China shifts into propaganda overdrive in pandemic era but world is beginning to see through it

Swearing by democracy? Or the Party?

My article China shifts into propaganda overdrive in pandemic era but world is beginning to see through it appeared in Firstpost.

Here is the link...

After China was not invited for Biden's 'Summit for Democracy', Beijing issued a 'White Paper' stating that it had a 'democracy that works'
China shifts into propaganda overdrive in pandemic era but world is beginning to see through it

Can we today take Chinese propaganda seriously? I don't think so. Take the issue of democracy.

On 9-10 December 2021, US President Joe Biden organised a 'Summit for Democracy’, bringing together leaders from governments, civil society, and the private sector in a "shared effort to set forth an affirmative agenda for democratic renewal and to tackle the greatest threats faced by democracies".

Communist China was not invited, but Beijing immediately issued a White Paper stating that it had a democracy that works: "Democracy is a common value of humanity and an ideal that has always been cherished by the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the Chinese people," it says in the preamble.

Is it believable? It would mean that Mao and the successive leaders of the Middle Kingdom in the 20th and the present century have been great 'democrats' (of course, the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution or the Tiananmen events are forgotten).

In a serious tone, the White Paper adds: "Since its founding in 1921, the Party has taken well-being for the Chinese people and the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation as its abiding goals, and has made continuous efforts to ensure the people’s status as masters of the country. Over the past hundred years, the Party has led the people in realizing people’s democracy in China. The Chinese people now truly hold in their hands their own future and that of society and the country."

The argument developed by the authors of the White Paper is that the Chinese 'people' are the masters of modern China and the Party line represents the essence of People's Democracy.

Unfortunately for the 'people', China has become the most 'monitored' state in the world (with North Korea), with facial recognition reigning over the Communist state and instantaneous censuring of any news or information contrary to the Party line; but Beijing continues to pretend that it is a democratic model for the world.

"Since the 18th CPC National Congress in 2012, with a deeper understanding of China's path to democracy and the political system, the Party has developed whole-process people’s democracy as a key concept and striven to translate it and relevant democratic values into effective institutions and concrete actions," argues the White Paper.

This does not explain why no Tibetan, Uyghur or Mongol has been able to make it as Secretary of the Communist Party in their respective regions; or why the Standing Committees of the regional parties are packed with Han cadres; nor why not a single minority member sits in the Politburo or why the People's Liberation Army has hardly any non-Hans at the senior operational level (without speaking of the Central Military Commission where minorities are banned).

This can probably be called 'democracy with Chinese characteristics'.

Another example, look at the fate of Peng Peng Shuai, the tennis player who disappeared in early November 2021, after writing in a Weibo post that Zhang Gaoli, former member of Standing Committee of the Politburo and and Vice-Premier, coerced her into sex. The story was immediately censored by the Chinese government. Peng dropped out from public view, before resurfacing two weeks later in state media photos and videos only. Later, she apparently denied having accused anyone of sexually assaulting her, but this incident does show China, the self-proclaimed world's greatest democracy, cannot be a role model for other states (including the US and India) as far as the place women have in the society is concerned.

China is a 'democracy' that does not like democratic symbols. In Hong Kong, where elections were recently held, after the pro-democracy leaders were put under house arrest, symbols of democracy have been systematically removed.

According to Hong Kong Free Press: "Two more Hong Kong universities have torn down monuments commemorating the Tiananmen Massacre from their campuses in the early hours. The removals came one day after the University of Hong Kong (HKU) tore down the Pillar of Shame, another Tiananmen Massacre tribute." The government used the pretext of safety issues and legal concerns.

The Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) removed the Tiananmen Lady Liberty statue in the middle of the night. The Hong Kong paper says, "A mobile crane was spotted at the scene, and workers were seen washing the floor where the statue used to stand with a high pressure washer."

There is more. A new invention of the Chinese ‘democracy’ is the emotion recognition software which "reinforces privacy rules to tackle abuse" argues The Global Times' propaganda.

On 3 March, the tabloid and mouthpiece of the Communist Party explained: "Tired and depressed after a long day's work, a man sits down and asks his smart stereo to play a song. The stereo immediately recognises his emotional state and plays him a cheerful tune. In the beautiful melody, the man is slowly rejuvenated, and his mood gradually improves."

This is great, but… worrying.

The Global Times mentions another use: "At a busy highway checkpoint, artificial intelligence (AI) pre-warning systems silently observe drivers and passengers in vehicles passing through. Seconds later, security officers stop a car with passengers looking strangely nervous and discover drugs in the car."

The tabloid admits that this incident, reminiscent of science fiction, is on the increase in daily life. "In China, emotion recognition technology is fast developing in this data and AI era boom, [it] has been widely used in various fields including health, anti-terrorism, and urban security," it says.

The White Paper speaks of a ‘Democracy That Works’. "With complete institutions and extensive participation, whole-process people’s democracy has evolved from an idea into a system and mechanism of governance that has taken root in the soil of Chinese society and become part of people’s lives. The light of democracy has illuminated China’s entire territory, allowing its people to enjoy extensive and tangible democratic rights."

Who will believe this? For decades, China has been a land of dichotomy with the government saying something and doing something else.

The White Paper says that the Chinese Constitution stipulates that all power in the People’s Republic of China belongs to the people and “China’s political power is not linked in any way with personal status, wealth, or social relations, but is equally enjoyed by all the people”. In reality, a person’s status is entirely linked to his/her complete allegiance to the Party.

Remember what happened to Liu Xiaobo, the Chinese writer, literary critic and human rights activist who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2010? Liu was arrested numerous times and described as China's most famous political prisoner for fighting for democracy. As he was dying of liver cancer, he was granted medical parole in June 2017; he left this world on 13 July 2017. He just wanted a bit of democracy in his country; he paid with his life.

Examples could be multiplied.

Having lived 47 years in chaotic, but truly democratic Bharat, every day I appreciate this not-always efficient, but ‘incredible India’.

There is no doubt that the present regime in China is fast losing its credibility and perhaps for the first time after the COVID-19 virus spread its tentacles over the planet, the world has started realising this; no amount of propaganda can cover it any more

Lessons for China

My article Lessons for China appeared in the Edit Page of The Pioneer

Here is the link...

Tsai’s presidential poll win and the Hong Kong local elections last year show the weakness of the Chinese regime, which remains dependent on propaganda and influence to bully its neighbours

The just-concluded presidential and legislative elections in Taiwan might remain a turning point in the life of not only the island but  the entire region. President Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) defeated Han Kuo-yu from China-friendly Kuomintang by more than 2.5 million votes (57.1 per cent for Tsai and 38.6 per cent for Han). The former became the first-ever candidate to capture more than eight million votes. James Soong Chu-yu, chairman of the People First Party (PFP) close to China performed poorly with only 4.2 per cent of the votes. More than 14 million (out of 19 million eligible voters) participated in the vote, which also saw the DPP retain its majority in the legislature, winning 61 out of 113 seats.
Many observers saw this as a slap in the face of China and its President Xi Jinping. The problem for Beijing is that this is a second debacle in a row — in November 2019, the Hong Kong District Council elections were held for 18 seats when a record 71 per cent of the electorate had voted. The election was viewed by many as a referendum on pro-democracy protests that continued for six months. The results came as a jolt for Beijing; the Communist regime had never expected a “tsunami” in favour of the pro-democracy movement, which took control of 17 of the18 district councils.
At first, it looked as if Beijing did not know how to react. According to The South China Morning Post: “Xinhua waited [two days] to release a two-paragraph news report on the polls. It only stated that the elections took place and 18 districts produced results.” The next day, the People’s Daily went on talking about the history of US intervention in foreign elections. In the weeks preceding the elections, the Global Times repeatedly claimed that a “silent majority” in Hong Kong was condemning the protests.
An important common factor, the country’s mobilising youth, has been pointed out by Juang Wen-jong, professor of public policy and management at Shih Hsin University in The South China Morning Post: “Young people — or those between 20 and 39 — were the key to the weekend’s elections as they made up at least 6.6 million of the eligible voters in Taiwan… They helped bolster the turnout rate, which helped increase both the vote for Tsai and her party.”
Many considered the Taiwan’s presidential election to be a proxy contest about its national identity. This probably explains why Beijing was not amused. What has made matters worse for China is that many countries sent congratulatory messages to the new Taiwanese President. “China cried foul, claiming that their actions violated the ‘one-China’ principle,” wrote the Taiwan News.
The Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) had announced that officials from some 60 countries had greeted Tsai via phone call and email. It included US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi. “In a released statement, Pompeo congratulated Tsai on her well-deserved win and praised Taiwanese voters for demonstrating the spirit of democracy.”
The word “democracy” makes China see red. China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang spoke of elections in “Taiwan region of China” and asserted that it was a “sub-national affair in China.” He added that Beijing deplores and firmly opposes “those countries” which violate the “one-China principle” by “offering the congratulations and lodged solemn representations.”
Geng declared that Beijing opposes any official relations between “the Taiwan region” and countries that have diplomatic ties with China. He asked these countries to deal with the issue “properly and with caution to avoid sending the wrong message to Taiwan’s independence forces.”
Beijing’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) released a communiqué asking Taipei to adhere to the “1992 consensus” between China and Taiwan. Ma Xiaoguang, the TAO spokesman, said: “Our political policy towards Taiwan is clear and consistent. We adhere to the basic principles of peaceful reunification; one country, two systems and one China.” We will resolutely safeguard China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, resolutely oppose any plot or act of “Taiwan independence” and resolutely promote the interests and “well-being of Taiwan compatriots.”
At the same time, Xinhua blamed Tsai and the DPP of using “dirty tactics such as cheating, repression and intimidation to get votes.” The official news agency claimed that it exposes “their selfish, greedy and evil nature.” In a Chinese language op-ed, Xinhua even accused Tsai of “buying votes and blamed the election results on external dark forces.”
The “dark forces” are obviously the “West”, which has sinned for “inventing” democracy (incidentally, is it the West which “invented” the “evil” democracy? Serious historians believe that elected village councils existed in India centuries before it was introduced in Ancient Greece).
The “two slaps” show the weakness of the Chinese regime, which depends too much on “propaganda” and “influence” to bully its neighbours — whether “Chinese ones” like Hong Kong or Taiwan or foreign ones such as Australia, Vietnam or the Philippines.
Once again, the billions of dollars used to change the mind of the voters did not help Beijing.  To the contrary, it looks as if it had the reverse effect and this may not change in the near future. Beijing is facing a dead end without even realising it.
Chinese leaders are unfortunately incapable of changing their tactics. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who was recently in India to discuss the boundary issue with the National Security Advisor, went on the same old track. In Zimbabwe during an African tour, Wang affirmed that Tsai’s win would not stop Taiwan’s reunification with the mainland: “A local election on the Taiwan island will [not] shake [China’s determination] despite erroneous words and actions by some Western politicians… The rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and the reunification across the [Taiwan] strait is inevitable. Going against the trend is bound to reach a dead end. Anyone separating the nation will stink for 10,000 years.”
Well, the human spirit for freedom and the aspiration to choose one’s own destiny is also difficult to suppress or extinguish. It is true not only for Hong Kong or Taiwan but places like Tibet and Xinjiang, too.
According to the official Tibet Daily, on January 12, the legislative branch of the Tibetan Autonomous Region voted in favour of new regulations to “strengthen ethnic unity” in Tibet. Four years ago, similar rules were introduced in Xinjiang. It was later used to justify crackdowns on the Muslim Uygur minority. But once again, it is not easy to tame the human spirit and change the hearts of the masses. Beijing will have to learn one day.

I would like to perform one Kalachakra initiation on Tiananmen

I repost an old interview with the Dalai Lama.
Eighteen years ago...
 
In 2001, I had an interview with the Dalai Lama in Dharamsala. It was published by Rediff.com.
Click here to read the interview.

March 27, 2001, Dharamsala: HP: The Little Lhasa in exile. For the past two weeks a colourful crowd of more than 10,000 devotees has followed the Dalai Lama's teachings on the Graded Path of Enlightenment. They have come from the Himalayan regions of Ladakh, Lahaul, Spiti or from the refugee settlements of South India and even from Tibet. A contingent of a few hundreds westerners have also joined in.
The day's Buddhist teachings are over and what better way to relax and recover from these intense days of concentration and prayers, but to attend the annual Tibetan opera festival at the Tibetan Institute of Performing Arts, a mile away from McLeod Ganj, the Tibetan village with a British name.
It is here that the Dalai Lama receives Claude Arpi, a couple of days before leaving for another hectic 12 day journey to the Chinese 'rebel' island of Taiwan. He also explains the dichotomy between the real Karmapa and his rival. A Rediff exclusive. 

On the occasion of the Tiananmen Day, here is an extract of the interview:

Could you envisage a day when you will perform the Kalachakra puja in Tiananmen Square?

Oh, yes.

Do you think lakhs of Chinese would come to listen to Buddhist teachings?

Yes. In fact, after the events in Tiananmen Square (in 1989), I felt that one day in the future, I would like to perform one Kalachakra initiation on Tiananmen in order to purify the area and help the people who died. This desire or vision is still there with me.

When you read the recently released the Tiananmen Papers, you see the leadership living in constant fear. Is it why they do not want to handle the Tibetan case?

More than 15 years ago, I met an old French diplomat, a friend of mine, he told me the Chinese Communist leaders fear religion, they fear Buddhism.

There is some substance in this and, of course, with the public interest for Marxist ideology decreasing, and the interest for spirituality (including the Falun Gong) increasing, naturally, the fear increases. Though (religious) practice is prohibited, it is today spontaneously increasing (in spite of the ban), so it is obviously causing fear.

Some sources say the Chinese leadership has no confidence in you. Is it true?

Yes, they think I am a very cunning, a very clever man. And on top of that they believe I am colluding with the Western powers to 'split' China. (Laughs).

Xi Jinping and the return of Mao

As President Xi Jinxing arrives in India for the BRICS Summit in Goa, weird information has recently come from China about the revival of the cult of Mao Zedong. It is usually linked to democracy and the role of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in the Middle Kingdom.
For Beijing, democracy is not a good system.
Watching the US presidential campaign makes you wonder if the Communist leadership does not have a point.
In July 2014, an article published in The Qiushi, the organ of the CPC’s Central Committee, termed Western democracy as ‘chaotic’.
The article expounded: “The West, in particular the U.S., emerged as the triumphant side in the post-Cold War world and then promoted the so-called Third Wave of ‘Democratization’ in the world. Some twenty years later, the records of the democracies that the U.S. exported are totally lackluster.”
It quoted The Economist which asked, "What’s gone wrong with democracy?" The London’s publication provided the answer: "Democracy’s global advance has come to a halt, and may even have gone into reverse."
For The Qiushi, “in west democracy it has become a norm to canvass for votes through the use of illegal bribes. …The ultimate goal of political parties is to court votes. …To win more votes, they would do their best to cater to voters in elections, which lead to illegal bribes for votes as a norm.”
A second argument is added “as the U.S. Democratic and Republican Parties are tit-for-tat in the budget battle, resulting in delays in passing the budget act, and the federal government has to close down its non-core departments.”
The piece asserted that money is mother’s milk for ‘the game of democracy’: “The West has always preached that Western capitalist democracy is sacred and equal, and that the process is fair. In fact, money, business, media and vested interests groups often manipulate Western-style democracy.”
And it goes on like this.
Watching a debate between Donald Trump and Hilary Clinton or listening to a speech of President Rodrigo Duterte makes one feel that the Chinese may be right about ‘democracy’.
But is the authoritarian Chinese system really better?
The answer is ‘no’, it is worse.
In China, the power struggle is more accentuated and there is no corrective remedy such as the next elections in the West (or India). Further, the so-called intraparty elections are not free from corruption.
Recently 45 deputies from Liaoning province were thrown out after several candidates were found to have paid a bribe to get elected in the local assembly (and then to the National People’s Congress).
The South China Morning Post reported: “The expulsion of dozens of National People’s Congress [NPC] deputies from Liaoning province was triggered by the lower-level, provincial legislature’s rejection three years ago of NPC candidates recommended by Beijing.”
The Hong Kong newspaper speaks of “unprecedented, large-scale vote rigging in the Liaoning People’s Congress in 2013 [which] saw NPC candidates favoured by the party leadership fail to win election,” it added: “The scale of the scandal, which saw the party’s preferred candidates lose out to ones backed by bribe-paying business chiefs, had alarmed the party leadership, and if not addressed had threatened to undermine party general secretary Xi Jinping’s game plan for the party’s national congress late next year.”
A pro-mainland Hong Kong newspaper Sing Pao published a surprising commentary implicating Zhang Dejiang, the NPC’s Chairman (and No 3 in the Party’s hierarchy) as responsible for the Liaoning election bribery case. The commentary pointed out that Zhang Dejiang, being under former President Jiang Zemin’s ‘protection umbrella’, does not have “to face the consequences for his failures.”
The Hong Kong media also reported that the combined wealth of China’s 70 richest NPC deputies is more than that of all 535 members of the United States Congress, plus the US president and members of his cabinet.
China can’t really throw stones at the West.
In this context it is interesting to looks at the revival of the Cult of Chairman Mao, which seems to attract the masses.
Early this year in Henan province, some overzealous villagers and businessmen erected a statue of Mao. It was over 36 meters tall, painted gold; The People’s Daily Online said that it cost nearly half a billion dollars (it must have been rich villagers!).
The statue was to commemorate the Great Helmsman’s life.
As often, the social media mocked the giant statue, especially as the Henan province was one of the worse sufferers during the Great Leap Forward during which tens of millions of Chinese died due to Mao’s follies.
A few weeks later, the statue of Mao Zedong was demolished, showing the contradictions within the Chinese society and the Party.
According to London-based The Daily Mail: “the rise and fall of the Mao monument in central China's rural Henan province highlights the political sensitivities in the country surrounding a historical figure alternatively revered and criticized by both the public and the government.”
The People's Daily bluntly noted that the statue “may have lacked approval from cultural management authorities, though it also cited an official as saying that did not appear to be the reason.”
Nobody was ready to comment further.
Earlier, The Global Times had mentioned the construction of the statue, but had commented: “Building Mao temples is not encouraged by the central government or local authorities"
The same Global Times reported that Mao worship is becoming increasingly common in rural China, and ardent Mao followers are pushing for December 26, his birthday, to become a public festival.
Amazingly, replicas of mangoes distributed by Mao are given as rewards to loyal workers: “they’re traded at a few hundred dollars. Original Mao badges are prized possessions of some collectors,” says The Daily Beast in a long piece on the former Chinese leader.
The New York-based publication gives another example, the melting of a 50-kilo solid gold Mao: “It was unveiled at a Shenzhen art exhibition in December 2013, meant to commemorate the man’s 120th birthday. Producing the piece required eight months of work by over 20 artists who shaped gold, carved jade, and set precious stones. In all, the statue cost over $15 million.”
The Wall Street Journal explains: “In the west, Mao is understood chiefly as China’s ‘Red Emperor’ — a vicious dictator who fostered an extreme personality cult, launched the disastrous Cultural Revolution and masterminded a ‘Great Leap Forward’ that resulted in the worst famine in history. Experts estimate that Mao was responsible for between 40 million and 70 million deaths in peacetime — more than Hitler and Stalin combined. While Hitler and Stalin were repudiated, it is not the case for Mao.

Will Mao return?
However, Mao may not stage a comeback on China’s political stage for one reason.
Xi Jinping has not forgotten the fate of his father, China’s Vice-Premier Xi Zhongxun.
In the Fall of 1962, during the Tenth Plenum of the 8th Party’s Congress, Mao violently attacked Xi Sr, accusing him of supporting the rehabilitation of Gao Gang, a Communist Party leader who has been purged in 1949. Machiavellian Kang Sheng led the charge; he announced that Xi Sr. had been investigated for his ‘anti-party activities’.
Dr. Li Zhuixi, Mao’s personal physician later wrote: “Kang Sheng's investigations implicated more than three hundred cadres from the party, government, and military.” This included Xi Zhongxun.
Dr. Li continued: “I knew Xi Zhongxun well, and the charges against him and his supporters were fabricated. But Kang Sheng's job was to depose and destroy his fellow party members, and his continuing ‘investigations’ of ranking party leaders in the early 1960s laid the groundwork for the attacks of the Cultural Revolution to come.”
Subsequently, Xi Jinping’s father disappeared from public view for 16 years. When Xi Sr. was ignominiously purged, the future President was just 9 year old. Such a trauma for a kid!
Xi Jr. knows that his father’s main ‘crime’ was to have been associated with Marshal Peng Dehuai, the courageous solitary critic of Mao during the Great Leap Forward.
Xi may today use some of the Great Helmsman’s slogans, but will never rehabilitate him. The return of Mao’s cult is nevertheless rather worrying at a time China is struggling to become a ‘normal’ State. It simply shows that China is searching for a role model, which the Party is unable to provide.

Tibetan Democracy: random thoughts

Democracy: something one may not see in Tibet soon

Some thoughts about the recent Tibetan elections

Elections for the post of Sikyong (Prime Minister of the CTA) as well for Assembly of Tibetan People’s Deputies were recently held.
As someone who has been following ‘Tibetan affairs’ for the last 45 years, I wish put down in writing some my thoughts on the recent election of the Sikyong, which has attracted a lot of ink in the media (and keyboarding on the Net).
Let us start by a small telling observation: the social networks have played a role like never before in the election process. This can have negative or positive features, but, overall, it should be seen as a sign of growing awareness and active involvement of the Tibetan society in their leader’s election. As Tibet-in-exile is a free society, this should be encouraged, with self-restraint, of course.
Looking back, since 1959, His Holiness the Dalai Lama (HHDL) can claim, in my opinion, three great achievements in the political field:

• HHDL reunited the different parts of Tibet (let us not forget that in October 1950, when the Communist troops entered ‘Tibet’, they crossed the Upper Yangtze (Drichu). It means that, territories east of the Drichu were not de facto under the control of Lhasa). Today, the map of Tibet with the 3 provinces of U-Tsang, Kham and Amdo is accepted by all Tibetans; it was not the case in the 1950s. It is a historic achievement.
• HHDL reunited the different schools of Buddhism. Historically, Tibet has witnessed a lot of conflicts between the different religious schools. HHDL has given a voice to all the schools (including the Bon faith). This is an important progress.
• In March 2011, HHDL offered full democracy to the People of Tibet. This is an earth-shaking change for the Tibetan nation.

The recent elections are the result of this gift from HHDL.

Democracy as a system
Democracy cannot be said to be a perfect system, but it has good features as well as not so good ones. It is however far superior to the one-party system prevalent in Modern China.
Beijing is often pointing to the failures of the Western democracies, but its own system is today on the brink of collapsing; as a result, more and more repressions have to be applied to keep it going.
Democracy is sometimes chaotic (we can see this every day in India), but it ultimately brings a sort of stability in the society and the possibility for what Communist China calls ‘the masses’, to express themselves and change their leaders when they are unhappy or deceived. In other words, the voice of the ‘common men and women’ can be heard.
The system of rule by reincarnations was a poor system of governance:

• It left a gap of 20 odd years between two reincarnations/political leaders
• It was subject to manipulation by external forces (eg: the cases of the 10th and 11th Panchen Lama)
• In the interregnum, Tibet has often had mediocre regents, unable to give a lead to the nation (during the interregnum of the 14th Dalai Lama, the power struggle between 2 regents was so bad that it nearly lead Tibet to a civil war).
• Just take the 19th century, the Manchus fully used the fact that the 9th, 10th, 11th and 12th Dalai Lamas passed away too early to rule, to ‘return’ to Tibet.

A modern nation can't afford such an antiquated system.
Therefore ‘democracy’, though imperfect, is the best system until the human society reaches the level of a Gnostic or Spiritual Society, where the ‘wisest’ will automatically come to the fore to organize the public life. It may take some time.

Present Sikyong Elections

• Tibet had the good luck to have a remarkable man elected as the first Kalon Tripa. It was Tibet’s good karma.
• It is important to keep in mind that this does not mean that the ‘best man’ is automatically and always taking the right decision for his people (remember the Greek Gods who often led their people to their doom).
• On the other hand, even if an elected leader is not perfect, it does not mean that the system is not good and in this particular case, that Tibet should not continue with this system of governance.
• Usually, in other societies (for example in India), anti-incumbency plays an important role to bring fresh blood into the system.
• Things are different in the Tibetan society where there is an immense respect for the established hierarchy. In fact, many believe that the Dalai Lama had to ‘force democracy’ down reluctant Tibetan throats; everybody was quite happy to depend on their wise leader to guide and tell them what to do with their lives; ultimately, it does not empower the ‘people’.
• It is true that even in exile, a deep veneration for the leader/lamas has remained ingrained in the Tibetan psyche. It should not stop people to have an independent thinking of their own.
• At the beginning of the campaign of this election, it is interesting to note that there was no anti-incumbency vote; this partially explains Lobsang Sangay’s high score in the first round.
• During the campaign for the second round, it is regrettable that the debate did not reach the expected level; however, on the positive side, it has been one of the few opportunities for the Tibetan society to debate the functioning of its administration and point a finger at what was considered wrong or unacceptable.
• At the same time, the election process should not be an excuse for ‘regionalism’ to return as a plague for the Tibetan nation. Regionalism apparently played an important role in the recent election. There is nothing wrong in regional representation, but regional favoritism should be avoided at all cost by the new leadership. It has not always been the case. I believe HHDL said this to the 2 candidates in no uncertain terms.
• To an outsider, the CTA seems to be a very opaque organization. Instead of openly debating serious (and sometimes negative) issues facing the society in general, these problems are often kept under wraps (I remember the case of a Tibetan who had raped a girl in a Tibetan settlement; the first ‘official’ reaction was to hush up the incident, because “it is not good for the cause”. But a rape is a rape, whether committed by a French, a Chinese or a Tibetan and it should be denounced with full vigour). One could give many other such cases.
• It is true that some of the arguments/points mentioned during the campaign should have come out earlier during the term of the Sikyong (particularly the issues raised by Kasur Dicki Chhoyang). However, apart from the debate at the Assembly, there are very few opportunities for the ‘common man’ to express himself or know what is happening behind the opaque curtains of Gangkyi.
• In this context, it is interesting to note that the incumbent Sikyong did not fare well in Gangkyi area. There is obviously a trust issue which needs to be looked at and ironed out.
• In the future the press should take a more active role and openly speak of the thorny political issues facing the society. For example, the problem of ‘health services’ recently brought up by HHDL should have been raised long ago by a vibrant media.
• Old Tibet had ‘street songs’ making fun or criticizing the leaders/lamas, what is replacing this today?
• Personally, I feel that it is wrong for the gods or the ‘protectors’ to interfere in the ‘common man’s elections. Without judging the former’s competence and knowledge of geopolitics (or just in politics), the time has come for ‘common men’ to think for themselves; keeping in mind that in some cases they may take the wrong decisions, the ‘masses’ should be empowered (even if that means having different perspectives than HHDL). It is what China will never be able to do; the present regime can built beautiful modern airports, safe highways or comfortable five-star hotels, but people are not allowed to think on their own.
• More important than to take the right or wrong decisions, it is essential to learn from past errors and avoid the same mistakes in the future.
• The Buddha taught his disciples: 'As the wise test gold by burning, cutting and rubbing it on a piece of touchstone, so are you to accept my words only after examining them and not merely out of regard for me."
• Democracy likewise should be burnt, cut, rubbed and tested again and again and ultimately perfected. External interference cannot help much the empowerment of the Tibetan society.

It may be possible to avoid the ‘boxing’ encounters during the campaign; it is happening in most democracies: just look at the present US Presidential Elections campaign. It is part of the ‘imperfection’ of the system, simply because our societies (and the human composing them) are imperfect.
One has to make with it, and just get the best of it.

How to make the Tibetan Administration more transparent?

• The Tibetans should have a vibrant, independent and fearless press (including investigative journalism). For this, the Tibetan mindset has to change; criticism should be taken as an occasion to ‘change’. The society does need to wait to receive ‘critics’ from HHDL or other religious leaders; the Tibetan should become more ‘positively’ critical.
• Take the example of the recently released ‘Panama Papers’, it is ‘positive’ criticism, which will hopefully help the world to be more just.
• Implement an RTI Act for the CTA. It would go a long way to better understand the opaque functioning of the CTA. Once again, cases such as the one mentioned by HHDL for the health facilities in the Tibetan settlements could have been raised much earlier and taken care of.
• Women should play a more important role in the Sikyong elections (why not have 50% female Kalons?). In a modern society, women are often able to give a lead that a man is unable to provide.

Tasks in front of the new Sikyong

• Hopefully the new Sikyong will be able to fit the description given by Kasur Dicki Chhoyang at the time of her resignation. The Kasur also raised the issue of regionalism vs unity of Tibet; this should be taken seriously.
• The new Sikyiong’s choice for the next Kalons should be dictated only by what is the best for the Tibetans in exile and the Tibetans inside Tibet and not by personal acquaintances or personal preferences.
• The new Kalons should be role models for the Tibetans inside Tibet (and the Chinese government).
• The new Sikyong should establish a close connection and understanding with the Government of India at all levels, in all domains.
• He should be in touch with what is happening in Tibet and China and provide an alternative to the Chinese schemes or at least comment on it (for example when the Chinese provide a database of the ‘Living Buddhas’ or when the Chinese invade Tibet bringing tens of millions of tourists on the plateau).
• Why not have a Department headed by a Kalon for ‘Inside Tibet’ Affairs?
• And if the Chinese do something good, why not say it!
• Since several years, the Chinese have always been a few steps in advance on Dharamsala in terms of information/propaganda. It is sad.
• The new Sikyong should take more responsibilities; since HHDL has delegated his political power, the new elected leader should act as a leader on his own (always keeping the general good in mind).
• Human resources should not vanish under the US/European sky, but remain in India and work for the general good of the Tibetan community.
• The CTA needs to have a think-tank which ‘thinks’ of solutions for the future of the Tibetan nation
• The CTA also needs a good professional spokesperson who will be able to articulate the policies of the CTA (after these policies are decided); particularly the policies vis-à-vis China. He should also be able to tackle difficult questions on the life of the society in exile.

These are some of my thoughts.
Tibetan democracy is clearly going through a period of apprenticeship; overall it is doing fairly well.
The most important task is to empower the ‘common man/woman’.

Tibet is learning the tricks of democracy

Penpa Tsering, Lobsang Sangay, The Dalai Lama

My article Tibet is learning the tricks of democracy appeared in The Daily Mail.

Here is the link...

The ballots have spoken. Lobsang Sangay, the incumbent Tibetan prime minister, has been re-elected as ‘Sikyong’ (Political Leader) to lead the Tibetan refugees during the next five years.
In the old days, the State Oracle would speak to the ‘Spiritual Leader’, that is, the Dalai Lama, and give him directions on how to conduct state affairs.
Now times have changed, and though some might miss the past democracy is more fitting for a modern state - so the Dalai Lama decided in March 2011.
Incumbent Tibetan PM Lobsang Sangay, pictured with the Dalai Lama, has a lot riding on him

Democracy
The uncontested leader of Tibet thought that the time had come for Tibet to become an ordinary democracy led by a leader chosen by the people, instead of a divine incarnation ruling by virtue of his birthright. It was a great move from the Dalai Lama - and it annoyed Beijing immensely.
The current Chinese leadership does not believe in democracy. Though the Communist Party rules on behalf of the ‘people’, the masses’ participation is absolutely unwarranted.
The official results will only be declared by the exiled Tibetan Election Commission on April 27, but private websites give Lobsang Sangay 33,234 votes, while his opponent Penpa Tsering gets only 24,752 in his favour — out of some 90,000 registered voters.
The beauty of democracy is often the anti-incumbency factor against politicians in power. But things are different in Tibet, where there is immense respect for the established hierarchy. In fact, many believe that the Dalai Lama had to ‘force democracy’ down reluctant throats.
During the recent campaign, Tibetans realised the not-so-nice aspects of the process. This probably explains the reaction of Professor Samdhong Rinpoche, the first directly elected prime minister. He told a Delhi newspaper that he boycotted the election process because the campaign had moved away from the ideals.
“The exiled government was based on the principles of Swaraj of Mahatma Gandhi. It didn’t involve competition or opposition,” he observed.
Well, democracy is democracy, with its good and bad intact. The Dalai Lama laughed when he asked the two candidates during an audience: ‘How is the boxing match’?
At the end of the campaign, out of the blue, Dicki Chhoyang, the Canada-based minister of information and international relations, resigned and declared her intention to vote for Tsering.
In her statement, she enumerated ‘some personal character traits’ which she considered important for the Sikyong. Her list was interesting: Motivation and dedication to the collective interest, the ability to think holistically and with long-term vision, to be honest, a team player, to value substance over appearance, etc.

Qualities
Was the incumbent prime minister lacking these qualities? Now that the people have spoken, one can only hope that the entire community will unite around the new Sikyong.
True, everything is not perfect in the exiled Tibetan society, but where does a perfect society exist? A few days after the final vote, the Dalai Lama spoke of the deplorable health conditions in some Tibetan settlements in India, and asked the new administration to provide better care and services to them.
“Feel-good appearances will not help. That will be empty glory,” he added.

Future
Another area the Sikyong will have to take a serious look at is the happenings in Tibet.
Dissensions have recently appeared in the Chinese leadership. The South China Morning Post reported that Zhu Weiqun, the interlocutor of the Dalai Lama’s Special Envoys and a hardliner on Tibet affairs, has been accused of taking huge bribes “to grant approvals for people to become Living Buddhas”.
The Hong Kong daily quotes an overseas Chinese website, Bowen Press, which believes that Zhu is under investigation for allegedly granting the status of ‘Living Buddha’ (reincarnated lamas) in exchange for cash.
If proved true, this is a big development. Zhu, after all, had advocated that the Communist Party was the sole authority to decide the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama and pledged to strictly follow policies.
In many fields, the Chinese leadership is steps ahead of Dharamsala. Take the flooding of the plateau with mainland tourists, which has irreversibly changed the ‘Roof of the World’. More than 50 million annual visitors have been the pretext for expanding border infrastructure - hurriedly constructed railways, roads and airports… all leading to India.
The new leader will have to be able to take up these issues with New Delhi and Beijing. The fact that the Dalai Lama has ‘imposed’ a democratic system is important for India. It corresponds to India’s value system. It should definitively be encouraged by Delhi, and with the Dalai Lama getting older, it is crucial to have a solid interlocutor, someone who can speak on behalf of the Tibetan community and have influence in Tibet.
Will Lobsang Sangay fit the bill? Only the future will tell.

From Theocracy to Democracy

My review of H.H. the Dalai Lama XIV: My Appeal to the World appeared in 
Mail Today a few days ago. 

Innumerable books have been published about the remarkable life of Tenzin Gyatso, the 14th Dalai Lama of Tibet. The one written  by French Sanskrit scholar Sofia Stril-Rever (H.H. the Dalai Lama XIV: My Appeal to the World) is however special as it deals the political Statements pronounced by the Tibetan leader, every March 10, from 1961 until 2011.
Year after year, the Statements highlight the achievements not only of the Buddhist monk, but also the struggle of his people to survive under Chinese occupation or in exile.
On March 10, 2011, the ‘simple monk’ as he likes to call himself, pronounced his last Statement as he renounced his temporal power. As Stril-Rever notes, this marks ‘the end of the political authority of the Dalai Lamas’: “The speech was short, …eighteen minutes that have radically changed nearly four hundred years of Tibetan history.”
Ever since the Great Fifth Dalai Lama was given in 1642, the temporal and spiritual responsibility to lead the people of Tibet, the Dalai Lamas have ruled over the Roof of the World.
Why this ‘ritual’ statement every March 10?
On that day in 1959, the Tibetan ‘masses’ rose against the Chinese invaders and ‘with their bodies’ protected their beloved leader, who had been invited for a performance in the PLA garrison in Lhasa. The entire population of Lhasa stopped the Dalai Lama to attend the Chinese show, especially ‘without his usual Corps of Body Guards.’
Since then, March 10 is termed ‘Tibetan Uprising Day’.
The greatest lie of Communist China has been to make the world believe that Mao and his colleagues just wanted to ‘liberate’ the Tibetan people from the oppression of the aristocracy and the clergy.
During the days following the Uprising, according to Chinese figures, 87,000 Tibetans were killed for resisting the so-called Liberation. Ultimately on March 28, Beijing proclaimed ‘The Serfs are emancipated’ and since then, China celebrates the day as the ‘Serf’s Emancipation Day’.
What a price to be emancipated!
Stril-Rever’s work highlights each March 10 Statement by giving a detailed commentary on the existing situation, a few times with some minor inaccuracies, (a big one is that Tawang is not ‘a Tibetan village’).
It makes fascinating reading because it shows the evolution of a two-thousand old nation, which in 50 years is metamorphosed from a theocracy with all its imperfections into a modern State with democratic institutions.
Though not often reported by the world media, the Dalai Lama’s first and greatest gift to the Tibetan people is undoubtedly ‘Democracy’.
This collection of the March 10 Statements is the Tibetan leader’s log on this arduous path, often struggling against his own people, reluctant democrats. But, year after year, the persevering Dalai Lama managed to force into the Tibetans’ mind, the necessity of a more modern governance system.
Tenzin Gyatso knew that if ‘democracy’ was not imposed, after his passing into the Eternal Fields, Tibet would have two Dalai Lamas, like there is today two Panchen Lamas. The temptation would be too strong for political leaders in Beijing, to not choose ‘their’ own candidate.
This explains why the Dalai Lama recently told the BBC “The Dalai Lama institution will cease one day. These man-made institutions will cease.”
Soon after the events of March 10, 1959, the Dalai Lama secretly left Lhasa and took the direction of India and finally crossed the border, north of Tawang on March 30. During the following months, some 80,000 Tibetans joined him and settled in India.
On April 29, 1959 from the hill station of Mussoorie, the Dalai Lama formed a Tibetan Government-in-Exile, also known as the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA); a year later the CTA moved to Dharamsala, where it is still located.
The process of democratization then started. As a first step, on September 2, 1960, the Tibetan parliament-in-exile, then called ‘Commission of Tibetan People’s Deputies’, came into being.
On 10 March 1961, in his first Statement, the Dalai Lama formulated a draft Constitution of Tibet, incorporating traditional Tibetan values and modern democratic norms. Two years later, it was promulgated as the Tibetan Constitution-in-Exile.
The process continued during the following years; in 1990, the Tibetan Parliament was empowered to elect the Kashag or the Council of Ministers, which was made answerable to the Parliament. A Supreme Justice Commission was also instituted.
The newly-empowered Parliament soon drafted a new Constitution, known as the Charter of the Tibetans in Exile which defines the role of the three organs of the government: judiciary, legislature and executive. Today, the CTA functions as any democratic government. This fact deeply irritates China, which is still governed by a one-Party system.
The Dalai Lama has often had to fight to impose these democratic institutions on the Tibetan ‘masses’, who often thought that “the Dalai Lama is wiser, why do we need a human governance, when we have a divine one?”
But it shows the wisdom and the vision of the Tibetan leader, who knows that in the long run, democracy is a more stable system.
This book is a good addition to the large collection on the Dalai Lama; it documents a rare historical process, whereby a theocrat par excellence, decides to be the father of the democracy for his own nation.
What makes China so angry with the Tibetan leader is that Beijing is unable to follow his footsteps.
A Foreword of Prof. Robert Thurman is always a plus.

The Dalai Lama: Three Commitments and Three Choices

As Tenzin Gyatso, the Fourteenth Dalai Lama celebrates his 80th Birthday today, let us come back on his Three Commitments and Three Choices he made in his life.


The Dalai Lama’s Three Commitments
The Dalai Lama has 3 commitments in life.
The first one is the promotion of human values such as compassion, forgiveness, tolerance, contentment and self-discipline. He often speaks of ‘secular ethics’. For the past 2 decades, wherever he travels, he shares these human values. One remarkable fact about the Dalai Lama is that he is able to place ‘humanity’ before his own self, before his own community and even his own nation.
For his second commitment is not Tibet, he wants to work for the promotion of religious harmony and understanding among the world’s major religious traditions. Are there many religious leaders in today’s world who are ready to admit: ‘several truths, several religions are necessary?’
His country is only his third commitment (he always insists on this order); he says: “as a Tibetan [who] carries the name of the ‘Dalai Lama’, Tibetans place their trust in me. Therefore, [my] third commitment is to the Tibetan issue.” It is however true that for the past 50 years, the Tibetan issue, though a cause célèbre, has not progressed much.
Apart from these 3 commitments, the 14th Dalai Lama will go down in history for three bold, one could say visionary, choices he has made for Tibet.

His first gift to the Tibetan Nation: Democracy
Following the Tibetan Uprising of March 1959, the Dalai Lama secretly left Lhasa and took the direction of India. He crossed the border at Khenzimane, north of Tawang on March 30, 1959.
During the following months, some 80,000 Tibetans joined him and settled in India, Nepal and Bhutan.
On April 29, 1959 from the hill station of Mussoorie, the Dalai Lama formed a Tibetan Government-in-Exile, also known as the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA); a year later the CTA moved to Dharamsala, where it is still located.
The process of democratization then started. What he couldn’t do during the 9 preceding years in Tibet due to Chinese objection, the Dalai Lama could now work on: insufflating modern democratic practices into the old theocracy; the Tibetan leader did not want to be the last word for each and every political decision. As a first step, on September 2, 1960, the Tibetan parliament-in-exile, then called ‘Commission of Tibetan People’s Deputies’, came into being.
On 10 March 1961, the Dalai Lama formulated a draft Constitution of Tibet, incorporating traditional Tibetan values and modern democratic norms. Two years later, it was promulgated as the Tibetan Constitution-in-Exile.
The process continued during the following years; in 1990, the Tibetan Parliament was empowered to elect the Kashag or the Council of Ministers, and was made answerable to the Parliament. A Supreme Justice Commission was also instituted.
The newly-empowered Parliament soon drafted a new Constitution, known as the Charter of the Tibetans in Exile. Today, the CTA functions as any democratic government. This fact deeply irritates China, which is still governed by a one-Party system.
The Tibetan Charter adheres to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and provides equal rights for all, without discrimination on the basis of sex, religion, race, language and social origin. It also defines the role of the three organs of the government: judiciary, legislature and executive as well as the statuary bodies, namely the Election Commission, the Public Service Commission and the Office of the Auditor General.
In March 2011, the Dalai Lama renounced temporal power and handed it over to an elected leader.
What is remarkable through this process is that the Dalai Lama has had to fight to ‘impose’ these democratic institutions on the Tibetan ‘masses’, who often thought that “the Dalai Lama is wiser, why do we need a human governance, when we have a divine one?”
But it shows the wisdom and the vision of the Tibetan leader, who knows that in the long run, democracy is a more stable system.

Stopping divisive sectarian practices
A not-too-well known choice that the Dalai Lama made was to stop the cult of Dorje Shugden. You may have seen pictures of vociferous and excited groups of Westerners, dressed in Tibetan monks, shouting slogans against the Dalai Lama, wherever he goes in Europe or America (and more recently in Australia). People often ask, but who are they? They are the followers of an old Tibetan spirit called Dorje Shugden, who worked for the supremacy of the Dalai Lama’s Yellow Sect over other schools of Tibetan Buddhism.
The Dalai Lama has always professed that the 4 Buddhist schools in Tibet and the indigenous Bon faith should be treated at par.
It was a courageous choice, because some conservative forces believed that the supremacy of the Yellow Sect should continue.
There is another interesting aspect to the issue.
Who is behind these well-organized sectarian groups?
It is necessary to go to Tibet to understand.
The Dungkar Monastery is located some 13 kilometers north of Yatung, where the Kailash yatris recently spent a night. Last year, Xinhua reported: “In June 2014, with the support of the local government, 7.9 million yuan was allocated to repairing the monastery.” In other words, the monastery has been rebuilt by the Chinese government. Interestingly, the Dungkar monastery has traditionally been a center for the Dorje Shugden cult in Shigatse Prefecture.
But Dungkar is not the only monastery to have been ‘renovated’. Last month, the Chinese-selected Panchen Lama (Gyalsten Norbu) spent time at the Ganden Sumtsenling Monastery in Gyalthang (Shangrila), the largest Tibetan-Buddhist temple in Yunnan. The monastery has also been restored with government’s funds; here too, it is closely associated with the Shugden practice. But that is not all.
Last year, the Lhasa government announced that the ‘maintenance’ of the Chamdo Jampaling Monastery, which had received some 90 million yuan (14 million U.S. dollars), was nearly completed. Xinhua then explained: “It is one of the key projects in Tibet during the 12th Five-Year Plan.” And guess what? It has been the main centers for the Shudgen cult in the Chamdo Prefecture of the TAR.
Obviously, Shugden centers have some sort of priority for funds allocations under the Chinese Five-Year Plan.
Many believe that the demonstrations by Western monks are also sponsored by Beijing. It is difficult to prove, but it needed courage on the part of the Dalai Lama to renounce the supremacy of his own sect. Here too, Beijing does not appreciate the fact.

The Last Dalai Lama
A third important choice was his decision to terminate the lineage of the Dalai Lamas.
In December 2014, the Buddhist leader told the BBC that it “would be better that the centuries-old tradition [of having a Dalai Lama] ceased at the time of a popular Dalai Lama.”
The present Dalai Lama knows that the rule of the Dalai Lamas over Tibet, is a flawed system of governance for a modern State. In the past, it has failed Tibet for several reasons.
First, one is never sure that the choice of a new reincarnated lama is the right one. During some troubled periods of Tibetan history, the Mongols or the Manchu dynasty did use their influence for imposing ‘their’ choice.
Then, there is a gap of 20 odd years, between the death of a Lama and the time when his reincarnation is able to take over the job; during the interregnum, the Tibetan nation was often left without governance.
Should the system continue, it is certain that there will be 2 Dalai Lamas a few years after the death of the present hierarch: one enthroned by the Party in Beijing and one recognized by the Tibetans. The temptation will be too strong for the political leadership in Beijing not to choose ‘their’ candidate. But it needed guts to take this decision.
The 3 choices made by the Dalai Lama during his life in exile will help Tibet to become a truly modern nation in the future. Not surprisingly, these choices are not acceptable to China.

Makings of a serious mass movement

My article (Edit Page) entitled Makings of a serious mass movement appeared yesterday in The Pioneer.


Here is the link...

Pro-democracy activists in Hong Kong believe that, in ‘One Country, Two Systems', the second part of the promise is more important than the first. Beijing’s emphasis on the first has left them disturbed

On October 1, the People’s Republic of China’s founding day, Zhang Xiaoming, director of Beijing’s liaison office in Hong Kong, told the media with a smile, “The sun rises as usual”. This was an indirect comment on the Occupy Central movement in Hong Kong. Is it only wishful thinking from Beijing?
Three days later, Xinhua published an article accusing the Western media of carrying biased articles on the recent protests in Hong Kong and “promoting democracy”. The Chinese news agency writes that the Occupy Central movement in Hong Kong is one example of the West’s partiality. The article blasted the US “for providing media and financial support” to the protest movement; it further warned that, as the “color” revolutions in Egypt, Thailand, Libya, and Ukraine, all assisted by the West, ended up in domestic chaos and social turmoil, a “Hong Kong Spring” would inevitably lead to a similar situation.
Nobody can deny that the change of regimes in the above examples brought instability to their respective countries, but there is another side to the coin.  First, contrary to what Beijing believes, democracy does not belong to the West or the United States; it is a universal value practised the world over (though not in China as yet). India practised it since times immemorial. Was not Suddhodana, the Buddha’s father the ‘elected’ raja of the Sakyas? The small republics of northern India were ruled in a ‘democratic’ way, long before the US existed, so why always associate democracy with the West.
Then, the Indian experience shows that democracy can deliver a strong and decisive leader who, with the backing of the masses, can lead the nation. Beijing should have noticed this when Mr Xi Jinping visited India!
Recently again, President Xi Jinping dismissed the notions of ‘Western-style’ political reform for China and affirmed the importance of one-party rule for China.
One can however seriously ask: Can the scheme, ‘One Country, Two Systems’, work? Can there be ‘Two Chinas’? One communist and the other democratic? This question is crucial not only for China’s future, but for Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia too, aspiring to ‘another system’, if not a separate country.
Let us look at the recent ‘pro-democracy’ incidents in Hong Kong. During the ongoing Occupy Central movement, tens of thousands of Hong Kongers have taken to the streets in the former British colony to pressure Beijing to keep its promises.
The latest news is that Hong Kong Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying has appointed his deputy Carrie Lam to lead a team of senior officials to meet with student leaders. Though the pro-Beijing leadership affirms that the students’ protests are dwindling, talks are on for ‘reforms’.
What will happen if the police uses riot gear, teargas or rubber bullets tomorrow or in the future? The police will not be different here than in Tibet or Xinjiang. Can it use another ‘system’? It probably cannot, and the younger generation in Hong Kong is certainly not ready to become another of China’s ‘minorities’.
When, after years of negotiations, the UK returned Hong Kong to China, the colony was promised “a high degree of autonomy” for the next 50 years (similarly, the Dalai Lama today asks for a “genuine autonomy” for Tibet).
The former British colony came under ‘One Country, Two Systems’, which supposedly guarantees freedom of speech, of assembly and of religion and a free press. All this is enshrined in the Basic Law, which governs Hong Kong since 1997. But in 2004, Beijing warned that it would have to “approve” of any change to Hong Kong’s election laws.
Today, the pro-democracy activists believe that, in ‘One Country, Two Systems’, the second part of the promise is more important than the first. This is not the case with Beijing.
When Mr Leung announced that the nominating committee will be modelled on the existing election committee, loyal to Beijing, which selected him in 2012, former Hong Kong Governor Chris Patten said that Beijing was not keeping its commitments “by hiding behind flexible legal language”.
On August 31, the National People’s Congress had asserted that only after approving candidates, would it allow direct elections in 2017. This brought the differences between the different parties to the fore; candidates for Chief Executive must gain the support of a majority of a ‘nominating committee’ (packed with Beijing supporters); further, only two or three candidates can contest. Beijing’s blessing is, thus, necessary.
The young demonstrators sing another song, “Give us real universal suffrage”. Interestingly, one observes a change of pattern in the protest movement. The New York Times reported the case of a 17-year old student, Joshua Wong, who has been at the forefront of a student movement for democracy in Hong Kong: “He was born less than nine months before this former British colony’s handover to China in 1997, and raised here at a time when the party has tried mightily to win over the people and shape them into patriotic Chinese citizens. His prominence in the protest movement also embodies a shift in politics. [It] has confounded the local government and infuriated its communist supervisors in the mainland.”
This is what worries Beijing: Another generation is ready to take over the struggle. Further, could there be another Tiananmen in the making despite the tight censure of Hong Kong news in the mainland?
There is no doubt that if the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ model fails, it will have serious repercussions for other parts of China (particularly in Tibet and Xinjiang). And in Taiwan too, which has recently been offered a similar scheme (though Taipei immediately declined).
In April 1989, the Communist Party’s mouthpiece, The People’s Daily, published a front-page editorial denouncing the students on the Square, using the word “chaos”, a notion violently objected to by the students. The same newspaper says now that Hong Kong would “fall into chaos if the protests were not dealt with according to law”.
Beijing’s language may not help in the long run, especially when it says: “[The protesters] should not be so blatant in undermining the rule of law, stability, and order.” The fact that Beijing is not ready to stick to its promises could have other consequences. Several years back, during an interview with the Dalai Lama, I asked the Tibetan leader: “If, tomorrow, you sign an agreement with the Chinese, do you think that they will respect this agreement more than they did the 17-Point Agreement with Tibet in 1951?”
The Dalai Lama had said that he was quite certain that “international pressure” could force China to keep its promises. This does not seem to be the case today.

Chinese dilemmas

My article Chinese dilemmas appeared in The Statesman on February 12, 2014.

China today speaks of  ‘reforms’ and at the  same  time  restricts  further  the freedom of ordinary people. The Horse Year starts on an ominous note. But can repression, always more repression, help China to grow? Certainly not, though the apparatchiks believe that it could...

Click here to read...

It was reprinted in the China Post in Taiwan under the title China's transparency dilemmas

Seven Don’t Speaks: Twenty Four Years Later

My article appeared in the Edit Page of The Pioneer under the title Things are changing. Better be cool, Mr Xi.

Millions of Chinese are craving for more freedom to express their problems and their aspirations. This could well be the beginning, even if small, of a sort of democratic process in the Communist nation.

Here is the link...

Is Mr. Xi cool?
No, according to a Beijing-based business magazine The Investor Journal, which was swiftly censured last week after publishing a full-page editorial asking the new leadership to start political reforms to ensure the future economic prosperity of the Middle Kingdom.
Without mentioning President Xi Jinping’s name, the editor-in-chief, Zhao Li daringly wrote: “When the debate [about constitutionalism] broke out and our new leader’s [Xi] verbal environment was confirmed — [we found that] he is far from cool.”
His argument is that the Chinese investors are unhappy with a society where the distribution of wealth is ‘stagnant and deformed’.
Zhao went a step further when he compared the ‘freedom’ experienced today on the Chinese microblogs Weibo and WeChat, to the Democracy Wall at the end of the 1970s or the situation in Beijing University campus in the early months of 1989.
But 24 years after the dramatic events of Tiananmen Square, freedom is relative in China. A recent study conducted by several US universities on ‘The Velocity of Censorship’ shows that the authors were able to detect deletions of posts within one minute of the event, “giving us a high-fidelity view of what is being deleted by the censors and when.”
While analyzing the deleted posts, they stumbled upon difficulties, for example neologisms or informal language used on Chinese social media; however their conclusion was that deletions occurred mainly in the first hour after a post has been submitted; some 30% of the total deletion events occur within 5-30 minutes, while nearly 90% of the deletions happen within the first 24 hours.
The deletions are faster when subjects combines current events and hot topics or sensitive issues such as the Party, the government, corruption or Tibet.
As Zhao Li pointed out, the hot discussion between Weibo and official media over ‘constitutionalism’ had an intensity close to, or perhaps even surpassing, the controversy caused by the World Economic Herald in the Spring of 1989. The pro-reform publication had then dared to praise the sacked Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang. Deng Xiaoping had accused Hu Yaobang, who had just passed away, of being soft on dissent. The Herald wanted Deng to retract his denunciation of Hu. Eventually, Shanghai’s Party secretary and future President Jiang Zemin was instrumental in the closure of the publication; Jiang would have said: “It’s not appropriate to publish these sensitive views in the current situation.”
Today why is Xi not cool?
Recently some 100 members of the Tiananmen Mothers Group published an open letter addressed to Xi ("Hope fades as despair draws near"); the mothers are disappointed by the President's public speeches and his reluctance to take political reforms head on. They point out that Xi had praised things that needed to be repudiated particularly the Cultural Revolution and June 4 (the Tiananmen massacre): “this has caused those individuals who originally harbored hopes in him in carrying out political reform to fall into sudden disappointment and despair. …What we see, precisely, are giant steps backwards towards Maoist orthodoxy.”
Professor Ding Zilin, the founder of the group said: "We thought Xi should have the backbone, like his father, to do something for China's political reform and democratic development, but now we've found he is just following what his predecessors Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao did."
Bao Tong, the former aide of reformist leader Zhao Ziyang (Bao was the senior most party official to be jailed after June 4), was an admirer Xi Zhongxun, President Xi's father. Bao thinks on the same lines as the Tiananmen Mothers, he told The South China Morning Post: “I hope Xi Zhongxun's son will do well, otherwise I shall be very disappointed”.
Referring to The Chinese Dream, Xi Jinping’s pet project, Bo says that if Xi is not ready to implement China’s Constitution, his Dream will stay only a dream.
Twenty four years after the democracy movement was crushed by the tanks on the Square, Bao is still under house arrest in Beijing. For the few who manage to approach him, he remains outspoken. He told The Post: “The silencing of dissident voices had disastrous consequences. If you cover the mouths of a hundred people, there could still be hundreds, thousands, tens of thousands of mouths still speaking. But if they silence 1.3 billion people, that's frightening."
Unfortunately, the Party sticks to its guns. Xinhua quoted Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei who accused the United States of ‘prejudice’ after the U.S. State Department stated last week that Beijing should ‘fully account for those killed, detained, or missing’ after the Square events.
Hong Lei said that Washington should immediately stop interfering in China's internal affairs “…the Party has already reached a ‘clear conclusion’ about the events of 1989”. It was a counter-revolutionary movement.
The Chinese masses may not agree with this assessment.
According to Xinhua, China had 564 million Internet users at the end of 2012; micro-blogging adepts surged to 309 million.
Sina-Weibo, the most active microblog site in China sent more than 100 million messages daily.
This makes the State nervous, very nervous. Already two years ago, Sina Corp’s Chief Executive Charles Chao had declared: "Because sometimes rumours can spread too quickly, Sina is now establishing more mechanisms to quash rumours through a variety of channels."
While the mechanisms are increasingly sophisticated, the number of users and their boldness increases fast.
A Party document recently issued by the General Office of the Central Committee, warned officials to combat ‘dangerous’ Western values.
As often for Party’s circulars, the document entitled ‘Concerning the Situation in the Ideological Sphere’ partially appeared on government websites, before disappearing.
An account saved before deletion said that Party cadres should “fully understand the dangers posed by views and theories advocated by the West [i.e. democracy]. …Strengthen management of the Internet, enhance guidance of opinion, purify the environment on the Internet, give no opportunities that lawless elements can seize on.”
Another Party posting explained: “The central leadership has made a thorough analysis of and shown a staunch stance toward seven serious problems in the ideological sphere that merit attention, giving a clearer understanding of the sharpness and complexity of struggle in the ideological sphere.”
The universities were also told about the ‘Seven Don’t Speak’: teachers should avoid discussing with their students universal values, freedom of speech, civil society, civil rights, the historical errors of the CCP, official bourgeoisie and judicial independence.
The West is an easy scapegoat, but the fact remains that hundreds of millions of Chinese are craving for more freedom to express their problems and their aspirations. Is it not the beginning of a sort of democratic process in China?
Today, Internet has another function: it forces the Government to take action against injustice. Hundreds of examples can be quoted: recently in Henan province, a black Honda knocked down a 10-year-old girl who was on her way home from school. The lady driver not only did not help the child, but insulted the mother telling her, "I am from an influential family." An angry crowd soon assembled and smashed the 26-year-old woman's car. A few minutes later photos and video footage of the scene were posted online. The police had no choice but to act.
In the blogosphere, it is called the ‘My dad is Li Gang syndrome’. In 2010, the drunken son of Party cadre (Li Gang) tried to tell the police ‘do you know that I am the son of Li Gang’. He had just crushed to death a student in a car crash.
Things are changing very fast in the Middle Kingdom. Better be cool, Mr Xi and accept that the people of China also long for freedom and justice.

Thank democracy for small mercies

My article Thank democracy for small mercies appeared in today's Pioneer.

India has been hit by various scams that have rattled the people and made them question our political leadership. But at least we can heartily criticise and condemn, unlike the people in China.
Click here to read...

You can also read it below ('India and the Chinese Model').

After writing this article, I found an interesting related news item published by the BBC (Chinese language)

People's Daily Editor’s Suicide highlights the Plight of Media Personnel in China On August 22, 2012, Xu Huaiqian, the former editor-in-chief for the Dadi (Earth) supplement of People's Daily, committed suicide. Xu’s suicide elicited heated responses from Chinese netizens. Xu Huaiqian’s words were quoted in Chinese media and quickly circulated on the Internet.
Xu said: “My pain is that I dare to think but I cannot speak out; I dare to speak out but I cannot write; I dare to write but I have no place to publish.”

Changes in the Chinese Military?

A series of interesting articles on the PLA recently appeared in the Chinese press.
I am posting two of them from The Epoch Times, a Falun Gong group publication.
One speaks of the attempted coup mentioned on this blog in March and the subsequent reshuffle in the PLA: "China’s military has moved around a large number of senior generals, including generals in the Navy, Air Force, Lanzhou Military Region, Guangzhou Military Region, Chengdu Military Region, Hong Kong Garrison, General Logistics Department, and Armed Police. The South China Sea and North Sea Fleets have also changed their chief commanders." 
The second article mentions the promotion of General Liu Yazhou also cited on this blog in June 2011: "In August 2010, a Chinese two-star general has warned his conservative Communist Party masters and firebrand People's Liberation Army colleagues that China must either embrace US-style democracy or accept Soviet-style collapse."
Liu Yazhou, a political commissar in the PLA National Defense Academy has now been promoted as a full General. According to The Epoch Times "he is known for promoting a Westward Strategy, or moving the nation’s development focus to Western China, partly because of his belief that U.S. influence in the Asian region is hampering China’s strategic expansion there."
It is difficult to predict how this will translate into a change of policy.
Finally, Peter Mattis, the Editor of the China Brief speaks of "Hu Jintao’s Doubtful Future on the Central Military Commission". He says: 

With the Beidaihe retreat coming to a close this week and Chinese leaders reemerging from behind closed doors, China’s leaders are in the home stretch for deciding the outcomes of the 18th Party Congress. Some of the issues at stake are the size of the Politburo, who will make it into the Politburo Standing Committee, and a miscellany of other important personnel appointments, like Shanghai’s party chief. One of the most consequential questions is whether President Hu Jintao will hold onto the chairmanship of the Central Military Commission (CMC), which oversees the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), after he resigns as general secretary this fall. Some speculation suggests Hu will follow his predecessor’s path and oversee military affairs in quasi-retirement (Ming Pao, July 22; Apple Daily, May 30). The idea of precedent looms large for a China-watching community starved of reliable, current information. President Hu, however, appears unlikely to retain the CMC chairmanship past the 18th Party Congress based on the factors that allowed Jiang Zemin to continue in that capacity after resigning as general secretary.

All this is of course speculation, because even the best informed China watcher knows very little about what is happening behind the thick walls of Zhongnanhai or Beidaihe's retreat. 
Mattis anyway tries his luck at suggesting:

The idea of President Hu staying on as chair of the Central Military Commission has precedent with both Deng Xiaoping and Jiang. There is little reason to suggest the PLA has changed its position on the perils of a divided command. Since at least March, the propaganda line has been a consistent statement about the clear relationship between the party and the army—not between a civilian leader and the PLA. The recognition of Hu Jintao’s role as leader of the party and the role of the party’s general secretary also suggests the PLA stands by Jiang’s reasoning for unity of command.

It means that the CCP's General Secretary, the PRC's President and the Chairman of the CMC should be the same person, in other words, Xi Jinping.
Interesting months ahead. 
The fate of the next ten years of China (and the world) may depend on which side the wind will blow in Beijing and Beidailhe in the weeks to come. 
Let us watch the smoke. 

With Promotion of General, Chinese Regime Tilts To West
Epoch Times
Sun Yun 
August 13, 2012
Before the real transfer of power takes place at the 18th Party Congress, supposedly this fall, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has already promoted a number of lieutenant generals to general—among them Liu Yazhou, who among other things supports an aggressive defense posture against the United States, some form of democracy in China, and closer ties with the Islamic world.
Liu is political commissar of the National Defense Academy of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and is known for promoting a Westward Strategy, or moving the nation’s development focus to Western China, partly because of his belief that U.S. influence in the Asian region is hampering China’s strategic expansion there.
He was promoted to general on July 30, in what outsiders see as a sign that his ideas are to some extent being accepted by Party leaders.
Along with the westward tilt is a plan to transform the western province of Ningxia into China’s Islamic Finance Center.
The newly promoted Gen. Liu’s idea of developing Western China would fit well with turning Ningxia into a Sino-Arab financial trade settlement center, according to Hong Kong’s Oriental Daily, in a commentary on Aug. 6.
Liu’s promotion to general shows his Westward Strategy is being accepted and supported, the Daily said.
In 2011, Sino-Arab trade totaled US$195.9 billion, making the Arab world China’s seventh largest trading partner, and making China the second largest trading partner of Arab countries.
Liu Yazhou is the son-in-law of Li Xiannian, former chairman of China (1909–1992). He is also a military commentator. It is believed that Liu is an important military ally to Xi Jinping, the presumptive next leader of the CCP. Both Liu and Xi are princelings.
Following the Wang Lijun scandal in February, Liu on April 16 wrote an article in Qiushi, a Communist Party ideological journal, saying the army must unconditionally obey the leader of the CCP, the Central Military Commission, and Party chief Hu Jintao. The article was understood as Liu showing his allegiance to Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao, and Xi Jinping, in the wake of reports about of a failed political coup by Bo Xilai, former Chongqing Party secretary, and security chief Zhou Yongkang,
Since 2004 Liu has strongly advocated that China strategically move West. In his article “On Advance Toward The West,” he says Western China is not a frontier but a hinterland of China’s progress—developing Xinjiang and Tibet, befriending the Middle East, and becoming economically competitive in Central Asia.

Major Reshuffle of China’s Top Military Brass
The Epoch Times
Wang Jingwen
August 16, 2012
China’s military has quietly reassigned a large number of high-ranking officers and removed most of supporters of Bo Xilai—the now deposed official who was being groomed by the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) most ruthless faction to become the next Party leader—in two key regions. Within just one month, there have been 14 transfers of generals ranking at the level of Military Region.
According to several published reports collected by Southern Metropolis Daily, since July, China’s military has moved around a large number of senior generals, including generals in the Navy, Air Force, Lanzhou Military Region, Guangzhou Military Region, Chengdu Military Region, Hong Kong Garrison, General Logistics Department, and Armed Police. The South China Sea and North Sea Fleets have also changed their chief commanders. This is the largest reshuffle of top Chinese military officers since the June 4, 1989 Tiananmen Square student massacre.
The most notable adjustments have taken place in the Lanzhou and Chengdu Military Regions. Most generals supportive of Bo Xilai and former CCP leader Jiang Zemin have been removed from their positions since they were linked to an alleged coup plotted by Bo Xilai and Zhou Yongkang, both members of the Jiang Zemin faction. The three were united in a plan to seize power at the top of the Communist Party in order to cover for their crimes in persecuting Falun Gong, a Chinese spiritual practice, according to insiders and the analysis of experts.
But according to a high ranking Beijing official, Hu Jintao, in order to remain as the Party’s Central Military Commission (CMC) chairman, and maintain some hold on power after handing over his Party leader post, doesn’t want to make too many enemies. Hu is using “soft treatment” in dealing with Bo and Zhou to leave their supporters “a way out” and to try to minimize the impact of the political tsunami brought on by the pair, the official told New Epoch magazine on condition of anonymity.
According to reports, the two vice-chairmen and the eight members of the CMC all signed a petition asking Hu to remain as chairman of the CMC. Obviously, Hu’s compromise has brought benefits to himself. Those high-ranking officials involved in the Bo and Zhou incident have already changed their stance, and Bo and Zhou have no influence now even though Zhou still remains in his current Party position.

Breaking up the PLAC
Recently an official message further confirmed Hu’s and Wen’s “outside loose and inside tight” policy towards Zhou. According to state media Xinhua News, from the beginning of August, provincial and autonomous regions’ police chief positions will be taken over by transferred officials from other provinces. This is another major initiative—following the June 26-July 31 intensive rotational training of police chiefs from more than 1,400 cities and counties—to weaken the impact of the Gestapo-like Political and Legislative Affairs Committee (PLAC), and to break up and reshuffle the PLAC.
Additionally, local Party committees were due for reelection in early July. There were 23 new provincial PLAC secretaries who were not local police chiefs; instead the positions were filled by officials without any PLAC background. Previously the PLAC secretary position was always held by the local police chief, and its authority often surpassed that of other law-enforcement agencies. The PLAC thus formed a second power center in China controlled by Jiang Zemin and Zhou Yongkang.
The intention of Hu’s series of actions is to weaken the second power center and second armed forces, and to avoid the renewed possibility of a coup.

Outcome of Reshuffle
1. In order to stabilize power, anyone who publicly declared loyalty to Hu Jintao, even though he had some minor connection to Bo, would have his future secured—at least for now. As long as he has cut ties with Bo, Hu uses the policy of “ignoring the past.” Of course, the purpose of this adjustment is to eliminate members of the Jiang faction, who were removed or at least not promoted this time.
2. Although Hu is to remain as chairman of the CMC, Xi Jinping will take the top post soon, and Hu has to promote Xi’s proposed personnel. Therefore, in this top military brass reshuffle, there has been a number of positive outcomes for Xi. The most obvious being the rise of the “princelings,” which is the privileged group of descendants of past CCP leaders, including Xi himself.
3. On the surface, Hu has trivialized the Bo Xilai scandal, reducing it from a planned political coup to a criminal case in order to safeguard the Party’s rule. But in fact, Hu has been vigorously eradicating the core elements connected to Zhou Yongkang. Changes, rotational training, and promotions within the PLAC and Armed Police are all about weakening Zhou Yongkang who represents the old forces of Jiang Zemin and Zeng Qinghong.
4. On the surface, the CCP can still maintain power for some time, and the 18th Party Congress may still be held as scheduled. But a discerning eye can see that the more the CCP shouts, “The Party has absolute leadership over the Armed Forces,” the more unstable the military is.
5. The CCP is reshuffling generals on such a large scale. It’s for protecting its own power and preventing the military from taking part in a political coup. But at the same time, the frequent relocation of army generals will also weaken the military’s fighting power.
6. From this round of reassignments, one can see that the CCP is putting hardliners in the South China Sea, thus there could be localized military conflicts there. But, the CCP doesn’t want to fight a major battle. The CCP’s national defense policy has been defensive in nature, because it knows that its military power really cannot match that of other major powers. Unless it uses atomic weapons as a last resort, China cannot win conventional weapons wars. In the South China Sea, they only talk big, but act little.