Since when Galwan was Chinese?

Chinese map dated 1893 showing
the Aksai Chin as part of Ladakh

My paper Since when Galwan was Chinese? is posted on the website of the United Service Institution of India (USI)

Period: July - September 2020

Here is the link...

On June 19, 2020, the Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian, one of the ‘Wolf-Warrior’ diplomats, asserted that the Galwan Valley is located “on the Chinese side of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the west section of the China-India boundary”. He further said that Galwan has always belonged to China. In the same statement, Zhao exonerated the Chinese troops of any blame. All this does not stand serious scrutiny. Constantly repeating a lie, i.e. Galwan and the Aksai Chin areas have been Chinese, and this, since time immemorial, does not make it true.

No Chinese in the area till mid-1950s
The fact is that no Chinese national ever set a foot in the area till the mid-1950s and it is only due to the then Indian government’s weakness and negligence that Mr Zhao is able to make such outrageous claims today. One event is crucial to understand the recent development in Eastern Ladakh (EL); it is the annexation of Eastern Turkestan, now known as Xinjiang, the Western Province, by the Communist forces at the end of 1949. In Mandarin, Xinjiang literally means ‘New Frontier’ or ‘New Territory’, a proof in itself that the area is ‘new’ to the Middle Kingdom.
Some formerly classified documents from the Russian archives about the annexation of Xinjiang, have recently been made public by the History and Public Policy Program at the Wilson Centre in the US; they shed some light on this historical event. Charles Kraus, the program’s Deputy Director wrote: “The Chinese People’s Liberation Army invasion in October 1949 of Xinjiang, the vast ‘province’ bordering the Mongolian People’s Republic and Soviet Central Asia, was a stunning development.”[1] It is worth remembering that Eastern Turkestan, as the area was known at that time, was a more or less independent nation, with a small Nationalist military presence, but under the Soviet Union’s tutelage.

The Soviet Green Light
Anastas Mikoyan, a member of the Soviet Union’s Politburo, was the Soviet leader designated to take contact with the Chinese Communist Party. Mao Zedong arrived in Moscow on January 30, 1949; on the previous day, Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist government had abandoned Nanjing to move to Canton. Mikoyan informed the Politburo that Mao had already proclaimed that Stalin was the supreme leader of world communism and the ‘teacher of the Chinese people’ (Mikoyan also added that Mao did not genuinely believe what he was saying). However, the Soviet leaders knew that the winds had turned in China in favour of the CPC.
On February 4, 1949, Mikoyan met Mao Zedong, who was accompanied by members of the Chinese Communist Party’s Standing Committee of the Politburo, Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, Marshal Zhu De, and Ren Bishi. Mao had informed the Soviets that he wanted to discuss Xinjiang. The future Great Helmsman started the conversation: “In the Yili district of Xinjiang, which is subordinate to the Urumqi government, there is an independence movement and there is a Communist Party there.” [2] Mikoyan replied that he did not know about the existence of a communist party in the Yili district, but he knew about the national movement of the local nationalities; he interestingly remarked: “This movement was triggered by the incorrect policy of the Chinese government, which does not want to take into account the national specifics of these nationalities, does not present rights of self-rule, does not permit the development of the national culture.”
The Soviet leader added: “If the nationalities of Xinjiang were [not] given autonomy, the soil for the independence movement would likely remain. …We do not stand for the movement of independence of the Xinjiang nationalities and do not have any claims on Xinjiang territory.” These remarks of Mikoyan sound valid even today. Mikoyan later gave Mao the green light he needed to send the PLA in Xinjiang.

The former Indian Consulate General in Kashgar, now a restaurant

The Annexation and Closure of the Kashgar Consulate
On October 1, 1949 Mao Zedong announced from the rostrum of Tiananmen Square in Beijing the birth of the People’s Republic; the Great Helmsman did not waste a day; he immediately moved to annex the territories in the West of the Middle Kingdom. Kraus explained: “Of course, taking hold of the oil and other strategic resources present in Xinjiang motivated Mao.”[3] According to the US scholar, “but no one expected the PLA to move quickly. …Xinjiang was too distant, there was no reliable means of transportation, the weather was turning cold, and troop morale was low.” In less than two months, the PLA annexed Xinjiang (refer to the Map below) and in the same stroke closed down the Indian Consulate General in Kashgar.
India’s observatory post watching Central Asia was no more. Delhi was told that the new regime would have to renegotiate all its former agreements, a position untenable in international law; but in 1953, Nehru announced in the Parliament that India had to close its Consulate in Kashgar because “nothing could be done about it”. The capture of Xinjiang was a great military feat and a master strategic coup; the doors to Northern India were suddenly open to China. By taking over Xinjiang, Mao controlled the Middle Kingdom’s western borders and trade with Central Asia; for the first time, he also came in contact with the Indian frontiers, particularly the Aksai Chin area, which witnesses the present tension.
Kraus concluded: “The invasion was military cunning combined with political skill and, frankly, dumb luck.”[4] Mao’s strategic vision and his ‘dumb luck’ helped to prepare the background for the contemporary events in Galwan, Hot Springs, Depsang or Pangong Tso areas.

The Southern Advance in the 1950s
In 1950, several ominous signs should have forced the Indian government to read beyond the Chinese rhetoric and the Chinese Premier’s assurance of eternal friendship with India. It would not be. What followed was just a logical outcome of Mao’s first move in Xinjiang: Western Tibet was invaded a year later; as the two new provinces of Xinjiang and Tibet needed to be linked, a road across Indian territory in the Aksai Chin was started in 1953-54; Delhi chose to close its eyes.
In a note written in 1963, the Indian government explained: “Territorial claims were put forward for the first time by the Chinese Prime Minister in September 1959, [was] based on a Chinese map published in 1956. In December 1959 [Zhou] affirmed the boundary on this map as the correct boundary claimed by China. …Since then the Chinese claim line has varied according to China’s bargaining convenience and the progressively increasing extent of occupation of Indian territory through force.”[5]
In 1960, Beijing produced another map engulfing large parts of Ladakh; Delhi probably did not realize the implications, thinking that China was still a ‘friend’. The line had moved hundreds of kilometres south from Kashgar and Hotan, which had only been occupied a decade earlier. Then in July 1962, the first clash took place in Galwan; on July 26, South Block wrote to Beijing: “The local Chinese forces have in the last few months established several new posts and resorted to aggressive patrolling in Indian areas, which lie west of even the 1956 Chinese map claim line”. [6]
A few days earlier VK Krishna Menon had meet Chen Yi, the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs in Geneva; the latter assured him that India and China were friends.

A Daring Mission
A few years earlier, in early 1957, the Army selected an officer to go with a patrol and physically confirm the reports that China was building a road in the Aksai Chin area; the officer was Lt Col RS Basera of 1 Kumaon Rifles. Later, in a note, Brig Jasbir Singh, the historian of the regiment wrote: “His mission was to be tough, exciting and most unique, as he had to proceed under cover to the vast plateau of Aksai Chin and confirm reports that the Chinese were constructing a motorable road from Kashgar to Lhasa.” [7]
Disguised as a yak herder, Basera was accompanied by Havildar Diwan Singh from the Corps of Engineers. They were to move with three genuine Ladakhi yak herders. During a briefing at the Headquarters in Leh, Basera was told that it was crucial to maintain utmost secrecy about the mission. The Military Intelligence (MI) instructed them not to carry any documents that could disclose their identities, no notes should be taken. They were asked to memorize the map and the route: “They had to move in the easterly direction from Leh for about 250-300 km, till they reached the expected location of the new Chinese built road, in Aksai Chin. Initially, they would pass over difficult, undulating terrain, till they crossed the Karakoram Mountain Range and Shyok River,” wrote Brig Jasbir Singh. Their mission was of national importance, said their handlers in the MI.
They finally reached the road, saw Chinese truck moving on it and reported to Delhi. But their findings, obtained with such hardship, were dismissed by the Prime Minister and Defence Minister.

Other Cases Showing China’s Recent Presence
The History of the Conflict with China, 1962 published by the Indian Ministry of Defence cited other cases: “In order to ascertain the exact alignment of the road before sending a protest to China, two reconnaissance-cum-survey parties were send out in the summer of 1958; an army party under Lt Iyengar [from the Madras Sappers] towards the north and an Indo-Tibetan Border Police party under Karam Singh, Deputy Superintendent of Police towards the southern extremity of the road.” The Official History says: “The Army party did not return because they had been arrested by the Chinese and were released two months later. From the police party, it was learnt that a part the Tibet-Sinkiang highway was definitely in Indian territory.”[8]
There is no doubt that the Indian government had information about the Chinese presence on Indian territory, as early as the mid-1950s. The greatest tragedy of the inaction then is that India is facing the consequences in Galwan or Hot Springs today.

Col Chhewang Rinchen, MVC** with General AS Vaidya, Chief of Army Staff

The Story of Chhewang Rinchen, MVC**
Another episode is worth recounting. A young Ladakhi, Chhewang Rinchen, who earned his first Maha Vir Chakra (MVC) in 1948 at the age of 17, is also telling about the ‘new’ Chinese presence in the Aksai Chin in the years before the 1962 conflict. In June 1960, Chhewang was transferred from 7 J&K Militia (Ladakhi) to 14 J&K Militia (Ladakhi), a newly raised battalion. On arrival at the Spituk Dak Bungalow in Leh, he was ordered to move with a company to Deskit in the Nubra Sector. He was soon given the responsibility of the construction of an airfield at Thoise; it was the first airstrip to be built in this area and the second in Ladakh, after the Leh airport built in 1948. Chhewang accomplished a feat: on September 26, 1960, the first Dakota could land on the new airfield.
Chhewann Rinchen’s biography reads: “In the beginning of 1961, 14 J&K Militia (Ladakhi) was moved to the north and its Headquarters were established at Partapur. It was feared that the Chinese who had already penetrated along the Chip-Chap river might occupy Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) before the Indians reached there.”[9] The presence of the Chinese troops in this area only dates from that time. Chhewang’s mentor was Major (later Lt Col) Randhawa, who dispatched the young Ladakhi “on recces in uncharted wilderness of the Depsang Plains and desolate heights beyond.” Incidentally, Randhawa himself was awarded an MVC for his achievements in Ladakh during the years 1960 to 1962.
Chhewang’s biography states: “In August 1961, in pursuance of the Forward Policy, Rinchen was ordered to recce the area in the extreme north and establish a post at DBO, very close to the Karakoram.” Located 16 kms south of the Karakoram Pass, DBO lies “at an altitude of approx. 5,000 metres. From Leh it is approximately 120 km on the SilkTtrade Route between Leh and Yarkand.” At that time, there were two routes from Leh to DBO; one via the Shyok river which was the winter route and the other one across the perilous Saser La (pass), the summer route; both routes converged at Murgo.
It is interesting that early June 2020, the Hindustan Times reported: “India is working on two key roads near the China border in eastern Ladakh — the site of a tense weeks-long border stand-off with its northern neighbour — to provide connectivity to an important forward area that the military calls Sub-Sector North (SSN). While the first is the strategic Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldi (DS-DBO) road that provides connectivity to the country’s northern-most outpost, DBO; the second road being built from Sasoma to Saser La could eventually provide an alternative route to DBO near the Karakoram Pass. The Sasoma-Saser La road axis is south-west of DBO.”[10]
To come back to Chhewang Rinchen, he recounted that the entire area between Murgo, known as ‘Gateway to Hell’ and DBO was notorious for treacherous weather and snow blizzards. He wrote that September 3, 1961 became a memorable date in his career, while proceeding with a patrol party, along the ‘Chip Chap’ river, he noted “the hoof marks of camels and horses and, a little further, tyre marks of a three-ton vehicle. It clearly indicated the possible presence of the Chinese in that area.”
According to his biography: “Along with three jawans, Rinchen proceeded to locate the Chinese post, leaving his ponies and administrative tail behind. The party had to pass through difficult terrain, at times crawling for a few km to reach close to the Chinese water point. Beyond that point, he climbed a small plateau to have a better view of the enemy with his binoculars. Hardly 500 metres away Rinchen could see that the Chinese had established their headquarters in a double-storeyed fort, having two doors and many loopholes. About 300 Chinese were busy making bricks and loading and unloading three three-tonners.” The Chinese had just arrived in the area, one of the sites of the present clash; this was in 1961, far from the time immemorial repeatedly mentioned by the Chinese propaganda.

Conclusion
One can only conclude that soon after the annexation of Xinjiang, which was the turning point for the fate of the entire region, the Chinese decided to move South and annex further territory which had for centuries belonged to the Kingdom of Ladakh and therefore, to India. Beijing’s propaganda cannot bluff any informed reader.

End Notes
[1] How Stalin Elevated the Chinese Communist Party to Power in Xinjiang in 1949; see https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/how-stalin-elevated-the-chinese-communist-party-to-power-xinjiang-1949.
[2] “Memorandum of Conversation between Anastas Mikoyan and Mao Zedong,” February 04, 1949, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 39, Ll. 54-62. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 2, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), pp. 66-72. Translated by Sergey Radchenko. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113318.
[3] Kraus, op. cit.
[4] Kraus, op.cit.
 [5] The Chinese Aggression in Maps, Publication Division, 1963; see: http://www.claudearpi.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/1963-Chinese-Agression-in-Maps.pdf
[6] Notes, Memoranda and letters Exchanged and Agreements signed between The Governments of India and China; White Paper VI, (December 1961 – July 1962). See: http://www.claudearpi.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/WhitePaper6NEW.pdf.[-0
[7] Account of Lt Col RS Basera is available in the USI Archives.
Brig Jasbir Singh, SM, 1 Kumaon Regiment, who commanded the same battalion than Lt Col SR Basera, wrote down the account of the recce.
 [8] Ministry of Defence, Government of India, Official History of the 1962 India China War , Chapter 2; see: https://www.bharat-rakshak.com/ARMY/history/1962war/266-official-history.html
[9] Virendra Verma, A Legend in His Own Time, Chewang Rinchen: Memoirs (Young India Publications, 1998).
[10] The Hindustan Times, India working on two roads in Ladakh amid border row; see: https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-working-on-two-roads-in-ladakh-amid-border-row/story-lAh4LPrp20Z1wxX4AU9EON.html

The Freedom of Ladakh

This comes to my mind the day after Ladakh finally obtained its freedom of from Srinagar yesterday.
A momentous day for the Himalayan region, now Union Territory.
This memorandum was sent to Nehru in 1949. 

Memorandum submitted by Shri Cheewang Rigzin, President Buddhist Association, Ladakh to the Prime Minister of India on behalf of the people of Ladakh

Sir,
On the eve of the grant of responsible Government to the people of Kashmir by the Maharaja, we the Buddhists of Ladakh and adjoining areas presented to him through our representatives in the Praja Sabha, a memorial, a copy of which was submitted to you for your information and consideration This memorial, which was prompted by our apprehensions for our future, based on our bitter experience of nearly a century and a quarter, embodied the following proposals:

• That he should govern us directly through legislative and administrative machinery, proposals for which would be submitted by us at his command.
• That our homeland amalgamated with the Hindu-majority parts of Jammu should form a separate province for which adequate safe-guards should be provided for our distinctive rights and interests.
• That we should be permitted to re-unite politically with Tibet of which land we form part and parcel forall purpose but political.
• That we should be permitted to join East Punjab.

Proposal (1) originated in our respect for the obligation we owed to the ruder in view of the relation which bound us to him from the day of the conquest of our land by his great grandfather.
Proposal (2) emanated from the fact that we desired to see nothing more of the adminitratosrs from Kashmir, who had mostly governed us during the past to our utter ruin, that our Cultural kinship with the Hindus encouraged us to expect a Sympathetic regard for our interests and an assured future in a Hindu majority province, and finally that historical causes bound us to the people of Jammu and not to those of Kashmir, for it was the Jammu Dogras who conquered Ladakh for Maharaja Gulab Singh in 1834, while Kashmir came into his possession in 1846, twelve years latter.
All things considered, however, proposals No. 1 and 2 were concessions to treaty obligations imposed on us by the Dogra conquest while proposal No. 3 which would come into force on the failure of (1) and (2) was put forward because it is the only panacea for all our ills, the only guarantee for our future progress and development.
No. 4 was a proposal of despair, for though we are in and of Tibet, the political and economic system of that land-our racial and spiritual home-are too archaic, antiquated and unprogerssive to suit us. We rather wish that India should exert her wholesome influence in the political and economic fields on her (Tibet) at the present day even as she shaped and moulded her spiritual and cultural life in ancient times.
The Maharajadhiraj has so far vouchsafed to us no reply and we have taken this silence of His Highness to imply the relinquishment by him of his position as a party in respect of proposals (1) and (2), a tacit recognition of our right to choose our path independent of him. We have given most anxious thought to this grave problem and after mature deliberation arrived at the decision that we should straightway merge with India.
That we have the right to determine our own future apart from other communities and people inhabiting the state and that we cannot be affected by the result of the forthcoming plebiscite in the evens of its being favourable to Pakistan is evident from the following facts:
We are a separate nation by all the tests-race, language, religion, culture determining nationality. The only link connecting us with the other people of the State being the bond of common ruler. If the Indian National Congress could persuade itself to recognise: the Muslims of India as a separate nation although they had so much m common with the other elements of the Indian population, the Government of India should have no hesitation in recognition what is patent and Scout revertible fact in our case.
Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah built up his case on the validity of the Treaty of Amritsar. This treaty bears upon the territory of Kashmir only so while the ruler has consented to the transfer of his sovereign power in favour of all his people, S. Mohammad Abdullah and the people of Kashmir can, through this transference manage the affairs of their country as they will. But they have not the power to appropriate against their will a people, a separate nation, whom a separate treaty the result of the war of 1834 twelve years anterior to the treaty of Amritsar-bound to the ruler in a special relationship, in which, the people of Kashmir, who came into the picture later, naturally, did not figure at all.
The right of self-determination claimed by us cannot lie claimed with equal force by the people of Baltistan including Skardu the parts of Kargil tehsils predominantly peopled by Muslims, as they are connected by ties of religion with the majority community in Jammu and Kashmir, nor by tile people of Gilgit who came under Dogra rule through conquest after the annexation of Kashmir and whom not only identity of religion but of race as well binds to the majority community of Jammu and Kashmir. It may be added that at the time of the conquest of Ladakh by Zorawar Singh, the entire area comprised under the Tehsils of Leh and Kargil acknowledged the suzerainity of our Raja, while Baltistan had several Rajas of its own.
In case the result of the plebiscite is favourable to India, we simply go a step further than other people of the State in seeking a closer union with that great country and in case it is otherwise, our verdict stands clear and unchallengable. When we have decided to cut ourselves from the State itself, the question of our forming part of Pakistan cannot arise at all.
We have indeed made up our minds to join India; but what is our decision worth until India is prepared to accept it ? We certainly make the offer for our own advantage; we see in our merger with India the only hope of our salvation. But India, too, will not be loser by this arrangement. The Tehsil of Leh alone covers 23,000 Sq. miles and, if we add to it the other areas predominantly inhabited by Buodhs, viz.
Zanskar Bodhkharbo, Mulbek, Fukar, Darcik Garcon, in Kargil Tehsil and Padar in Kishtwar, the total acquisition of territory to India not probably measure less than 33,000 Sq. miles. It is true that the whole of this area is undeveloped and most of it at present barren. But it must also be remembered that its economic potentialities are tremendous and in the hands of a great country like India it is bound to be transformed into a smiling garden and a source of immense wealth and power. Its strategic and commercial importance too cannot be underrated. The Tehsil of Leh has Tibet and China among its neighbours and the town of Leh is the nerve centre of Central Asian trade.
The British Indian Government took Gilgit on lease from the Maharaja for military reasons for no consideration in return. The Indian Government has already incurred an expense of crores of rupees for the protection of Kashmir, not to speak of the great sacrifice of military personnel which the process has involved. It is clearly impossible for Kashmir to liquidate this colossal debt which is daily growing in magnitude. Would this not be an additional reason for India to take over the Buddhist homelands hereby offered by the Buddhists themselves for its acceptance ? Though our right of self-determination stands intrinsically unassailable, we are willing to be considered as the instrument of redemption of the people of Kashmir, heretofore our fellow citizens, if that purpose can be automatically served by India's acceptance of our offer.
There is nothing in our offer which is in any way incompatible with the high idealism which characterises India's international policy. We might even say in positive terms that it is perfectly consistent with it, for has not India repeatedly declared that it stands for the right of self-determination for all nations and are we not a nation whose right of self-determination it should uphold and to whom it should extend the protection it seeks ?
Tibet is a cultural daughter of India and we of lesser Tibet seek the bosom of that gracious mother to receive more nutriment for growth to our full stature in every way. She has given us that we prize above all other things-our religion and culture and it is the experience of having been the recipients of such precious gift which encourages us to ask for more. The Asoka wheel on her flag-symbol of goodwill for all humanity and her concern for her cultural children calls us irresistibly. Will the great mother refuse to take to her arms one of her weakest and most forlorn and distressed children a child whom filial love impels to respond to the call ?
Sir, the absence of a reply to our previous references on the subject of our future has depressed us greatly.
We beseech you with all earnestness to be so kind as to vouchsafe a line in reply to this our last prayer on the subject.
Before we close, we wish to make it clear that our desire to be absorbed into the body politic of India does not imply any reflection on the present National Government of Kashmir. Far from it, we have no hesitation to say that we have full confidence in the present Prime Minister, S. Mohammad Abdullah. The step we have taken has been dictated solely by the instinct of self-preservation which governs all men and nations alike, as also by the desire to find swiftly deliverance from the misery, sqalor and stagnation in which we have been sunk for generations past.

Recalling the great China-Russia friendship

My article Recalling the great China-Russia friendship appeared in the Edit Page of The Pioneer
Openness in China-Russia relations is valuable. The comprehensive strategic partnership suggests that both support each other back-to-back but maintain a positive attitude in developing relations with others, including the West
Information coming from Xinjiang, Western China’s restive Muslim province is rather depressing. Radio Free Asia (RFA) reported that the authorities in Karakaz (also written Qaraqash) in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) have detained nearly half the population of a village in political re-education camps. Karakax county is located in the southern part of the Tarim basin in the Hotan Prefecture bordering India.
RFA affirmed: “Beginning in April 2017, Uyghurs accused of harbouring ‘strong religious views’ and ‘politically incorrect’ views have been jailed or detained in re-education camps throughout the XUAR,” adding that “members of the ethnic group have long complained of pervasive discrimination, religious repression, and cultural suppression under Chinese rule.”
For the last six decades, Xinjiang has been one of the greatest failures of the Chinese State. How did it start?
New archival material released by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington DC, brings light on the annexation of Xinjiang in 1949, which it calls a ‘stunning development’.
Charles Kraus, a scholar at the Center wrote: “Mao Zedong’s eyes had been on Xinjiang for a while. He worried that his rivals, the Nationalist Party, would hang onto Xinjiang and use it as a base for continued operations against the Communist Party of China (CCP). Stalin stoked Mao’s fears, warning that countries antagonistic to the CCP, such as Great Britain, could ‘activate the Muslims’ in Xinjiang in order to ‘continue the civil war’. And of course, taking hold of the oil and other strategic resources present in Xinjiang motivated Mao.”
The Soviets got involved because Stalin probably considered it a win-win solution for Moscow, China would do the ‘dirty work’ of sending lakhs of troops and Moscow would benefit from new trading opportunities with a ‘stable’ Communist province.
One of the newly released documents quotes a meeting which took place on June 27, 1949, in Moscow. Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov, Mikoyan on the Soviet side met Liu Shaoqi, secretary of the CCP’s Central Committee and Gao Gang, the chairman of the Government of Manchuria when the take-over of the Western region was planned: “Comrade Stalin said that one should not put off occupation of Xinjiang, because a delay may lead to the interference by the English in the affairs of Xinjiang.” Stalin argued: “They can activate the Muslims, including the Indian ones, to continue the civil war against the communists, which is undesirable, for there are large deposits of oil and cotton in Xinjiang, which China needs badly.”
One understands better why the Indian Consulate General in Kashgar was closed down by the Communists soon after their arrival in Southern Xinjiang.
During the meeting, the Soviet leader encouraged the Chinese, still battling Chiang Kai Shek’s Nationalist forces, to take over Eastern Turkestan, as it was known at that time. More than three months before Mao announced the founding the People’s Republic, Moscow was ready to give full support to the plan of annexing Xinjiang.
Something interesting in the present tense context, Stalin remarked: “The Chinese population in Xinjiang does not exceed five per cent, after taking Xinjiang one should bring the percentage of the Chinese population to 30 per cent by means of resettling the Chinese for all-sided development of this huge and rich region and for strengthening China’s border protection.”
Today, the Han population in the XUAR has reached 50 per cent, and the Uyghurs are still restive, though decades ago they were ‘liberated’ in Marxist terms.
At that time, Stalin observed: “In general, in the interests of strengthening the defense of China one should populate all the border regions with the Chinese.”
A year later, the formula would be applied to Tibet too.
In September, Mao sent a long telegram to Stalin, mentioning “the most important and necessary (priority) for us is a (air) route from Urumchi-Lanzhou to Xi’an which we hope you will help us create.”
The Great Helmsman also informed Stalin that “500,000 troops intend to enter the province of Xinjiang via Lanzhou in the first days or the middle of November. But the railroads in this region are poor, the conditions difficult, there are few people, and there is no food — therefore we acutely need and hope that you will help us with 30-50 transport aircraft to ship food, clothing, key personnel, and some of the troops.”
Mao pointed out that if help could not come in time: “This would be detrimental to the solution of the Xinjiang problem.”
He promised Stalin, who was keen to reap the economic benefits of the Chinese military operation: “As soon as the transportation of the troops is finished this route will immediately be turned into a civil air route.”
On October 14, just two weeks after the birth of New China, Stalin cabled Mao: “We consider your decision about sending one division from Lanzhou to Urumchi by air transport to be correct.”
He informed the Chinese: “Regarding your request about shipping 1,000 tons of aviation fuel to Urumchi and 200 tons of it to Hami we report that we can give this fuel to Urumchi and Hami via vehicle transport with arrival on site 1-3 November,” adding: “We can give …the five reserve transport aircraft at the disposition of Cde Peng Dehuai …by the deadline you indicate.”
A few days later, Stalin was informed that the Chinese also wanted some 10,000 tons of grain from the Soviet Union for the supply the PLA quartered in Xinjiang. Five days later, Gromyko wrote: “The Soviet Government agrees to deliver 10,000 tons of wheat to the PLA in Xinjiang.”
After having obtained the Soviet support, Mao’s second master stroke was to obtain the defection of the Nationalists. On September 25, Tao Zhiyue, the Nationalist Commander-in-Chief of the Xinjiang garrison and Burhan Shahidi, the Political Commissar, announced the formal surrender of the Nationalist forces in Xinjiang; they had become…Communist.

Another victory for Mao…without fighting.
In October, starting from Yumen (in Gansu province, on the old Silk Road), the Communist troops advanced through indescribably harsh terrain, deep gorges, cold desert, “they started a massive advance towards Xinjiang along the North and South of Tian mountain,” says a Chinese account.
On November 5, a forward battalion reached Urumqi by air. The next day, the HQ of the 1 Corps was airlifted.
From November 20 to 26, the PLA took over most of Southern Xinjiang and Kashgar where the HQ of the two Army was established on December 1; all opposition had fallen by then; the annexation of Xinjiang was complete. One understands better why Chinese President Xi Jinping recently presented China’s first Friendship Medal to the Russian President: “President Putin is the leader of a great country who is influential around the world. He is my best, most intimate friend”, declared Xi. Despite ups and downs, the friendship is indeed solid. Without Stalin, Eastern Turkestan might not be Xinjiang today; the Uyghurs would have probably not minded.

The Legend of Zoru

My article The Legend of Zoru appeared in Rediff.com

Here is the link...
 
Claude Arpi salutes Lieutenant General Zorawar Chand Bakshi, India's most decorated general, who passed into the ages recently.

Last month, India lost its most decorated general; Lt Gen Zorawar Chand Bakshi, known as Zoru to his officers and friends, passed away at the age of age of 97.
Very few noticed. No tweets from the Prime Minister or the Defence Minister.
General Bakshi was born in 1921 in Gulyana town, Rawalpindi district, of today’s Pakistan. Like several soldiers of his generation, he served in the British Army; in this, he followed the footsteps of his father, Bahadur Bakshi Lal Chand Lau.
During World War-II, Zoru fought with the Baloch Regiment against the Japanese in Burma; he covered himself with glory and his name was mentioned in dispatches for conducting successful ambushes against the enemy.
Following the Partition of India, the family moved to India, and after briefly serving in the Punjab Boundary Force, a military force set up to restore peace on the Punjab border, he was commissioned into the 5th Gorkha Rifles (Frontier Force). During the 1947-48 operations in Kashmir, he was already noticed as a great soldier; he was awarded the Vir Chakra.
Later, he would fight two more wars against Pakistan and get more decorations, including the Maha Vir Chakra.
It is because of the military mission he undertook to Tibet in 1949 that I got to know Gen Bakshi. At the end of the 1990s, while working on my book The Fate of Tibet, I had a burning question, “why did India not militarily intervene in Tibet in 1950?”
I was told by one of his colleagues from the Burma World War II days, “why don’t you meet Zoru Bakshi, he went there”. Not only did he go to Lhasa but he was awarded the MacGregor Memorial Medal, a decoration instituted in 1888 in memory of Sir Charles MacGregor, the founder of India’s original secret service, the ‘Khufiya Bureau’, for his visit to Tibet. This most-prestigious decoration is given to army personnel for exceptional feats of reconnaissance. Gen Bakshi was the first recipient (only 15 have received it so far).
Here is Zoru’s Tibet’s adventure.
In the summer of 1949, the Government of India, though not ready to get involved in a full-fledged military operation in Tibet, was still studying different options. But in order to have a proper assessment Delhi decided to send someone to survey the eventual routes. The information thus collected could be used to send troops and ammunition in the event of a ‘political’ decision to defend Tibet. The officer was also asked to check on the military preparedness of the Tibetan Army.
After some tussle with the Army HQ, which was keen to send its own Military Intelligence officer (one Capt Kovil), the Ministry of External Affairs (and probably Nehru himself as a minister), Maj Bakshi was selected.
The reason why Lt Govil was not sent was probably a note from Lt Gen Nathu Singh, the Eastern Command commander who was in favour of an armed intervention in Tibet: “[China’s] recent activities, their declared policy towards liberation of Tibet, clearly indicate the writing on the wall. The Communist menace is gradually spreading towards the very borders of India,” wrote Nathu Singh.
But the Prime Minister believed in non-violence.
The independence of mind of Gen Nathu Singh and his desire to send its own man (Lt Govil) to scout Tibet, prompted the MEA to select someone who would directly report to the Ministry.
On September 3, 1949, Harishwar Dayal, the Political Officer still thought that a ‘party’ would be sent for the purpose: “this party should be as UNOBTRUSIVE as possible and should go as TREKKERS or as officers visiting Gyantse escorts.” He did not want the ‘party’ to have an armed escort.
The fact that this covert mission took place under the direction of KPS Menon, the Foreign Secretary, is proof that in the summer of 1949, the Government of India was still keeping all its options open. Gen Bakshi who was a man of a few words, explained to me: “My mission was very simple. It was to see the routes in these areas. In the army, we always prepared for eventualities. The Army does not decide to go anywhere, but should we be asked to go anywhere, we must know where the routes are. In fact the Army does not make any recommendation at all [that we should go for war or not]. Nothing like we should go to Tibet.”
On his return, Zoru made his recommendations: “Nothing was impossible, after all Younghusband had done it 45 years earlier under much more compelling conditions. But it was a ‘political’ choice.”
One of the questions Bakshi had to study was ‘should India send arms and ammunition to Tibet?’
On July 4, 1949, KPS Menon, the Foreign Secretary had emphasized the need for the Indian Mission to continue to supply arms and ammunition supply to Lhasa. He also suggested finding out ‘other ways’ to ‘give our moral support to Tibet’ and the strengthening of India's northern frontiers.
Nehru himself wrote: “We should certainly try to maintain and continue our friendly relations with the Tibetan Government and give them such aid as we have been giving them in the past.”
One year later, when the PLA troops crossed the Yangtze and invaded the Land of Snows, Nehru’s determination would disappear, but this is another story. It is more than a decade after meeting Gen Bakshi, that I came across his report, a fascinating document.
The young major first looked at the ‘strength, composition and location’ of the Tibetan Army: “The Tibetan army is about 8,000 strong. There are approximately 10 battalions in it.”
Bakshi explained that these battalions do not have a fixed strength, though ‘normally’ battalions have approximately 900 strong soldiers; further the battalions have ‘no fixed scale of weapons and equipment’. They are equipped with rifles, brens and sten guns and a few 2-inches mortars.
The report confirmed that some of the Tibetan soldiers and officers had been trained in firing by Indian Army instructors. Bakshi also mentioned the state of training and discipline: “I have had a few opportunities of seeing the men of Kusung and Trapchi Regiments on parade in Lhasa. The standard of drill, with and without arms, is very poor. I have no hesitation in saying that an IA [Indian Army] recruit, after two weeks training, is much smarter than the soldiers of the Tibetan Body Guard Regiment.”
He added: “The Tibetan soldier shows no pride in being a soldier. The standard of turn out and discipline is shocking. The soldier does not seem to wash himself and his clothes.”
But Delhi was not ready to get involved in a conflict on the Tibetan plateau. The rest is history, a few months later India abandoned a weak and unprepared Tibet to its fate. It would then become clear for other ‘non-aligned’ nations that India was not in a position to play the high-moral role she pretended to play in world affairs.
It remains sad that India did not pay officially homage to one of its greater soldiers.

The Xinjiang takeover: China’s master-stroke

Aksu in Southern Xinjiang was one of the PLA's Headquarter

My article The Xinjiang takeover: China’s master-stroke appeared in the Edit age of The Pioneer.

Here is the link...

By taking over Xinjiang, communist China controlled the western borders of the Middle Kingdom, access trade with Central Asia, block any possibility of Soviet advance, and come in contact with Indian frontiers

Xinjiang, China’s western province, has often been in the news during the last few months, mainly due to instability of the region and the repressive measures taken by Beijing to curb ‘religious extremism’ and the rise of ‘terrorism and separatism’ amongst the Uyghur local population. It is interesting to look at how communist China annexed the ‘New Dominion’, as Xinjiang was known.
It was perhaps one of the greatest strategic feats in modern military annals. Mao Zedong’s words are telling about the mindset of the Chinese military leaders at that time (has it changed today?): “People may ask if there is contradiction to abandon a territory gained by heroic battle. This is to put the wrong question. Does one eat to no purpose simply because he relieves himself later? Does one sleep in vain because one wakes up and goes about? These are illusions born out of subjectivism and formalism and do not exist in real life.”
There was no question of Mao of losing territory in 1949; in fact, ‘real life’ meant controlling the periphery of the Middle Kingdom as fast as possible, starting by the ‘liberation’ of Xinjiang and Tibet.
On February 4, 1949, during a meeting with Soviet Foreign Trade Minister Anastas Mikoyan, Mao Zedong raised the issue of Xinjiang and pointed to the northwestern district of Ili (today’s Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture), where China had noted the presence of a Communist Party. Mikoyan said that he did not know about the existence of communists in the area, but he was aware of nationalist forces wanting independence: “This movement was triggered by the incorrect policy of the Chinese Government, which does not want to take into account the national specifics of these nationalities, does not permit the development of the national culture.”
The Russian Minister continued: “If the nationalities of Xinjiang were given autonomy, the soil for the independence movement would likely [disappear]. We do not stand for the movement of independence of the Xinjiang nationalities and do not have any claims on Xinjiang territory.” After Mao had been the green light he needed, he explained that China planned “giving Xinjiang autonomy, in the same manner as for Inner Mongolia, which is already an autonomous region”.
Interestingly, Mao enquired “whether there is a lot of oil in Xinjiang or a little”. He also suggested the construction of “a railroad connecting the Chinese railroads with the Soviet railroads through Xinjiang. This would have great significance for joint defence in case of a new war [with the West]”. Had he in mind a project similar to Xi Jinping’s One Belt One Road?
While the remnants of the nationalist forces were systematically annihilated in the mainland, in Xinjiang, Mao used a two-pronged ‘war’ tactic: First inducing the surrender of the nationalist forces and then sending a large number of troops in two different directions (north and south Xinjiang); the assurance of support received from the Soviets made things easier.
By swiftly taking over Xinjiang, the communists would control the western borders of the Middle Kingdom, access trade with Central Asia, block any possibility of Soviet advance in the region (in case the Soviet leaders changed their mind later) and come in contact with the Indian frontiers, particularly in the Aksai Chin area. By the end of September 1949, a large contingent of communist troops started moving towards the New Dominion where a 70,000-strong nationalist force was still stationed.
Following the Hexi (Gansu) Corridor, the PLA advanced towards Urumqi, which was ruled by a coalition comprising the Nationalists (KMT) and representatives of the former Second East Turkistan Republic (ETR), supported by the Soviet Union. The ETR sympathisers were particularly strong in the three districts in northwestern Xinjiang, where they had retained some autonomy, while the KMT controlled most of southern Xinjiang. After having obtained the Soviet support, the second phase was marked by Chiang Kaishek’s Generals turning coat. On September 25, Tao Zhiyue, the Nationalist Commander-in-Chief of the Xinjiang garrison and Burhan Shahidi, the Political Commissar, announced the formal surrender of the nationalist forces to the Chinese communists. Several Kuomintang Generals joined the PLA and began serving the communists; those who refused to surrender fled to Taiwan or Turkey. A second victory for Mao …without fighting!
Later, the five ETR leaders who were to negotiate with the communists, died in an air crash in Soviet airspace over the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic; it was rumoured that they were murdered. The way was now open for Mao’s troops. Starting from Yumen, east of Jiuquan in Gansu Province, the communist troops went through indescribably harsh terrain, deep gorges, cold desert, and “they started a massive advance of forces towards Xinjiang along north and south of Tian mountain”, says the Chinese account.

The PLA 'advising' the Uyghurs

With poor communications, the advance of communist forces into Xinjiang was extremely ‘difficult and risky’; the distances were long, 1,253km from Jiuquan to Urumqi and 2,547km from Kashgar: “In order to overcome the communication and transportation difficulties, Soviet Union came for assistance with 40 transport planes so as to quickly transport soldiers from Jiuquan towards Urumqi”, notes the Chinese account.
On October 14, supported by a tank regiment, the main forces of 4 and 5 Division of the 2 Army reached Hami in Northern Xinjiang. They then took a southward turn and ten days later, the 4 Division ‘liberated’ Yanchi, where the troops stayed a couple of weeks to recover from the quick march. By that time, the 400 motor vehicles given by the Soviets had all collapsed… in any case there was no fuel anymore. To complete their advance towards Kashgar, the troops…to walk more than 1,000km in one month.
The Chinese records say: “The main force, in more than two months’ time, successively liberated each important town and city in the north and south of Xinjiang, pinned down uprising launched by reactionaries of Nationalist Party at many.” Marshal Peng Dehuai and Xi Zhongxun (Xi Jinping’s father) praised the troops in a telegram: “You have created an unprecedented record of the advance of forces.” Strategically, communist China was at the Gate of Tibet — and, of India. Soon, construction across Indian territory in the Aksai Chin area would start.
Nearly 70 years later, one understands the enormous importance of the annexation of Xinjiang with its natural resources such as oil, but also the trade routes such as the One Belt One Road initiative or the China Pakistan Economic Corridor. But in the process, Mao had forgotten his promises to give autonomy to Xinjiang; this probably explains China’s present difficulties.

India holds on to Siachen...because Pakistan showed the glacier area on its maps in 1975

My article India holds on to Siachen...because Pakistan showed the glacier area on its maps in 1975
appeared in Mail Today.
 

Here is the link...

The Siachen glacier has recently been in the news, 10 Indian soldiers tragically lost their lives in an avalanche. This triggered another avalanche: Indian ‘experts’ commenting on why, since 1984, successive governments have allowed 900 Indian Army personnel to die?
Why occupy such inhospitable terrain, mostly above 20,000 feet, with temperatures reaching minus 60 degrees?
Why should the tax payer spend Rs 200 to transport a 2-rupee roti to the glacier?
To answer, it is necessary to look at some historical facts. In 1975, when a German expedition applied for rafting on the Indus River, Col Narinder ‘Bull’ Kumar, a well-known military mountaineer, discovered that the Germans had a US map showing the Siachen Glacier as part …of Pakistan.
Col Kumar later told journalist Nitin Gokhale, author of Beyond NJ 9842: The Siachen Saga: 

Those maps, to my surprise, had shown the ceasefire line [today known as the LoC] being extended to the Karakoram Pass.

By that time, not only was Pakistan openly showing the glacier area on their maps, but Islamabad had also begun sponsoring mountaineering expeditions on ‘their’ glacier. After a first expedition led by Col Kumar in 1978, other Army missions returned to the glacier in 1981 and during the following years; finally in 1984, it was decided to permanently occupy the glacier.
Gokhale quotes from an assessment by the Northern Command in 1984:

Pakistani occupation of the Siachen upto the Karakoram Pass would lead to their domination of the Nubra Valley and the route down to Leh. Indian positions in Siachen as well as in the vicinity of the Karakoram Pass are thus a formidable wedge between POK, the 4500 sq km area ceded by Pakistan to China [the Shaksgam Valley] and Aksai Chin occupied by China.

It would have been a formidable strategic corridor with Pakistan and China controlling the Karakoram Pass and threatening Ladakh; it appeared to be a new Aksai Chin in the making (in the 1950s, China had built a road cutting across India’s territory, without Delhi being aware of it).
This strategic concern pushed India to take the hard decision to settle on the glacier and the neighbouring peaks in the Saltoro range.

There is also a not-often mentioned, legal angle. On January 1, 1949, India and Pakistan agreed, under the UN auspices, to a Cease Fire Line (CFL), which had to be subsequently demarcated.
The military representatives of Delhi and Islamabad eventually met in Karachi between July 18 and 27, 1949; the Indian delegation was led by Maj Gen S.M. Shrinagesh, who later became Army Chief. Before leaving for Karachi, the delegates received an in-depth briefing from Sir Girija Shankar Bajpai, the Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth’s Secretary General.
Sir Girija explained to them the legal position: the UN resolution of August 1948

had conceded the legality of Kashmir's accession to India and as such no man's land, if any, should be controlled by India during the period of ceasefire and truce.

Further, the onus of proof to convince the commission in any disputed territory, rested with Pakistan. "In the absence of any such convincing proof, and even if India had no troops on the date of ceasefire in that area, the disputed territory should automatically come under Indian control,” later recalled Gen S.K. Sinha, then A.D.C. to General Shrinagesh.
The future Governor of J&K further commented:

This convincing and legalistic argument proved a trump card in our hands at Karachi. Based on this, we obtained control of several hundred square miles of State territory where we were not in position on the date of the ceasefire.

An accord was finally reached and the Line of Ceasefire was demarcated. The last point on the map was known as 'NJ 9842'. At that time no one thought about the possibility of a war on the glaciers.
The agreement mentioned that the line continued 'thence north to the glaciers', without going into the details. The demarcation had however been done on a clear principle: If a territory was no man's land and not occupied by any of the two armies at that time, it was deemed to be part of India.
This position was then accepted by Pakistan and the UN. It remains valid today. Even if not demarcated in 1949, the glacier legally belongs to India. In early 1987, when Pakistani troops established a post on a feature overlooking India’s defence posts near the Bilafond Pass on the Saltoro ridge, Islamabad knew the legal implications.
The post was so important for Islamabad that it was named the 'Quaid Post’, after M.A. Jinnah, the first Quaid-e-Azam.
Some Indian positions, being maintained by air, suddenly became untenable. It is then that the Indian Army planned a daring, secret operation to evict the Pakistanis.
On June 26, 1987, Bana Singh captured the 'Quaid' Post; since then, the glacier and the Saltoro range have remained with India. Bana Singh was later awarded the Param Vir Chakra, India's highest bravery award.
What is disturbing is that often the Indian press swallows the Pakistani bait and portays the glacier as ‘disputed’, which is legally wrong.
And as always in India, there are peaceniks who argue that for the sake of ‘bonhomie’ with Islamabad, the Siachen should be a demilitarized zone, dedicated to ‘science’ or ‘peace’.
If accepted, it would mean that India gives up the gains obtained through the 1948 UN resolution, which recognized the validity of India’s position on the State of Jammu & Kashmir.
It could have dreadful consequences for India.

1949: Tibet before the invasion

Soon after Zoru Bakshi's visit, Apa Pant also went to Lhasa (photo courtesy: A. Pant)

A few weeks ago, I posted on this blog a report of the covert mission of Maj. (later Lt. Gen.) Z.C. 'Zoru' Bakshi (5th Gurkha Rifles) to Tibet, in the summer of 1949.
(By the way, Maj, Bakshi was later awarded the MacGregor Medal 'for valuable military reconnaissance'; it is a medal instituted in 1888 in honour of the United Service Institution of India's founder, Maj Gen Sir Charles MacGregor).
I then commented: "the Government of India was still keeping all its options open."
I am posting today a complementary report of Maj. Bakshi on the situation in Tibet, a year before the Chinese invasion.
Particularly interesting are the recommendations.
Maj. Bakshi said: "The occupation or domination of TIBET by a potentially hostile power constitutes a grave threat to the security of INDIA. It is, therefore, important that we must watch the events closely and keep ourselves fully informed about the latest situation in TIBET."
He suggested that an intelligence officer from the Indian Army from should be posted in Lhasa.
The Indian Foreign Service was probably not keen to see the Army walking on its turf, but it would indirectly happen in the following years. 
Both S.L. Chhiber (Jat regiment) and P.N. Kaul (Rajput regiment), officers from the Indian Frontier Administrative Service, who served as Consul General of India in Lhasa between 1957-1959 and 1959-1961 respectively, had earlier served in the Indian Army.
They dutifully reported about the evolution (worsening) of the military situation on the Roof of the World during the years before the 1962 Chinese attack.
The fact that nobody in Delhi (including the 'illustrious' Intelligence Bureau Director, B.N. Mullick) was interested to listen is a different issue.
The Political Officer in Sikkim, Apa B. Pant visited Lhasa a few months after Maj. Bakshi. He is seen on the picture in Lhasa with Maj. S.L. Chhiber (with the cap on the right).

Lt. Gen. Zoru Bakshi

SECOND REPORT - TIBET

1. Political situation
The late Dalai Lama (Thirteenth) was a man of progressive ideas. This may have been due to the fact that he had lived in INDIA for a few years. For the first time in TIBET’s history he took 3 cars (carried in parts) to LHASA from INDIA. He built a special road between the POTALA and NORBULINGKA for these cars. He encouraged the officials to buy motor cycles. He electrified his palaces and LHASA city. He arranged to send some army officers to QUETTA and SHILLONG for training. He sent 4 boys to England for higher education. The other lamas were opposed to all this. But the late Dalai Lama was a very strong man who did not take much notice of opposition. When he died, a very young lama became the Regent and although he was also a man of progressive ideas, he found himself helpless against the other lamas. The cars and the motor cycles were locked up and the owners ordered not to use them. The trained army officers were removed from the army and given civil appointments. A general reaction started. All the favourites of the late Dalai Lama were removed from their appointments and demoted. But as time went on the young Regent gained more and more experience and became quite strong. The other influential lamas were very suspicious of his progressive ideas. They, therefore, advised him to go into seclusion for three years as otherwise great misfortune was likely to fall on him. The Regent decided to go and he thought that the best man who could officiate in his temporary absence was his own Guru. So after handing over the Government to his Guru he went to some secluded place for praying and meditation. At the end of three years he returned to LHASA. But when he asked his Guru to hand him back the Government, he was locked up in the POTALA by the Guru. All his favourites were demoted and disgraced. He died in prison under mysterious circumstances. The Guru is still the Regent. He is very old and is opposed to any type of reform. He is very unpopular and is dreaded by other officials. But he is firmly established. He will remain Regent till he dies. The cabinet consists of KALING [Kalon?] LAMA, SURKANG SHAPPE and RAGASHAR. KALING LAMA has been a ministry for a very long time. He is NOT very intelligent and is against all reforms. The next senior is SURKHANG SHAPPE, the son of SURKHANG DZASA, the Foreign Secretary. He is the most intelligent minister and has progressive ideas. He became a minister about four years ago by heavily bribing the Regent. His chief aim in becoming a minister was to make money. He is clever enough to realize that he must never come out in the open with his progressive ideas. RAGASHAR became a minister last month. He was C-in-C [Commander-in-Chief] before this. He is not so intelligent and looks very unimpressive. He is a quiet member of the cabinet. The lamas and all the officials from the lowest to the senior most minister seem to be worried about the recent success of the Communists in CHINA. Everywhere we went and every official and lama we met, asked us the same question “What news about the Communists”. I was told by the C-in-C that the Chinese Communists were building reads and aerodromes in SINKIANG. But this fear of Chinese Communists does not spur them to much action. A religious ceremony was being performed by the lamas in LHASA to ward off the evils. The abbots of DREPHUNG monastery said that the best they could do to keep the Chinese Communists away was to perform this religious ceremony!

2. Political Parties
There are no political parties as such in TIBET. Neither is there any likelihood of the formation of such parties in the near future- as such a move will be considered nothing less than an open rebellion against the Government. In TIBET no person can oppose those who are in authority. Even those who differ are severely punished.

3. Is the Government firmly established
It is difficult to say whether the Government is firmly established and has absolute support of the people. To understand this one has to study the structure of the Tibetan Society and also the system of the Government.
The Society can be broadly divided in three classes; lamas, ruling class and the poor. Lamas from 1/3 of the total population. It is generally believed that one can enter heaven only through a lama. For this reason lamas have got a strong hold on the population. The interests of the ruling classes are identical to those of the lamas. All the officials are either lamas or from the ruling class. The land, nearly the whole of which belongs to the Government, is given only to these two classes.
The poor are not at all associated with the Government. They can neither hold any official position in the Government nor do they possess any land. They work for their land-lords and are completely dependent on them. They are badly exploited by the lamas as well as the ruling classes.
The Dalai Lama is the spiritual head as well as the King. When he is a minor, the Government is in the hands of a Regent who is also a lama. There is a cabinet of three to four ministers who are appointed by the Dalai Lama. The ministers do not hold separate portfolios. They all sit together and give their decisions on questions brought up before them.
There is no written law. The officials can award any punishment they like to the accused. The most common punishment is to clip off the ears of the accused. It is, therefore, not surprising that the poor people dread the officials and always obey them. A Government which is in the hands of a certain class and which has got absolute powers over it the people should normally be difficult to disrupt. But/is certain that when such a structure is shaken at the top by any outside power, the people will rise against the Government. The intelligent Tibetan officials are afraid that the masses will join the Communists and rise against them if they feel that the Communists are strong enough to throw away the present Government.

4. Chinese influence
For years the Chinese officials in LHASA have looked down upon the Tibetan officials and civilians and have openly said that the Tibetans were barbarious. The Tibetans strongly resented this and hated the Chinese. There is no influential Tibetan official who is pre-Chinese especially now when CHINA has turned Communists. All the Chinese except a few business men in LHASA, have been turned out of TIBET. Even the use of some of the favourite Chinese dishes like sea slugs has been banned.

5. Attitude towards INDIA
The members of the INDIAN Mission at LHASA have always treated the Tibetan officials with respect and maintained very friendly relations with them. As a result the Tibetans have developed a special regard for Indians. In my opinion the Tibetans were a bit suspicious of the British and other Europeans. But with Indians they are quite frank. There is, however, one important question which has created some doubt in the minds of some of the Tibetan officials. Our failure to supply all the arms and ammunition which the Tibetan Government had asked for is being viewed with suspicion.

6. Economic and industrial resources

TIBET is an agriculturist country. Sufficient barley to feed the whole population is grown in the country. Rice and peas are also grown, though in very small quantities, in certain parts of the country. The Government maintain reserve stocks of barley in LHASA, GYANTSE, SHIGATSE and eastern TIBET. Wool is the main export. Most of it is sent to KALIMPONG and GANGTOK. Some wool is used in making carpets. These are also exported to INDIA.
    Gold is extracted in eastern TIBET but not in considerable quantity. It is believed that a large number of other minerals can also be extracted. But there is a religious belief against extracting minerals from the earth.

7. Population
Though no exact figures are available, it is estimated that the population numbers between one and three millions inhabiting an area not far short of one million square miles. 1/3 of the total male population consists of lamas. There is wide spread polyandry and usually all the brothers in a family share one wife. The lamas do not marry. Most of the girls therefore cannot get married and are forced to become nuns. This is the cause of a low rate of birth in TIBET.
Nearly two-thirds of Northern and Western TIBET consists of high mountains and plateau country at an altitude of well over 11000 ft. this area is very sparsely populated by a people who live a primitive and nomadic life. The remainder of TIBET can be divided in two natural divisions. First, the tracts containing the upper valley of the INDUS, SUTLEJ and BRAHMAPUTRA. This area slopes gradually from West to East, and the lower parts are more populous. The valley of the Brahmaputra and its tributaries contains the three largest town of TIBET: LHASA (about 50,000), SHIGATSE (about 20,000) and GYANTSE (about 10,000).
The second division is the system of mountains and rivers of East TIBET. The southern parts of this division get greater rain fall and are wooded. This is the most thickly populated area of TIBET.
The desert and mountain barriers which isolate TIBET from its neighbours have preserved their unique way of life. The Tibetans are strong hardy people who look cheerful even amidst so many hardships. They are very hardworking and have a tremendous stamina. They have natural love for arms.

8. Personalities in the Army

1. DZASA KESANG TSULTRIM
   A small, unimpressive but cheerful man who has been Monk C-in-C for nearly nine years now. He seems to have great confidence in the fighting qualities of the Tibetan soldiers and is of the opinion that man to man the Tibetan soldier will always beat the Chinese soldier.
2. DZASA KUNSANG-TSE
   A tough and aggressive looking man who was appointed lay C-in-C in October 1949. He was a salt tea tax officer before becoming C-in-C. He has also been a Depien (Bn Comd) [Depon or Brigade Commander] for some time in Eastern TIBET. Intelligence persons regretted his appointment as C-in-C at this critical moment due to his lack of influence in the army. He succeeded RAGASHAR who has been appointed a minister now.
3. YUTHOK DZASA
   A strong, well built and intelligent man who is very influential in LHASA. He received training in QUETTA and SHILLONG. A man of progressive ideas who wants the army to be well equipped and well trained. He is himself a good gunner. He is NOT in the Army now and is holding a civil appointment in LHASA. He has refused repeated offers to become a minister as he wants to keep out of the intrigues of the other cabinet ministers. He can speak Hindustani.
4. TERRING LACHAG [Jigme Taring]
   Educated at St. Paul School, DARJEELING. He was trained by Indian Army instructors at GYANTSE. He is believed to be the best gunner in TIBET. Speaks good English and Hindustani. Is now holding a civil appointment. I could NOT meet him as he was NOT in LHASA.
5. TSARONG SHAPE
   A strong, well built intelligent man who joined the Army as a sepoy. He fought well against the Chinese and became a favourite of the late Dalai Lama who later appointed him C-in-C. The Dalai Lama married him to a very rich heiress. He became very influential and was appointed a cabinet minister. His popularity and influence increased so much that the Dalai Lama himself became jealous of him and demoted him to second rank (DZASA). TSARONG SHAPPE now is the Mint Officer. He has been offered cabinet post repeatedly by the present regime. But he has always refused such offers. He has been to MONGOLIA, CHINA, JAPAN and INDIA. He is a man of the most progressive ideas in TIBET. He controls most of the trade with INDIA and is the richest man in TIBET (excluding Dalai Lama who is not a man but the incarnation of GOD). He wants TIBET to establish trade with America and European countries. It is believed that he had asked LOWEL THOMAS, the American radio commentator to bring to the notice of American businessmen the tremendous opportunities for trade in TIBET.

9. Communist propaganda and infiltration
As I have said before, in TIBET no one can utter a word against the Government. I do NOT think that there are many people in TIBET who know what Communism is. And these who know a little about it are the Lamas and the ruling class. These people are strictly against Communism. As long as the present system of government remains, there can be no possibility of any Communist propaganda. So far the Communists have not succeeded in infiltrating anywhere in TIBET.

15. Recommendation:
With the establishment of a Communist Government in CHINA, the security of TIBET has been gravely endangered. There seems little doubt that sooner or later the Chinese Communists will invade TIBET. In fact their leaders have already declared that they intend to liberate TIBET which according to them belongs to CHINA. INDIA has got nearly 600 miles of common frontier with TIBET. The occupation or domination of TIBET by a potentially hostile power constitutes a grave threat to the security of INDIA. It is, therefore, important that we must watch the events closely and keep ourselves fully informed about the latest situation in TIBET. But at present we have got no source which can give our Defence Services infm [information] which may be of vital interest to them. There can be two methods by which we can establish such a source.
First, by keeping an army officer in LHASA. As things are at present this can be ruled out as the Tibetan Government will NOT agree to it.
Second, by transferring a suitable army officer to the Foreign Service and posting him to the INDIAN Mission in LHASA.
Even if we remain neutral and the Chinese Communists occupy LHASA, this officer can keep us informed of the latest op situation. He can report tp conc [troop concentration] and move, constr of rds [construction of roads] and air fds [air fields], reported intentions of the Communists and a lot of other infm of a military nature. I do NOT think that the Chinese will turn him out of LHASA. The INDIAN Mission has been functioning in LHASA for the past 10 years side by side with the Chinese Mission. If this proposal is accepted, the matter should be taken up with the Foreign Affairs Ministry at a high level as soon as possible as Mr. [Hugh] RICHARDSON who is at present the head of the Mission is due to retire next year.

When the Chinese were expelled from Tibet

Chinese soldiers leaving Tibet in 1912

One is often asked, do you have any proof that Tibet was an Independent nation during the 20th century.
There are of course, many signs that Tibet was a de facto independent country when the Chinese troops entered Chamdo in October 1950. 
One of them is the expulsion of the Chinese from Lhasa, a first time in 1912 and a second time in 1949.
I quote here from my book, Tibet, the Lost Frontier.

On July 8, 1949, Chen, the acting head of the Chinese mission in Lhasa, was called by the Kashag and informed that he and his staff as well as all Chinese working in schools and hospitals had to leave Tibet. The pretext was that the Chinese Mission no longer had any relations with the Nationalist Government and was not accredited with the new government.
In fact, the Tibetan Government was afraid that some (if not all) members of the Chinese mission in Lhasa would switch over to the new Communist regime in Beijing ‘for bread and butter’, as Richardson put it. The Chinese were swiftly expelled by the Tibetan Government and their bank accounts frozen in India on the request of the Tibetan Government.
The move had been prepared for more than a year by Tsipon Namseling who had made a detailed list of Chinese agents in Lhasa. The remarkable feature was that secret had not leaked out of the Kashag Office during all that time. It was a record of sorts for a small village like Lhasa.
The Indian Mission was later informed about the fait accompli. “It was a complete surprise for the Indian Mission”, [Hugh] Richardson [the Head of the Indian Mission in Tibet] commented later.
However the Chinese were expelled with courtesy and a band accompanied them until they were outside of Lhasa.
The cable that Nehru sent to the Political Officer in Sikkim demonstrates the position of the Government of India vis-à-vis Tibet in 1949 and makes interesting reading:

2. We are concerned over the Tibetan Government's decision to turn out all Chinese officials in Lhasa.[It was reported that the Head of Tibetan State Department at Lhasa had shut off the Nationalist Radio Station in Lhasa on 8 July 1949, asked the Nationalist Government's branch office to close down and ordered all officers to leave.] These officials were appointed by the National Government of China. Their wholesale expulsion will naturally be regarded as an anti-Chinese rather than anti-Communist move. And the Government of India, by letting them into India without any travel papers in contravention of all passport regulations, will be regarded as privy to this move.
3. We can however understand the desire of the Tibetan Government to get rid of persons suspected of subversive tendencies and officials sympathizing with them. From the Tibetan Government's own point of view it would seem better for Tibetans to expel these suspects rather than all Chinese officials in Lhasa.

Nehru was ready to help to a certain extent; he informed the Political Officer in Sikkim that “there are many difficulties in the way of the Government of India receiving and looking after these suspects. Nevertheless, in view of our friendly relations with the Tibetan Government, we are considering the possibility of giving them passage. We would be gravely embarrassed if they stayed in India. We shall require advance information of the names and particulars of the persons concerned, some indication of the charges against them, and the place or places to which they will proceed.”
He concluded by suggesting:

… that unless you or Richardson have any further comments the position of the Government of India should be tactfully explained to the Tibetan Government. The Tibetan Government are the best judges of their own interests but to us it would seem unwise on their part to take any steps which in effect mean the forced discontinuance of the Chinese Mission in Lhasa. The objects of the Tibetan Government will be served by expelling the suspects and officials associated with them. If any of the Chinese, left behind, indulge in objectionable activities they can also be similarly dealt with. Such gradual and considered action will appear justified in the eyes of the world, but not the precipitate action now contemplated.

It is clear that a few months before the Fateful Year of 1950, the Government of India, “in view of [its] friendly relations with the Tibetan Government”, was ready to help Lhasa with its security concerns. Not only Delhi treated Tibet as an independent entity, but the Government of India accepted that they were the best judge of their problems.