The more chaotic Tibet gets, the better

Lhasa Uprising, March 1959

The Digital Archives of the Cold War International History Project of the Wilson Center in the United States has added few new fascinating historical documents to their rich collection.
Three of them are related to Tibet.
The first one is a short 'marginal note/directive' from Chairman Mao. It is written onto a 'situation report' [qingkuang jianbao] about Tibet and it is dated February 18, 1959, just 4 weeks before the uprising of the Tibetan people in Lhasa (Match 10, 1959).

The note (and report) sent to Liu [Shaoqi], Zhou [Enlai], Chen Yi, [Deng] Xiaoping, mentions: "After reading return to Comrade [Marshal] Peng Dehuai."
Mao's commented:

The more chaotic [luan] Tibet gets, the better.  We can train troops and toughen the masses. Furthermore, this furnishes sufficient reason for future pacification and reform.
Mao Zedong
18 February

Twelve days after the Dalai Lama left at night the Norbulinka Palace to take refuge in India, Mao put up another marginal note. 
It is a comment on a report about the Indian Foreign Ministry's spokesman stating on 29 March 1959 that Tibetans in India had not undertaken 'illegal activities'.

Mao wrote:

Dear Indian friends: Don’t be credulous with the Tibetans. Their direction of the Tibet uprising is secret. Maybe we know what you don’t know! 

(Editor's note) Mao’s tone seems to imply that he suspects the Indians of feigning ignorance.

The third document is a report  from Yuri Andropov, who had been posted as Soviet Union's Ambassador in Hungary during the 1956 tragic events.
In 1957, Andropov returned to Moscow from Budapest in order to head the Department for Liaison with Communist and Workers' Parties in Socialist Countries. 
Later he became the KGB boss, and from 1982 to 1984, he was General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
It is interesting to note that 'Chinese friends’ are concerned about Communist China relations with India after the Tibet's events: "Since Indian circles were mixed up in the Tibetan events, it will effect Chinese-Indian relations in some measure."
The Soviet report mentions the reactionary parties such as the Indian Popular-Socialist Party which organized several 'anti-Chinese' meetings and demonstrations. It refers to George Fernandes' Party activities.
The report further points out that many Indian newspapers have begun an anti-Chinese campaign.
The Soviet Union will later condemned China rather mildly.
In a report dated December 18, 1959 for CC CPSU [Central Committee of the Communist Party of Soviet Union] Plenum, Suslov wrote: "During this spring relations between the People's Republic of China and India have seriously deteriorated. This deterioration is linked to the counterrevolutionary rebellion in Tibet in March 1959. Reactionary circles of India to some extent were probably involved in this rebellion. However, the rebellion in Tibet would not have taken place, had one implemented timely democratic reforms and appropriate measures to improve economy and culture with a view on historical specifics of Tibet, and had one been duly vigilant with regard to reactionary elements. Unfortunately, Chinese comrades also did not draw appropriate conclusions from the warnings of the CC CPSU about the activities of reactionaries aimed at the forceful separation of Tibet from the People's Republic of China."
My website has a large collection of historical documents related to the 1959 events.
The discussion between Mao and Khrushchev is also worth reading.

To the Central Committee of the CPSU
'On the situation in Tibet' was prepared on the basis of information provided by the Chinese friends on the latest events [in Lhasa] and [using] other materials available to the [International] Department of the CC CPSU.

On the Situation in Tibet
Head of CC CPSU Department of ties with communist and worker parties in socialist countries.
Yuri Andropov
31 March 1959
Tibet is one of the largest territories of the border provinces of China, occupying more than 1.2 million square kilometers.  According to the 1953 census, the Tibetan population in the PRC numbers 2.775 million.  In Tibet itself, however, less than half is concentrated (1.27 million). The remainder live in the areas of the PRC next to Tibet and are autonomous (autonomous districts and provinces in Qinghai, Sichuan, and others).
In the past Tibet was long the object of English and then American influence.  The Indian bourgeoisie also had significant interests in Tibet. Tibet’s leadership cultivated ties with these countries and came up with the idea of creating an “independent Tibet.”  When the Guomindang regime fell in 1949, the Tibetan ruling circles tried to realize the idea of Tibetan independence. They asked all governments for help “in the struggle for independence,” drove out the Guomindang men, refused the peaceful suggestions of the PRC and prepared for military action against China.
In 1951 PRC troops entered Tibet and these leaders had to end their resistance. Officially, Tibet was liberated peacefully on the basis of an agreement concluded in Beijing in May 1951 between the PRC central government and the Tibetan local government. The Tibetan delegation to the negotiations was headed by Ngabo Ngawang Jigme, who had previously handed over Eastern Tibet to the PRC troops. The Panchen Lama also took part in the negotiations. He had established contact earlier with the Chinese friends and was interested in returning from exile to Tibet to recoup his position as second only to the Dalai Lama.
The agreement contained the following planned measures: as a part of China, Tibet’s
troops would be reorganized and integrated into the PRC’s armed forces, while in Tibet a military-administrative committee would include representatives of the local Tibetan government. The agreement also stipulated continuation of the political system in Tibet and also the functions and powers of the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama as well as preserving the religion, language, writing and customs of the Tibetan people.  Foreign affairs were concentrated in the hands of the PRC central government.  An agreement on realizing national autonomy
under the leadership of the PRC government was achieved. The agreement noted that the Central
People’s Government of China would not force matters regarding reform in Tibet and that the
carrying out of one or another reform would be agreed upon [in advance] with the Tibetan authorities.  Measures for helping Tibet to develop its economy and culture were also planned.
Although in recent years the PRC government has carried out several measures to raise its economy and culture, Tibet remains, even today, one of the most backward provinces of China.  Some of the most important enterprises are the completion of major highways: Xikang- Tibet (length 2255 km), Qinghai- Tibet (2100 km) and Xinjiang-Tibet (under construction). Local industrial enterprises, several state farms, and experimental agricultural stations have been established.  Much has been accomplished in providing the population of Tibet with goods and food.  Previously, there were no lay schools in Tibet.  Now there are over 60 schools, including one middle school in Lhasa.  Much has also been done in public health, including the training of some Tibetans.
Despite some successes achieved by the Chinese comrades, the political situation in Tibet remained complicated.  There were periodic disturbances.  Major unrest occurred in 1954-56. In 1955, the CC CCP sent Deputy Premier and Politburo member Chen Yi to Tibet. To calm things down a part of the Chinese organization and troops were withdrawn from Tibet. The region of Chamdo, populated by Tibetans, was joined to Tibet. The military-administrative committee was reorganized into a preparatory committee for the creation of the Tibetan Autonomous Region, with the Dalai Lama at its head.
The Dalai Lama and his reactionary retinue continually prevented democratic transformation.  Because of this, in Tibet neither land nor other democratic reforms have been carried out.  Land remains in the hands of the monasteries, lay and spiritual feudals [feodaly]. In the socio-political realm, the feudal-serf order under the rule of religion, monasteries, and lamas remains almost untouched.  There are over 100,000 lamas in Tibet cons tituting the basic reactionary force actively supporting the Dalai Lama.  Even now there are no elective organs of popular power in Tibet.  In this respect the PRC Constitution has not yet been extended to Tibet.
In his 1957 speech “On the question of the correct solution of contradictions within the people,” Com. Mao Zedong pointed out that conditions for democratic changes in Tibet were not yet ripe, and therefore they would not be carried out in the Second Five-Year Plan (1958-62). In Mao’s words, the Tibetans themselves would decide on carrying them out in the Third Five-Year Plan.
The Communist Party of China has made the realization of Tibetan autonomy depend on the general political situation in that province, the carrying out of democratic transformations and the preparation of new cadres capable of carrying out the party’s policy.  The joining to Tibet of other areas of the PRC with Tibetan populations also depends on this.
Anglo-American intelligence is always active in Tibet, including around the Dalai Lama. The nearest relatives of the Dalai Lama (three brothers) are abroad and systematically propagandize against the PRC and for the “liberation” of Tibet. [Calls for support from African and Asian countries are detailed.]
The Chinese comrades try to lead a careful policy in Tibet in order to avoid unnecessary complications.  Despite these efforts, however, the situation in Tibet recently became more strained.  At the end of 1958, disorders and open revolts began in some Tibetan areas.  With the help of foreign intelligence agencies, reactionary nationalists began to broaden their subversive work.  In January-February 1959 a major revolt erupted in the region of Kham (eastern Tibet). The rebels cut the eastern highway into Tibet and established communication abroad, including with Jiang Jieshi’s troops in Burma.
According to Chinese comrades, the situation in Tibet in March took on a military character.  On 19 March about 30,000 rebels blockaded the Chinese garrisons of Lhasa and other places and began to fire on them. The internal center of the uprising was Lhasa and the foreign one was the Indian city of Kalimpong. The revolt took place under the battle slogan: “For the independence of Tibet and her separation from China.”
According to information held by the Chinese comrades, the Tibetans’ actions are inspired by the Americans and English. The Americans are sending help to the rebels through Pakistan and Burma.  India, despite Nehru’s assurances of non-interference in Tibetan affairs, also according to the Chinese comrades’ information, has not stood aside.  Help to Tibet, including cannons and machine guns, is coming from India via Nepal. The Indian consulate in Lhasa took a direct part in organizing the revolt. The uprising’s foreign center has been founded in the Indian city of Kalimpong.
In this situation the Chinese friends took decisive measures to put down the uprising.
According to them, the revolt was crushed in Lhasa on 22 March.  The Dalai Lama escaped from Lhasa and his whereabouts are still not known.  In other parts of Tibet the uprising continues, but the Chinese friends are sure that they will soon re-establish order throughout Tibet. This is made easier, because the Panchen Lama, the above- mentioned Ngabo Ngawang Jigme, is on the PRC’s side.  The friends intend to rally the workers of Tibet around him and other Tibetan progressive figures to carry out reforms, agricultural, first of all.  The friends for political reasons intend to draw the Dalai Lama to their side again.
From the Chinese friends’ communications, we can see that the uprising in Tibet has a national-religious tint.  In the main, the central, eastern, and southern areas of Tibet are involved in the uprising.  The main forces of the Tibetan counter-revolution are religious circles, who have drawn local Tibetan military units and one of the Tibetan mountain tribes, the Khampa, to their side.  Spies from imperialist countries were the inspirers and, in large part, the organizers of the uprising.  We can also assume that the majority of the population, especially laboring peasants stayed away from the action, supporting neither side.  Here we clearly need to find the reasons in aspects of CCP policy in Tibet.  First of all, it is necessary to note that eight years after liberation [by the PLA], Tibetan peasants remain in serf- like dependence, while in other minority regions, socialist transformations have already been carried through, with the party’s policy receiving broader social support there.  In Tibet the mai effort was through peaceful solution of all problems by agreement with the feudal-theocratic circles and their “re-education”.  In the main, the working masses saw few real results from living in a socialist state.
The Chinese friends are aware that the wide publicity of the Tibetan events in the capitalist world may bring certain international complications for China. In their opinion, England and the US will try to use the Tibetan events for inimical propaganda against China to strengthen the “cold war,” possibly [including] putting the Tibet question in front of the UN.  It is possible that the escaped rebels with the aid of the US and other imperialist states will create a Tibetan emigre government.  This will become even more complicated, if the Dalai Lama is hiding abroad.
As can be seen from the Chinese friends’ messages, they are especially concerned about PRC relations with India and the events in Tibet.  Since Indian circles were mixed up in the Tibetan events, it will effect Chinese-Indian relations in some measure.  Recently, the reactionary parties and groups in India are demanding a parliamentary discussion of the Tibetan events.  The Indian Popular-Socialist Party is organizing anti-Chinese meetings and demonstrations.  Many Indian newspapers have begun an anti-Chinese campaign.  Religious circles in India also are trying to use the Tibetan events to aggravate relations between India and the PRC.
Since Nehru in his 23 March speech separated himself from the events in Tibet, the Chinese friends plan for the moment to withhold from publication the information in their possession on the interference of India in Tibetan affairs.  In the present situation, said Chen Yi, the main task is to neutralize India and then attract her to our side ... [An overview of “bourgeois” press coverage of the Tibetan uprising follows, in which Tibet is described as an “Asian Hungary.”  Special attention is paid to official remarks by Nehru, the U.S. State Department, and Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek).]
The Chinese friends are more concerned about the international aspects of the disturbances in Tibet. Here, evidently, sooner or later they will have to make appropriate statements and take practical steps.

1962: The Soviet Angle

Despite the comprehensive coverage of the 1962 conflict in the India press/media, one angle has not been studied and analyzed: it is the views from Moscow.
I am posting two documents (published by  the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C.) which bring some light on the Soviet's position.
First a report from a Romanian delegation led by Foreign Minister Corneliu Manescu; after visiting Indonesia, India and Burma, and before returning to Bucharest, they had a stop-over in Moscow; they were invited for dinner by N. S. Khrushchev, the First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and as Chairman of the Council of Ministers with whom they shared their impressions of their trip.
Moscow has just decided to take Beijing's side in the border conflict. 
India had no friends left.
The second document is a Journal entry by Benediktov, Soviet Ambassador to India, describing a conversation with the General Secretary of the Communist Party of India, E.M. Nambudiripad. 
The encounter took place a day after the Soviet leadership had dramatically announced its new policy on the Sino-Indian conflict (in an article in Pravda on October 25). 
This document shows the servile attitude of the Indian comrades.

Report of the discussions of the government delegation of PRR [Romania] with the CPSU [Soviet Communist Party] and the Soviet leaders including N. S. Khrushchev on October 23, 1962.

Affairs Department of the RWP CC [Romanian Communist Party]
Top Secret
No. 1522 / S 16 XI 1962
Politburo Archive of the RWP CC
Nr. 1493 / 16.11.1962

After mentioning their visit in Indonesia and Burma, the Romanian Foreign Minister Corneliu Manescu reports:

…Comrade N. S. Khrushchev showed that the opinions and conclusions reached by the Romanian comrades are the same as those reached by the Soviet comrades, after the visit of Comrade N. S. Khrushchev, comrade [Anastas] Mikoyan and other companions in these countries and currently.

Comrade N. S. Khrushchev insisted more on the attitude of [Indian Prime Minister] Nehru and the Sino-India problem. In this context, comrade Khrushchev generally mentioned that Nehru had oscillated between the line of imperialist countries, neutrality and the socialist countries. Lately, [being] under the influence of the ruling party, of the reactionary forces, Nehru seems to be closer to the line of imperialist countries.
The position he occupies in the last time, toward the issue of border conflict with China, is downright reactionary. The Chinese side (the Soviet ambassador in China was informed directly by Zhou En-Lai about this) recently proposed the withdrawal of Chinese and Indian troops at 20 km on each side of the border. Also under the pressure of the reactionary forces, the Indian side rejected this proposal on the grounds that the border should remain the McMahon line. [Manuscript comment: at[tention!]
Comrade N. S. Khrushchev said that this is not fair because the McMahon line was established by the British in 1912, when India was a British colony and, of course, the British had every incentive to take as much Chinese territory as possible.
Therefore, based on proposals of the Chinese side, now would be normal to start bilateral negotiations. [Manuscript comment: v[ery] i[mportant].
The point of view of the Soviet side was communicated to the P.R. [People's Republic] of China on 8 October and India on 20 October, through a confidential discussion of the Soviet Ambassador in India with J. Nehru.
Basically, Nehru considered that the USSR’s opinion is good, but in fact he didn’t give any practical response that could show the decision that will be taken by him. Manuscript comment: at[tention!]
But most troubling is the fact that the General Secretary of the C[ommunist] P[arty] of India [E.M.S. Namboodiripad] was in a wrong position this time, supported the view of J. Nehru. This is dangerous because it can lead to divisions among the Party.
He has taken measures in order to know the opinion of CPSU, including the opinion of General Secretary of the C[ommunist] P[arty] of India.
After the brief presentation Comrade N. S. Khrushchev toasted to the Romanian-Soviet friendship.


Entry from the journal of Soviet ambassador to India Benediktov, conversation with General Secretary of the Communist Party of India, E.M. Nambudiripad
Date: December 26 1962
Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVPRF)

Description: Journal entry by Benediktov describing a conversation with General Secretary of the Communist Party of India, E.M. Nambudiripad. The encounter took place a day after the Soviet leadership had dramatically modified its policy on the Sino-Indian dispute (in an October 25 article in Pravda), suddenly taking a pro-China position, evidently due to the danger of global war breaking out as a result of the Cuban Missile Crisis, then peaking. While taking pains to welcome the Pravda article as helpful in correcting misunderstandings among Indian Communists, the CPI leader acknowledged that the party secretariat had concluded that “this publication in all probability will inaugurate a new period of anti-Soviet hysteria in India”, pushing the Indian Government toward the West, and he pleaded with the Soviets to influence China to resolve the border dispute "without damage to the prestige of India and of Nehru himself."

Today at my own initiative, fulfilling the commission of the CC CPSU, I met with E.M. Nambudiripad and informed him of the statement of the CC CPSU on the Indian-Chinese border conflict. He listened most attentively to the statement of the CC and promised immediately to convey its contents to the members of the secretariat of the National Council of the CPI.
Nambudiripad said that four members of the secretariat, who were in Delhi, today carefully studied and discussed at length the Pravda article of October 25 on the border question. "We ask that you transmit this to the CC CPSU, - he continued, - that the publication of this article and the advice of the CPSU contained in this letter of the CC CPSU, truly will help our party get out of the extremely difficult position it is now in. Before this [help] there were moments when we felt ourselves to be simply helpless, but now the party will be able to remedy this situation. We are grateful to the CC CPSU for this help; you can transmit this personally from me and from Comrade B. Gupta."
He pointed out the whole array of difficulties the CPI faces in correcting its earlier positions and statements on the border question. The most typical mistake of many communists, in his words, is that they cannot clearly distinguish [between] patriotism and bourgeois nationalism. Some of the members of the party considered it possible [that there would be] support for the Indian position in this dispute from a number of communist parties of the socialist countries in light of the ideological differences between the CCP PRC and other fraternal parties, although - he continued, - I knew that this was impossible and incorrect. Moreover, it is very difficult in general to sharply reformulate the whole system of views on the border conflict held by members of the party, since these views in many cases were contradictory to those expressed in Pravda and in this letter of the CC CPSU. In particular, the CPI for three years considered the McMahon line the real border between the two states. Many rank and file members of the party and some members of the leading organs, in solidarity with the widespread opinion among the population, hold to the view that the PRC is [the] guilty [party] in the origin and exacerbation of the border conflict." "Undoubtedly the article in Pravda will have an influence on these comrades, he said, it will force them to think through the whole question again." Members of the secretariat Nair and Sharma at today's meeting pointed out that the Pravda article, while in fact criticizing the position of the Indian communists and India's relation to this question as a whole, did not express any critical comments with regard to the PRC and the Chinese comrades.
Nambudiripad reported that the secretariat of the CPI after the discussion of the Pravda article today reached the conclusion that "this publication in all probability will inaugurate a new period of anti-Soviet hysteria in India." The campaign that is going on everywhere against the PRC will, obviously, be extended to the Soviet Union, and then to all countries of the socialist system....He expressed the opinion of the secretariat that in connection with this statement of the Soviet press and in connection with the pressure on India from many neutral countries regarding a more rapid peaceful settlement of this conflict, the Indian government... can reach the conclusion that only western countries are our true friends...
"In this connection we very much would like to find out if Soviet leaders could help the CPI give an understanding to the Chinese comrades that it is extremely desirable to give the possibility to Nehru to move toward peace negotiations and cease military actions without damage to the prestige of India and of Nehru himself, - Nambudiripad stated. The Secretariat has unanimously reached the conclusion that such a step by the PRC would have a huge significance for the cause of world peace, for all progressive forces, for the anti-imperialist struggle..."

When the Party lost Stalin’s Knife

Twenty-one years ago, the tanks rolled on Tienanmen Square. Old Deng had used Stalin's knife once more.


China is not an ordinary country.
China is one of the last two States in the world strictly adhering to the Marxist Theory while engaged on a seemingly wild capitalist path (‘with Chinese characteristics of course). But for the past 60 years, the Communist Party of China (CCP) continues to rule supreme over the Middle Kingdom.
From time to time, China watchers have predicted the ideological and economic collapse of the Chinese empire, but despite many prophesies, Beijing continues its ‘peaceful rise’ and has now reached the Number 2 economic slot after the United States of America.
Unlike Indians, the Chinese like to analyze the future; they like to be prepared for any eventuality. An Indian friend recently explained to me that this is not really required in India which has 33 crores of gods and goddesses and above all, the Supreme Grace always ready to intervene. So, why bother!
Not having the ‘Grace’ advantage, Chinese rulers have to bother about the future of the Communist Dynasty. They are aware that, in the past, Heaven has withdrawn its Mandate to many dynasties, bringing disasters, famines, floods or earthquakes to different parts of the Empire and dethronement for the Emperors.
It is probably the reason why the State Council ordered in June 2006 an eight-episode TV research entitled Preparing For Danger in Times of Safety – Historic Lessons Learned from the Demise of Soviet Communism.
The project was given to no less than the Academy of Social Sciences, the prime Government think tank.
Later CCP’s party members were requested to watch the series and carefully study and ‘discuss’ the conclusions offered by the Chinese President himself. Hu Jintao affirmed: “There are multiple factors contributing to the disintegration of the Soviet Union, a very important one being Khrushchev throwing away Stalin’s knife and Gorbachev’s open betrayal of Marxism-Leninism.”
In China, as earlier in the Soviet Union, the Party is the foundation stone of the entire nation; if one day the CCP collapses, like in Soviet Union in the early 1990’s, the Apparatchiks in Beijing believe that Chaos will prevail and a new Dynasty may take over.
The matter is so serious that in 2000, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences created two special research groups: one to study the strength and decline of the Soviet Communist Party and the other the rise and fall of the Soviet Union. It was designated as “fundamental national social science research topic”.
Arthur Waldron in a paper entitled Chinese Analyses of Soviet Failure: The Party in the China Brief of the Jamestown Foundation mentions the film: “The message is that the Soviet party failed because it gave up the dictatorship of the proletariat, ceased to practice democratic centralism, criticized Stalin, was beguiled by western concepts such as democracy, and also tripped up by Western propaganda and other operations.”
Indeed the film praised Lenin’s Theory [i.e. the dictatorship of the proletariat led by a revolutionary vanguard party]: “After the victory of the October Revolution, Lenin led the Bolshevik Party in implementing the War Communism and the New Economic Policy, and conducted a painstaking exploration on how to build socialism in underdeveloped countries such as Russia,” but also Stalin’s Work.
Though acknowledging the ‘excesses’ of Stalin, it states that his realizations will remain in history: “The Soviet people who had personal experiences of Stalin’s times fully affirmed Stalin's great historic feats, but they also experienced the expansion of his purges, as well as the bitter fruit from his autocratic working style and the mistakes caused by his abusive manner. However, as time goes by, when we brush off the dust of history, people feel more than ever that Stalin's errors should never tarnish his position as a great Marxist and a proletarian revolutionary in history.”

But then came the Destroyer of the Party.
On February 14, 1956, the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of Soviet Union (CPSU) was held in Moscow. At night, the delegates were suddenly summoned back to the Kremlin by Khrushchev, the first secretary of the Central Committee who presented the famous ‘secret’ report entitled On Personal Worship and its Consequences. The Chinese film says: “In the secret report, Khrushchev exaggerated Stalin's errors and expressed sharp criticism of Stalin. After the 20th Congress of the CPSU, the Soviet Union launched a nationwide campaign criticizing Stalin.”
This was the beginning of the end. The Party was condemned to death; as Mao Zedong said “the CPSU had lost the knife of Stalin”.
Without a ‘knife’, the Soviet Union could not survive.
The script explains: “Young people in the CPSU grew up under Khrushchev’s ideological influence [after the 20th Congress] …They were unfamiliar with the Party's revolutionary tradition, and lacked firm beliefs in socialism. They were later known as the ‘the babies born at the 20th Congress’. After the mid-80s of the 20th century, it was exactly these people who became the backbone that disintegrated the CPSU and buried the socialist system”.
In the early 1990’s, Gorbachev, probably considered as a ‘baby of the 20th Congress’ put the last nail in the coffin of the Soviet Union and the Party.
The film regretted: “A party that Lenin personally created; a party that led the Russian working class in overthrowing the reactionary rule of tsarist Russia and successfully established the first socialist state under the dictatorship of the proletariat; a party that resisted the armed intervention of 14 countries and successfully defended the fruit of the revolution; a party that defeated Nazi Germany in the great patriotic war, and made great contributions to victory in World War II; a party that has made brilliant achievements in socialist development and was the first to send satellites into space; why, after 74 years in power, did it actually lose its ruling position?”.
The lessons are crucial for China. Deng Xiaoping who wore the Emperors’ Mantle after Mao’s death knew it only too well. He cleverly set up an Open Policy at the end of 1978 as the only way to save the Party. He knew that by opening the door to foreign businesses, he was offering the Chinese people the ‘glory of becoming rich”. He could thus pacify the masses’ frustrations after the Cultural Revolution and this, without encroaching on the supremacy of the Party.
In the early 1980’s, one leader could have been a Chinese Khrushchev; it was Hu Yaobang, the then Secretary General of the CCP. When Deng realized the danger of democratic ‘opening’, Hu was quickly tackled from within the Politburo and sidelined.
When Hu died in April 1989, students gathered spontaneously on Tiananmen Square to mourn his demise. What started as an expression of grief, quickly turn into the massive pro-democracy demonstration. Tens of thousands occupied Tiananmen Square till the fateful night of June 3-4, 1989.
The knife had to save the Party. Deng decided to send in the tanks and massacre the students.
When one looks at the last 20 years of the history of the People’s Republic of China, the ‘knife’ has been the Party’s instrument for keeping its predominant position.
Take the unrest in Tibet in March/April 2008. Beijing could have tried to understand the motivations behind the protests (it is what several Chinese think-tanks suggested), but the leadership decided to use disproportionate force and not take any chance. The Part could not afford to lose control. It is what Hu Jintao had already done in March 1989 when he quelled unrest in Lhasa. A few hundred Tibetans were killed.
The knife was again used in Xinjiang in July 2009 for the same reason; were the Party to show weakness, it may have been wiped out from ‘minorities’ areas’.
In the film, the script mentioned: “In June 1988, at the 19th National Conference of the CPSU, [Gorbachev] for the first time, clearly stated that the goal of reform is to establish a ‘humane and democratic socialist’ society, fundamentally different from the current socialism (which he called ‘authoritarian socialism’. …To reform the party’s guiding ideology according to the ‘humane, democratic socialist’ theory is to use the old theories of western social democratic parties to replace the party’s Marxist theoretical basis.”
This destroyed the Soviet Union. The present leadership does not want to fall in the same trap. It is the reason why the brutal regime of North Korea will continue to be supported, even at the cost of Beijing’s image as a responsible world power.
Now, Beijing is front of a serious dilemma: the ‘proletarian’ strikes in a Honda factory in Foshan. As reported by Xinhua: “The assembly plants of Japan's second-largest automaker Honda in China have been forced to halt production as workers at a parts maker went on strike demanding higher salaries. Hundreds of workers, wearing white uniforms, red-and-white caps and even masks, rallied at the compound of Nanhai Honda Auto Parts Manufacturing Company in Foshan, southern Guangdong Province Thursday, asking for an increase of $118-$147 in monthly pay.”
Will the Politburo use the knife against protesting proletariat? The Party has never walked on a tighter rope, caught between different slogans, ‘not giving up the dictatorship of the proletariat, not dropping the knife and a ‘humane society’?
The question is, how long can a ‘harmonious society’ use Stalin’s knife to survive? In the Middle Kingdom, many are asking today this question.