The Importance of Tibet – ‘Ethnic Work’ in Progress

My article The Importance of Tibet – ‘Ethnic Work’ in Progress has been published on the Chanakya Forum website.

Here is the link...

Why are Members of the politburo of the Communist Party of China’s (CPC) Central Committee so attracted by Tibet these days? During the last two months, ten out of the twenty-five members of the politburo travelled to the Roof of the World.

One remembers a Party Secretary, who later became Chinese President (and General Secretary of the CPC), who during his three years posting in Tibet tried his best to avoid to fly to Lhasa; the young Hu Jintao did not like the place. He once told a journalist that he “disliked Tibet’s altitude, climate and lack of culture”. During his tenure, he shuttled between Lhasa and Beijing where the real power was; there was a common joke about Hu amongst Tibetan cadres: ‘Where is Hu?’ The answer was: ‘Hu is in Beijing Hospital.’ He often reported sick each time he was going to leave Beijing!

That was some thirty years ago.

Today, ‘important’ cadres have to make sure that they are seen in Tibet.

Xi Jinping Visit to Nyingchi and Lhasa

The ‘Emperor’ himself, the ‘Core Leader’, Xi Jinping paid an ‘inspection tour’ of Central and Southern Tibet between July 21 and 23; it was his first visit to Lhasa after a gap of ten years, though he had visited the Northeastern province of Amdo (today Qinghai) in June.

Five members of the Politburo accompanied the General Secretary (concurrently serving as Chairman of the all-powerful Central Military Commission).

It is interesting to look at Xi’s delegation; the composition of a delegation is a clear indicator of the purpose of the ‘inspection tour’, especially in a system where the information is entirely monitored by the State and where watchers are left to read signs.

Xi’s Delegation from Beijing

First, Ding Xuexiang, CPC’s General Secretary and a Secretary of the Party Secretariat; he usually accompanies Xi on his visits/inspection tours. His role is to make sure that decisions are implemented and that there is a concrete follow-up.

Also regularly seen during Xi’s tours is Liu He, Vice-Premier and member of the Politburo. Liu further serves as Director of the Office of the Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission. Liu He is Xi’s trusted lieutenant, who has several times been used to fill up the ‘perception’ gap between China and the US. He takes care of the financial aspects of the visit.

Yang Xiaodu is the Director of the National Supervisory Commission and also Deputy Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) which makes sure that everybody follows the line of the Party. We shall see in a few months if a few heads roll; if it happens, Yang’s hand will certainly be behind.

Incidentally, during his early political career, Yang served several years in Tibet (1986-1992, Deputy Commissioner, Nagchu Prefecture; 1992-1995, Deputy Secretary, Chamdo, 1998-2001, vice-chairman, TAR government); Yang knows Tibet well, having served fifteen years.

One noted the absence of another Politburo member and old Tibet hand: Hu Chunhua; the Vice Premier was not on board for the visit. He had served in Tibet from 1983 to 2007 and is the only member of the Politburo who can fluently speak Tibetan. Probably, the emperor does not like to be in the shade.

Then Chen Xi, also a member of the politburo and head of the Organization Department and like Xi Jinping a graduate from Tsinghua University (they know each other since that time). Chen is President of the Central Party School and Vice-minister of Education and Vice Chairman of the China Association for Science and Technology. Xi clearly wants to bring modernity …to the borders with India.

The presence of General Zhang Youxia, Vice-Chairman, Central Military Commission (CMC), also member of the politburo is explained by the ‘important’ meeting between the CMC Chairman (Xi) and all the officers of the Tibet Military District (TMD), including the Commander and the Political Commissar of the Western Theater Command or WTC (based in Chengdu) which had a new Commander, Gen Xu Qiling. The WTC not only looks after Tibet but also the Ladakh front (incidentally Gen Xu Qiling lost his job since then, but we shall come back to this).

The CMC Chairman was certainly briefed in detail about the borders with India when he met the top brass of the Theater Command.

To this list of six members of the politburo, one should add He Lifeng, Minister in charge of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the equivalent of our Planning Commission. His presence means that a number of large projects, including the railway line between Lhasa and Chengdu and the Giga hydropower plants on the Yarlung Tsangpo will soon be undertaken. Xi was personally explained the implications of these projects while on the banks of the mighty river, which becomes the Siang and the Brahmaputra in India.

The People’s Daily resumed the tour’s objectives: “implement the Party’s strategy for governing Tibet in the new era and write a new chapter in long-term stability and high-quality development of the snow-covered plateau.” This refers to the 7th Work Forum held in August 2020 which defined the development policies for Tibet for the five next years, particularly the Sinicization of Tibetan Buddhism.

But undoubtedly, the emphasis was the military and economic development of the borders with India. An indication: in the Annual Report presented by the Tibet Autonomous Region’s government a few months earlier, the word ‘border’ was mentioned 54 times, while ‘Dalai Lama’ only once.

Xi Jinping wants to change the organization of the border for good; we shall see how.

Visit of Wang Yang in Tibet

But that was not all; on August 19, a central delegation led by Wang Yang, a member of the Politburo’s Standing Committee and chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) arrived in Lhasa to attend the 70th anniversary functions. Wang is No 4 in the Communist pantheon.

One can ask, why not celebrate the so-called liberation when the ‘Core leader’, Xi Jinping visited Tibet in July. I have no answer to this.

Wang had been ‘entrusted’ by Xi Jinping to “lead Beijing officials in Tibet along with veteran senior Tibetan officials” to Tibet; a cohort of old Tibetan collaborators was honoured by the visiting VVIP.

Wang Yang was accompanied by Admiral Miao Hua, a CMC member, who will probably be the lone uniformed member to survive when the term of the present CMC comes to an end. It was the first visit of a three-star admiral in Tibet.

Did Wang and Miao knew that a few days later, Xi would change the commander of the Western Theater Command for the third time in nine months and Xu Qiling, who had met Xi a few weeks earlier, would be replaced by General Wang Haijiang, a former commander of the Tibet Military Region. Probably not.

The visit has also to be seen in the context of the CPC’s 100th anniversary and the 70th anniversary of the so-called Liberation of Tibet (read ‘invasion’).

Three more important visits

From September 2 to 4, Li Xi, Party Secretary of Guangdong and Ma Xingrui, Governor of the same wealthy province, visited Lhasa and Nyingchi “to earnestly study and implement the important speeches and instructions of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s inspection tour …[and] implement the spirit of the Central Ethnic Work Conference.”

Guangdong province economically helps Tibet, which for decades was considered remote and backward and out of range for modernization. The instability of the restive province and the importance of the border with India have changed all this.

From September 5 to 6, Cai Qi, also a politburo member and Beijing Party Secretary “led a Beijing delegation to Tibet to research counterpart support work and further promote exchanges and cooperation between Beijing and Tibet,” said a release.

The delegation wanted to “conscientiously implement the spirit of important instructions of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s important speech on his inspection of Tibet and a series of important instructions on Tibetan work and counterpart support work, and implement the spirit of the Central Ethnic Work Conference.”

Finally, Wang Chen, vice chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, was in Tibet from September 5 to 8 to be sure that the region had “a firm sense of Chinese national community” and to preach “for long-term stability and high-quality development of the snowy plateau.”

Ten visits of politburo’s members (plus two CMC members) have never been seen in the past.

Ethnic Work

Two words explain this new interest in Tibet: Ethnic Work.
This word has an ominous meaning. It practically means ‘sinicization’ of the Roof of the World, which includes building new ‘mixed’ villages on the Indian border, recruiting a large number of Tibetans in the PLA, and giving Chinese characteristics to Tibetan Buddhism.

On September 1, Xinhua had reported that the Central Party School started its Fall Training Class for Young and Middle-Aged Cadres. It was attended by Xi who gave an ‘important’ speech (his speeches are always ‘important’).

Xi recommended that cadres have a fighting spirit in the current situation; he said that at the present moment, “the world’s unprecedented changes have been accelerating and the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation has arrived at a critical period. The risks and challenges that the CCP faces have increased significantly. It is impractical to dream of always living in a peaceful environment without taking on any struggles.”

He advised the young cadres: “dare to fight … at any time, Communists should have the bones and courage not to be afraid of anything, and not to yield to anyone.”

All this is quite ominous for India’s Northern borders.

Fireworks in the Middle Kingdom ...and on the Plateau

The lonely man of China

The Middle Kingdom is sailing through rough weather and we may soon witness more fireworks.
The Nikkei in Japan reported a verbal ‘jab’ between President Xi Jinping and Yu Zhengsheng, the Chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) during the recently-concluded Two Sessions at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing.
Commenting on the CPC’s 19th Congress to be held in November next year, The Nikkei correspondent said: “The quinquennial event is to take place in the autumn of 2017. Five of the seven members of the Politburo Standing Committee, the ruling party's top decision-making body, led by Xi, are expected to retire during the congress.”
He then quoted an old China hand: “China's political theater has so far been Xi Jinping's one-man show, but signs of discord within the Politburo Standing Committee have now emerged. The rift may come to the surface over the committee seats.”
Interesting!
Yu Zhengsheng, a member of the Politburo’s Standing Committee, opened the fire against Xi on March 14 during the concluding session of the CPPCC.
During his concluding remarks, Yu deviated from the official line.
Apparently, the Communist leadership had agreed to uphold ‘Four Consciousnesses’ that is ‘of politics, the bigger picture, the core and consistency’.
Yu spoke of only three: i.e. the need to further enhance the consciousness of politics, the consciousness of the bigger picture and the consciousness of responsibility.
What about the ‘consciousness of the core and the consciousness of consistency’ projecting Xi as the ‘core leader’ to be followed by all in the Party.
Every good member is supposed to praise ‘the core of the Chinese leadership’ (Xi) and have some ‘consistency’ in following ‘the core leader’.
Observers believe that Yu demonstrated ‘resistance’, while bringing up a ‘new consciousness’, that of responsibility
According to the Japanese newspaper, Yu once told some followers that his role in the Party is that of a ‘balancer’; Yu’s role is to mediate any feuds that might break out among Communist Party factions.
Incidentally, he also looks after the United Front Department, whose role is to ‘unite’.
In his opening speech on March 3, Yu had mentioned that differences of views and perceptions can arise over specific issues and he stressed the need to seek ‘consistency’, while respecting ‘diversity’.
What means ‘diversity’?
It was not defined, but Nikkei however concluded: “[Yu] himself has nothing to fear. But close attention should be paid to how the ‘balancer’ performs on a political stage that is becoming more discordant.”
Interestingly, Yu is in charge of Tibet and Xinjiang affairs in the Standing Committee of the Politburo.
Mingjing, a Chinese publication asserted that the open letter attacking Xi Jinping and asking him to resign was first published in Wujie News (Watching) website in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.
The letter was entitled: ‘A Request for Comrade Xi Jinping to Resign from Leadership Positions in the Party and the State.’
It blamed Xi Jinping for many negative events in China and called for him to step down. It was of course quickly removed from the Wujie website.
Wujie claimed that article had been posted by a hacker.
Wujie is a joint venture of the SEEC Media Group Limited (the parent company of Caixing magazine), the Xinjiang Government and the Alibaba Group.
Zhang Chunxian, the Xinjiang Party Secretary is on the publication's board (incidentally, Wang got his job thanks to Zhou Yongkang).
Was it an act of a hacker?
With Alibaba hosting the site, it is considered the safest hosting service in China, further the state Cyberspace Administration didn't find any sign of a hacker intrusion.
Could have Wujie published the letter on its own?
The website was subsequently shut down for several days.
The Mingjing You Bao (Mingjing Post) provides the name of the officials behind the Wujie media group.

• Jiang Jianguo, the Deputy Director of the CCP's Propaganda Department: Wujie's CEO Ouyang Hongliang is a confidant of Jiang Jianguo. Jiang and the disgraced Ling Jihua both got their part-time Master's degree from Hunan University.
• Zhang Chunxian, Xinjiang Party Secretary.
• Zhou Benshun was Zhou Yongkang's loyalist. He once served as the Secretary-General of the Political and Legal Affairs Committee where Zhou Yongkang was the head.
• Wang Boming, the Chairman of the SEEC Media Group Limited: Wang has a brother, Wang Dongming, who is the former Chairman of CITIC Securities. Wang Dongming was forced to resign after many high ranking officers at CITIC Securities were taken down for their involvement in the stock disaster in 2015.
• Liu Lefei, Vice Chairman of CITIC Securities: Liu is the son of Liu Yunshan who is a member of the Politburo Standing Committee and in charge of the propaganda work for the CCP.

Indeed, some big shots.
Are some of these officials behind the publication of the letter?
Difficult to say.
But obviously, Xi Jinping does not have only friends and comrades in the Party.

Fireworks on the Plateau
Are the above ‘waves’ connected with some strange happenings in Tibet?
According to the website Chinascope, Jamphel (alias Jambay) Gyatso, a Tibetan scholar recently published two articles criticizing two Chinese officials, Ye Xiaowen, the former Director of the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA), and Zhu Weiqun, Director of the Ethnic and Religious Commission of the CPPCC and former interlocutor of the Dalai Lama’s Special Envoys.
I briefly mentioned it on this blog in December 2015.
Both Ye and Zhu have had close connection with Beijing’s Tibet policies.
Jamphel Gyatso noted that, over the past decade, the CCP’s Religious Management Group, under Ye and Zhu, adopted wrong policies to manage Tibet:

Instead of separating religion from governance, Ye tried to replace Tibetan Buddhism with a new orthodox religion: the will of the Party’s religious office. Ye’s new policy of ‘certifying’ Living Buddhas led to corruption in the Buddhist temples. Zhu tried to escalate this simple event to the level of the political, linking it to Tibetan separation.

It is rare for a scholar to openly criticize the CCP’s official religious policies.
More interesting, Gyatso’s critics appeared in The Paper which appears to have close links with Xi Jinping and Wang Qishan.
The Paper reported on February 22, 2016, that Ye Xiaowen was removed from his latest official positions as the Party Secretary and Deputy Director of the Central Institute of Socialism.
I have earlier mentioned the role of Ye in selecting the Party’s Panchen Lama.
Ye had explained the Party’s religious management policy thus:

the ultimate goal of the CCP, as the representative of the Chinese proletariat, was to realize communism and eradicate capitalism. …the elimination of religion and any concept of gods and higher beings is a fundamental duty of the Party. In the ideological battle, the Communist Party was to ensure the triumph of Marxist atheism. …Why would the Chinese Constitution grant freedom of religious belief when the Communist Party fought for the ultimate eradication of religion?

Ye also believed that China’s religious issues are closely related to its ethnic issues:

At the time of the Cultural Revolution, there were more than 50 ethnic minorities spread out over large segments of the country. Most of them had their own religions. … Any problem with religion could easily trigger conflicts between ethnic groups. …there is a hidden danger that such conflicts could disrupt the state. So the religious policy of China needs to fit the situation.

Ye explained the policy of ‘roping in minorities’:

In order to prevent religious issues from triggering conflicts between ethnic groups, to rope in minority groups, and to convince people in religious circles to join the ‘united front,’ the CCP included the freedom of belief clause in the Chinese Constitution to accommodate the religious situation in China.

He added that:

This was the mission of SARA to weaken religions while recruiting religious leaders to serve the Party’s agenda of regional stability. Ye boasted about the CCP’s ‘wisdom’, that is, how the Party used the velvet glove. It bribed and coerced key religious leaders by giving them high ranking official titles, money, privileges, and fame. It relocated them to desirable homes or even to the central government compound, while, at the same time, using ruthless measures against religious dissidents.

“Giving high ranking official titles, money, privileges, and fame”, is not new. It has earlier been practiced by the Ming and the Manchu Dynasties.
Ye however continued:

disobeying the CCP’s religious management is an act of disrupting the state. Religions that followed the CCP’s leadership would be recognized as patriotic religions. All others were considered secessionist.

I mentioned on this blog, the video circulated in China in November 2015 about Zhang Tielin, a famous Chinese actor who became a ‘Living Buddha’, courtesy his guru Padma Woeser Rinpoche.
Zhu Weiqun, in a TV interview had said: “A fake Living Buddha might endanger national security,” while Ye had commented that the only way to be able to tell a real Living Buddha from a fake Living Buddha was whether they followed the State Council’s Regulations on Religious Affairs (in other words, if he follows the Party).
Article 11 states,

For any activities that violate this regulation and [if any person] claims to be the reincarnation of a Living Buddha on his own, the government religious affairs office can issue administrative punishment of the responsible individual or responsible organization, following the Regulations on Religious Affairs. Anyone who has committed this crime should be held for criminal charges.’ This is the law to attack fake Living Buddhas.

In other words, only Marxist Lamas can be Good Lamas.
Jamphel Gyatso’s article continued:

In the name of the action of cleaning temples and cleaning Buddhas, Ye Xiaowen created a certification process to issue a ‘Living Buddha Certificate’. However, neither temples nor senior monks could determine who was a Living Buddha. Ordinary monks, nuns, or the general public did not have the right to ask for it either. Who made the decision? The government religious affairs offices at different levels did so. They reviewed, approved, and then issued this Living Buddha Certificate.

And the trick is played.
It is the way the 15th Dalai Lama will be recognized, if nothing drastic happen before in Tibet.
Further, can you believe it, Ye also linked the ranking of ‘Living Buddhas’ to the ranking of government officials: “This further contributed to the corruption in the Tibetan Buddhist communities.”
It became, says Gyatso,

an administrative system over the temples and defined the ranks and positions for Living Buddha, such as county level Living Buddha, prefectural level Living Buddha, and provincial level Living Buddha. He also defined which level of Living Buddha could serve as the National People’s Congress representative, as a CPPCC member, and as local members.

Jamphel Gyatso also criticized Zhu Weiqun for the latter’s interview with CCTV on December 13, 2015:

Nowadays, there is an issue that draws our attention. More and more people care for and love Tibetan culture, believe in Tibetan Buddhism, and long for Tibet, the world’s last and most holy piece of pure land. We must further promote and strengthen the friendship between the Chinese and Tibetan people, further safeguard the unity of the motherland, and further strengthen ethnic unity. This is the main theme and the general trend. We absolutely must not allow the creation of confrontation, conflict, and estrangement between the Han people and Tibetan religious believers.

Jamphel explains, “Whenever something takes place in Tibet and other areas where Tibetans live, Ye Xiaowen and Zhu Weiqun label them it as ‘secessionist’ and posture themselves as anti-secession heroes,”  and Gyatso added: “Today, history is repeating itself. Zhu Weiqun is using the anti-secession basket again.”
He also refers to Padma Woeser and Zhang Tielin: “no one accused them of engaging in ‘separatist’ activities or ‘endangering national security.”
Of course, they are Hans:

Only Zhu Weiqun, with his vision and insight, saw that these two engaged in ‘separatist’ activities and endangered national security. Unfortunately, Zhu did not continue to investigate their problems further. Instead, he changed the subject so as to target the Tibetan regions, the Tibetan people, and the Tibetan lamas.

To conclude Jamphel addressed Zhu Weiqun:

Comrade Zhu, do not wield the stick of ‘anti-secession’ against the Tibetan people. …You should know that this in itself is the greatest separatism; it is ‘endangering national security’; it is destroying reunification of the motherland; it is destroying Han and Tibetan unity; it is undermining national unity; and it is sabotaging stability. History will condemn whoever does this!

Indeed, we may soon have fireworks in Tibet too.

China must go beyond one-party system

My article China must go beyond one-party system is posted in NitiCentral.

Here is the link...

In the early 1970s, the CIA published for its agents, a manual entitled: “The Art of China Watching”. At that time, the CIA wrote, “by most standards, China is a peculiar country”. Forty years later, China has not changed much; it remains difficult to grasp the moves and motives of a self-proclaimed ‘more transparent’ leadership.
For the watchers, the latest episode was enthralling to follow; I speak of the ‘public’ trial of Bo Xilai, a former Politburo member and Chongqing’s Communist Party Secretary.
Bo’s trial has been the object of immense speculation on the part of the ‘watchers’. Will it demonstrate some progress by the new leadership led by President Xi Jinping in the Art of Transparency, or will it be an old style drama à la Mao Zedong, enacted by a State which has understood the importance of using the modern means of communication such as Internet and micro-blogging. Old wine in new cyber bottles!
John Garnaut, the author of The Rise and Fall of the House of Bo wrote: “It would be a suitably jaw-dropping postscript to one of the most remarkable political shows on earth if Bo Xilai turns out to be the man who saves the Chinese legal system.”
But Bo has not really saved a system which has not witnessed major reforms and taken a step forward towards constitutionalism, the normal rule of law?
Probably not!
Garnaut explains that “as celebrity drama it doesn't get much more riveting than a fallen neo-Maoist, …brawling with his former right hand man and his current wife over infidelity, insanity, defection, a $3.2 million mansion in France, the murder of an Englishman and a ‘princeling’ child marooned in the United States.”
There is no doubt that the Intermediate People's Court in Jinan in the eastern Shandong province witnessed a historical event. All the ingredients were there: the ‘fallen’ hero, brilliantly defending himself and denouncing his wife Gu Kailai, who had ‘gone mad and always lies’; ‘sex’, with Bo stating that Gu was angry with him over an affair that the Red Prince had with another woman (Gu herself apparently had an affair with the Police Chief); but more interestingly, the relative transparency of the Court which regularly published transcripts of the proceedings. There was, of course, no way to check the veracity of the released documents as live transmission was not permitted by the Court (read the Party).
There is no doubt that the leadership has scripted the ‘show’ in detail during the previous week and the ‘transparency’ was a carefully calculated risk; knowing that it would be watched by hundreds of millions of avid spectators in the Mainland and abroad.
The Party had perhaps not planned such a spirited defence from the side of the fallen leader, but it remained within manageable limits for the new leadership. It has not always been so.
In his youth, President Xi Jinping must have heard (he was too young to remember ut ) about the fate of his father Xi Zhongxun, a vice-Premier, who during the Lushan Conference in July 1959 sided with Marshall Peng Dehuai, Mao’s old companion (more or less his equal). Peng had the courage to present a report on what was happening in the countryside; he spoke on the (today) infamous Great Leap Forward. During his inspection tour, the Old Marshal had seen peasants dying by millions. He told Mao in no uncertain terms that China was on the brink of the greatest man-made disaster; Mao never forgave Peng for having spoken against the Great Leap Forward and his lieutenant Xi Zhongxun also paid the hard price for having taken Peng’s side.
In September 1962, Mao, who had remained in the background after the Lushan Conference, decided to come back on the front stage. During the annual Plenum, he reemphasized class struggle ‘to prevent the emergence of revisionism’; denounced 'the members of the bourgeoisie right in the party ranks' and reasserted that the Great Leap Forward was the right thing for China. Peng and Xi Sr. were sent to the ‘countryside’, an euphemism for a purge at that time, without TV cameras, newspapers, micro-bloggers to report about their fate. Such were the ways of the Party during those days.
Today China has changed, though the manner in which decisions are taken by the inner core of the Party remains shrouded in absolute secrecy.
Although many ‘watchers’ believe that Bo went beyond the prepared script, Xinhua reiterated the Party’s position: “During the trial, both prosecution and defense sides had opportunities to fully express their opinions. Also, the court released trial transcripts through microblog.”
It reminded us that on April 10, 2012, Bo was suspended from the CPC Central Committee Political Bureau and the CPC Central Committee, on suspicion of serious discipline violations and the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of the CPC filed a case for investigation.
The Party mouthpiece gave what will probably be the final verdict: “Although the country's legal system has a principle of tempering justice with mercy, a heavy sentence in line with the law should be handed to Bo, as he committed very serious crimes and refused to plead guilty. …he is not subject to any terms of leniency by law." Thus the Party has decided.
But in China everything is linked and Bo’s trial should be seen in the largest context of the continuous power struggle at the top of the Party. Soon after the trial ended, the Politburo announced the dates of the Third Plenum of the Central Committee in November, during which the ‘deepening of the reforms’ will be discussed. Bo Xilai who represented the ‘leftist’ wing of the Party, is now out of the game.
Observers believe that the Third Plenum should give some clear indications about the leadership's new economic agenda and if deeper ‘political’ reforms can be envisaged in the near future; they are badly needed to tackle the difficult challenges facing the country, such as corruption, polluted environment, regional economic imbalance or the restive ethnic provinces.
But by most standards, China remains a peculiar country and India is still far ahead in the field of rule of law and transparent governance, even if rampant corruption and other problems cannot be denied.
To become ‘normal’, China needs to go beyond a one party system.

Will the Lama return?

Look up, fellow Tibetans,
Look at the blue twilight above,
Like a heavenly tent of White Mountain,
My lama has returned.

…His Holiness the Dalai Lama,
When he lived far away,
He traveled around the world,
Praying for the end of suffering of the red faced Tibetans,
And released us from darkness.

This is the stanza of a poem written by a 17-year-old Tibetan nun, Sangay Dolma before she took the fatal decision: Dolma set herself on fire in front of a Chinese government office at Tsekhog, near Rebkong in the formerly Amdo province of Tibet (now Qinghai). Dolma passed away soon after. On a photograph of herself, she had written, “Tibet Independent Nation”.
The young nun, like millions of Tibetans, dream of a future return of their leader, the Dalai Lama (‘My Lama has returned’). She saw her native land free:

Look up, Tibetans,
Look at the Snow Mountains.
The Land of Snows’ era has begun.
And Tibet is free and independent.

So far, 89 Tibetans have made the supreme sacrifice by immolating themselves with this prayer on their lips.
That is not all, on November 26, Voice of America (VOA) reported: “Over a thousand students in Chabcha County [in Hainan Tibetan ‘Autonomous’ Prefecture] took to the streets to call for equality of nationalities, freedom of language, investigation of present situations and respect for truth. The protest by Chabcha Tibetan Medical School students lasted for about two hours before Chinese personnel used severe force to break the peaceful demonstration, injuring many students.”
The Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy in Dharamsala said that the students demonstrated against a ten-point political questionnaire on self-immolations and the conducting of ‘patriotic education’ sessions during which they had to make disparaging remarks against the Dalai Lama.
Looking at the widespread resentment against the present Beijing regime, one could ask: where is China heading? There is a corollary question: can repression, always more repression, solve the problem?
This reminds me the Chinese reaction to the uprising of the Tibetan people in March 1959. The entire population of Lhasa (is it not what the Party calls the ‘masses’?) surrounded the Norbulinka Place to protect the Dalai Lama who had been invited to attend a cultural performance in the PLA's cantonment and this, without being accompanied by his usual regiment of bodyguards.
As the Lhaseans protested, Beijing reacted with great brutality. Xinhua published a communique stating: “Violating the will of the Tibetan people and betraying the motherland, the Tibetan Local Government [the Dalai Lama Administration] and the upper-strata reactionary clique colluded with imperialism assembled rebellious bandits and launched armed attacks against the PLA Garrison in Lhasa during the night of March 19. …The valiant units of the PLA stationed in Tibet completely smashed the rebellious bandits in the city of Lhasa on the 22nd. Now the units of the PLA, assisted by patriotic people of all sections, both religions and secular, are mopping up the rebellious bandits in other places in Tibet.”
Sixty-three years later, the resentment in Tibet remains unchanged. Is the Chinese reaction different? How long can Beijing continue ‘mopping’ up?
Already on 9 November, some 5000 Tibetan schoolchildren had a peaceful protest march near Rongwo Monastery, in Malho (Rebkong) Prefecture.
On 14 November, an official five-point notification was issued by the Malho People’s Government warning self-immolators and their families as well as those offering condolences and prayers for the deceased.
The first point states that government aid will be cut off for three years to the family members of a person who had self-immolated.
Next it calls for ‘thorough investigation’ to determine whether any government officials and staff had visited the homes of self-immolators to offer condolences. The Public Security Bureau officers would ‘strike hard’ on those who do not listen to such guidance.
The third point asks the Party officials to provide “advice and guidance to monks and lay Tibetans on the consequences of visiting homes of self-immolators to offer condolences and contributions for prayer rituals”.
Then, the notification warns that investigation will be conducted “to see whether any person, both monks and lay, had arranged and forced some officials to visit the prayer ceremonies for self-immolators”.
These warning are obvious proofs that ‘local’ Tibetan officials often sympathize with the self-immolators?
The fifth and final point threatens those who would participate in prayer rituals; they would immediately be fired and punished.
Ultimately, as always, the blame is put on the Dalai clique “wearing religious robes, use self-immolations to create instability.”
Can the situation improve after the Xi Jinping’s new regime is in place in March? It is a billion-dollar question.
Let us have a look at the ‘political’ equation in Beijing.
A few days before the beginning of the CCP's 18th Congress, Xinhua reported that Jia Qinglin, the then No 4 in the Standing Committee of the Politburo and Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference called "for greater development in China's ethnic Tibetan regions, as well as more efforts to fight the Dalai Lama clique, in order to ensure the regions' lasting stability."
Jia then told a press conference that "Tibet-related issues are of paramount importance for the Communist Party of China and the country". He added: "stability and development should be stressed in Tibetan regions."
Xinhua explained that "China's Tibetan regions include the Tibet autonomous region and parts of the Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan and Yunnan provinces."
In another words, Beijing speaks of ‘Historical Tibet’, as defined by the Dalai Lama.
The outgoing member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo further said: "Tibetans' livelihoods should be improved and the regions' ecological protection should be emphasized."
He did not mention that the Central Working Coordination Small Group on Tibet (or Leading Small Group) had a meeting just before the Congress. What is a 'leading small group' or LSG?
According to Wikipedia it is "an ad hoc supra-ministerial coordinating and consulting body formed to build consensus on issues that cut across the government, party, and military systems when the existing bureaucratic structure is unable to do so. The authorization for the formation of leading groups comes from Chapter IX of the Constitution of the Communist Party of China."
The online encyclopedia adds: "These groups provide a mechanism for top decision-makers to exchange views – both formally and informally – and to develop recommendations for the Politburo and the State Council. LSGs do not formulate concrete policies, but rather issue guiding principles about the general direction in which bureaucratic activity should move."
The job of the Small Group on Tibet is to implement the policies of the 5th Tibet Work Forum held in January 2010.
The Group had a meeting on October 18, under the Chairmanship of Jia Qinglin. It was attended amongst others by senior officials such as Ma Kai, Meng Jianzhu, Ling Jihua, and Du Qinglin as well as 'local' cadres posted in Tibet.
At that time, Ma, Meng and Du were the Vice Chairmen of the Small Group. After the 18th Party Congress' leadership change, all these leaders have secured good jobs for themselves.
Ma Kai and Meng Jianzhu are members of the reconstituted Politburo, (Meng will take the crucial mantle of Zhang Yongkang as the boss of the Security apparatus).
Du Qinglin was shifted from the United Front Work Department (responsible for Tibet affairs) to the Party Central Secretariat while Ling Jihua will take Du's seat in the United Front.
Though a new Small Group on Tibet needs to be officially reconstituted, these officials will probably continue to influence China's Tibet policy.
Can any improvement be expected in Tibet with the same old faces?
Probably not!
Who will replace Jia as the leader in the Politburo's Standing Committee, responsible for the 'minorities' affairs'?
It is rumoured that Yu Zhengsheng, former Party Chief in Shanghai may step in Jia’s shoes. The only thing one can say is that he has no earlier experience with ‘minorities’.
But the foremost question is: can President Xi Jinping give a fresh impetus to the Party and reverse its Tibet Policy?
In my opinion, the only solution would be that Xi Jinping, whose father Xi Zhongxun knew the Dalai Lama well in the 1950’s and early 1960’s, agrees to personally meet the Tibetan leader in a Chinese (or Indian) embassy abroad and have a preliminary discussion with him to prepare a road map to stop the immolations and bring about a genuine reconciliation between Tibet and China.
Will Xi Junior have the courage to take this step? Will he be allowed by his new Politburo? Does China have any alternative?
So many questions without any immediate answer.

Will Propaganda save China?

Li Changchun is a powerful man; he is no. 5 in the Standing Committee of the Politburo of CCP. 
One of his objectives is to 're-popularize Chinese-style Marxism'.
As Chairman of the CPC Central Guidance Commission for Building Spiritual Civilization, Li is also de facto responsible for China's propaganda machinery and the Party's media relations. 
His idea is to “enhance public faith in the country’s political theory amid social conflict and to answer the public’s doubts, reach a consensus and generate strength”.
He has little chance to succeed.
Take one example, you will understand why.
The city of Shifang, in Sichuan Province recently witnessed serious protests. The reason? The building of a heavy-metals refinery in town. It began by a crowd assembling outside the gates of a municipal government building, but soon the events turned soured. The New York Times reported:

Things then turned bloody as local security officials began muscling up on the crowds. In the end, there were arrests, tear gas, stun grenades, riot police, guns, batons, blood.

Reuters quoted a microblogger: "The government has repeatedly squandered the people’s patience. It is time for us to be independent.”
The New York Times added:

The police warned that anyone using the Internet, cellphones or text messages to spread news about the protest would be 'severely' punished. But there was a flood of photos and microblog posts, plus some video, and a widely circulated piece from Han Han, perhaps China’s most famous blogger.

The Chinese Global Times had to acknowledge that thousands local people,  strongly against the project, had come down in protest in the streets. The government newspaper added that "projects involving environmental concerns are always sensitive topics in people’s eyes around the world.”
More interesting, the Huanqiu, the Chinese language counterpart of the Global Times, commented: "such student actions should not be encouraged, particularly regarding social unrest and political conflict."
According to Chinascope website, the Huanqiu criticized "the interpretation of the government’s decision to shut-down the smelter as a victory for the common people. Such a stretched interpretation is merely the wishful thinking of some people and not a reality in Shifang.” 
The Huanqiu commentary warned local and higher governments that they should not be fooled by such political fantasies and should not divert their focus from a proper aftermath of reflection and remedial action to vigilance for this 'revolutionary' trend. 
Revolutionary or not, revamping Marxist thinking and repackaging it for popular consumption is an impossible task. At the age of Internet, social networks and microblogs, it is difficult to fool people and stop them expressing their genuine grievances.
Deng Xiaoping always advised to 'Seek truth from facts'. This was part of his Socialism with Chinese characteristics, to be applied at that time, to economic reforms.
The Chinese people have learned from his words. 
Propaganda is just not enough. Li Changchun should have discovered this long ago.
As this article of the China Brief, the author says: "The CCP remains central to so much that some underlying justification is still required. If socialism without Chinese characteristics or Chinese-style Marxism are insufficient, disregarded or up for challenge, then the current government could find itself facing more serious problems."
It is certainly not in bluffing people that problems like corruption or pollution will be solved. Propaganda or not.

Re-Popularizing Marxism: Li Changchun’s contribution to reform
Peter Mattis
China Brief
Volume: 12 Issue: 13
July 6, 2012

On the eve of the 91st anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), propaganda czar Li Changchun gave a speech to a political theories seminar emphasizing the need to re-popularize Chinese-style Marxism. Li, a Politburo Standing Committee member, argued the task is necessary to “enhance public faith in the country’s political theory amid social conflict” and “to answer the public’s doubts, reach a consensus and generate strength” (Xinhua, June 29). Li’s speech is part of a continuing series of exhortations to revamp Marxist thinking and repackage it for popular consumption. Even though it is difficult to believe an increasingly pluralistic and information-saturated Chinese society will renew its faith in CCP ideology, the effort is nonetheless important for the CCP to maintain power on its own terms.
Li’s speech is an implicit admission that the latest campaign starring Lei Feng, a Mao Zedong-era propaganda icon known for his selflessness, has failed to rekindle the proper spirit among the populace since it began in February—or at least that the campaign is insufficient. The difficulty lies in finding another way, because two of China’s most important indigenous political frameworks, Confucianism and Maoism, are potentially dangerous to the CCP (“Another Lei Feng Revival: Making Maoism Safe for China,” China Brief, March 2). Clearly, the problems with popularizing socialism with Chinese characteristics are not new to Li or other members of the leadership. For example, speaking to the CCP Central Compilation and Translation Bureau in February, Li hailed the theorists’ efforts at “sinicization and popularization” of communist ideology. Li’s justification for strengthening ideological research—“to provide  advice to the country’s decision makers”— suggests observers should not so readily dismiss the importance of this subject (Xinhua, February 13).
Many observers believe the party has substituted nationalism for ideology as the foundation for the party’s continuing leadership; however, the CCP remains central to so much that some underlying justification is still required. If socialism without Chinese characteristics or Chinese-style Marxism are insufficient, disregarded or up for challenge, then the current government could find itself facing more serious problems. For example, the party cannot use nationalism as a substitute for its ideological reasoning that places the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) under the CCP’s control. Nationalization, de-politicization and taking the party out of the army are the three dangerous ideas that the PLA has been beating the propaganda drum against over the last six months (People’s Daily, June 25; PLA Daily, June 17, May 15, March 19; China Daily, March 13). While there could be a number of reasons for the propaganda, it also could be the natural reflection in the military of a society disenchanted with communist ideology. The PLA, however, is still the ultimate guarantor of government power.
Perhaps just as critical for the Chinese government, the CCP has positioned itself as the inheritor of Sun Yat-Sen’s democratic legacy—even if it has emphasized nationalism and people’s livelihood (minsheng zhuyi) over democracy (minquan zhuyi) (Red Flag, June 27; Outlook Weekly, October 9, 2011). This is why Zheng Ruolin, a correspondent for Wenhui Bao, could state boldly “Democracy has been broadly accepted as an idea” (Global Times, June 20). This point has been echoed in many places, including the 17th Party Congress political work report and a Central Party School book China and Democracy published in 2011. The continuing recurrence of democracy in important places indicates democracy is far more important than a mere rhetorical device, but relates to a serious intellectual contest that Li’s propagandists must confront. The government-approved, CCP-mediated democracy, however, rests on the vitality of socialism with Chinese characteristics—as Hu Jintao wrote “Developing the democratic politics of socialism is our party’s consistent objective of struggle” [1]. Democracy may be a CCP object, but it is delimited within a one-party system with the CCP at the center, on the party’s timeline and with structural political reform taking a backseat to economic development and stability (Red Flag, June 12, March 26; People’s Daily, April 9; PLA Daily, April 1) [2].
Although it is easy to dismiss the importance of Li Changchun’s call to popularize CCP ideology, the underpinnings of the CCP-led Chinese state depend on acceptance of Chinese-style Marxism—or unwavering popular faith in the CCP’s ability to govern. Regardless whether Li’s efforts and those of whoever succeeds him at the 18th Party Congress this fall are successful, the point is that the CCP is not satisfied with relying on coercion and competence to maintain its power. Beijing seeks to restore popular confidence in the system itself and Li is leading the intellectual charge while others focus on improving cadre performance.