The Tibetan Factor in 1962: The importance of stable operation base

This article The Tibetan Factor in 1962: The importance of stable operation base was written at the end of last year and published in a defense Journal.
 
As the 19th Congress approaches, the Chinese authorities have banned foreigners to travel to the Tibetan plateau from October 18 to 28. During this period, the Congress, which is expected to the nominate a new leadership, will be held in Beijing.
On September 22, Radio Free Asia (RFA) asserted: “The ban was announced by telephone about ten days ago”. A Tibetan working in a travel agency in Xining (in Qinghai province) told the radio’s Tibetan Service: “During this period, it is not just foreigners but also Tibetans living in the Amdo region of Qinghai who are not allowed to travel in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR).”
Usually, foreign visitors and Tibetans living in the Chinese western provinces are not allowed to visit Tibet in March, at the time of the Two Meetings  and the anniversary of the 1959 Tibetan uprising on March 10.
Why is China so nervous about its ‘border areas’?

The Stability of the Operational Base
To understand this, it is important to look at the Tibet factor in the 1962 China-India war; it is indeed an angle which has been insufficiently studied.
We have a fairly good idea why China suddenly decided to inflict the worst possible humiliation on the Nehru’s government, as well as the ‘political’ compulsions which pushed the Great Helmsman into this win-win venture for China; all this however does not explain why the conflict was so short.
The internal struggle within the Chinese Communist Party between 1959 and 1962 and Mao Zedong’s declining power after 1959, due to the man-made famine triggered by the Great Leap Forward, give some indication of Mao’s drive which ended in an armed conflict in October-November 1962. But why did Beijing decide to suddenly put a halt to the conflict hardly after a month, at a time China was winning on all fronts? One obvious reason is the forthcoming winter, but the political instability on the plateau is an issue which played a non-considerable role.

Mao’s ideological position
In his Origin of the Cultural Revolution, MacFarquhar remarked: “behind Mao's tactical devices in a relatively brief speech , one can detect elements of the thinking which would lead eventually to his decision to launch the Cultural Revolution: the degeneration of the Soviet revolution, the danger of China becoming infected, the need for class struggle to prevent that, the shortcomings of Chinese senior cadres, their failure to deliver the goods.”
Mao’s attack against the Soviet Union was also directed at India, considered as a ‘lackey of Moscow’.
During the Tenth Plenum of the Party's Eighth Central Committee which followed the Beidaihe Meet, Mao's theoretical argument continued: “China was facing a danger of capitalist restoration that had to be fought through relentless class struggle”.
Marshal Peng Dehuai, who had submitted an appeal for his political return , was further accused of different crimes such as colluding with the Soviet Union and other ‘reactionary forces of the world’. This still does not explain the unilateral cease-fire suddenly announced by China.

The Poisonous Arrow
During the same speech at Beidaihe in August, Mao delivered a diatribe against the Panchen Lama and his critics about the Communist actions in Tibet. The young Lama, who had been made Chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) when the Dalai Lama left for India in 1959, had dared to criticize the policies of the Party in Tibet.
Dr Li Zhisui, author of The Secret Life of Chairman Mao, recounts: “Then [Mao] turned his opprobrium against the Panchen Lama of Tibet, denouncing him as ‘an enemy of our class’. [After the 1959] crackdown, the Panchen Lama, ordinarily subservient to Beijing, was now arguing that Beijing's so-called ‘democratic reforms’ had moved too far to the left. He hoped that the ultraleftist trend in Tibet could be corrected.”
The Tibetan factor, influencing the weakness of the supply lines to the Indian front was a major issue for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA); at the end of 1962, this impeded longer military operations against India as discontent was brewing on the Roof of the World.
This appears unmistakably in the 70,000-character petition sent by the Panchen Lama to Zhou Enlai and Xi Zhongxun  in April 1962. The Chinese Premier requested Xi Sr., Li Weihan , General Zhang Jingwu , General Zhang Guohua  to read and study the Panchen Lama's petition. 
The Panchen Lama listed several problems such the ‘suppression of the Rebellion’ in March/April 1959. Each time, after agreeing with the official line, the young Lama criticized it: “The rebellion in Tibet was counter-revolutionary in nature, being against the Party, the motherland, the people, democracy and socialism. Its crimes were very grave. Thus, it was entirely correct, essential, necessary and appropriate for the Party to adopt the policy of suppressing the rebellion. However, when these points were implemented…” And then he mentioned the grievances of the Tibetan population.
Then he took on the ‘Democratic Reform’, the ‘Production in Agriculture and Animal Herding’, ‘Livelihood of the People’, the United Front policy for the ‘nationalities’, ‘Democratic Centralism’, the Dictatorship of the Party and finally the most important for him, the freedom of religion. Each time, he used the same pattern. The Panchen Lama paid a heavy price for having dared to write what everyone knew.  But his letter was termed a ‘poisonous arrow’ by Mao.
It should be pointed out that a longer war would have been very difficult to sustain in the atmosphere of 'rebellion' prevalent on the Roof of World.
It is crucial to understand Tibet’s instability to fully comprehend the ‘short’ Sino-Indian border war.
Though openly siding with the 'reformists' camp led by Lui Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, the Panchen Lama was also warning the Communist leadership of the resentment of the so-called minorities.

The situation in Tibet
Some new historical documents concerning the 70,000-character petition sent by the Panchen Lama to Zhou Enlai and Xi Zhongxun have recently been translated into English. The Panchen Lama bitterly describes the situation in Tibet. The transcripts make fascinating reading.
In the Summary of a Meeting between Comrade Xi Zhongxun, Comrade Li Weihan and Panchen held on June 21, 1962 in The Great Hall of the People in Beijing, Nehru and India are several times cited.
In one discussion, Xi Zhongxun intervenes: “…It is possible that you have a few [opposite] opinions about each other, this is quite natural. …This is a beginning [to solve the issues in Tibet]. …If you are angry, let it out. If you have disagreement, speak out. Problems should be solved through consultation and discussion.”
Two years later, the Panchen Lama’s ‘anger’ would cause him to suffer 14 years in jail. The issue of the Dalai Lama’s flight to India also came in the discussion. Xi Zhongxun explains: “Comrades in Tibet should be clear of the fact that through a big struggle, the reactionary Dalai clique had split off. Through suppressing rebellion and implementing reform, we have laid an initial foundation for our work in Tibet, which is the foundation for development and prosperity within the big family of motherland.”
‘Implementing reform’ meant forcing on the Tibetans an unwanted ideology. This obviously created a great resentment amongst the masses.
It has to be noted that according to Chinese figures 87,000 died in the first week of the ‘suppression’. For Communist China, ‘anti-rebellion work’ was the ‘base’ of the so-called ‘Liberation’.
Xi admits: “we must strengthen our unity, and unite every person that can be united. If this work is not done well, Dalai will laugh at us, and Nehru will laugh at us too. Don’t give them a chance to amuse themselves by our failure.” The 1962 conflict was a way for Mao to ‘reunite’ the leadership, though Xi Zhongxun himself was purged a couple of weeks later; one of his crimes: he had probably not spoken strongly enough against the Panchen Lama. Tibet however remained in turmoil and in these circumstances, it would have been dangerous to plan longer operations against India in 1962.

Tibet’s Stability today
A question can be asked, has the situation improved during the last decades. The answer seems to be ‘no’.
In 2015, Tibet celebrated the 50th anniversary of the foundation of the so-called Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) with great pomp. All was well in the Middle Kingdom?
But to analyze the situation on the Roof of the World, one has to look beyond the glamourous function in front of the Potala Palace and look at the program (and speeches) of Yu Zhengsheng, the chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC); Yu, a member of the Standing Committee of the CCP is the official responsible for the ‘minorities’.
Side-visits often speak more than grandiose parades.
Yu Zhengsheng met the representatives from the PLA and the People’s Armed Police Force (PAPF) posted in Tibet.
On September 7, Yu urged the army and the police: “to crack down on separatist forces and be ready to fight a protracted battle against the 14th Dalai clique.”
Yu also asked the defence forces “to improve their abilities of governing Tibet according to law [sic], specifically cracking down on the separatist forces, strengthening social management and protecting the people's rights.”
The defence forces should uphold the correct ‘political direction’ and exert a larger role for safeguarding border stability and ethnic solidarity.
‘Border stability’ comes back again and again in the discourse. Addressing through video conference the defence staff posted in the seven prefectures across the plateau region, Yu repeated the message, while praising the army’s and police’s contribution to Tibet's stability and development
Stability seemed to be the new Mantra of the Land of Snows.
Even in the monasteries, the Sutra of Stability is recited, Nirvana can wait!
The recent banning of foreign visitors demonstrates that the situation has not improved over the last two years.

The instability of the borders
In February 2017, at the end of the first round of the strategic dialogue between India and China co-chaired by Zhang Yesui, the Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister and S. Jaishankar, the Indian Foreign Secretary, The Global Times commented in a paternalistic tone: “One lesson India may learn from China is to be honest with oneself. Asymmetry in economic and geopolitical power is natural for any bilateral relations.”
While the ‘asymmetry’ may be in China’s favour in many fields, there is one domain where India is far in advance on the Middle Kingdom; it is the people’s participation in the State’s governance through fair and open elections. Though Indians elections may look ‘chaotic’ from Beijing, the process brings an obvious stability to India. This is absent in China, which is fast becoming a police State.

The explosive situation in Xinjiang
In August 2016, at the end of the annual closed-door meeting held at the beach resort of Beidaihe, an official statement announced that Zhang Chunxian would be replaced by Chen Quanguo as party secretary of the restive Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). Chen was then serving as party boss in the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR), where he had shown his skills to forcefully ‘pacify’ the restive Tibetans.
More than a year after his appointment in Xinjiang, Chen is using the ‘Tibetan recipe’, a good dose of repression mixed with an opening to ‘tourism’, to bring some wealth to the local population.
The situation however remains extremely unstable.
In January 2017, the Chinese media reported that eight people had been killed in a violent attack in Pishan county of Hotan Prefecture in Southern Xinjiang. According to the local Government, three knife-wielding men attacked and stabbed several people. Subsequently, the police shot dead the three attackers and ten others were injured.
A few days earlier, Radio Free Asia (RFA) had reported that Uyghurs had been called to several meetings to confess their 'crimes'. This was part of a campaign called ‘Revealing Errors’; the meetings were held in Aksu Prefecture "to uncover behavior considered politically destabilizing. …Residents are called to a podium one by one to confess these errors after they have listed them on a 39-question form. They are also told they will face legal consequences if they attempt to cover up their own or anyone else’s anti-state activities.” 
The fast development of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) may bring more trouble for Xinjiang as the State-sponsored terrorism in Pakistan is bound to percolate north.
The situation in Xinjiang is so tense that the Chinese authorities have ordered all motor vehicles in Bayingol Prefecture to have mandatory satellite tracking devices installed.
On February 27, more than 10,000 Peoples’ Armed Police (PAP) paraded in the streets of Urumqi, Xinjiang’s capital. The authorities spoke of a rapid-response system to quell unrest. During the rally, helicopters hovered around the city, while armored vehicles threateningly patrolled the streets of the capital. It was the fourth such massive display in one year. On the occasion, Xinjiang's Party Secretary Chen Quanguo told the PAP that they must realize the ‘grim conditions’ facing the region.
Chen also dispatched 1,500 PAP to the ‘frontlines’ in Kashgar, Hotan and Aksu, not far from the Indian border.
The fact is that today the Middle Kingdom’s periphery is unstable and Beijing does not know how to handle the situation (except by increasing the repression and offering a few economic carrots). But, more repression automatically brings more resentment; a vicious circle!
In October 2017, it was even reported that Koran and prayer mats have been confiscated in some districts.
It should be noted that the most restive areas are located close to the Indian border north of the Aksai Chin; recent large military parades in Hotan and Kashgar were synchronised with the one in the capital, Urumqi.
At a time when Beijing has decided to demobilize several Group Armies (corps), the XUAR is recruiting. The Jamestown Foundation noted that the party “has built a multi-tiered security state with, among other components, the recruitment of nearly 90,000 new police officers and a 356 per cent increase in the public security budget.”
Part of the ‘recipe’ is a new wave of infrastructure spending. But will it work?

The ethnic representation in the PLA
Another issue is ethnic representation in the PLA. Though Xi Jinping, the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, has recently undertaken a complete overhaul of the defence forces and new faces have appeared on the scene, very few ethnic faces can be seen.
Ethnicity still plays a negative role in PLA promotions; though there is a slight rise in the number of ‘ethnic’ delegates at the 19th Congress (six per cent of the delegates are ethnic minority officers, from 4.6 per cent in 2012), their number is relatively small and they don't occupy important posts.
The Manchus and the Tibetans will send three delegates each, while the Uyghur, Hui and Tujia will each put forward two. Many consider this as the PLA’s Achilles’ heel.
Two Tibetan ladies, Kalsang and Sonam Dolma made it in the list though their qualification or designation is unknown. Their presence in the Congress will probably be for ‘ethnic’ representation only.

A Tibetan Major General: Thubten Thinley
It is, however, worth noting that the list contains a Tibetan Major General, Thupten Trinley serving as a deputy commander of the Tibet Military Region.
Thubten Thinley  is born in December in Lhasa in 1961. In July 1987, after spending three years in the lower ranks of the PLA, he was admitted to the Communist Party.
Prior to joining the military, he completed a four year university course and gradually climbed the PLA echelons in the departments of political propaganda, military recruitment and the promotion of military-civilian relations. Between January 2001 and March 2003, he attended training classes at the Central Party School in Beijing and in April 2005; this probably helped him to become responsible for preparing for the induction and assignment of new troops in the Tibet Military District (TMD).
Between January 2006 and September 2008, he attended again some courses in the Graduate School of the Central Party School.
In March 2013, he was promoted to PLA Deputy Political Commissar in the TMD before becoming in June 2014, Deputy Commander of the TMD.
His main job is probably the recruitment of Tibetans in the PLA.
What does it mean?
That China is conscious of this endemic weakness and one way to solve it would be to recruit more and more Tibetans in the PLA. Will it work is another issue.

The situation in India
India has a different ‘population’ problem, with large scale migration away from the border areas, but Delhi is conscious of the importance of the ‘local population factor’
Home Minister Rajnath Singh, during a recent forward area tour to the border areas in Uttarakhand, told PTI that a group will be soon constituted to conduct a study on various aspects of the border areas which need improvement.
The Centre is planning to set up a study group to analyse the security and development issues along the China border, with a special focus on involving the frontier population in the mainstream of the country. The group will also look at ways to further expedite the work of completing border roads in these states.
He called the border population as ‘strategic assets’ for the country who need to be given due importance, while urging the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) and others guarding the border “to ensure that the locals living in these areas do not migrate.”
A senior official of the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) further elaborated on the new views of the government: “The local populations are the eyes and ears of the country and its security mechanism.”
This realization and later an implementation of new policies would go a long way to get a strategic advantage on China, which is far from getting the local populations in Tibet and Xinjiang on its side.
In case of a long conflict, this could make the decisive difference.

Han Chauvinism and Stability on the Indian Border

Senior Colonel Gawa

As the Two Meetings (Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference - CPPCC and National People’s Congress - NPC) are taking place in Beijing, a Tibetan lady-delegate from Qinghai province used strong words about the ‘prejudice against ethnic minorities’ rampant in the Middle Kingdom since the unrest in Lhasa a decade ago.
It was much older, but few have said so in public.
One was Bapa Phuntsok Wangyal, the 'first' Tibetan Communist.
Read an earlier post on the subject.

Sr Col Gawa
During a CPPCC session’s panel discussion, Guowa Jiamaoji (Gawa Jamyang?), a PLA singer, born in the Tibetan-inhabited area of Qinghai province, affirmed that the discrimination shown by the authorities against people from her ethnic group (‘Tibetans’) was ‘detrimental to national unity’.
According The South China Morning Post, the army soprano, who served the PLA for more than 20 years, “appealed to China’s central government to stop treating ethnic Tibetans as if they were separatists”.
Gawa said: “I don’t think they [Beijing] should impose measures intended to deter separatists on the whole Tibetan race …It’s like there’s an order from above [for all] to follow.”
Gawa first witnessed the prejudice after the March 2008 incidents, when riots and clashes broke out in Lhasa and spread across the plateau.
She clearly remembered “the prejudice she experienced in the aftermath of the unrest. …One time I led a group of performers to Beijing, everyone checked in to their hotels, but I wasn’t allowed to, because I was Tibetan.”

It is extremely rare that, what is known as Han Chauvinism, is admitted at official meetings.
The fact that it is being reported, is even rarer
Gawa told the panel that despite her military rank (Senior Colonel) and status as a CPPCC member, “the hotel staff simply refused to let her in. I showed them my CPPCC membership ID and my military ID but still wasn’t allowed to check in. I had to stay at a friend’s place.”
She added that the incident was not an isolated one; she had witnessed numerous examples of prejudice against Tibetan cadres, especially in Han-dominated areas.
She cited examples of discrimination: “The mainland has a 4G network already, but in many parts of Tibet and Xinjiang, the network is still only 2G,” the PLA soprano said, “of course, it might be deliberate that the networks there are not so strong.”
According to her, one solution would “to increase the number of people from minority groups in positions of authority: “Native cadres will stay here forever. But cadres sent from the mainland only stay for two or three years before they are promoted to higher office.”
It is a fact that the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) has never had a Tibetan Party Secretary.
It is interesting that Gawa was allowed to speak on this ultra-sensitive topic.

Inspecting the border areas
In the meantime, the authorities are nervous with the approach of March 10; in 1959, the entire population (‘the masses’) of Lhasa rose to protect the Dalai Lama’s life. Ultimately, he escaped to India.
Since then, the day is celebrated by the Tibetans as their national Uprising Day.
The Global Times, the mouth piece of the Communist Party of China (CPC) mentioned the visit of a ‘stability maintenance supervision group’ to Ngari prefecture of Western Tibet and …on the China-India border.
Three senior officials of the (TAR) visited police and armed police posts. The delegation was headed by Penpa Tashi, a member of the TAR Standing Committee in charge of propaganda; other members were Tenzin Namgyal and Wang Yalin.

Penpa Tashi

The local Tibet Daily affirmed: “The [officials] received reports from police officers about the security situation and emergency preparedness.”
Xiong Kunxin, a professor at Tibet University in Lhasa told the tabloid: “Ngari is an undeveloped prefecture in a high-altitude area with tough living conditions, and it's really close to the border with India. This lends foreign forces and Dalai Lama secessionist criminal gangs the opportunity to permeate into the region and conduct illegal and violent activities."
This is clearly a pretext as no Tibetan living in exile is allowed to approach border areas in Ladakh or Uttarakhand.
Why is Beijing so nervous?
Penpa Tashi asserted that “maintaining stability is really tough and the anti-secession and counter-terrorism struggles are intense and complex.”
The border police was encouraged to safeguard the ‘sustainable stability and security’ of the prefecture, located north of Uttarakhand and Himachal and east of Ladakh.
Tibet Daily further quoted Xiong saying that the “tough local topography makes it hard for the local government to boost economic development in the region, but promoting development is still the main goal for the local government to maintain stability. Ngari is a main battleground of the 1962 Sino-Indian border conflict.”
It is not completely true; the battles in NEFA were as tough as the ones in Ladakh.
The Tibet Daily also said that the officials visited a gas station and a security inspection station in the town of Shiquanhe (Ngari) where regular safety checks are conducted.”
The police was ordered to maintain stability and ‘prevent any security-related incident from happening.’
One of the officials, Tenzin Namgyal and his inspection team went at Geji County. Geji (Gegye Dzong in Tibetan) is located northwest of Mt Kailash.
Tenzin Namgyal inspected the area and ‘guided’ the work of the local officials; a Chinese website remarked: “The cold weather did not stop the pace of the inspection and the guidance work.”
Tenzin Namgyal is the deputy head of the District Supervision and Guidance Group.
During the inspection, Namgyal went “deep into the grassroots to maintain the first-line stability.” The group visited the Gegye County Public Security Checkpoint, the Command Center of the Public Security Bureau, the poverty alleviation relocation site in other places.
Namgyal emphasized that the victory of the first meeting of the 13th NPC is a major event in the political life of the Party and the country.
Did he mean the amendment of the Chinese Constitution giving Xi Jinping the possibility to rule China for more than two terms?
Namgyal also hoped that everyone will have “a hundredfold Enthusiasm, with a hundredfold effort to complete all kinds of work, …work style should be rigorous and meticulous; one should be determined to make every effort to stabilize the [Ngari] area during the ‘Two Meetings’ and the sensitive period of March [10] and ensure that the area keeps a sustained stability, long-term stability, and comprehensive stability.”
These words are dear to the New Emperor Xi.
But the fact that 'stability' is the leitmotiv of the Chinese leadership may be an indication that all is not that stable on the plateau.

A more optimistic note
According Zhang Xinmin, a senior researcher at the institute of high energy physics in the Chinese Academy of Sciences affirmed: “China has almost completed building the world's highest cosmic ray telescope in Ngari prefecture.”
The chief scientist told The Global Times: “At an altitude of 5,250 meters, the Cosmic Microwave Background polarization telescope project will start operations in 2020."
The Academy's program in the TAR is designed to probe the primordial gravitational waves created by the first tremors of the Big Bang.
Ngari is the place to watch in the coming years, perhaps not for the ancient Big Bang, but for a new one.

Stability, Stability, Stability, the new 'Tibet Mantra'

As the dust is settling down on the Potala Square in Lhasa, the time has come to take stock of the ‘grand’ event held last week in the Tibetan capital, namely the celebrations for the 50th anniversary of the foundation of the so-called Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR); in other words, the dismemberment of the Roof of World in 5 parts (with the TAR remaining the largest one, parts of Tibet are now administered by Sichuan, Yunnan, Qinghai and Gansu provinces).
Beijing has been preparing the events for months.
Imagine, 2 White Papers published since March 2015, a full Politburo meeting (on July 30), a two-day Sixth Tibet Work Forum (on August 24 and 25), a new Leading Group on United Front Work to deal with Tibet affairs and numerous high-profile visits to Tibet reported from time to time on this blog.

Why should China spend so much time and energy on Tibet?
The Chinese propaganda will probably tell you: China loves Tibet.
A few days ago, China Tibet Online announced a photo contest on ‘Charming Tibet’ to be held in Beijing: “The event aims to provide a platform for Tibet enthusiasts and photography lovers to showcase and share the charm of Tibet through their lens. Outstanding photos will receive awards. …In order to objectively present Tibet’s achievements in economic development, peace and stability in Tibet over the past 50 years, the event encourages all amateur and professional photographers, domestic college students and foreign students to show to the world a real Tibet through their cameras.”
Today, everyone in China loves 'charming' Tibet .

Tibet is indeed ‘charming’ and Beijing is ‘rejoicing’.
On September 10, an article in China Daily says: “The now-50-year-old Tibet autonomous region has every reason to rejoice: The national regional autonomy mechanism is working well and benefiting ordinary Tibetans.”
This is the Golden Age, according to the Communist leadership, which takes the occasion to demolish the Dalai Lama’s Middle Path approach: “Yet the 14th Dalai Lama and those in Dharamsala of India will not be sharing the festive mood, for this is not what the Dalai Lama wants. The ‘high degree of autonomy’ he advocates is de facto independence. He wants the central government to forsake any military presence in the region and for the region to conduct its own diplomacy. This would mean the region becoming an independent sovereignty entity.”
It is not what the Dalai Lama has been advocating, but it is irrelevant for Beijing, which continues with its propaganda: “But for that to happen, he would first have to overturn the established jurisprudential truth that Tibet is a part of China. Which is impossible.”
It seems impossible today!

The doors to the negotiations are closed
This is one of the visible outcomes of the grand celebrations: the doors are closed for the Dalai Lama to discuss any ‘degree of autonomy’ with the Communist authorities in Beijing.
I arrived at that conclusion a few years ago, in my book The Negotiations that never were, but now Beijing openly says so, and it adds: “Even among the country's autonomous regions, Tibet has been the subject of envy for the policy favors it has received. Financial subsidies from the central government accounted for almost 93 percent of financial expenditures of Tibet from 1952 to 2014, not to mention the endless aid programs provided by dozens of central government offices, provinces and major State companies. And the sixth central conference [Sixth Tibet Work Forum] on Tibet has just promised further efforts to improve local living standards.”
Will economic measures be sufficient?
Beijing knows that it will not suffice, and that why the leadership is so nervous about the ‘stability’ of the region.
This was reflected in Yu Zhengsheng's program while in Tibet.

Yu met the generals: the Stability of Tibet
Apart from the political issue which seems sealed for the time being, to analyze the recent events on the Roof of the World, one has to look beyond the glamourous function in front of the Potala Palace.
In China, side-visits often speak more than grandiose parades.
Take for example the meeting of Yu Zhengsheng, chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) with the representatives from the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the People’s Armed Police Force (PAPF) posted in Tibet.
On September 7, Yu took the opportunity to urge the army, the police and the judicial staff “to crack down on separatist forces and be ready to fight a protracted battle against the 14th Dalai clique.”
Yu also asked the defence forces “to improve their abilities of governing Tibet according to law [sic], specifically cracking down on the separatist forces, strengthening social management and protecting the people's rights.”
The defence forces should uphold the correct ‘political direction’ and exert a larger role for safeguarding border stability and ethnic solidarity.
Yu also addressed through video conference the defence staff posted at the ‘stability-maintaining command centers’ in the seven prefectures across the plateau region, says China Tibet Online.
Yu praised the army, police and judicial staff's contribution to Tibet's stability and development, calling them a strong team that the Party can trust and the masses can rely on.

The Visit to Tashilhunpo monastery
The Chief Guest of the TAR’s ‘celebrations’ also visited Shigatse and the Tashilhunpo Monastery, the traditional seat of the Panchen Lama, as pointed out by the Chinese press.
But, as mentioned in a previous post, Gyaltsen Norbu, the Beijing-selected Panchen Lama, was nowhere to be seen.
He should certainly have been present in ‘his’ monastery, the Tashilhunpo, to receive the eminent member of the Politburo's Standing Committee.
His absence speaks a lot about the climate of insecurity in which the Chinese leadership lives. Beijing can’t even showcase their selected ‘leader’ and head of monastery!
Here too, like in Jokhang, Yu Zhengsheng held a banner with President Xi’s words, "Enhancing ethnic unity, building a beautiful Tibet”.
In his speeches, Yu highlighted again and again the importance ethnic unity and social stability.

Yu at the Tashilhunpo monastery

‘Ethnic Unity’ probably means ‘Unity between Hans and Tibetans under Han leadership.'
Yu affirmed that “the top priority of work in Tibet at present and in the near future is to strengthen ethnic solidarity and safeguard national unity, promote economic development while improving people's livelihoods, and to enhance social stability and harmony.”
Stability, stability, stability is the new Mantra of the Land of Snows.
In the monastery, Yu urged the Lamas “to observe religious precepts and national laws at the same time, further advance their religious studies.”
The Sutra of Stability to start with, Nirvana can wait!

Yu inaugurates the Lhasa-Nyingchi road
Perhaps more importantly (for India at least), Yu Zhengsheng presided over the opening ceremony of the new four-lane highway linking Lhasa with Nyingchi.
It is “expected to help tourism, assist regional industrial transformation as well as preserve border stability and bolster ethnic unity,” said Yu.
And like for any infrastructure in Tibet, it will have dual use: civilian and military.

The new road Lhasa-Nyingchi

Nyingchi (or Nyingtri for the Tibetans) is the prefecture bordering the Indian border (Arunachal Pradesh), still today claimed by China.
The article speaks of Dagze county as the terminus of the highway; it it probably Dagze Village, where the Benri La Mountain is located, 28 km of Bayi town (the PLA headquarters). It is a sacred site for the Bön tradition and one of the four great holy mountains in Tibet.
The construction of the highway started in 2013 and it has been built with an estimated investment of 6 billion U.S. dollars.
It is a game changer for India, but who is bothered in Delhi?
According to the information of Tibet Business Daily, the high-grade highway between Lhasa and Nyingchi is expected to start a trial operation on September 15.
On September 10, 2015, reporters drove from Lhasa to Maizhokunggar (Meldro Gungkar) County east of the Tibetan capital, testing the Lhasa-Nyingchi high-grade highway on this section. The whole journey took only  40 minutes.

General General Zhang Yang arrives in Ngari

General Zhang Yang visits Western Tibet
Xinhua reported that on September 9, General Zhang Yang, head of General Political Department of PLA and member of the Central Military Commission, visited Ngari Prefecture.
He was accompanied by Lt Gen Xu Yong, commander of the Tibet Military District Party (note that Ngari depends from the Lanzhou Military Area Command (MAC), while Central Tibet belongs to Chengdu MAC; therefore technically Lt Gen Xu Yong was not in his jurisdiction).
Zhang arrived by plane at Alikunsha Airport in Ali (Ngari) Prefecture, one of the 6 main airports in Tibet.
It is not said that if General Zhang Yang visited the close-by border areas (adjacent to Ladakh), though he was seen inspecting an ecological agriculture park in Gar[tok] County of Ngari Prefecture.
Did he go and see the seagulls (and the speedboats) on the Tibetan side of the Panggong Lake?
It was not mentioned by the Chinese press.
What is interesting to note is that it is the boss of the ‘Political Department’ who was selected to represent the PLA during the ‘celebrations’.
Does it mean that the 'political' situation is not 'stable?
Stability has certainly been that main focus of the recent Tibet celebrations and ‘Political Stability’ is bound to remain the Mantra for the years to come.
Bringing millions of tourists will not help solve the issue.

Promotion and demotions in Tibet?

New promoted Maj Gen Tang Xiao

When I wrote yesterday's post, I was not aware that Lt. Gen. Niu Zhizhong, the Chief of Staff of the People’s Armed Police was in Lhasa, from where he made his announcement about the 'promotion' of the PAP's political commissar in Tibet.
Nui was received by Pema Thinley (alias Pema Choling), the Chairman of the TAR’s People's Congress (and senior most Tibetan in the Party). Deputy secretary Wu Yingjie (also vice chairman of the TAR) and the powerful secretary of Politics and Law Committee, Deng Xiaogang were also present.
Lt. Gen. Niu Zhizhong briefly described the purpose of his trip to Tibet; he expressed his gratitude to the regional party committee and the Tibet government for their support in the build up the People’s Armed Police Force; he also congratulated the Tibetan leaders for the region's achievements in terms of development and ‘stabilization’ of the region.
He spoke of the long-term dedication of all cadres posted on the snow-covered plateau, and their work for the masses. He said that Tibet Armed Police Force should continue to follow the Party's command (are they not always following??); they should serve the people in the fine heroic tradition; they should actively participate in the local construction, in order to build a well-off society and realize the great rejuvenation of the Chinese Dream (so dear to Xi Jinping).
Nothing really new, except that the Commander of the Tibet Armed Police Corps Maj. Gen. Song Baoshan, and the Political Commissar of the Tibet Armed Police Corps, (now) Lt. Gen. Tang Xiao were in attendance.
While Tang Xiao had just received his promotion, it is not the case for Song Baoshan who remains Major General.
What a public insult for Song!
A military expert told The South China Morning Post that "the commanding officer of Tibet’s armed police force is expected to be promoted to a rank equivalent to lieutenant general as well, because the commanding chief of an army usually has a rank at least equal to that of a political commissar."
The issue is that Song has not been promoted.
The expert explains thus the strange situation: "The very fact that the political commissar’s promotion came before that of the commanding officer underscored the notion of ‘party commands the gun’.”
The expert believes: "The directive of the promotion is intended to show that military must only answer to party leadership and serve the best interest of the Party.”
Well, it is one explanation.
Let us first see if Song Baoshan is also promoted, he may not, in which case, 'experts' will have to find another explanation.

Tibet: why is China so nervous?

China is slowly but surely tightening its grip on Tibet.
The latest sign is the 'upgradation' of the status of the Tibet Armed Police's Political Commissar.
The Global Times yesterday announced : "China's Central Military Commission upgraded the political status of the political commissar of the Armed Police Corps of the Tibet Autonomous Region, indicating the central government's determination to safeguard regional stability".
The Communist mouthpiece quotes 'experts'.
Major General Tang Xiao, the Political Commissar of the Tibet Armed Police Corps, under the People's Armed Police, will now enjoy a new 'treatment'. He will be treated at par with the head of a corps-sized military body, (equal to that of officials at a provincial or ministerial level, according to The Global Times). However, the Tibet Corps itself has not been upgraded.
The Global Times explains to its readers: "Under the dual leadership of the State Council and the Central Military Commission, the Chinese People's Armed Police is composed of internal security forces and various police forces, including border security, firefighting and security guard units."
Niu Zhizhong, Chief of Staff of the PAP announced Tang's promotion at a press conference on October 3.
Niu said that 'better treatment' for the head of Armed Police in Tibet "is a major decision made by Central Military Commission based on the special environment and strategic position of the Tibet Armed Police."
The objective of Tang's promotion is to better safeguard regional stability.
Song Zhongping, a Beijing-based military expert told The Global Times that: "It is not unusual that heads of certain military bodies, which are usually located in strategically important areas or suffer from harsh living conditions, are given certain benefits through their 'treatment' being improved."
One online commentator said that it is an official announcement of the militarization of the People’s Armed Police in Tibet.

Lt. Gen. Tang Xiao

The commentator explained: "Tang Xiao took over as political commissar of the Armed Police force in the Tibetan autonomous region in September 2013 after being promoted to the police rank of major general of the Armed Police in Tibet in July, 2010. With the October 3, 2014, announcement, Tao Xiao now has official military rank and receives regular military salary. "
Nothing has been said about the PAP Commander in Tibet, Maj. Gen. Song Baoshan. Why to promote the Political Commissar only?
This is an unanswered question.
Let us also not forget that General Wang Jianping, the PAP's Commander is an old Tibet-hand.

Earlier Promotions
Already in July, The PLA Daily had announced that People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had made intensive human resources (HR) adjustment. It was said that the emphasis was laid on the capability demonstrated by the officers: "it indicated the great importance attached by Xi Jinping to practical capabilities of military officers."
China Military Online then reported: "At least 3 of the newly promoted officers have received relevant training in Russia after China and Russia resumed military exchange in 1996, and some of them obtained real war experiences in the China-Vietnam border war at the end of 1970s. This fully demonstrates Xi Jinping’s style of promoting people “who can fight and win battles”.
Two of the Major Generals promoted Lieutenant Generals on July 15 were Xu Yong and Diao Guoxin, respectively Commander and Political Commissar of the Tibet Military District; both participated in the China-Vietnam border war.
Though that was long ago, the Chinese insist on the experience 'acquired' (they must have been 2nd Lieutenant then)!
The PLA website added: "The 55-year-old Xu Yong is quite young among the newly promoted military officers this time. During the Wenchuan earthquake in Sichuan in 2008, which caused the death of 87,000 people, Xu Yong was the first PLA major general that led his troops to participate in the earthquake relief."
This has already been mentioned on this blog.
In the meantime, the civil administration also works hard to ‘stabilize’ Tibet. Deng Xiaogang, the Deputy Secretary in charge of security went on an inspection tour in Lhasa to "check security measures taken during the holiday season and the implementation of the anti-terrorism plan”.
He met ‘festival staff’, representatives of the regional party committee, government officials, and on behalf of Chen Quanguo, the Party boss, he lectured them all about the importance to work hard for maintaining stability of Tibet. Deng, who was accompanied by Lhasa Party Secretary Choedrak and other Party officials, went to Lhasa railway station, to the bus station, where he checked that the Party Standing Committee’s stability maintenance measures have fully been implemented.  He talked to police officers, staff on duty, security personnel and ask them to strictly and meticulously follow the security procedures in order to assure smooth and orderly passenger's transport, stability and harmony. It seems that Deng Xiaogang very pleased but what he saw; he told the security officials that the current social situation in Tibet is generally stable, but the situation is still complicated. Tough anti-terrorism, stability maintenance measures are still required. The forces must remain vigilant and 'tighten the string of measures to maintain stability'. Deng added that everyone should continue to carry forward his duties without fear or fatigue, always remaining on high alert, taking strict precautions according to the regulation to crack down on various criminal activities.  Security staff must consolidate the harmony and stability in the Tibet region. Why is China so nervous? Do they fear the contagion of Hong Kong?

Show of force of the PAP a few months back in Lhasa.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Deng Xiaogang addressing the PAP

One more new airport in Tibet

A year ago, I mentioned on this blog, the construction of some new airports in Tibet.
One more now!

Xinhua just reported, "Southwest China's Sichuan Province opened its fourth high-altitude airfield, which local officials hope will boost tourism in the heavily Tibetan-populated region."
It shows that Beijing's policy of 'opening up' restive areas to tourism continues.
It must pay rich dividends.
According to the official news agency, the new Hongyuan Airport is located in Aba [Ngaba] Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture at an elevation of 3,535 meters.
The Prefecture is situated in northwestern Sichuan, at the border of Gansu and Qinghai provinces.
Ngaba, also known as Ngawa (or Aba in Chinese) was the epicenter of the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, in which over 20,000 of its local residents died.
The area has also been the epicenter of the wave of Tibetan self-immolations in 2011 and 2012.
While half of the 'Tibetan' self-immolations happened in Ngaba Prefecture, very few of them happened in Tibet Autonomous Region.
Can the number of self-immolations be inversely proportional to the number of tourists visiting an area on the plateau?
It is what Chinese officials believe.
According to a local official, the new flights will be "cutting travel time to the local plateau prairie and Jiuzhaigou Valley, a World Heritage site famous for its colorful pools and snowy mountains."
But the main purpose is clearly to bring 'stability' in the restive prefecture.
Xinhua admits: "Lack of transportation facilities has long troubled the province's out-of-reach Tibetan region, which includes the two prefectures of Aba [Ngaba] and Garze [Kartse] and the county of Muli. Prior to Hongyuan, the province opened three high-altitude airports to link the region with the outside world"

Luo Erwu, head of the tourism bureau of Ngaba told the Chinese news agency: "The new airport will not only help travelers but also benefit locals by bringing more tourists to the region."
This is part of Beijing's policy to make the Tibetan plateau a giant Disneyland.
Beijing's rationale is that by bringing more tourists, the level of employment (and the revenue) of the local population will automatically increase, so will the 'stability' of the area.

China’s top two obsessions — loyalty and Party

My article China’s top two obsessions — loyalty and Party appeared in the DNA yesterday.

In recent times, China has had two obsessions: stability and loyalty to the Party. China watchers know that when Beijing’s State machinery starts hammering a certain issue on the masses, it usually means that the leadership has a serious predicament.
Take the example of general Guo Boxiong, Politburo member and
vice chairman of the powerful Central Military Commission (CMC); he recently reiterated that the armed forces “must resolutely follow the Party’s command and remain absolutely loyal and reliable”...


To read click here...

Stability overrides all

A report on Tibet of the Human Right Watch speaks of 'The Four Stabilities' for Tibet. It is apparently a brainchild of President Hu Jintao. 
In order to 'keep a tight hand on the struggle against separatism', the new motto is 'stability overrides all' (wending yadao yiqie).
It practically means:

• monitoring the overall coverage of internet management in towns and in the rural areas
• strengthening the management of news media
• firmly striking against the criminal activity of creating and spreading rumors by using internet and mobile phone text messaging
• Strict guidelines for foreign visitors.

Already in March, Jia Qinglin, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee mentioned stability as the first objective of the Party in Tibet and Tibetan-inhabited areas: "We should consider both internal and external situations and firmly follow the gist of 'making progress while maintaining stability,' striving for a steady economic growth in Tibet and the Tibetan-inhabited areas in the four provinces," Jia said.
He added: "Currently, the clique of the Dalai Lama are trying in vain to continuously create incidents in Tibet and the Tibetan-inhabited areas in the four provinces, ...Authorities should implement the prescribed measures well to resolutely crush the Dalai Lama clique's conspiracy of making Tibetan-inhabited areas unstable, thus making the masses able to live and work there comfortably."

In the meantime new guidelines for foreigners wanting to visit Tibet have been issued:
1) All groups entering Tibet through Nepal can get Tibet travel permits, as long as the groups has 5 or more people
2) Travel to Tibet from mainland China: If a group contains 5 or more people the travel agency can apply for an invitation from the Tibet Tourism Bureau in Lhasa, then send a copy to the group members by email. After receiving the letter then a group visa can be obtained from the Chinese Embassy. In this way a group can enter Tibet through mainland China, but they must enter and exit China together, and all members of the group must be listed on the group visa. Individual travel is prohibited.
A website Explore Tibet recently published this information.
The Tibet Travel Permit or Tibet visa is to be obtained from the Tibet Tourism Bureau; all travelers should deal with local registered agencies in advance to get the permit, as there are several different types of permit depending on where in Tibet the traveler plans to go. 
To apply for the permit, travelers should submit their valid passports and a copy of their China visa to an authorized travel agency. 
For travel to a restricted region such as Mt. Kailash, the permit must be applied for at least 20 days in advance. For travel to open areas like Lhasa and Mt. Everest, the permit should be applied for at least 10 days in advance.
The Chinese leadership seems today to live in fear, inventing everyday new restrictions, which in turn create more resentment amongst the Tibetan populations as well exacerbating the sense of identity of the Tibetans vis-a-vis the Hans. It is a loose-loose solution.
How long can Beijing seal off the Roof of the World from the rest of the planet? 
Historically, this type of restrictions have never lasted very long.

I forget to mention that 'Truth' has vanished from the Chinese internet. Bloggers recently discovered that the word had been blocked on the country's leading social media website.
Online messages began circulating claiming that the Chinese characters for 'Truth' could not be searched for on micro-blog Sina Weibo, used by 300 million users. 
If you type 'Truth', you get the following message: "According to relevant laws, regulations and policies, search results for 'Truth' cannot be displayed."
In India, we still believe that 'Truth will prevail'.

China: Attempts to Seal Off Tibet from Outside Information
Escalating Restrictions on Media and Travel in Tibetan Areas
July 13, 2012
(New York) – Restrictions on news, media, and communications in Tibet have been stepped up by Chinese authorities in the lead-up to the 18th Party Congress, due to take place in late 2012.
The measures appear to be an effort to cut off Tibetans in China from news not subjected to the government’s domestic monopoly on information.
They are presented officially as an attempt to prevent the views of the exiled Dalai Lama and his followers from reaching Tibetans inside China, particularly those living in rural areas.
The new restrictions, described in the official Renmin Wang media outlet on May 31, 2012, as key to maintaining stability and national security, aim to “ensure the absolute security of Tibet’s ideological and cultural realm,” according to Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) Party Secretary Chen Quanguo in a June 27 interview. The measures involve significantly increased controls, particularly in the TAR, on internet use, text messages, phone ownership, music publishing, and photocopying, as well as intensified government propaganda through new TV channels, village education sessions, film showings, distribution of books, and the provision of satellite television receivers with fixed reception to government channels. As a result, Tibetans have virtually no access to independent news, are being subject to intensifying political education and propaganda in villages, schools, and monasteries, and face increasing limitations on travel into the TAR from other provinces.
“Under the guise of combating ‘separatism’ the Chinese government is blatantly violating Tibetans’ rights to the freedom of expression, religion, culture, and movement,” said Sophie Richardson, China director. “The authorities have a responsibility to uphold public order, but that cannot be used as a blanket justification for the kinds of measures to limit communications that the Chinese authorities are imposing in Tibet.”
According to a Xizang Ribao Online article on November 18, 2011, the measures follow an instruction by Party Secretary Chen to “promote full coverage by radio, television, publications, and networks to…enable the voice of the Party and government to cover the whole of this vast territory” of the TAR and to exert strict control over the media “to effectively purify the public opinion environment … and strike hard at separatist elements entering Tibet to carry out reactionary propaganda.”
In June 2012, Chen urged officials to “make sure that the Central Party’s voices and images can be heard across 120 thousand square kilometers,” and that “no voices and images of enemy forces and Dalai clique can be heard and seen.”
The scope of the new restrictions reflect a sharp change in official views about Tibetan unrest, which officials previously stated was caused by “a small number” or “a handful” of Tibetans, mostly monks and nuns plus a few urban laypeople, who were considered to have been influenced by the Dalai Lama or by exile groups. But following protests across the Tibetan plateau in 2008, leaders there have now acknowledged, at least in the domestic press, that the influence of the Dalai Lama is widespread among Tibetans, including in rural areas, where some 85 percent of Tibetans live.
These new measures are part of a Tibet-specific policy called “the Four Stabilities” that was announced by China’s leader Hu Jintao in an internal speech in early March 2012. They are being carried out in the name of the slogan “stability overrides all” (wending yadao yiqie) in order to “keep a tight hand on the struggle against separatism.” The goals include achieving “the overall coverage of internet management in towns and in the rural areas” (Xizang Ribao, March 19, 2012) and “strengthening the management of new media” (Xizang Ribao, March 18, 2012). On May 30, 2012, Hao Peng, a deputy party secretary of the TAR, told officials that, because of “the Dalai clique’s sabotage activity,” they must “strengthen the work of guiding the media,” “strengthen the supervision and management of new media such as the Internet,” and “firmly strike against the criminal activity of creating and spreading rumors by using internet and mobile phone text messaging” (Xizang Ribao, May 31, 2012).
Controls on travel from inland provinces into the TAR have also been tightened significantly since March 2012, with new limitations on travel into the TAR by monks, nuns, and lay Tibetans from outside the TAR. Additional restrictions on travel by foreigners to the TAR were introduced in May 2012 and again in early June.
These restrictions on movement into the TAR by Tibetans from outside the region appear to be designed to prevent protests taking place in the Tibetan capital, Lhasa, particularly following the almost 40 self-immolations that have occurred in the Tibetan areas of Qinghai, Gansu, and Sichuan provinces since March 2011. These protests appear to have been in response to increasing limits on basic freedoms, increasingly punitive security measures, and other concerns.
Since two Tibetans from Sichuan and Gansu set themselves on fire in Lhasa on May 27, 2012, Tibetans from those provinces or from Qinghai who do not have permanent residence in Lhasa, including many with valid business permits and valid temporary registration permits, are reported to have been forced to leave the TAR.
In 2009, United Nations High Commissioner Navanethem Pillay urged that Chinese authorities “reflect on the underlying causes” of disturbances in the TAR and surrounding areas, “which include discrimination and the failure to protect minority rights.”
“The Chinese government refuses to even acknowledge the serious grievances of Tibetans,” said Richardson. “Trying to seal the region off will only lead to further frustration and greater international concern.”

Read more at: http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/07/13/china-attempts-seal-tibet-outside-information