign trades surge benefits from the steady conditions of neighboring countries, such as Nepal." 
In fact, it is with Nepal only. The opening a Consulate of Nepal in Lhasa is probably responsible for this 'surge'.  
But is has a price. 
In April, AsiaNews reported: "To help Kathmandu restore its diplomatic missions, Beijing is financing the construction of three new buildings in the Nepalese Consulate in Lhasa (Tibet). In the rest of the world Nepal's embassies are crumbling for lack of funds. The project was recently approved. The buildings will house the residence of the consul and his staff."
Already in 2009, Beijing had announced it would pay 1,80,000 Euros for the Consulate of Nepal in the Tibetan capital. 
A Memorandum of Understanding was signed in November 2011 between Kathmandu and the Government of the Tibet Autonomous Region providing, in addition to restoration of the buildings, giving an even wider representation of the Nepalis State in Tibet. Let us not forget that Nepal is the only country which has a consulate in Tibet.
AsiaNews affirms that in Kathmandu, not everyone is happy with the latest Chinese offers; some Nepalese politicians even accused Beijing of wanting to control the bilateral relations in its favour and increase the clampdown on Tibetan exiles in Nepal.
It quoted Lok Raj Baral, former ambassador of Nepal to India: "The Maoist government should limit itself to applying for funding at home, it should not accept foreign funding for its diplomatic missions. How is it possible to defend national interests when working inside a building paid for with money from the host country? "
Bheki Bahadur Thapa, former Minister for Foreign Affairs, stated that Kathmandu is increasingly severe with the exiled Tibetans and a consulate in Lhasa built with Chinese money poses a serious risk to the lives of the Tibetans. 

As mentioned yesterday on this blog, Beijing has rejected New Delhi’s request to allow India to open a consulate in Lhasa. India’s demand was in response to China’s desire to have a consulate in Chennai. Instead, Beijing has said that Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan province, could be an alternative.
Chengdu will certainly not help 'foreign trade' with Tibet.
Beijing would perhaps grant India's demand, would New Delhi accept to restrict the Dalai Lama and the Tibetans in exile or harass them like the Nepal Government does. 
In exchange of a clampdown on the Tibetans in India, China would probably pay for a building for the Indian Consulate in Lhasa (though the old building, Dekyi Lingka still exists and still belongs to India).
But why should Delhi agree to such anti-democratic and inhuman action against the Tibetan refugees.
By the way, India is more and more frustrated with the bilateral trade talks with China, initiated by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in December 2010, when he visited New Delhi. 
During the last fiscal year ended March 31, the trade deficit of India with China jumped 42 percent to about $40 billion.
Even India’s Commerce Minister Anand Sharma said that he is 'very concerned' about the imbalance with China
Asia Pacific Finance News said: "The trade woes of India has become economic threat and the current account deficit with the world is 4.5 percent of GDP in the quarter ended March 31, which is an all-time high. This has also resulted in sharp depreciation of rupee."
A complicate issue, but its is not worth for India, trading business against human rights.

Foreign trades boost Tibetan economic growth
China Tibet Online 
Lucy Su
2012-08-03
The foreign trade of Tibet continues rising in the first half of this year with total export-import volume reaching more than 1 billion US dollars, increasing by 1.7 times from the same period last year and contributing significantly to Tibetan economic growth, according to Xinhua News Agency.
According to the statistics, local GDP of Tibet reached 28.72 billion yuan, increasing by 11.3 percent from that of the previous year; the growth rate is 3.5 percent points higher than the national average, and keeps stable growth.
"It is the surge of foreign trades that drives Tibetan local GDP growth in the first six months of 2012,” said He Gang, a researcher with Tibet Academy of Social Sciences.
According to He, Tibetan foreign trades surge benefits from the steady conditions of neighboring countries, such as Nepal.
During the first six months, Tibetan foreign trades with Nepal amounts to 530 million US dollars, increasing by 79.5 percent, according to Lhasa Custom.
The improvement of Tibetan transportation network, especially the Qinghai-Tibet Railway, and development of Tibetan characteristic and competitive industries also contribute a lot.
Meanwhile, investments also boost Tibet’s developments, thanks to a series of major projects carried out at the beginning of this year, said Dorje Dradul, deputy director general of Tibet Bureau of Statistics.

An opportunity lost, an advantage given

My article An opportunity lost, an advantage given about the opening of an Indian Consulate in Lhasa appeared on Thursday in The Pioneer.

Click here to read...

When New Delhi decided to downgrade India's relations with Tibet, the bare minimum it could have done was to have pushed the Chinese to settle the border issue. But, Prime Minister Nehru did nothing of the kind.
If I were asked to cite the biggest blunder of Jawaharlal Nehru’s foreign policy, I would find it hard to answer, but in the end it would probably be the downgrading of the Indian Mission in Lhasa in 1952. It was the most gratuitous act done by the Indian Government.
Let us go back a bit in history...

The next day, the Chinese Government said 'no' to the proposal. 
But India should continue to insist that it is also important for Beijing.

China says no to Indian consulate in Tibetan capital
Hindustan Times
August 03, 2012
Jayanth Jacob
Beijing has rejected New Delhi’s request to allow India to open a consulate in Lhasa, the administrative capital of Tibet. India’s request, first reported by HT, was in response to China’s desire to have a consulate in Chennai. Instead, Beijing has indicated that Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan province, could be an alternative location.
Chengdu is a key economic centre of western China and a consulate here would help the ever-expanding trade ties between the two countries. There are many Indian companies operating out of Chengdu.
However, the Indian side is not willing to settle for anything other than Lhasa, with officials noting that the “Chinese would naturally place Chengdu, or even Kunming before us”.
“We have asked for the re-opening for the consulate in Lhasa. It’s given to our understanding that Beijing is not keen on having any more mission in Lhasa or in any part of the Tibet Autonomous Region. The issue of opening of new consulates in each other’s country is a matter of continuing discussion,” said an official familiar with the development.
According to diplomatic sources familiar with the developments, the Chinese don’t want more consulates in Lhasa, where only Nepal has one.
The Chinese side is wary because of a series of self-immolations in support of Tibet’s right to self-determination. These, Beijing says, were done at the behest of Dalai Lama, whom the Chinese look upon as a “splitist.”
The US has also been angling for a consulate in Lhasa. The consulates that come under the Indian embassy include Hong Kong, Guangzhou and Shanghai. 

Indian Consulate in Lhasa

Dekyi Lingka, the Indian Mission in Lhasa

If I was asked to cite the biggest blunder of Nehru’s foreign policy, I would find it hard to answer, but in the end it would probably be: “the downgrading of the Indian Mission in Lhasa in 1952.”
It was the most gratuitous act done by the Indian Government.
Let us go back a couple of years in history.
When Mao’s troops invaded Tibet at the end of 1950, India enjoyed several privileges in Tibet; apart from the full-fledged Mission in Lhasa, there were three Indian trade marts managed by Agents posted in Gyantse, Gartok (Western Tibet) and Yatung (near the Sikkim border). These Agents were entitled to a military escort. The Post and Telegraph Service, a chain of rest-houses and the principality of Minsar (near Mt Kailash) were also under the Indian Government’s control.
Ideologically, Nehru was not comfortable with these ‘imperialist’ advantages, though he admitted that they were useful for trade. However, after the invasion of Tibet, the Indian government found it increasingly difficult to retain these benefits on the ground. The new masters did not want any trace of foreign power on their newly acquired territory.
When Indian visitors, traders (and even diplomats) began to be harassed; Delhi could have protested, but they meekly bowed to the Chinese.
On 3 November 1951, during a press conference when a journalist pointed out ‘differences’ between India and China, especially about the status of the Indian Mission at Lhasa, the Prime Minister remarked that the Indian mission would continue to remain there.
A few months later, the issue of the Indian Mission in Lhasa came up again during an interaction with the press, Nehru vaguely answered that the Mission was dealing “with certain trade and cultural matters more or less [sic!]”. He added that technically the Mission never had any diplomatic status. This was far from correct. Before Independence, the British Head of the Mission had for years negotiated with the Tibetan Foreign Bureau bilateral issues concerning India and Tibet, including the frontier in Tawang area.
By June 1952, the situation further evolved. The Chinese were physically in control of most of the plateau; the Tibetans had begun discovering the hardships caused by an invading army. When asked about the negotiations with China on Tibet, Nehru hinted at changes: “Obviously once it is accepted and admitted that the Chinese Government is not only the suzerain power in Tibet, but is exercising the suzerainty, then something will flow from it. Then you cannot treat Tibet as an independent country with an independent representation from us. Though our Representative remains, this changes his character somewhat, and the trade mission and other things also follow.”
The Prime Minister therefore admited that ‘due to the circumstances’, the status of the Mission may change.
During the following months, Nehru’s position continued to shift; it became vaguer and vaguer: “the status of the representative in Lhasa has never been defined for the last thirty years,” said the Prime Minister once, adding “from an independent country, Tibet had become a country under the effective suzerainty of China, China is now exercising its suzerainty”.
It is in these circumstances that the decision was taken to downgrade the diplomatic relations between Tibet and India; the Indian Representative in Lhasa would thereafter be re-designated as a Consul-General.
A few weeks later, the silver-tongued Zhou Enlai told KM Panikkar, the gullible Indian Ambassador in China that he “presumed that India had no intention of claiming special rights arising from the unequal treaties of the past and was prepared to negotiate a new and permanent relationship safeguarding [China’s] legitimate interests.”
But that was not all! Nehru informed Panikkar that there was no objection to convert the Mission in Lhasa into a Consulate-General …and to open a Chinese Consulate in Bombay.
Nehru however added: “We would naturally prefer a general and comprehensive settlement which includes [the] Frontier.”
That is why I called it a ‘gratuitous gesture’. If the Government was so keen to downgrade India’s relation with Tibet, the bare minimum would have been to settle the border issue at the same time. It was easier then, than now!
But nothing happened on the frontier front; the Mission in Lhasa was downgraded and a new Consulate was offered to the Chinese in Mumbai, as a bonus.
The Chinese eventually closed the Consulate General after the 1962 conflict with India.
It was refreshing to recently read in the Indian media that Delhi was keen to reopen its Consulate General in Lhasa.
As an article in The Business Standard put it: "India and China are sparring over the opening of consulates in Lhasa in exchange for Chennai, in what amounts to a second round of diplomatic confrontation between Asia's largest powers (after the one in the South China Sea)."
It is an important move by India, and this for one good reason, in the past India had 'interests' in Tibet; today it continues to have them.
What are these ‘interests’?
The 4,057 km common border between India and China; the presence in India of the Dalai Lama and more than one lakh of his people; the environment issues; the rivers of Tibet flowing to India, but also traditional and civilisational interests such as the Nalanda tradition of Buddhism (which has been preserved for centuries in its purest form in the Tibetan monasteries), without forgetting pilgrimages such as the Kailash/Mansarovar as well as trade.
Last week, the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies released a new report stressing the importance of increased economic engagement between India and China. It argued: "India should facilitate more border trade with China with better connectivity and more commerce opportunities including on the Nathu La trading point in Sikkim."
The writers of the report strongly believe that India's attempt at facilitating economic exchanges with China will benefit all players in South Asia.
The reopening of the Consulate in Lhasa should be seen in this context.
Paradoxically, it is not that Nehru did not understand the ‘interest’ of having a representation in Lhasa. In November 1958, in a note written from Bhutan, after meeting the Consulate General in Lhasa, the Prime Minister remarked: “it is obvious that some places require special attention. Thus, our mission in Tibet has to be considered quite apart from any other place in the world. I can hardly imagine a more dreary life, both climatically and to some extent politically, than has to be faced in Tibet.”
He then suggested giving a grant for buying books and the latest movies for a library for the staff of the mission (he even said that Harivansh Rai Bachchan, Big B’s father, then an OSD in the MEA should select the Hindi books).
Would China agree to reopen the Consulate, it will be an occasion for Beijing to show its ‘peaceful’ face.
Take the example of the Indian army delegation which made a rare visit to Tibet, earlier this month and interacted with the officers of a Chinese military regiment based in Lhasa; with a Consulate, such confidence-building measures could become routine; it could not only facilitate bilateral trade, but also help the large number of Indian tourists wanting to visit Tibet and its holy sites.
On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the closure of the Indian Consulate General in Lhasa, the reopening of an office, even if it is no longer a full-fledged Mission like in the old days, would go a long way to heal the wounds of 1962 and restart the Indo-China relations afresh.

Indian Missions in Tibet

Dekyi Lingka, the Indian Mission in Lhasa

The Indian media recently mentioned India's demand to reopen a Consulate General in Lhasa, the capital of Tibet. 
For example, an article in The Business Standard affirms: "India and China are sparring over the opening of consulates in Lhasa in exchange for Chennai, in what amounts to a second round of diplomatic confrontation between Asia's largest powers, in the wake of their recent disagreement over an oil block in the South China Sea that is controlled by India, owned by Vietnam and counter-claimed by China."
Though the discussion over the opening of new consulates has, for the time being, remained within the confines of the Foreign ministries in Delhi and Beijing,it is an important topic for India, which always had and still has, 'interests' in Tibet.
One of these interests is trade.
Last week, the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies released a new report stressing the importance of increased economic engagement between India and China.
It argued that: "India should facilitate more border trade with China with better connectivity and more commerce opportunities including on the Natu La trading point in Sikkim."
The writers of the report strongly believe that India's attempt at facilitating economic exchanges with China will benefit all players in South Asia: "Moreover, intangible gains in terms of acquiring a substantial stature within the region will also be important for India."
The reopening of the Consulate in Lhasa should be seen in this context.
It is also interesting to quote from a note, written by Jawaharlal Nehru, the Indian Prime Minister when he visited Paro in Bhutan in September 1958.
The note was addressed to N.R. Pillai, Secretary General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth, Subimal Dutt, Foreign Secretary, M.J. Desai, Commonwealth Secretary, and B.N. Chakravarty, Special Secretary, MEA. A copy of this note was sent to Apa B. Pant, Political Officer in Sikkim and Bhutan, and J.S. Mehta, Deputy Secretary, MEA.
Some of Nehru's remarks, school teacher-like, may seem childish, but it nevertheless shows the importance of the Indian mission and the trade agencies in Tibet for the Prime Minister at the end of the 1950's. 

S. Sinha, head of the Indian Mission in the early 1950's

Indian Missions in Tibet 

During my brief stay at Yatung [Nehru stayed at Yatung ovenight on 18 September on his way to Bhutan], I met our representatives in Tibet that is, our Consul-General at Lhasa [S.L. Chibber] and our Trade Agents at Gyantse [R.S. Kapoor] and Yatung [K.C. Johorey].
At Yatung, I saw the land and buildings attached to our Trade Agency. In regard to the other two places, I was given some account of the position there.

2. We divide up our missions abroad on some basis of importance and according to the standard give amenities, etc. While this may be good enough as a general rule, it is obvious that some places require special attention. Thus, our mission in Tibet have to be considered quite apart from any other place in the world. I can hardly imagine a more dreary life, both climatically and to some extent politically, than has to be faced in Tibet. People have to live at an altitude of 10,000 to 12,500 ft or perhaps more. The winter is terribly severe and the long nights must be enough to try anyone's nerves. There is hardly any social intercourse or cultural activities.

3. The first thing to be sure about is that, in so far as possible, our representatives who are sent there are physically capable of supporting that altitude (I might mention that the present representatives did not complain to me about the altitude and apparently did not fare badly because of it). Twice at least in the past we have had trouble about our Ambassadors who were sent to Addis Ababa in Ethiopia because they had to live at an altitude of 9,000 ft. Tibet is generally much higher and the climate much more rigorous. Every person who is sent to these places must have his heart and blood-pressure examined carefully and only when he passes the test should he be sent there. On the whole, the term of a person's tenure there should not be too prolonged. I realise the difficulty of having short tenures because work in Tibet is of a very specialised kind and it may not be easy to find suitable men for it. If a person is healthy and does not suffer from the altitude or the climate, he may continue to remain there for a relatively longer period. But we should have reports about his health periodically. It should be remembered that this is not merely a question of health of the officer concerned but of his family also.

4. A certain minimum standard of comfort and conveniences should be provided. Comfort obviously includes proper residence, adequate heating and water supply and lighting. This is the barest minimum anywhere, but in these cold regions its importance is all the greater. The long cold nights require warm rooms and proper lighting for reading or other work or amusement. The water supply should include running hot water wherever possible.

5. I am suggesting the barest minimum for residential purposes. Without this life tends to become intolerable in these regions for any normal family with children. Another aspect of this is the provision of cultural facilities for all our staff and their families. These facilities include (1) radios; (2) films; (3) books and periodicals; (4) games.

6. I believe some kind of radios have been supplied through Shri Apa Pant to these places in Tibet. It is essential that properly functioning radios should be given to these missions. I should imagine that one radio is not enough. There should be one in our representative's house and one in some common room for the rest of the staff.

7. Films. These again are important, not only our documentaries which are much appreciated, but also feature films. Both these types of films are also very popular with the general population and are good publicity. Arrangements should be made for a regular and frequent supply of our documentaries. As for feature films also, more might be sent. The normal price charged by the film companies is based on some kind of competitive charges. This does not apply to Tibet at all and we ought to try to get some of these feature films at cheaper rates for Tibet especially. It would be good propaganda for them.

8. Books and periodicals. This again is very important for the long winter evenings for our people cut off from their homeland and living in an alien and sometimes even hostile atmosphere. We must build up good libraries there, principally in English and Hindi, and definitely set aside an adequate sum for this purpose. These libraries should also be available to the local residents should they require to use them. That is an important aspect, but I am thinking principally now of the members of our own missions and their families who should have not only a good basic library but new books sent to them from time to time.

9. I suggest that immediately a set of books worth about Rs 500/- each set should be sent to Lhasa, Gyantse and Yatung through our Gangtok Agency. This may form the base and should be added on annually. I am suggesting the figure of Rs 500/- as a minimum figure. I do not quite know how far that will help.

10. This Rs 500/- may be split up into Rs 300/- for English books and Rs 200/- for Hindi books. There are some very good cheap editions of English books appearing in Bombay and perhaps elsewhere too. Old Indian classics or their translations have been brought out and they cost from Re 1/- to Rs 2/ 8/- each. I suggest that full sets of these popular editions might be obtained. Once before I suggested that we should get these books to be sent to all our missions abroad. I do not know what was done about that. In any event, a full set should be obtained for these three missions in Tibet.

11. Another type of books which will of course be more expensive should be those relating to Tibet or problems of that area, travel books and others.

12. Among our books, children's books should always be included for the children of our people in the missions, both in English and in Hindi.

13. Dr Bachchan  should be asked to make a selection of the Hindi books to be sent to these three missions in Tibet.
I have suggested Rs 500/- as a beginning. It should by no means be thought that this is the ceiling.

14. Games. It is desirable to send some equipment for games, both indoor and outdoor. These are useful for the members of our missions and their families.
They are also very useful for other residents of the towns who I am told welcome them and take part in them.

15. At present, I am told, there are practically no suitable buildings for us in Lhasa and Gyantse. In Gyantse the terrible flood of two-three years ago destroyed our building and killed 60 or 70 of our people. Since then our Agent there has lived in a very unsuitable and uncomfortable hired place. I understand that there have been proposals for putting up some buildings and possibly also a dam to protect them in future from floods. As usual with such proposals, they take a mighty long time to materialise. We have to face two almost insuperable difficulties. One is on our side, the CPWD, etc. The other is on the Chinese side who even excel us in delaying matters.

16. In both Gyantse and Lhasa I understand that the land in our possession at present is both spacious and well-suited. In fact it is probably the best land in those towns. If we do not utilise it quickly, we might well find part of it slipping away from us. Therefore, early steps should be taken to finalise the buildings, etc., which have to be put up there. The plans for these buildings should be adequate and spacious, even though the en tire plan should not be given effect to immediately. We may build quickly the central part of it, leaving the rest for a future period as convenient. There is some importance in having good and solid buildings put up there. I do not attach much importance as a rule to prestige in such matters. Nevertheless, this aspect cannot be ignored in Tibet as things are.

17. This will require a competent engineer to be sent by us to these places, more especially for the proposed dam. Any such dam at Gyantse really should have been the business for the Chinese to put up. I have no idea of its extent or cost. I think that we should start at the house first and take a risk if necessary about the dam. After all the terrible accident that occurred at Gyantse was not the kind of thing which repeats itself perhaps in less than a century. It was due to a big lake in the mountains breaking its barriers and the water rushing down suddenly. So the dam may well be postponed for some time, though it must be kept in mind. The engineer could report on it.

18. So far as the dam is concerned, we must necessarily act according to the advice of the Chinese. Our first attempt should be to ask them to make it. If this does not succeed, even so we should take their advice and our engineer should work in close cooperation with the Chinese engineers.

19. I have mentioned books above. Current periodicals are essential. Our Publications Division sends some of its published literature to Gangtok from where it is distributed to our Tibetan missions. It seemed to me that a very poor supply was sent even of this output of the Publications Division which should be increased.

An Indian Mission in Lhasa?

Dekyi Lingka, the Indian Mission in Lhasa

According to The Hindustan Times, India would like to reopen its consulate General in Lhasa: "India has sprung a surprise on China by seeking to re-open its consulate in Lhasa, Tibet that was closed after the 1962 war between the two countries. India’s demand came after a Chinese request to open a third consulate in Chennai. Beijing has consulates in Mumbai and Kolkata and embassy in Delhi".
One of the greatest blunders of Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Indian Prime Minister was to have downgraded the full-fledged Indian mission (equivalent to an embassy) to a Consulate General in 1952.
I quote here from my book Born in Sin: the Panchsheel Agreement 
. 
The Downgrading of the Mission in Lhasa

One of the most astonishing aspects in the exchange of Letters and Notes between the Indian and Chinese governments after the latter’s troops entered Tibet [October 1950], is that India never insisted on the rights she had inherited from the Simla Convention.
In 1950 India still enjoyed several privileges in Tibet; apart from the full-fledged Mission in Lhasa, there were three Indian Trade Marts managed by Agents posted in Gyantse, Gartok and in Yatung. These Agents were entitled to a military escort. The Post and Telegraph Service, a chain of rest-houses and the principality of Minsar (near Mt Kailash) were also under the Indian Government’s control.
Ideologically, Nehru was not comfortable with these ‘imperialist’ sequels, though he admitted that they were useful for trade. However after the arrival of the Chinese troops, the Indian government found it increasingly difficult to retain these benefits on the ground. Even though Delhi could have protested when visitors and traders from India were harassed or put to hardship, they hardly did so.
Soon after the signing of the 17-Point Agreement, Panikkar, the Indian Ambassador to China, came to India for consultation with his government. By this time he was already fully in love with the Communist regime. Nehru, too was convinced that the future of India lay with the East. In one of his letters to the Chief Ministers, he described the situation thus: “it is important to know what the new China is and in what direction it is going… For the first time, China possesses a strong Central Government whose decrees run even to Sinkiang and Tibet. Our own relations with China are definitively friendly.”
But a few weeks after the above letter, the Indian Prime Minister admitted for the first time that there were some differences of perceptions with the Chinese government. At a press conference on 3 November 1951, when someone pointed to certain differences between India and China especially about the Indian Mission at Lhasa , he remarked that the Indian mission would continue to remain there.
A few months later, at another press conference when questioned again about the position of the Indian Mission in Lhasa, Nehru vaguely answered that the Mission was dealing “with certain trade and cultural matters more or less [sic!]”.  He added that technically the Mission never had any diplomatic status. 

During the same press conference the Indian Prime Minister declared that he was not aware of “any infiltration of Chinese troops in India.” Rumours had begun about Chinese incursions through the U.P.-Tibet  border as well as through the Ladakh-Tibet border. The first Chinese surveys for the Sinkiang-Tibet highway cutting through the Aksai Chin probably occurred during these years. Unfortunately, as we shall see later the Indo-Tibetan border in the western sector was still shown as ‘undefined’ on the Indian maps.

At this point in time, the Government of India decided to renegotiate some of the arrangements it had with Tibet.
By June 1952, the situation had further evolved. The Chinese had physical control of most parts of Tibet and the Tibetans were discovering the hardships caused by an invading army.  During another press conference in June 1952, when asked about the negotiations with China on Tibet, Nehru’s hinted at changes:
Nothing very definite has taken place yet... Obviously once it is accepted and admitted that the Chinese Government is not only the suzerain power in Tibet but is exercising the suzerainty, then something will flow from it. Then you cannot treat Tibet as an independent country with an independent representation from us. Though our Representative remains, this changes his character somewhat, and the trade mission and other things also follow.
During the following months, in direct contradiction of the Simla Convention which had been ratified by the Government of India and the Tibetan Government, the question of involving the Tibetans in negotiations would be completely ignored. In the worst colonial tradition begun by the British at the beginning of the century, India was ready to negotiate an agreement with China on Tibet without any reference to the Tibetan authorities.
Although a few months earlier Nehru had ambiguously declared that the Mission in Tibet never had a diplomatic status, in June 1952 he declared more prudently that “the status of the representative in Lhasa has never been defined for the last thirty years.”
The Prime Minister admitted that the circumstances had changed and from an independent country, Tibet had become a country under the effective suzerainty of China: “China is now exercising its suzerainty”.
Nehru announced that as Tibet was no longer an independent country, the Indian Representative in Lhasa would soon be re-designated as a Consul-General. There will be no “difficulty in fixing these and like matters up.” 
The decision had been taken to demote the diplomatic relations between Tibet and India.
In the same month, the clever Zhou Enlai told the gullible Indian Ambassador in China that he “presumed that India had no intention of claiming special rights arising from the unequal treaties of the past and was prepared to negotiate a new and permanent relationship safeguarding legitimate interests.”

It would be good to have an Indian Consulate General in Lhasa, after all India had for centuries very close cultural and trade contacts with the Land of Snows. It was a tragedy that this connection was discontinued after the 1962 War.
Whether the Chinese are happy with this 'connection' is another matter.

India wants to reopen Lhasa consulate, China not game
Jayanth Jacob,
Hindustan Times
New Delhi, May 28, 2012
India has sprung a surprise on China by seeking to re-open its consulate in Lhasa, Tibet that was closed after the 1962 war between the two countries. India’s demand came after a Chinese request to open a third consulate in Chennai. Beijing has consulates in Mumbai and Kolkata and embassy in Delhi.
Although Nepal has a consulate in Lhasa, China of late has been more wary than ever about opening up Tibet because of a series of self-immolations, which Beijing claims were done at the behest of the Dalai Lama.
China’s initial reaction wasn’t so encouraging and it preferred a consulate somewhere else. But official sources said New Delhi would like to push for Lhasa.
India holds Tibet as an integral part of China. It maintains that the Dalai Lama is its “honoured guest” and follows a stated policy of not allowing Indian soil to be used for anti-China activities. China’s dislike for the Dalai Lama is well-known.
Beijing is New Delhi's largest trade partner in goods. Officials say a consulate in Tibet would only help bilateral trade and pilgrimage, such as the Kailash Mansarovar yatra.
The consulates that come under the Indian embassy in Beijing include Hong Kong, Guangzhou and Shanghai.
Incidentally, Shivshankar Menon, India’s national security adviser and special envoy for India-China boundary talks, spent some of his childhood days in Tibet while his father was posted as India’s consul general in Lhasa in the 1950s.

The Chinese Tibetan Flavor

I have updated a previous posting on the reincarnation issue.



The fact that China is today a recognized superpower (the Middle Kingdom has become the 2nd largest economic power and the first exporter of the planet), may lead you to conclude that the leadership in Beijing lives in peace with itself, enjoying its newly-acknowledged position.
But you are wrong, despite their status, the Politburo members in the walled-enclave of Zhongnanhai are trembling.
Why? Like in the famous comics Asterix, some indomitable tribes continues to refuse the rule of the most powerful empire of its time. Though the tiny Armorican village could not be captured by the Roman Empire because the villagers managed to acquire invincible strength by drinking a magic potion brewed by the local druid; in our case, the tribe does not use magic potion, but non-violence.
The Empire does not really know how to strike back.
A meeting of the all-powerful Politburo of the CCP was held on January 8 to deal exclusively with the situation in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), which represents about a third of historical Tibet.
President Hu Jintao, who between 1988 to 1992, was posted as Tibet Party Secretary, spoke during the meeting of two objectives: to seek a breakthrough in [economic] development and maintain long-term stability.”
Hu said that the Central Government would help Tibet in four ways: boosting investment, transferring technology, and sending in more qualified officials as well as ‘experts and talents’. The new motto suggested by the Chinese President is “going down the road of development with Chinese characteristics and Tibetan flavor”.
Unfortunately, this will not apply when it comes to the Lamas’ most sacred institutions: the reincarnation tradition.
“Keeping a living Buddha under control means keeping a temple under control, and keeping a temple under control means keeping a district under control." This quotation, conveniently put in the mouth of an unknown supporter of the ‘separatist Dalai’s group’, appeared in The People’s Daily, on January 7. In fact, this is what the CCP has realized long ago.
The entire article, entitled ‘Dalai Lama's reincarnation tale indicative of separatism’ is most offensive and shows a great nervousness on Beijing’s part.
What provoked the anger of the ‘analyst’? The People’s Daily’s argument is that a few months back the Dalai Lama declared that he could very well be reincarnated in the form of a woman. Beijing says that it is “an eye-popping thing to say”.
Several years ago, I had the occasion to ask the Dalai Lama to elaborate on this point, he had then explained: "In Tibet, the tradition of having reincarnated teachers is almost 700 years old. Among them, we had one institution of a female reincarnation. In case a female Dalai Lama is more useful to Tibet in future, then why not have a woman as ‘reincarnation'? If a Tibetan lady Dalai Lama comes, every male will become her follower," he said, laughing.
"I feel that education alone cannot solve all our contemporary problems. More emphasis should be given on ‘compassion'. Women are basically more sensitive and compassionate. But men are not. They are more aggressive”.
The Tibetans consider the Dalai Lama to be the reincarnation of Avalokiteshvara, the Bodhisattva of Compassion and Saint-Patron of Tibet. His ‘job', as the present Dalai Lama puts it, is to make sure that the Buddhist tradition flourishes in the Land of Snows.
Beijing has now reacted violently (and belatedly) to the idea of a girl Dalai Lama: “A living reincarnation, reincarnated as a girl or a bronze-haired foreigner… all these absurd arguments by the 14th Dalai Lama on his reincarnation have made people in the Tibetan Buddhist circle feel furious.”
The Communist Party, which has apparently gained great expertise in the Buddha Dharma, argues “according to the basic teachings of Tibetan Buddhism, ‘may be a girl’ is simply an outrageous remark.” It then adds: “In the eyes of many Tibetan Buddhists, it was a blasphemy.”
What a sexist remark! Did not Buddha ordain his own mother? But one can’t expect the apparatchiks in Beijing to have read the sutras.
Alreday a couple of years ago the Chinese government had announced new Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism.
Beijing was preparing for the Dalai Lama’s departure (and return); the ‘measures’ clearly targeted the Tibetan leader. If Karl Marx could read some of the 14 articles of the ‘measures', he would be turning in his grave. They describe in great detail how “reincarnating living Buddhas should carry out application and approval procedures.” The Party threatened: “No group or individual may without authorisation carry out any activities related to searching for or recognising reincarnating living Buddha soul children.”
The Communist Party, who always treated religion as ‘poison’, has suddenly become an authority on the century-old tradition of ‘reincarnation’.
The People’s Daily comes back to the ‘Measures’ to state that “the reincarnation of Living Buddha shall not be interfered or dominated by any organization or individual abroad.” It is another way to say that the Dalai Lama has no business in deciding reincarnation.
In Tibet, the lineage system has never been rigid. For example, during the 13-14th century, the hierarchs of Sakya monastery ruled over the Land of Snows. Their succession was set up by way of ‘transmission' from father to son or uncle to nephew. Further, historians believe that at the beginning of the 17th century, two Dalai Lamas were alive at the same time (the 6th and the 7th). There was no fixed place about where a Dalai Lama could be reborn. The Fourth, Yonten Gyatso was born in Mongolia while the Sixth, Tsangyang Gyatso, took birth in India (in Tawang district of today's Arunachal Pradesh).
Through Tibet's history, the interregnum between two Dalai Lamas has been a weakness of the reincarnation system. The 19th century saw a succession of five Dalai Lamas. The Chinese, through their Ambans (or Ambassadors) in Lhasa, made full use of this weakness. Many surmise that the premature deaths of the Ninth up to the Twelfth Dalai Lamas were not a mere coincidence and the Chinese Ambans certainly took great advantage of their ‘timely departure’. It is clear that the problem is not only a spiritual issue, but also a political one and this explains the meddling of the Chinese Communists in what seems at first sight to be a religious affair.
The unnamed ‘analyst’ of the People’s Daily commented: “Seeing Dalai Lama keep sullying Tibetan Buddhism, many people sharply pointed out the most sacred reincarnation system of Tibetan Buddhism has become his tool of separatism. It is foreseeable that he will trample on the historical and religious rituals more savagely, and finally bring disrepute to Tibetan Buddhism. He should realize carrying out separatist activities through the reincarnation issue will only meet with public ridicule.”
History will decide who is the most ridiculous, but obviously, Beijing is nervous to think of what will happen after the death of the present Dalai Lama.
Like the Gaulish tribe, one can hope that the Tibetans will be able to resist (without magic potion as they have abjured violence), the cultural invasion of the mighty Empire and preserve their religious heritage, more particularly the tulku (reincarnation) tradition which should be acknowledged by UNESCO as part of the Intangible World Heritage.
In any case one could ask, is it befitting for a superpower to speak in such appalling manner? If President Hu Jintao is serious about the preservation of a ‘Tibetan flavor’, he should remember the words of the Dalai Lama: “My religion is simple, my religion is kindness”. This is Tibetan flavor.