Dumped by friends, bullied by others

My article Dumped by friends, bullied by others appeared in the Edit page of The Pioneer today.

Following the Chinese attack in 1962, India asked the Soviet Union for support. But the Soviets backed Beijing on the McMahon Line. The US promised to help only if New Delhi compromised on Kashmir

Despite the comprehensive coverage of the 1962 conflict in the Indian media, one angle has not been analysed: The views from Moscow. In the 1950s already, Beijing’s and Moscow’s outlook on the world had started diverging; Khrushchev dared speaking of the possibility of ‘peaceful coexistence with the West’, while Mao Zedong believed in an ideological war with the ‘class enemies’. For Beijing, the Soviet Union’s attitude was ‘Marxist revisionism’.
When the first Sino-Indian border clash occurred in a place called Longju on the McMahon Line in August 1959, the misunderstanding between the People’s Republic of China and the USSR became deeper. When the Dalai Lama escaped Tibet in March 1959, following an uprising of the Tibetan population of Lhasa against the Chinese invaders, Moscow supported Beijing, but five months later, the Soviet stand changed.
Nikita Khrushchev, the First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, refused to unequivocally support China.
Using new documents from the Soviet Archives, MY Prozumenschikov, a Soviet scholar, wrote a paper on the Sino-Indian Conflict and the Cuban Missile Crisis, which was published by the Washington-based Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Prozumenschikov asserted: “Soviet leaders believed that in many ways the flare-up was provoked by the Chinese themselves, in order to demonstrate in practice their refusal to accept the McMahon line (a 1914 boundary agreed on by British and Tibetan officials and which Indian accepted as the correct Sino-Indian frontier) as the state border between the PRC and India.”
A month after the Longju incident, TASS News Agency issued a statement calling on both the warring sides to resolve the conflict by peaceful means. The fact that Moscow refused to take a clear ‘class’ stand in a conflict between a Socialist state and a Bourgeois state, deeply upset China. On September 13, 1959, the Chinese Communist Party accused the Soviet regime of “compromise”.
Beijing pointed out: “The TASS statement showed to the whole world the different positions of China and the Soviet Union in regard to the incident on the Indian-Chinese border, which causes a virtual glee and jubilation among the Indian bourgeoisie and the American and the English imperialists.”
When Jawaharlal Nehru and Krishna Menon decided to ‘throw out the Chinese’ from the Thagla Ridge in early October 1962, they were probably under the impression that they would get the tacit support of the Soviets, or that at least that Moscow would remain neutral. That was not to be the case as, by that time, Khrushchev had got entangled in the traumatic and volatile Cuban missile crisis.
The notes taken by Vladimir Malin, the Chief of the General Department of the Party’s Central Committee, bring some light on the Soviet change of heart. Malin recorded all the discussions of the top party officials of the Politburo.
On October 14, 1962, six days before the Chinese attacked India, the comrades in Moscow mentioned the forthcoming ‘Indian attack’ on the Chinese forces.
According to Malin, “Decision was taken: 1. Delay the shipment to India of MiG-21 aircrafts; 2. On instructions to the Soviet Ambassador in India, Cde. [comrade] [Ivan] Benediktov. Say to [Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal] Nehru: ‘We are disappointed.’ Are they [India] thinking about how this conflict will end?”
The McMahon Line was then questioned: “By whom was the McMahon Line created? By whom was it recognised? When was it introduced?” For the Soviet Politburo, the PRC’s “proposals for troop withdrawals spanning 20 km are reasonable.” The conclusion was: “We are in favour of eliminating the conflict; ...India is hardly going to gain anything from the conflict.” Nehru had clearly lost a friend in the Socialist world; Moscow was now parroting Beijing’s stand: India was about to attack China.
Three days after the Chinese attack (on October 20), a Romanian delegation led by Foreign Minister Corneliu Manescu stopped over in Moscow after visiting Indonesia, India and Burma. They were invited for dinner by Khrushchev Manescu later reported: “Comrade NS Khrushchev insisted [to know] more on the attitude of Nehru and the Sino-India problem. In this context, comrade Khrushchev generally mentioned that Nehru had oscillated between the line of imperialist countries, neutrality and the socialist countries. Lately, [being] under the influence of the ruling party, of the reactionary forces, Nehru seems to be closer to the line of imperialist countries.”
Again, there was a mention of the Chinese proposal: “Also under the pressure of the reactionary forces, the Indian side rejected this proposal on the grounds that the border should remain the McMahon line.” Khrushchev commented that this was not fair because “the McMahon line was established by the British in 1912 [1914], when India was a British colony and, of course, the British had every incentive to take as much Chinese territory as possible.”
Khrushchev was, however, disturbed by the fact that then CPI general secretary EMS Namboodiripad was “in a wrong position this time” as he supported Nehru”s view on the conflict. “This is dangerous because it can lead to divisions among the party”, he commented.
A few days later, Benediktov, the Soviet Ambassador to India met Namboodiripad. By that time, Moscow had made official its change of stand (in an article in the Pravda on October 25); this was mainly triggered by the difficult Soviet position in the Cuban missile crisis. The CPI leader told Benediktov that the CPI believed  “this publication in all probability will inaugurate a new period of anti-Soviet hysteria in India.” This document shows the servile attitude of the Indian comrades.
Namboodiripad was happy by the new Soviet stand: “The publication of this article …truly will help our party get out of the extremely difficult position it is now in. Before this [help] there were moments when we felt ourselves to be simply helpless, but now the party will be able to remedy this situation.” The CPI leader pleaded with the Soviets to push China to resolve the border dispute “without damage to the prestige of India and of Nehru himself. On November 19, Nehru began panicking. He shot two secret letters to President Kennedy. India’s non-alignment position had gone for a toss.
As a result of Nehru’s letter, Averell Harriman, then US Assistant Secretary of State visited India on November 22. The visit, on the day China declared a unilateral ceasefire, supposedly was to assess India’s needs to resist Communist China; but the US envoy (and his British counterpart) “made clear their Governments’ willingness to provide military assistance to India, but pointed out the related need for negotiations to resolve the Kashmir dispute.”
A clear signal to India, which had not recovered from the blackest month of its history: Compromise on Kashmir.

1962: The Soviet Angle

Despite the comprehensive coverage of the 1962 conflict in the India press/media, one angle has not been studied and analyzed: it is the views from Moscow.
I am posting two documents (published by  the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C.) which bring some light on the Soviet's position.
First a report from a Romanian delegation led by Foreign Minister Corneliu Manescu; after visiting Indonesia, India and Burma, and before returning to Bucharest, they had a stop-over in Moscow; they were invited for dinner by N. S. Khrushchev, the First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and as Chairman of the Council of Ministers with whom they shared their impressions of their trip.
Moscow has just decided to take Beijing's side in the border conflict. 
India had no friends left.
The second document is a Journal entry by Benediktov, Soviet Ambassador to India, describing a conversation with the General Secretary of the Communist Party of India, E.M. Nambudiripad. 
The encounter took place a day after the Soviet leadership had dramatically announced its new policy on the Sino-Indian conflict (in an article in Pravda on October 25). 
This document shows the servile attitude of the Indian comrades.

Report of the discussions of the government delegation of PRR [Romania] with the CPSU [Soviet Communist Party] and the Soviet leaders including N. S. Khrushchev on October 23, 1962.

Affairs Department of the RWP CC [Romanian Communist Party]
Top Secret
No. 1522 / S 16 XI 1962
Politburo Archive of the RWP CC
Nr. 1493 / 16.11.1962

After mentioning their visit in Indonesia and Burma, the Romanian Foreign Minister Corneliu Manescu reports:

…Comrade N. S. Khrushchev showed that the opinions and conclusions reached by the Romanian comrades are the same as those reached by the Soviet comrades, after the visit of Comrade N. S. Khrushchev, comrade [Anastas] Mikoyan and other companions in these countries and currently.

Comrade N. S. Khrushchev insisted more on the attitude of [Indian Prime Minister] Nehru and the Sino-India problem. In this context, comrade Khrushchev generally mentioned that Nehru had oscillated between the line of imperialist countries, neutrality and the socialist countries. Lately, [being] under the influence of the ruling party, of the reactionary forces, Nehru seems to be closer to the line of imperialist countries.
The position he occupies in the last time, toward the issue of border conflict with China, is downright reactionary. The Chinese side (the Soviet ambassador in China was informed directly by Zhou En-Lai about this) recently proposed the withdrawal of Chinese and Indian troops at 20 km on each side of the border. Also under the pressure of the reactionary forces, the Indian side rejected this proposal on the grounds that the border should remain the McMahon line. [Manuscript comment: at[tention!]
Comrade N. S. Khrushchev said that this is not fair because the McMahon line was established by the British in 1912, when India was a British colony and, of course, the British had every incentive to take as much Chinese territory as possible.
Therefore, based on proposals of the Chinese side, now would be normal to start bilateral negotiations. [Manuscript comment: v[ery] i[mportant].
The point of view of the Soviet side was communicated to the P.R. [People's Republic] of China on 8 October and India on 20 October, through a confidential discussion of the Soviet Ambassador in India with J. Nehru.
Basically, Nehru considered that the USSR’s opinion is good, but in fact he didn’t give any practical response that could show the decision that will be taken by him. Manuscript comment: at[tention!]
But most troubling is the fact that the General Secretary of the C[ommunist] P[arty] of India [E.M.S. Namboodiripad] was in a wrong position this time, supported the view of J. Nehru. This is dangerous because it can lead to divisions among the Party.
He has taken measures in order to know the opinion of CPSU, including the opinion of General Secretary of the C[ommunist] P[arty] of India.
After the brief presentation Comrade N. S. Khrushchev toasted to the Romanian-Soviet friendship.


Entry from the journal of Soviet ambassador to India Benediktov, conversation with General Secretary of the Communist Party of India, E.M. Nambudiripad
Date: December 26 1962
Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVPRF)

Description: Journal entry by Benediktov describing a conversation with General Secretary of the Communist Party of India, E.M. Nambudiripad. The encounter took place a day after the Soviet leadership had dramatically modified its policy on the Sino-Indian dispute (in an October 25 article in Pravda), suddenly taking a pro-China position, evidently due to the danger of global war breaking out as a result of the Cuban Missile Crisis, then peaking. While taking pains to welcome the Pravda article as helpful in correcting misunderstandings among Indian Communists, the CPI leader acknowledged that the party secretariat had concluded that “this publication in all probability will inaugurate a new period of anti-Soviet hysteria in India”, pushing the Indian Government toward the West, and he pleaded with the Soviets to influence China to resolve the border dispute "without damage to the prestige of India and of Nehru himself."

Today at my own initiative, fulfilling the commission of the CC CPSU, I met with E.M. Nambudiripad and informed him of the statement of the CC CPSU on the Indian-Chinese border conflict. He listened most attentively to the statement of the CC and promised immediately to convey its contents to the members of the secretariat of the National Council of the CPI.
Nambudiripad said that four members of the secretariat, who were in Delhi, today carefully studied and discussed at length the Pravda article of October 25 on the border question. "We ask that you transmit this to the CC CPSU, - he continued, - that the publication of this article and the advice of the CPSU contained in this letter of the CC CPSU, truly will help our party get out of the extremely difficult position it is now in. Before this [help] there were moments when we felt ourselves to be simply helpless, but now the party will be able to remedy this situation. We are grateful to the CC CPSU for this help; you can transmit this personally from me and from Comrade B. Gupta."
He pointed out the whole array of difficulties the CPI faces in correcting its earlier positions and statements on the border question. The most typical mistake of many communists, in his words, is that they cannot clearly distinguish [between] patriotism and bourgeois nationalism. Some of the members of the party considered it possible [that there would be] support for the Indian position in this dispute from a number of communist parties of the socialist countries in light of the ideological differences between the CCP PRC and other fraternal parties, although - he continued, - I knew that this was impossible and incorrect. Moreover, it is very difficult in general to sharply reformulate the whole system of views on the border conflict held by members of the party, since these views in many cases were contradictory to those expressed in Pravda and in this letter of the CC CPSU. In particular, the CPI for three years considered the McMahon line the real border between the two states. Many rank and file members of the party and some members of the leading organs, in solidarity with the widespread opinion among the population, hold to the view that the PRC is [the] guilty [party] in the origin and exacerbation of the border conflict." "Undoubtedly the article in Pravda will have an influence on these comrades, he said, it will force them to think through the whole question again." Members of the secretariat Nair and Sharma at today's meeting pointed out that the Pravda article, while in fact criticizing the position of the Indian communists and India's relation to this question as a whole, did not express any critical comments with regard to the PRC and the Chinese comrades.
Nambudiripad reported that the secretariat of the CPI after the discussion of the Pravda article today reached the conclusion that "this publication in all probability will inaugurate a new period of anti-Soviet hysteria in India." The campaign that is going on everywhere against the PRC will, obviously, be extended to the Soviet Union, and then to all countries of the socialist system....He expressed the opinion of the secretariat that in connection with this statement of the Soviet press and in connection with the pressure on India from many neutral countries regarding a more rapid peaceful settlement of this conflict, the Indian government... can reach the conclusion that only western countries are our true friends...
"In this connection we very much would like to find out if Soviet leaders could help the CPI give an understanding to the Chinese comrades that it is extremely desirable to give the possibility to Nehru to move toward peace negotiations and cease military actions without damage to the prestige of India and of Nehru himself, - Nambudiripad stated. The Secretariat has unanimously reached the conclusion that such a step by the PRC would have a huge significance for the cause of world peace, for all progressive forces, for the anti-imperialist struggle..."

When Khrushchev took India's side

A few years ago the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars published this discussion between Khrushchev and Mao in October 1959, six months after the uprising in Lhasa which forced the Dalai Lama to take refuge in India.
In August 1959, an armed clash occured at a border post called Longju on the McMahon Line. An Indian border guard was killed leading to an outburst of public suspicion against China.
In this conversion, Khrushchev mentions this incident.  
A few days after the clash, Zhou Enlai, the Chinese Premier had given his version of the clash, in a letter to Nehru, the Indian Prime Minister: 

Since the outbreak of the rebellion in Tibet, however, the border situation has become increasingly tense owing to reasons for which the Chinese side cannot be held responsible. Immediately after the fleeting of a large number of Tibetan rebels into India. Indian troops started pressing forward steadily across the eastern section of the Sino-Indian boundary. Changing unilaterally the long-existing state of the border between the two countries, they not only overstepped the so-called McMahon Line as indicated in the map attached to the secret notes exchanged between Britain and the Tibet local authorities, but also exceeded the boundary drawn in current Indian maps which is alleged to represent the so-called McMahon Line, but which in many places actually cuts even deepeer into Chinese territory than the McMahon Line. Indian troops invaded and occupied Longju, intruded into Yashar, and are still in occupation of Shatze, Khinzemane and Tamaden-all of which are Chinese territory-shielding armed Tibetan rebel bandits in this area.
...Nevertheless, the Indian Government has directed all sorts of groundless charges against the Chinese Government, clamouring that China has committed aggression against India and describing the Chinese frontier guards' act of self-defence in the Migyitun areas as armed provocation. Many political figures and propaganda organs in India have seized the occasion' to make a great deal of anti-Chinese utterances. The fact that India does not recognise the undelimited state of the Sino-Indian boundary and steps up bringing pressure to bear on China militarily, diplomatically and through public opinion cannot but make one suspect that it is the attempt of India to impose upon China its one-sided claims on the boundary question. It must be pointed out that this attempt will never succeed and 'such action cannot possibly yield any results other than impairing the friendship of the two countries, further complicating the boundary question and making it more difficult to settle.

A few days later, Nehru answered: 

You have suggested in your letter that the Government of India have applied all sorts of pressure on the Chinese Government, including the use of force, to make the Chinese Government accept the Indian demand: This is the reverse of what the Government of India did. We did not release to the public the information which we had about the various border intrusions into our territory by Chinese personnel since 1954, the construction of a road across Indian territory in Ladakh, and the arrest of our personnel in the Aksai Chin area in 1958 and their detention. We did not give publicity to this in the hope that peaceful solutions of the disputes could be found by agreement by the two countries without public excitement on both sides. In fact our failure to do so has now resulted in sharp but legitimate criticism of the Government both in Parliament and in the press in our country. Far from using force, we sought the peaceful settlement of the disputes. You must be aware of the prolonged negotiations between the Indian and Chinese representatives over Bara Hoti in 1958 and of the notes exchanged between our two Governments on the other disputes. I need hardly tell you ' that there is great resentment in India at the action of your troops in overpowering our outpost in Longju on our side of the McMahon Line, and although you have up till now not withdrawn your troops have not sought to reoccupy the post.

Here are the views of the Soviet and Chinese Presidents on the issue.

Discussion between N.S. Khrushchev and Mao Zedong on current political situations in Tibet, India, Indochina and Taiwan.
Present at the conversation:
Soviet side: M.A. Suslov and A.A. Gromyko accompanied Khrushchev. 
Chinese side: Deputy Chairmen of the CC CCP Liu Shaoqi, Zhao Enlai and Lin Biao; Members of the Politburo Peng Zhen and Chen Yi; Member of the Secretariat Wan Xia Sang were with Mao
Khrushchev: Today, together with Comrades M.A. Suslov and A.A. Gromyko, I paid a visit to Mao Zedong at his request in his residency.
Date: 3 October 1959

Khrushchev: I am telling about all this to show you that for us this territorial issue was not insurmountable. You have had good relations with India for many years. Suddenly, here is a bloody incident, as result of which [Prime Minister of India Jawaharlal] Nehru found himself in a very difficult position. We may say that Nehru is a bourgeois statesman. But we know about it. If Nehru leaves, who would be better than him? The Dalai Lama fled from Tibet, he is a bourgeois figure. This issue is also not clear for us. When the events in Hungary took place, then Nehru was against us, and we did not take offense at him, because we did not expect anything from him as a bourgeois statesman. But although he was against it, this did not prevent us from preserving good relations with him. If you let me, I will tell you what a guest should not say the events in Tibet are your fault. You ruled in Tibet, you should have had your intelligence [agencies] there and should have known about the plans and intentions of the Dalai Lama. 

Mao Zedong: Nehru also says that the events in Tibet occurred on our fault. Besides, in the Soviet Union they published a TASS declaration on the issue of conflict with India. 

N.S. Khrushchev: Do you really want us to approve of your conflict with India? It would be stupid on our part. The TASS declaration was necessary. You still seem to be able to see some difference between Nehru and me. If we had not issued the TASS declaration, there could have been an impression that there was a united front of socialist countries against Nehru. The TASS declaration turned this issue into one between you and India.

Mao Zedong: Our mistake was that we did not disarm the Dalai Lama right away. But at that time we had no contact with the popular masses of Tibet.

N.S. Khrushchev: You have no contact even now with the population of Tibet. 

Mao Zedong: We have a different understanding of this issue. 

N.S. Khrushchev: Of course, that is why we raised this issue. One could also say the following: both you and we have Koreans who fled from Kim Il Sung. But this does not give us ground to spoil relations with Kim Il Sung, and we remain good friends. As to the escape of the Dalai Lama from Tibet, if we had been in your place, we would not have let him escape. It would be better if he was in a coffin. And now he is in India, and perhaps will go to the USA. Is this to the advantage of the socialist countries?

Mao Zedong: This is impossible; we could not arrest him then. We could not bar him from leaving, since the border with India is very extended, and he could cross it at any point. 

N.S. Khrushchev: It's not a matter of arrest; I am just saying that you were wrong to let him go. If you allow him an opportunity to flee to India, then what has Nehru to do with it? We believe that the events in Tibet are the fault of the Communist Party of China, not Nehru's fault. 

Mao Zedong: No, this is Nehru's fault. 

N.S. Khrushchev: Then the events in Hungary are not our fault, but the fault of the United States of America, if I understand you correctly. Please, look here, we had an army in Hungary, we supported that fool Rakosi - and this is our mistake, not the mistake of the United States.

N.S. Khrushchev: If you like, you can to a certain degree. 

Mao Zedong: The Hindus acted in Tibet as if it belonged to them. 

N.S. Khrushchev: We know. As you know, Nepal wanted to have a Soviet ambassador, but we did not send there for a long time. You did the same. This is because Nehru did not want that Soviet and Chinese ambassadors were there. This should not come as a surprise - nothing else can be expected from Nehru. But this should not be a ground for us for breaking off the relations. 

N.S. Khrushchev: Why did you have to kill people on the border with India?

Mao Zedong: How can you compare Rakosi to the Dalai Lama?

Mao Zedong: We also support Nehru, but in the question of Tibet we should crush him.

Mao Zedong: They attacked us first, crossed the border and continued firing for 12 hours.

Zhou Enlai: What data do you trust more, Indian or ours? 

N.S. Khrushchev: Although the Hindus attacked first, nobody was killed among the Chinese, and only among the Hindus. 

Zhou Enlai: But what we are supposed to do if they attack us first. We cannot fire in the air. The Hindus even crossed the McMahon line. Besides, in the nearest future [Indian] Vice President [Savrepalli] Radhakrishnan comes to China. This is to say that we are undertaking measures to resolve the issue peacefully, by negotiations. In my letter of 9 September to Nehru we provided detailed explanations of all that had occurred between India and us.

N.S. Khrushchev: Comrade Zhou Enlai. You have been Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PRC for many years and know better than me how one can resolve disputed issues without [spilling] blood. In this particular case I do not touch at all the issue of the border, for if the Chinese and the Hindus do not know where the borderline goes between them, it is not for me, a Russian, to meddle. I am only against the methods that have been used.

Zhou Enlai: We did not know until recently about the border incident, and local authorities undertook all the measures there, without authorization from the center. Besides, we are talking here about three disputed regions between China and India. The Hindus were the first to cross the McMahon line and were the first to open fire. No government of China ever recognized the McMahon line. If, for instance, the Finns attacked the borders of the USSR, wouldn't you retaliate? 

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