What if Nehru had used the IAF in 1962

Wing Commander 'Jaggi' Nath, MVC Bar is no more.

I re-post this interview with the great man for Rediff.com

Fifty seven years ago, the Chinese attacked India on the slopes of the Thagla ridge in NEFA as well as in Ladakh.
On this occasion, I re-post three old articles, including my interview with Wing Commander 'Jaggi' Nath What if Nehru had used the IAF in 1962, which appeared in Rediff.com

Also the account of a young captain who was taken to Tibet as POW war on October 20,  1962. He recalls his days in the camp in the Yarlung Valley.
I had earlier posted another account of the Indian POWs in Tibet on this blog as well as Brig Amar Jit Singh Behl's account of his experience on the front in October 1962.

Interview with Wing Commander 'Jaggi' Nath, MVC Bar

'If we had sent a few airplanes (into Tibet), we could have wiped the Chinese out.'
'And everything could have been different in the 1962 War.'
'They did not believe me there was no Chinese air force.'
'Can you imagine what would have happened if we had used the IAF at that time?'
'The Chinese would have never dared do anything down the line.'

Wing Commander Jag Mohan (‘Jaggi’) Nath, MVC (Bar)

Canberra plane

Wing Commander Jag Mohan (‘Jaggi’) Nath is the first of the six officers to have been twice decorated with the Maha Vir Chakra (MVC), India's second highest war time military decoration. He was awarded the MVC for his contributions in the Sino-Indian War of 1962 and Indo-Pakistan War of 1965.
‘Jaggi’ Nath was born in Layyah in undivided Punjab in 1930 into a family of doctors; he studied in the prestigious Government College in Lahore. Soon after Partition, he joined the Royal Indian Air Force as a trainee; he was commissioned in the Indian Air Force in October 1950 and served till 1969, when he took voluntary retirement to join Air India.
In a letter to Air Chief Marshal Arup Raha in 2014, Wing Commander Nath spoke of his mentor, Marshal of IAF Arjan Singh: “Like a father figure, he had always been concerned and caring. I owe my Bar to MVC [in 1965] strictly to him. His personal allocation of all reconnaissance tasks, code naming me ‘Professor’, kept me safe and alive on all my missions. I owe my happy times to him –of the 11 years on Canberras, 8 years in 106 [Squadron] without a break only on [the] Canberra, his consistent appreciation gave the squadron a sense of achievement and kept my spirits sky high.”
He received his first MVC for his role in reconnaissance missions over the Aksai Chin and Tibet, before and during the 1962 war; the citation says: “As Flight Commander of an Operational Squadron, Squadron Leader Jag Mohan Nath has fulfilled a number of hazardous operations tasks involving flying over difficult mountain terrain, both by day and by night, in adverse weather conditions and in complete disregard of his personal safety. He has displayed conspicuous gallantry, a very high sense of duty and a high degree of professional skill.”
His missions proved immensely useful to learn everything about the Chinese military build-up on the Tibetan plateau. Unfortunately, the political leadership refused to believe the hard evidence gathered during of his sorties or use them.
His conclusions were: China had NO Air Force worth this name on the Tibetan plateau in 1962. The fate of the Sino-Indian War could have been totally different had India used its own Air Force, but the Government in Delhi chose to ignore to the findings of the brave airman.
The soon-nonagenarian meets Claude Arpi in his modest flat in Mumbai. He is still fired-up by the events of 1962.

Wing Commander Jag Mohan Nath with Marshal of the Air Force Arjan Singh.

CA: Tell us about the years before the 1962 conflict with China? Tell us about 106 Squadron, using Canberra planes. Once you said that the planes are not just Air Force assets, but national assets!

JMN: I got to know exactly what was happening [in Tibet].
But let me tell you from the start. I joined 106 Squadron on January 1, 1960. My Squadron was involved in strategic Aerial Photographic Reconnaissance; Canberra airplanes were used all over the border to survey and update the maps. We covered the entire Indian territory three or four times; this could be done only with the Canberra and not with the Dakotas, which were used in the early years, as they flew at lower altitude. The Canberra, a bomber, was perfect for surveying.
I will give you one example, 106 Squadron was tasked to survey the Aksai Chin; one day, we were flying towards Xinjiang when we saw a white line, which was the Aksai Chin road; we spotted troops on the road, when we saw this happening, we passed on the information to the Air Force Headquarters. This was probably at the end of 1960 [in early 1961, 14 J&K Militia (Ladakhi) moved its Headquarters to Partapur; it was feared that the Chinese, who had already penetrated along the Chip Chap river, might occupy Daulat Beg Oldi or DBO].
We put on our reconnaissance cameras on; there was one single camera used for survey and four other cameras for taking pictures; the findings were later reported on maps; each time we saw something interesting, we switched on the photographic cameras.

CA: You were the only one do this?

JMN: I was not only one. That was the job of the Squadron to survey these areas. This information was passed on [to the Air Headquarters], but nobody said anything.
In late 1960 or early 1961, the Chinese had a confrontation with the Jammu & Kashmir Border Police at DBO; it was the first confrontation. The J&K Police had already realized that they Chinese were up to some tricks, but everything was kept at a low key because Pandit Nehru and Krishna Menon, the Defence Minister, were totally switched off [from reality].
The first reconnaissance flight of Squadron 106 over this area was done by me. My Commanding Officer [later Air Marshal] Randhir Singh was on leave at that time, I was alone. I was briefed by Western Air Command to go, find out from where the Chinese have come and take photographs.

CA: In the White Papers on China, the Chinese government always complains of some Indian planes ‘intruding’ in Tibet air space. Was it you?

JMN: Yes, that was me.
I flew several times, in some cases up to three to four hours over Tibet, which was under Chinese occupation. My reconnaissance used to start from Gilgit area [Karakoram Pass] and I went westward; I would sometime do reconnaissance over the entire Himalaya, sometime till the trijunction with Burma [today’s Anjaw district of Arunachal Pradesh]. I photographed the entire route, following the Brahmaputra [Yarlung Tsangpo], not one time, but so many times.

Wing Commander Jag Mohan Nath
with Marshal of the Indian Air Force Arjan Singh

CA: Do you mean to say that before 1962, the Army and Air Force Headquarters had a clear picture of what was happening?

JMN: Sometime at the end of 1960, one day, Air Chief Marshal Subroto Mukerjee, [the Chief of Air Staff or CAS] was on leave; he may have been sick. Air Vice Marshal [AVM] Diwan Atma Ram Nanda, then Deputy Chief of the Air Force, was holding forth in Delhi, at that time.
I am talking of the job given to the Air Force by the Army to survey DBO. AVM Nanda told me: “You go and take pictures and I will send an escort with you.” Can you believe it, an escort, in case the Chinese would attack me [with an airplane]!
The whole thing was weird.” AVM Nanda told me: “Another Canberra will escort you while you take the picture of DBO.”
That day, the clouds were very low. I had to fly below the clouds to take the pictures. While the Canberra at the back was armed with guns; my plane had no provisions for such a thing, it was purely a reconnaissance aircraft, fitted with cameras.
It was my first flight [over the Aksai Chin] and I was keen to get results.
As I went, the clouds were very low. I could not take a picture. I went to the Shyok river [The Shyok River, a tributary of the Indus River, flows through northern Ladakh. The river widens at the confluence with the Nubra River].
The river made a U turn and DBO is on the top.
So, I went ahead while Squadron Leader [AIK] Suares of 5 Squadron was keeping an eye on me in case the Chinese come. I went down under the clouds and followed the Shyok river valley, then I came up and went down again following the River. When I went down again, I had to slow down, because the turning radius of the Canberra is low (if you fly slow, the turning radius in smaller). Suares asked me “Jaggi, are you still carrying on”.
I said: “Yes, I am on, the cameras are on”. He asked: “Are you still planning to continue?” I answered: “Yes, I am going”. That was the discussion between both of us.
I kept going down like this and suddenly, I saw the Chinese there. I took photographs of the Chinese soldiers all over the place. I could have taken their portrait. They were all around.

Front page of Times of India for his first Maha Vir Chakra in 1963.

CA: How many Chinese could you see?

JMN: I could not count them, but they were there in good number and I took photographs. That was enough [for my job]. Suares said: “It is enough, we have finished.” We had already taken the pictures. The job was done; later, all the photos were put in front of AVM Nanda, the acting Air Chief, and I explained to him how it had happened. I said that the pictures were taken from very low and all the details could be seen; the Chinese were clearly there. Then, messages came from Pandit Nehru, from Krishna Menon [the Defence Minister] and Lt Gen BM (Biji) Kaul; they would like to talk to the reconnaissance party.

CA: Gen Kaul was Chief of General Staff?

JMN: No, he had not yet taken over, but he was the main advisor of Pandit Nehru; he was the bloody favorite. So, with Air Marshal Nanda, I went to South Block to see Krishna Menon. We were waiting outside when Biji Kaul came. He started talking away: “I know, I know, these fellows [the Chinese] are there. They asked me to throw them back. I can throw them back, not a problem! But they will be back the next day. It has to be planned out properly.”
I was surprised that he would speak like this in front of a squadron leader. I was a junior officer, a low level officer. He continued shouting: “You saw the Chinese soldiers.” I said “Yes, Sir, I saw them. You can blow up the pictures.”
“OK, go to the Defence Minister,” he finally said.
So AVM Nanda and I landed up in the office of Krishna Menon. He did not ask anything, he just said “Did you see the Chinese soldiers?” I answered “Yes Sir, I saw them”. “That’s alright, you can go”, he said. He must have passed the information to Pandit Nehru, but a similar reaction.
There was a total breakdown; I still have such a poor impression of Biji Kaul shooting his mouth without knowing anything.
Krishna Menon also, I told him there were Chinese soldiers and that was it all. It was amazing.
They did not know how to handle the situation.
They knew for more than a year about the Aksai Chin [cutting across Indian territory].
When the 1962 War started, [the Air and Army Headquarters] had all the information. You probably know that the confrontation had started earlier than October 20, [this probably refers to the Dhola Post incident in Tawang sector of the NEFA, when some 600 Chinese soldiers surrounded the Indian troops on September 8, 1962].
On October 20, it started in DBO, and the Galwan River [a tributary of the Chipshap River, which in turn drains into the Shyok River. The main stream of this river rises near the Depsang plain near DBO].
I am still getting worked up when I think of these things.
I remember the Aksin Chin, at that time. I went, the clouds were again low, the war had actually started. In one sortie, I flew over the Aksai Chin, I had to find out where exactly where the Chinese were, what were their positions, their backups, etc. It was well after October 20.

With Defence Minister YB Chavan showing pictures of the recces

CA: Was it at the time of the battle of Rezang-la?

JMN: Yes, exactly.
I took pictures of the Northern borders; it was a three hour flight. I flew up and down [showing gesture of sweeping trajectory]. I could see the concentration of the Chinese; I would go around and take pictures. The Chinese could see me and started shooting with their rifles. How could they shoot down an airplane with a rifle? It was just not possible.
The point is that they did not have anything; NO weapon to shoot down an aircraft, No Air Force!
I went down all the way to Kailash and Taklakot [trijunction Tibet-Nepal-India]; the flight lasted three to four hours.
I got the full picture of how many Chinese soldiers were there; I got everything. The Government had full information at that time.
I had already surveyed the Galwan river area; there too Delhi had the complete picture.
I was getting a full view seating in the front row and could tell how the war was progressing, what was happening. Without reconnaissance, you can’t do anything. Of course today, we are out of business, because of the drones and the quality of the cameras.
The SR-71 was still used for a long time, because it would fly at high altitude and nobody could shoot it down. [The Lockheed SR-71 ‘Blackbird’ was a long-range, strategic reconnaissance aircraft that was operated by the United States Air Force.]
For a long time, planes like that were still required to collect intelligence, because the results were immediate. But the SR-71 are today totally out of the game. For a long time, the images shot by the satellite were not immediate as it took time to analyze them.
[In 1962], I spent hours doing reconnaissance flights.
After October 20, 1962, I used to go with Air Marshal Elric Pinto, the Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Western Air Command, to meet the Chief of Air Force [CAS], Aspi Engineer. I used to go for a briefing of what needed to be done, but also about what I had done; so many times, I went [to meet the CAS]. I can tell you, that if Elric Pinto had been the Chief, things would have been so very different. Aspi Engineer was too low key.
I told the Air Headquarters: “I am flying hours over Tibet, if they had radars, they [the Chinese] should have picked up the phone and said there is a bloody airplane flying [over our country]. They had radars [but nothing happened]. I could fly three to four hours, but nothing would happen. It is the proof that they had no Air Force in Tibet [near the border]. The best proof is that I was never shot down, except with their rifles.
In 1962, we had all the information about the Chinese [deployment].
I mentioned this to Elric Pinto.
If we had sent a few airplanes [in Tibet], we could have wiped them all out. I told AM Pinto: “we could wipe them out”. And everything could have been different in [the] 1962 [War].

CA: I was once told by Air Chief Marshal Anil Tipnis that when he was a young pilot in 1962, one day, he and his colleagues were ordered to board their aircrafts in Ambala …to support the operations in Ladakh. And suddenly they were asked to deplane. Orders had come from the ‘higher ups’ in Delhi, not to use the Air Force. Who gave this order?

JMN: Listen to this. When I went to Elric Pinto and told him: “We could finish them off in no time, do you know what he said?”. He told me that the Indian Government believed that the Chinese had bombers, they could bomb Delhi and other cities. This information was passed by the top, by Pandit Nehru and Krishna Menon and [later] the information percolated down. [As a result] they decided not to commit the Air Force.
My feeling today is that question [of bombing big cities] may have come for discussion, but they did not believe me that there was no Chinese Air Force. They must have thought “will the IAF will be able to defend the cities!”
There was no [air] confrontation with the Chinese, but if we had had it, it would have been a different ball game; however there was Zero Possibility, as they had no Air Force. The person who should have put his foot down was Air Chief Aspi Engineer. Otherwise why was the Air Force not used to support the Army which was getting beatings everywhere. We could have [first] verified their positions [and then used the IAF].
Can you imagine what would have happened if we had used the IAF at that time? Chinese would have never dared do anything down the line.

What type of set-up India had?
We had the information at our end: the Chinese Air Force was grounded for lack of spares. They were mainly using Mig-17, but as China had problems with Russia, they did get the supply of spare parts; the planes were blocked; other planes were on the Korean front, from where they could not move.
Even a small airplane could not land in Tibet; they had no forward strip at all. Further for their fighter planes, it was a one-way trip [from Korea] as they had no fuel to go back.
All this information was available. What excuse did we have to not use the Air Force? Things could have been completely different, if the Air Force had been used.

Extracts of a letter addressed by Wing Commander JM Nath to Air Chief Arup Raha, in September 10, 2014.

It was always a common knowledge that China was equipped with Migs-15s and 17s. Delhi was out of their range. The shortage of spares as a result of falling out with Russia in 1960 had almost grounded their Air force.
Hours were spent by me personally in broad day light over Tibet and Aksai Chin. Most prominent - a 3 hrs flight at 100 ft AGL [above ground level] covering whole of Aksai Chin-DBO to Chashul [Chushul] and Demchok continuing to Shipkila pass [Himachal Pradesh] and Taklakot near Manasarovar. Thereafter, in broad daylight, the long flights from the origin of Brahmaputra till Pasighat (Trijunction of India, Burma and China) for four hours, numerous milk-runs over the eastern battle front and the adjoining 50-70 nm [nautical miles] area north into Tibet. Thousands of Squadron’s Recce photographs then are a matter of record with IAF and the Army Hq [headquarters]. One may ask, where was the Lack of Intelligence and where was China’s Air Force and their Air defence set up? This account may be considered as from a front seat witness to the 1962 tragic show.”
(The second part of this interview will be on Wing Commander ‘Jaggi’ Nath role in the 1965 War against Pakistan and his second Maha Vir Chakra).

USI Monograph - India Tibet Relations (1947-1962)

This monograph is a short summary of a study undertaken under the Field Marshal KM Cariappa Chair of Excellence of the United Service Institution of India, New Delhi.
The study is divided in four parts, each covered in a volume.
The four volumes respectively cover the periods 1947-1951, 1951-1954, 1954-1957 and 1957-1962.


Introduction
The end of the 1940s saw momentous events which, in one way, redesigned the world.
Two years after the end of WWII, India got her Independence from the British; in October 1949, the sleeping Dragon, Communist China rose  when its Great Helmsman announced the creation of the People’s Republic of China from the rostrum on Tiananmen Square.
Mao Zedong was very quick to move: by the end of December 1949, with the blessings of Stalin, he had annexed Eastern Turkestan (today Xinjiang) and reached the gates of India, north of the State of Jammu & Kashmir.
In January 1950, Beijing announced its next step on the Asian chessboard: it would ‘liberate’ Tibet, Formosa (today Taiwan) and the island of Hainan.
While the Communists advanced their pawns towards India’s borders, some leaders in India continued to imagine a perfect world and soon their main strategic objective became to avoid at any cost a world conflict.
It is with this background that the study of Tibet-India relations between 1947 and 1962, conducted under the Field Marshal KM Cariappa Chair of Excellence of the United Service Institution of India, witnessed the rise of the two Asian giants, with two different purposes, one could say, two opposite visions of the world: one wanted to dominate Asia with its foreign ideology, while the other dreamt of world peace.
Unfortunately in the process, India lost a century-old buffer zone between its Northern plains and the Middle Kingdom.
By the beginning of 1951, Tibet and Xinjiang were militarily absorbed into the new People’s Republic of China.
Many Indian political leaders soon realized that the Hindi-Chini-Bhai-Bhai honeymoon between Delhi and Beijing as envisaged by the Indian Prime Minister could only translate into the loss of a peaceful frontier for India.
Unfortunately, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, the Deputy Prime Minister and prime opponent of this policy, who presciently foresaw the implications for his country, passed away on December 15, 1950, leaving Jawaharlal Nehru to freely continue his policy of ‘friendship’ at any cost, with consequences very much present more than 70 years later.
Paradoxically, the Indian officials posted on the Roof of the World quickly discovered the true objectives of the Communists. But tragically, after Patel’s death, nobody in Delhi or the Indian Embassy in Beijing was ready to listen to the intrepid officers.
This study goes in depth into the slow break-down of the age-old Indo-Tibet relations, gradually being replaced by a cruder relation with the new occupiers of Tibet.  
India’s friendly relationship with its Buddhist neighbour was progressively terminated by the presence of the PLA on the plateau. During these fifteen years, not many Tibetans had the courage to fight the ineluctable; most of them, whether from the aristocracy or the clergy, collaborated with the occupying forces, particularly in the first years after the invasion.
The fifteen years under study witnessed a series of momentous events: starting with the annexation of Xinjiang and the closure of the Indian Consulate in Kashgar (end of 1949/1950), the invasion of Tibet (end of 1950), the signature of a 17-Point Agreement (May 1951) between China and Tibet and the arrival of the Chinese troops in Lhasa (September 1951).
During the first years of occupation, the reports of the Indian Trade Agent in Yatung, Gyantse and Gartok, as well as of the Indian representatives in Lhasa, vividly described the changing trends in the power balance on the plateau. The Indian officials, who for decades dealt directly with the Tibetan authorities, had now to pass through the Chinese PLA officers.
Then China started to build strategic roads, most of them towards the Indian borders or worse, through Indian territory in the Aksai Chin in Ladakh.
As the situation continued to deteriorate on the plateau, India and China decided to engage in the ‘Tibet Talks’ in Beijing (which started on December 31, 1953); the negotiations, which culminated with the signature of the Panchsheel Agreement in April 1954, saw India losing all the rights it had in Tibet since the beginning of the 20th century.
This bi-lateral accord between Delhi and Beijing redefined India’s age-old trade relations with Tibet; but the Tibetans themselves were excluded from the negotiations and the benefits of the Agreement.
In many ways, it marked the tail end of the events set into motion by the entry of Younghusband in Tibet in 1904. While the British expedition indicated recognition of Tibet as a separate entity (for the Western power), the signing of the Agreement put an end to Tibet as an independent nation. The circle was closed, with incalculable consequences for the Himalayan region and India in general.
It took a few more years and many persistent Chinese intrusions on Indian soil to sensitize the Indian government and public to the gravity of the new state of affairs.
The third and fourth parts of our study go further into the deteriorating situation on the Roof of the World, with Communist China tightening their grip on the administration, trade and religion. Despite a visit to India of the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama in 1956/57 for the 2500th Buddha Jayanti celebrations, the down-sliding could not be stopped.
This tense situation culminated in the events of March 1959, which saw an uprising of the Tibetan population in Lhasa and the flight of the Dalai Lama who took refuge in India.
Soon after, the border intrusions turned into armed clash on the frontier (Longju, Spangur Gap, etc.); this marked the beginning of the ‘dispute’ with China over the Northern boundaries of India.
The three following years saw the Chinese ‘preparations’ for the onslaught on the Indian borders. Our narrative finishes with the border war between the two Asian giants in October 1962; it shattered the Indian Prime Minister’s dream of an eternal friendship with Communist China.
The Indian presence in Tibet ended with the lapse of the Panchsheel Agreement in April 1962 (it was not renewed) and the closure of the Consulate General of India in Lhasa in December 1962. This marked the end of an era.
The study has recorded in great detail these events which continue to have implications 60 years after the armed conflict in NEFA and Ladakh; the consequences can still be seen today in Eastern Ladakh and other sectors of the Tibet-India boundary, which has unfortunately become the Sino-Indian border.
Today, the Chinese propaganda would like us to believe that Tibet has always been part of China, but historical records show that it is not a fact and that the relations between Tibet and India are as ancient as the Himalaya ranges. Fifteen years have been documented through more than 2,000 pages.
To put these facts on record was the main purpose of our study under the Field Marshal KM Cariappa Chair of Excellence.

LAC vs IB: Why India's assessment of the length of border along China is misleading

My article LAC vs IB: Why India's assessment of the length of border along China is misleading appeared in FirstPost.

 Here is the link...

The length given by India's Ministry of Home Affairs (3,488 km) is unfortunately wrong

What is the length of India’s border with China?
You may think that it is easy to answer this question, but unfortunately, it is not.
The Ministry of Home Affairs states: “India has 15,106.7 Km of land border and a coastline of 7,516.6 Km including island territories.” It then gives the length of India’s land borders with neighbouring countries; Bangladesh has the longest border (4,096 km), then China (3,488 km) and Pakistan (3,323 km).

India’s International Border (IB) with China is 4,056 km.
Let me explain why.
The length given by the MHA (3,488 km) is the length of the Line of Actual Control (LAC), not the IB.
The concept of LAC was introduced by the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, during a press conference in Delhi in April 1960 (he had earlier vaguely mentioned it at the end of 1959 in a letter to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru).
Zhou proposed six points to solve the border issue; the first two points were:

•     There exist disputes with regard to the boundary between the two sides.
•     There exists between the two countries a line of actual control (LAC) up to which each side exercises administrative jurisdiction.

The fact that the Indian government then rejected the Premier’s proposal is irrelevant to the present argument.
Zhou had come to Delhi to set up talks with India on the boundary dispute. Subsequently, the officials of India and China met for several months during which Delhi made its position clear: “The India-China boundary starts from the tri-junction of the boundaries of India, China and Afghanistan and runs eastward through the Kilik Pass, Mintaka Pass, Kharchanai Pass, Parpik Pass, and the Khunjerab Pass. These passes lie on the watershed between the Hunza river flowing into the Indus system in India and the Qara Chukar river flowing into the Yarkand system in Sinkiang. From the Khunjerab Pass the boundary lies along a spur down to the north-western bend of the Shaksgam or Muztagh river which it crosses at that point and ascends the crest line of the Aghil mountains. It then runs along the crest of the Aghil watershed through the Aghil Pass the Marpo Pass and the Shaksgam Pass to the Karakoram Pass.” The coordinates for each of these places were given.
Historically, there is no doubt that Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) was part of the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir’s territory and that the IB presently starts at the trijunction with Afghanistan while the LAC begins at the Karakoram Pass.

Rajnath Singh’s declaration
On 28 October, 2022, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, while addressing a function in Srinagar to mark 75th year of induction of the Indian Army in Kashmir, reiterated that GB was part of India, though presently under occupation. “India’s development march towards the North will be complete after reaching GB,” he stated.
The minister also referred to the 1994 Resolution passed in the Indian Parliament to recover the territories under illegal occupation of the ‘neighbouring country’. “We have only started our northward journey. Our journey will be complete when we fully implement the unanimous resolution passed by the Parliament on February 22, 1994, and we reach our remaining areas like GB,” said Singh.

A little bit of history
In 1935, the viceroy prevailed upon Maharaja Hari Singh of Kashmir, ‘in the interests of the security of the British empire’ to lease the Gilgit Agency as well as the hill-states Hunza, Nagar, Yasin and Ishkoman for 60 years to the British. Thereafter, Gilgit was administered by the Political Department, with a Political Officer reporting to the viceroy.
The British Paramountcy lapsed on 1 August, 1947, and Gilgit reverted to the Maharaja’s control. Lt Col Roger Bacon, the British Political Agent, handed his charge to Brig Ghansara Singh, the new governor appointed by the Maharaja. A British officer, Maj Brown remained in-charge of the Gilgit Scouts.
On 26 October 1947, after the brutal tribal invasion of Jammu and Kashmir organised by Pakistan, Maharaja Hari Singh signed an Instrument of Accession and joined the Union of India. However, Maj Brown refused to acknowledge the orders of the Maharaja, under the pretext that some leaders of the Frontier Districts Province (in GB) wanted to join Pakistan. He took it upon himself to hand over the entire area to Pakistan on 1 November, 1947.
An interesting announcement was published in the 1948 London Gazette which mentioned that the King “has been graciously pleased… to give orders for… appointments to the Most Exalted Order of the British Empire…” The list included “Brown, Major (acting) William Alexander, Special List (ex-Indian Army).”
Why awarding Brown? Simply because Brown had just ‘offered’ to Pakistan this strategically important area for London.

A British Article
In 2017, an IANS article, When the British poured scorn over Gilgit, explained the background of the 1947 rebellion in Gilgit: “A carefully chosen force capable of rapid movement in the mountainous territory controlled by British officers, the Gilgit Scouts, provided the muscle to the administration.”
The article continued: “The bloodless coup d’etat was planned by Brown to the last detail under the code name ‘Datta Khel’, which was also joined by a rebellious section of the J&K 6th Infantry under Mirza Hassan Khan.”
In his memoirs, Gilgit Rebellion: The Major who Mutinied over the Partition of India, Brown described his encounter with Pakistan prime minister Liaquat Ali Khan in November 1947: “Colonel Bacon, Colonel Iskander Mirza, and I were called into the ante-room. The Pakistan Premier was seated at a desk, poring over a large-scale map of Kashmir and Central Asia. …Mr Liaquat Ali Khan started by congratulating me and thanking me for all I had done in preserving peace in the Gilgit Agency.”
Liaquat then said: “Brown, give me your ideas [for Gilgit] from a military point of view.” The major explained in detail his plans to defend the area by reorganising the Scouts. “Right” said the Premier: “That disposes of the military angle.”
Though there is no doubt about the illegality of the mutiny, one paramount question remains: was the British Headquarters informed?
At the time, the entire Pakistani Army hierarchy was British. So, the answer can only be that Maj Brown’s British bosses were aware of his ‘gift’ to Pakistan. The fact that he was nominated to the OBE is further proof. The King usually does not appoint ‘deserters’ or ‘rebels’ to the august Order.

The length of the IB
Even today, this has serious implications for India, though it does not change the length of the IB (4,056 km), beginning at the trijunction with Afghanistan in the West and ending at the trijunction with Burma (Myanmar) in the east. The report of the officials cited above gives the Indian position in the East: “The boundary crosses the Yonggyap Pass and the Kangri Karpo Pass in this sector. It then crosses the Lohit river a few miles south of Rima and joins the tri-junction of the India, Burma and China boundaries near the Diphu Pass.”

The UN Resolutions
The UN resolutions of 17 January, 1948, and 13 August, 1948, and 5 January, 1949, (UNCIP Resolutions) made it clear that “Pakistan cannot claim to exercise sovereignty in respect of J&K.” In 1963, a secret note from the MEA clarified further that according to the term of the UN Resolutions, “Pakistan cannot purport to exercise even ‘actual control’ over the defence of these areas.”
Practically, it also means that the agreement signed on 2 March, 1963, between Pakistan and China about the Shaksgam Valley of the Gilgit Agency being transferred to China is legally invalid.
Another logical conclusion is that inhabitants of the area if they want to move to India, should be entitled to Indian citizenship.

A British Resolution
Amazingly, in 2017, the British Parliament passed a resolution confirming GB was part of Jammu and Kashmir.
The motion was tabled on 23 March, 2017, by Bob Blackman of the Conservative Party. It reads: “GB is a legal and constitutional part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, India, which is illegally occupied by Pakistan since 1947, and where people are denied their fundamental rights including the right of freedom of expression.”
Two years later, the new maps released by the Government of India showing the Leh district of Ladakh including the districts of Gilgit, Gilgit Wazarat, Chilhas and Tribal Territory of 1947, made this clear.
Interestingly, the Indian media reported last month: “Amidst news of flour and food crisis across Pakistan, the Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK), GB is again making headlines as residents are furious over the discriminative policies of the Pakistan government that has exploited the region for several decades and are now demanding a reunion with India in Ladakh”, noted India Today, adding: “Several videos on the internet show the extent of the discontent among residents.”
Let us hope that the correct length of India’s border with China will soon be obvious to all.

Kitne sundar! Kitna dukh?

Reading about Joshimath 'sinking' thought of this old interview of Malika Virdi...

Munsyari in Pithoragarh district of Uttarakhand was recently in the news for a sad reason: 43 residents of three villages — Chetla, Mati and Balagaon were buried alive after a seasonal landslide destroyed their village.
This event did not garner the same amount of ink as the swine flu did; it is not as thrilling. The tragedy attracted a few lines in the media and this for a day only.
It is in this last small town, the last one before the Nepal-Tibet border, that Claude Arpi and Abha Tewari met Malika Virdi, one of the most renowned Indian mountaineers, a social worker and sarpanch, who has chosen to live the ordinary life of local folks. Her endeavour is to find herself and eventually also be a catalyst to help ease the harshness of their lives.
It needs courage, character and idealism to decide to spend one’s life in such a beautiful, but harsh place. This is evident in the answers of Malika which justify her choices and point to the issues faced by mountain populations, especially women.
At a time when eco-tourism is fast becomes a fashion, Malika tells us of an incident which occurred during the All-Women Himalayan Traverse in 1997: as she walked with a Nepali porter carrying 100kg on his back, she remarked pointing at the gorgeous mountains around, “Kitne sundar!” (How beautiful they are!), his reply was immediate, “Kitna dukh!” (So much suffering!). This summarizes the hard life in these mountainous areas.
The backdrop of this free discussion with Malika is the gorgeous Panchachuli range where the Five Pandavas are supposed to have cooked their last meal before leaving this world. But even here, at the gateway to Heaven, it is said that there was a sixth chula (stove) for Draupadi to cook for her husbands!!

Claude Arpi: Malika, you wear several caps: you are a sarpanch (elected village head person), you are a mountaineer, you are working on women’s issues. But before going into this, tell us about your background. Where do you come from, where were you educated?

Malika: For me, it is a question of identity. It means who am I? My identity as a woman was easy enough to discover early. Having grown up in an urban area, for a long time it was not clear. My cultural roots were in rural Punjab; but it was not obvious. We lived in Delhi, we traveled around. The first assertion of my identity came in 1984 when I realized that I belong to the Sikh community, a minority community. It was quite different from having a free-floating identity as an urban woman or just a Punjabi woman.
In 1984, after Indira Gandhi’s assassination, when the Sikh carnage took place, it became very clear to me. I came face to face with my roots.

CA: You were a student at that time?

MV: No, I was working in the resettlement slums in Delhi. Many Sikhs got massacred at that time. I lived close to the area in East Delhi [where the massacre took place] and I spent 3 nights waiting with my father and my mother. I thought: “They [the mobs looking for Sikhs] will come”. We had just moved 6 months earlier [to this area]; we could see houses burning, people with broken legs or arms being carried away. We were just waiting and not sure [what will happen to us]. At that time, I clearly realized that I belonged to a minority community. I am a Sikh and it has a meaning. It is not just a surname that I carry around in life.
Apart from that, I always lived in an urban area, my parents lived in Delhi, but grand-parents were farmers [in Punjab]. I was twice removed from the land. I did my schooling and college in Delhi, started working in Delhi after my MA in Social Sciences. I did my MPhil and wanted to do a PhD. But I wanted to ‘work’. I was interested more by action than research. I stopped my studies, went into activism. It is how I can describe myself.

CA: Tell us how did you decided to leave Delhi and come to Munsyari, this remote part of Uttarakhand?

MV: I was working in Rajasthan on a Women’s Development Program. It was interesting. Theo [Malika’s partner] and I had been together for many years, but we lived our own lives. He was in Anand in Gujarat [with the National Dairy Development Board] and I was in Rajasthan. We decided to set up a home together; it made sense to do so in the mountains. We came here in 1992. He had a project and I came to settle here and be a farmer and a mother. I had never done farming before, but I thought that it was the right thing to do. It was not really significant that this place was very remote. We thought if we can find a piece of land, ‘fine, we can settle here’. There was a lot of romanticism involved. . In 1993, we bought a piece of land and in 1994 we built a small room.

CA: How did you get involved in local politics? Today you are a sarpanch (head person of the village forest council or Van Panchayat). What does it mean to be a sarpanch?

MV: Sarmoli is a remote mountain village. The subsistence economy is such that you need a forest to support it. It is the way agriculture has been going on in the Himalayas for a long, long time. After a struggle during the British Raj, the people managed to get community forests legally notified: this is called the Van Panchayat. This happened in 1931, and our village Van Panchayat was notified in 1949. Each village community has a support forest area (in our case 34 hectares) and it is governed in a democratic way. We have elections every five years. A council is elected and the head of the council is called a sarpanch.

CA: How many members do you have in the council?

MV: We have nine because it is a large Panchayat with two revenue villages, Jainti and Sarmoli. I have just completed my five-year term.
Already when I worked in Rajasthan, I did not want to do my work as a ‘job’. As an activist, if it is your [earning] ‘job’, you first think of securing your job and it may be at variance with your beliefs. It happened to us a couple of times, when either our project was closed down or we had to quit. [In these cases] you have then to decide if you want to stick to your beliefs or secure your job.
I like to work with communities and take up causes as they come, but as a citizen, not someone who is getting paid.
I work more on the political level, though on the same [social] issues. I am on my own and not part of any large institution or political party]. It is the same for women’s issues and keeping your autonomy has been central to my beliefs
When I came here, I did not join any organization. It was hard, I had no work. I took up farming. I basically wanted to be part of the community. I was a persona non grata for five years. I did not belong to the urban area, I did not belong here. It took time for me to get really accepted. After 5-7 years of checking me out, [they realized] that I did stand by what I professed. It is always easy to talk principles, but is more difficult to stand by them. The community looks at actions, not talks. The reason why they made me sarpanch, besides the fact that by that time I had been accepted by the community, is that nobody wanted to be sarpanch.

CA: Why?

MV: It is interesting. When there is money coming in for development in the Gram or Village Panchayat, you can not only make a ‘political’ career, but you can also ‘earn’ something [out of it]. In contrast, the Van Panchayat has no money, we are working for the common property and we are not getting state funding. There is no money allocated from anywhere. So nobody is eager to be sarpanch.
In our village, because we are close to the town of Munsyari, people prefer to be where they stand a better chance [to make money].
The Van Panchayat is (or was) a losing proposition. Not only do we not have [development] money, but people usually do not want to work together. It is an eroding culture. When I became sarpanch, the community said: “you are talking so much, now show us”. [Personally] I was very excited. Because I did not have ‘political’ ambitions, I was able to mobilize the community, first the women and the youth of the region.

CA: Do you think that women can do better than men to bring people together?

MV: I wouldn’t say that, but women are more dependent on the forest, so it made sense to respond to me [as a sarpanch]. [In our area] economy has not been monetized that much, there is still the remnants of the concept of shared labour.

CA: Is it disappearing?

MV: Yes, it is, but women are still ready to share labour and they are more dependant on the forest. As a woman, I was also ready to give them space, not just the rhetoric. Still women were cynical [at the beginning], “the village won’t change, there will be no turn around”. What we managed in 5 years is that a third (or perhaps half) of the village has really changed.
CA: In which way?
MV: Today, there is hope. People want to keep the Van Panchayat going. Some will still say [cynically], “Go ahead, since you are so keen!”. But there is a change.

CA: Is there still an exodus towards the cities and the plains?

MV: Yes, agriculture is only subsistence agriculture, you can’t make cash. It is a problem.

CA: What about tourism?

MV: It is one of the experiments of our Van Panchayat. To be meaningful, one should get something back from the forest. It is too small to meet all the subsistence needs of all our right holders of fuel-wood and fodder; too many people depend on a too small land.
We had to find some [environmentally] non-extractive way to get benefits to as many people as possible. Tourism was a good option. We have organized it involving the community of right holders. It means that benefit comes to the community at large. Some 50 families out of the 300 are benefiting directly. We have a home-stay program with 25 families on the roster. We have also 25 families where young men or women work as porters and guides. They are trained. They can also plan logistics for different types of treks.
These are two aspects: the home-stay where visitors share food, house, skills, crafts, etc. with the host family and the second one is the logistic for treks.

CA: The Uttarakhand Government is planning to develop tourism on a much larger scale. What are your views? Is it not destructive?

MV: As the Government created SEZs [Special Economic Zones], the State today speaks of STZ (for tourism). This is typical top-down model of planning and development. It is the wrong way to go. All the benefits are kept at the top and little ‘trickles’ down to the bottom. Only the crumbs only reach the communities; and s what the Uttarakhand state government is trying to do. But the Government also knows that eco-tourism has potential. We find some support with the Forest Department, perhaps because eco-tourism is fashionable. We have received some money for a community center. [In a way] it has validated our endeavor, but it is too small. The main thrust is with the big tourism industry which is based in Nainital or Dehra Dun.

CA: Could the Government make Munsyari, a Nainital?

MV: Well, many people are turning their houses into lodges or hotels. One can’t imagine that there is a recession in India when one sees the amount of [new] buildings under construction. If one does not watch, the same thing will happen in Munsyari as elsewhere. But it will be an overkill. The [tourist] capacity in a place like Munsyari is limited.

CA: In which way?

MV: Take water, we had never heard of water shortage until 5 years ago. Whether it is because of global warming or other problems, it is becoming an issue.

CA: What are the main women issues in Munsyari?

MV: Broadly the same issues as anywhere else [in India]. It is why women’s groups will never be out of work, I am speaking of slog work. Violence does not seem to end. Deep patriarchal perspectives [in the villages] legitimize any degree of violence against woman. When I first came, during the first six years, I observed that there were 6 brutal murders, and the police did nothing. [At that time], I had no credibility as I was a newcomer to this community. When I would raise the issue of speaking out against the violence, I was ignored. People would say, “what is the big deal”.

CA: What was the motivation of the murderers?

MV: Mainly for marital affairs. The man had another woman and wanted to marry again. The first time, I got involved is when there was a brutal murder in the bazaar; everybody was horrified; people had seen the woman's dead body, but nobody wanted to say anything. There was a complicity of silence. I had the same question, should I speak? I felt it was time to speak up. I noticed that people need a catalyst; there is some cynicism which believes people do not want to speak, but they do. Someone has to start. In no time, we were 40 women going to the police station asking for a post-mortem; what was the State doing? etc… Since then, we never looked back. We have a small organization, not yet registered called Mahila Sangathan.
We are thinking of registering it, because we now have a public profile and there is antipathy to what we stand for in some quarters. For our own safety, we need to be registered; our accounts have to be [officially] audited. Even if we generate very little money, we need to be able to show where we are getting funds from.
So, the first issue is violence against women. The second issue is liquor.
In the mountains, people have always brewed their own liquor). . It is part of the culture of the Bhotias a local tribe that is a Scheduled Tribe. It makes sense when it is cold, life is tough, but the now the growing problem is the commercialization of liquor.

When there is already poverty, when the minimum wage is so small, when people are in a general state of hopelessness, then take to drink- it often results in violence against women, and then there is a problem. It is not just a women’s issue, though women take the brunt of it. It is an economic and political issue.
I am a feminist, but I believe that it is not only gender which traps people. It is as much the caste, the class, and poverty related. We have to look at life in a multidimensional way.
Many women's groups like ours in Munsyari work first to liberate ourselves, we invest our energies [on our issues and problems]; and society will change only when we have a critical mass. We have to change the way society sanctions things. If you stand up and say, “I don’t agree”, after sometime, you find that there are 10 people who do not agree, and after a while many others begin to stand up. Then there is a cultural shift. Times are changing. That is what we are fighting for!

CA: Do you see any change with the spreading of education?

MV: Definitely. It has been a very important factor, even though our educational system is not in a good shape, even though we don’t have enough teachers.

CA: Nobody wants to come to such a remote place?

MV: Yes, this is a genuine problem. But, just the fact that girls can now step out, that they are no longer restricted to private spheres [of the household]; the fact that schools are for them as well, this has brought a big big change. They are not fully educated, but they have stepped out. Amongst them, the more assertive can move ahead. That is good, though the quality of education in general is bad, but there is now an opportunity for them.

CA: What brought you to mountaineering?

MV: I grew up with my grand-mother in Dehra Dun. I was always close to the land. We had some land; we did a bit of agriculture. I liked to walk in the forests. I realized that it had a special meaning in my life. In school, I started rock climbing, then I pushed ahead, did my mountaineering courses. At that time in India, it was hard to be a woman mountaineer. It still is!

CA: Can you explain?

MV: Either you are part of a club and a club culture where everything is laid out for you. [In this set up], women have their place and remain at their place. If you don’t belong to a club, if you are not patronized by an institution or the Army, you are left to your own strength. Though mountaineering is about physical ability, but it is not the reason why you are usually selected for an expedition]. You are called, because you are someone’s partner or daughter, or for a funding purpose: a woman is needed on the team to secure sponsorships. If you want to do mountaineering for the pleasure of it or the adventure, it is hard to find a group where you will be valued for what you are, not just for your ‘label’. I did my basic and advanced mountaineering courses, a few expeditions, but I was choosy. I was not ready to do anything to get on an expedition. I like to do it the way I believe it should be done.

CA: Can you elaborate?

MV: Some people take to mountaineering not to challenge themselves, but to ‘vanquish’ the mountain. They say they have ‘conquered’ a peak. Sometimes even, ‘a virgin peak’! This is patriarchal; it is like ‘conquest’ during a war. I look at it the other way around: there is only yourself to ‘conquer’. You vanquish your own fears, your own limits. It is for the challenge of conquering yourself that you are there. Then I feel physically alive.
Styles are also different: you have the ‘siege’ type or ‘military’ type, where you rope up the mountain and there is the ‘alpine’ style, you pull your own weight. The first is OK when you want to ‘win’. For example, the Everest was a race between the British and the Swiss. The Karakoram was a ‘German’ goal.

CA: Annapurna is ‘French’?

MV: Yes! It became a symbol of nationalistic prowess instead of being a pleasure to be with the mountain. I am not necessarily negating [the first type], but it is not my style.

CA: A few words on your trans-himalayan venture, the `Indian Women's First Trans-Himalayan Journey '97?

MV: Being a mountaineer, you usually want to go to the top. There is a peak attraction; there is the name to be earned, the recognition at the end of the tunnel. Ours was different; the Traverse [trans-Himalayan trek] was more an expedition of endurance. It was a physical expedition as well as an emotional one. It took us some 6 and half months to walk from Arunachal Pradesh [the eastern most part of Himalay in India] to the Karakoram Pass in Ladakh [at the border of Chinese ]. We walked 205 days in high altitude. Of these just 19 days was spent replenishing our stocks or having a bath, but the rest of the time, we trekked. It was the first all-women expedition. There were 9 of us. Earlier only 8 expeditions worldwide had attempted and completed the Himalayan Traverse.
We were fortunate to do it in one push, some of the earlier expeditions with foreigners had to it in several stages (to get their visas for example). Being Indians, it was easier for this. We were State guests in Bhutan and with Nepal, India has special arrangements.
It was a good challenge for me. First because we were all women.
Politically, it was important that we succeeded. But power [equation between individuals] is not different, just because we were women. [Between ourselves], we had different styles of working. The leader of the expedition was Bachendri Pal, the first Indian woman to climb the Everest. She put this expedition together, and her style was more a military style. She was not from the Army, but she had climbed the Everest with the Army.
After 4 months of trekking, we had a split. We had crossed Arunachal, Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal. [We separated] and three of us completed it and went to Karakoram Pass, the others went to the Siachen Glacier [located nearby].
The essential thing is that all of us started and all of us completed it. Nobody went home crying. Before we left, the media had said: “Oh, nine women, they will certainly have a fight and go home crying”. Typical [macho media]! “They can’t make it without a male presence”.
But it is true, we had different styles of climbing and these got thrown up in sharp contradictions during the traverse.

CA: Which is your best souvenir after 17 years?

MV: The trek confirmed certain things that I always believed in. Emotionally and physically, it was extremely hard in parts, but at the same time, affirming. The sheer joy of having gone to places I would not have gone to without this expedition; to have seen how people live there. From outside as a short tourist trip, mountains are always beautiful, but while trekking you see another side of it. I won’t say poverty, it would be patronizing, but the hardship of life in this rugged and demanding terrain becomes a living reality; though people are [usually] coping well. It is a life style that is meaningful, sustainable — quite like here in Munsyari. The problem is that now people feel, “it is not good enough; we have to go to the cities”. That is perceived as ‘progress’. The expedition was the occasion to see so many mountains communities, so many different people and how life in these mountains can sustain and be meaningful.

CA: Is there a link between all these communities?

MV: Yes, essentially yes. The terrain decides. But Bhutan is different in a way. It is a monarchy. It is good that they decided to limit the number of tourists [allowed in Bhutan]. It was also depressing to see the divide between the urban rich and rural areas of Bhutan. It was quite shocking.
In Nepal, it was still a monarchy, but the Maoist revolution was picking up in 1997. In remote areas, you could understand why people became Maoists. I remember once walking in one of these beautiful places around the Annapurna region with a Nepali porter. He was my size, but he was carrying a pack of 100 kg (mainly beer bottles for some tourists). I said your country is so beautiful (“kitna sundar hai”), he replied: “kitna dukh hai” (so much suffering). It struck me! Two people are walking the same mountain path. One is here to see the world and to experience beauty; the other sees suffering. We had a real conversation, he said that if he fell sick, he would die, but if a rich man's sheep fell sick, he would be flown out of the valley in an aircraft. I think that without democracy, poor people remain in a much more difficult position.
What has bound us together is the challenge to be in a mountain area.

CA: How did your partner and son take it?

MV: They were very supportive. When I embarked on the expedition my son was five years old. Though I had chosen to be a home maker, I had become very restless. I feared that the world had passed me by. I was 37 and I believed that my time was over and I had finished my active physically challenging life in this remote mountain area. I asked Zanskar [Malika’s son]: “I want so much to go for this expedition, what do you say?” He first said: “No, Amma, please don’t go!”
I told him: “To be a happy mother, I have first to be a happy woman”. He said: “Ok, but we should meet every Sunday?” I said: “Just give me 6 months”. When 6 months were over, I spoke to him from Ladakh and said to him “ Another 20 days and I will be home”. He got emotional and told me: “But, Amma, you have told me 6 months”. Before this, I had never heard him missing me- he must have adjusted.
With Theo [Malika’s life partner], there was a lot of support in another way. When there was a crisis between us in the expedition team it was very difficult. For example in Nepal, they would not tell us the next destination; they would not give us enough food. It was a way to say: “Well, if you don’t want to fall in line… It is your problem, you handle it”. It was hard and emotionally trying. When I spoke to Theo, he said: “It is the trek of your lifetime, let us do it on our own. .” When we reached Dharchula [Indo-Nepal border] after 4 months of trekking together with the original team, I had made up my mind and said to the leader of the expedition: “You do it your way, I do it mine.” So after entering India, from there on, till the Karakorum Pass, we continued the through the next 3 months expedition as a new team. All my friends rallied around; all those who think the same way about mountaineering as I do. Even people that I did not know, came forward and sent money, support for the remaining 3 months of the expedition.

AT: Theo joined you in the trek?

MV: After splitting from the main expedition team, we first came home in Munsyari [it was not far from Dharchula] and it took 5 days to reorganize the next phase of our expedition. With the 2 other women who left the group, we reequipped ourselves. Theo, our colleague Ram and some others joined us as the support team. One would walk with us while the other would prepare the logistic waiting for us at the next stage. They had taken leave from their respective jobs to join the expedition. Ram trekked with us from here Munsyari to Leh. Theo trekked till Himachal.

AT: What about Zanskar?

MV: He was too small; he stayed with Theo and then with my parents, but came wherever he could to meet us.

CA: In India, there are many ‘nouveau riches’. Do you think that they are happier than mountain folk?
MV: I would say: it depends what you are looking for. What makes you happy?

CA: The problem is: do the people here have a choice?

MV: If you asked them, they would like to be better off. The confusion comes when happiness is equated to material well-being only. But material well-being is also critical. That is the crux. If you have no money, you are struggling and it is an unhappy situation. One could romanticize poverty and say: “They are happy with so little!”
One is not happy with too little, but to get what people get in Delhi and still wanting more, does not provide happiness either. If you are looking for money only, you are in big trouble, like the ‘nouveaux riches’ Punjabis in Delhi. Because there is no end to what they want.

CA: There is a Resort in Uttarakhand that is running a Rural Home Stay Programme and part of its package and the rate is 625 $ a night to see ‘rustic life’- what do you think of it in light of your Community Based Nature Tourism Programme?.

MV: When I first saw it, I thought the rate was in Rupees. When I realized it was in dollars, I could not believe it. It is insane. But it works; they can’t cope with the demand. We are not in that league as we run a programme that is inclusive of the different sections of the village community and at the same time is affordable to the discerning traveler. We continue to grow in our enterprise, but the high end tourism companies have started suffering with the recession. We believe that the benefits of tourism must flow to the mountain communities that conserve the beauty and ecological integrity of places like Munsyari and that the endeavour be sustainable in the long run.

Why clear demarcation of LAC is a prerequisite to ensure India and China border peace

A Very Sacred Place: Arunachal Pradesh CM inaugurating a small gompa in the area

My article Why clear demarcation of LAC is a prerequisite to ensure India and China border peace appeared in Firstpost

Here is the link

Unless maps of the different perceptions are exchanged and a Line of Actual Control is agreed upon by both parties, clashes will continue, with the risk of degenerating into a larger armed conflict

It is important to understand how the northern border of India has been delineated. From the end of the 19th century, the main factor for fixing a boundary in the Himalaya, in particular with Tibet, India’s northern neighbour, has been the watershed principle.
During the Simla Conference in 1913-14, Sir Henry McMahon, India’s foreign Secretary and Lonchen Shatra, the Tibetan Prime Minister representing the 13th Dalai Lama, agreed to define the border between their nations; they signed, with seals, a map, today known as the ‘McMahon Line’, though ideally it should be the ‘McMahon-Shatra Line’.
It should be noted that Ivan Chen, the Chinese Plenipotentiary, who was present during the Conference, did not object to the presence of Lonchen Shatra on the same footing as him and India’s Foreign Secretary, and this for months.
Till 1954, when India unnecessarily agreed to the ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence’ (Panchsheel), the Line was a peaceful frontier with Tibet; but the ink had not dried on the agreement that it became a ‘disputed’ border with China, with serious consequences for India, which continue to be seen today.
Apart from the watershed, other principles can be used to define a frontier, i.e. rivers running in the area, land tax patterns or grazing rights of the local population; this has been done in some cases.
It is a fact that during the previous centuries, no dispute had taken place with Tibet in the remote Himalayan areas; with the arrival of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) on the border at the end of the 1950s, all this changed.

A very old dispute indeed (Chinese map of 1960)

An old dispute
While the first clash with the PLA took place in the Central Sector (Barahoti) in 1954, by mid-1959, soon after the Dalai Lama crossed to India, the Chinese started intruding in the Eastern Sector. Three places soon became ‘disputed’ (today one can count seven); these were Khenzimane, Yangtse and Longju.
It is Maj Bob Khathing, who after touring the area, demarcated the border in the Yangtse sector at the end of 1951. It was later confirmed by a detailed survey in 1954, as well as during tours of Indian officials in the following years; in Yangtse, the border was along the Kanglung Himalayan ridge.
In some cases, the border had to be slightly adjusted with the McMahon Line which, at time was imprecise due to the fast pace McMahon’s surveyors had to work before the Simla Conference and the inadequate equipment available at that time.

No fixed LAC
While China still today claims the entire Arunachal as theirs, the Line of Actual Control (LAC) remains officially undefined.
Maps of the Chinese and Indian perceptions of the LAC were exchanged in 2000 for the Central Sector (Barahoti); maps of the Northern Sector (Ladakh) came on the table for 20 minutes during a joint meeting in 2002, but were later withdrawn as China did not agree to Delhi including Gilgit-Baltistan in India’s territory.
In the case of the Eastern Sector (particularly of Tawang), maps have never been exchanged or even seen. This compounds the present confusion (often to the advantage of Beijing) and reinforces Chinese perceptions.
Sixty-two years later, the 1960 ‘disputed’ places remain ‘hotspots’ and it was expected that a flare-up could take place on any one of this places (one could also add Asaphila in the Upper Subansiri district as a possible point for a future clash).
The last flare-up took place on 9 December in Yangtse.
Indian troops were ready to retaliate
An unofficial report explains that the area under attack has “a commanding view of the ridges and tracks across the LAC deep into Tsona County in Tibet. The PLA were roughly 300 troops.”
It is far more than for their ‘routine’ intrusions.
They used melee weapons with a clear intention to harm the Indian troops holding the area: “Closely placed echelons on the lower ridges and the river valley were quickly able to reinforce the 50 troops firmly facing the PLA onslaught and reinforcements poured in from multiple directions immediately after being radioed.”
The report continues: “What started with abuses and stone pelting gradually progressed to fisticuffs and then fierce hand to hand combat where the PLA troops were overpowered and in some cases their weapons were used against them. This free for all went on until the PLA found itself losing ground with many of their troops overpowered and battered.”
The Chinese troops then started falling back on their side of the LAC.
Interestingly, they left behind some sleeping bags and other equipment which indicates that they had come to stay.

Medieval Weapons
Like in Galwan on 15 June, 2020 (it was Xi Jinping’s birthday), the PLA used melee weapons and shields. This time, the Indian soldiers were ready with the same equipment.
The reason why guns were not used is the “Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the LAC” signed by China and India in September 1993, agreeing to maintain the status quo on their mutual border pending a final solution, as well as the 1996 Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures in the Military Field” on the LAC, which mentioned: “No armed forces deployed by either side in the border areas along the line of actual control as part of their respective military strength shall be used to attack the other side, or engage in military activities that threaten the other side or undermine peace, tranquility and stability in the India-China border areas.”
Can this be considered a positive aspect during in these tense moments?

The gompa at Chumig Gyatse close to the LAC in the same sector

Development of Chumi Yangtse area
Though the Opposition would like to blame the Government for the incident, tremendous efforts have been made by Delhi in the recent years to develop the border areas in this sector and elsewhere.
It is enough to mention the opening of a new gompa (monastery); dedicated to Guru Padmasambhava, who meditated there in the 8th century, it is located a few hundred meters south of the LAC.
The Chief Minister of Arunachal Pradesh, Mr Pema Khandu himself walked to this exceptionally sacred place, blessed by 108 waterfalls, to inaugurate the gompa in July 2020.
It has to be noticed that the Chinese did not object to the construction of the gompa and its opening to Indian tourists in July 2020.

Xiaokang village north of the LAC (@NatureDesai)

Xiaokang Village as base?
A rather disturbing news that is China may have used one of the Xiaogang border villages (Beijing has built more than 600 of them, officially, ‘moderately well-off’ villages for the welfare of the local populations) as a base for their operation.
Does it mean that this string of villages on the border can just be used as garrisons for the PLA to launch attack on India?
This issue has to be followed closely by the Indian government (Army and Security agencies).

Xi Jinping abroad
President Xi Jinping was out of China (in Saudi Arabia) when the incident took place. Was he informed about the massive attack on the Indian position? Like when more than one thousand PLA troops intruded in Chumar (Ladakh) in September 2014, while Xi was visiting India?
Informed or not, such an operation needs a high level of clearance, at least from the Central Military Commission in Beijing.

End of the COVID lockdown
The Tibet Region, including the Tibetan Military District, which is responsible for the border, has been under severe (not to say brutal) COVID restrictions since the month of August; it is clear the PLA could not move earlier.
The lockdown had just been lifted when the incident in Yangtse took place and with the winter coming, rendering the logistics more complicated, Beijing had not much choice of options to show India that it has not forgotten the old disputes.
A longer stand-off would have undoubtedly been difficult for the PLA. At the same time, the CMC was probably not expecting such a stiff Indian resistance; it was therefore better for the PLA to withdraw as if nothing ‘big’ had happened.

China will not drop the ‘disputed’ area
In a press statement, Senior Colonel Long Shaohua, the spokesperson for the Western Theater Command in Chengdu claimed that it was the Indian troops who illegally crossed the LAC; he said: “The Chinese troops made a professional, normative and resolute response, bringing the on-site situation under control. Up to now, the Chinese and Indian troops have disengaged,” said the Chinese military officer.
Interestingly, he did not mention that a number of Chinese soldiers were severely injured.
The above means that the intrusions will continue, whether in Yangtse, Sumdorong chu or Asaphila (or in the Fish Tails area in Eastern Arunachal).

The status quo
India’s Defence Minister made a statement in the Parliament; he said: “On 9 December 2022, PLA (People’s Liberation Army of China) troops tried to transgress the LAC in Yangtse area of Tawang Sector and unilaterally change the status quo. The Chinese attempt was contested by our troops in a firm and resolute manner.”
Status Quo is the need of the hour, until a LAC (if not a IB) is agreed upon, the status quo should be respected by both parties.

Need to demarcate the LAC
One way forward could be to hold Ladakh-type talks for the Eastern Sector.
After 16 rounds of talks in Moldo/Chushul, some progress has been made to delineate a LAC, though in two areas (Demchok and Depsang), China has refused to vacate the areas occupied in May 2020.
Unless maps of the different perceptions are exchanged and a LAC is agreed upon by both parties, clashes will continue, with the risk of degenerating into a larger armed conflict.

Claude Arpi on China’s Interest in Arunachal Pradesh

My interview with Sudha Ramachandran for The Diplomat: Claude Arpi on China’s Interest in Arunachal Pradesh

Here is the link...

“For Beijing, it is a bargaining chip for an eventual ‘swap’ and the recognition by India of the occupation by China of Aksai Chin.”

Sixty years ago, on November 21, China declared a unilateral ceasefire against India bringing to an end the month-long India-China border war. Of the territory it occupied in the war, China retained control of Aksai Chin in the western sector of the disputed border but, although it took control of almost all of the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) or today’s Arunachal Pradesh in the eastern sector, it withdrew 20 kilometers north of the McMahon Line. The pullback of Chinese forces north of the McMahon Line suggested that China was perhaps not serious about pressing its claims in the eastern sector. However, since the mid-1980s, it has robustly asserted claims over some 90,000 square kilometers of territory in India’s northeast, which roughly approximates the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh or what China calls Southern Tibet.

In a conversation with The Diplomat’s South Asia Editor Sudha Ramachandran, author, historian and Tibetologist Claude Arpi points out that China “has not always claimed” NEFA/Arunachal and that its assertion of claims here is to gain leverage over India in a future border settlement.

When the war ended on November 21, 1962, China retained control of Aksai Chin but pulled back from India’s Northeast. Why?

The two sectors are historically very different.
To understand, it is necessary to go back to the Bandung Conference in 1955. An apparently moderate Zhou Enlai [China’s premier] convinced [Indian Prime Minister] Nehru of the “sincerity” of the Chinese Communist rulers. Writing about his encounter with Zhou at the Conference, Nehru said: “When asked if he wanted to push communism into Tibet, Chou En-lai [Zhou Enlai] laughed and said that there could be no such question as Tibet was very far indeed from communism. It would be thoroughly impracticable to try to establish a communist regime in Tibet and the Chinese Government had no such wish.”
A few days later, the Indian prime minister told the Indian foreign secretary about a remark by the Chinese premier on the McMahon Line: “Although [Zhou] thought that this line, established by British imperialists, was not fair, nevertheless, because it was an accomplished fact and because of the friendly relations which existed between China and the countries concerned, namely, India and Burma, the Chinese Government were of the opinion that they should give recognition to this McMahon Line.”
Five years later, Zhou Enlai visited Delhi and had long talks with Nehru. In an informal encounter with Indian Defense Minister V.K. Krishna Menon,  Zhou explained that in the Western Sector (Aksai Chin) there had never been any delimitation and only an old treaty (of 1842), which did not mention any area; Aksai Chin, he affirmed, had always been part of Sinkiang (today’s Xinjiang) and the [Aksai Chin] road built by China (without India realizing it) was on Chinese territory.
Later, Zhou tested the ground for a “swap”: India would acknowledge Aksai Chin as Chinese and Beijing would recognize the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA or today’s Arunachal Pradesh) as Indian.
One has to understand that for Beijing Aksai Chin was strategically far more important than the NEFA. The road built in the early 1950s linked the two newly-acquired provinces of the People’s Republic of China, Xinjiang and Tibet.
Therefore, for Mao and his colleagues, there was never a question to return Aksai Chin to India. Further, Beijing has argued that the Communists started surveying the Aksai Chin road in 1952, the construction began in 1954/55 and it was inaugurated in 1957; during all these years India did not complain. Delhi only started objecting to Beijing in 1958. For the Chinese leadership, it was proof that the area never belonged to India.
On the opposite end, NEFA saw very few incursions from the Chinese troops south of the McMahon Line (the first one took place in Longju in August 1959). An early incursion had happened in the Walong sector in 1910, but the Chinese troops quickly returned to their barracks north of the watershed.
All this shows that both areas do not have the same strategic importance for the Chinese.
It is probably why China decided to withdraw from the NEFA in 1962.
The eastern sector of the India-China border, depicting the disputed area of the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, which China claims as Southern Tibet. Map by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

Chinese claims in NEFA in 1960

Since the mid-1980s, China has been reasserting rights over Arunachal Pradesh. Why the renewed interest in this territory?

During the last few months, Beijing’s propaganda has reiterated that the entire Arunachal Pradesh is part of “Southern Tibet.”
On November 10, Xinhua published a news item: “A 5.6-magnitude earthquake jolted Medog County in Nyingchi City, southwest China’s Tibet Autonomous Region, at 1:01 pm, Beijing Time, according to the China Earthquake Networks Center (CENC). The epicenter was monitored at 28.35 degrees north latitude and 94.48 degrees east longitude, with a depth of 10 km, the CENC said.”
The area mentioned is near Likabali in Arunachal Pradesh.
In January 2022, Global Times announced new names of 15 places in Arunachal Pradesh, given with precise coordinates. Eight were residential areas, four were mountains, two were rivers, and one was a mountain pass (Sela). It was the second batch of so-called standardized names of places published by the Chinese government; the first batch of the so-called standardized names of six places in Arunachal was released in 2017. This is part of the propaganda to assert China’s claims.
For Beijing, it is a bargaining chip for an eventual “swap” and the recognition by India of the occupation by China of Aksai Chin.
It is interesting to look into the rationale of the Chinese claim over NEFA/Arunachal. The origin is linked to the creation of the Xikang province. In the 1930s, a Chinese scholar, Ren Naiqiang was encouraged by Liu Wenhui, the governor of Xikang, to produce a map of the area. Though the Chinese had never set foot in the area, the new map included NEFA in the new Chinese province.
In 1939, the Nationalist Government formally established a new province called Xikang (more or less corresponding to Tibet’s Kham province).
At the end of 1949, Ren Naiqiang met Marshal He Long, one of the senior-most generals of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and explained why his map was dependable; the Marshal was convinced and ordered the distribution of copies. On January 10, 1950, He Long sent a report to Mao Zedong strongly recommending that Ren’s map should be accepted and circulated amongst the PLA. It is after this episode that Beijing started claiming NEFA as Chinese. This shows that China has not always claimed NEFA.

Why is Tawang important to China?

Maj Bob Khathing in February 1951 in Tawang

China has never officially accepted the existence of the Tibetan exile government. If India would return Tawang to China (including the monastery), it would be a denial by Delhi that the 1914 Indo-Tibet border agreement and the McMahon Line ever existed.
The fact remains that the border agreement of March 1914 had been signed with official seals by the Foreign Secretary of India (Sir Henry McMahon) and the Prime Minister of Tibet (Lochen Shatra).
It is also true that monastic taxes in the area were being collected by Tibetan officials till February 1951, when the expedition led by Maj. Bob Khathing took over the Tawang administration.
But taxes paid by a monastery do not amount to ownership certificates. Several monasteries in the Indian Himalaya have been affiliated with large monasteries in Tibet; it does not mean that these monasteries belong to China.
Another factor is that the Sixth Dalai Lama, Tsangyang Gyatso, was born in Urgyeling, south of Tawang. It is another pretext for China to claim the area. But the fact that a religious leader is born on a foreign territory is not legally considered a valid argument to claim ownership of the country (or the area where the leader is born).
Not often mentioned are the bitter relations existing between the Monpas and the Tibetans till the arrival of Major Khathing. In 1938, when Captain Lightfoot, the Assistant Political Officer (APO) in Balipara (Assam) visited Tawang, he noted: “Our visit raised hopes that they might be relieved of the Tibetan yoke but there was grave uneasiness at our departure lest they should be punished for the help they had given us… Tibetan domination is loathed by the Monpaas and is intolerable by any civilized standards.”
The APO observed that forced labor and extortion of supplies, failure by the Tibetans to protect the Monpas, payment of tribute at rates bearing no relation to the ability of villagers to pay, and finally a brutal and unspeakably corrupt judicial system made the local Monpas believe that they were “liberated” by Major Khathing and his Assam Rifles from the Tibetan yoke in 1951.
India has improved connectivity and military infrastructure along the LAC in the eastern sector. How does it match up to infrastructure on the Chinese side?
Because of the nature of the terrain, India will never match China in terms of infrastructure, but since a few years, the mindset of the government has changed and serious efforts have been made, if not to at least “catch up” to have a decent infrastructure to the border districts/circles in India.
To give a few examples, Hollongi Greenfield Airport, also called Donyi Polo Airport, near Itanagar, serving Arunachal’s capital has recently been opened.
On November 2, a Dornier D-28 aircraft landed at the Ziro Advanced Landing Ground (ALG) in the Lower Subansiri district; commercial operations are expected to start soon. The 17-seater aircraft was operated by Alliance Air. ATR-72 and Dornier D-228 are already operational at Pasighat (Assam) and Tezu airports.
Arunachal Pradesh now has four airports (Itanagar, Ziro, Pasighat, and Tezu) and nine ALGs at Aalo, Mechuka, Pasighat, Tawang Air Force Station, Tuting, Vijaynagar, Walong, Ziro, and Daporijo. Several helipads have also been built near the McMahon Line.
While most of the existing roads have been improved, for example between Tezpur in Assam and Tawang, many new ones closer to the Line of Actual Control (LAC) have been built. Further, the traffic on the Bomdila-Tawang road will greatly improve with the opening of the tunnel under the Sela pass at the end of the year.
Even the last post in the Upper Subansiri district (in Maja), will soon be connected.
But first and foremost, what has changed is the mindset. A few years ago, one often heard: “We don’t need good roads, if the Chinese come again, they will break their vehicles on our poorly-maintained tracks.”
Today, the Arunachal Pradesh government as well as the Indian Army understand the necessity of dual-use infrastructure, not only for defending the border, but also helping the remote villages to survive.

Could you throw light on India’s “Vibrant Villages” scheme? What underlies the development of these villages?

To understand the “Vibrant Villages” scheme one has to look at the other side of the McMahon Line.
The Sixth Tibet Work Forum (TWF), held in Beijing on August 24 and 25, 2015 was a turning point for the Tibetan plateau. Tibet Work Forums are large meetings called every 5 to 10 years to discuss the Chinese Communist Party’s Tibet policies. They are attended by all the members of the powerful Politburo Standing Committee, members of the Central Committee, or senior PLA generals. The Sixth Forum decided to tackle poverty and develop Xiaokang (“moderately well-off”) villages on the plateau.
In 2017, soon after the conclusion of the 19th Congress, President Xi Jinping wrote a letter to two young Tibetan herders who had written to him introducing their village, Yume, north of the Upper Subansiri district. Xi “encouraged a herding family in Lhuntse County …to set down roots in the border area, safeguard the Chinese territory and develop their hometown.” Soon after, Yume became a model village for more than 600 Xiaokang villages, a large number located close to the Indian border.
The “Vibrant Villages” is a response to hundreds of Xiaokang villages, which have mushroomed on the Tibetan plateau. In India, they are also meant to tackle another genuine problem: large-scale migration from the border areas.
According to the Central Government’s announcement, India plans to open the villages along the Chinese border for tourists.: “The activities will include construction of village infrastructure, housing, tourist centers, road connectivity, provisioning of decentralized renewable energy, direct-to-home access for Doordarshan and educational channels, and support for livelihood generation.”
The government’s objectives are clear: “to enhance infrastructure in villages along India’s border with China, in states like Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, and Arunachal Pradesh.”
Like in Tibet, the scheme is based on the premise that the border areas will be opened to tourists, which will provide the economic backbone for the scheme. Several measures to remove/relax the Inner Line Permit system and other restrictions have already been taken, in Ladakh in particular.
If successful, it should give a boost to the local economy and benefit the populations living in these remote, largely inaccessible border areas. It will also enhance the defense preparedness of the Indian defense forces, which can use the newly created infrastructure

We are well prepared for any eventualities: Pema Khandu

Arunachal Pradesh Chief Minister Pema Khandu pays tribute to Veer Jawans
of the 5 Assam Rifles at the Chhetri War Memorial
near Tulung La pass at the India-Tibet border

 The first part of my interview with Pema Khandu, the Chief Minister of Arunachal Pradesh 'We are well prepared for any eventualities' appeared in Rediff.com

'Guarding the borders in extreme weather conditions is not easy and most people don't realise it is a very tough job.'

In April 2011, Dorjee Khandu, the chief minister of Arunachal Pradesh, died in tragic circumstances in a helicopter crash.
Soon after, his elder son Pema succeeded him as the MLA of Mukto in Tawang district; he was then only 32 years old.
Five years later, on July 17, 2016, after a long period of confusion in the state, Pema Khandu took oath as the chief minister; soon after, he joined the Bharatiya Janata Party.
During the 2019 legislative assembly elections, Khandu won a landslide victory with 41 seats out of 60 for the BJP alone.
Under Khandu's leadership, the border state found badly needed stability which helped putting Arunachal Pradesh on fast track development, while preserving its own genius.
At a time when China social media is buzzing with threats of military action against Arunachal (with various verified or unverified handles releasing videos and photos of People's Liberation Army troops training close to the Indian border), Arunachal Pradesh's dynamic 42-year-old chief minister answers Claude Arpi's questions.
He speaks of the 'Philosophy of Arunachal', his visits to the troops posted at the LAC, but also of the development of the infrastructure, his vision for 'Low Volume High Value' (including spiritual) tourism and the importance of ecology for the entire Himalaya.
He concludes by putting on record that Arunachal Pradesh does not share any direct border with China, but only with Tibet; it is indeed the best answer to Beijing, who without any historical basis, continues to claim the entire Indian State.

The first of an exclusive two-part interview:

For decades the 'Philosophy of NEFA' has been the guiding policy for what is today Arunachal Pradesh (as well as the North-East in general).
It may have helped to preserve the tribal culture but it did not take care of the borders when India was attacked.
Do you have today a 'Philosophy of Arunachal'? If yes, can you elaborate?

The 'Philosophy of NEFA' propounded by Verrier Elwin included facilitating the local population to develop on their own genius, respecting tribal rights in land and forests and respecting the social and cultural institutions.
These contours are honoured even today.
But there is a significant change in the Government of India's approach to the northeast region, where earlier a Union government's minister coming even to Guwahati used to become news.
Today we have five ministers in the Union council of ministers from the northeast region, including a Cabinet minister from Arunachal Pradesh.
Every month we have visits from the Union government bringing in some important development scheme for the people.
This signifies a major shift in the mindset and the confidence of New India under the leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi.
Developing our border areas and securing territorial integrity is the priority of our government both at the Centre and state.
The 'Philosophy of Arunachal Pradesh' is the same as the 'Philosophy of New India' which comes with the awareness of where we stand today and what we wish to achieve.
We care about the last person standing in the queue and our aspirations are not limited by our past.

Chief Minister Pema Khandu with Indian Army jawans on the occasion
of 22nd Kargil Vijay Diwas in Tawang

The media has lately reported your visits to forward posts and your interactions with jawans and officers.
Tell us about your motivations. And also about the importance of these visits. Should it be emulated by other CMs in other border states?

My father served in the Indian Army and having been born and lived most part of my life in the border region of Tawang district in India, I have seen the life of our security forces very closely.
Guarding the borders in extreme weather conditions is not easy and most people don't realise it is a very tough job.
By visiting our forces in the forward posts, I am only paying a humble tribute to them for the immense sacrifice they are making for our great nation.
I know many other leaders in our country who too visit border regions.
Visiting my uniformed brothers in forward posts is a very personal motivation and if other leaders and common people in other states too emulate it, would be a wonderful gesture.
I welcome fellow countrymen to come and visit forward posts of Arunachal Pradesh and understand the tough life of security forces and common citizens of the state.

Chief Minister Pema Khandu at Chuna with Indian Army soldiers.

Many in India believe that one should change the narrative of the 1962 War with China, in the sense that India did well in many areas (in the Walong sector for example). Do you plan to do something to change this 'defeat' narrative?

1962 is in the past, We have learned many things and is well prepared for any future eventualities.
I fully agree that the Walong sector triumph of our armed forces is under reported.
No matter what, the people of Arunachal Pradesh stand resolutely behind the armed forces.
Yes, We are developing the sites of the 1962 war as memorials in Tawang as well as the Walong area, it is an emotional feeling just to be present at those sites and experience the valour of the soldiers who fought then.
All these will tell the story, as it happened.

Chief Minister Pema Khandu with movie star Salman Khan.

China is building infrastructure on the other side of the border. For example, a new large airport is coming up in Lhuntse Dzong in Lhoka (Shannan); the train has reached Nyingchi, and the G219 (Aksai Chin road) to Tsari area and all along India's northern border?
What are you doing to counter this? What are Arunachal Pradesh's achievements in this field.

Our Prime Minister Narendra Modiji in the speech at the UN General Assembly had said, 'Democracy can deliver, Democracy has delivered.'
People of India and Arunachal Pradesh don't want to emulate any 'model of development' that tramples the liberty and culture of the local people.
Indian democracy isn't a 'one size fits all' model.
We are working towards providing amenities to the people in the border areas.
We are working aggressively to expand our road, rail and air network, improving communication networks and developing infrastructure to improve health and education status of our people.
The case in point is the Bogibheel bridge and the Dhola-Sadiya bridge which were pending for decades, it used to take hours to cross the Brahmaputra then.
Today because of the initiative of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the bridges got completed in record pace and can be crossed in minutes.
We will get our first airport in 2022 in Itanagar whose foundation was laid in 2019.
The Trans Arunachal Highway (about 1,600 km) is almost under completion and the Sela tunnel will make year-round travel to Tawang easy.
Eight new ALGs have become functional and around 1,000 new 4G towers are being installed in addition to the ongoing optical fibre projects to enhance digital connectivity.
All foothill areas will be connected with a rail network soon.
Surveys are being conducted to bring rail connectivity to Bame and high altitude areas like Tawang as well.
The list is long, yet our model of Compassionate Governance will have NO Match.