China promotes ...the Indian tribes: a dangerous move

My article Ten thousand methods to safeguard India’s rich tribe appeared in the Edit Page of The Pioneer

Here is the link...

The fact that China is promoting ‘Indian culture’ is dangerous. The Union Government has been ignorant about the issue. But for how long? India could lose a crucial battle on its borders… without a shot being fired

Watching Chairman Xi Jinping officiating during the mega parade at the Zhurihe Combined Tactics Training Base in Inner Mongolia on the occasion of the 90th anniversary of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), this writer was struck by the Chinese martial air of the Chinese President driving in an open jeep, dressed in combat fatigue.
He later ordered the PLA to be prepared for the battle and to defeat ‘all enemies that dare offend’ his country. Was India, who had dared to challenge the mighty PLA when Beijing tried to change the status quo at the tri-junction between Tibet, Bhutan and Sikkim, targeted? It’s difficult to say.
It was indeed a huge display of military power; Chinese state agencies reported that some 40 per cent of the weapons on show had never before been seen by the public. Xi, who is also the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, by far the most powerful organisation in the Middle Kingdom, inspected 12,000 combat troops.
Well, Chairman Xi has a problem; a serious problem. Can he speak of a ‘Chinese Dream’ or ‘Peaceful Rise’ while threatening to go to war against those who dare to oppose China? Would war take place, the Chinese Dream and its attendant mega projects such as the One-Belt-One-Road or the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor would be over in no time; the myth of ‘Peaceful Rise’ would be busted.
Is it what China wants? True, India dared putting a spanner in China’s wild expansionism, and it is a national feature that the Chinese leadership does not like to lose face, especially at a crucial time when a new leadership is supposed to take office. So what is the solution?
It can perhaps be found in a book written soon after the Gulf War by two senior Colonels (corresponding to brigadiers in India); Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui wrote a modern war treatise entitled, Unrestricted Warfare: China’s Master Plan to Destroy America. Their book was widely read among the strategic community who saw in it the way China would fight tomorrow’s war. One chapter is consecrated to ‘Ten Thousand Methods Combined as One: Combinations That Transcend Boundaries’.
Forget about the new 40 types of war gadgets, while China knows that a conventional war would bring chaos in its economic development, the leadership in Beijing believes that a few ‘cuts’ here and there, could teach India a severe lesson; one of the ‘methods’ could be to influence Tibet’s Southern neighbours.
Beijing is already working on the Dragon Kingdom. Some ‘Bhutanese liberals’ are discretely told to reject India’s help. Just go to Thimphu, you will see a huge statue of Buddha dominating the entire valley. Ask who financed it? People usually remain vague: “Probably money from the North”, some Bhutanese will finally tell you; it gives the direction! And there are other ways to defenders of the ‘freedom of speech’ in Bhutan; Beijing knows this.
When one studies the history of the relations between India and China, one realises that Beijing has often tried to create an edge between India and the Himalayan region. One example, in the Prisoners of War (PoW) camps in Tibet after the 1962 conflict, the Gorkhas got a preferential treatment; they were kept in separate barracks: “you are like us, just look at your features, we belong to the same family,” hammered the Chinese propaganda. Maj Gen KK Tewari, who was one of the Commanding Officers kept as PoW in Tibet, recalled: “(the camp) was organised into four companies. The prisoners were segregated in accordance with ‘Chinese logic’.
No 1 company was all officers, junior commissioned officers (JCOs) and non-commissioned officers. Field officers (Majors and Lieutenant Colonels) were completely segregated from the JCOs and men. No. 2 and 3 companies were jawans of various units. No 4 company consisted only of Gorkhas and was given special privileges, for obvious political reasons. There are indeed many more ‘methods’.


The Three Wafares
In 2003, China’s Central Military Commission approved the concept of ‘Three Warfares’; one is “the coordinated use of strategic psychological operations.” In recent months, Beijing has been intensifying the implementation of this military doctrine. The border populations are particularly susceptible to be targeted by China.
In contradiction with an advisory notice issued by the Chinese embassy in Delhi, an article published in July in the China Travel Guide magazine promotes Ziro as a tourist destination for Chinese travelers. Why ‘promote’ Ziro, headquarters of the lower Subansiri of Arunachal Pradesh?
The answer is simple: For Beijing, Ziro is part of southern Tibet and the local population is hence Chinese. Six pages of the magazine describe in detail the ‘Chinese’ tribe, the Lhoba Apatanis.  Lhoba are usually diverse Tibetan-speaking tribes living around Pemako, a region in south-eastern Tibet, north of the McMahon Line. Wikipedia says: “The term is obscure …largely promulgated by the Chinese Government, which officially recognises Lhoba as one of the 56 ethnic groups in China.”

In its introduction, the article explains that the Apatanis are “the most beautiful ethnic people” …of China of course. It says: “In the Tibetan area of southern Tibet, there is a tribe named Apatani. The women of this tribe are known to be the most beautiful of all Tibetan tribes. But their beautiful appearance can also become a burden. In order to protect themselves from other tribal intruders’ attack, they make themselves less attractive, by plugging a big cork into the nose. …but for the Apatanis in southern Tibet, this is considered as a protection to live a longer life.”

The article describes the most important Apatani settlements “in the valleys of the southern mountainous region of Tibet, where 26,000 Apatanis live.” It means that though a part of Arunachal Pradesh, China considers Ziro as Chinese. This article seems a determined step toward the assimilation of Aruanchal.
That is not all, in recent weeks, China has produced a series of professionally produced films on the ‘tribes of southern Tibet’. It makes many in the border areas of Arunachal Pradesh envious: “Why is China promoting our culture better than our own Government?” This has been passionately debated on the social media.The fact that the Union Government has so far ignored the issue, is dangerous to say the least. While the babus in Delhi have no clue of the existence of the Tanis or other tribes of Arunachal (or elsewhere in India), in the meantime China is slowly scoring crucial points and winning battles in propaganda/information warfare. How long can India complacently ignore the danger?
Why can’t Doordarshan start documenting the rich culture of Arunachal (and the North-East in general) and invite Indian and foreign visitors to come and see for themselves the beauty of the people, their culture, their villages …and their wiser sustainable way of life.
For this, New Delhi would have to liberalise the antiquated Inner Line Permit/Protected Area Permit system.
There is, however, a grave risk that India could lose a crucial battle on its borders …without a shot being fired.

 

Be prepared for China's Electronic Warfare

My article Be prepared for China's Electronic Warfare appeared last month in Rediff.com
However on the occasion of the 90th Anniversary of the People's Liberation Army, I am posting it today.

Here is the link...

'In India, China's capacities to conduct new types of warfare is critically underestimated,' says Claude Arpi.
China's People's Liberation Army is ready with extensive plans for Electronic Warfare

General Bipin Rawat, the chief of the army staff, recently mentioned the future of the defence forces in India; the general spoke of a long-awaited integrated command.
While dismissing apprehensions about shortage of funds, he asserted: 'If we are going to fight a war someday, the war is going to be fought by the three forces together. Integration has to be in a holistic manner. Can we have a joint forces mechanism? Is it better or not? We have to look at the option.'
'You also economise by integration of logistics. The integration has to be in the form of all services utilising their resources in a harmonised manner, the amy chief said.
Though often expounded upon, little has been concretely done to make the integrated command a concrete reality.
At the same time the Chinese People's Liberation Army under President Xi Jinping is taking giant steps towards the future.
Despite (or perhaps thanks to) its rigid system of governance, at the beginning of 2016 China has undertaken in-depth reforms of its defence forces, which aim at a far wider 'integration' than that of the three services mentioned by General Rawat.

The PLA's reforms
Instead of three, China has five 'services'; added to the PLA's army, navy and air force, the PLA has now a Rocket Force (formerly, the second artillery) and a Strategic Support Force. The SSF could be a game changer.
'While the Chinese PLA's new SSF is a critical force for dominance in the space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains,' The Diplomat noted, 'the SSF's function of "strategic support", namely information support, will be equally vital to the PLA's capabilities to fight and win wars.' It is certainly the force to watch.

Towards an e-China?
Clay Chandler in Fortune mentions the experience of Thomas J Friedman, the New York Times columnist, who 'has emerged from a recent foray to China newly astonished by the breakneck pace of innovation here. In his latest column Friedman marvels that the Middle Kingdom has become a cashless society in which "everyone pays for everything with a mobile phone’ and even beggars use QR codes".'
In the Middle Kingdom, the dependence on the cyber world is, of course, not restricted to the defence sector only; the entire Chinese society seems to have entered the cyber area, Friedman commented, 'in an age when raw data from the Internet of people and the Internet of things is the new oil.'
The columnist’s conclusion is that Americans 'underestimate China -- and attribute all of its surge in growth to unfair trade practices -- at our peril.'
This is true for the defence domain too and not only applicable to the US.
In India, China's capacities to conduct new types of warfare is critically underestimated.
In the future, India may have to face not 'one', but several 'asymmetric' attacks.

New types of War?
In 2003, the Chinese Communist party's Central Military Commission approved a 'guiding conceptual umbrella' for information of the PLA's operations -- the 'Three Warfares'.
It was based on three strategies or ‘Warfares’, each mutually reinforcing the others:

• Coordinated use of strategic psychological operations;
• Overt and covert media manipulation;
• Legal warfare designed to manipulate strategies, defence policies, and perceptions of target audiences abroad.

Has India thought of countering China in these fields? Probably not, though the fact that the army chief often speaks to the media tends to show that there is perhaps a change in the right direction.

China is looking into the future
In testimony before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission on 'China's Advanced Weapon', David D Chen, an independent analyst, spoke to a panel about 'Directed Energy and Electromagnetic Weapons Programmes'.
This is cutting-edge research, like quantum communication (which will make communications un-hackable), undertaken by Chinese scientists.
Chen quoted from The Academy of Military Sciences who 'explicitly' asserted: 'Space and cyberspace increasingly constitute important battlefields. A new type of five-dimensional battle-space of land, sea, air, space, and cyber is currently taking shape, which is wide in scope, hyper-dimensional, and combines the tangible and intangible.'
'Battlefield control is moving from control of the land, sea, and air toward control of space and cyber.'
Chen gave an example.
In December 2016, a Chinese publication National Defence Reference remarked China could defeat the US' 'network-centric warfare' with 'energy-centric warfare'.
National Defence Reference explained that 'energy-centric warfare' vouches for increasing the speed of 'attack'.
'The specific way to do so is to develop new concept weapons such as near space hypersonic weapons, electromagnetic rail guns, and directed energy weapons, shortening the time between detection and destruction of a target.'
It moves toward a hyper-dimensional battle-space 'emphasising space and cyber and energy-based weapons faster than an adversary can react,' Chen explained.
Taking the example of a high power output microwave transmitter, Chen oted: 'Its structure is similar to that of a radar transmission system, but its radiated energy is hundreds or even 10,000 times greater than a radar.'
While the Indian media extensively quoted the recently released annual report to the United States Congress, it merely mentioned the fact that China could open military bases in Pakistan and other locations.
But there is more in the report, which affirms: 'China is advancing a comprehensive military modernisation program. It also continues to develop capabilities for what PLA writings call 'non-war' missions, as well as operations in emerging domains such as cyberspace, space, and the electromagnetic spectrum.'

Electronic Warfare will have a special place in a conflict of tomorrow.
China's military modernisation, according to the report, will include 'capabilities to attack, at long ranges, adversary forces that might deploy or operate within the Western Pacific Ocean in the air, maritime, space, electromagnetic, and information domains.'
It cites an array of weapons such as different types of missiles, but also a Ballistic Missile Defence. 'China is taking steps to develop a BMD capability. It is developing a missile defence umbrella consisting of kinetic-energy intercept at exo-atmospheric altitudes (greater than 80 km), as well as intercepts of ballistic missiles and other aerospace vehicles within the upper atmosphere.'
The new HQ-19 missile will be specifically used for intercepting ballistic missiles at mid-course.
'The HQ-19 is still undergoing PLAAF-organized testing; as of May 2016, China was focused mainly on testing the HQ-19's capability to intercept 3,000 km-ranged ballistic missiles.'

The list of new fields of research is long; it is presented in different categories:

•  Surface and Undersea Operations: 'China continues to build a variety of offensive and defensive capabilities that could permit the PLA to achieve sea control within what the PLA Navy calls the 'near seas', as well as to project limited combat power into the 'far seas'.
• Information Operations: 'China's ability to counter third-party intervention is the ability to control the information spectrum in the modern battlespace.'
• PLA authors speak of 'information blockade' or 'information dominance' as necessary to seize the initiative, employing military and non-military instruments of State power across the battlespace.
• Long-range unmanned aerial vehicles: 'In 2015, media reported the development of the Shendiao (Sacred Eagle or Divine Eagle) as the PLA's newest high-altitude, long-endurance UAV for a variety of missions such as early warning, targeting, EW, and satellite communications.'

China is also working on an unmanned combat aerial vehicle named the 'Black Sword', which could compete with the best US drones one day.
Beijing has a medium and long term programme which aims at transforming China into an 'innovation-oriented society' by 2020.

The plan defines China's leading-edge technologies.
'China has identified certain industries and technology groups with the potential to provide technological breakthroughs, to remove technical obstacles across industries, and to improve international competitiveness.'
The US report lists other fields such as 'intelligent perception technologies' or 'virtual reality technologies', but also 'new materials' such as smart materials and structures, high-temperature superconducting technologies, and highly efficient energy materials technologies; and, of course, AI (Artificial Intelligence).

The Role of the Strategic Support Force
Undoubtedly, the SSF will play a primordial role in a future conflict.
The SSF ]appears to link space, cyber and EW missions,' the report points out adding that the SSF 'may represent the PLA's first step in developing a cyber force that combines cyber reconnaissance, attack and defence capabilities under one hat.'
Moreover the report asserts, 'the PLA may seek to use its cyberwarfare capabilities to collect data for intelligence and cyberattack purposes.'
The Australians recently bitterly complained about Chinese cyberespionage; it is probably just a beginning.
The time has come for India to wake up and realise that India's defence needs to look beyond the present three services, even if the latter are soon able to work in a more coordinated manner.

Invest in the aircraft of tomorrow

The Forth Generation Rafale M

My article Invest in the aircraft of tomorrow appeared yesterday in The Asian Age/Deccan Chronicle
Here is the link...

Mr Modi has developed a rapport with Mr Macron and Ms Merkel; it would make economic and strategic sense for India to partner Europe.

On July 13, a day before Bastille Day, during a press conference jointly addressed by French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel in Paris, the two nations announced their intention to cooperate for the development of a future combat aircraft, which could one day replace the Rafale of Dassault Aviations and the Eurofighter/Typhoon.
Mr Macron asserted that “road maps” and joint investment opportunities in 18 areas were discussed with Ms Merkel; it included a fifth-generation fighter plane.
The young French President added that this would help reduce duplication and enable the European nations to more effectively pursue export opportunities.
Apart from the fighter plane, European nations have agreed to further develop the Airbus Helicopters Tiger attack rotorcraft and complete work on a medium-altitude, long-endurance “Eurodrone” unmanned vehicle as well as military satellites.
Mr Macron said: “It is a deep revolution — but we are not scared of revolutions when they are conducted in peaceful manner.”
According to Flight Global, the French President described the venture as part of a broader integration of several European partners for the development, deployment and export of combat equipment.
Airbus Defence and Space, which works on the Eurofighter, welcomed the announcement “to jointly develop a next-generation fighter jet”. A communiqué added: “Strengthening the Franco-German axis will help to safeguard critically needed European defence capabilities in the future.”
On June 9, Fernando Alonso, the head of Airbus Group’s military aircraft division had affirmed: “We have to do this in Europe. There’s no place to do two or three different systems.”
It would not be the first time that Europeans try to collaborate in the field of defence R&D and production, though the outcome has not always been up to the mark.
Soon after the World War II, a man had a revolutionary proposal: to unite the enemies of yesterday, France and Germany, by bringing them to work together. Jean Monnet, the father of Europe wrote: “the course of events must be altered. To do this, men’s attitudes must be changed. Words are not enough.” Monnet thought that since Germany and France had to rebuild their industry, it was bound to revive the old rivalry. Monnet’s idea was to reverse the problem — what had been the seed of war must become the seed of unity — his proposal was therefore to create a high authority which could manage the resources in coal and steel for both nations. This was the birth of the European Coal and Steel Community, the embryo of the European Economic Community (EEC) and later the European Union.
But it is not always easy. Francisco Duarte in The Inquisitr quotes the case of the joint design for the main battle tank for the France and German armies in 1957. He says: “After some years of development and construction of opposing prototypes, one of the German proposals was chosen. Even before the decision was taken, relations started to go sour with other Nato partners, which, among other developments, meant a split in the project for a European tank. The Germans would eventually create the Leopard 1, while the French pursued their own concepts, leading to the unveiling of the AMX-30.”
Hopefully it will be different this time. More recently, we have the example of the UCAV (Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle) developed by Dassault Aviation of France as the prime contractor.
The nEUROn European drone project perfectly reflects the original European “spirit” though ironically, Germany is not directly associated. Six European countries have decided to build an UCAV as a technology demonstrator.
This European programme has been designed to pool the skills and know-how of Alenia Aermacchi (Italy), Saab (Sweden), EADS-CASA (Spain), HAI (Greece), RUAG (Switzerland) and Thales (France) to produce the drone of the future.
With a length of 10 metres, a wingspan of 12.5 metres and an empty weight of five tonnes, the aircraft is powered by a Rolls-Royce Turbomeca Adour engine.
It was French President Jacques Chirac who unveiled the Dassault-led nEUROn project in June 2005; it marked the beginning of the six-nation research programme to build a technical demonstrator.
The project crossed a major milestone on December 2012 when the UCAV had its first successful flight from Istres airbase, near Marseille in South France.
Flight trials in France to evaluate its stealth characteristics were successfully completed in March 2015. It was followed by sensor evaluation trials in Italy, which were completed on August 2015. In July 2016, extensive stealth and detection tests were conducted with the nEUROn and the Charles de Gaulle carrier group.
In November 2014, a two-year feasibility study was started by the French and British governments. It could lead to a programme combining the experience of the BAE Systems Taranis and nEUROn programs into a Future Combat Air System.
One of the most interesting aspects of the project is the close collaboration between different European partners.
Monnet had prophesied: “Europe will be built through concrete realisations, creating at first a de facto solidarity.” For him, it was essential to “develop habits of cooperation among nations which had so far only known relationships based on power”.
Dassault Aviation is the master builder, responsible for the overall architecture and design, flight control system, global testing (static and flight), elements of stealth, final assembly, integration of systems and testing.
NEUROn is undoubtedly an extraordinary technological challenge for the European companies involved.
But let us come back to the development of a fifth-generation combat aircraft. India has tried to work with the Russians. The project is not doing well.
Franz-Stefan Gady wrote in the Diplomat an article entitled: “India, Russia 5th Generation Fighter Jet Deal is Lost”: “The transfer of sensitive defence technology from Russia to India has been one of the most contentious issues between the two sides right from the start.”
Gady commented: “India wants a guarantee that it will be able to upgrade the fighter jet in the future without Russian support, which would require Moscow sharing source codes (sensitive computer code that controls the fighter jet’s various systems — the key to an aircraft’s electronic brains).”
Recently, Sergei Chemezov, the CEO of Rostec, the Russian state corporation which develops and promotes hi-tech defence and civilian products worldwide refused to speak about the future aircraft, which was not mentioned in the Saint Petersburg Declaration (“A vision for the 21st century”), when Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Russia in early June.
Delays are said to have been caused because New Delhi and Moscow disagree on over many fundamental aspects such as work and cost share, aircraft technology or numbers of aircraft to be ordered by India.
A question, though presently theoretical, could be raised, why can’t India join the European project? Europe will require a market for its fifth generation aircraft; in the coming decades, India will need hundreds of planes, having to cope with two fronts.
Mr Modi has developed an excellent rapport with Mr Macron and Ms Merkel; it would make economic and strategic sense for India to partner Europe. It could be good for the European industries as well, as they would get crucial financial support and a market.
It is worth thinking about such far-away possibility; it could be a win-win deal for India too as Delhi would be involved in the project from the conception.

Claude Arpi
The writer is based in South India for the past 40 years. He writes on India, China, Tibet and Indo-French relations.
http://www.asianage.com/opinion/oped/290717/invest-in-the-aircraft-of-tomorrow.html
Mr Modi has developed a rapport with Mr Macron and Ms Merkel; it would make economic and strategic sense for India to partner Europe.
Dassault Rafale fighter aircraft (Photo: Youtube screengrab)
On July 13, a day before Bastille Day, during a press conference jointly addressed by French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel in Paris, the two nations announced their intention to cooperate for the development of a future combat aircraft, which could one day replace the Rafale of Dassault Aviations and the Eurofighter/Typhoon.
Mr Macron asserted that “road maps” and joint investment opportunities in 18 areas were discussed with Ms Merkel; it included a fifth-generation fighter plane.
The young French President added that this would help reduce duplication and enable the European nations to more effectively pursue export opportunities.
Apart from the fighter plane, European nations have agreed to further develop the Airbus Helicopters Tiger attack rotorcraft and complete work on a medium-altitude, long-endurance “Eurodrone” unmanned vehicle as well as military satellites.
Mr Macron said: “It is a deep revolution — but we are not scared of revolutions when they are conducted in peaceful manner.”
According to Flight Global, the French President described the venture as part of a broader integration of several European partners for the development, deployment and export of combat equipment.
Airbus Defence and Space, which works on the Eurofighter, welcomed the announcement “to jointly develop a next-generation fighter jet”. A communiqué added: “Strengthening the Franco-German axis will help to safeguard critically needed European defence capabilities in the future.”
On June 9, Fernando Alonso, the head of Airbus Group’s military aircraft division had affirmed: “We have to do this in Europe. There’s no place to do two or three different systems.”
It would not be the first time that Europeans try to collaborate in the field of defence R&D and production, though the outcome has not always been up to the mark.
Soon after the World War II, a man had a revolutionary proposal: to unite the enemies of yesterday, France and Germany, by bringing them to work together. Jean Monnet, the father of Europe wrote: “the course of events must be altered. To do this, men’s attitudes must be changed. Words are not enough.” Monnet thought that since Germany and France had to rebuild their industry, it was bound to revive the old rivalry. Monnet’s idea was to reverse the problem — what had been the seed of war must become the seed of unity — his proposal was therefore to create a high authority which could manage the resources in coal and steel for both nations. This was the birth of the European Coal and Steel Community, the embryo of the European Economic Community (EEC) and later the European Union.
But it is not always easy. Francisco Duarte in The Inquisitr quotes the case of the joint design for the main battle tank for the France and German armies in 1957. He says: “After some years of development and construction of opposing prototypes, one of the German proposals was chosen. Even before the decision was taken, relations started to go sour with other Nato partners, which, among other developments, meant a split in the project for a European tank. The Germans would eventually create the Leopard 1, while the French pursued their own concepts, leading to the unveiling of the AMX-30.”
Hopefully it will be different this time. More recently, we have the example of the UCAV (Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle) developed by Dassault Aviation of France as the prime contractor.
The nEUROn European drone project perfectly reflects the original European “spirit” though ironically, Germany is not directly associated. Six European countries have decided to build an UCAV as a technology demonstrator.
This European programme has been designed to pool the skills and know-how of Alenia Aermacchi (Italy), Saab (Sweden), EADS-CASA (Spain), HAI (Greece), RUAG (Switzerland) and Thales (France) to produce the drone of the future.
With a length of 10 metres, a wingspan of 12.5 metres and an empty weight of five tonnes, the aircraft is powered by a Rolls-Royce Turbomeca Adour engine.
It was French President Jacques Chirac who unveiled the Dassault-led nEUROn project in June 2005; it marked the beginning of the six-nation research programme to build a technical demonstrator.
The project crossed a major milestone on December 2012 when the UCAV had its first successful flight from Istres airbase, near Marseille in South France.
Flight trials in France to evaluate its stealth characteristics were successfully completed in March 2015. It was followed by sensor evaluation trials in Italy, which were completed on August 2015. In July 2016, extensive stealth and detection tests were conducted with the nEUROn and the Charles de Gaulle carrier group.
In November 2014, a two-year feasibility study was started by the French and British governments. It could lead to a programme combining the experience of the BAE Systems Taranis and nEUROn programs into a Future Combat Air System.
One of the most interesting aspects of the project is the close collaboration between different European partners.
Monnet had prophesied: “Europe will be built through concrete realisations, creating at first a de facto solidarity.” For him, it was essential to “develop habits of cooperation among nations which had so far only known relationships based on power”.
Dassault Aviation is the master builder, responsible for the overall architecture and design, flight control system, global testing (static and flight), elements of stealth, final assembly, integration of systems and testing.
NEUROn is undoubtedly an extraordinary technological challenge for the European companies involved.
But let us come back to the development of a fifth-generation combat aircraft. India has tried to work with the Russians. The project is not doing well.
Franz-Stefan Gady wrote in the Diplomat an article entitled: “India, Russia 5th Generation Fighter Jet Deal is Lost”: “The transfer of sensitive defence technology from Russia to India has been one of the most contentious issues between the two sides right from the start.”
Gady commented: “India wants a guarantee that it will be able to upgrade the fighter jet in the future without Russian support, which would require Moscow sharing source codes (sensitive computer code that controls the fighter jet’s various systems — the key to an aircraft’s electronic brains).”
Recently, Sergei Chemezov, the CEO of Rostec, the Russian state corporation which develops and promotes hi-tech defence and civilian products worldwide refused to speak about the future aircraft, which was not mentioned in the Saint Petersburg Declaration (“A vision for the 21st century”), when Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Russia in early June.
Delays are said to have been caused because New Delhi and Moscow disagree on over many fundamental aspects such as work and cost share, aircraft technology or numbers of aircraft to be ordered by India.
A question, though presently theoretical, could be raised, why can’t India join the European project? Europe will require a market for its fifth generation aircraft; in the coming decades, India will need hundreds of planes, having to cope with two fronts.
Mr Modi has developed an excellent rapport with Mr Macron and Ms Merkel; it would make economic and strategic sense for India to partner Europe. It could be good for the European industries as well, as they would get crucial financial support and a market.
It is worth thinking about such far-away possibility; it could be a win-win deal for India too as Delhi would be involved in the project from the conception.

The Doka La Confrontation

My article on the Doka La Confrontation appeared in Hindi on the BBC website

Here is the link...

After independence, India chose to be represented in Lhasa by a British ICS officer, Hugh Richardson; the Scot was Indian Mission-in-Charge from 1947 to 1950. On June 15, 1949, in a communication addressed to the Ministry of External Affairs in Delhi, he suggested that India might consider occupying Chumbi Valley up to Phari ‘in an extreme emergency.’ The Chumbi Valley is the highly strategic ‘finger’ sandwiched between Bhutan and Sikkim.
Sixteen months later, Chinese troops invaded Eastern Tibet and Harishwar Dayal, who had replaced another Britisher as the Political Officer in Sikkim, made again the same suggestion: “[Richardon’s] suggestion was NOT favoured by Government of India at the time. It was however proposed as a purely defensive measure and with NO aggressive intention. An attack on Sikkim or Bhutan would call for defensive military operations by the Government of India,” he wrote to Nehru.
The proposal was again rejected by the Indian Government, though many in India thought that Delhi should be more proactive to support the Dalai Lama.
On June 16, 2017, when the Chinese troops entered a disputed stretch at the southern tip of the same Chumbi Valley, India did what it had not done in 1950, it came to the rescue of a friendly neighbor; this time it was Bhutan.
Beijing’s sharp response, via its spokesperson and State media, is probably due to the surprise; China did not expect Delhi to militarily defend Thimphu. It is also true that the trijunction is a strategic hotspot for Delhi, and by occupying it, the Chinese would have a ‘view’ not only on the Chumbi Valley but also on the Siliguri corridor, which is India’s main strategic weakness in case of a military conflict.
Beijing bases its action on the 1890 Convention between the British and the Manchus, which was never recognized by the Tibetans, as they (and the Bhutanese) had not been consulted by the 'Great Imperial Powers'. Tsepon WD Shakabpa, the Tibetan historian explained: “The British were aware that China exercised no real power in Tibet at that time.”
The need to bring the Tibetans onboard eventually resulted in the Younghusband’s military expedition in 1904 and ten years later, the Tripartite Simla Conference.
Further, the 1890 Convention mainly dealt with Northern Sikkim, where two years earlier, an armed conflict had taken between the British and the Tibetans. Though Article 1 mentions “The line commences at Mount Gipmochi on the Bhutan frontier,” the area had never been surveyed. The first survey of northern Sikkim dates 1895; some maps published more than a decade later did not show a defined border.
On June 30, 2017, the Ministry of External Affairs in Delhi clarified that, in 2012, it had been decided with China that the status quo would be maintained: “The two Governments had in 2012 reached an agreement that the tri-junction boundary points between India, China and third countries will be finalised in consultation with the concerned countries.”
Probably getting upset with the delay in finding a solution, Beijing decided to take the matter in its own hand, as it had done earlier in the South China Sea. Beijing has a tendency to believe in the principle that it is better to first be ‘in possession’ and then start talking.
While recently addressing the foreign diplomats in Delhi, Foreign Secretary S Jaishankar stated that China has been ‘unusually aggressive and articulate’.
He told Indian MPs that India’s position has been clearly outlined on the border, though the Chinese have a differing position.
An interesting (and reassuring) feature of the present standoff is that both the Indian and Chinese troops, facing each other in the 7 km gap between the different ‘perceptions’ of the trijunction, are unarmed. Braving the high altitude, two chains of soldiers stand opposite each other preventing a move of the opponent.
As long as no weapon is used, there is still hope to find a diplomatic solution, though the Chinese have gone rather far in their propaganda campaign; this has made a win-win solution, without ‘loss of face’, more difficult to find.
In a recent interview, Former National Security Advisor Shyam Saran said there was no need of acrimonious exchanges: “I don’t think we should look for tit-for-tat kind of exchanges. This is serious business. Would welcome the fact that the Indian side has rather been restrained and mature in its reaction.” It should remain so.
One can only hope that reason will prevail, but a solution is bound to take time, certainly not before the Chinese leadership change during the Communist Party’s 19th Congress at the end of the year.
Before this, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will celebrate its 90th Anniversary on August 1. In April, President Xi Jinping, who has introduced in-depth reforms of the PLA, asked all military units to prepare themselves for combat and give priority to building ‘new-type’ fighting capabilities in electronic, information and space warfare. He was probably not expecting that India would jump so quickly to Bhutan’s defence.
All these factors make it more difficult to find a quick solution, which lies in the return of the status quo and eventually the creation of a demilitarized zone.

Does India need to be invaded by China to wake up?

My article Does India need to be invaded by China to wake up? appeared today in Rediff.com.

Here is the link...

Very few in India have heard of Taksing.
It is the last village on the Tibet (China)-Arunachal Pradesh border, and the first village likely to be invaded if Beijing retaliates.
Scarily, it takes jawans THREE days of walking to reach Taksing.
In all the noise surrounding the Doklam confrontation, Claude Arpi focuses on a crucial issue that has hardly been covered -- the construction of roads for the armed forces and the local population to reach the most remote border posts.

Very few incidents have triggered so many comments as the confrontation at the trijunction between Tibet, Bhutan and Sikkim.
On June 16, 2017, Chinese troops entered a stretch of land at the southern tip of the Chumbi Valley to build a road …on Bhutanese territory.
They were stopped by the Indian Army.
Beijing’s response was sharp, probably due to the surprise; China did not expect Delhi to militarily defend Thimphu. It is also true that the trijunction is a strategic hotspot for Delhi, and by occupying it, the Chinese would have a ‘view’ not only on the Chumbi Valley but also on the Siliguri corridor, which is India’s main strategic weakness in case of a military conflict.

Trying to change the historical posts
On June 30, 2017, the Ministry of External Affairs in Delhi affirmed that in 2012, it had been agreed with China that the status quo would be maintained in this area: “The two Governments had in 2012 reached an agreement that the tri-junction boundary points between India, China and third countries will be finalised in consultation with the concerned countries.”
Probably getting upset with the delay in finding a solution, Beijing decided to take the matter in its own hand, as it had done earlier in the South China Sea. Beijing has a tendency to believe in the principle that it is better to first take ‘possession’ and then start talking.

The Infrastructure to the Frontiers
One issue has hardly been covered by the Indian media, though crucial for the defence of the borders: it is the construction of a decent infrastructure for the Indo-Tibet Border Police Force (ITBP), Army and the local population to reach the most remote border posts.
On July 18, it was announced in Parliament that some 73 roads were being built along the Sino-India border. According to PTI, Minister of State for Home, Kiren Rijiju told the Lok Sabha: “The government has decided to undertake construction of 73 roads of operational significance along Indo-China border. Out of these, 73 roads, 46 are being constructed by the Ministry of Defence and 27 by the Ministry of Home Affairs.”
The minister said 30 roads had been completed so far though all the roads had been scheduled to be completed by 2012-13. According to the government, the main reasons for the delay are: limited working season, logistical issues due to high altitude, rugged and difficult terrain, natural calamities, delay in land acquisition and forest/wildlife clearances.
The last justification is surprising as the Modi government had decided in 2014 to do away with the environmental clearance for road projects located within 100 km of the Line of Actual Control (LAC).
This raises another issue: why cannot the private sector be involved, especially at a time when the Modi Sarkar tries its best to invite private players into the defense sector?

The Most Difficult Road of all
Very few in India have heard of Taksing.
It is the last village on the border with Tibet (China) in Upper Subansiri of Arunachal Pradesh. It is certainly the first village susceptible to be invaded in case the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) decides to retaliate after the confrontation in Sikkim. Here the villagers believe that it will take at least five to ten years to see a road.
It is not that nothing is happening.
On April 6, 2017, the Border Roads Organisation (BRO) managed to open a new section connecting Tame Chung Chung (TCC) and Nacho. The inhabitants living in the vicinity of Tame Chung Chung (locally known as ‘The Land of Snakes’) had dreamed of seeing this road for decades, but like many other things for the border population, it had remained a dream.
A BRO’s communiqué explained: “The area is located in an extremely remote area with rugged terrains, thick vegetation and inhospitable weather. The place has remained inaccessible since 2009.”
In fact, the road was to be opened in 2009.
The same report noted: “The persistent efforts of BRO engineers have finally changed the scenario. The road comes under Project Arunank, run by the Indian Army in five districts of Arunachal Pradesh. The Nacho-TCC section of the road is strategically vital due to the Chinese presence nearby. The road does not reach the LAC as yet, but the completion of this portion marks a major step towards Taksing, the last border village in Arunachal.”
In October 2014, The Deccan Chronicle reported that the Chinese PLA had been focusing on the Taksing area: “After the recent Ladakh incursions, frequent intrusions by China’s PLA in Arunachal Pradesh’s Taksing region have come to the notice of the security agencies… Security sources also confirmed this incursion had come to their notice about a month back, but the PLA had gone back after a brief stay.”
Around the same time, the Times of India noted: “Both armies undertake regular patrols to lay claim to 8-10 disputed areas like Asaphila, a remote 100 sq km.” PLA’s “heightened activity” had been witnessed in Asaphila area for months. “The PLA troops, with vehicles and other equipment, then tried to build a road till Point 2445. They were then stopped from doing so by our soldiers,” a source told the newspaper.
At that time, some local villagers had managed to shoot a short video on their phones of the PLA ‘visiting’ their village. The last Indian military outpost before the border is still some 35 km away from the newly-opened section, but the construction will hopefully be easier: “Due to the exceptionally hard rock and treacherous terrain, this portion of the road took many more years than expected,” said the BRO statement, adding that TCC is situated near the confluence of Subansiri and Tsari Chu river valleys: “(it) acts as a gateway to both the valleys and its connectivity was essential for further development of the area.” The Army organization admitted that a large number of personnel suffered severe injuries during the construction work and equipment worth crores of rupees was lost in landslides.
The question remains: have the Central and Arunachal authorities finally decided to undertake the construction of roads in border areas on a ‘war-footing’?
It is not sure. The work is frightening slow.

Already in the fifties
Already in the 1950s, there was a crying need for a road.
In 1957, Capt. LR Sailo, then assistant political officer in Taliha of Subansiri Frontier Division (NEFA), reached the administrative camp in Limeking and wrote in a superb account titled, “Report on an Exploratory Tour Undertaken in the Upper Subansiri Area and the Tsari Chu Valley”, “The location of Limeking vis-a-vis the international border has been determined; the exploration of the Subansiri westwards of Limeking upto the international border has been completed and the confluence of the Subansiri and the Yume Chu has also been ascertained (Taksing); the determination of the precise location of the confluence of the Subansiri and the Tsari Chu; the Tsari Chu valley has been explored upto the international border with Migyitun settlements (in Tibet); a sketch map of the area has been prepared with estimate of the locations of villages or settlements, the courses of rivers, mountains, and important routes.”
Capt. Sailo’s conclusions were clear: “The urgency and importance of constructing roads from Daporijo to the border settlements of Lower Na (Taksing) and Migytun (Maja) cannot be over-emphasised.”
Of course, since 60 years, babus from the MHA or the State Government have never set a foot in these areas.

The Present Situation
Unfortunately not much has been done during the following 50 years — a real tragedy for the defence of India and the border populations.
A few months ago, I received a message from Hiwak Chader, who lives in Taksing; he explained the difficult situation for the local population. After saying that he felt extremely proud to be an Indian, he noted: “During these 69 years our country has made tremendous progress in the field of science and technologies; we also joined the elite club of few selected country to have achieved a fate of sending the mission to Mars which raise our stature in international level. On the other hand, people of Taksing Village are deprived of all those developmental activities; still local peoples have to resort tiresome and risky three-day trek to reach nearest motorable road.”
He continued: “We have been sentinel of the country since time immortal but in return what we are get, underdevelopment and apathy attitude of the government.”
He blamed both the Central and State governments: “Taksing is a frontier village located at an advance position for the defence agencies near Indo-China border. When there is disruption in transportation, electricity and communication in capital complex for a single day, the people get irritate like anything, just think about the magnitude of hardship which dwellers of Taksing renders in a so called 21st century.”
Chader concluded that Taksing, which is naturally richly endowed in varieties of vegetable and fruits: “can easily feed entire population of Upper Subansiri district at least for one session. However in absence of road product perishes.”
He does not mention the hardship of the CRPF jawans and the Army who have to man the frontier. Though there is a helipad for emergency, it takes some three days for a jawan to walk from TTC to Taksing (while a local porter can make it in two days).
It is extremely doubtful that Takshing will see a road in the next 5 years; let us hope that it won’t be too late.
It is not that there is no solution: one would be to involve the private sector, or even ‘friendly’ foreign countries such as Japan in the road construction; also the BRO or any other contractor should give better salaries to the local workers to insure continuity in the laying of the road; more camps for road workers could be created en route between TCC and Taksing, etc.
But the main issue remains: is there the will to reach the frontier at any cost? Does India need to be invaded to wake up?
Let us pray not.

 

 

  

India, China, Tibet and the curious case of the missing Sikkim Papers

Harishwar Dayal in front of The Residency in Gangtok

My article India, China, Tibet and the curious case of the missing Sikkim Papers appeared in The Mail Today, DailyO and Daily Mail (UK)

Here is the link...

The present standoff at the trijunction between Sikkim, Tibet and Bhutan, on the southern tip of the Chumbi, is a worrying development. While recently addressing the foreign diplomats in Delhi, Foreign Secretary S Jaishankar rightly stated that China has been ‘unusually aggressive and articulate’.
Beijing seems to have only one argument, i.e. the 1890 Convention between the British and the Manchus, conveniently forgetting several other agreements, particularly the 1893 Trade Regulations (1890 twin accord) which allowed India to open a trade mart in Yatung in the Chumbi Valley.

Treasure
There is also general amnesia on the fact that the Tibetans never recognized the 1890 Convention as Lhasa and Paro were not consulted by the 'Great Imperial Powers'. Tsepon WD Shakabpa, the Tibetan historian explained: “In 1890 a convention was drawn up …without consulting the government of Tibet …and since [Tibet] was not represented at the Convention, those articles were not allowed to be put into practice by the Tibetans. The British were aware that China exercised no real power in Tibet at that time.”
To come back to the present day, Jaishankar told a panel of MPs that India has clearly outlined its position on the border though the Chinese have a differing position, “but they are misinterpreting it and so India was trying to clarify it. He said that India has been maintaining the same position since 1895 as per an Anglo-Chinese agreement.”
One can only hope that reason will prevail in Beijing, but a solution is bound to take time, certainly not before the leadership change in November during the Communist Party’s 19th Congress.
In this context, an anecdote came back to mind. A few years ago, an acquaintance who, as a young diplomat, was posted in Gangtok in the Political Officer’s office told me that in 1975-76, soon after the merger of the Himalayan State with India, he spent months going through all the historical records kept in Gangtok between 1889 to 1975; Delhi’s orders were to dispatch them to Delhi for safe custody. Once his work was over; the diplomat sent six truck-loads of old files to Delhi under CRPF escort. Since then, nobody seems to know where these Sikkim Papers are and if this archival treasure still exists.
It would have an immense historical value today to show that India and Tibet had a different relation than the one portrayed by China; further Beijing would be unable to bluff its way through with incorrect historical information.
The Political Officer (PO) was the Government of India’s eye over the entire Himalayan region. From the seasonal Indian Trade Agency (ITA) in Gartok in Western Tibet, to the ITA in Gyantse and Yatung, the Indian Mission (and later Consulate General) in Lhasa, all correspondence passed through Gangtok. It included the relations with Sikkim and Bhutan; the PO even overlooked the NEFA area in coordination with the Governor of Assam.
Gangtok has seen many remarkable personages serving as POs.
The first was Claude White, a British engineer who was send to Sikkim in 1887 to tackle the tense situation on the Sikkim–Tibet border in the north. A year later, White came back to Sikkim as an Assistant Political Officer of a British Expeditionary Force which defeated the Tibetans a year later; this resulted in the 1890 Convention. In the meantime, a post of Political Officer in Sikkim had been created, making Claude White, the Administrative head of the entire Himalayan region.

Tragedy
In his book Sikkim and Bhutan: 21 Years on the North East Frontier 1887-1908, the first PO wrote, “one of the first things to be done after his arrival in Sikkim was to build a house, the site for which was found in the midst of the jungles around Gangtok”; then called the Residency, it is today’s the Raj Bhavan. White also ordered a survey of the borders with Tibet, including the 1895 one.
Though South Block probably has copies of some of the Sikkim Papers, the entire set is not traceable (it is at least what I was told). It is a tragedy for researchers and it would undoubtedly help strengthen India’s case in the present circumstances.

History
Interesting officers occupied the Residency in Gangtok.
Amongst them, Sir Charles Bell who had developed a deep friendship with the Thirteenth Dalai Lama, when the latter was living in exile in Kalimpong, but also Frederick Bailey who was instrumental in mapping the North-East, what became the McMahon Line in 1914; and Sir Basil Gould, who in the 1930s, travelled to Tibet to establish diplomatic relations with a then Independent Tibet or Arthur Hopkinson, the religious-minded ICS officer, who was asked by the Government of India to continue for a year after Independence as the First ‘Indian’ PO.
Harishwar Dayal took over from Hopkinson and was officiating when Tibet was invaded by the Chinese troops in October 1950.
Once in a cable to the Prime Minister, Dayal dared quoting a dispatch sent from Hugh Richardson, the Scottish-born ‘Indian’ representative in Lhasa; on June 15, 1949, he suggested that India might consider occupying Chumbi Valley up to Phari ‘in an extreme emergency’.
This did not go well with Nehru, but in November 1950, Dayal wrote: “This suggestion was NOT favoured by Government of India at the time. It was however proposed as a purely defensive measure and with NO aggressive intention. An attack on Sikkim or Bhutan would call for defensive military operations by the Government of India.”
Though it is history now, it is what China’s PLA strategists would today call ‘active defence’. Let us hope that the Sikkim Papers could soon be traced, they contain the history of Modern Himalaya.

Beijing banks on history, India on new confidence

In one voice?

My article Beijing banks on history, India on new confidence appeared in the Edit Page of The Pioneer.

Here is the link...

China appears to have miscalculated New Delhi’s response to its attempt to change the status quo at the tri-junction. It believed that a ‘weak’ New Delhi would back out of a confrontation
The best form of defence is attack, believed Sun Tzu, the ancient Chinese military strategist. This probably explains the new diplomatic offensive undertaken by China which would like to convince the foreign diplomatic community in Beijing that India was in the wrong to ‘occupy Chinese territory’ in the southern tip of the Chumbi Valley.
According to a national English daily, officials of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs had closed-door briefings, giving their version of the events to several foreign diplomats posted in Beijing. A diplomat from one of the P-5 (permanent members of the UN Security Council) told the daily, “They have told our colleagues in Beijing that the Indian side has trespassed into Chinese territory and changed the status quo.”
In actual fact, the opposite happened.  On June 30, the Ministry of External Affairs in Delhi clarified that, in 2012, it had mutually been decided that status quo would be maintained in the disputed area: “The two Governments had in 2012 reached an agreement that the tri-junction boundary points between India, China and third countries will be finalised in consultation with the concerned countries. Any attempt, therefore, to unilaterally determine tri-junction points, is in violation of this understanding”, explained South Block’s statement, which asserted that it was essential that “all parties concerned display utmost restraint and abide by their respective bilateral understandings not to change the status quo unilaterally”.

A blunder
This raises a serious question. Despite the noise emanating from Beijing, it does appear that, by starting a conflict which will take months or years to cool down, someone, somewhere, in China has serious blundered. Whether it is the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) or the civilian leadership which miscalculated India’s resolve to militarily defend Bhutan, is irrelevant; but it has triggered a vicious circle (though India had a measured and mature response).
Nevertheless, it is a huge intelligence blunder on the part of Beijing which took India for granted. Of course, the deciders in Beijing had previous historical cases, particularly that of Tibet in the early 1950s, when India refused to defend ‘small insects being eaten by big insects’, as the 13th Dalai Lama termed an earlier Chinese invasion in 1910. This time, India did not hesitate to defend Bhutanese interests, especially in an area which is so strategic for New Delhi.
Could have the central Chinese leadership have taken such a risky gamble without a green signal from the ground — their representation in India? Though nothing will immediately change, in the months to come, we may see some heads rolling. Did the Chinese Ambassador in Delhi report that the ‘weak’ Indians would not react to the construction of a road? We may never know. But there is no doubt that the preparations for building a road in the disputed area started several months ago, if not earlier.
One issue which is usually not mentioned by commentators on the current stand-off is the tense situation in China, before the Communist Party’s 19th Congress, which will witness a significant change of guard. Could serious differences within the party have influenced the situation at the tri-junction Sikkim-Tibet-Bhutan?
It is possible.

The case of Sun Zhengcai
Last Saturday, Sun Zhengcai, a member of the Communist Party’s Politburo, and a Xi Jinping heir-apparent, was removed from the scene. Sun was one of the top contenders for a seat in the Central Committee’s Standing Committee of the Politburo; serving as party boss of Chongqing megacity, Sun is apparently investigated by the anti-graft agency.
Quoting a source in Chongqing, The South China Morning Post wrote: “Sun Zhengcai, at 53, the youngest member of the party’s 25-strong Politburo, is suspected of serious violation of party discipline.”
After Sun lost his job, the Hong Kong newspaper commented: “The development could have a significant impact on the upcoming leadership reshuffle in the autumn... The internal briefing did not state whether he had been placed under official investigation.”
Sun was immediately replaced by Guizhou’s party chief, Chen Miner, a Xi Jinping protégé. Earlier in the day, on Saturday, a video footage on state-run CCTV showed Sun attending a high-level finance meeting in Beijing: Impermanence is the way of life in communist China.

The case of 1962
One can recall the deadly infighting during the first months of 1962. At a meeting known as the 7,000 Cadres’ Conference, in January 1962, President Lui Shaoqi stated: “…man-made disasters strike the whole country”. He was targeting Mao, who was sidelined for a few months. In the summer of 1962, Mao decided to stage a comeback against ‘Left adventurism’ and ‘capitalist roaders’.
One person stood up and supported Mao: This was Lin Biao, who had replaced Marshall Peng as Defence Minister. Lin, who would lead the attack on India a few months later, asserted: “The thoughts of Chairman Mao are always correct.” This new-found alliance between Mao and the PLA Chief was, no doubt, one of the most important factors in the 1962 conflict.
In September 1962, at the 10th Plenum of the party’s 8th Congress, Mao took back the fate of China into his hands, denouncing “the members of the bourgeoisie in the party ranks”. He even attacked his mild Premier Zhou Enlai and Foreign Minister Chen Yi, who were accused of trying to rehabilitate intellectuals and scientists: "The bourgeois spirit hangs over like a ghost over their heads.”
Nine years later, the heir-apparent, Lin Biao was ‘eliminated’ in mysterious circumstances in an air crash.

The present power struggle
There is no doubt that times have changed, and it is difficult to conceive today a full-fledged conflict between India and China, but the fact remains that the Chinese leadership tends to become irrational when there is an intense power struggle within the party.
Recently, when Xi Jinping visited Hong Kong, unprecedented security measures, including a last-minute decision of shifting hotels, was due to fierce in-fighting in the party, according to Apple Daily, Hong Kong’s second best selling newspaper: “The threat to Xi’s safety is, for sure, not from Hong Kong demonstrators, the non-existent Hong Kong separatists, or the overseas extreme religious or separatist forces. Rather, it is from the communist party’s power struggle.” It was at the last minute that Beijing decided to change hotels, creating utter chaos for the media and the Hong Kong police. “This arrangement let the outside world realise that the communist party’s power struggle has come to the point of life or death for its leaders” commented Apple Daily.
Presuming that the tension on the border will continue till after the 19th Congress (when the winter will set over Dokala), it may become more and more difficult for China to extricate itself from its own rhetoric, which is not based on facts. In any case, this makes the situation dangerous. Incidentally, China will celebrate the 90th anniversary of the PLA on August 1; other crucial date.

Little Bhutan in Tibet

Darchen, one of the Bhutanese enclaves in Tibet

My article Little Bhutan in Tibet appeared today in The Statesman.

Here is the link...

China quite amazingly is able to deny even the most undeniable facts.
Geng Shuang , spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was recently asked by an Indian correspondent, about the details of the meeting between President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Modi on the side of the G 20 Summit in Hamburg. Geng replied: “According to my information, the two said leaders did not hold any bilateral meetings.”
When asked by another correspondent “Are you saying this did not happen?” He answered: “The two leaders of China and India did not hold any meetings on the sidelines of any meeting in Hamburg.”
He thrice repeated his contention.
This was an event which took place only a few days earlier, with a photo tweeted all over the world; one can imagine the scenario when something occurred several decades or centuries earlier; historical events can never be in China’s disfavour.

The Doklam plateau
Moving to the Doklam plateau, the same spokesman quoted a letter written by Nehru on September 26, 1959 in which he would have acknowledges the 1890 Convention between Great Britain and China; the fact that this agreement was never implemented simply because the main stakeholders Tibet, Bhutan and Sikkim were not signatories or even represented, has been forgotten. Here too Geng has selective memory.
The same para (no 17) of Nehru’s quoted letter speaks about the Tibet-Bhutan border, the object of the present stand-off.
The Indian Prime Minister tells the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai: “It is not clear to us what exactly is the implication of your statement that the boundaries of Sikkim and Bhutan do not fall within the scope of the present discussion. In fact, Chinese maps show sizeable areas of Bhutan as part of Tibet.”
This relates in particular to Doklam plateau.
Nehru continues: “Under treaty relationships with Bhutan, the Government of India are the only competent authority to take up with other Governments matters concerning Bhutan's external relations …The rectification of errors in Chinese maps regarding the boundary of Bhutan with Tibet is therefore a matter which has to be discussed along with the boundary of India.”
Not only was the boundary line never rectified, but China has recently tried to change the status quo.
A year later (1960), the prime ministers of India and China agreed to participate in a Conference with ‘Officials’ of the two sides to sort out the boundary issue. China conveniently refused to discuss the Tibet-Sikkim and the Tibet-Bhutan borders.
The Indian Officials nevertheless filed a separate statement about Bhutan; at that time, the main issue was the eastern part of Bhutan, adjacent to Kameng Frontier Division (today’s Tawang district). The Report of the Officials stated: “As far as India and Bhutan are concerned the valid boundary in this sector is known and recognised.”

Darchen and Mt Kailash

The Bhutanese enclaves
But more interestingly, the Report mentions several Bhutanese enclaves in Tibet, it notes: “Chinese officials have illegally dispossessed the designated authorities of the Government of Bhutan in the following eight villages situated in western Tibet over which Bhutan has been exercising administrative jurisdiction for more than 300 years: Khangri, Tarchen, Tsekhor, Diraphu, Dzung Tuphu, Jangehe, Chakip and Kocha.”
Minsar, the Indian enclave in Tibet is better known, but these villages too did not belong to Tibet, they were part of Bhutan’s territory.
The Report continues: “Bhutan has for centuries appointed the officers who governed these villages, collected taxes from them and administered justice. Tibetan authorities consistently recognised that these villages belonged to the Bhutan Government. The villages were not subject to Tibetan officers and laws; nor did they pay any Tibetan taxes. There has thus been a violation of Bhutan's legitimate authority over these villages.”
On August 19 and 20, 1959, at the request of Bhutan, official Notes were sent by Delhi to Beijing, in which the Chinese Government was requested “to restore the rightful authority of the Bhutan Government over their enclaves.”
A scholar, John Bray, who is President of the International Association of Ladakh Studies, wrote a fascinating research paper on the ‘Bhutanese enclaves’ in Tibet. He explained that until the 1950s “both Ladakh and Bhutan governed small enclaves of territory in Western Tibet. Ladakh’s enclave consisted of the village of Minsar, near lake Manasarovar, and its surrounding land, while Bhutan governed the Darchen Labrang and several smaller monasteries and villages near Mount Kailash …and Bhutan continued to raise revenue there for some 300 years.”.”
For centuries, the inhabitants of Minsar, although surrounded by Tibetan territories, paid their taxes to the kingdom of Ladakh. During in the 19th century, when Ladakh was incorporated into Maharaja Gulab Singh’s State, Minsar de facto became a part of the Jammu & Kashmir State.
In October 1947, after Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession, Minsar became Indian territory. This lasted till the mid 1950s.
Bray remarked: “Both sets of enclaves share a common origin in that they date back to the period when the Kings of Ladakh controlled the whole of Western Tibet. The link with Bhutan arises because of the Ladakhi royal family’s association with the Drukpa Kagyupa sect.”
This school of Buddhism, different of the Dalai Lama’s Gelukpa has been influential in Ladakh and Bhutan for centuries.

Minsar, the Indian enclave
Regarding Minsar, the Indian principality in Tibet, the rights to this small town were inherited from the Peace Treaty between Ladakh and Tibet signed in Tingmosgang in 1684. Besides the confirmation of the delimitation of the border between Western Tibet and Ladakh, the Treaty affirmed: “The king of Ladakh reserves to himself the village of Minsar in Ngari-khor-sum [Western Tibet]”. For centuries, Minsar has been a home for Ladakhi and Kashmiri traders and pilgrims visiting the holy mountain.
In 1953, wanting to sign his Panchsheel Agreement with China, Jawaharlal Nehru decided to abandon all Indian ‘colonial’ rights inherited from the British. Though he knew that the small principality was part of the Indian territory, he felt uneasy about this Indian ‘possession’ near Mt. Kailash in Tibet. Nehru was aware that Minsar had been providing revenue to maintain the temples around the sacred mountain and the holy Manasarovar lake, but believed that India should unilaterally renounce her rights as a gesture of goodwill towards Communist China.
He instructed the diplomats negotiating the Panchsheel accord in Beijing: “Regarding the village of Minsar in Western Tibet, which has belonged to the Kashmir State, it is clear that we shall have to give it up, if this question is raised. We need not raise it. If it is raised, we should say that we recognize the strength of the Chinese contention and we are prepared to consider it and recommend it.”
Eventually Minsar was not discussed in 1954 during the talks for the Tibet (also known as Panchsheel) Agreement and, the Bhutanese enclaves could not be brought up during the India-China talks in 1960, as China refused to deal with Sikkim and Bhutan.
It means that the fate of these enclaves has never been negotiated or settled. It remains so today.
On December 31, 1953, while opening the ‘Tibet talks’ (without the participation of the Dalai Lama’s government), Premier Zhou Enlai affirmed: “all outstanding problems between China and other countries could be solved on basis of mutual respect for territorial integrity, non aggression and non-interference in internal affairs so as to enable peaceful co-existence. I know Prime Minister Nehru Government and people of India also feel the same way. On basis of this principle all outstanding questions between us which are ripe for settlement can be resolved smoothly.”
Are the forgotten Bhutanese enclaves ‘ripe for settlement’ now?
Mr Geng has probably forgotten about their existence.

When the Chinese confuse the issues

1910 Map showing an demarcated trijunction

The spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China has purposefully created a lot of confusion about the trijunction between India, Tibet and Bhutan.

He quoted time and again the 1890 which was not a valid agreement as the main stakeholders (Tibet, Bhutan and Sikkim) had not been consulted.
I explained why on this blog and mentioned the Tibetan reactions and the non-acceptance of the 1890 Convention by Lhasa.
During the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War, China threatened to intervene and cross the border. It is probably at that time when the first incursions near the trijunction took place.
Later, Chinese incursions continued.
Already then, it was very clear for India that the trijunction was located at Batang La and not at Gyemochen as claimed by Beijing.
India and Bhutan have consistently claimed this.
The letter posted below is another proof of it.
In 1966, Delhi wrote:

The traditional frontier in this segment runs from a point east of Batang La along the ridge which forms the northern water parting of the Torsa stream up to Sinchel La and thence to height 4421 metres.

Here is the full letter.

Note given by the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi to the Embassy of China in India on 30 September, 1966 (No. C/14/66) as published in the White Papers on China.

The Ministry of External Affairs present their compliments to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China and have the honour to state that the Government of Bhutan have requested the Government of India to draw the attention of the Chinese Government to a series of intrusions in the Doklan pasture area which lies south of the traditional boundary between Bhutan and the Tibet region of China in the southern Chumbi area.
It is reported that on the 13th of April 1966, a patrol of the Royal Bhutanese Army observed that a Chinese patrol of 13 men had intruded about three miles south-west of Sinchel La.

• On the 28th July 1966, another Bhutanese patrol found a party of 5 Tibetans with approximately 300 yaks encamped about two miles south of Sinchel La. The Tibetan graziers were informed by the Bhutanese patrol that they were in Bhutanese territory and asked to withdraw.

• Again on the 8th of September 1966, a Bhutanese patrol found Tibetan graziers in the area in question. It was further discovered that two heaps of loose stones had recently been set up in the area with a view presumably to establishing a claim south of the traditional frontier.

• Again on the 13th of September 1966, a Bhutanese patrol found not only that the graziers from the Tibet region of China were continuing to use these pastures but a part of Chinese troops had also intruded into the same area and had dug fresh trenches.

In view of the persistence of these intrusions by Chinese troops and nationals and the increasing strength of the intruders, the Government of Bhutan could no longer dismiss the incidents as accidental transgression of the frontier.

The traditional frontier in this segment runs from a point east of Batang La along the ridge which forms the northern water parting of the Torsa stream up to Sinchel La and thence to height 4421 metres.

The Government of India, on behalf of the Royal Bhutan Government, protest against these intrusions and urge that the Chinese personnel and troops should be withdrawn from Bhutanese territory and should refrain from future violations of this well-defined and traditional Bhutanese frontier.

The Ministry of External Affairs take this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China the assurances of their highest consideration.

China is on a sticky wicket in Bhutan

Most of the maps show Batang-la as the trijunction Sikkim-Tibet-Bhutan

My article China is on a sticky wicket in Bhutan appeared last week in the Mail Daily/Mail Online (UK)


Here is the link...

Has China lost its gamble on a Himalayan ridge in Sikkim? It is too early to say, but some lessons can already be drawn from the scuffle between the Indian Army and the People's Liberation Army in Doka La, near the trijunction between Tibet (China), India and Bhutan.
The episode started when China began building a road on Bhutanese territory without informing Thimphu.
Beijing was certainly not expecting that India would come to the rescue and defend the small kingdom.
China, which dreams of becoming a 'Big Power', attempted to change the status quo south of the Doklam plateau on the Bhutan-Tibet border.

Statement
On June 29, the Royal Government of Bhutan, which had held 24 rounds of talks on the issue with China so far, explained the situation in a statement: 'On 16th June 2017, the Chinese Army started constructing a motorable road from Doka La in the Doklam area towards the Bhutan Army camp at Zompelri.
'Boundary talks are ongoing between Bhutan and China and we have written agreements of 1988 and 1998 stating that the two sides agree to maintain peace and tranquillity in their border areas pending a final settlement on the boundary question...
'The agreements also state that the two sides will refrain from taking unilateral action, or use of force, to change the status quo of the boundary.'
Bhutan conveyed to Beijing that the construction of the road inside Bhutanese territory was a direct violation of the agreements and that it would affect the ongoing demarcation process.
On June 30, 2017, the MEA too issued a press communiqué underlining that 'the two governments had in 2012 reached agreement that the trijunction boundary points between India, China and third countries will be finalised in consultation with the concerned countries.
'Any attempt, therefore, to unilaterally determine tri-junction points is in violation of this understanding.'
Beijing was well aware that the area has been under dispute for several decades; already some 50 years ago, nasty letters were exchanged between Delhi and Beijing on the issue.
The first lesson of the present episode is that India is eons behind China in terms of communication.
Though Beijing broke its pledge to Bhutan and India, the constant threatening statements by their spokesperson made it sound as if Beijing was the aggrieved party.
In 2003, China's Central Military Commission approved the concept of 'Three Warfares', namely: (1) the coordinated use of strategic psychological operations; (2) overt and covert media manipulation; and (3) legal warfare designed to manipulate strategies, defence policies, and perceptions of target audiences abroad.
The Chinese spokespersons efficiently demonstrated how, even when wrong, you can make it appear that it is the other parties, Bhutan and India in this case, who are the culprits.

History
Take the case of the 1890 Convention between Great Britain and China relating to Sikkim and Tibet.
The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs' spokesperson managed to convince most of the Indian and foreign media of the importance of the treaty.
Beijing, however, forgot to mention that the two main stakeholders, Tibet and Sikkim, had not even been consulted by the then 'Great Imperial Powers'.
Tsepon WD Shakabpa, the famous historian, in his Tibet: a Political History, explained that in 1890, a convention was drawn up without consulting the government of Tibet: '…six articles related to Tibet, and since (Tibet) was not represented at the Convention, those articles were not allowed to be put into practice by the Tibetans.'
Shakabpa added: 'The British were aware that China exercised no real power in Tibet at that time; but it suited their interests to deal with the Manchus, because of the advantages they gained from the Convention.'
An unequal treaty in Chinese parlance! The Manchus agreed to 'offer' Sikkim to the British as they were afraid that Tibet and Britain might enter into direct negotiations with London; therefore, they signed the treaty to forestall such a possibility.
In 1904, Capt Francis Younghusband anyway mounted a military expedition to Tibet to make the recalcitrant Tibetans sign their first agreement with the Crown.
 
Wedge
China has always been interested to create a wedge between India and Bhutan.
In 1966, in similar circumstances, for the same disputed place, the Dokham plateau, the Chinese government attempted to convince Delhi that Bhutan did not require India's support 'as it was an independent country'.
The Communists did not accept that Delhi could advise Bhutan; they crudely wrote: 'inheriting the mantle of British imperialism, the Indian Government has all along been pursuing an expansionist policy and bullying its neighbouring countries.'
Chinese President Xi Jinping (right) shakes hands with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to the G20 Summit on September 4, 2016 in Hangzhou, China (stock photo)
Chinese President Xi Jinping (right) shakes hands with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to the G20 Summit on September 4, 2016 in Hangzhou, China (stock photo)
As at present, the Bhutanese Government had issued a press statement on October 3, 1966: 'The Government of Bhutan have, for some time, been concerned with reports received from its patrols of a number of intrusions by Tibetan grazers and Chinese troops in the Doklam pastures which are adjacent to the southern part of the Chumbi Valley.'
It concluded that the area has been traditionally part of Bhutan, and China had never disputed 'the traditional frontier which runs along recognisable natural features.'
However, later, China started claiming large strategic chunks of Bhutan's territory.
Incidentally, Article 1 of the much quoted 1890 Convention placed the trijunction at Gipmochi: 'The line commences at Mount Gipmochi on the Bhutan frontier, and follows the above-mentioned water-parting to the point where it meets Nepal territory.'
According to Sikkimese records, Gipmochi is in Batang La, 5 km north of Doka La.
It means the territory south of Batang La is indeed Bhutanese, and therefore India did not 'trespass' into Tibet.
So, why all this fuss?