The Case of Demchok

Radar on the ‘Chinese side’ of Demchok

On August 14, 1939, as he camped near Gartok, one of the three British (Indian) Trade Agencies in Tibet, Rai Bahadur Dr Kanshi Ram, the British Trade Agent (BTA) in Western Tibet, found finally time to write to the Political Agent of the Punjab Hill States in Simla: “I have the honour to submit herewith the following report of my journey from Simla to Gartok via Srinagar and Leh, Kashmir,” Ram started.
He had left Simla on May 20 to reach Srinagar on May 27; after a week-long stay in the Valley, he began his journey to the Tibetan border. He was accompanied by the Wazir Wazarat of Ladakh; both were to meet the Garpon or Governor of Western Tibet  for a tripartite inquiry into the alleged murder of a Tibetan, Champa Skaldan by Zaildar, a Ladakhi of Rupchu. The crime had been committed in Ladakh a few years earlier.
After a week-halt in Leh, they started for Demchok, the last Ladakhi village before the Tibetan border. They reached Demchok on July 17, 1939, where they were to meet the Senior and Junior Garpons; the inquiry started three days later.
Dr Kanshi Ram, in his report to Simla, notes: “On the night of July 21 the stream by the side of which we were camping suddenly rose to higher level and began to flow over our camping ground at midnight. We were abed as alarm was raised and we then got up and took our luggage and other belongings to a place of safety, and had to keep awake throughout the night. The rain which began to pour down since morning was still continuing. The next morning we crossed the stream and camped on the Tibetan border at a place of safety. The Wazir also renewed his camp some yards away from the stream amongst the boulders. This stream forms a natural boundary between Tibet and Kashmir at Demchok.”
This is interesting because it shows that before Independence, the Indo-Tibet border in Ladakh was well defined and agreed upon by the government of British India (represented by the BTA), the State of J&K (the Wazir) and the Tibetan Government (the Garpons).
It is not true anymore; since the end of the 1950s, a very large area around Demchok is claimed by Beijing though no Chinese had ever been seen in the area. The fact is that soon after invading the Tibetan plateau, the Communist regime in Beijing started claiming more and more of India’s territory in the Himalaya.
We shall look at the case of Demchok which is a case study of Chinese ‘advances’ which resulted in what today is called a ‘difference of perceptions’ on the LAC.


The building of the Aksai Chin road
The Chinese ‘advances’ in the Demchok sector began with the objective to protect a new road linking Tibet to Xinjiang in the Aksai Chin area.
Though the issue would only become public through a debate in the Lok Sabha in August 1959, in the early 1950s already, Delhi was aware that China was building a road, but South Block was not ready to acknowledge it.
The Official Report of the 1962 War published by the MoD states: “The preliminary survey work on the planned Tibet-Sinkiang road having been completed by the mid-1950’s, China started constructing motorable road in summer 1955. The highway ran over 160 km across the Aksai Chin region of north-east Ladakh. It was completed in the second half of 1957. Arterial roads connecting the highway with Tibet were also laid. On 6 October 1957, the Sinkiang-Tibet road was formally opened with a ceremony in Gartok and twelve trucks on a trial run from Yarkand reached Gartok. In January 1958, the China News Agency reported that the Sinkiang-Tibet highway had been opened two months earlier and the road was being fully utilised.”

In his book The Saga of Ladakh,  Maj Gen Jagjit Singh mentions that in 1956, the Indian Military Attaché in Beijing, Brig Mallik received information that China had started building a highway through Indian territory in the Aksai Chin area. Mallik had reported the matter to Army Headquarters in New Delhi which passed the report to South Block.
Other examples could be given , but the fact that the road lies close to Demchok, triggered the Chinese claims on the area.

The Panchsheel negotiations
In 1953-1954, long negotiations preceded the signature on the "Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India", known as the Panchsheel Agreement for its famous preamble, on April 29, 1954.
The negotiations ended with India giving away all its rights in Tibet (telegraph lines, post offices, dak bungalows, military escort in Gyantse and Yatung, etc.), while getting no assurance on the border demarcation from the Chinese government in return, on the contrary.
The talks were held in Beijing between Zhang Hanfu, China’s Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, N. Raghavan, the Indian Ambassador to China and T.N. Kaul, his Chargé d’Affaires and Chen Chai-Kang, a Director. They lasted from December 1953 till end of April 1954.
On February 21, N. Raghavan, the Indian Ambassador in China informs R.K. Nehru, the Foreign Secretary, that Kaul had met Chen the previous day.
Amongst other issues, the ‘trade marts’ were discussed: “Chen agreed regarding Tashigong and said we could also have Demchok.”
The move was clever: Chen was offering a Tibetan mart …on India’s territory.

The Demchok-Tashigang route
Kaul objected, Demchok was in India, he told Chen who answered that India’s border was further on the West of the Indus. On Kaul’s insistence Chen said “There can be no doubt about actual physical possession which can be verified on spot but to avoid any dispute we may omit mention of Demchok”. Though Kaul repeated Demchok was on India’s side, the Chinese did not budge.
In the same discussion, Chen also mentioned that Rudok and Rawang were not acceptable as trade marts to China. When Kaul insisted, Chen promised to put up the suggestion regarding Rutok again before his delegation, but he added “I know it is impossible as our Government has decided not to open Rudok.”
The Aksai Chin road was passing via Rutok and Rawang .
On April 22, after more than four months of ‘talks’, Raghavan cables the Foreign Secretary that Zhang even ‘virulently’ objected to inclusion of Tashigong in Agreement.
Ragahvan explains: “Tibet talks resumed at plenary sitting to-day... Chinese produced new drafts of both Agreement and Letter partly based on our draft and partly covering new points. …Four main points still at issue are: Inclusion of route from Indian border to Tashigong along Indus. Chang Han-Fu [Zhang Hanfu] vigorously objected inclusion of route in Agreement or Letter. Conceded that traders customarily using this route might continue such use but said an oral understanding to that effect between two delegations would suffice. We strongly contended inclusion of route in Agreement. Our view is Chinese might not concede. If so shall try to get it included by separate letter.”
It did not occur to the Indian negotiators to ask why?
For centuries, the trade and pilgrimage route for the Kailash-Manasarovar region followed the course of the Indus, passed Demchok the last Ladakhi village and then crossed the border to reach the first Tibetan hamlet, Tashigong, some 15 miles inside Tibet.
Not only did the Chinese refuse to mention Demchok in the Agreement, but bargained for nearly 5 months not to cite the Tashigong route.
In retrospect, one can find two main reasons for the Chinese dragging their feet. One, as already mentioned, is the proximity of the ‘Aksai Chin Road’ ; preliminary work on the road had just started at the time of the Panchsheel negotiations.
In 1954, Indian border forces visiting Demchok could have noticed that a road was clandestinely being built; Beijing did not want to take a risk.
The second reason is as grave and presently relevant.
After months of infructuous exchanges, Zhang Hanfu conceded that “traders customarily using this route might continue such use but an oral understanding to that effect between two delegations would suffice, [China] would not like in writing, even by implication, to have any reference to Ladakh.”
It means that China considered Ladakh a ‘disputed area’.
Kaul informed Delhi: “We have taken [the] position that Ladakh is Indian territory and route should be mentioned as its omission would be invidious.”
But China did not accept the Indian contention and “after considerable argument [Zhang] agreed, but subsequently withdrew [his agreement]. [He] suggests we would consider exchange of letters which will not form part of Agreement...”
India had finally to concur to the Chinese formulation. Demchok was mentioned nowhere, though Article IV of the Agreement says: “Also, the customary route leading to Tashigong along the valley of the Indus River may continue to be traversed in accordance with custom.”
China made no concession to India, while India had given up all its assets in Tibet.
Incidentally, a report sent from the Indian Consulate in Lhasa in February 1953 states: “Information as to Western Tibet relatively scanty unfortunately. In 1950 the Chinese advanced towards Rudok and Taklakot with about 500 troops. The present strength could NOT have been increased beyond 2 to 3 thousand due to difficulty in obtaining supplies. They are reported to be at Rudok, Gyanima (north of Uttarakhand), Gargunsa (Ngari), Taklakot and Khojernath (near Mt. Kailash) and Tashigong.”
The Tashigong PLA outpost was located some 20 kilometers east of Demchok.

The Closure of the Kashgar Consulate
At that time, very few Indian diplomats could see beyond the Chinese rhetoric and Zhou’s assurance of friendship. How many noticed the ominous signs on the horizon?
Another warning was the closure of the Indian Consulate in Kashgar in 1953.
Nehru readily agreed to the Chinese decision without taking any retaliatory measures or even protesting. India’s interests were lost to the ‘revolutionary changes’ happening in China. He declared in the Parliament: “Some major changes have taken place there [Kashgar]. …But when these changes, revolutionary changes took place there, it is perfectly true that the Chinese Government, when they came to Tibet, told us that they intended that they wanted to treat Sinkiang as a closed area. They told other State Government, too. …The result was, our Consul remained there for some time, till recently… but there is now no work to be done. So we advised him to come away and he did come away.
During the following years, trade and pilgrimage practically stopped via Demchok. You may think that it is past history, but it is not.
China today continues to adamantly refuse to reopen the Demchok-Tashigong route to Kailash/Manasarovar, while insisting on a long and tortuous route via Nathu-la in Sikkim. Probably, China would have to acknowledge that Demchok is in India.

Demchok engulfed in Chinese maps
Soon after the escape of the Dalai Lama to India  and the first border clashes in Longju (NEFA, today Arunachal Pradesh) and Kong-ka Pass (Ladakh), Beijing decided to redraw its border.
Maps had to match the new claims.
In the 1960s, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs published a collection of maps  explaining Beijing’s tactics.
One of the maps shows three lines: “The first line shows the disposition of Chinese posts in Ladakh in November 1959. It will be seen that at that time there was strictly speaking no ‘Line of control’ but only a series of Chinese posts on Indian territory. The November 1959 'line' would be one that joined the then Chinese posts.”
Then the second line describes the position between Indian and Chinese forces immediately prior to September 8, while the third line depicts the limits of the areas occupied by Chinese forces during the 1962 War: “The area between the September 7, 1962, line and the line of actual control of 1959 as falsely claimed by China represents the further aggrandisement of Indian territory by China as a result of its latest aggression.”
By the end of 1959, China distributed the new maps of the Western Sector in Ladakh, Demchok and the area around was now fully Chinese territory.
The next step for Beijing was to occupy some of these places.
According to retired diplomat R.S. Kalha, in his well-document book : “After the failure of the Nehru-Zhou talks in April 1960, Zhou wrote to Mao on 6 May, 1960, that “as no agreement had been reached ...it was imperative to strengthen China's military presence in the Western sector.” Zhou suggested that Chinese forces should seize the opportunity and favourable weather conditions to establish additional posts inside China's claim line. Mao approved the proposal and Deng Xiaoping was entrusted with the responsibility for its implementation.”
The former ambassador who participated in the boundary talks in the 1990s continues: “Acting on Mao's instructions, by the summer of 1961, the Chinese had advanced in the Western sector nearly 112 kilometres South-West of the positions they held in 1958 and began to set up several forward check posts backed by strong bases in the rear.”
In September 1961, the Intelligence Bureau (IB) prepared a paper on Chinese activities in the border areas and predicted that the “Chinese would like to come up to their claim line of 1960, wherever we are not in occupation.” The IB recommended that “posts be opened in unoccupied areas of Ladakh.”
This marked the beginning of the ‘forward policy’.
On 28 November, 1961 Nehru told the Lok Sabha that the Chinese had advanced even beyond their 1956 (and 1959) claim line in Ladakh and have established new bases. Nehru termed this as Chinese new “aggressive activities”.
Demchok was now in China.
The Report of the Officials of China and India interestingly says: “The Chinese side brought forward remarkably little evidence to substantiate their own claim that the alignment shown by them was a traditional and customary one.” It further added: “In the Demchok area they cited material specifying that the traditional alignment lay along Lhari Karpo. This was very near the traditional Indian alignment, and very far from the line now claimed by China. The Indian side, therefore, welcomed this statement and saw no reason to discuss this further. There was only one Lhari in the area, and that was the stream joining the Indus near Demchok.”
Lhari Karpo is the sacred hill above the village.

The attack on Demchok
In October 1962, the Demchok sub-sector was held by the 7 J&K Militia. The PLA launched an attack on October 22.
According to the book, A View from Other Side of the Hill , which used Chinese sources: “The attack was in the form of two pincers aimed to meet at Kariguo , thus cutting off the route of withdrawal from Shiquan  River Valley. The 3 B/11 R Group  carried out a wide outflanking move on Night 27/28 Oct from Jiagong  southwards to Zhaxigang  and then turned northwest towards Kariguo behind Demchok. …This was the northern inner pincer. The outer pincer in the North was provided by 3rd Cavalry Regiment and the 4th Division Reconnaissance Company. Since the southern outflanking move by the 3 B/11 R Group was delayed, the trap could not be closed fully. Indian troops were able to withdraw during the Night 27/28 Oct to Koyul and Dungti in fairly good order.”
The Chinese narrative mentions that on October 28: “the Chinese troops had achieved their objectives and had occupied the Kailash Range that dominated the eastern bank of the Indus Valley. All the seven Indian strongholds in this sub-sector were removed and New Demchok itself was captured.”
The PLA eventually withdrew, but occupied the southern part of Demchok .
The Indian media often speaks of ‘difference of perceptions’ between India and China on the LAC’; it is the consequence of Chinese advances in Ladakh in the early 1960s as well as during the 1962 War.

The Chinese attack on Demchok in 1962
The two ‘perceptions’ create a dangerous situation with two de facto Lines of Actual Control (LAC). It is not only in Demchok, but in 11 other places, also that India’s and China’s views differ. From north to south, they are: Samar Lungpa north of the Karakoram pass, Trig Heights, Depsang Plain (which saw a serious incident in April 2013), Pt 6556, Chanlung nalla, Kongka La, the ‘fingers’ at Siri Jap near the Pangong Tso, the Spanggur Gap, Mt. Sajun, Dumchele, Demchok and Chumar (which witnessed a massive incursion as President Xi Jinping arrived in India in September 2014).
Dumchele: a Security Risk
Though since 1962, the border is closed, it does not mean that there are no ‘exchanges’ along the LAC.
Not far from Demchok, a place called Dumchele witnesses a good deal of smuggling between Tibet and Ladakh. Local herders visit the shops in Dumchele, which gets its supplies from a Tibetan mart on the other side of the range; the Chinese goods are later clandestinely brought to Leh. While visiting the bazaar in the capital of Ladakh, if you wonder how there are so many Chinese bowls or other cheap stuff, the answer is Dumchele.
An author  describes the place thus: “The right bank, just as is the left bank of the Indus, is dotted with scrub and tsama with many grazing grounds. Directly to the east of this lake and just about 4 km away is the large Chinese market of twenty shops of Dumchele, which is actually in Indian territory. About 6 km behind it is the large and spacious shelf of the Chang La (5,300 m) through which the Chinese have built a truckable road to Dumchele.”
Smuggling happens when the Indus freezes in winter. The ‘trade’ has been going on for years on a rather large scale (some say more than 100 crores annually).
In a paper for Research and Information System , Dr Siddiq Wahid writes: “Dumchele has for some years now been a trading post between residents on this side of the LAC and the Chinese side. The PLA has set up a military post at its edge near a hillock and apparently encourages this trade. This is done with some intensity for a few days in late November or early December. I asked Mr. Zangpo [a resident of Nyoma] if he had ever come to the grazing fields of Dumchele during the winter market fair. He replied that he had, although not very regularly. He then told us about some of the items, other than the usual consumer goods, that were traded (smuggled?) at Dumchele during this market festival. He mentioned tiger bones, tiger skins, rhino horns and sandalwood. He said that the Chinese buy these items enthusiastically from the ‘Tibetans’ who bring them there. Mr. Zangpo knew that this was an illegal activity as he was aware that the Ladakh police have been of late very active in stemming this trade and had made several arrests.”
A mart has been opened by the Chinese at a place called Kakzhung; this is regularly supplied by trucks coming from Tibet. From Kakzhung, goods are sent to Dumchele.
From a military point of view, the situation is far from healthy: the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) can gather intelligence on what is happening on the Indian side; that is why China closes its eyes (or actively encourages) goods trafficking.

Reopening Demchok
What could be a solution?
Considering the ‘Nathu-la’ effect, reopening Demchok route could be an excellent Confidence Building Measure (CBM) between India and China.
Remember the skirmishes in Sikkim before the Nathu-la pass was officially reopened to trade in July 2006. It had the effect to fix the border, drastically reducing the tensions in the area.
For years, the people of Ladakh have also asked for the reopening of the ancient route. Why is Beijing so reluctant to let people and goods flow again over the Himalaya? Why can’t China allow the devotees wanting to visit Kailash-Manasarovar to use the easiest route, i.e. via Demchok?
It would an additional benefit; it would stop the smuggling between China and Ladakh, which poses serious security risks of infiltration for India.
The Indian External Affairs Minister should definitely raise this question with her Chinese counterpart when they meet.

Kyirong: A New Gate to Nepal

A 'Nepali' Festival at Kyierong

Last week, The Sunday Review of the The New York Times published an Editorial on Nepal entitled 'Doing China’s Bidding in Nepal'.
It quotes the Human Rights Watch (HRW) report which "shows how far Nepal has gone in capitulating to Chinese pressure in cracking down on Tibetan residents and refugees. "
The report gives 'a long list of shameful actions against Tibetans in Nepal, including restrictions on their activities and movements, surveillance and intimidation, arbitrary detention and forcible return to China."
The New York Times asserts: "In effect, Nepal has turned itself into a partner of China’s anti-Tibetan policies."
To quote from a section of the HRW Report, entitled 'Chinese Pressure on Nepal':

It is no surprise that China would pressure Nepal to push back Tibetans or to crackdown on their political activities in Nepal. Beijing continues to assert that the 14th Dalai Lama and supporters of the Tibetan cause in exile or abroad play a major role in seeding discontent among ethnic Tibetans in China. It also continues to see this purported negative influence as a substantial hurdle to inculcating the kind of undivided political loyalty to the Communist Party and the state that it would like to see among Tibetans in China. For these reasons, measures to limit foreign and cross-border influence have featured prominently in the policies that Beijing has meticulously deployed since the 2008 protests.

The Report gives further details: 

These policies have included militarily sealing off Tibet’s international borders to end the constant trickle of Tibetans fleeing the region. The approach seems to be working: the number of Tibetans crossing the border has dropped from an average of 2,200 per year before the 2008 protests, to under a thousand between 2009 and 2012, to 171 in 2013. The available evidence suggests that Tibetans detained by Chinese authorities for crossing the border irregularly from Nepal are routinely imprisoned and physically abused in China.

But that is not all:

Chinese authorities have confiscated the passports of many Tibetans and require that all Tibetans submit to pre- and post-trip debriefings with police as a condition of international travel. They maintain registers of Tibetans who have family members abroad. Tibetans within Tibet must now also endure rigorous scrutiny before obtaining domestic travel permits. In recent years Tibetans have been arrested and sentenced for passing, receiving, or simply consuming information critical of China’s policies in Tibet.

The Chinese are now present everywhere in Nepal. The Report says:

There is now substantial evidence of increased Chinese government onitoring and censoring of telecommunications, Internet activity and messaging, and increased limitations on access to foreign Tibetan language broadcasts through the jamming and confiscation of satellite reception dishes. Chinese authorities have also stepped up efforts to prevent Tibetan communities in neighboring countries from assisting, documenting, or protesting conditions in the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) and adjoining provinces with significant Tibetan populations. As detailed below, China frequently imprisons, and tortures or otherwise mistreats Tibetans who leave China without permission.

And of course the Chinese government's main goal is to suppress the influence of the Dalai Lama.
The human rights group affirms that Beijing has had three primary objectives:

1. Ensuring Nepal’s effective cooperation with China’s efforts to put an end to clandestine border-crossing by Tibetan asylum seekers and migrants, including children sent to study in Tibetan schools in India by their families;
2. Enforcing a de-facto ban on pro-Tibetan political mobilization in Nepal, including demonstrations and all activities linked to the Dalai Lama or Central Tibetan Administration (the Tibetan government-in-exile);
3. Enrolling Nepal’s intelligence and law-enforcement apparatus to monitor and infiltrate Tibetan communities living in Nepal, as to provide up-to-the-minute intelligence for China.

The Human World Seaven?

The New York Times comments: "Tibetans in Nepal know that wherever they gather to socialize or worship, they are likely to be spied on by Nepalese security forces who make no secret of their close links with Chinese authorities. Non-governmental organizations that seek to monitor the situation or are engaged in humanitarian work with Tibetans in Nepal are also under surveillance and have been accused of disloyalty."
Even after the democratic election of Sushil Koirala as prime minister, harassment of the Tibetan refugee population continues.
The New York Times concludes: "The government of Nepal has every right to seek positive trade and diplomatic relations with China. But it must stop allowing China to dictate policy regarding Tibetans in Nepal. Mr. Koirala and Nepal’s Constituent Assembly should move quickly to guarantee resident Tibetans legal status that respects their basic rights, and to treat Tibetan refugees in accordance with Nepalese and international law."

Wishful Thinking?
It appears wishful thinking because Nepal's all-important economic relations with the giant northern neighbour will soon get a tremendous boost when the Kyierong (Chinese: Gyirong) land port opens.
A few days ago, the official China Tibet Online reported: "The Gyirong Port in southwest China’s Tibet bordered with Nepal will be formally opened in October this year. The opening of the Gyirong Port has been listed in the key work plan of national ports in 2014."
The website also announces that a cross-border China-Nepal Gyirong Port Economic Cooperation Zone will soon be established; further the Gyirong Port will be built into a tourist destination.
The website affiliated with Xinhua continues: "The Gyirong Port enjoys a long history of being the largest land trading port between Tibet and Nepal. Many shop owners have expressed their hope that the opening of the port can help them get more involved in the border trade. From May 2007, the Shigatse Customs House will dispatch four officials to station at the Gyirong Port. A regular coordination system had been set up in order to seek support from the Gyirong county government, the Gyirong Customs and the Risur Customs of Nepal. Besides, the officials have been trying to promote preferential trade policies to encourage the local people to participate in the border trade. And some training have been provided to the port officials in Zham Customs House, another Class A port next to Gyirong in south Tibet’s Shigatse Prefecture."

Kyirong Town

What will be the consequences of the opening of a new port between Tibet and Nepal?
First and foremost, it means new infrastructure on both side of the border.
Dong Mingjun, a vice president of the Tibet Autonomous Region told the press: "By the end of July this year, construction of roads, energy and medical appliances will be completed at the port. The Gyirong Port will be equipped with special facilities for supervision and smuggling suppressing in preparation for the opening of the port."
But more importantly, a month earlier (in September)  the Lhasa-Shigatse Railway will be inaugurated.
China affirms that "the Gyirong Port will serve as a link between China and the South Asian countries. It is expected to bring a big number of visitors into Tibet and boost its tourism, which will help enhance the port’s popularity home and abroad."
The Party boss of the Gyirong County told the press: "The opening of the Gyirong Port will become a key trading port next to Zham Port in Shigatse, and an important destination for international trekking, folk activities and visitors’ driving tours."

The Strategic G219 National Highway

In other words, Chinese tourists and goods will be poured into Nepal through the Lhasa-Shigatse railway line and then a highway between Shigatse and Gyirong (a branch of the highly-strategic  G219 highway linking Tibet to Xinjiang, i.e. the Aksai Chin Road).
The Chinese officials believe that "the Gyirong Port will be opened wider to the outside world with improved operation capacity in order to promote trade with South Asia and become a cross-border economic cooperation zone between China and Nepal."

As I mentioned in an earlier post, the message is clear, even if there is nobody to hear it in Delhi: Kathmandu, once the secluded ex-Kingdom is connected by rail to the Tibetan Autonomous Region, is interested to import petroleum products from China.
Nepal still remembers the unwise economic blockade put in place Rajiv Gandhi.
More interesting, a couple of years ago, a Nepali government statement mentioned that “an expanded and enhanced connectivity between the two countries [will] also open the avenues for Nepal being a transit country between the two giant economies, China and India."
Has India been asked?
China boasted that as early as 789 AD, Gyirong served as a hub for commercial and cultural exchanges between Tibet and Nepal (it might be true, though China was not around at that time).
However in 1961, the Gyirong Port of Entry obtained from Beijing the approval to open to the outside world; Gyirong was upgraded to a national first-class (A Grade) land port of entry in 1987.
By the end of 2008, Gyirong's imports and exports of had reached 0.67 million U.S. dollars.
In 2013, the volume of border trade between Tibet and Nepal reached 114.1 US dollars, an increase of 10.8 percent over the previous year.
Till now, the transactions in Gyirong represented only a small percentage of it; this will change with the opening of the new land port.
The strategic relations are also improving fast.
China Military Online reported  that on February 21, 2014, Girija Prasad Koirala (it meant Shushil Koirala!!!), prime minister of the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal met with General Wang Guanzhong, the deputy chief of general staff of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in Kathmandu.
According to the Chinese agency, Koirala said that "Nepal and China have long been maintaining good neighborly relations, and Nepal regards China as a reliable friend and partner, and thanks China for providing long-term selfless help and assistance in economic and social development of Nepal".
It is not necessary to comment of the 'selflessness' of Beijing.
Koirala added that "The new government of Nepal will always develop its relations with China on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence as before, continue to firmly pursue the one-China policy and not allow any force to engage in anti-China activities by using the territory of Nepal."
It is what General Wang Guanzhong wanted to hear.
He profusely thanked Kathmandu "for Nepal’s long-term and firm support on issues concerning China’s core interests such as that on Tibet."
He assured the new Nepali Prime Minister: "The Chinese military is willing to strengthen the pragmatic cooperation with the Nepalese military in the new historical period so as to make contributions to the development of the relations between the two countries."
This is quite ominous for the Tibetan refugees.


By the way, during the 1792 Tibet-Nepal War (in Chinese: 平定廓爾喀, 'pacification of Gorkha') , the Manchus troops called by Tibet to defeat the Gorkhas used Kyierong route to invade Nepal.
There is of course no connection with today's situation!
 

Trading pettily with China

On May 2, the border will reopen between India and Tibet at Nathula in Sikkim.
Business is not flourishing.
An article in iSikkim reported: "The fifth edition of Indo-China trade through the Nathu-La border in 2010 recorded absolute zero import."
At the same time, a few hundreds kilometers westwards the trade is with Nepal is increasing (though one-way only). 
The website China Tibet Online affirms that the "total volume of cross-border petty trade between Tibet and Nepal has increased remarkably in the first quarter of 2011".
Lhasa Customs figures show that the overall petty trade value amounted to 131 million US dollars, 62.3 % higher than the figure over the same period of last year, accounting for 98.4 % of the total cross-border trade value. 
Of the total petty trade volume, imports reached up to 748,000 US dollars, dropped by 16.2 % while exports took up 130 million dollars, increased by 63.2 %."
Like in the case of India and the United States, the trade is heavily tilting in China's favour, but the Nepalis do not seem to mind too much.
An amusing story about the term 'petty trade'. At the time of signing the Panchsheel Agreement in 1954 and despite the nice preamble (The Five Principles), the two delegations were miles apart. 
A telling incident shows how little confidence there was between India and China. 
In the Hindi version of the Agreement, the Indian translators had written 'chhota mota vyapar' for ‘petty trade’. 
'Chhota' means ‘small’ and 'mota', ‘fat’ or ‘big’. The Chinese Hindi expert could not reconcile the two contradictory words. He did not realise that it was a widely used idiomatic Hindi phrase for ‘petty’. He thought that there was some trick behind the term. It took two weeks to convince the Chinese that the term chhota mota was correct. They finally accepted it only after having cross-checked with their embassy in Delhi.
The problem is the trade is 'chhota' for India and 'mota' for the Chinese side.

Nathu La opens from May 2 for trade
April 20, 2011
iSikkim
Gangtok: The sixth edition of Nathu-la border trade with Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) of China will start on May 2 this year. It will continue till November 30 when the pass at 14,420 ft closes down for winte. Under the bilateral agreement between India and China, there are 29 exportable items. Sikkim traders are allowed to export them to TAR. But the Indian business community can import only 15 items. The trade through the Nathu La pass started in 2006.
The fifth edition of Indo-China trade through the Nathu-La border in 2010 recorded absolute zero import. In 2009 also the Nathu-La border trade closed for the season recording zero import.
As per the official record 2010 saw exports worth a little over Rs 4 crore. Canned foods, utensils, textiles, copper items, vegetable oil, tea, cigarette, coffee, misri, and blankets have been the most popular export items.
ist of items allowed for trade across Nathu La border
List of items allowed for trade across Nathu La border (Pic Courtesy: The Hindu)
China’s In-charge of Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR), Ms Kesang Diki said that the reason for zero import was because of the non-feasible list of items for trade across the historic post. She requested the Indian Government to expanding the trade list so as to cater to today’s market demands.
As per the bilateral agreement in 2006 only 29 items can be exported to TAR from the Indian side while the Chinese traders can export only 15 items. Most of these items listed in the schedule are obsolete and do not have commercial value, a fact both the Chinese and the Sikkimese traders have highlighted in the past four years.
The Chinese traders, however, did brisk business by selling non-permitted items such as blankets, woollen jackets and carpets to tourists and locals. Custom officials said it was difficult to check imports of such items in the absence of adequate staff.

Feeding the enemy

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Today the trade between India and China at Nathu-la is stagnating. It has not always been the case.
In the early 1950's, the Chinese needed to feed the PLA building roads towards the Indian border. They dediced to import rice from India through the Sikkim border (Jalep-la). I quote from my book Born in Sin, the Panchsheel Agreement: 
"The Chinese were becoming greedier, they now wanted the rice to be delivered at Phari instead of Yatung. John Lall, a former Dewan of Sikkim, was posted in Gangtok when the supply of rice was in transit; he could witness the long caravan of mules leaving in the direction of Nathu-la. In his book on Aksai Chin, he recalled: "But suddenly all was sweetness and light. The reason became apparent when a request was made for shipment of Chinese rice through India and Sikkim to their troops in Tibet. This could, and indeed should, have been made the occasion for a settlement of the major problems with China as a prelude to the altogether unprecedented help requested from the Government of India. It simply did not occur to anyone in Delhi, and which caution as I advised was brushed aside. Released from anxiety on accounts of supplies, the Chinese and local Tibetan labour were able to press ahead with the vitally important task of creating a network of communications to defend frontiers of China with India."
Today business is practically nil, but the Chinese are still building roads towards the Indian border.
Infrastructure development was raised in the Rajya Sabha by Former Union Minister and Congress MP Ashwani Kumar. He expressed concern over the media reports that China was pursuing a major military build-up in a 'secretive manner' near India’s border.
Though it is wrong to say that the Chinese are doing it 'secretly', the development of Nyngtri and Ngari districts in Tibet, north of Arunachal and Himachal/Ladakh respectively, is going on full swing.

Ashwani Kunar speaking during the Zero Hour, said that "A peaceful and harmonious relationship with China was in national interest, but India cannot forget the historical facts. ...A rising India cannot be apologetic for an enhanced  defense expenditure necessary to secure its strategic interests.”
India is not apologetic, India is a slow moving elephant.

Nathu La border trade remains a no show this year too
Businessmen blame it on obsolete items on trade list. 
Karma Samten Yangzom
Gangtok, Aug. 18
Barely three months are left for this year's Nathu La trade to end, but there is very little to show for.
The fifth season of the Nathu La border trade between Sikkim and Tibet Autonomous Region in China continues its jinxed run with no imports taking place since the border opened for this year in May. Indian traders have recorded abysmally low business transactions — the same as the pervious years.
Reports of the State Commerce and Industries Department says that exports from Sikkim have been averaging at Rs 35 lakh a month but there has been consistent recording of absolutely nil imports.
For the second consecutive year, the import figures have remained at a dismal zero till date.
As for exports, May saw the highest figures at Rs 45 lakh. The largest item of export was vegetable oil at Rs 18 lakh. The lowest was cigarettes at just Rs 3,000. In June, exports were to the tune of Rs 36 lakh with the largest item of export being vegetable oil at Rs 16 lakh while the lowest was tea at Rs 32,750. In July, exports stood at Rs 35 lakh. This time the largest item of export was canned food at Rs 8 lakh and the lowest was tea at Rs 85,000.
Last year too the Nathu La border trade closed with zero imports.
Traders on both sides of the border have attributed this lopsided business transaction to the list of tradable items, which do not cater to modern needs.
According to the bilateral agreement in 2006, only 29 items can be exported to TAR from the Indian side while Chinese traders can export 15 items.
Most of these items do not have commercial value, a fact both the Chinese and Sikkimese traders have highlighted in the past four years. The demand to alter the list is yet to be heeded by the Centre.
Sikkimese traders have reiterated that the old list of items has no commercial value.
They have been demanding a revision and expansion of the import-export list for increasing the volume of border trade.
The Sikkim Government, through the nodal State Commerce and Industries Department, has repeatedly written to the Centre seeking an enhancement of the list of items allowed for trade.
However, recent reports have suggested that the Central Government has made it clear that there can be no increase in the list for this season, especially as there has been no proposal for enhancement of the list from the Chinese side.
The trade is due to close on November 30 for this session.