Thursday, February 17, 2011

They are as dense as the stars on the sky



A recent BJP report on the functioning of the Congress governments in the Northeast has equated the ‘hydropower project scams’ in Arunachal Pradesh with the 2G scandal. 
The Report alleges that since the Congress government came to power in 2004 some 137 MoUs were signed and awarded ‘to dubious companies’: “The hydropower scam in Arunachal Pradesh is one of the biggest scams of the region.”
Arunachal Pradesh chief minister Dorjee Khandu would have allotted contracts ‘through agreements’: “The MoUs have been signed flouting all procedures and norms set by the Union power ministry.”
It says that “hydro power projects totaling 70,000 MW and worth Rs 400,000 crore were signed in a short period. Companies with zero business activities and zero experience and with little financial strength had been allotted hydro power projects worth Rs 100 to Rs 1,000 crore”.
Whether the allegations will prove correct, only the future will tell, but there is no doubt that in India, like in China, the dam-builder lobby is extraordinary powerful.
As this article published in the ‘official’
Global Times shows, these lobbies have been able to revert the decision taken by Premier Wen Jiabao in April 2004; Wen had then given an assurance that the large hydropower plnats (on the Salween to start with) will be “seriously reviewed and decided scientifically.” As a result between 2008 and 2009, not a single major hydropower project was given the green light by Beijing.
Now ‘Science’ has taken a U-turn and says build, build, build.
A recent article in the
South China Morning Post (SCMP) noted the ‘scientific’ change of wind: “analysts say mainland authorities have clearly pinned their hopes on renewable energy such as wind, solar and hydropower, to help reduce the mainland's reliance on coal amid mounting concern over the country's environmental woes and huge carbon emissions”.
Weng Lida, former head of the Yangtze River Water Resources Protection Bureau told the SCMP: “Power companies and planning authorities have apparently gained an upper hand in the debate over hydropower development and used the need to cut carbon emissions and pollution as an excuse to gloss over problems resulting from irrational dam-building across the country."
The SCMP explains: “Environmentalists said the mounting international pressure on the mainland over its refusal to accept a mandatory cap on carbon emissions should not be used as an excuse to sacrifice the environment.”
But who will listen when billions of Yuans or Rupees are involved?
In authoritarian, as well as in ‘coalition’ governments, the dam-builders are the kings. The Indian Prime Minister will say that he was not informed.
This ‘scientific’ turn also shows that Premier Wen is already on his way out.


Ecologists dread new dam boom
Global Times
By Xu Donghuan
February 10, 2011
On the night of August 18 last year after days of torrential rain had soaked the steep mountain slopes, a mudslide struck a remote village in the northwest tip of Yunnan Province, killing 92 villagers.
"I was woken up in the middle of the night by a loud bang of rolling rocks and I ran outside with my family," 27-year-old villager Yu Lichun told the Xinhua News Agency the next morning.
"When we reached the road, the mud was already up to our knees. It was lucky all my family made it to safety."
Others were less fortunate: Another villager Zhou Shunfang told the Yunnan Information News she lost eight family members to the slide.
Although officially cleared of any wrongdoing, an iron mine that sits too close to the riverbed two kilometers upstream on a tributary of the Nujiang River was blamed for blocking the river flow and causing havoc. Large mining machinery including 40 trucks from the plant was swept away into the river.
"When morning light broke, we could only see the tip of the mine in the floodwater," He Shilong, a villager who lived across the river, told Xinhua.
The mud flow - up to five meters thick - carried 600,000 cubic meters of debris and inundated homes and roads in an area of nearly seven square kilometers. Upstream from the debris, river levels were six meters higher than normal.
The site of a 300-meter-high dam in the early stages of planning 30 kilometers downstream at the Maji hydroelectric plant on the Nujiang River, remained largely intact.
Days after the deadly mudslide, the government of the Nujiang Prefecture found 750 mudslide-prone sites of about 20 square kilometers each in its 14,700-square-kilometer territory.
Less than six months after the tragic night, a two-story high rock that had been swept down from the mountains during the mudslide, was placed at the center of a memorial site for the lives buried under the debris.
"You have to stand in awe of the power of nature," said Guo Yuhua, a sociologist from Tsinghua University who visited the site in early December. "We humans must be out of our mind, wishing to harness nature."

Earthquake fears
This seems exactly what the country's dam builders are still trying to do. In 2003, a proposal to build 13 dams on the Nujiang River was submitted to the National Development and Reform Commission, just one month after UNESCO listed the river as a World Heritage site. Premier Wen Jiabao called off the project in April 2004 saying it should be "seriously reviewed and decided scientifically.''
China's southwest, loosely known as the greater Shangri-la region, is famous for its water. For years hydropower companies in China have been eyeing the potential of rivers here, generated by steep drops in elevation along their course.
Attempts to penetrate the region have been foiled over the last five years by the country's en-vironmentalists effectively lobbying the government to tighten its approval policy.
Between 2008 and 2009, not a single major hydropower project was given the green light by Beijing, resulting in less than one third of proposed projects in the nation's 11th Five-Year Plan (2006 - 10) beginning construction.
With large hydroelectric projects on ice, smaller projects that do not need State Council approval have multiplied on the tributaries in the Southwest.
"They are as dense as the stars on the sky," said Wang Jian, a river specialist from Beijing who visited sections of the major rivers in December.
Sixty tributaries around the Nujiang Prefecture have been dammed, local officials told the Economic Observer in April. Forty-two hydropower projects have been completed. Another 88 are in the pipeline.
"These sub-standard small hydroelectric stations can trigger landslides and are a great threat to the local ecological system," Wang said.
His worries are shared by Yu Xiaogang, a renowned river management specialist and founder of the non-governmental group Green Watershed in Yunnan.
Yu is known for his successful campaign over the years to protect the trunk of the Nujiang River from being dammed. In his view, building dams on the Nujiang River can trigger not only mudslides, but earthquakes.
"The Nujiang River valley sits right on a fault line," he said. "Building dams disturbs the mountains and is very risky."
A potentially deadly link between the earthquake in Wenchuan in 2008 and the Zipingba Dam just 17 kilometers from the epicenter has been pointed out by Fan Xiao, the chief engineer of the Sichuan Geology and Mineral Bureau in Chengdu.
Fan fears history repeating itself as the four Nujiang River dams downstream from the prefecture seat of Liuku are within a high-frequency earthquake zone.
As the 12th Five-Year-Plan for 2011-2015 approaches, environmentalists fear the government may lift the ban on large dams.
The approval on July 8 of the long-stalled construction of Jin'anqiao hydropower station on the Jinsha River, upstream of the Yangtze River, and the Zangmu hydropower station on the Yarlung Zangbo River in the Tibet Autonomous Region, has been widely interpreted as a clear signal.

Full steam ahead
The target is to construct hydropower stations with an installed capacity of 83 million kilowatts, according to the Institute of Water Resources and Hydropower Planning and Design for the Ministry of Water Resources.
"There is little chance that we will not meet our target this time," said Zhang Boting, vice-general secretary of China Hydropower Engineering Society and a
leading advocate for China's dam builders.
"Over the years, it has become clear that the accusations from the environmentalists are not based on facts.
"Building hydropower stations actually helps protect the rivers and the environment."
China's pledge to generate 15 percent of its power from non-fossil fuel sources by 2020 will inevitably play a significant role in the government's thinking about hydropower projects.
"China's stance on large hydropower projects goes with the pressure from the International community for us to keep to our promise on carbon emission reduction," Zhang said.
Lifting the ban on hydropower projects for the sake of reducing carbon emissions is too big a sacrifice to make, environmentalists argue.
"If the government approves the target, it means we will build one Three Gorges Dam every year for the next five years," Yu said.
Dai Qing, a veteran journalist and author from Beijing, believes that what's going on in China shows that China is always one step behind the world.
"In many Western countries, dam builders are out of favor," she said. "But here in China, we are still busy building dams."
When the country's legislators meet on March 5 for the annual National's People's Congress, environmentalists know it will probably be their last chance to raise concerns about the dam boom in southwestern China.
"We are very concerned about the rush to build so many hydropower stations across almost every river in the Southwest," said Wang Yongchen, founder of Green Earth, a leading non-governmental group specializing in the protection of China's rivers. "This is overexploitation and chaotic exploitation."
An emergency report is being drafted and a separate letter to Premier Wen Jiaobao is also nearing completion.
"We need to bring the decision-making process into the sunlight," Yu said. "The public has the right to know the risks of some projects of our 12th Five-Year Plan."

Fast facts: A history of China dam catastrophes
On August 9, 1960, the newly-built Qiaodun Reservoir in Zhejiang Province collapsed during a typhoon. Built and sealed in a rush in March that year, the dam had stood at 39 meters tall, three meters above the water level when a typhoon hit in early June. Locals were hastily mobilized to elevate the height of the dam. Then when a second typhoon hit on August 9, the dam collapsed, killing at least 500 people. Some records say the death toll was 4,000. After the flood, the 100-year-old town of Qiaodun was afloat with corpses.
On August 8, 1963, after a week of heavy downpours in the upper reaches of the southern branch of the Haihe River, Liujiatai Dam, built in 1958 at the height of the Great Leap Forward near Baoding in Hebei Province, collapsed in a "one-in-20-year" flood. In 30 minutes, 40 million cubic meters of water at a rate of 28,000 cubic meters a second, rushed out of the reservoir. Some 948 people were killed, 67,000 houses damaged and more than 1,400 hectares of farmland destroyed.
On July 31, 1971, the nine-month-old Hutai Reservoir in Fushun, Liaoning Province, collapsed during a "one-in-60-year" flood, killing 512 people. At a height of 21 meters and storage capacity of 4.6 million cubic meters, the reservoir had allegedly been designed to withstand a "one-in-500-year" flood.
On August 8, 1975, Banqiao Dam, built on the Ruhe River in 1952 at Zhumadian, Henan Province as part of a flood-prevention and electricity-production program aimed at controlling the Yellow River, collapsed. At a height of 118 meters and with a storage capacity of 492 million cubic meters, it was designed to withstand a "one-in-1,000-year" flood. The Shimantan Dam on the Honghe River, the second-largest in the flood-prevention system, and two other smaller reservoirs also failed that day: 26,000 people died in the floods, according to the official death toll. After the flood receded, 145,000 people died from epidemics and from famine. Some estimates put the total death toll at more than 220,000. The number of people affected by the disaster exceeded 12 million. A Discovery Channel show on May 28, 2005, rated the Banqiao Dam collapse No.1 on a list of the "Top 10 Technological Catastrophes of the World," beating the Bhopal toxic gas leak in India on December 3, 1984, and the Chernobyl nuclear accident on April 6, 1986.
On August 29, 1993, the less than two-year-old Gouhou Reservoir in Qinghai Province collapsed, killing 328 and leaving 40 missing.

Fast facts: China dams

China has more than 25,800 large dams, more than any other country in the world. These projects have relocated more than 10 million people from their homes and land Chinese banks and companies in recent years have been involved in constructing some 269 dams in 67 different countries, particularly in Africa and Southeast Asia. They include Kamchay Dam in Cambodia, Mphanda Nkuwa Dam in Mozambique, Merowe Dam in Sudan and Tasang Dam in Myanmar Dammed, diverted and polluted, China's rivers are reaching an ecological tipping point.

Wednesday, February 16, 2011

A Train for Nil Trade

In the early 1950's, Yatung (Yadong for the Chinese) was still a busy Indian Trade Mart.
Through the Panchsheel Agreement, some Trade Agencies were 'officially' established:
"(1) The Government of India agrees that the Government of China may establish Trade Agencies at New Delhi, Calcutta and Kalimpong.
(2) The Government of China agrees that the Government of India may establish Trade Agencies at Yatung, Gyantse and Gartok."

It was further agreed: "The Trade Agencies of both Parties shall be accorded the same status and same treatment. The Trade Agents of both Parties shall enjoy freedom from arrest while exercising these functions, and shall enjoy in respect of themselves, their wives and children who are dependent on them for livelihood freedom from search.
The Trade Agencies of both Parties shall enjoy the privileges and immunities for couriers, mail-bags and communications in code."

Unfortunately, it did not last long. A Note given by the Government of India to the Chinese Counsellor in India on 8 July 1959 states: "Apart from the Embassy, the Chinese Government have consulates General in Bombay and Calcutta and, by virtue of the 1954 Agreement, a Trade Agency in Kalimpong. All these Chinese posts in India enjoy full facilities for hiring of suitable accommodation for the offices and their residential staff. Chinese officers and members of the staff have freedom of movement without even intimation to the Government of India. They are allowed, after registration, to keep personal arms with them. They enjoy freedom of meeting whom they wish, freedom to distribute official bulletins, move in official transport and function without restrictions in India. Further full facilities are allowed for couriers to carry official mail from and to Chinese Mission and Posts in India.
2.Similarly Chinese nationals, other than officials, are permitted freedom of movement, facilities to take up employment, own property, ply their transport and indulge in trade between India and Tibet region as well as maintain shops and undertake petty commerce in India.
3. In contrast to these facilities for the Chinese officials and their nationals, India posts in the Tibet region and Indian nationals have faced, particularly in recent months, innumerable difficulties and disabilities in the pursuit of their official normal functions. The following are only some examples of such difficulties reported to the Government of India."
This was particularly true in Yatung. 

The Note pointed out to the restrictions on the movements of the Trade Agent: "By order of Military Control Commission freedom of movement is not being permitted to our Trade Agents even in the vicinity where the Trade Agencies are located. For example the I.T.A. Yatung was not permitted to go to Rinchengang,only six miles from Yatung, where he wished to meet the Indian Trade Agent, Gyantse, and his wife, who were returning to their post from Gangtok. Similarly a junior official of the Trade Agency, who desired to return to Gangtok on short leave, was not permitted to do so."

What is use for this new railway line considering that the trade is practically nil through the Natu Pass? Why this tremendous investment? For military purpose?




Plans on track, China rail link to stretch to near Sikkim border
Pranab Dhal Samanta
The Indian Express
February 14 2011
New Delhi : China is set to extend its Tibet railway network into the strategically important Chumbi valley area, next to Sikkim and the Siliguri corridor. This was confirmed by a Chinese Railways Ministry map, put out last month, showing China’s “long term railway network plan”.
Until now, these plans were being loosely speculated upon, but they now have an official stamp on it. The latest map shows the railway line extending from Lhasa to Zangmu on the Nepal border, which is going to eventually extend into Nepal and even Kathmandu.
According to the plan, another line will branch out midway from this link to Zangmu, at a place called Shigatse. This line will move east and go right up to Yadong, on the mouth of the Chumbi Valley. This town is connected to Sikkim through the Nathu La pass and is strategically located on the tri-junction of India, China and Bhutan.
There are areas near Yadong which are still disputed between China and Bhutan. The area witnessed military conflict in 1962 as part of the Indian effort to defend Nathu La.
While construction on the line has not yet started, sources said, feasibility studies are already being conducted. This project is slated for completion by 2017, bringing the Tibet railway just 500 km short of the Siliguri corridor. This may raise demands from Bangladesh to provide connectivity to the Chinese market via India.
This project must be seen along with the hectic progress, further east, on a railway line connecting Kunming in China to Singapore. With the Thailand government throwing its weight behind the idea, work on this project is moving at a quick pace. Given that there already exists a trade route from the Indian border to Kunming, the understanding is that pressure will increase on India to link up with the Chinese railway network.
What is of more concern to India is that the improved technological ability in this sphere means Beijing will end up meeting its deadlines. In the last year, China added over 10,000 km of high speed railway, and in the past five years has built 70,000 km railway lines. India, on the other hand, has struggled to connect Bhutan to India by rail.

US, China and the game of killing satellites

My article US, China and the game of killing satellites is posted on Sify.com. Click on the title to read.

Tuesday, February 15, 2011

Almost every tourist property is owned by non-Himachalis


"It would not be an exaggeration to claim that today almost every tourist property in the state is owned by a non-Himachali, and the government is silent about it." says this article in the HimVani.

The author raises some important questions behind the Karmapa issue, particularly the land problem.
Has the vociferous DGP, frivolously accusing Karmapa of all sorts of crimes, inquired into the 'tourist' properties in McLeod Ganj or Kangra in general? Do they all belong to Himachalis? Have they been legally purchased?
It does not absolve the Karmapa to be inquired into. But there should be no double standards. 
Prof Samdhong Rinpoche, the Tibetan Prime Minister yesterday told  the Times of India: "if huge haul of foreign currency including Chinese Yuan had been accumulated illegally must be investigated thoroughly to extract the truth about it." He added that "the Karmapa staff had been responsible for the money found to be kept at monastery in illegal manner. Regarding suspicions being raised about Karmapa being Chinese agent or spy, he said that he (Karmapa) was not so smart and competent to indulge in such sort of activity."
For the land issue, Mr Dhumal has to decide what he wants to do, but he can't apply the stick for Tibetans, if doesn't do it also for Punjabis and others who 'own' properties in Dharamsala and else in the State.
Politicians usually understand that 'business is business' (Dhumal knows that it is not in the interest of the State, if the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan refugees leave Himachal), therefore an anachronistic situation should perhaps be regularized.
As for the Karmapa, being surrounded for the past 11 years by police and intelligence officers, if he still manages to spy for China, only means that he is really clever... or the intelligencewallas totally stupid.
In my opinion, his biggest failure is probably not to have been able to make friends with Himachalis.
Let us hope that this will change soon.

Would we ever blame ourselves for the Tibetan crisis!
Himvani
February 14, 2011
By Satyakam Bharti
So the Himachal Pradesh government continues with its flip-flop on the Karmapa issue with the state chief secretary making a formal announcement declaring that the “state government trusts him fully” a day earlier, and then the Chief Minister himself contradicting her by saying that “there is no question of giving clean chit to anybody”. A couple of days earlier the state police had made every effort to vilify the religious leader and the state political big-wigs had fought a most unlikely war of words over the issue. While the whole debate over Himachali interests being compromised through benami land deals by Tibetans was waiting far an appropriate trigger, which happened to be recovery of unaccounted cash from Karmapa’s staff, the way the political establishment and the administrative machinery have conducted themselves over the last fortnight only reflects our own naiveté.
On the other hand, silence of the Union government reflects India’s perplexity in dealing with Ogyen Trinlay Dorje, the person, and therefore the status quo maintained over the last one decade is expected to continue. Or has the central government something up its sleeves? As of now, the way various wings of government have reacted to the development, there appears total lack of any definite policy on Tibetan refugees in general. If it was not so, them how come the government took 10 years to take action against the Karmapa on his alleged China links despite the fact that he has been living under near house arrest. And anyway, 10-years was a long enough time for India to decide what to do with him and maybe also to win him over, if we ever doubted his intentions.
The larger question, however, is of the common Tibetan refugees, who have been living with us for over five decades now. Let’s admit that there has always been an uncomfortable relationship between Himachalis and Tibetans and they live in two separate worlds, the reasons for which are several – from economy to culture and politics. The recent developments will take them further away, and our politicians have been contributing to that. Sadly, over these years hardly have we ever thought about their refugee status and life in exile. Surely, there are several Indo-Tibetan friendship forums, but their reach is limited to seminar rooms and there is no people-to-people contact.
So while, as any other refugee community, they have created an economy of their own, for locals it’s still a riddle how they manage their finances. While overtly it may appear that the Tibetans are comparatively well off, but that may not be the complete reality. In any case, Tibetans still need our land for shelter and to do business but we never understood this need of theirs, or rather decided not to bother ourselves with the thought.
From 8,000 in the 60s to nearly 2 lakh now (that’s the official figures though the actual numbers may be in the multiples), the Tibetan community today is spread across India, but they can’t buy property. So were they expected to live in hotel rooms throughout their life? Those who settled in Karnataka and were allowed forest land are today successful farmers. Why could the same not happen in Himachal? Because land in the mountains comes at a premium, and it’s more profitable to raise a hotel building than to till fields. The local administration had no problems with this arrangement because influential property dealers were earning in millions by buying cheap land from gullible local villagers and selling it to cash-rich Tibetan institutions and individuals. And anyway, the Tibetans just used the loopholes in our system to get benami land transactions done that other non-Himachalis too have been exploiting without being questioned.
It would not be an exaggeration to claim that today almost every tourist property in the state is owned by a non-Himachali, and the government is silent about it. Why, because it suits the political and bureaucratic establishment and also the local land mafia. The state government needs to answer why a request from the office of the Dalai Lama to consider the issue of Tibetans’ property rights has not been decided yet. The situation cannot continue for ever as the third generation of Tibetans has already started applying for Indian citizenship, to which they are now legally entitled. What if it happens fast enough and in large numbers and also that they continue building huge monasteries across Himachal. Would we still call it cultural invasion and an attack to alter our demography? This scenario is unlikely to arise as the Tibetans are as desperate to preserve their identity, as are we about not letting them usurp our resources. So let’s not be hypocritical but realistic and try to understand ground realities so that the two communities may co-exist without any ill-feelings, and considering our cultural, historical and political interests that should not be much of an effort, but only if our rulers show some signs of maturity.

Monday, February 14, 2011

I do not envy the job of the CSO: 100 Years of Signals

Maj. Gen. KK Tewari in 1961 in Tezpur

At a time when The National Military Strategy of the United States of America (2011) believes that: "assured access to the global commons and cyberspace constitutes a core aspect of US [military strategy]", it is worth looking back at the world history of communications.
The advent of the telegraph has been a major evolutionary step in communication which greatly changes the perspectives and possibilities of the Defence Forces. 
Let us not forget that it was only in 1868 that the first telegraph routes were built by the Army Signals, then under the responsibility of the Sappers and Miners.
However, on 15 February 1911, the Corps of Signals was formed as a separate arm. Since then, the world of communication has tremendously changed and
for the past 100 years, the Corps of Signals has followed this evolution keeping in mind its motto — Teevra Chaukas (Swift and Secure).
On the occasion of the 100 Years of the Corps of Signals and the 40 anniversary of the War for the Liberation of Bangladesh, we are publishing excerpts of the memoirs of Maj. Gen. K.K. Tewari (
A Soldier’s Voyage of Self Discovery), who commanded the Signals on the Eastern front in 1971. The author makes an interesting description of the set-up on the Eastern theater before the 1971 War.

Excerpts of A Soldier’s Voyage of Self Discovery
“About the time of the elections [in West Bengal] in mid February 1971, the Annual Signals Conference of CSOs [Chief Signals Officers] and Commandants was also held at Delhi presided over by the Signal Officer in Chief. The then Chief of the Army Staff, General (later Field Marshal) Maneckshaw addressed all of us. The remark he made while reviewing the situation in the country and with particular reference to Eastern Command, is worth quoting. He said, "I do not envy the job of the CSO, Eastern Army." He should have known only too well because he was the GOC-in-C [General Officer Commanding in Chief] of the Eastern Army before he became the [Army] Chief.
We had hardly heaved a sigh of relief, having successfully accomplished a most unusual and difficult task [supervising the Bengal elections], when trouble erupted in (then) East Pakistan. General elections had been held earlier in the whole of Pakistan under the military dictatorship of General Yahya Khan. Sheikh Mujibur Rehman's party from East Pakistan had secured a majority of seats, entitling his party to form the national government in Pakistan. This was not acceptable to the rulers in Pakistan who were mostly from West Pakistan. The denial of their rights brought the people of East Pakistan into the streets in protest. So a ruthless military clamp-down was ordered. It was enforced most brutally in Dacca and other places, starting in the last week of March 1971.
The result was that tens of thousands of poor miserable refugees-men, women and children flooded into India to escape the suppression which broke ail norms of decent human behaviour. We kept getting reports in Calcutta about the hell let loose by the military rulers in the whole of East Pakistan. The flood of refugees was unprecedented, nearly ten million ultimately had come into India in West Bengal, Assam, Meghalaya and Tripura. They blocked ail roads and caused serious problems for the already overcrowded state of West Bengal and others.
India could not possibly bear the burden of feeding and accommodating this massive influx. And with an unrelenting military regime in Pakistan, India's options were limited. It was obvious fairly soon that a military action might be inevitable. This possibility was a real nightmare. The monsoon, which broke in mid-1971, was a time when vast areas of Bengal got waterlogged. The only places which were free of water in the vast countryside other than some of the habitations were the roads and rail tracks and these were choked with refugees. How would the Army operate if it came to a military action?
It was also obvious that any military clash in East Pakistan would immediately involve a full scale war between India and Pakistan. Knowing also about the coming together of Pakistan and China-clandestinely with covert United States support, there was the added worry about a military collusion between these two countries and the possibility of a Chinese military action simultaneously on our Northern borders. Moreover, it was to be expected that insurgent activity in the border states of Nagaland and Mizoram would also increase. This would tie down more troops in a counterinsurgency role, besides the two fronts against Pakistan and China.
After the failure of an adventurist war against India in 1965, Pakistan had been feverishly preparing for the next round with the ample aid of sophisticated military hardware from their friends among the military bloc of which Pakistan was a part. It was not unreasonable to assume that the Pakistani Army in East Pakistan would have received a share of this weaponry, though the main threat was expected from West Pakistan along the Kashmir, Punjab, Rajasthan and Gujarat borders.
World attention had been focused on the mass uprooting and migration of population from East Pakistan to India. A large number of foreign correspondents from various parts of the world had gathered in Calcutta. There were also a number of dignitaries flitting in and out of Calcutta-not only those from the United Nations concerned with relief and rehabilitation matters and the World Health Organisation, but others too.
For strategic reasons, until then India's defence planners, had put the Eastern Command on a lower priority for allocation of resources, with the possible exception of its northern borders with Tibet. The disturbed law and order situation in our border states due to Naxalite and insurgent activities, as well as the almost insurmountable problems created for the local administration by ten million refugees, were potent additional factors to be taken into account in the operational planning at HQ [Headquarters] Eastern Commando. I personally used to feel deeply concerned.
The 29 years of my service then had been trouble free. There was also a justified sense of achievement in having done well till then with considerable operational experience in my field of work. The thought foremost in my mind was that if war were thrust upon us, there was no guarantee that we could deliver the goods; one would get the sack or 'get the bowler hat', as they say in the army.
Enough has been said by military writers about 'communications' being as vital for the success of any operation as are nerves for the human body. Here we were, dependent on the sparse, underdeveloped and indifferent P&T Department set-up for ail our trunk communications in the widely spread out areas in Eastern Command with the daunting challenge of a full scale war on more than one front ahead of us.
I had asked the Army Commander, Lt Gen Aurora in one of my earlier briefing sessions with him to let me have two things; firstly, more resources of men and material and secondly, more time to prepare and develop the necessary minimum telecommunications set-up. With a typical but affectionately understanding glint in his eyes, Gen Aurora had responded immediately by saying, "Krishen, I can give you an answer to your two requests right now. First of all, as for more resources, the answer is NA (stands for 'not available', a term commonly used by the Ordnance Corps with which most army units were particularly familiar at that time). I have been told clearly by the Chief that we have to make do with whatever we have got. I am sorry this is not in my hands. And as for your second request, I suggest that the only thing to do is for you to pray for it."
Underdeveloped and inadequate were terms which were equally applicable to the road and rail communications in different sectors in which the army would be required to operate. One can visualise the problems geographically with the wedge of East Pakistan driven into the area of responsibility of Eastern Command in North Bengal. Just to give an idea of air travel: whereas the flight from Calcutta to Agartala in Tripura took 55 minutes in an Indian Air Lines Fokker Friendship, later on when we could not fly over East Pakistan, the same flight via North Bengal took almost 5 hours.
Similar to that of the Army Commander, was the response from my departmental head in Army HQ, the SO-in-C [Signal Officer-in-Chief], Lt Gen E. G. Pettengell when I appealed to him for more resources or at least for retention of some of the resources which had been pooled from all over India in Eastern Command for the elections. His answer was, "Sorry, chum. I cannot give you anything, you have to lighten your belt yourself and redistribute the resources to meet your additional requirements." This was the stage when all planning was hush-hush (Top Secret in Army language) and one could not even scream openly for more. In any case, in the Army, the hierarchy is not used to being questioned too much about their decisions, however unpalatable they may be to those below. "Yours not to reason (question) why!"
There were other problems to be faced besides the internal security aspects of Naxalite disturbances in West Bengal. As mentioned already, there were frequent strikes and bandhs by the P&T and other essential services during which the Army had to provide aid to civil power. We had to send telephone operators to man the civil exchanges and mechanics to take care of the equipment, which in many cases was deliberately faulted. And these personnel had to be escorted to and from their places of work and guarded there too. In addition, there were frequent thefts of underground cables" and overhead copper wires used for the static civilian telecommunications set-up on which the Army was dependent.
The Army had its own, exclusive field communications only in the forward areas, but for their rearward communications the P and T provided the trunk set-up on which circuits, both speech and telegraph, were hired by the Army. Everything would get disrupted whenever there was a theft of copper on trunk routes. Even when the copper wires had been replaced by copper weld wire, after a short while the ingenious thieves, found an equally lucrative trade for copper weld wire, making coil springs out of it. It was suspected that some politicians were behind these organised gangs committing thefts. I used to be deeply concerned about the protection of the P&Ts microwave towers and had to make special arrangements for that, particularly for the one on Tiger Hill in Darjeeling on which ail our communications going to the North Eastern states depended. We did not have Tropo scatter equipment [a method of transmitting and receiving microwave radio signals over considerable distances] in the army at that time.
With the tremendous load of work and responsibilities on my jawans due to the shortages of manpower, we were suddenly faced, in the third quarter of 1971 in Calcutta, with a serious epidemic of conjunctivitis. Out of my five staff officers, three were down with this problem at one time. There was nothing one could do except to reduce further the hours of sleep for those not affected. This most acutely affected the cipher staff whose duties could not be performed by any other trade category.
This was then the scenario and backdrop to the operational situation in 1971. The third war between India and Pakistan since independence in 1947 was about to begin-the first in Jammu and Kashmir in 1947-48, the second in 1965. This narrative does not intend to cover the conduct of the actual operations for the liberation of Bangladesh. It would, however, be appropriate to reflect a bit on this war which split up Pakistan 25 years after its creation.
...When one does not have adequate resources for various tasks, one is forced to make various contingency plans. What is amazing, on reflection now, is how one was able to push through some of these plans against all odds and resistance at the time.
The resistance was at times even in the form of accusations that one was being unrealistic and too ambitious in hoping that the plans would work out. We were preparing for operations which could start any day at short notice; yet, one could not put things/resources on the ground where they would actually be required in war, for security reasons. All planning was still shrouded in the utmost secrecy and preparations had to be made in a clandestine way or as part of an overall deception plan. While the date of operations was not known, planning had perforce to cater for sudden short-term contingencies, even though one could go on with preparations for long-term contingencies.
On my staff in the CSO's branch, among others I had a very bright and capable staff officer Grade 2, who was a great support and strength to me Major AJS Gill. One of my regrets in the service at that stage had been the failure of all my efforts to get his worth recognized through a suitable award. I had mentioned earlier that I could not get adequate awards for some of the really deserving cases in the 1962 War against China. However, more than five years after my retirement, when I was invited by the Commandant of the Military College of Telecommunication Engineering at Mhow to conduct a discussion with a Senior Signal Officers Course on the Bangladesh operations, I was able to partly repay my gratitude to this officer. I insisted that Col Gill be invited from his retired life to assist me for the Senior Officers Study and thus relive those days together.
Just one example for the planning and development of telecommunications would be worth quoting. For the launching of operations from Tripura as the nearest route to Dacca, we had first to establish a static civil multi-channel telecommunication station in Tripura to link it to the national network on Microwave, which terminated at Shillong. Long arguments ensued on this crucial issue because of numerous technical and other objections. But we insisted that this had to be do ne and the P&T Department was persuaded to establish a VHF station at Teliamura in Tripura to give us multi-channel links from Calcutta via Shillong. After this proposal was approved, a bright P&T officer who had just returned from a course in the United States and who had been put in charge, stated categorically that this was not technically feasible.
There were three main objections raised by this officer which are worth listing. This has relevance to the question of executing projects in peace time without the overall emergency powers available during active war. One was, that this hook-up would not provide the reliable long-distance communications needed in spite of heavy expenditure. To counter this objection, we demonstrated its viability practically by using field type of portable army VHF radio relay equipment, proving that communications could be established satisfactorily from the height of Shillong, the long range notwithstanding.
The second objection was the non-availability of the required spare equipment in the country. We were told that orders for the new equipment from abroad would take many months to materialise. We could not wait. Therefore, we got a set of this equipment lifted from Nagaland area, which was under Eastern Command army control for counter-insurgency operations. We replaced that with our own army field type of radio relay equipment.
The third was the most serious objection from the security point of view. This link would be operating right across East Pakistan territory (Sylhet area) and would, therefore, be liable to interception by Pakistan. It was said that this might jeopardise operations due to premature leaks. This could not be answered easily. Our main argument was that it was better to have communications which could be 'protected' by other means such as codes and ciphers, rather than no communications at ail which would result in operations not taking off properly.
This was not the end of the story. After all the clearances had been obtained, the same P&T officer insisted that a proper building be provided for the installation of their equipment. This was also done by a crash programme through the courtesy of Army Engineers. But when it was all ready, our U.S. trained friend came to 'inspect' the building. He summarily disapproved of it, saying that the roof of the building was not high enough for the racks to be fitted.
One can visualise the patience one needed at that time with so many other things happening at once. To cut a long story short, the Engineers were persuaded to raise the roof by two feet. Our troubles did not end there. We had to have the equipment moved from where it was, together with a 200-line switchboard. White all this was being moved in a ferry across a river, the boat capsized resulting in the switchboard getting 'drowned' and lost. But fortunately the other equipment was saved.
The entire incident has been described at length because it is just one example of the type of problems we faced in Eastern Command even when decisions had been painstakingly arrived at.
The point is that whatever the difficulties were and however daunting they appeared at each stage, ultimately they got resolved and I do believe it was due to another 'force' which had come into play.
Immediately after the surrender of the Pakistani Army in Bangladesh in December 1971, a Military Study Team under a senior army officer (Lt Gen Eric Vaz, later an Army Commander) was appointed to study and record various aspects of the just concluded operations, for lessons. On the telecommunications aspects, I was asked to give one example each of the most important/momentous Decisions, Achievements and Mistakes in my sphere of responsibilities. My reply went as follows: Decision-the establishment of the VHF station by the P&T Department in Tripura before the launching of operations; Achievement-the judicious distribution of available meagre communication resources (men and material) in spite of a great deal of opposition from different sources including some of the formation commanders; Mistake-not to have thumped the table hard enough for more resources which were deserved by us. Of the last, a live example can be quoted.
I had asked one of the staff officers who had served with me earlier as a captain and was at that time posted as the Staff Officer Grade 1 (Signals) at Lucknow, for some help with resources during those planning days. We were told categorically that there were none to spare. The same officer, as luck would have it, was posted on promotion as a Colonel as the CSO of one of the newly created Corps in our Command for Bangladesh operations. As soon as he took over, he screamed for more resources. When he was told that we had tried all possible sources and the answer had been the same, namely 'NA', he promptly said, "Sir, I will tell you where you can get them from. You ask the CSO at Lucknow. They can easily spare …(such and such) items, as they do not need them." He was reminded what he had replied earlier but then such is human nature. We did ultimately tap that source successfully.
Another source of equipment which we tapped successfully was the Ordinance Depot at Agra. As the Staff Officer Grade I (Signals) at Lucknow between the years 1957 and 1959, I had occasion to visit this Depot. It was found that a lot of World War II vintage signal equipment was lying unrecognised and unmarked in the huge sheds at this Depot. These sheds were given the name of 'LAN', standing for Local Agra Number, as they were not in the inventory of current equipment. In the middle of 1971, we had obtained permission from the Army HQ at Delhi to organise a team of technical personnel to go to the Central Ordnance Depot at Agra and recognise and pick out such equipment as could be of use to us, even though obsolete. This was done and some of this equipment proved to be of immense help during operations.
…Mention has also been made earlier about my conscientious approach to the work. In the past, during war situations or other times, and it happened on numerous occasions that difficulties would arise, I would adopt an attitude of 'fatalism'. But this time, I had a strange but powerful experience of peace in the midst of extreme uncertainty, confusion and tension and many a time amidst frayed tempers and frustration. A marked determination and self-confidence had developed in me. It is difficult to describe it in words but it can be said that it was unlike my normal self. There was a feeling and a conviction that whatever was being done was all right and that my efforts and plans would not be wasted nor fail.
The pace of work was fast and whatever resistance there was at various levels to anything we wanted to do would crumble, and smooth solutions follow all the initial turbulence. For months, the schedule was more than 15 to 16 hours of work a day with no holidays and frequent disturbances even during the rest periods. This did not consist of just sitting at an office table in air-conditioned comfort, but of travelling almost constantly to see results after instructions had been issued and making modifications on the spot where necessary.
I have always practised a maxim learned early on in the service, namely, giving of orders is five per cent, seeing that the orders are carried out is the other ninety-five per cent. An unaccountable energy helped me to keep this frantic pace day after day without a break.
After the Bangladesh war was over, the Army Commander, Lt Gen Aurora, while talking informally at the Corps of Signals birthday dinner party at which he was the Chief Guest on 15 February 1972, remarked as follows: "What has been achieved by Signals is really a miracle. But I do not believe miracles happen. It is the hard work and devotion to duty of all ranks. Resources were extremely meagre yet excellent results were produced…"

Sunday, February 13, 2011

Cast Away Illusions; Prepare for Struggle


Every student of international politics should study  this article published in the Qiushi Journal and translated by Chinascope, a website on China's affairs.
The Indian press has quoted parts of the article, particularly this sentence: "When faced with an aggressive U.S., how should China respond? The article “Cast Away Illusions; Prepare for Struggle” that Mao Zedong published on August 14, 1949, is still applicable to today’s situation: Our wishes to persuade the imperialists and those who are against China to be kindhearted and repent are fruitless and will never come to pass. The only way is to organize forces to fight against them. One fundamental principle that we must follow is the strategy, “If friends come, treat them with wine; if jackals come, we have shotguns for them.”
Beijing does not realize that if China is treated as a jackal by many of its neighbours today, it is because it acts as a jackal. 
Ultimately, threats will not help solving China's serious problems, including its aggressive image.


How China Deals with the U.S. Strategy to Contain China

[Editor’s Note: On December 10, 2010, Qiushi Journal, the official publication of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, published an article examining six strategies that the U.S. has developed to contain China: a trade war, an exchange rate war, a public opinion war, an anti-China campaign, military exercises and simulated warfare, and the development of an anti-China alliance. The author also analyzed seven counter-strategies for China to adopt. The entire article is translated below.] [1]

Recently, particularly since the financial crisis, the White House has been moving forward with a policy, which has become more and more aggressive, to contain China.

A. The U.S. Containment Strategies

1. The Trade War. According to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, the latest statistics show that, in just two weeks from October 1 to 15, 2010, the U.S. Department of Commerce developed as many as 24 trade remedies and related cases involving China. Nine of those incidents occurred in just four days from October 12 to 15. Since September, the U.S. has launched seven “section-337” investigations and one “section-301” investigation, involving products such as solar lights, LCD monitors, and printer cartridges. If we look at just the famous case of special protection given to U.S.-made tires, we can easily see that, indeed, the U.S. has launched a trade war with China. Whether China wants it or not, most of the world's media can see it clearly.

2. The Exchange Rate War. China is the U.S.’s largest creditor. However, the U.S., the borrower, is, in every way, more arrogant than China, the lender. Instead of discussing how to pay back the debt and stabilize the U.S. dollar, the U.S. government and public are clamoring for China to let the RMB appreciate. Ever since the U.S. Congress passed a bill on the RMB exchange rate, the U.S. media have continued to advocate for RMB appreciation. On the other hand, the U.S. Federal Reserve made the statement that “in order to foster economic recovery and job creation, inflation needs to return to an appropriate level." To accomplish this, it will print 100 billion more U.S. dollars per month. However, its real aim is to force currencies in emerging economies to appreciate. The U.S. also encourages its followers such as Japan and the European Union to join in pressuring China for RMB appreciation. The Bank of Japan has already proactively intervened in the currency markets. Because the U.S. wants to see the depreciation of the U.S. dollar, it is printing more and more dollars so that other countries become stakeholders and all get involved in the currency war. It is obvious that the intention of the U.S. is to contain China by launching an exchange rate war so that it can control the entire situation in the Asia-Pacific area.

3. Public Opinion War. The U.S. is the best at using public opinion to serve its national interests. The U.S. media are completely at the service of the U.S. government in creating propaganda. Whether it is CNN, the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, or the Washington Times, they all think it is a great honor to publish articles attacking and criticizing China. Moreover, the U.S. media also encourage the media in other Western countries to join the anti-China camp. These media pretty much all publish identical statements designed to create an iron curtain surrounding China. The situation cannot help but remind people of the Cold War.

4. An Anti-China Campaign. As the U.S. mid-term elections approached, the headline issues were not congressional candidates, but China. It was as if everything had to be linked to China. Everyone was constantly repeating, “China, China, and China.” The New York Times reported that at least 29 mid-term election candidates were playing the "anti-China card." For both Republicans and Democrats, China, like a sandbag that they can simply punch at will, is blamed for the current economic crisis in the U.S. The politicians were happy to manipulate the ever-increasing protectionist sentiments among voters. These candidates competed to use the anti-China label, attempting to amass more voters this way. The intensity of the anti-China campaign almost amounted to an anti-China war.

5. Military Exercises and Simulated Warfare. Recently, the U.S. allied with multiple countries to conduct military exercises in the Pacific, in Northeast Asia, in Southeast Asia, and in other regions. In particular, these military exercises frequently took place in the waters around China. On July 23, 2010, the U.S. led the biennial multi-country "Pacific Rim" exercise in waters near Hawaii; 34 ships, five submarines, hundreds of military aircraft, and 2 million troops from 14 countries participated. From July 25 to July 28, in the waters from the east to the south of Korea (the Sea of Japan), the U.S. and South Korea conducted a military exercise code-named "Indomitable Will." It was the largest US-South Korean joint military exercise in the past 34 years. More than 8,000 infantry, navy, air force, and marine soldiers participated in this exercise. The nuclear powered aircraft carrier the USS George Washington, South Korea’s landing ship "Dokdo" (recognized as the largest in Asia), and more than 20 other ships and submarines participated in this exercise. Starting on August 11, the U.S. and Vietnam held their first joint naval exercise in the South China Sea. The U.S. dispatched many large ships, including the USS George Washington. The latest military exercise began on September 16; the U.S. and South Korea launched a 10-day joint military exercise. The U.S. frequently prevails upon South Korea, Japan, Vietnam, and other countries that neighbor China for joint military exercises. Its purpose is very clear: to encircle China militarily.
6. Creating an Anti-China Alliance. The Russian newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta published an article on October 27, 2010, entitled "The United States Is Piecing Together an Anti-China Alliance." The article stated that the Pentagon is spending heavily to expand its base to contain China. Washington is also trying to persuade Vietnam and other Southeast Asian countries to join its anti-China alliance. Currently, in the confrontation with China, the Obama administration’s policies have become tougher and tougher. They are trying to put together an anti-China alliance that includes China's neighboring countries and trading partners, and form a united anti-China front based on issues of conflict such as the South China Sea and the RMB exchange rate. Recently, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Vietnam and other countries before returning to the East Asia Summit. She made a high-profile announcement that the U.S. would lead Asia. In November 2010, when Obama will visit Japan, Indonesia, India, and South Korea, “China” will certainly be an important topic of discussion. [2]

B. China’s Counter Strategies

When faced with an aggressive U.S., how should China respond? The article “Cast Away Illusions; Prepare for Struggle” that Mao Zedong published on August 14, 1949, is still applicable to today’s situation: Our wishes to persuade the imperialists and those who are against China to be kindhearted and repent are fruitless and will never come to pass. The only way is to organize forces to fight against them. One fundamental principle that we must follow is the strategy, “If friends come, treat them with wine; if jackals come, we have shotguns for them.”

1. Economic Warfare. Of course, to fight the U.S., we have to come up with key "weapons." What is the most powerful weapon China has today? It is our economic power, especially our foreign exchange reserves. The key is to use it well. If we use it well, it is a weapon; otherwise it may become a burden. Counting on the fact that the U.S. dollar is the international currency, the U.S. government has increased the number of dollars in circulation, leading to its devaluation. The countries with high reserves in dollars will suffer, but the U.S. itself loses nothing. However, for this to be true there is a premise. Someone must purchase those excess dollars they printed. If no one purchases them, then they will only be circulated domestically, inside the U.S., and cause inflation. In order for the countries with foreign exchange reserves in the U.S. dollar to restrain the U.S. from over-issuing U.S. currency, they must act together and not buy U.S. dollars. There are two ways to achieve this. The first is for all these countries to reach a consensus and act together as one. The second is if one country takes the lead, does not buy U.S. dollars, and other countries then follow. Which alternative should China choose? The first tactic requires countries with foreign exchange reserves to reach a consensus. China, Japan, the U.K., India, and Saudi Arabia are all countries with high foreign exchange reserves. Japan is constrained by the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and will not break away from the U.S., so the probability of Japan cooperating is very low. Great Britain has always followed the U.S., so the probability that it will cooperate with China is also pretty low. There have been recent changes in Britain’s political structure. Prime Minister Cameron has adopted a new strategy toward China that increases the possibilities for cooperation, making it a more likely player than Japan. Also, the U.K.’s foreign exchange reserves, which are market adjusted instead of sovereign funds, are to a large extent subject to market impact. India has stayed closely allied with the U.S. in recent years, and Obama promised to support India for a permanent membership in the UNSC. Thus, the probability for India to cooperate with China is also not great. India's purchasing power of foreign exchange reserves is very limited anyway, so it cannot influence the overall situation much. Saudi Arabia does not have much political interest in the U.S.; its purchase of foreign exchange reserves is purely commercial. So they are more likely just to follow the market. Based on this analysis, it is very unlikely that China and these countries would ever reach a consensus. Therefore, we are left with the second option, which is to take the lead in affecting the market for U.S. dollars. This approach is market-driven, so others will not be able to easily blame China. It is a good solution, and also we will not owe anyone anything for the favor of becoming our partner. The key issue is that China must have people who understand the market well and are good at using the market at the right time to impact the exchange rate of the U.S. currency. Of course, the most important condition is still that China must have enough courage to challenge the U.S. currency. China can act in one of two ways. One is to sell U.S. dollar reserves, and the second is not to buy any U.S. dollars for a certain period of time. The first option may cause the U.S. dollar to devalue, so China must consider whether it can take a loss resulting from the depreciation of the U.S. dollar. However, the U.S.’s over-printing currency will also cause the dollar to depreciate and will cause the foreign exchange reserve to shrink even more in value. Thus, in comparison, we will probably end up losing less. For the second option, if we do not buy the U.S. debt, what should we buy instead to increase our foreign exchange reserves? Options are the Euro, the British sterling, Japanese yen, Indian rupee, Russian ruble, and Brazilian currency. At the same time, buying the debt of these countries will help promote good relations and economic and trade cooperation between China and these countries. It will enhance China's economic influence in these countries. Therefore, this is a highly cost-effective tactic, and, more importantly, China is the biggest buyer of U.S. debt. China's actions will have a demonstrable effect on the market. If China stops buying, other countries will pay close attention and are very likely to follow. Once the printed excess dollars cannot be sold, the depreciation of the dollar will accelerate and the impact on Americans wealth will be enormous. The U.S. will not be able to withstand this pressure and will curtail the printing of U.S. currency. The dollar will then appreciate. Most importantly, through this, China's foreign exchange reserves will no longer be “the meat of the Tang-dynasty monk” [3] for the U.S. Instead, they will become a major economic force to constrain the U.S. The key to success is that China needs to have enough courage and determination to take the U.S. pressure. This is exactly what we need. It just shows how much the U.S. needs China. The more pressure we can take, the more successful this strategy. It will indicate that this "weapon" is highly effective and the U.S. will start to fear us.

2. Financial War. The fact that the U.S. dollar is the world's reserve currency makes the U.S. a financial superpower. Currently, China’s increased share in the International Monetary Fund and its increased voting rights are a very big step forward. The problem is not that the value of this share is expressed in U.S. dollars, but that it would be best if the share could be expressed in RMB. Therefore, for China to challenge the position of the U.S. dollar, it needs to take a path of internationalization and directly confront the U.S. dollar. The path of internationalization can be done in four ways. First, use Hong Kong as a springboard to increase the payment of the amount and the issuance of RMB bonds; there has been much progress, but not enough; we should believe in the popularity of the RMB in the international community. Second, using the huge foreign exchange reserve as a guarantee, we can issue RMB bonds globally, allowing other countries to use RMB as their foreign exchange reserve; we can consider setting up a central foreign exchange bank, specializing in the deposit and lending of foreign exchange reserves and related financial services. The huge foreign exchange reserves serve the same role as gold, to ensure that offshore RMB can be exchanged for foreign currency at any time. Third, create an international version of the Chinese securities market to attract foreign companies. Participants can buy the securities with RMB or foreign currencies. Overseas companies that are listed can raise funds in yuan or other currencies. Then the listed companies or a foreign exchange policy can determine the specific proportion of RMB or other currencies. Fourth, establish an international currency trade center, allowing world currencies to trade, forming an international financial market and a foreign exchange market. Specific trading rules and the national currency trade volume can be adjusted according to market demand. China's 30 years of history of reform and opening up show that the Chinese government and its people’s understanding and application of the market mechanism and free trade will be on par with the U.S. and other Western countries. China's ability to grasp the laws of the market and the ability to control economic trends are not inferior to those of Western countries. The market mechanism can propel the internationalization of the RMB, rather than relying on government negotiations. We fully trust the Chinese government’s capacity to handle the market and the regulations. If these four suggested actions can be implemented smoothly using the market mechanism, the RMB will become the world's reserve currency, putting pressure on the U.S. dollar and undermining U.S. financial strength.

3. Military exercises and simulated warfare. No doubt the U.S. military exercises challenge China's strategic bottom line. China should certainly actively respond, but the issue is how to respond skillfully. Wherever the U.S. chooses to conduct its military exercises, let's pick another location for our military exercise. This is not to avoid confrontation; it is “besieging Wei to rescue Zhao.” [3] The timing can be the same, but the location can be different. In areas where the U.S. once engaged in a military exercise, the Chinese military should immediately arrange a military exercise with a clear target, simulating war. There is no need for China to fear the U.S. aircraft carrier. During the Korean War, when the contrast in military strength was much greater than it is now, we were not afraid; why should we be now? Would the U.S. really dare to start a war with China? Facts prove that America is a paper tiger that cannot even handle Iraq or Afghanistan, not to mention China. We should definitely have the strategic determination and courage to defy such an enemy. As for aircraft carriers, they should not put any military pressure on China. Courageously contacting the U.S. carriers will only benefit us, not harm us. Only by in-depth contact can we truly understand the U.S. aircraft carriers. The fundamental purpose of war simulation via military exercises is to show China’s determination to meet challenges instead of avoiding them. This will send a clear message to the world that China has the strong will to resolutely safeguard its national sovereignty.

4. Space war. All U.S. strategic forces rely on its strong space facilities, which are both an advantage and a weakness for the U.S. As long as China can fully demonstrate its ability to destroy any space facility, and in particular to attack U.S. satellite facilities with precision, at a minimum cost, China can pose enough of a threat and place enough pressure on the U.S. Compared to U.S. aircraft carriers, U.S. military satellites are more vulnerable to attack. China's missiles can directly attack the military satellites, which usually orbit at an altitude less than 10,000 kilometers. In 2007, when China test fired missiles to destroy an abandoned satellite, the whole United States was shocked. China should make efforts to develop space weapons as soon as possible, as this is the most effective military means of attacking the U.S. If we can eventually fire missiles from a satellite, the U.S. will find that it has nowhere to hide; it will find itself entirely exposed to the attack radius of Chinese weaponry. At the same time, China’s satellite technology is what it is most proud of, most good at, and what is most independent (from foreign forces). It is only a small step behind the U.S. and Russia. Vigorously strengthening the building of our space military forces should be not only the focus of our national defense, but also the most powerful weapon to deter U.S. military blackmail. We should learn to explore independence in making more strategic choices and in developing weapons of strategic importance, instead of following the direction of the U.S. military. Of course, the Chinese government should not be afraid of Western media hype about the China threat. Defending our own interests is more important than any PR stunt. When the U.S. government sent troops to occupy Iraq and Afghanistan, it didn’t even care about criticism from other countries. Following our own way is a reflection of our self-confidence and is also a strategy.

5. Attacking a nearby enemy. The U.S. seems highly interested in forming a very strong anti-China alliance. It not only made a high-profile announcement of its return to East Asia, but also claimed to lead in Asia. What is especially unbearable is how the U.S. blatantly encourages China's neighboring countries to go against China. We cannot completely blame the U.S., as flies do not stare at seamless eggs. Countries like Japan, India, Vietnam, Australia, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Korea are trying to join the anti-China group because they either had a war or another conflict of interest with China. They are attempting to gain benefits by using the U.S., and these are the countries that surround China. Throughout the history of the new China (since 1949), peace in China has never been gained by giving in, only through war. Safeguarding national interests is never achieved by mere negotiations, but by war. Therefore, China must adhere to a basic strategic principle: We will not attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked, we will certainly counterattack. We must send a clear signal to our neighboring countries that we don’t fear war, and we are prepared at any time to go to war to safeguard our national interests. China's neighboring countries need China’s international trade more than China needs them, with the vast majority of China's trade deficit caused by these countries. Therefore, they, but not China, will suffer greater damage by antagonizing China. China should make good use of these economic advantages and strategic power. This is also the most effective means to avoid a war.

6. Befriending distant enemies. To attack a nearby enemy and befriend distant enemies was one of the most brilliant bits of political wisdom (articulated) during the Spring and Autumn Period. It should still be the best diplomatic strategy for China. Regarding the U.S. attempt to build an anti-China alliance, China's counter strategy of befriending distant enemies can have three components: First, disintegrate the traditional U.S. allies, particularly the European Union. Second, strengthen strategic cooperation with the U.S.’s neighboring countries. Even if we do not form an anti-American alliance, at least we can let the U.S. feel the pressure. Third, step up cooperation with Africa and other regions that the U.S. does not pay attention to. Let’s first analyze how to implement the first strategy. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and a weakened Russia removed it from being the European Union’s biggest threat and strategic rival. The thought of war is far removed from the EU, and peace is the norm. There is no reason for the U.S. to exist in Europe. Almost certainly, Europe does not need the U.S. in the military arena. So is there any economic need for the U.S.? The economies of the U.S. and the EU are quite homogeneous; they are more mutually competitive rather than interdependent. The global financial crisis has saddled Europe with huge losses and the U.S. with almost none. This has made Europe recognize that the U.S. has a reduced value.  Many European countries have come to realize that Europe does not need the U.S. The estrangement between Europe and the U.S. is an opportunity for China. The complimentary economic relationship between China and the EU is greater than the mutual economic dependence between the EU and the U.S. Therefore, China should make Europe the focus of its strategy of “befriending distant enemies.” Recently, China has increased exchanges with France, Portugal, Greece, Spain, Germany, and the UK, thereby significantly strengthening the cooperation between China and the EU. This is the right strategic direction. We must have the courage to implement the second strategy. The enemy's enemy is our friend; even if it is not our friend, it can be used to contain the U.S. In the Americas, countries surrounding the U.S. are not monolithic. China can further expand its cooperation with Cuba, Venezuela, and other countries that are not taking orders from the U.S. In addition, China should strengthen its cooperation with Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and other countries in the Americas, both in their economies and in trade. These countries’ economies do not vigorously compete with the Chinese economy, and there are broad areas of cooperation, particularly in agriculture. China should weaken its agricultural trade with the U.S. but enhance it with other American countries. China should make good use of the huge agricultural market, an important strategic diplomatic tool, to contain the diplomatic strategy of the U.S. On this strategy, China hasn’t done good planning and implementation. It should seize the current opportunity, that the U.S. is overlooking the Americas, to weaken the U.S.’s strategic backyard. Third, we should vigorously cultivate Africa. At present, the diplomatic relationship between China and African countries is built upon a good base and prospects are promising. The African countries are not only helping China in competition in the international diplomatic situation, but, in recent years, we have also been strengthening economic and trade cooperation with them. However, there haven’t been many military exchanges, so China’s strategic and economic interests in Africa are not effectively protected. Piracy is rampant in Somalia and the international community is crying out, but doing very little that is effective in the fight against piracy. Therefore, China can make use of this situation to expand its military presence in Africa

7. Public opinion war. The basic function of public opinion is to arouse the attention of the majority of the population, who are either for or against a certain issue. The media’s influence on public opinion agitates for support of or opposition to a person, an issue, or a country. So far, compared to the U.S., China’s position in international public opinion is vulnerable. It is often in the position of being opposed, with the initiators usually being the U.S. media. However, is the U.S. media loyal to the U.S.? No, the media is loyal to the market. Whoever can ensure that the media makes a profit can control the media. The media’s greatest goal is to expand their influence and expand their market share. In this regard, we can capitalize on the current advantage, which is that China is the object of a high degree of concern in the world, to fully use the role of the market to leverage the tone of international media coverage. For example, the Chinese leaders can take the initiative to accept some important Western media interviews, showing the world the real China and real Chinese leaders. In the past, Chinese leaders’ tendency to appear in a group has been very different from that in Western culture, which focuses on individuality. Westerners like to see more concrete and vivid individuals, especially the leaders. Therefore, Chinese leaders who have more charisma, personality, and the courage to accept a Western media interview are usually popular in the West. There are a number of media outlets in the world, but the opportunities to interview Chinese leaders are scarce. Being able to interview the Chinese leaders would certainly help to improve the media’s influence, would be conducive to attracting attention, and would expand the market. Therefore, Chinese leaders can fully take advantage of the market to let the world know the real China, understand China’s policies, and understand the Chinese people and government, so as to win the support of upright people, increase China’s influence, and create a favorable international environment. Past history has proven that whenever Chinese leaders take the initiative to actively accept the Western media, our policies are in an advantageous position, the Western media’s reports on China are more objective and comprehensive, and the Western public's understanding of China is comprehensive and concrete. Recently, there has been a great breakthrough in Chinese leaders’ acceptance of Western media interviews, but there is still great flexibility in the choice of media and in the way interviews are conducted. We can further explore this area, and choose how to publish information that Western people are used to. For example, we can do television interviews, publish articles in newspapers, give comments on the Internet, and even post a message on the micro-blog. Internet tools played a great role in U.S. President Barack Obama’s election campaign. We can use the new media and actively seize the international public opinion market.

Endnote:
[1] Qiushi, December 10, 2010
http://www.qstheory.cn/lg/zl/201012/t20101210_59023.htm
[2] Although this article was published on December 10, 2010, it was probably written prior to Obama’s November visits. We noticed the problem of the verb tense in the original Chinese, but did not attempt to alter the meaning. Instead we put a note here, so that the reader will understand.”
[3] Regarding “the meat of the Tang-dynasty monk”: This is an analogy from Journey to the West, one of the Four Great Classical Novels of Chinese literature. The “Tang-dynasty monk” refers to the Buddhist monk Xuanzang, who traveled to the "Western Regions" during the Tang dynasty to obtain sacred texts (sūtras). It is said that anyone who eats his meat will become an immortal.
[4] Besieging Wei to rescue Zhao, one of the famous Thirty Six Strategies from an ancient Chinese military strategy book.  This strategy derives its name from a famous incident that occurred in 354 BC involving one of China's most renowned strategists, Sun Bin (a descendent of Sun Zi). Pang Juan, a minister at the court of the State of Wei, who is believed to have had the same teacher as Sun Bin, was jealous of Sun's talent and had him framed as a spy. Sun escaped and fled to the State of Qi. Several years later, the king of the State of Wei appointed the same Pang Juan as commander of the army and sent him to attack the capital of the State of Zhao, Han Dan. The king of Zhao immediately appealed to the State of Qi for help. The king of Qi consulted his advisors, who all spoke in favor of immediately sending aid to their ally. Only Sun Bin recommended waiting and advised, “To intervene between two warring armies is like trying to divert a tidal way by standing in its path. It would be better to wait until both armies wear themselves out." The king agreed to wait. The siege of Zhao lasted more than a year before Sun Bin decided the time was ripe to come to Zhao's aid. The king of Qi appointed Prince Tian Ji as general and Sun as his military advisor. Sun came up with a plan, "Since most of Wei's troops are out of the country engaged in the siege, their defenses must be weak. By attacking the capital of Wei, we will force the Wei army to return to defend their own capital, thereby lifting the siege of Zhao while destroying the Wei forces at the same time." Tian Ji agreed to the plan and divided his army into two parts, one to attack the capital of Wei and the other to prepare an ambush along the route to the capital. When the Wei general, Pang Juan, heard that the capital was being attacked, he rushed his army back to defend it. Weakened and exhausted from the yearlong siege and the forced march, the ambush caught the Wei troops completely off guard and they suffered heavy losses. Zhao was thus rescued, while Pang Juan barely escaped back to Wei to recoup his losses. Hence the strategy of: besieging Wei to rescue Zhao.

Saturday, February 12, 2011

The Worse Drought in 200 Years




Some of China's provinces are facing the worst drought in 200 years. 
Xinhua reported about a solution to reduce the sufferings of the Chinese farmers: "China's air force has boosted the volume of rain and snow in four of country's driest provinces to alleviate drought.
An air force cargo plane took off from Yaoqiang Airport in east China's Jinan City, capital of Shandong Province, and performed cloud seeding in four provinces including Shandong, Henan, Jiangsu and Anhui. The operation took about six hours and covered nearly 50,000 square kilometers. The cargo plane shot more than 400 cloud-seeding shells into the sky in two sorties."

Unfortunately, this type of situation will keep recurring. It induced some Chinese engineers to think of a more radical solution. To divert waters from the South to the North and more frightfully (for India) from the West (Tibet) to the mainland. 
A few months ago, I wrote: "One of the possibilities was to divert waters from the Great Bend of the Yarlung Tsangpo, north of the McMahon Line by building a mega structure. There are different versions of the project, but the Shuotian Canal is the most elaborated. It is the brainchild of an engineer, Guo Kai whose life mission is to save China with Tibet’s waters. He has calculated that if waters from the Salween, the Mekong, the Yangtse, the Yalong and the Dadu (last two are Yangtse’s tributaries) were diverted and directed to the Ngawa Prefecture of Qinghai (Amdo) Province, the problem for the recurrent water shortage in north and northwest China could be solved (today, the Yellow River is dry more than 250 days in a year).
Guo not only worked closely with experts from the Chinese Ministry of Water Resources and the Academy of Sciences (CAS), but also made several on-the-spot investigations and surveys, before coming up with the details of his pharaonic scheme. According to him, the ‘Great Western Route’ diversion could solve the water shortage in north China, bring drinkable water to Tanjing and even counter the desertification facing the northern and northwestern provinces. It is why it is considered so vital to the Middle Kingdom’s strategic security."

China's future is not rosy. 

East China wheat basket braces for worst drought in 200 years
English.news.cn   2011-02-08 16:21:09    
JINAN, Feb. 8 (Xinhua) -- East China's Shandong Province, one of the country's major grain producers, is bracing for its worst drought in 200 years.
Liu Wei, deputy Party chief of Shandong, Monday told a meeting on drought relief mobilization that Party and local government agriculture officials of all levels should go to farms to ensure drought alleviation measures were being implemented.
"Provincial authorities should hold officials accountable if drought relief work is not well done," said Liu, deputy secretary of the Shandong Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China.
Data from the provincial meteorological bureau showed the drought would be Shandong's worst in 200 years if there were no substantial precipitation by the end of this month. The province has received only 12 millimeters of rain since September last year.
The central government Friday initiated a grade II emergency response in eight drought-ravaged provinces, including Shandong, under which the provinces began 24-hour weather monitoring and daily damage reports, and sent experts and relief materials to wheat growing areas.
The four-month drought had affected 35.1 percent of wheat crops -- 96.11 million mu (6.4 million hectares) -- accounting for 21.7 percent of total farmland in the provinces, the Ministry of Agriculture announced Monday.
The wheat growing area in the eight provinces accounted for more than 80 percent of the country's total, said a statement from the ministry's website on Friday.
Yin Changwen, spokesman of the Shandong provincial headquarters of flood-control and drought-relief, said Friday that water-efficient irrigation facilities under construction in Shandong were expected to supply 191 million cubic meters of water to farms this spring.
The four-month drought had affected 35.1 percent of wheat crops -- 96.11 million mu (6.4 million hectares) -- accounting for 21.7 percent of total farmland in the provinces, the Ministry of Agriculture announced Monday.
The wheat growing area in the eight provinces accounted for more than 80 percent of the country's total, said a statement from the ministry's website on Friday.
Yin Changwen, spokesman of the Shandong provincial headquarters of flood-control and drought-relief, said Friday that water-efficient irrigation facilities under construction in Shandong were expected to supply 191 million cubic meters of water to farms this spring.

Friday, February 11, 2011

Chinese Star War and the US



In December 2004, an interesting White Paper on Defense was published by the Chinese government. When I read it for the first time, I could not grasp a concept mentioned several times by its acronym RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs).
The White Paper explains thus the RMA: “The forms of war are undergoing changes from mechanization to informationalization... Confrontation between systems has become the principal feature of confrontation on the battlefield. Asymmetrical, non-contiguous and non-linear operations have become important patterns of operations.”
This theory made full sense only after I read one of the scariest books ever-published.
Unrestricted Warfare was written by Colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, both senior colonels belonging to the People's Liberation Army. Qiao and Wang started their fascinating study with the US’ success against Saddam Hussein's army during the Gulf War of 1990-1991. Unrestricted Warfare is basically a war manual detailing how a nation like China can face the technologically advanced US army, overcome this advantage and defeat the enemy.
The book came to the notice of the CIA after the September 11 attacks, because China’s military planners had suggested ways in which terrorists (bin Laden is specifically mentioned) could wage a new, unrestricted war against America.
In their foreword, the editors of Unrestricted Warfare point out the authors’ "advocacy of a multitude of means, both military and particularly non-military, to strike at the United States during times of conflict."
Blending the ancient martial arts theory with the knowledge of the high-tech era, the authors explain how the strong can be defeated by the weak through merciless unconventional methods: “the first rule of unrestricted warfare is that there are no rules, with nothing forbidden."
Unrestricted Warfare mentioned "Ten Thousand Methods Combined as One: Combinations That Transcend Boundaries". The art is to combine different elements of these various forms of warfare.
One of these forms made headlines in January 2007, when Beijing launched a ground-based weapon to destroy one of its own satellites. Recent Wikileaks revelations throw more light on the incident. The Chinese military establishment wanted to demonstrate its capability to destroy US satellites in case of a conflict.
As The Telegraph, which revealed the secret documents, explains: “The threat was obvious. Without navigation or spy satellites, much of America’s military would be vulnerable”.
According to Wikileaks, on January 15, 2007, US Ambassador Clark T. Randt delivered a demarche to Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister He Yefei. On January 21, 2007, Yefei gave the Chinese Government's formal response, he told US Assistant Secretary Hill that “the test posed no threat to any other nation, targeted no third country, and that for the time being, China has no plans for further tests."
Note the ‘for the time being’.
Hill replied a few days later that “the explanation did not square with China's stated position of not wishing to embark on any kind of arms race in outer space.” Hill further told He Yefei: “the U.S. remained concerned that China had not explained adequately the purpose of the test.”
A year later, Randt commented: “In nearly 12 months since the Chinese test, Beijing has provided no further explanation in diplomatic or military-to-military channels regarding the questions first raised on January 15, 2007.”
While several nations including the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea, France and Germany had also approached the Chinese government seeking an explanation, no ‘sensible answer’ was received "to questions concerning the apparent contradiction between the test and the PRC's stated policy against militarizing space.”
On January 7, 2008, the US Embassy in Beijing delivered a second démarche to the Chinese Foreign Ministry. The Americans pointed out that the anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon was intentionally used to destroy a satellite. The immediate consequence was that China has produced more breakup debris in low earth orbit than any other spacefaring nation (45% of the breakup debris is generated in space by China).
Condoleezza Rice, the Secretary of State used strong words to stress the contradiction between China's statements and actions. It raised serious “questions about the credibility of China's declaratory policies and commitments in other areas of national security affairs.”
Washington reminded Beijing that under Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty: the signatories of the Treaty (China is one them) have undertaken to have appropriate international consultations before starting an activity which could potentially have harmful interference in the peaceful exploration of outer space.
A threatening Condoleezza Rice added: “Any purposeful interference with US space systems will be interpreted by the United States as an infringement of its rights and considered an escalation in a crisis or conflict. The United States reserves the right, consistent with the UN Charter and international law, to defend and protect its space.”
It was clear that Washington was not happy with Beijing’s concurrence in space. As the United States were convinced that diplomacy had failed, they decided to strike.
Kevin Chilton, the head of US Strategic Command, and Marine General James Cartwright, the vice-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed Robert Gates, the Secretary of Defence that the conditions were ‘ripe’ to conduct a secret test of America’s anti-satellite weapon, the first in space for 23 years. A sophisticated SM-3, took about three minutes to climb 150 miles above the Earth, and destroyed an American spy satellite, known as USA 193.
The Bush administration immediately declared that the strike was a safety measure. The official version explained that the US spy satellite was falling towards the Earth and its toxic fuel tank posed a risk to human health. The safest option was to destroy the satellite which would then burn out while reentering the atmosphere.
According to a Wikileaks’ memo sent from the Beijing Embassy on February 22, 2008, the Chinese Ministry reacted sharply and asked “when the decision was made to intercept the satellite, [the Chinese Ministry] repeatedly emphasized that the United States should provide information on the planned satellite interception prior to releasing the information to CNN.”
While the direct discussions with Beijing mostly focused on the technical aspects of the situation, the Chinese spokesperson asserted that “the PRC was concerned about ‘possible harm caused by the U.S. action to outer space security.’ That was tit for tat!
At the same time, some Chinese academic think-tanks noted that “the PRC public and official response to the event was driven by their anger over the berating the PRC received after their January 2007 test”. Interestingly, the Wikileaks cable confirms that the US government always considered the strike as a military test.
On February 19, during a press briefing, Chinese spokesperson Liu Jianchao affirmed that “China was highly concerned over the action and would watch the situation closely”. He hoped that the United States will fulfill its obligations under international laws.
Two days later, Liu mentioned again that “China was closely following the possible harm caused by the U.S. action to outer space security and relevant countries".
The story is however not finished.
On January 11, 2010 Xinhua reported a midcourse missile interception within China's territory. According to a US cable: “[The US intelligence agencies] detected two geographically separated missile launch events with an exo-atmospheric collision also being observed by space-based sensors”.
Apparently, an SC-19 missile successfully destroyed a CSS-X-11 missile about 150 miles above the earth.
A worried Washington immediately questioned Beijing: “What was the purpose of this intercept flight-test? Was the intercept flight-test conducted as part of a ballistic missile defense (BMD) development program? …Which foreign ballistic missile threats are China's BMD development and testing program intended to defend against?”
A memo originating from the US embassy in Beijing said: “This test is assessed to have furthered both Chinese ASAT [anti-satellite] and ballistic missile defense technologies”.
For Secretary of State Clinton, the Obama Administration had no other choice but to retain the Bush-era concerns over Chinese space weapon plans.
The Telegraph commented:”There is growing concern over the potential for nuclear states or terrorists to attack western countries using space”.
The Chinese Senior Colonels had warned: “Whether it be the intrusions of hackers, a major explosion at the World Trade Center, or a bombing attack by bin Laden, all of these greatly exceed the frequency bandwidths understood by the American military… This is because they have never taken into consideration and have even refused to consider means that are contrary to tradition and to select measures of operation other than military means."
The new Great Space Game is indeed worrying; in a near future, the RMA is bound to bring great changes in the world balance of power not only between the G2, but also between the other ‘developed’ nations and China.
In the meantime, Indian officials have also acquired a great expertise on frequency bandwidth, but in a different manner. This is the Small Game!