Tuesday, August 14, 2012

1000 posts

This is the 1000th post on this blog.
As tomorrow, we will be celebrating India's Independence Day as well as Sri Aurobino's birthday, I am copying an article written several years back for the magazine Life Positive

It is an homage to the great Rishi and his Vision of tomorrow's India.
It is also 40 years years that I have been around.



It was presumably my ‘good’ karma which made me visit India during the university holidays of 1972.
This journey took me to several places in the Himalayas, my main interest being to meet the Tibetan refugees who had been rehabilitated by the Indian Government in hill stations, working on the construction of high-altitude strategic roads. There was something strange about these people: they had lost everything, they were living in the worse imaginable conditions and still they smiled. I visited Dharamsala, Dalhousie, Mussoorie, Kathmandu and many other places Everywhere I had a similar experience.
It was when I met the Dalai Lama in Dharamsala that I began to grasp that Tibetans as well as Indians had a different set of values compared to us westerners. They did not possess much material wealth or political freedom, but they had deep human qualities. The Tibetan leader was the living embodiment of these values.
Watching this ‘simple monk’, I understood that, though endangered, inner calm and compassion still survive; he was the personification of a wisdom which directed its energy to look ‘within’, into the heart of man.
Perhaps the West had spent too much time looking ‘outside.’ It had concentrated on ‘outer’ realisations and on controlling the material world, but in the process, it had forgotten the inner virtues and powers of the Spirit. Did the Tibetan road worker have a lost key to happiness? This first discovery later led me to live in India.
I had another deep question: should the ‘outside’, the material world be abandoned and all life devoted to reaching ‘higher’ realms? Frankly, I had some reservations. Travelling for a couple of months in India in the early seventies was a shock for a foreigner. The dirt, the chaos in the big cities, the lack of ‘modern’ facilities, the blaring of loud speakers, the crowds, all these were a constant reminder that things were not so bad in Europe where trains ran on time, towns were clean, information was easily available to the public, hygiene a way of life.
Was it my ‘karma’ or a coincidence that I carried from France a book for the travel. This French translation of The Life Divine, Sri Aurobindo’s magnum opus was to since greatly influence my life: it answered my question. One of the first sentences went home: “The affirmation of a divine life upon earth and an immortal sense in mortal existence can have no base unless we recognise not only eternal Spirit as the inhabitant of this bodily mansion, the wearer of this mutable robe, but accept Matter of which it is made, as a fit and noble material out of which He weaves constantly His garbs, builds recurrently the unending series of His mansions.”
Matter had to be transformed in the image of the Spirit. In the same work, Sri Aurobindo noted: “The earliest preoccupation of man in his awakened thoughts and, as it seems, his inevitable and ultimate preoccupation… [is]  the impulse towards perfection, the search after pure Truth and unmixed Bliss, the sense of a secret immortality”.
Unfortunately, as he put it: “These persistent ideals of the race are at once the contradiction of its normal experience.” This central contradiction had to be worked out; Matter and Life had to be transformed.
This second discovery decided me: I did not want to spend my life in a Himalayan cave, but to live more a ‘concrete’ life. Two years later, I left France for Auroville, the ‘Universal City’ near Pondicherry whose ideals, defined by its founder, the Mother, corresponded more to my search: ”Auroville will be a site of material and spiritual researches for a living embodiment of an actual Human Unity.”

Is Sri Aurobindo still relevant in the 21st century?
To answer this query in few lines does not do justice to Sri Aurobindo who left us 35 thick volumes of his philosophical, socio-political and evolutionary thought, as well as Savitri, an epic in 28,000 verses. However, some glimpses of his socio-political philosophy and how it translated into action during the last years of his life might be thought-provoking.
Today, we hear that India is shining as never before. But on the streets of any metropolis or in the villages of rural India, one still sees the same ‘misery’ which I saw more 30 years ago (with louder noise, more chaos, pollution and garbage).
It is true that in the past two or three decades the Spirit of India appears to have woven new garbs. However is it not symptomatic that a great deal of the ‘shine’ has come from the Indian Diaspora in the West which did not reject the world ‘outside’ while retaining some inner Indian values?
Sri Aurobindo, in a chapter of his Foundations of Indian Culture envisioned a three-point program for the ‘renaissance in India’:
The recovery of the old spiritual knowledge and experience in all its splendour, depth and fullness is its first, most essential work.
The flowing of this spirituality into new forms of philosophy, literature, art, science and critical knowledge is the second.
An original dealing with modern problems in the light of Indian spirit and the endeavour to formulate a greater synthesis of a spiritualised society is the third and most difficult.
This message is more than relevant today as these tasks written nearly a century ago remain unfulfilled. ‘Synthesis’ is a key word in Sri Aurobindo’s vision.
Recently, this ‘Indian renaissance’ has been equated to economic growth, a Chinese-model development with an 8 or 9% growth of the GNP (to ‘become rich is glorious’ à la Deng Xiaoping), but it is certainly not the sort of renaissance Sri Aurobindo envisaged (though he excluded nothing).
But ‘synthesis’ does not mean aping the West! India has to rediscover her past, not for the sake of the past, but because “Spirituality is the master-key of the Indian mind.” The ancient seekers had found that “the physical does not get its full sense until it stands in right relation to the supra-physical; [Ancient India] saw that the complexity of the universe could not be explained in the present terms of man or seen by his superficial sight, that there were other powers behind, other powers within man himself of which he is normally unaware.”
This knowledge is the key to the true transformation the bodily mansion of Mother India. Only then will India be able to play her rightful role in the world and truly shine.
In the meantime, planetary civilisation is going through one of the most difficult (and challenging) times of its recorded history. Just read a newspaper, whether published in India, the US, China or Timbuktu, everywhere headlines are similar: Iraq, environment catastrophe looming large, nuclear proliferation, corruption, new viruses…
In 1940, Sri Aurobindo foresaw: “At present mankind is undergoing an evolutionary crisis in which is concealed a choice of its destiny... Man has created a system of civilisation which has become too big for his limited mental capacity and understanding and his still more limited spiritual and moral capacity to utilise and manage, a too dangerous servant of his blundering ego and its appetites…”
How can we deal with this crisis? Sri Aurobindo’s answer is by a change in consciousness; not only an individual one, but a revolutionary transformation of the entire race.
Sri Aurobindo had noted: “The end of a stage of evolution is usually marked by a powerful recrudescence of all that has to go out of the evolution.... The law is the same for the mass as for the individual.”
The planet is today going through this stage. India could help, but will she be able to grasp once more the Spirit which sustained her past achievements and formulate a ‘greater synthesis’? In 1920, Sri Aurobindo wrote to his brother Barindranath: “The chief cause of the weakness of India is not subjection nor poverty, nor the lack of spirituality or Dharma, but the decline of thought-power, the growth of ignorance in the motherland of Knowledge… The modern world is the age of the victory of Knowledge.” Since then, a tremendous change has occurred; the explosion of the Indian IT phenomenon is one of the many signs which could be cited. But is it enough?
Fifty-four years after Sri Aurobindo’s departure, can his message help us to deal better with this troubled world?
Though for the sake of his sadhana, he lived a secluded life, Sri Aurobindo never retired into some sort of Nirvana or beatific splendour. He remained well acquainted with the politics of the sub-continent and the world situation. In 1940, when many Indian leaders were vacillating and would have supported a German victory in World War II, he sent a personal contribution to the British war effort and expressed ‘unswerving sympathy’ to the Allies cause. He wrote: “We feel that not only is this a battle waged in just self-defence and in defence of the nations threatened with the world-domination of Germany and the Nazi system of life, but that it is a defence of civilisation and its highest attained social, cultural and spiritual values and of the whole future of humanity.”
Most contemporary Indian politicians believed that Sri Aurobindo could no longer understand the intricacies of the freedom struggle. When Sir Stafford Cripps came to India in March 1942 with a proposal for dominion status as a first step towards full independence, Sri Aurobindo immediately offered his support to Sir Stafford: “I welcome it as an opportunity given to India to determine for herself, and organise in all liberty of choice, her freedom and unity, and take an effective place among the world's free nations. I hope that it will be accepted, and right use made of it, putting aside all discords and divisions...”
Unfortunately, the Congress leaders thought otherwise and rejected the proposal. Dr. K.M. Munshi, a senior minister in the first Indian Cabinet after independence (and the founder of the Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan) told an audience soon after Sri Aurobindo passed away in December 1950: “We rejected the advice. We who rejected it had sound reasons for it, but today we realise that if the first proposal had been accepted, these would have been no partition, no refugees and no Kashmir problem.”
Sri Aurobindo strongly disapproved of the “two-nation theory”. He described it as “only a newly-fangled notion invented by Jinnah for his purposes and contrary to the facts.” He pointed out: “Jinnah is himself a descendant of a Hindu, converted in fairly recent times, named Jinahbhai.”
If Pakistan would accept its common past with India, a great step towards a more harmonious relation would be made. And why not the creation a sort of confederation between the two nations?
Today, Sri Aurobindo would certainly firmly condemn terrorism or the Al Qaida type of actions simply for the reason that it is again the future of the human race which is at stake. How can one accept an ideology or a creed which seeks to dominate others and impose by force its will on the rest of humanity?
Sri Aurobindo had taken a similar position when North Korea attacked the South in 1950. He even foresaw the invasion of Tibet: “The whole affair is as plain as a pike-staff. It is the first move in the Communist plan of campaign to dominate and take possession first of these northern parts and then of South East Asia as a preliminary to their manoeuvres with regard to the rest of the continent - in passing, Tibet as a gate opening to India. If they succeed, there is no reason why domination of the whole world should not follow by steps until they are ready to deal with America.”
Sri Aurobindo opposed the hegemony of any one single ideology. For the planet to survive, every nation, every culture or individual has to find its rightful place according to its own genius.
On August 15, 1947 India obtained the independence which Sri Aurobindo had worked so much towards. It coincided with his 75th birthday. For this occasion, he wrote about five dreams. The first one was to see India united again: “India today is free but she has not achieved unity.” During the last years of his life he often spoke of the aberration of the Partition. “It has to go!” Though the occasion presented itself a few times, political leaders were never able to grasp the opportunity. The problem remains, can the division between India and Pakistan disappear one day?
The second dream was to see the “resurgence and liberation of the peoples of Asia”. He envisaged an important role for Asia in the future of mankind. In many ways, this continent has come out of its ashes and it is widely predicted that Asia could be the leader of the world in a few decades. One can hope that it will not be an economic leadership alone, but a deeper one, more in resonance with its spiritual roots.
His third dream was a “world-union forming the outer basis of a fairer, brighter and nobler life for all mankind.” Many groupings such the European Union or the ASEAN are already taking shape. The sub-continent has been slow to come together, but the progress towards a free trade zone and a region where ideas and people can travel freely, seems now to be on its way.
The fourth dream was a “spiritual gift of India to the world”. Here again, one just has to go to a bookshop in the West or look at the number of yoga, dharma or meditation centers flourishing in the United States or Europe to see that a firm beginning has been achieved.
The final dream was a new “step in evolution which would raise man to a higher and larger consciousness and begin the solution of the problems which have perplexed and vexed him since he first began to think and to dream of individual perfection and a perfect society.”
Sri Aurobindo has described this quest as ‘the Adventure of Consciousness and Joy’. It seems to be the most urgent task at hand for humanity. If enough individuals would aspire for this higher consciousness, undoubtedly the process could be hastened and the world around us would begin to change. The Mother once told the Ashram children: “I invite you to a Great Adventure”.
It is perhaps the only relevant adventure in the world today.

Monday, August 13, 2012

Sacrifice and Sacrifice

Last week, Dolkar Tso, mother of a 5-year-old daughter and a 2-year-old son undressed near the Tsoe monastery in Kanlho prefecture of Amdo region and later immolated herself.
She is said to  have raised slogans for the return of the Dalai Lama to Tibet and the freedom of her country.
She passed away
soon after succumbing to her injuries.
When monks from the nearby large
monastery of Labrang Tashikhyil traveled to Tsoe, they were arrested by local Chinese authorities. They could not even pay their last respect to the departed soul.
It is from the same Amdo region that Choeyang Kyi, the bronze medal at the London Olympics comes from.
According to Xinhua: "She grew up herding yaks on a plateau meadow, just like many other women from rural Tibet. Singing and praying accounted for much of her spare time. And it was not until 2008 that she got the chance to watch the Olympic Games on TV for the first time."
The young Choeyang told the Chinese agencies that during the race: "I had only one thought in mind -- fight! The crowds were so enthusiastic. That helped me stay in high spirits." 
On her blog on Sina Weibo, the most popular microblogging site, many congratulated her. A blogger wrote: "Last night, all of the Tibetans here stayed up and watched your game on the track. We were thrilled to see you win a medal. Tashi delek! Hope you can bring more glory to the Tibetan people."
Someone else commented: "She smiled a lot during the final 20 km. But I was almost thrilled to tears."

I wish that would more Choeyang Kyis and less Dolkar Tsos. 
It is not that I deny the extraordinary courage of this mother of two in sacrificing her own life, but to win a medal also needs decades of sacrifice. 
A report mentioned that Choeyang has not seen her parents for years; this is probably true for most Olympians in China.
But just imagine, that 5 young Tibetans, living in exile manage to earn an Olympic medal (they probably would have to compete as Indian nationals), it would have incredible effects on their country's struggle for freedom.
As I mentioned yesterday on this blog, many young Tibetans are very fit, some of them having fought on the Siachen or elsewhere on the Himalayas under the Indian flag.
To win an Olympic medal certainly means more than to be fit, it demands 10 or 15 years of hard work and sacrifice. 
Who is ready?
At the end, I prefer a hero smiling that a burned hero. This is not to lessen the action of Dolkar Tso and those who immolated themselves.

Tibetan nomad youth passes away after setting self on fire
Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy
12 August 2012,
Dharamsala (India)
The young Tibetan nomad, Choepa in Meruma township in Ngaba (Chinese: Aba), Sichuan Province has succumbed to burn injuries after setting himself ablaze on Friday in protest against the Chinese government.
“Choepa died of burn injuries at around 3 pm (local time) at a place on way near to Barkham (Chinese: Ma’erkang) on the same day that he set himself on fire,” a Tibetan monk in exile with reliable contacts in Ngaba said yesterday evening.
Depriving the deceased a proper cremation in accordance with the Buddhist rites and rituals, the Chinese authorities in Barkham cremated the charred body of Choepa, and handed over the ashes of the deceased to the latter’s family.
Following the 24-year old's fiery protest, officers from the People's Armed Police (PAP) have reportedly gathered in large numbers in and around Meruma area; some were seen patrolling the area. The atmosphere is still said to be highly tense as PAP officers have surrounded the town on all sides since the fiery protest on Friday.
Choepa is one of the participants in the demonstration that took place in Meruma on 23 January 2012, and since then he had been on the run evading arrest in the hands of local Chinese police.
“Choepa was on the run and hiding since the demonstration and the Chinese police couldn’t catch him until he turned himself up, and burned himself alive last Friday,” the same source said. Choepa is survived by his six family members-parents and four siblings.
More than 40 Tibetans in Tibet in recent months have lighted themselves to the fire in protest against the Chinese government, demanding for ‘freedom in Tibet’ and ‘return of the Tibetan spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama from exile'.

Sunday, August 12, 2012

The dilemma of the Middle-Way

Choeyang Kyi on the podium after the 20-kilometer walk race
The dilemma of the Middle-Way Approach appeared concretely during the London Olympics Games when a young Tibetan walker, Choeyang Kyi for the Tibetans (or Qieyang Shenjie to the Chinese) earned a bronze medal in the women’s 20-kilometer race walk.
The Chinese supporters on the road in front of the Queen's Palace were heard shouting “Jia You!” while many Tibetans encouraged her, “Gyuk!” (“Go on!” in their respective language).
Both groups had their flags, the red one of the People's Republic of China, under which Choeyang participated and the one with the snow lions of the Tibetan supporters.
Where was the Middle-Way Approach in this?
The Dalai Lama has thus described his philosophy for the future status of Tibet:
The Tibetan people do not accept the present status of Tibet under the People's Republic of China. At the same time, they do not seek independence for Tibet, which is a historical fact. Treading a middle path in between these two lies the policy and means to achieve a genuine autonomy for all Tibetans living in the three traditional provinces of Tibet within the framework of the People's Republic of China. This is called the Middle-Way Approach, a non-partisan and moderate position that safeguards the vital interests of all concerned parties-for Tibetans: the protection and preservation of their culture, religion and national identity; for the Chinese: the security and territorial integrity of the motherland; and for neighbours and other third parties: peaceful borders and international relations.
Can the Tibetan and Chinese supporters be side by side in this scheme?
In London, they appeared to be on a different wave-length. 
The bronze-medal earner kept very quiet during the Press Conference.
One can understand.
Regarding the flag, I have already mentioned about Mao's remarks on the Tibetan flag on this blog. In the mind of the Great Helmsman, it is not incompatible to have two flags (the red one and the snow-lion one flying together) flying together (Kashmir has also 2 flags after all, why not Tibet?).
For the rest, it is more complicated, much more complicated.
It looks like the Chinese government was testing the waters; for the first time, they brought a Tibetan athlete to the Games to see if the situation is controllable in a foreign arena, especially after the series of self-immolation in Eastern Tibet.
Choeyang Kyi must have had harder times during the Press Conference than during the race. But she should be congratulated to have managed well in both.
The dilemma of the Middle-Way appears to be: was Choeyang Kyi a Chinese runner or a Tibetan one?
Can she be both?
Not sure for the Tibetans supporters. One of them told the AP reporter: "As an individual, we are proud of her, but that she is representing China, I’m not happy."
But it is what the Middle-way is about, isn't it?
This does not pose a problem for Mary Kom, who can be an Indian and a Manipuri at the same time; it poses a serious dilemma in Communist China.
Thanks God India is not China, though the China's tally is fuller than India's.
In the meantime, let us hope that Choeyang Kyi will trigger new vocations in Dharamsala (and why not amongst the well-trained Tibetan Special Frontier Forces).
Unfortunately, the dynamic Tibetan Prime Minister, Dr Lobsang Sangye does not seem to have a sports policy.
A great pity!

China makes history and causes dilemma at the Olympic Games
Associated Press
August 12,
LONDON — On any other day and in any other situation, the Tibetan exiles who gathered excitedly in groups next to Buckingham Palace would never have come to cheer for an athlete wearing the colors of China, a country they regard as their oppressor, a country that invaded and has governed their Himalayan homeland with an iron fist for six decades.
But this was exceptional. Because, apparently for the first time at an Olympics, the athlete was one of them, a Tibetan.
Standing apart but, just this once, both wanting the same thing, groups of Chinese supporters shouted “Jia You!” while the Tibetans yelled “Gyuk!” — both meaning, “Go on!”
The Chinese waved their red flags. The Tibetans waved the flag of Tibet that is banned in China, with a bright yellow sun rising over a snow-clad mountain. They could hear and see each other, but they studiously ignored each other, too.
The athlete — Qieyang Shenjie to the Chinese, Choeyang Kyi for the Tibetans — could hear the yells of encouragement. But she kept her head down and concentrated on not putting a foot wrong. It seemed a fitting metaphor for a Tibetan competing for China, one smart enough not to get sucked into the politics that have swirled around her Olympic participation.
Not only did Qieyang make history for Tibetans, she won a medal, too — bronze in the women’s 20-kilometer race walk Saturday. She beamed when she crossed the finish line, a picture of delight. If she felt discomfort at all as a Tibetan in Chinese colors, she didn’t show it.
“I’m extremely honored to take part as the first representative of the Tibetans at the Olympic Games and to win a medal,” she said.
She said she heard Tibetans encouraging her along the route that went past the residence of Queen Elizabeth II.
“I heard it! Really. I heard a Tibetan cheering me on. At the time, I looked backward but couldn’t see who that person was,” she said.
But she looked alarmed when asked if she saw the Tibetan flags, shaking her head and refusing to answer.
Because Tibet is ruled by China, it does not have its own team or athletes at the Olympics or other international competitions, like the football World Cup. So, for Tibetans, this was the first time they’d been able to cheer on one of their own. But it also was a shock to some of them to see Qieyang striding past them in Chinese red.
“Am I really cheering for Tibet or China?” wondered Ugyen Choephell, who said his parents fled Tibet in the 1960s to India, where he was born.
Still, he yelled “Choeyang Gyuk!” and was thrilled when she went past.
“Great, really. Very emotional,” he said. “History in the making.”
If there was another Tibetan at previous Olympics, history has forgotten them. In China, the government-run Xinhua News Agency and other media said Qieyang was the first Tibetan to make a Chinese Olympic team.
Olympic historian Bill Mallon said Tibet has never fielded an Olympic team and that he and other Olympic experts he consulted weren’t aware of any previous Tibetan Olympian. The Tibetan government in exile in India said likewise.
“As an individual, we wish her well,” said Dicki Choyang, the exiled administration’s minister for information and international relations. “She must have put in a lot of effort to reach there. But we are sad that she cannot represent a free Tibet.”
“China uses things like this for their political gain. The fact that a Tibetan is participating in the Olympics does not take away anything from the dire situation prevailing inside Tibet,” Choyang added.
Qieyang, 21, said she was born in what is now the Chinese province of Qinghai and that her family are Tibetan herders, although she was stumped when asked how many animals they have.
“I can’t remember. I haven’t been home for many years,” she said.
She seemed something of a curiosity to reporters from China who peppered her with questions after the race, won by Russian Elena Lashmanova. They asked Qieyang for a Tibetan song. She refused.
She told them her Tibetan name means “the sun,” that she started running as a kid, that she said a Buddhist prayer before the race and that her family isn’t well off.
On the blog she keeps, Qieyang said she was sworn in as a member of China’s ruling Communist Party in July before coming to London to compete. “Will be making a swear-in speech. A bit excited and a bit nervous,” she wrote.
That drew a range of responses from other Chinese bloggers, from those who called her “disgusting” and questioning why she wanted “to join the world’s biggest mafia?” and was “boarding the wrong boat” to others who wrote “congrats,” ‘’impressive,” ‘’very good.”
She sounded embarrassed when asked why she joined — again, clearly trying not to put a foot wrong.
“Why? I ... I ... How to say? It’s all good,” she said.
If Qieyang was keeping her real feelings to herself — and it was impossible to know — Tibetans who turned out in support found it hard to believe that she might be happy competing for China, even though she certainly seemed to be.
“For her, I can understand it’s a difficult situation. I imagine that the Chinese have given her threats of all sorts. I would think she is brainwashed or forced to do this. There’s not much choice for Tibetans in Tibet,” said Yangchen Kikhang, a Tibetan born in India.
“As an individual, we are proud of her, but that she is representing China, I’m not happy,” she said.
Still, she cheered Qieyang and consoled herself with this thought.
“Inside her head,” she said, “she probably thinks she is Tibetan.”
Associated Press writers Ashwini Bhatia and Didi Tang contributed.
John Leicester is an international sports columnist for The Associated Press. Copyright 2012 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.

Friday, August 10, 2012

The Himmatsinghji Committee Report

If  the Henderson-Brooks report is the symbol of the over-classification of the Indian archives, it is not the only 'secret report' to remain in the drawers of the ministries of Defence or External Affairs in North or South blocks.
The Himmatsinghji Committee Report is another of such reports which should have been made public long ago.
Here is the background of the Report of the Himmatsinghji Committee.
Unfortunately, we have very few details about the findings of Committee which, besides Major-General Himmatsinghji, Deputy Minister of Defence (Chairman), included Lt.-General Kulwant Singh, K. Zakaria, Head of the Historical Division of the Ministry of External Affairs, S.N. Haksar, Joint Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs, Group Capt. M.S. Chaturvedi from the Indian Air Force and Waryam Singh, Deputy Director of the Intelligence Bureau.
B.N. Mullik, the Intelligence Chief says in his China’s Betrayal: My Years with Nehru that the decision to form a Committee followed a note “New Problems of Internal Security” sent by the Intelligence Bureau as well as the letter of Sardar Patel, which “were considered by all the Ministries concerned within the next seven days”.
The latter is probably true.
According to Mullik, two main decisions were taken:
  1. A small committee of military experts with a representative of the IB in Shillong would visit the NEFA agencies and propose the places near the frontier at which the Assam Rifles units should be posted.
  2. A high-powered committee presided over by the Deputy Minister of Defence, Major-General Himmatsinghji, with representatives of Defence, Communication, Home, External Affairs and the IB would be formed to study the problems created by the Chinese aggression in Tibet and to make recommendations about the measures that should be taken to improve administration, defence, communication, etc. of all the frontier areas.
This Committee, known as the North and North East Border Defence Committee sent its report in two parts. Mullik explains:
The first part consisted of its recommendations regarding Sikkim, Bhutan, NEFA and the Eastern frontier bordering Burma. This part was submitted in April, 1951. The second part contained the recommendations on Ladakh and the frontier regions of Himachal Pradesh, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh and Nepal and was submitted in September, 1951.
Mullik has often to be taken with a pinch of salt, having the habit to justify his own decisions and actions first; in this case however, there is no reason to doubt his words when he says:
The Himmatsinghji Committee also had before it the recommendations which had been made by a smaller Committee formed in Assam to assess the dangers in NFFA and suggest the possibility of pushing the Assam Rifles Posts as far towards the frontier as possible.
It is probably this ‘smaller’ Committee which decided to do what the British had not done, to occupy Tawang.
The North and North-East Border Defence Committee carefully analyzed the nature of the frontier, the contending claims, the general situation in the border areas, the state of the administration and the appreciation of the threat. On the basis of this analysis, it laid down the principles of policy to be followed. Thereafter it made comprehensive recommendations under various heads; such as (1) Administration, (2) Development, (3) Defence and Security which included the Army and the Air Force, (4) the Civil Armed Forces including the Assam Rifles and other police units, (5) Communications, and (6) Intelligence. According to Mullik:
With regard to the state of the frontier and the contending claims, …at that time the knowledge about the alignment of the frontier was not as accurate as it was after the study made in 1960-61. Regarding the threats and dangers from this undemarcated frontier, the state of administration in these areas and also the threats and dangers arising out of the Chinese presence in Tibet, the Committee came to the same conclusion as [drawn] by the IB in its note of November, 1950, and also Sardar Patel's letter.
The Committee also recommended the reorganization of the administrative divisions of NEFA, the opening of new districts, and increase in the staff manning new posts, the extension of these administrative centres further towards the McMahon Line and the formation of a Frontier Service cadre for service in the frontier areas.
The Himmatsinghji Committee further recommended an important increase in the Assam Rifles and the Civil Armed Police and the deployment of the Assam Rifles and other Armed Police units in larger concentration at strategic points from which effective patrolling could be regularly undertaken.
The Committee also suggested the construction of new roads and the improvement of existing ones to link the Assam Rifles posts with headquarters.
The State Governments were to extend modern administration right up to the frontier and this without interfering with the customs and the ways of life of the tribal people. However new schools and dispensaries were to be opened at the earliest.

Still a classified report
Sixty-one years after the Himmatsinghji report was presented to the Government, it is still a secret. Better, the Report seems to have been lost by the Ministry of Defence.
In November 2011, one Anil Mukherjee applied under the Right to Information Act to see the Report of Himmatsinghji Committee.
In its order, the Central Information Commission stated:
Shri P.K. Gupta [Director, Vigilance in the Ministry of Defence] submits a letter dated 12.10.2011 before the Commission which is taken on record. The operative paras of the letter are reproduced below:
I am directed to refer to CIC order File No. CIC/LS/A/2011/001106 dated 05.09.2011 and state that none of the remaining five reports viz-a-viz - (1) PMS Blackett Report 1948; (2) Himmatsinghji Committee Report, 1951; (3) HM Patel Committee report on functioning of the Ministry of Defence(MOD), 1952; (4) Sharda Mukherjee Committee report on restructuring of MoD, 1967 and (5) Committee on Defence expenditure report, 1990 are available in the Ministry of Defence. This is issued with the approval of Defence Secretary .
The Ministry of Defence admitted: “It is, thus, clear that the reports mentioned at Sl. Nos. 01 to 04 and 06 of the RTI application are not available with the MoD and the question of supplying them to the appellant does not arise.”
Practically, does it mean that the Himmatsinghji Committee Report is lost forever? For the CIC, the conclusion was:
However, the issue raised by the appellant regarding the alleged loss/mislaying of the Reports mentioned at Sl. Nos. 1 to 4 and 6 of the RTI application by the MoD cannot be disregarded. The MoD has not denied existence of these Reports; it has simply indicated their non-availability. Needless to say, the Reports deal with sensitive national security related issues and their 'non-availability' in the MoD is a serious matter. In the premises, it is ordered that a copy of this order be sent to the Defence Secretary for information and appropriate action at his end.
As usual, the ministry’s babus will seat on this order till their retirement.
The Himmatsinghji Report being will continue to be missing in action in the vaults or almirahs of the Ministry of Defence.

The take-over of Tawang
More than 60 years, later, it is still not clear who ordered the take-over of Tawang, but is probably the first Committee. At the end of 1950, the entire area down to Dirang Dzong (South of the Sela Pass) was still under some vague Tibetan administration, with the Tibetan Dzongpon of Tsona in Tibet, collecting 'monastic' taxes from time to time in and around Tawang.
It is there that Major Bob Khathing of the Assam Rifles entered the scene.
Born on 28 February 1912, in Ukhrul district of today's Manipur, Ranenglao (Bob) Khathing belonged to the Tangkhul Naga tribe.
In 1942, Khathing joined the newly raised Assam Regiment in Shillong and became a captain. Later he was told by Sir Akbar Hydari, the first Governor of Assam after Independence to join the Assam Rifles.
He served with the 2nd Assam Rifles in Sadiya and by 1951 he was inducted into the Indian Frontier Administrative Service as an Assistant Political Officer (APO).
We are quoting here from an excellent article written by Yambem Laba in The Imphal Free Press.
Summoned by then Assam governor Jairamdas Daulatram, [Khathing] was asked, “Do you know Tawang?” He was then given a 'secret' file to study and told to “go and bring Tawang under Indian administration”. This task could not be implemented by the British for 50-odd years.
On 17 January 1951, Khathing, accompanied by Captain Hem Bahadur Limbu of 5th Assam Rifles and 200 troops and Captain Modiero of the Army Medical Corps left Lokra for the foothills, bound for Tawang. They were later joined by a 600-strong team of porters.
On 19 January, they reached Sisiri and were joined by Major TC Allen, the last British Political Officer of the North East Frontier Agency. Five days later the party reached Dirang Dzong, the last Tibetan administrative headquarters, and were met by Katuk Lama, Assistant Tibetan Agent, and the Goanburras  of Dirang. On 26 January, Major Khathing hoisted the Indian flag and a barakhana  followed. The party stayed in Dirang for four days, during which time they received airdrops.
On 1 February, they moved out and halted at Chakpurpu on their way to Sangje Dzong. On the third day, they made a five-mile climb to cross Sela pass and pressed on to what was entered in Khathing’s diary as the ‘Tea Place’ where water could be collected from the frozen surface to make tea. By 7.30 pm, the party closed in on Nurunang.
On 4 February, they reached Jang village where two locals were sent out to collect information and gauge the people’s feelings towards their coming. The next day, the headmen and elders of Rho, Changda and the surrounding villages of Jang called on Khathing, who lost no time in explaining the purpose of his visit and told them in no uncertain terms that they were no longer to take orders from the Tsona Dzongpens. That day, he, Captain Limbu, Subedar Bir Bahadur and Jamadar Udaibir Gurung climbed about half a mile on the Sela Tract to choose the site for the checkpost and construct a barracks.
On 6 February they camped at Gyankar and Tibetan representatives of the Tsona Dzongpons came to meet them. It was also Tibetan New Year or Lhosar, the first day of the Year of the Iron Horse. In the evening it snowed heavily and the villagers took this as a very good omen.
The Assam Rifles of Bob Khathing finally reached on February 7.
…two days were spent scouting the area for a permanent site where both civil and military lines could be laid out with sufficient area for a playground. A place was chosen north-east of Tawang Monastery and a meeting with Tibetan officials was scheduled for 9 February, but they had shown a reluctance to accept Indian authority overnight.
The journalist of the The Imphal Free Press remembers Khathing telling him in 1985 (he had accompanied Khathing on his last trip to Tawang) that he had no option, but to order Captain Limbu to ask his troops to fix the bayonets and stage a flag march around Tawang “to show he [Khathing] means business”.
Apparently, it had the desired effect and in the evening the Tibetan officials and elders of the monastery came to meet the Political Officer; they were told that from now on the Tsona Dzongpons or any representatives of the Tibetan government would no longer exercise any power south of Bumla.
The article continues:
On 11 February, Khathing visited the monastery, called on the abbot and presented him and the other monks gifts that comprised gramophone players, cloth and tiffin-carriers. The next day all the chhgergans (officials) of the 11 tsos  or Tibetan administrative units were called up and a general order was issued directing them not to take any more order from the Dzongpons or Drekhong or pay tribute to them any longer. That afternoon, Tibetan officials and the Nyertsang called for time and permission to exercise their authority till they heard from the Tibetan government in Lhasa. Khathing put his foot down and told them the ‘area is ours according to the Treaty of 1914’ and there was no question of a reply from their government in Lhasa and, hence, no extension could be given. Thus did Tawang effectively become a part of India from that day on.
Some rumours have recently circulated that Nehru did not know about the operation; it would mean a truly serious lapse as the Assam Rifles worked directly under the Ministry of External Affairs and Nehru was then the Minister.
It is possible, but it is certain that a 'military' operation of this scale needed the approval and funds of the Central Government.
Did Patel and Bajpai (the Secretary of the Ministry) decided the operation on their own and ordered Jairamdas Daulatram accordingly?
It is impossible to answer this question unless the related files are declassified, but it is a possibility.
The website of the Assam Rifles states: “Following the end of the war, the five Assam Rifles battalions became part of the civil police under the Assam Inspector General of Police. After independence, however, the Indian government assigned the Assam Rifles its own Inspector General. The Assam Rifles were then placed under command of the Ministry of External Affairs as part of the North Eastern Frontier Agency."
Nehru was the then Minister of External Affairs.
Was it Bajpai's last homage to Sardar Patel who had passed away on December 15 and who had understood the meaning of integrating all territories belonging to the Union of India? The fact is that it had been realized by a few in Delhi that a ‘thoroughly unscrupulous, unreliable and determined power’ was knocking at India's doors.
We have another version of Khathing taking-over of Tawang: Neeru Nanda an IAS officer who had a posting in Tawang wrote an excellent book on the area. She says:
Soon after independence Major Bob Khating, a Naga officer of the Indian Frontier Service and the Deputy Commissioner [then known as Assistant Political Officer] of Bomdila, marched into Tawang. He was greeted warmly by representatives of the Tawang monastery, the three tsorgens (heads) of Choksum (the three chos ) and other noted leaders who welcomed him with open arms when he declared the intention of the Indian government to establish a permanent office and headquarters in the area. After watching the working of the office and men for about a month the leaders came to him quietly in a deputation with folded hands and grave faces.
Nanda continues:
‘Well sahib’, they said, ‘we have been watching your work and we like it but there is something that makes us very suspicious.’
‘What is it?’ a startled Major Khating asked, wondering what had gone amiss.
‘Sahib’, they said melancholically, ‘you do not take anything from us by way of tax, neither do you seem to be proposing to take any. This is causing grave concern to all of us.’
The sahib relaxed visibly. ‘Is that all?’ he said cheerfully and drawing himself to his full height, delivered a long lecture on how there was only one country and one government that was not exploitative. The Indian government considered itself specially bound to develop the brothers and sisters of border areas, who had been neglected so far by the Britishers.
I was personally told that the truth is that it is the Monpas of Tawang who called the Indian Government to intervene and stop the tax collections of the Tsongpons. They had written to Shillong about it. It is perhaps the secret file shown by the Governor to Khathing. Nanda concludes:
The village elders heard him out politely and respectfully and after he had delivered his sermon they folded their hands, again bowed before him and said, ‘Well sahib, all this is very good. But the villager is illiterate, foolish and ignorant. He will not understand a government that abstains from taxation-so even if it is a very petty amount, you must take a tax.’
It was thus, the story goes, that the system of house-tax was instituted whereby each household paid Rs 5 annually to the government and this is the only tax collected in Tawang till today.
Major Khating was true to the frontier tradition of not interfering as far as possible with the local institutions. But he did appoint a gaon budha (village headman) in each village in addition to the traditional pattern where there was a gaon budha only for each cho (group of three to tell villages). The administrative divisions of Tawang were also formed in such a way so as to coincide, as far as possible, with the traditional political divisions.
The Monpas had for centuries one of the most remarkable ‘democratic’ system which was functioning despite the raids of the Tibetan tax collectors or the Bhutanese neighbours 'visiting' the Land of Mon from time to time.
The Chinese 'Liberation' Army arrived in Lhasa on September 1951, just a few months after Khathing had taken the control of Tawang.
One can imagine what would have happened if Khathing had not ‘liberated’ Tawang and the areas around in time.

Thursday, August 9, 2012

50 years later, what has the GoI got to hide?

My article on the Henderson-Brooks-Bhagat Report, 50 years later, what has the GoI got to hide? is posted on Rediff.com website.

After the defeat in the 1962 war with China, the Indian government requested Lieutenant General Henderson-Brooks and Brigadier Prem Bhagat to prepare a report.
Fifty years later, it remains one of India's most secret documents.
What on earth has stopped the government from revealing the report to the Indian public, asks Claude Arpi


Click here to read...

China Testing India’s Nerves

My article, Blow hot, blow cold! China Testing India’s Nerves appeared in The Statesman on August 7, 2012.

CHINA is blowing hot and cold with India. Beijing can afford to because it is far ahead of India, not only in the Olympic tally, but also in the field of infrastructure development on the Indo-China border in Tibet. Frank Jack Daniel of Reuters recently iterated what every India-China watcher in the subcontinent knows: “In the Himalayan arms race, China one-ups India”.
In fact it may not be one-up, but ten-up. Quoting a 2010 Pentagon report, Daniel said: “It has all the appearance of an arms race on the roof of the world. Asia’s two great powers are facing off here in the eastern Himalayan mountains. China has vastly improved roads and is building or extending airports on its side of the border in Tibet. It has placed nuclear-capable intermediate missiles in the area and deployed around 300,000 troops across the Tibetan plateau.”


Click here to read...

Wednesday, August 8, 2012

Advising the Leadership

The article of The Wall Street Journal posted below, explains the importance of the 'internal references papers' prepared for the Party leadership by various Chinese 'experts'.  
Yiyi Lu, the writer says: "At a recent conference of Chinese political scientists and international relations scholars in Beijing, a western academic remarked that he was struck by how Chinese scholars often seemed keen to use their research to come up with advice for the Chinese state on how to advance its goals. He observed that, by contrast, western scholars were more likely to act as critics rather than aspiring advisers to their governments."
In the meantime, the Chinese top leadership gathered for a summer conclave in the resort of Beidaihe to decide the future of the Middle Kingdom. 
Jeremy Page for The Wall Street Journal wrote: "Vice President Xi Jinping, the man widely expected to take over the Communist Party's top job in the fall as part of the transition, met officials and academics advising the government in the northeastern beach resort of Beidaihe on Sunday, according to the state-run Xinhua news agency. It was the first official confirmation that he and other top Chinese leaders were in Beidaihe, where current and retired Communist Party chieftains usually gather in late July or early August to rest and hold informal talks in sprawling villas along a private beach."
Incidentally, it was in Beidaihe, that 50 years ago Mao Zedong decided to 'teach a lesson' to Nehru and India. I have dealt the subject in my article Why Mao attacked India in 1962.
The question of experts advising the Government will make many smile in India, where politicians do not need 'advice', having been elected by the People of India and in any case, being all-knowing.
The role of 'advisers' is certainly over-all positive, as in any case, it is up to the leaders to accept or reject the suggestions. However, often in China (perhaps due to the competition), these advisers offer the most extreme views.
Take the case of Zhao Gancheng, director of South Asia Studies at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies, an India's expert. He recently criticized India's proposal to reopen the Indian Lhasa Consulate in Lhasa. He analyzed that the move was motivated by political, rather than economic interests: "The Indian government hopes to closely watch, observe, and infiltrate the Tibetan area after the opening of a Lhasa consulate, ... The issue regarding Tibet is an internal affair and we won't tolerate any external forces imposing a negative impact on the situation in Tibet." 
So, why to have a Nepali Consulate in Lhasa.
This is not sound advice. Zhao Gancheng, who, by the way is often invited by Indian think-tanks, seems unaware of the traditional bonds between Tibet and India.The Indian presence on the Roof of the World is older that the British 'imperialist' (for the Chinese) inroads in Tibet. 
One of the best proof is the collections of thousands of 700-year old Sanskrit manuscripts found in Tibetan monasteries by the scholar Mahapandit Rahul Sankrityayan visited Tibet in the 1930's. Such examples could be multiplied.
If the Indian Government had wanted "to watch, observe, and infiltrate" Tibetans, they could have done it long ago, with or without a Consulate General in Lhasa.
It is a pity that Zhao, the India's expert, does not see the good (for China, as well as India and Tibet) that could result of reopening an Indian Consulate Consulate in Tibet. 
China should not always listen to advisers, as they often see issues in a narrow nationalistic prism which may please some of the leaders, but will not bring long-term solutions to vexed issues.

Advising Chinese Leaders: Futile Efforts?
Wall Street Journal
Yiyi Lu
August 6, 2012
At a recent conference of Chinese political scientists and international relations scholars in Beijing, a western academic remarked that he was struck by how Chinese scholars often seemed keen to use their research to come up with advice for the Chinese state on how to advance its goals. He observed that, by contrast, western scholars were more likely to act as critics rather than aspiring advisers to their governments.
One can think of a number of explanations for the different dispositions of Chinese and western scholars. One important reason would be the Chinese system for generating “internal references” – internal reports written exclusively for high-ranking officials, and financial and other rewards for those whose reports make a good impression on those officials.
A large number of reports and analyses are produced daily by Party and government organs, state-owned research institutes, media organizations and quasi-governmental organizations in China, according to the many who have written them over the years. These reports are not published for the benefit of society at large. Rather, their circulation is restricted to senior officials, in order to keep them better informed of the situation in the country. Because they are kept as internal documents, these reports discuss problems more candidly and often include data and information that are deemed sensitive and are therefore withheld from the public.
Many organizations produce internal reference reports for the leadership in parallel to their work for general release. For instance, China’s state-run news agency Xinhua publishes thousands of news reports every day. At the same time, Xinhua journalists also write reports for internal publications produced exlcusively for senior Party and government officials. The several thousands of researchers at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences publish books and journal articles just like scholars in other academic establishments, but they also contribute articles to the academy’s own internal publication produced for the state leadership.
The performance evaluation of researchers in government research institutions takes into account both their academic publications and their contributions to internal publications. For example, a CASS researcher would earn points toward her evaluation for publishing academic books and journal articles. She would also earn points for writing articles for the internal publication. If her article in the internal publication is read by a senior official — ministerial level and above — who appreciates it enough to write a comment, then the researcher would earn not only points but also cash rewards, say those who have been on the receiving end of these transactions. It would also increase her chances of winning a promotion. For some government-funded research projects, there is even the rule that no evaluation is necessary if the researchers write an internal reference article that has been read and commented on by a top leader.
The system that encourages or even requires researchers to produce internal analysis for the state apparatus is one reason why many Chinese scholars appear to enjoy playing adviser to the government. Another reason is that the state has increasingly become the main source of funding for social-science research in China in recent years. In addition to centrally administered funds such as the National Social Science Fund, individual Party and government agencies also provide funding directly to universities and research institutes to carry out research projects on their behalf. The state and individual agencies set the framework for the research projects and define their objectives. Naturally researchers are expected to produce output that serves the needs of their state sponsors.
The extensive and elaborate system for utilizing social-science research to develop policy recommendations for decision-makers should have made the Chinese government one of the best informed and advised in the world and uniquely equipped to address challenges facing the country. Yet, in many areas, the billions of yuan poured into government-funded research and the page after page of internal reference advice offered by the country’s best scholars do not seem to have resulted in any improvement in the government’s performance.
Take for example China’s soft power and international image, an area where Beijing appears eager to score points and has funded many research projects in the past several years. The National Social Science Fund alone has funded organizations such as the Xinhua News Agency, China International Publishing Group, Renmin University of China, Shanghai International Studies University and China Radio International to conduct research on how to build up China’s international communications capacity. On many occasions over the past few years, I have heard Chinese researchers and communications professionals discuss this issue. It is clear that they have a good grasp of what need to be done to improve China’s international communication. It is also clear that their analyses and recommendations have been fed to the decision-makers.
Yet, looking at China’s actual practice in international communication, which is marked by one blunder after another, there is no evidence that the generous investment in research and the collection of advice and suggestions have made any difference. At the above-mentioned conference of Chinese political scientists and international relations scholars, many of the longstanding criticisms of China’s soft-power projection attempts and international communication policies and practices were again aired by participants. For example, one scholar suggested that absolute statements such as “China will never seek hegemony” are logically flawed and not persuasive. Another researcher remarked that the thinking of state organs such as the Party’s International Liaison Department and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was still stuck in the pre-Internet age—they still think that any message they send out would be accepted without question.
A third researcher compared the microblogs of the U.S. embassy and consulates in China with that of the Foreign Ministry, pointing out that the popularity of the former among Chinese internet users is attributable to their style of communication, among other things. The Americans’ microblogs have such endearing features as “being talkative” and “playing cute.” MFA’s microblog feeds, in contrast, are often just official statements broken up and released bit by bit.
I asked a government researcher why all the good advice people like him had offered decision-makers did not seem to have any effect. “A lot of it is filtered out and does not reach people at the very top,” he said. “Besides, the thinking of many decision-makers has ossified and just can’t be changed.”
Seeking advice is always easier than following it. The Chinese state has developed a sophisticated system for collecting information, analysis and policy recommendations. Whether it has made good use of the system is an entirely different matter.
Yiyi Lu, an expert on Chinese civil society, is currently working on a project to promote open government information in China. She is the author of “Non-Governmental Organisations in China: The Rise of Dependent Autonomy” (Routledge 2008).

Monday, August 6, 2012

A certain feeling of kinship

China, a non-democratic regime finds it difficult to understand that India is different. 
As mentioned yesterday on this blog, the Chinese government would probably ready to 'offer' India a Consulate in Lhasa, if India would accept to behave like Nepal does vis-a-vis the Tibetan refugees. 
It can't be.
In an article, India still maintaining double standard toward exiled Tibetans, the CCP mouthpiece, The Global Times says: "India's policy toward the 100,000 or so Tibetans on its territory, both the separatist political group led by the Dalai Lama and ordinary Tibetans focusing on their daily lives, has played a large role in Sino-Indian relations."
This might be true, but the Chinese paper is wrong when it says that "there is contradiction between India's official 'one-China' stance and actual indulgence of some Tibetans' separatist activities."
The policy of the Government has been consistent (at least on this point), but the Chinese have always refused to admit that from immemorial times, there has been a special bond between India and Tibet.
On March 30, 1959,  a day before the Dalai Lama arrived in India, Jawaharlal Nehru, the India Prime Minister declared in the Lok Sabha: 
...the major things that we have to consider are as I said on the last occasion, the contacts of India with Tibet are very old, geographical, of course, trade, of course, but much more so, cultural and religious. Vast numbers of pilgrims go from here there and some come from Tibet to India. So that, this contact, this relationship is something deeper than the changing political scene. Naturally we are affected by it. Apart from that, as I said on the last occasion, large numbers of people in India venerate the Dalai Lama, respect him very greatly and he was our guest, honoured guest some time ago. Because of these contacts our reaction to anything that happens in Tibet is bound to be very deep, as we see it. It is not for me to object to those reactions. But, we have to bear them in mind.
For the past 50 years, Beijing has difficulty to understand that he relation between India and Tibet is "something deeper than the changing political scene". 
Nehru stated in Parliament: "there is this feeling of a certain kinship, If I may use that word, cultural kinship between the people of India and the people of Tibet. That, of course, does not mean that we interfere in Tibet, in any way. "
Four days later, the Prime Minister announced the arrival of the Dalai Lama in India. He stated in the Lok Sabha:

The other day, three days ago, I think, when I was speaking about recent happenings in Tibet, I mentioned that I would keep the House informed of every fresh development. In the last two days, day before yesterday and yesterday, we have been receiving a number of messages. They were often delayed because they had to come through a rather devious route.
Yesterday I was thinking of informing the House of a certain development, but then I hesitated to do so, because I wanted it to be fully confirmed; I was waiting for some details. We received them last evening. We could have issued this news to the Press last evening, but I thought I should inform the House first and then the Press can have it.
The facts are that on the 1st April, i.e. day before yesterday morning, we received a message via Shillong dated 31st March evening that an emissary with a message from the Dalai Lama had arrived at our border check-post at Chutangmu in the North-East Frontier Agency. He had arrived there on 29th March stating that the Dalai Lama requested us for political asylum and that he expected to reach the border on the 30th March, i.e. soon after he himself had come. We received the message on the 1st. The same evening, i.e. 1st April evening, a message was received by us again via Shillong dated 1st April that the Dalai Lama with his small party of 8 had crossed into our territory on the evening of the 31st March.
Expecting that some such development might occur, we had instructed the various check-posts round about there what to do in case such a development takes place. So, when he crossed over into our territory, he was received by our Assistant Political Officer of the Tawang sub-division, which is a part of Kameng Frontier Division of the North-East Frontier Agency. A little later, the rest of his party, the entourage, came in. The total number who have come with him or after him is 80. From the 2nd evening, i.e. yesterday, we learnt that this party in two groups is moving towards Tawang, which is the headquarters of that sub-division and that he is expected to reach Tawang the day after tomorrow, Sunday, 5th evening.
On April 27, Nehru further informed the Parliament of the latest development. He declared:
I have made several statements in the House in regard to the developments in Tibet. The last statement was made on April 3, in which I informed the House that the Dalai Lama had entered the territory of the Indian Union with a large encourage. I should like to bring this information up to date and to place such additional facts as we have before the House.
A few days ago, the Dalai Lama and his party reached Mussoorie, where Government had made arrangements for their stay. I have had occasion to visit Mussoorie since then and have had a long a talk with the Dalai Lama.
In the course of the last few days, reports have reached us that considerable numbers of Tibetans, numbering some thousands, have recently crossed into the Kameng Frontier Division of the Northeast Frontier Agency and some hundreds have also entered the territory of Bhutan. They sought asylum, and we have agreed to this. Such of them as carried arms were disarmed. We do not know the exact number yet.
Temporary arrangements are being made in a camp for their maintenance until they can be dispersed in accordance with their wishes and the necessities governing such cases. We could not leave these refugees to their own resources. Apart from the humanitarian considerations involved, there was also the law and order problem to be considered. We are grateful to the Government of Assam for their help and cooperation in this matter.
"We could not leave these refugees to their own resources", said Nehru.The least India could do was to make arrangement for the refugees to settle in India. It was done during the following months and years.
The Chinese propaganda however started saying that India had 'forced' the Dalai Lama into exile. The Prime Minister had to clarify:
I need not tell the House that the Dalai Lama entered India entirely of his own volition. At no time had we suggested that he should come to India.
We had naturally given thought to the possibility of his seeking asylum in India and when such a request came, we readily granted it. His entry with a large party in a remote corner of our country created special problems of transport, organisation and security. We deputed an officer [P.N. Menon, father of the present National Security Advisor, Shiv Shankar Menon] to meet the Dalai Lama and his party at Bomdila and to escort them to Mussoorie. The particular officer was selected because he had served as Consul General in Lhasa and therefore was to some extent known to the Dalai Lama and his officials. The selection of Mussoorie for the Dalai Lama’s stay was not finalised till his own wishes were ascertained in the matter and he agreed to it. There was no desire on our part to put any undue restrictions on him, but the special circumstances, certain arrangements had necessarily to be made prevent any mishap. It should be remembered that the various events in Tibet, culminating in the Dalai Lama’s departure from Lhasa and entry into India, had created tremendous interest among the people of India and in the world press. After arrival in Mussoorie, steps were taken to prevent the Dalai Lama from being harassed by crowds of people trying to see him as well as by newspaper men. Apart from this, no restrictions about movement were placed on him. He has been told that he and his party can move about Mussoorie according to their wishes. It should be remembered that the Dalai Lama has recently not only had a long strenuous and dangerous journey, but also had harrowing experiences which must affect the nerves of even a hardened person. He is only just 24 years of age.
That was the position of the Government of India in 1959; it is still the same 53 years later. Nobody can of course stop The Global Times and the CCP's other mouthpiece to express 'their' opinion.

India still maintaining double standard toward exiled Tibetans
Global Times
Xiao Jie
2012-8-5
After the 1959 rebellion, tens of thousands of Tibetans went into exile, following the Dalai Lama, and lived as refugees in India, Nepal, and other countries. Since then, the number of exiled Tibetans in each country has varied in accordance with the political atmosphere.
As the only great power that borders China's Tibet Autonomous Region, India has always been the largest host of exiled Tibetans. India's policy toward the 100,000 or so Tibetans on its territory, both the separatist political group led by the Dalai Lama and ordinary Tibetans focusing on their daily lives, has played a large role in Sino-Indian relations.
China and India had no problem related to the issue of sovereignty in history before UK's two invasions of Tibet in 1888 and 1904. By the end of 1947, India had achieved independence and inherited British government's privilege in Tibet.
In 1951, after the PLA drove out imperialist forces from Tibet, India didn't want to give up, which negatively influenced the Sino-Indian relationship.
The first issue that was raised between China and India was Tibet. Therefore the issue is not only a territorial problem, but also reflects more widely on relations. Indian policies toward the Dalai Lama group have changed from comprehensive support to selective support.
At first, India fully supported the establishment of the "Tibetan government in exile." Then Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru visited the Dalai Lama as soon as he arrived in India.
India and China restored ambassadorial relations in 1976. But later after that, India carried out a two-track policy on the Tibetan issue.
On one hand, publicly, India didn't recognize the "Tibetan government in exile" and opposed Tibetan separatist forces. Former Indian prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited China in this period. According the talks between the two sides, India has recognized that the area known as the Tibetan Autonomous Region is part of the People's Republic of China. India will not allow anti-China political activities by Tibetan exiles.
But on the other hand, India still secretly supports or indulges separatist activities.
In 1988, then Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi visited China. The resumption of dialogue between the leaders of the two countries marked the normalization of bilateral ties. Since then, India has changed its policies toward the Dalai Lama.
A joint declaration was released after a meeting between Vajpayee and former Chinese president Jiang Zemin in 2003, in which India expressed its official position in black and white for the first time.
The Indian government exerts pressure on ordinary exiled Tibetans and uses them as a political tool. Exiled Tibetans who came to India or were born in India prior to 1979 can receive Indian residence permits. However, the residence permits must be renewed yearly.
India reserves the right to politicize the issue of exiled Tibetans, and takes ambiguous policies toward this group. For instance, the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs views exiled Tibetans as stateless persons in the immigration registration form.
Generally, Indian policies toward exiled Tibetans are in keeping with India's strategic considerations about the "Tibetan government in exile." There is contradiction between India's official "one-China" stance and actual indulgence of some Tibetans' separatist activities.
Compared to the US and Europe's interference in China's domestic affairs over the Tibetan issue, India makes fewer accusations about the internal problems of Tibet.
Because India reserves the card of exiled Tibetans for future use, it needn't take risks to interfere in China's domestic affairs.
India can already exert pressure on China merely through indulging the activities of exiled Tibetans. However, exiled Tibetans may in the longer term be a heavy burden to Indian society.
Exiled Tibetans require residence permits to find work, rent an apartment, open a bank account, and obtain identity documents.
But most of the time, these exiled Tibetans can just be hired by small business and little workshops. Compared to local people, they lack opportunities of education and employment.
Exiled Tibetans may even become a hidden danger to India's own stability in future. The separatist activities of exiled Tibetans will threaten regional security and the whole China-India relations.
The "diplomatic bonus" brought by exiled Tibetans is decreasing, whereas the benefits of cooperation between China and India is growing.
Under these circumstances, the Indian government should reconsider its policies toward exiled Tibetans. Only then will India take a responsible stance for exiled Tibetans in a real sense.
The author is an assistant researcher at the China Tibetology Research Center.

Sunday, August 5, 2012

Trading business against human rights

China says that the Foreign Trade of the Tibetan Autonomous Region is progressing well.
Obviously, this is not thanks to the trade exchanges with India. 
The border trade has been stagnating for years.
In the article on China Tibet Online, He Gang, a researcher with Tibet Academy of Social Sciences states that "Tibetan foreign trades surge benefits from the steady conditions of neighboring countries, such as Nepal." 
In fact, it is with Nepal only. The opening a Consulate of Nepal in Lhasa is probably responsible for this 'surge'.  
But is has a price. 
In April, AsiaNews reported: "To help Kathmandu restore its diplomatic missions, Beijing is financing the construction of three new buildings in the Nepalese Consulate in Lhasa (Tibet). In the rest of the world Nepal's embassies are crumbling for lack of funds. The project was recently approved. The buildings will house the residence of the consul and his staff."
Already in 2009, Beijing had announced it would pay 1,80,000 Euros for the Consulate of Nepal in the Tibetan capital. 
A Memorandum of Understanding was signed in November 2011 between Kathmandu and the Government of the Tibet Autonomous Region providing, in addition to restoration of the buildings, giving an even wider representation of the Nepalis State in Tibet. Let us not forget that Nepal is the only country which has a consulate in Tibet.
AsiaNews affirms that in Kathmandu, not everyone is happy with the latest Chinese offers; some Nepalese politicians even accused Beijing of wanting to control the bilateral relations in its favour and increase the clampdown on Tibetan exiles in Nepal.
It quoted Lok Raj Baral, former ambassador of Nepal to India: "The Maoist government should limit itself to applying for funding at home, it should not accept foreign funding for its diplomatic missions. How is it possible to defend national interests when working inside a building paid for with money from the host country? "

Bheki Bahadur Thapa, former Minister for Foreign Affairs, stated that Kathmandu is increasingly severe with the exiled Tibetans and a consulate in Lhasa built with Chinese money poses a serious risk to the lives of the Tibetans. 

As mentioned yesterday on this blog, Beijing has rejected New Delhi’s request to allow India to open a consulate in Lhasa. India’s demand was in response to China’s desire to have a consulate in Chennai. Instead, Beijing has said that Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan province, could be an alternative.
Chengdu will certainly not help 'foreign trade' with Tibet.

Beijing would perhaps grant India's demand, would New Delhi accept to restrict the Dalai Lama and the Tibetans in exile or harass them like the Nepal Government does. 
In exchange of a clampdown on the Tibetans in India, China would probably pay for a building for the Indian Consulate in Lhasa (though the old building, Dekyi Lingka still exists and still belongs to India).
But why should Delhi agree to such anti-democratic and inhuman action against the Tibetan refugees.
By the way, India is more and more frustrated with the bilateral trade talks with China, initiated by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in December 2010, when he visited New Delhi. 
During the last fiscal year ended March 31, the trade deficit of India with China jumped 42 percent to about $40 billion.
Even India’s Commerce Minister Anand Sharma said that he is 'very concerned' about the imbalance with China
Asia Pacific Finance News said: "The trade woes of India has become economic threat and the current account deficit with the world is 4.5 percent of GDP in the quarter ended March 31, which is an all-time high. This has also resulted in sharp depreciation of rupee."
A complicate issue, but its is not worth for India, trading business against human rights.

Foreign trades boost Tibetan economic growth
China Tibet Online 
Lucy Su
2012-08-03
The foreign trade of Tibet continues rising in the first half of this year with total export-import volume reaching more than 1 billion US dollars, increasing by 1.7 times from the same period last year and contributing significantly to Tibetan economic growth, according to Xinhua News Agency.
According to the statistics, local GDP of Tibet reached 28.72 billion yuan, increasing by 11.3 percent from that of the previous year; the growth rate is 3.5 percent points higher than the national average, and keeps stable growth.
"It is the surge of foreign trades that drives Tibetan local GDP growth in the first six months of 2012,” said He Gang, a researcher with Tibet Academy of Social Sciences.
According to He, Tibetan foreign trades surge benefits from the steady conditions of neighboring countries, such as Nepal.
During the first six months, Tibetan foreign trades with Nepal amounts to 530 million US dollars, increasing by 79.5 percent, according to Lhasa Custom.
The improvement of Tibetan transportation network, especially the Qinghai-Tibet Railway, and development of Tibetan characteristic and competitive industries also contribute a lot.
Meanwhile, investments also boost Tibet’s developments, thanks to a series of major projects carried out at the beginning of this year, said Dorje Dradul, deputy director general of Tibet Bureau of Statistics.

Saturday, August 4, 2012

An opportunity lost, an advantage given

My article An opportunity lost, an advantage given about the opening of an Indian Consulate in Lhasa appeared on Thursday in The Pioneer.

Click here to read...

When New Delhi decided to downgrade India's relations with Tibet, the bare minimum it could have done was to have pushed the Chinese to settle the border issue. But, Prime Minister Nehru did nothing of the kind.
If I were asked to cite the biggest blunder of Jawaharlal Nehru’s foreign policy, I would find it hard to answer, but in the end it would probably be the downgrading of the Indian Mission in Lhasa in 1952. It was the most gratuitous act done by the Indian Government.
Let us go back a bit in history...


The next day, the Chinese Government said 'no' to the proposal. 
But India should continue to insist that it is also important for Beijing.

China says no to Indian consulate in Tibetan capital
Hindustan Times
August 03, 2012
Jayanth Jacob
Beijing has rejected New Delhi’s request to allow India to open a consulate in Lhasa, the administrative capital of Tibet. India’s request, first reported by HT, was in response to China’s desire to have a consulate in Chennai. Instead, Beijing has indicated that Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan province, could be an alternative location.
Chengdu is a key economic centre of western China and a consulate here would help the ever-expanding trade ties between the two countries. There are many Indian companies operating out of Chengdu.
However, the Indian side is not willing to settle for anything other than Lhasa, with officials noting that the “Chinese would naturally place Chengdu, or even Kunming before us”.
“We have asked for the re-opening for the consulate in Lhasa. It’s given to our understanding that Beijing is not keen on having any more mission in Lhasa or in any part of the Tibet Autonomous Region. The issue of opening of new consulates in each other’s country is a matter of continuing discussion,” said an official familiar with the development.
According to diplomatic sources familiar with the developments, the Chinese don’t want more consulates in Lhasa, where only Nepal has one.
The Chinese side is wary because of a series of self-immolations in support of Tibet’s right to self-determination. These, Beijing says, were done at the behest of Dalai Lama, whom the Chinese look upon as a “splitist.”
The US has also been angling for a consulate in Lhasa. The consulates that come under the Indian embassy include Hong Kong, Guangzhou and Shanghai. 

Friday, August 3, 2012

Building bridges in Tibet

We are told that the Chinese PLA has constructed an unbelievable infrastructure leading to the borders areas in Tibet, particularly in Nyingchi Prefecture (Bayi town), north of the McMahon Line. 
On the Indian side of the border, the infrastructure remains rather poor as far construction of roads, airports, advance landing grounds and helipads is concerned.
It appears that the PLA is also good at putting up temporary infrastructure.
These photos published on the China Defence Blog show how to quickly assemble a bridge on the Roof of the World.
Can you believe that it just takes 28 minutes and 100 men to construct this bridge?
At the same time, the Chinese complain against India's plans to deploy BrahMos supersonic missiles in Arunachal Pradesh.
They say that it is a matter of 'concern'.
After the the successful testing of 290 km range BrahMos supersonic cruise missile, the Communist English Daily Global Times said "the concern is because India has declared the deployment of three groups of these missiles to enhance deterrence".
The PLA are probably unhappy with the Indo-Russian cooperation in developing the BrahMos missile.
Don't you think that instead of developing new toilets, DRDO should find ways to quickly construct basic infrastructure?

At the end, I have added a picture of the road built by the PLA when the Chinese troops invaded India in 1962. The road was constructed in 18 days from the border pass of Bumla towards Tawang.
One can still see the trace 50 years later. 
According to Major General P.J.S. Sandhu (Retd) who wrote an article entitled 1962 – Battle of Se-La and Bomdi-La (A View From the Other Side of the Hill and a Comparison with the Battle of Chosin Reservoir) in the USI Journal"
The Chinese Military Command appreciated that the Indian Army’s main defences lay at Se La and Bomdi La. The concept of operations that was evolved by the Tibetan Military District Command was to advance along different routes, encircle these two positions and reduce them subsequently. The plan was approved by Marshal Liu Bocheng, Head of a Core Group of the Central Military Affairs Commission. He outlined the strategy of concerted attacks by converging columns. Under this strategy, Indian positions were to be split into numerous segments and these were to be destroyed piecemeal. Marshal Liu compared the Indian Army dispositions with an analogy – ‘a copper head with the tail made of tin, a stiff back and a soft under belly’. After some debate, the operational concept that was evolved entailed : ‘smashing the head (Se La), cutting-off the tail (Bomdi La), snapping at the waist (Road Se La – Dirang Dzong) and dissecting the belly (Dirang Dzong).
Before 'smashing' the head, the PLA needed the Bumla-Tawang road. This explains the three-week's 'lull' after the first Chinese attack at the end of October 1962.
Road Bumla-Tawang built by China in 1962