Are the Rafales, Mirages?

Air Chiefs Raha and Mercier in front a Rafale

The first dog fight on the French multi-purpose combat aircraft is on in full swing. It is not a battle in the air, but through communiqués, articles by ‘experts’, information and disinformation, and more importantly, tough negotiations which have been facing complex technical hurdles.
Negotiators need to find solutions for something which has never been attempted before in India, at that level of technology.
It is also true that India has the reputation to be a country which lives in ‘eternity’; it has serious drawbacks when it comes to defence procurement.
Take Egypt. Field Marshal Abdel Fattah Al-Sissi, the Egyptian President wanted a few Rafales to show off at the forthcoming inauguration of the Suez Canal: the ‘negotiations’ with Dassault Aviation were completed in just 3 months. He bought 24 Rafales from Dassault Aviation; it included 5 to be delivered in time for the function in August. Egypt agreed to shell out the price paid by the French Air Force for its fighters, explained Eric Trappier, the CEO of Dassault. A similar ‘quick’ procedure may happen in the coming weeks with Malaysia and Qatar.
In India however, everything is different. First the political set-up is not the same, one person can’t take the decision on his own (Sissi personally negotiated the deal with the French Defense Minister), but also from the start, Delhi wanted to ‘Make in India’, through a large transfer of technology.
Indeed, everything always takes more time in India. In this case, the process started 14 years ago. The initial Request for Information dates from 2001, while the Request for Proposal (RFP) was only issued in 2007 and as the then minister, AK Antony wanted to add new clauses in the Indian defence procurement policy, such as the Total Life-cycle Costs, the process got further delayed. ‘Complications’ then started.
In January 2012, the French firm Dassault Aviation was selected for supplying 126 Rafales Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) to the Indian Air Force (IAF). The Rafale fighter (in French, ‘rafale' means a 'gust of wind') had gone through a long competitive process which lasted five years, with the American F/A-18 and F-16, Russian MiG 35, European Eurofighter and Swedish Saab Gripen in the race.
Out of the 126 aircrafts to be supplied to the IAF, 18 planes are to be manufactured by the French supplier, Dassault Aviation, from its facilities near Bordeaux in France, while the remaining 108 planes have to be built in India, under a Transfer of Technology agreement, by Hindustan Aeronitical Ltd. (HAL). It is here that serious differences between Dassault and Delhi have appeared.

The complexity of the deal

Exercises over Jodhur

The complexity of the ‘mother of all deals’ partially explains the delay.
Trappier recently explained that once the contract is signed, France would continue for some time to build the subsystems, which will be shipped to India for assembly in Bangalore: “Over time the manufacture, including the active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, will be phased over to Indian partners. The timetable is part of the negotiations,” he said.
“Dassault is patient and tenacious in its pursuit of the Indian deal for 126 fighters,” Trappier admitted. It is normal as the deal is important to France …but to India too.
A lot has been written in India about ‘liabilities’ to be incurred during the process of manufacturing 108 aircrafts in India. Should it be entirely the French supplier's responsibility? Indian Defence Minister Parrikar made it clear that he wanted the same quality for the 108 ‘Indian’ ones, as for the 18 French.
On February 9, Laurent Collet-Billon, the boss of the Armament Procurement Agency (Direction générale de l’armement or DGA) of the French Ministry of Defence for the first time gave a hint of a possible compromise: “Dassault will not be responsible for the whole contract. It is a co-management setup.”
Collet-Billion also admitted: “A lot of progress has been made since 2012.”
This was before the deal with Egypt for 24 Rafales.
By the way, the contract with Egypt is interesting in the sense that one of the main arguments of the anti-Rafale lobby has been that Dassault has not exported any plane so far. Now, this argument is not valid anymore.
At the end of February, a few days after the Aero Show 2015 was held in Bangalore, in which 3 Rafales participated, the French Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian met his Indian counterpart Manohar Parrikar “to salvage the multi-billion Rafale contract”, said the press.
An official not wanting to be identified told PTI: “This visit was a serious attempt to thrash out the issues that continue to dog the deal.”
Two months earlier the French Minister had already visited India and met Parrikar to put the negotiations on the ‘fast track’.
The main issue was the cost of manufacturing 108 planes in India, which is probably not easy to calculate, considering that many technologies will be new for HAL.

Dwindling number of squadrons
In a meantime in India, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence recently expressed grave concern “over the dwindling number of fighter squadrons in the Indian Air Force. The squadron strength has come down to 25 from the sanctioned 42.” The Committee’s report which was tabled in the Parliament, stated that the Indian Air Force (IAF) required at least 45 fighter squadrons to counter a ‘two-front collusive threat’, while the government has sanctioned 42 squadrons only: “The revelation is astonishing, and the committee feels that the paradox in the required and sanctioned strength needs to be rectified at the earliest,” commented the Committee.
The AIF should maintain 32 squadrons of 18 aircrafts each. The committee noted: “Moreover, 14 of these squadrons are equipped with MiG-21s and MiG-27s, which will retire between 2015 and 2024. Thus the strength will be reduced to just 11 squadrons by 2024. Our capability has already come down.”
The Committee added that though the IAF has inducted several ‘force multipliers’, such as airborne early warning systems (AWACS), mid-air re-fuellers and tactical airlift aircraft, the dwindling fighter strength operationally means that the supremacy that India has enjoyed over its neighbours is fast eroding. There is no doubt that India needs the MMRCA deal, (the Sukhoi SU-30 is not a multi-purpose aircraft, as Air Chief Marshal Arup Raha reminded the press during the Air Show in Bangalore).

The latest progress
On March 4, during a visit to Dassault’s factory near Bordeaux, Eric Trappier, who accompanied French President François Hollande declared that Dassault Aviation and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) will be the ‘joint prime contractors’ to manufacture 108 Rafale fighters in India. This helped clarified the issue of responsibility for the timely delivery and quality of the 108 aircraft manufactured in India.
During a press conference on March 11, Trappier further explained that it was a ‘new development’ (probably arrived at during Le Drian’s visit to Delhi at the end of February). He added: “This is the first time Dassault agrees to be a co-contractor …Dassault and HAL will both take responsibility for the part they will each build on the Rafale aircraft made in India." He asserted that this was ‘in line with the Indian government’s initial request for proposals’. He also confirmed that Dassault’s price offer remains the same. This is less clear: does Trappier speak for the 18 manufactured in Bordeaux or for the 108 in Bangalore?
The will to conclude the deal seems present on both sides. No doubt that compromises have to be found and as often in these type of deals, a political intervention at the highest level will be required (for example in the case of Egypt, when Hollande requested French banks to participate). One more occasion to fill up the remaining gap(s) will be the forthcoming visit of Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar to Paris; officially, he will be there to prepare Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit in April, but there is no doubt that the Rafales will be on the table too; it is in the interest of both India and France to have the contract signed at the earliest.
An Indian website Defencenews.com summarized the issue: “By choosing Rafale, India also gains access to cutting-edge technology to advance its aerospace and defense industries. …The entire rationale behind the Rafale deal wasn't to get the least expensive fighter to meet India's needs, but the aircraft that would best satisfy the nation's long-range military needs as well as its industrial interests.”
Even if it is not said, it is also important for Delhi to diversify its procurement of fighter planes; India can’t afford today to put all its eggs in the Russian basket.
Perhaps as an appetizer, the IAF will get its first two upgraded Mirage-2000 with new avionics and weapons before the end of March.
An official told The Times of India: “The upgraded Mirages have been stripped down and virtually re-built with state-of-the-art avionics, radars, mission computers, glass cockpits, helmet-mounted displays, electronic warfare suites and long-range missiles.”
Let us hope that we will not have to wait too long for the main dish.

The Rafale Saga

Very few in India know the meaning of the French word ‘Rafale’, which is now associated with the supply of 126 Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) to the Indian Air Force (IAF); ‘rafale' means a 'gust of wind'.
When the 'rafales' prevailed in the MMRCA competition, many thought that the Big Deal would soon be signed; three years later, it is still going through tough procedural ‘gusts of wind’. The reasons are not the qualities of the combat aircraft, but other complications.
Out of the 126 aircrafts to be supplied to the IAF, 18 planes are to be manufactured by the French supplier, Dassault Aviation, from its facilities in France, while the remaining 108 planes have to be built in India, under a large Transfer of Technology agreement, by Hindustan Aeronitical Ltd. (HAL).
Till recently the French side seemed very optimistic. In November, Eric Trappier, Dassault’s Chairman declared that his firm expected to conclude a deal by March: “The final phase of exclusive negotiations on the contract should conclude within India's current budget year ending in March 2015.”
He added that this date was a ‘reasonable goal’.
On December 2, when this writer interviewed the French Defence Minister and asked about the pace of the negotiations, Mr. Le Drian said: “The negotiations are proceeding well. For a project of this scale and such complexity, which brings the transfer of numerous know-hows to several industrial stakeholders of India, the pace is comparable to that of other negotiations. Both our Governments share the will to conclude it and this is, of course, essential.”
In January 2012, the French firm Dassault Aviation had been selected for supplying 126 MMRCAs to the IAF. The Rafale fighter had gone through a long competitive process which lasted five years, with the American F/A-18 and F-16, Russian MiG 35, European Eurofighter and Swedish Saab Gripen in the race.
While the initial Request for Information had been issued in 2001, the Request for Proposal (RFP) was only issued in 2007, as the then minister, AK Antony wanted to add new clauses, such as the Total Life-cycle Costs, in the Indian defence procurement policy. This is where the ‘complications’ started.
It is not always easy to follow the intricacies of the Rafale saga, since Dassault is, as the French say ‘muet comme une carpe’ (‘silent as a carp fish’ which makes bubbles with no sound); and the Indian Ministry of Defence and the Indian Air Force are not very loquacious too; it is understandable in view of the high stakes.
One can however gather from the Indian press that the main disagreement raised by the French is that Dassault is not ready to take the ‘full responsibility’ for the 108 fighters to be manufactured in India by HAL, while there is apparently no issue with the 18 fighter planes to be manufactured in France by Dassault.
An Indian defence ministry official told some Indian journalists (on the condition of anonymity, as usual): “The ministry is in no hurry to conclude the negotiations despite what people may say. Dassault has to accept commitment mentioned in the RFP.”
Another ministry insider said that Dassault was not agreeing to HAL’s demand to take responsibility for the manufacturing process in India, “regardless of French government’s pressure, [Dassault finds that] it is too risky”.
The same senior Indian MoD official added: “accepting terms and conditions of the original tender have emerged as the key issue to be resolved. The RFP clearly stated that under the transfer of technology agreement, the French will have to …take full responsibility of Indian manufactured fighter jets.”
The negotiations seem stuck on the imposition of penalties in case any delay occurs in the supply of the aircraft manufactured by HAL.
The question is: can Delhi ‘legally’ impose liabilities on something over which Dassault has no control? This sounds like one of these clauses drafted during the Antony Raj, where the ‘foreign’ supplier has to pay’.
This is also true for the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, which will be discussed during Obama’s visit later this month. The Economic Times recently editorialized: “India should bring its liability law in line with international norms. It makes little sense to keep nuclear suppliers’ liability open-ended and unlimited. This is what has held back vendors from the US, Japan and elsewhere from concretising their India plans.”
This does not solve the Rafale issue.
Ajia Shukla writes in The Business Standard: “For the first time since January 31, 2012, …a top Indian official has admitted serious problems in negotiating the purchase with French vendor, Dassault.”
Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar indeed spoke of ‘complications’ in the negotiations “with the French side reluctant to meet commitments that the IAF had specified in the tender”. Parrikar announced India’s Plan B: “The Su-30MKI is an adequate aircraft for meeting the air force’s needs”.
It is only a bluff or is the IAF serious?
Earlier this month, the Indian minister had assured his French counterpart that the Rafale negotiations would be placed on a ‘fast track’. More recently, he asserted that Le Drian “had committed to send an empowered person to negotiate after New Year.”
Now it appears that a French ‘empowered’ delegation is likely to visit India to take forward the negotiations. One could however ask: empowered' by whom?
Dassault Aviations is a private limited company, the last aviation group in the world still owned by its founding family, who owns 51% of the group’s shares (while EADS France – Airbus Group has 46%).
Could someone outside Dassault Aviation be ‘empowered’?
Would Delhi like to deal with an official of the French Ministry of Defence?
In which capacity would that person negotiate? Can the French State guarantee the liabilities of a private limited firm? All this seems rather complicated.
Since 1999, Dassault’s main activity has been the export of business jets (Falcons). In 2012, 71% of the revenues came from the sales of the Falcons, while the Defence sector (export) is less than 5%. Is Dassault ready to take the risk to spoil its ‘civilian’ branch by guaranteeing the Rafale deal? Of course, it is up to the familial firm to decide.
When Mr. Parrikar recently declared, ‘we are in a mess that I can't spell out’, was he thinking of this Deal?
There is no doubt that Dassault’s defence branch badly needs the Rafale order to survive, while the Indian Air Force desperately has to replace its ageing MiG-21s with a modern fighter. The IAF is aware that HAL’s LCA, the Tejas does not fit the bill; further the IAF which has today a sanctioned strength of 45 fighter jet squadrons, has only 25 operational squadrons.
The ‘Rafale Deal’ would be indeed a win-win for both India and France …if signed. Let us hope for the best.

The Shenyang J-11 in the Tibetan Sky

A Shenyang J-11's patrol in Tibet

The Shenyang J-11 is a single-seat, twin-engine jet fighter based on the Soviet-designed Sukhoi Su-27. It is manufactured by the Shenyang Aircraft Corporation and operated by China's People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF). The J-11/A is a fourth-generation jet fighter which, like the Russian Sukhoi, wants to be a direct competitor to US fourth generation fighters such as the F-15 Eagle and F-16 Fighting Falcon.
In 1995, China started to work on the J-11 after securing a $2.5 billion production agreement with Russia to build 200 Su-27SK aircraft using Russian-supplied kits.
Under the terms of the agreement, these aircraft were to be fitted with Russian avionics, radars and engines.
In 2004, Russian media reported that Shenyang co-production of the J-11 was stopped after only 100 planes had come out of the workshop.
What was cooking up?
Experts had an indication, mid-2002 the PLAAF had leaked photos of an upgraded multi-role version of the J-11.
Wikipedia says: "The indigenous J-11B variant incorporates various Chinese material modifications and upgrades to the airframe with improved manufacturing methods in addition to the inclusion of domestic Chinese technologies such as radar, avionics suites and weaponry,including anti-ship and PL-12 air-to-air missiles presumably for the role of a maritime strike aircraft. The alleged reason for the sudden stop in the production line of the J-11 was because it could no longer satisfy the PLAAF's requirements, due to elements such as the obsolete avionics and radar, which were structured for aerial missions."
In 2009, Rosoboronexport's General Manager Anatoli Isaykin announced: "Russia is going to investigate the J-11B, as a Chinese copy of the Su-27 and Sukhoi Company is partaking in the process."
In 2010, Rosoboronexport affirmed on their website that talks had started with the Chinese side, regarding the ongoing production of weapons that Russia considers as 'un-licenced'. Rosoboronexport expressed its concern over future sales of advanced Russian systems and components to China.
Further in March 2011, a joint Sino-Pakistani exercise, Shaheen 1, was conducted at a Pakistan Air Force (PAF) base. It involved several PLAAF  aircrafts and personnel. Photos of Pakistani pilots inspecting planes looking like the Shenyang J-11B fighters appeared on the Internet. The exercise lasted for around 4 weeks and was the first time the PLAAF had deployed to and conducted 'operational' aerial maneuvers in Pakistan with the PAF.
Was China trying to export the J-11 to its all-weather friends?
Now, the J-11 have been spotted in the Tibetan sky.
The caption on the Chinese site is: "Four armed J-11 fighters patrol the Tibet Autonomous Region in southwest China"

 

 

 

 

 

A reader commented (see comment below) that the Shaheen II joint  exercise between China and Pakistan were recently conducted in Xinjiang Militarily District of Lanzhou Military Area Command (military region).
The Hetian airbase would have been used for the exercises.
That is not far from the Daulat Beg Oldi and the Depsang Plain!