Can China alleviate poverty in rural Tibet?

Du Qinglin during a previous visit to Tibet

A few weeks ago, I quoted an article published in China Tibet Online which hinted at a 6th Tibet Work Forum being held very soon.
The piece was titled: “Guess what? 6th Tibet Work Conference may be convened this year, netizens say.”
I then commented: “For China, it is new that netizens are aware of ‘State Secrets’ such as holding crucial meetings …and their timings!”
At that time, I guessed that the move was to prepare the ground for the TAR celebrations (and the new Tibet Work Forum).
The State media had asserted that from November 2014 to March 2015, “many in the central leadership as well as various government departments went to Tibet and Tibetan-inhabited areas in Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan provinces to conduct research and make inspections, including: Yu Zhengsheng, Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, Du Qinglin, Vice Chairman of the CPPCC National Committee, and Sun Chunlan, minister of the United Front Work Department of CPC Central Committee.”
Du Qinglin was recently on the (Tibetan) roads again.
From April 27 to 29, he visited Gannan (Kanlho) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in today’s Gansu Province. It was his 4th visit to Tibet.
Two years ago, I had written on this blog: “In September 2012, the appointment of Ling Jihua as the boss of the CCP's United Front Work Department was reported by the Chinese press. Ling then replaced Du Qinglin. I thought that after his retirement, President Hu Jintao wanted to keep his fingers in the Tibetan pie through his protégé, Ling.
Since then, Ling has been arrested, probably because of the Ferrari accident of his son in which 2 Tibetan girls died.
In 2013, I wrote: “The interesting part of it is that though Ling replaced Du Qinglin, the latter now seats in his place in the Secretariat of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee. That is a hot seat.”
Who is Du Qinglin?
Born in November 1946 in Jilin Province, Du joined the CPC in March 1966. He graduated from the School of Economics and Management at Jilin University with a major in national economic planning and management. He received a postgraduate education while in service and was awarded the degree of Master of Economics. Apart from his important job in the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee, Du is also vice chairman of the 12th CPPCC National Committee.
Du is a important man in the Party and probably close to Yu Zhengsheng, the CPPCC's Chairman.
After he visited the Tibetan-inhabited areas of Sichuan and Yunnan in 2013, I had guessed: “Probably, the Standing Committee of the Politburo wanted his views on the prevailing situation in these regions.”
Xinhua had then commented: "Du urged them to serve local people with emotion and responsibility. He called for the cultivation of a number of capable and passionate cadres to enhance the Party's public support."
Du was back in Tibet at the end of April.

Recent visit to the Gansu Tibetan Research Institute

Du visit to Tibet
Chinese Tibet Network said that during his stay in Kanlho, Du Qinglin stressed that "to accurately understand and implement new ideas and new requirements on the precise poverty alleviation, [one needs to] identify the crux of the difficulties and the Tibetan poverty alleviation work."
Du Qinglin visited an 'impoverished' village of Xiahe County' and he had 'face-to-face exchanges with the masses of farmers and herdsmen, grassroots cadres, monks'. He got "a detailed understanding of the lives of the masses, the grassroots organization construction, and implementation of policies that benefit the temple management."
He discussed 'with the cadres of state, city, county' and stated that "to eradicate poverty in Tibet, the goal must be clear, accurate, feasible, reliable."
Du also stressed “the most formidable task in reaching the goal of building a moderately prosperous society in all respects is in the countryside, and he particularity mentioned the economic development in the countryside is in the impoverished areas, especially the Tibetan areas.”
He added: “Industries with comparative advantages must be developed, infrastructure must be improved, and more efforts must be made to promote public service in order to achieve targeted poverty reduction in these areas.”
He reminded the local cadres that 2015 “marks the fifth year of poverty alleviation in Tibet Autonomous Region and the Tibetan-inhabited areas of Qinghai, Sichuan, Yunnan and Gansu provinces.”
It was in June 2010 that the State Council in Beijing convened the Work Conference on Poverty Alleviation and Development in Tibet and Tibetan-inhabited areas in the four provinces (Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu and Qinghai). Let us recall that the last Tibet Work Forum was held in January 2010.
Du said that the June 2010 Conference (or Forum) proposed to link Tibet and the Tibetan-inhabited areas 'as one impoverished area' in order to promote its development through a comprehensive approach.
By the way, it is one of the long-pending demands of the Dalai Lama.
Du was not shy to admit that: “Tibet and Tibetan-inhabited areas in the four provinces are the biggest poverty-stricken areas in China, including one autonomous region and four provinces; 19 cities (prefectures); 151 counties due to poor natural conditions, a fragile ecology and underdeveloped economy.”
This clearly gives some indications in which direction the 6th Tibet Work Forum will go when it meets: poverty alleviation in rural areas, using a scheme like the New Silk Road to bring wealth to Tibet.
The China Tibet Online article quotes another Chinese publication, the Financial News: “Since 2012, Tibet and Tibetan-inhabited areas in the four provinces have been actively implementing measures to reduce poverty and achieve steady growth through various loans. By the end of 2014, their financial institutions granted micro-credit loans totaling 12.56 billion yuan (2.02 billion US dollars), a 47.66 percent increase year on year.”
The article cites the highway to Metok which was open to traffic in 2013: “ending the county’s history as the ‘only island' on the plateau.”
This road is the most strategic road on the Tibetan plateau as it leads to the Indian border (Upper Siang district of Arunachal Pradesh). Contrary to what the Chinese propaganda says, it is not purely to alleviate the poverty of the local Tibetans that the road was built. The PLA were clearly the main beneficiaries.
China Tibet Online gives the usual figures:  “Data shows that there are more than 70,000 kilometers of highway in Tibet, with a county-level passenger traffic rate of 98.6 percent, and a township-level passenger traffic rate of 56 percent.”
Once again, it is probably another indication in which direction China wants to go while dealing with the Tibetan issue. The TAR and ‘Tibetan-inhabited areas in the four provinces’ are mentioned: Beijing wants to focus on the development of the education and put more energy for poverty reduction.
The publication gives an example: “Each student at the Number One Primary School in Dechen County of Yunnan Province can receive 3,000 yuan (483.3 US dollars) per year in subsidies. Room and board is free. Currently the rate of enrollment of school-age children for primary and middle schools in Dechen Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture is close to 100 percent.”
The article also mentions other social help for “Tibet [TAR] and Tibetan-inhabited areas in the four provinces [which] have rapidly developed institutions that care for the elderly."
It points out that in Gannan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in Gansu Province, "there are currently 31 nursing homes that provide more than 1,000 beds. There are already 333 elderly living in those homes, the majority of whom are ethnic Tibetans. There are currently more than 4,000 elderly in the prefecture who receive governmental support.”
China Economic Net shows the way Beijing has decided to go for Tibet when it affirms: “Tibet met the target of achieving economic growth rate of 11.7 percent in the first half of 2014, higher than 7.4, the average growth rate of other 23 provinces in the country. If this rate could be kept, it would be hopeful that Tibet and four Tibetan-inhabited areas would meet the goal that by 2020 poverty is basically reduced, and the per capita increase rate of farmers’ and herders’ income surpasses the national average."
Du's visit to Kanlho (he probably visited the Labrang monastery) clearly shows that in the years to come, Beijing will try to improve the economic situation in rural areas on the entire Tibetan plateau, not just in the TAR.
Why was it not done all these years, is another question.
For the purpose, the same recipe will be used than in Lhasa, Shigatse or Nyingtri; in a first stage, infrastructure will be developed; highways, airports, railway lines will be constructed and then tourists will be invited bringing along consequent revenues for these remote 'impoverished' areas.
Another scheme to help ‘alleviate’ poverty will be to link Tibet to Nepal (through Kyirong landport), Pakistan (through Karakoram highway and Pakistan Economic Corridor) and Xinjiang (as a gate to Central Asia and the main New Silk Route).
Where are the Tibetans in this scheme?
Nowhere, but they may become richer.

China develops tourism facilities in Labrang

Labrang (Xiahe) Airport

You may remember that when Yu Zhengsheng visited Amdo region (Qinghai Province) beginning of July, he called "for lasting prosperity and stability in China's Tibetan regions by improving local livelihoods and fighting the 14th Dalai Lama clique."
Yu visited the famous Labrang Monastery, 'one of the six great temples of the Geluk school of Tibetan Buddhism' according to Xinhua.
Yu was received there by the traditional head of the monastery, the Jamyang Shepa.
I then wrote: “It is clear that the Chinese are keen to use the traditional hierarchy to put across their message.”
But their main message, as we have seen during Yu’s visit to Lhasa and Nagchu in early August, is ‘development’ through ‘tourism’.
On August 19, Xinhua reported the arrival of a A319 passenger plane from Sichuan Airlines which “marked the opening of the Xiahe Airport of Gannan [Kan-lho] Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, the first civil aviation airport built in ethnic [Tibetan] areas of Gansu Province as well as the only plateau airport at an elevation of 3,198 meters in Gansu.”
Labrang monastery is located close by and the new airport will help develop tourism in the area.
But to receive hundreds of thousands visitors, the famous Buddhist center needs ‘renovations’, like the Bakhor area in Lhasa.
Three days after the opening of the airport, Xinhua announced that the facelift of the monastery is proceeding smoothly: “Renovations to a centuries-old Tibetan monastery in northwest China's Gansu Province will be finished by the end of August.”
Xinhua quoted Sonam Je, a deputy chief of the county's culture bureau saying: “Renovation of the Xiabudan [?] Buddha Hall of the Labrang Monastery in Gansu's Xiahe county is part of a first-phase facelift to the monastery, and the project will serve as preparation for bigger renovations in the future.”
Started year, the hall's renovation has already cost some 425,000 U.S. dollars. The first-phase of the project includes two other halls with an initial funding of 1.6 million U.S. dollars.
Later more than 10 other halls of Labrang Tashikyil monastery will eventually be renovated; they are on the ‘waiting list’ according to Xinhua, which further explains: “It is the religious center for more than 340,000 Tibetans in Gansu's Gannan [Kan-lho] Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, one of China's 10 Tibetan autonomous prefectures.”
The local authorities explain that the monastery's mud and wood structure is in urgent need of reinforcement; there are some cracks in the walls and roofs are leaking. This affects the life of the 1,000 lamas living in Labrang.
Again according to local Chinese cadres, the monastery has a number of “heritage pieces, including over 30,000 Buddha statues, 65,000 volumes of Buddhist scriptures and a rich collection of sutras and murals.”
At a cost of some 27 million US dollars, Beijing finances the entire operation “to reinforce the heritage buildings without making alterations to their original appearance”.

Yu Zhengsheng in Labrang

Why?
Sonam Je let the cat out of the bag when he says: “Religious activities and tourism have not been affected by the renovation work.”
It is an investment which will be recovered in no time with the revenue from tourism.
Once the renovation work is completed Labrang will apply for World Heritage status; it will take in 7 to 8 years as “hasty renovations could ruin the 303-year-old monastery".
The authorities are not keen to repeat a Bakhor episode where hundred thousands of concerned people signed (to no avail) a petition to the UNESCO.
It practically means that Disneyfication of Tibet is extending its tentacles to the ‘Tibetan-inhabited’ regions of Amdo, before it reaches Eastern Kham at a later stage.
Before this, the ‘stabilization’ work will have to be completed; in other words, the restive Khampas will have to be ‘pacified’ one way or another.
It may take a few decades, if it ever happens.

No policy shift in Tibet as yet

The Jamyang Shepa receives Yu Zhengsheng in Labrang

The article of the China Brief of the Jamestown Foundation posted below speaks of a possible policy shift in Xinjiang.
The author's conclusions are based on two visits to Xinjiang by Yu Zhengsheng, the new Chairman of the Xinjiang Work Coordination Small Group.
Interestingly, Yu, No 4 in the Party and Chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) is also Chairman of Central Tibet Work Coordination Working Group (Small Group on Tibet).
Could the China Brief's conclusions for Xinjiang also apply to Tibet?
For the China Brief, the appointment of Yu as head of the Xinjiang Small Group "indicates a willingness to explore alternative solutions to the problem in Xinjiang. The fact that both of the party’s new initiatives in Xinjiang—the mass line and accelerated economic development— are drawn from existing Party orthodoxy raises doubts over how the far the center ultimately is willing to go. ...The extent of the shift from a top-down focus on security to one rooted in the mass line will be become clearer as Yu’s tenure progresses." 
Beginning of July, Yu Zhengsheng visited Amdo region (Qinghai Province) and called "for lasting prosperity and stability in China's Tibetan regions by improving local livelihoods and fighting the 14th Dalai Lama clique."
That is not really new.
He said that: "The Dalai Lama has long been engaged in secessionist activity that runs against both the common interests of people of various ethnic groups and the traditions of Tibetan Buddhism", adding that the Dalai Lama's  'Middle Way', directly conflicts with China's Constitution and the country's system of regional ethnic autonomy."
Though the official Chinese position is often repeated, nobody in Beijing has ever explained why it conflicts with the Chinese Constitution or even answered points by points the Memorandum sent by the Dalai Lama to the leadership in Beijing in 2008.
While in Eastern Tibet, Yu said that the policies of the Central Committee toward the Dalai Lama are 'consistent and clear'. He asserted; "Only when the Dalai Lama publicly announces that Tibet is an inalienable part of China, gives up the idea of 'Tibet independence' and stops his secessionist activity can his relations with the CPC Central Committee be improved."
For the past 25 years, the Dalai Lama has often repeated that he does not seek 'Independence' any more, but Beijing remains deaf to his message.
On the positive side, while visiting a local primary school that promotes bilingual education (Chinese and Tibetan), Yu said that this will help Tibetan students to find employment in the future.
Perhaps more interesting, Yu visited the famous Labrang Monastery, 'one of the six great temples of the Geluk school of Tibetan Buddhism' according to Xinhua. Yu was received by the traditional head of the monastery, the Jamyang Shepa.  
Lobsang Jigme Thubten Chökyi Nyima, the present incarnation (the 6th) is born in 1948 and currently lives in Lanzhou, the capital of Gansu province. During the Cultural Revolution, Jamyang Shepa became a layman but retained a high degree of prestige in the area. The Jamyang Shepas have traditionally been the most prestigious teachers at Labrang Tashikhyil monastery.
It is clear that the Chinese are keen to use the traditional hierarchy to  put across their message.
In conclusion, like for Xinjiang, the visit of Yu Zhengsheng is a mixed bag of old policies and seemingly fresher moves to release the tensions on the Tibetan plateau. 
One will have to wait the autumn (or the winter) to see if the new leadership is serious to find solutions to the Tibet's (and Xinjiang's) issues.
 
New Faces in Xinjiang Signaling a Policy Shift?China Brief 
Edward Schwarck
Volume: 13 Issue: 15
July 26, 2013

As fresh violence erupted across Xinjiang in June, the outlines of a new ethnic policy—one rooted in Xi Jinping’s “mass line” approach— slowly may be coming into focus (Xinhua, July 3). One aspect of this shift may be the appointment of a new Chairman of the Xinjiang Work Coordination Small Group, Yu Zhengsheng, which was revealed during his tour of the region in late May. A Standing Committee member and Chairman of Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), Yu’s appointment breaks from a past tradition of handing control over Xinjiang affairs to hardliners within the political-legal affairs (zhengfa) system. This change in direction also may signal that, despite a resurgence of ethnic violence in the region, the party wishes to redouble efforts at fast-paced economic development, and that Yu, as former party secretary of Shanghai, may be the man to do so. 
Yu’s appointment was hinted at following his meeting with the delegation from Xinjiang during the National People’s Congress session in March and revealed formally during his five-day visit to Xinjiang in late May (Caixin, May 29). According to a Xinjiang Daily report, Yu undertook an expansive tour that included visits to Hotan, Kashgar, Yili and Urumqi, and he was accompanied by Xinjiang Party Secretary Zhang Chunxian and CPPCC chief of staff and new vice chair of the leading group Wang Wei (Xinjiang Daily, May 29). In an unusual move, Yu also visited Bachu County, which had witnessed a brief bout of sectarian bloodletting the month before. It was here that Yu pledged a “resolute strike” against terrorism, while paying condolences to the government “martyrs” and “heroes” that died in the incident (Xinhua, May 28). 
Despite Yu’s boilerplate rhetoric on stability, evidence suggests an ongoing yet discreet debate within the Party on how violence in Xinjiang should be handled. Following the Urumqi riots in 2009, the removal of the hardline local Party Secretary, Wang Lequan after inordinately long fifteen-year tenure marked the first step in a different direction. While Wang continues to attend policy meetings on Xinjiang through his new role as vice chair of the Central Political-Legal Committee (CPLC), his replacement, Zhang Chunxian, has emphasized “liberated thinking” and development-based solutions to Xinjiang’s ethnic tensions (Xinhua, May 28; Xinjiang Daily, March 4). Zhang’s policy of “flexible iron-fisted rule” has become the party’s new mantra for the region. The multi-billion dollar state-led development drive unleashed at the 2010 Xinjiang Work Forum also marked a watershed in Beijing’s policy toward its troubled western frontier [1].
The retirement of Zhou Yongkang, China’s politics and law chief from 2007 to 2012, and the subsequent downgrading of his portfolio from the Standing Committee to the Politburo level may yield further policy implications for Xinjiang. While acting as China’s security chief, Zhou wore a separate hat as head of the Work Coordination Small Group and also was the region’s delegate to the 2012 National People’s Congress (Tianshan Net [Urumqi], May 19). In this regard, Zhou followed his predecessor, CPLC chief Luo Gan, who also headed the Work Coordination Small Group, and marked the first link in a line of security officials spearheading policy in China’s far west.
Rumors now abound in the overseas Chinese press that the removal of the CPLC from power in Xinjiang marks another step in the targeted relegation of that organization after the 18th Party Congress (People’s Daily, February 5). Indeed, the year preceding the leadership transition witnessed a broad public debate on social management and the party’s stability maintenance apparatus. The CPLC in particular came under fire in party publications for overstepping its authority, interfering in the work of other government bodies and exacerbating social tensions through its heavy-handed reaction to social unrest (“Central Party School’s Critiques Suggest New Leadership Dynamics,” China Brief, June 22, 2012). While the downgrading of the political-legal portfolio after the 18th Party Congress is unlikely to have been driven by minority-related concerns, Xinjiang may now be subject to a broader move within the party away from top-down, coercive methods of stability maintenance. This has been reflected in a recent wave of rticles in the People’s Daily and party journals calling for a shift away from a government-centered approach to social management toward an embrace of the “mass line” (Wen Wei Pao [Shanghai], July 4; People’s Daily, May 19; Study Times, December 10, 2012).
“Following the mass line” (zou qunzhong luxian) was first revived toward the end of the Hu administration (“Resolving Contradictions in Social Management,” China Brief, September 21, 2012). Under the banner of fighting “formalism, bureaucratism, hedonism and extravagance,” Xi Jinping also has called repeatedly for reinvigorating the party’s grass roots work, warning that “winning or losing public support is an issue that concerns the CPC's survival or extinction.” China’s internal security organs have since fallen in step, and are now embarking on an education drive amongst grass roots officials about what the mass line entails. On 2 July, China’s Minister of Public Security, Guo Shengkun, called for “all work units to fully understand the significance of the party’s mass line”, and to ensure that “the masses can see, believe and are satisfied with its results” (Legal Daily, July 3). As violence erupted again in Xinjiang in late June, Yu Zhengsheng himself announced in a visit to the region that, in fighting violence and terrorism, the party should “greatly strengthen grass roots work” and “extensively mobilize and closely rely on broad based party members, cadres and the masses.” In a widely reported remark, Yu also singled out “religious figures and the masses of believers to make a greater contribution to building stability in Xinjiang” (sina.com.cn, June 29).
The mass line may also explain a raft of what Xinjiang news outlet Tianshan.net terms “new stability measures” by the local public security bureau (PSB). In the first two days of July, Xinjiang’s PSB announced three notices calling the public to come forward with information on terrorist threats and urging individuals to hand in knives and explosive weapons. An official responsible for the new initiative described its “core objective” as to “mobilize the masses, rely on the masses and garner the support of the masses” (Boxun, July 4). Xinhua later reported that the PSB is offering 50,000–100,000 yuan (roughly $8,000–16,000) for valuable information (Xinhua, July 3). On July 1, Beijing also dispatched 50 senior officials to “hostile communities” (di sheqing) in Xinjiang to lead local officials in a grassroots campaign to “widely propagate the party’s ethnic and religious policies,” “ensure that the masses of every minority deeply feels the party center’s concern” and that these ideas are “propagated down to every village committee and every household” (sina.com.cn, July 2).
The possibility that the mass line may bring improvement to the Xinjiang problem should be treated with caution. It should be noted, for example, that a string of incidents this year­—including the April violence in Selibuya and fatal stabbings of Han Chinese policemen in Atush city in early July—reportedly have been driven by house-to-house inspections by “community workers” and local police (Radio Free Asia, July 5; Phoenix News, April 25). Grass roots work aimed at achieving stability is also not a new innovation. The “People’s War” launched during the Beijing Olympics by former CPLC chief, Zhou Yongkang, sought to create an extensive network of informants and closed circuit television surveillance systems in cities nationwide (“Beijing Intensifies ‘People’s War’ Against ‘Splittism’ as Nationalism Rears its Head,” China Brief, April 28, 2008).
The mass line, however, is indicative of willingness by Beijing to explore solutions that are—in the Maoist sense—socially transformative as opposed to suppressive in nature. Official statements describe the mass line as a symbiosis between the party and the people in which local cadres ostensibly are better attuned to public needs and expectations. In this respect, the decision to consolidate China’s ethnic portfolio under the CPPCC—and its subordinate body, the United Front Work Department—may be an effort to build an ethnic policy that is more responsive to grassroots opinion and also more capable of influencing that opinion. The need for a new approach may even have been formally reached before the advent of the Xi administration. In Hu Jintao’s Work Report at the 18th Party Congress, China’s former leader singled out the united front as “a powerful instrument…for harmonizing relations between political parties, ethnic groups, religions, social groups and compatriots and home and overseas” (Xinhua, November 17). In an August 2012 article in the Study Times, CPPCC member and new Deputy Party Secretary of Xinjiang Han Yong also argued “mass line work under new conditions is the fundamental guarantee of social stability and of realizing long-term peaceful governance” in Xinjiang, later adding that “the masses are the main force in the struggle against splittism and building stability” (Study Times, August 20).

Economic Reformer
As Chairman of the CPPCC, Yu’s appointment may prove to be a modest step away from the previous government hard-line approach to Xinjiang. His past as a prodigious economic performer provides a further reason for his appointment. Since the Xinjiang Work Forum in 2010, the government has embarked on an ambitious development program that has seen a marked increase in foreign investment; a pledge for $10 billion to be allocated to the region on an annual basis; and a twinning policy called “duikou” that pairs Xinjiang localities with more prosperous eastern/coastal counterparts (“Xinjiang’s April 23 Clash the Worst in Province since July 2009,” China Brief, May 23).
Having successfully steered Shanghai through the global recession, Yu Zhengsheng is well placed to spearhead Xinjiang’s development. During his tenure as Shanghai party secretary, Yu pushed through a new initiative to turn Shanghai into “dual center” (shuang zhongxin) of international finance and shipping center by 2020 and achieved considerable success in rebalancing Shanghai’s economy away from fixed capital investment to consumer spending and FDI (China Economic Watch, November 19, 2012) [2]. This experience will prove useful in the government’s ongoing attempts to open Xinjiang further to regional trade and investment—an effort currently underway through the transformation of Kashgar and the northern city of Khorgos into Special Economic Zones, which have both been recently highlighted by Party Secretary Zhang Chunxian as a regional priority (Qiushi, May 16). Indeed, Yu presided over Shanghai’s support for Kashgar under the duikou policy. This partnership involved the opening of direct flights between the two cities and a multi-billion dollar boost in investment by over 50 Shanghai-based companies, including the creation of a major new Shanghai-Volkswagen plant in Urumqi (China Daily, April 26, 2012; Tian Shan Net, February 14, 2011).
While in Shanghai, Yu also proved himself an able public relations operator with the Chinese press lauding his deft handling of a high-rise fire in 2010. In the face of widespread public protest over the Maglev project, he showed an ostensible ability to compromise, promising to postpone the project until further discussions (South China Morning Post, October 1, 2012). Given that Xinjiang continues to suffer low levels of investment—largely due to fears over security—Yu’s appointment makes sense. Indeed, during his May visit to Xinjiang, Yu opened a new series of talks with local officials on how to building stability for industry and commerce (gongshang wending daji). This was followed by Yu’s publicized assurances that tourism, which is a major source of regional revenue, was safe for the public (Duowei, May 28).

Conclusion
The appointment of Yu Zhengsheng as head of China’s Xinjiang Leading Small Group indicates a willingness to explore alternative solutions to the problem in Xinjiang. The fact that both of the party’s new initiatives in Xinjiang—the mass line and accelerated economic development— are drawn from existing Party orthodoxy raises doubts over how the far the center ultimately is willing to go. One Uyghur dissident recently dismissed Yu’s appointment in Xinjiang as “old wine in a new bottle” (huan tang bu huan yao) (Voice of America, May 31). The extent of the shift from a top-down focus on security to one rooted in the mass line will be become clearer as Yu’s tenure progresses.

More on Xi Jinping in Gansu

Labrang monks enrolling a giant thanka on February 22

After posting Why Xi Jinping did not visit Tibet? I came across a communique from the Hong Kong Information Center for Human Rights & Democracy, a Hong Kong-based service which reports on dissidence in the mainland. It asserted:

It has been learned that Xi Jinping's inspection tour of Gansu from 2 to 5 February was not for 'poverty alleviation' purposes as the official media reported but for 'making arrangements to maintain stability' in Tibetan areas of Gansu. Since Xi left the province, the Gansu authorities have arrested over 100 Tibetans - who may be prosecuted for 'inciting subversion of state power' - and more mobile armed police forces have been transferred to Gansu.

The Hong Kong Center is not always accurate in his predictions.
In fact, the information that 100 Tibetans were arrested from Gansu has never been confirmed. On February 7 (a day after Xi Jinping left Gansu province), a Xinhua article mentioned some arrests in Qinghai province, not in Gansu. These arrests probably occurred a couple of days before Xi's arrival in Gansu. Xinhua says:

A total of 70 criminal suspects have been captured by police in Huangnan of northwest China's Qinghai Province in connection with a string of self-immolations that have occurred since November 2012, a senior police officer.
Lyu Benqian, deputy chief of the Qinghai Provincial Public Security Department, said 12 of the suspects were officially arrested over the self-immolation cases in the Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture.
Police will exert more efforts to thoroughly investigate the cases and seriously punish those who incite innocent people to commit self-immolation, he said.
The Dalai Lama clique masterminded and incited the self-immolations, said Lyu, who is also head of a special police team investigating the self-immolations. Personal information, such as photos of the victims, were sent overseas to promote the self-immolations, he added.
"Some of the victims were frustrated and pessimistic in life, and they wanted to earn respect by self-immolation," Lyu said when analyzing the motive for the self-immolations.

This is the usual Chinese propaganda.
What could have happened is: a large delegation of Labrang and Gannan Prefecture may have called on Xi during his stay in Gansu and briefed him about the prevalent situation. He probably wanted to be acquainted with the issue (by a large number of people, larger than if the encounter had taken place in Beijing).
He may have decided not to 'provoke' the Tibetans and take hasty decisions, without himself being fully settled in his seat. This is a speculation.

Monks carrying the thank in Labrang

Yesterday, China Tibet Online mentioned: "On February 22, 2013, Lamas unveil a gigantic Buddha tangka alongside a hillside for disciples' worship in Labrang Monastery in Xiahe [country of Gannan prefecture], northwest China's Gansu Province. The Buddha tangka display or "the basking of Buddha" is a Tibetan tradition praying for a good year. As one of the six leading monasteries of Tibetan Buddhism, Labrang Monastery built in 1709 is home to more than 1,000 lamas and is another center of the Gelug Sect, also known as the Yellow Sect, of Tibetan Buddhism outside the Tibet Autonomous Region."
Interestingly, during his visit to Gansu, Xi was accompanied by Wang Huning, the new Foreign Affairs star (and member of the Politburo).
A few months back The South China Morning Post reported: "Wang Huning often goes unrecognised despite being a trusted adviser to two presidents, but his cool demeanour hides a sharp political brain."
Now, he is following the new new boss and with his seat in the powerful Politburo he will be give a greater credibility to Foreign Affairs than his predecessor.  
In November, The South China Morning Post explained:

Wang Huning behind Xi in Gansu

Whether Hu Jintao is visiting farmers in remote villages or meeting heads of state, Wang Huning is usually by the president's side.
He was usually there with Jiang Zemin, too, during the latter's decade at the helm.
In fact, Wang has probably appeared in public more often than any other top official in recent years, although he rarely speaks and often goes unrecognised.
For two decades, Wang, 57, has served as a trusted adviser and wordsmith to the country's most powerful men.
He now heads the party's Policy Research Office, where his role is like a combination of national policy adviser and chief speech writer.
After becoming the mainland's youngest university professor - he stayed on after graduating from Fudan University to teach international politics in 1981 - Wang gained respect in leadership circles for his academic depth, neutral political stance and cautious working style.
...Before entering Zhongnanhai - the party headquarters in Beijing - Wang Huning advocated continued authoritarian rule to maintain political stability while gradually introducing democracy inside the party and expanding it to the outside. Jiang, who rose to power in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square crackdown, was particularly taken by Wang's book, New Authoritarianism, which contained ideas Jiang thought suited the country at the time.
...Due to his close ties to Jiang, many observers consider Wang a member of the former president's "Shanghai gang". But his political savvy and knack for negotiating internal debate have allowed him to thrive under Hu.

An interesting question remains unanswered: will Wang wears two hats after the Two Meetings: Foreign Minister in the State Council and Special Representative. It is rumoured that he could take Dai Bingguo's job with, among others, the responsibility to negotiate the border dispute with India (with the National Security Advisor Menon).
We will have to wait a couple of weeks to know for sure.

Why Xi Jinping did not visit Tibet?

This map shows Gansu province. 
According to The China Daily, Xi Jinping, CCP's General Secretary and Chairman of the Central Military Commission paid a visit ('an inspection tour') to Gansu from February 2 to 5. 
The Chinese paper says: "During his visit, Xi also extended Spring Festival greetings to all Chinese people as the Spring Festival, or the Chinese Lunar New Year, approaches."
But what about the Tibetans?
The monastery of Labrang Tashi Kyil, where several self-immolations were reported is located some 100 km from Dongxian Autonomous County, where Xi spent some time with another minorities', the Hui Muslims.
The Chinese article affirms: "[Xi's] remarks reflected the new leadership's determination to boost the image and working style of the Party and the government."
Why did he choose not to address the Tibetan issue, while he was so close?
Some guesses: one, the Tibetan self-immolations and the situation on the Roof of the World is not Xi's priority. His first priority seems to fight against corruption in the Party.
Second guess: Xi may not be 'settled' enough in his new chair to tackle such a tricky question as Tibet.
The leadership change will only be completed next month and Xi is perhaps unwilling to put his fingers in the Tibetan problem too early.
Another possibility is that Xi prefers (or is forced) to let Yu Zhengsheng, his colleague in the Standing Committee of the Politburo to handle the Tibetan affairs. Read my earlier posting on the subject.
One has to wait and see what will happen after the Two Meetings.
But he was so close!

Xi makes inspection tour to Gansu, stressing official's integrity
2013-02-05
China Daily
Xi Jinping, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and also chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission, visits a major water diversion project in the Weiyuan County of Dingxi City, northwest China's Gansu Province, Feb. 3, 2013. Xi Jinping visited villages, enterprises and urban communities, chatting with impoverished villagers and asking about their livelihood during an inspection tour to Gansu from Feb. 2 to 5. During his visit, Xi also extended Spring Festival greetings to all Chinese people as the Spring Festival, or the Chinese Lunar New Year, approaches.
A down-to-earth attitude, a good work ethic and an ability to stay away from empty gestures are some of the key characteristics officials require for promotion, top leader Xi Jinping said during a visit to Gansu province.
Officials who are out for pleasure and love formality must be told their behavior is unacceptable and reprimanded, he said.
Party chief Xi urged officials to spend more time with the public to address their problems and concerns, and work harder to develop poverty-stricken regions.

His remarks reflected the new leadership's determination to boost the image and working style of the Party and the government.
A good work ethic and personal integrity should be the key criteria in selecting, evaluating and promoting officials, Xi said during his four-day visit to the province, which started on Saturday.
The comments came against a backdrop of a number of recent scandals that have involved officials suspected of abusing their power or embezzling taxpayers' money.
Several officials across the country have been placed under investigation following allegations they owned property worth far more than they could afford on their official salaries.
Another case involved 10 officials in Chong-qing who have been removed from their posts after a whistleblower revealed a sex scandal.
"China has entered a crucial period that means the government and local authorities have to narrow the gap between developed and underdeveloped regions," Wu Hui, a deputy professor of Party building at the Party School of the CPC Central Committee, said on Tuesday.
"This task demands officials at all levels have a good work ethic and maintain close ties with the general public.
"To achieve the goal of building a prosperous society, the government must make sure that residents in the remote, impoverished areas can enjoy a rapid increase in their income in the coming years, and the key lies in the work of local officials," Wu said. "That is why Xi emphasized work ethics and integrity in Gansu."
Bordering the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau, the Inner Mongolia Plateau and the Loess Plateau, Gansu is one of China's poorest provinces. The annual net per capita income of local farmers in 2012 stood at 4,507 yuan ($723).
"The fundamental problem behind incompetent officials is that there are loopholes in the selection and promotion mechanism," Wu said.
If there are those who think they can bribe their way up, then the public will lose confidence in the Party and the government, Wu added.
"Officials at the grassroots level must use wisdom to improve the standard of living of their communities and strengthen links with the people."
During his visit, Xi met with villagers and migrant workers and asked about their lives.
On Monday, Xi visited Xihu community in Lanzhou.
The community has created a mechanism that collects public opinion and suggestions, deals with problems people are most concerned with and releases the results to the public.
Xi praised them for establishing such a platform.
On Sunday afternoon, Xi went to a reconstruction site in  autonomous county, where a landslide triggered subsidence in March 2011.
Chatting with migrant workers, he said a prosperous society could not be realized without the contribution of migrant workers