China’s Strategic thinking: yesterday and today

This article was published in the Journal of the Army War College

Introduction
'Strategic Leadership' often does not mean ‘Morals and Ethical leadership'. One of the best examples is Mao Zedong.
In Problems of War and Strategy, the Great Helmsman noted: “Some people have ridiculed us as the advocates of omnipotence of war. Yes, we are: we are the advocates of the omnipotence of the revolutionary war, which is not bad at all, but good and is Marxist.”
The moves of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in the early days of the revolution are a testimony that Mao was one the great strategists of the 20th century, though an extremely amoral leader.
On October 1, 1949, the new People's Republic of China was proclaimed; Mao told a million Chinese assembled on the Tiananmen Square. “The Chinese people have stood up, long live the Chinese Communist Party.”
In the following months, the new regime never missed an opportunity to tell the world through the Chinese media that China would soon ‘liberate’ large areas at the periphery of the Middle Kingdom.
On the other side of the Asian chessboard, Jawaharlal Nehru, the Indian Prime Minister was an idealist, not to say a dreamer or a romantic, and for him, the means more than the goal to be achieved, were of supreme importance. At Mao’s opposite end, he did not see the importance of the Army and believed that India could be the peacemaker of the planet; the Indian Prime Minister had little inkling about ‘strategy’ while Mao was a master, as the story of the long March shows.
We shall take two examples, the annexation of Xinjiang and the occupation of Tibet, to see how Mao acted as a great strategist, once he had chose his objectives.
A comment from the Communist Party’s Chairman speaks a lot about Mao’s mindset: “People may ask if there is contradiction to abandon a territory gained by heroic battle. Does it mean that the heroic fighters shed their blood in vain and to no purpose? This is to put the wrong question. Does one eat to no purpose simply because he relieves himself later? Does one sleep in vain because one wakes up and goes about? I do not think the questions should be asked thus; rather one should keep on eating and sleeping or fighting. These are illusions born out of subjectivism and formalism and do not exist in real life. ”
Mao, the great strategist, never forgot what his final goal was; the fact that Nehru and his collaborators later talk about ‘surprise’ and ‘betrayal’ showed their lack of strategic culture.
In the second part of this article, we shall look at today’s strategic policies of the Communist regime.

Military Annexation of Xinjiang
On February 4, 1949, during a meeting with Soviet Foreign Trade Minister, Anastas Mikoyan, Mao Zedong raised the issue of Xinjiang and pointed to the Northwestern district of Iili district, where China had noted an independence movement, as well as the presence of a communist party. Mikoyan told him that he did not know about the existence of a communist party, but was aware of nationalist forces in the district: “This movement was triggered by the incorrect policy of the Chinese government, which does not want to take into account the national specifics of these nationalities, does not present rights of self-rule, does not permit the development of the national culture.”
He added: “If the nationalities of Xinjiang were given autonomy, the soil for the independence movement would likely remain [sic]. We do not stand for the movement of independence of the Xinjiang nationalities and do not have any claims on Xinjiang territory, considering that Xinjiang is and must be a part of China.”
After Mao had the green light he needed, he explained that China was planning “giving Xinjiang autonomy, in the same manner as for Inner Mongolia, which is already an autonomous region.”
Interestingly, he was interested “in whether there is a lot of oil in Xinjiang or a little.” He also suggested the construction “a railroad connecting the Chinese railroads with the Soviet railroads through Xinjiang. This would have great significance for joint defense in case of a new war.”
The above discussion is interesting; first, Mao gets the Soviet green light to annex Xinjiang (later in the year). While showing his interest in oil and trade with Central Asia, then under Soviet Union.
Three months after this discussion, Mao instructed the PLA to ‘liberate’ the entire country, which included Xinjiang and Tibet. “A History of the Counter Attack War in Self-Defence along the Sino-India Border” which relates the annexation of Xinjiang, says: “The PLA rapidly advanced towards the East, South-middle, Southwest and Northwest China with the power of toppling the mountains and overturning the sea.” While, during the following months, the remnants of the Nationalist forces were slowly and systematically annihilated in the mainland, in Xinjiang, Mao used two tactics: sending a large number of troops in two different directions, while inducing the surrender of the Nationalist forces. He had already the assurance from the Soviets that they would not only, not interfere, but would also support the annexation.

A Swift Strategic Move
By swiftly taking over the Western Dominion, as Xinjiang is called, the Communists would be controlling the Western borders of the Middle Kingdom; access the trade with Central Asia; block any possibility of Soviet advance in the region (in case they change their mind later) and come closer to the Indian frontiers, particularly in the Aksai Chin area.
During the Second Plenum of the Seventh Party Congress, Chairman Mao Zedong gave the task for the liberation of Xinjiang to the Commander of 1 Corps of the 1 Field Army.
On September 8, the 1 Field Army was ordered to advance towards Xinjiang, while the 6 Army was to remain stationed in the Northern Xinjiang till further orders and the 2 Army was instructed to advance in Southern Xinjiang.
By the end of September 1949, a large contingent of Communist troops started moving towards the Western Dominion where a 70,000 strong Nationalist force was still stationed.
following the Hexi Corridor , the PLA advanced toward Urumqi which was ruled by a coalition comprising the Nationalists (KMT) and representatives of the former Second East Turkistan Republic (ETR), supported by the Soviet Union. The ETR sympathizers were particularly strong in the three districts in northwestern Xinjiang, where they had retained some autonomy, while the KMT controlled most of Southern Xinjiang.

The Second Step, the Nationalists become Communists
After having obtained the Soviet support, the second phase saw the Nationalists turning coats. On September 25, Tao Zhiyue, the Nationalist Commander-in-Chief of the Xinjiang garrison and Burhan Shahidi, the Political Commissar, announced the formal surrender of the Nationalist forces in Xinjiang to the Chinese Communists. Several Kuomintang generals joined the PLA and began serving the Communists; those who refused to surrender fled to Taiwan or Turkey.
A second victory for Mao …without fighting!
Later the five ETR leaders who were to negotiate with the Communists died in an air crash in Soviet airspace over the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic; it was rumoured that there were murdered. Anyway, the way was opened for Mao’s troops.

The Two Pronged Advance
Starting from Yumen , east of Jiuquan, the Communist troops went through indescribable harsh terrain, deep gorges, cold desert, “they started a massive advance of forces towards Xinjiang along North and South of Tian mountain,” says the Chinese account.
The 6 Army (comprising 16 Division, 17 Division and troops of the 18 Division) under the leadership of Army Commander Luo Yuanfa and Political Commissar Jianyue marched “towards various places in North Xinjiang continuously adopting various tactics for air transportation, mobilization of forces, advances, etc.”
The Chinese account says that the 2 and 6 Armies had been motivated by the slogan given by their Political Commissars: "Not be afraid of any sacrifice, don't fear any difficulties, bravely advance and hoist the five star red flag on the plateau of Pamir”.
On October 12, 1 Army HQ left Jiuquan by road.
On the same day, the 2 Army also advanced towards South Xinjiang. Wang Enmao, a veteran of the Long March who later governed China's Muslim-dominated Xinjiang Province for three decades was the Political Commissar.
Two days later, supported by a tank Regiment, the main forces of 4 and 5 Division of the 2 Army reached Hami . Ten days later , the 4 Division ‘liberated’ Qarqan , where the troops stayed a couple of weeks to recover from the quick advance march.

A New Headquarter in Urumqi
With particularly poor communications, the advance of Communist forces into Xinjiang was extremely difficult and risky; the distances were long, from Jiuquan  to Urumqi it was 1,253 km and from it was 2,547 Km from Kashgar: “In order to overcome the communication and transportation difficulties, Soviet Union came for assistance with 40 transport planes so as to quickly transport soldiers from Jiuquan towards Urumqi,” notes the Chinese account.
On November 5, a forward battalion reached Urumqi by air. Two days later the PLA commanders met with the Nationalist Army and Tao Chuyue troops at three places; on the same day, a People's Government was set up, formalizing the Xinjiang province’s accession to Communist China.
The next day, the HQ of the 1 Corps was airlifted to Urumqi.
From November 20 to 26, the PLA took over most of Southern Xinjiang and Kashgar where the HQ of the 2 Army was established on December 1, had fallen by then; the annexation of Xinjiang was complete.
The PLA had to cross deserts, walk over high snow-capped mountains, suffer starvation; indeed, the Communists realized an unbelievable military feast. Marshal Peng Dehuai and Xi Zhongxun  praised and encouraged the troops in a telegram: "You have created an unprecedented record of the advance of forces".
The PLA walked some 3,000 kms in six months, to complete their mission “the main force, in more than two month's time, successively liberated each important town and city in the North and South of Xinjiang, pinned down uprising launched by reactionaries of Nationalist Party at many.”
Strategically, Communist China was at the Gate of Tibet …and of India; a couple of years later, the construction across the Indian territory in the Aksai Chin area started.
Retrospectively, nearly 70 years later, one understands the importance of the annexation of Xinjiang with its the natural resources such as oil, but also the trade routes such as One Belt One Road initiative or the China Pakistan Economic Corridor.

The ‘Liberation’ of Tibet
In his study on Communist China and Tibet, Ginsburg gives a strategic definition of the plateau: "he who holds Tibet dominates the Himalayan piedmont; he who dominates the Himalayan piedmont, threatens the Indian subcontinent; and he who threatens the Indian subcontinent may well have all the South-east Asia within his reach, and all of Asia.”
Mao the strategist knew this well (so did the British before him).
For China, it was necessary to establish a de facto suzerainty over Tibet; iIt was also the first step towards the South, and possibly the sub-continent, particularly areas such as Ladakh, Bhutan or Sikkim.

The First Warning
On December 31, 1949, the Government of India hurriedly pushed through the recognition of the Communist regime in Beijing. The next morning, a broadcast of the New China News Agency proclaimed: "the task for the PLA for 1950 are to liberate Taiwan, Hainan and Tibet... Tibet is an integral part of China. Tibet has fallen under the influence of the imperialist."
Who were the ‘imperialists’? Was it the few Indians posted in Tibet?
Brushing aside India’s interests in Tibet, Mao prepared detailed plans for a military operation to ‘liberate’ Tibet. During the following months, China never missed a chance to assert that Tibet was part of China's territory and it was "China's sacred duty to liberate Tibet." Very few understood the message in Delhi.
In the meantime, the Indian Government was torn between two sentiments: on the one side Tibet was a small  independent nation with rich and deep cultural and religious bonds with India and on the other side Nehru and some of his colleagues had an immense admiration for the new People's Republic, which like India, had to struggle against colonial powers to gain her freedom.
In early August 1950, Marshal Liu Bocheng again reiterated: “[The] People Liberation Army will soon march towards Tibet with object of driving out the British and American aggressive forces so as to make Tibetans return to the Great Family of the Peoples Republic of China. As soon as the Liberation Army enters into Tibet they will carry out the Programme of National Regional Autonomy, religious freedom …. The military and political systems prevailing in Tibet now will remain as they are and will NOT be changed; various ranks of officials and men will work as usual; the present Tibetan Army will become a part of the National Defence Force of the Peoples Republic of China.”
The plans were clear.
For months KM Panikkar, the Indian Ambassador in China regularly put the blame on the Tibetans for refusing to ‘negotiate’ with China. However for Mao, it was clearly a two-phase strategy; first a military take-over of the Chamdo area and then a ‘peaceful liberation’ after the Tibetans had been militarily defeated and forced to sign an agreement with the ‘Central Government’, i.e. the Communist regime in Beijing.
On August 23, 1950, the Chairman cabled the CPC Southwest and Northwest Bureaus: "If our army can capture Chamdo in October, this will urge the Tibetan delegation to come to Beijing for negotiation for peaceful settlement."
So much for the peace-loving Panikkar who for months tried hard avoiding putting the blame on Mao for Tibet’s invasion.
Even though the Indian government was informed in August via Hong Kong of the war preparations, he had refused to believe it.
Mid-October, Chamdo the capital of Kham Province fell and on October 17 Ngabo Ngawang Jigme, the Governor of Kham capitulated without fighting and ordered the Tibetan army to surrender to the Chinese troops.
The four-direction attack on Tibet was a well-prepared military operation. The Chinese propaganda managed to put to sleep Delhi while the war preparations were going on full-swing.
The attached sketch shows how masterfully were executed the military operations (phase 1), which lasted hardly two weeks.
The history of Mao's China is a tale of well-planned and well-executed moves. All the events from 1949 onwards have been unfolded in a perfectly calculated sequence: the invasion of Tibet in 1950; after a very vague protest by the Indian Government and the adjournment of the Tibetan Appeal to the UN (at India's instance), the 1951 Sino-Tibetan ‘Agreement’ (forced on the Tibetans under duress); then the 1954 ‘Panchsheel’ Policy (neutralizing India under the Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai bluff); the first incursions on Indian soil at the end of the fifties; the crushing of the Tibetan uprising in 1959, and finally the ‘teaching of a lesson’ to India in October 1962 for having given asylum to the Dalai Lama and his followers in March 1959.

The Situation in 1953
On February 13, 1953, AK Sen, the Indian Consulate General in Lhasa sent a report to the Ministry of External Affairs in New Delhi assessing the advances of the PLA troops in the plateau. It gives a clear idea of the determination of the Chinese strategic planners to advance towards the Indian borders. The ‘Liberation’ of Tibet was just a pretext.
The report first discuss the total strength of Chinese troops stationed on the plateau. It is estimated to be between 20,000 and 25,000; these figures exclude the road workers: “The Chinese admit it was their plan to have a force of 60,000 troops but the supply position forced them to abandon it for the time being although they said the present strength was NOT enough to guard the borders,” writes AK Sen.
For centuries, the Indo-Tibet border did not need any troops to guard its borders and all a sudden, a force of 25,000, with all the attendant problems (such as food shortage) is not ‘enough’ for the Communists.
Does it mean that the Southern neighbor, i.e. India has become aggressive or is Delhi planning to ‘invade’ Tibet?
The report does not go further in the analysis, it just notes: “with the completion of the Chamdo-Lhasa Road within the next two years, more troops would be brought in.”
The two main axes, namely the Tibet-Qinghai and the Tibet-Sichuan highways, would be completed in December 1954, less than two years after the report was written.
The Consul General notes: “concentration at the outposts cannot be considered to be heavy. They are well scattered in small detachments and are kept frequently on the move.” The figures however show that the deployment is quite massive, as the map shows.
Mobility was part of the usual PLA tactics: “This mobility would enable them to be concentrated at any place in an emergency with ease.”
Is it different today, when most divisions bank more on the excellent infrastructure than the sheer number of troops on the plateau?
More than sixty years later, the main change is the incredible improvement of the infrastructure in Tibet, especially since the arrival of the railway link in Lhasa in July 2006 and subsequent development towards the Indian border.

Modern Strategic Thinking
Let us jump nearly 70 years in history and come to the recent Two Sessions of the National People's Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) which took place in Beijing in March. The Sessions are always an occasion to take stock of the new directions in which Beijing plans to go. While presenting his government’s Work Report, Premier Li Keqiang gave a comprehensive idea of China’s objectives in the defense sector; he asserted that “China will strengthen its maritime and air defense as well as border control amid efforts to safeguard its sovereignty and security,” adding that China would continue “to deepen military reforms, while upholding the absolute leadership of the Communist Party of China over the armed forces.”
Li also remarked that Beijing will ensure the organization of important operations related to countering terrorism, safeguarding stability, international peacekeeping, and providing escort in high seas, while China would “enhance its capacity of innovation in defense-related science and technology and step up development of advanced logistics and equipment …military-civilian integration will be intensified.”
These were the great lines of the strategic choices of today’s China.

PLA’s budget increase
A day before the NPC’s opening, a 7% military budget increase was announced. In an interview with China Military Online, Maj Gen Chen Zhou, Deputy Commander of the Military Strategy Department of the PLA Academy of Military Science explained the rationale of the increase during a press conference.
When asked how the incremental military budget would be used, Gen Chen said that it would support the national defense and the military reforms; he also spoke of updating China's military equipment, improving the training, the working and living conditions for grassroot-level troops, and cultivating high-caliber military talents.
He mentioned the in-depth military-civilian integration, dear to Chairman Xi Jinping. Gen Chen Zhou further explained that the military budget was “based on objective and rational judgment. China won't change the scope of increase simply because of sudden changes in external factors unless there is a large-scale war.” He added: “For a very long time to come, China doesn't face the threat of a large-scale war,” though he admitted that China could face local “warfare and armed conflicts caused by external factors.”
He described the military budget as consisting of two parts: “the need of national defense and the suitability with national economic development level. …China's military budget is coordinated with the growth of GDP and fiscal deficit and revenue.”
Giving an indication of the strategic choices confronting the People’s Republic, Gen Chen explained that the China’s armed forces still remain “an Army-based, defensive and labor-intensive military, and China's geopolitical environment requires it to maintain a strong army. …However, with the deepening of reform and the changes in China's security environment and the form of warfare, China needs to intensify the construction of other services too, including the Navy, Air Force, Rocket Force and Strategic Support Force.”
These are the new strategic changes.
Accordingly, the Central Military Commission (CMC) has decided to downsize the Army and phase out some troops while increasing the strength of the PLA Navy (PLAN): “China has set the strategic goal of building a maritime power, which is why the PLAN has developed so rapidly recently.” When questioned about China’s second aircraft carrier, he answered that it is “a benchmark in China's naval development. The Liaoning [the first Chinese carrier] has performed superbly both in testing and training. The second aircraft carrier is also in smooth progress and equipment is being installed on it."
He concluded by saying that China would continue to adhere to the peaceful development path and uphold the defensive national defense policy: “China's naval development and military development will be limited and appropriate," Chen Zhou emphasized, reiterating the main lines of the 2015 White Paper on Defence.
Let us look at the main strategic changes recently undertaken by the PLA.

Increase of the Marine Corps
On March 13, The South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported an increase of the size of the PLA Marine Corps (PLAMC), working under the PLAN, from 20,000 to 100,000.
According to unnamed PLA insiders, part of the expanded Marine Corps would be stationed abroad, including Djibouti in the Horn of Africa and Gwadar in southwest Pakistan.
The Mission of the PLAN has been expanding from conducting operations in China’s coastal areas — including defending Chinese ‘assets’ in the East and South China Seas — to play a larger role and prepare for a possible amphibious assault on Taiwan.
The SCMP explained “The PLA marines will be increased to 100,000, consisting of six brigades in the coming future to fulfill new missions of our country”. The size of the navy would grow 15 per cent from its estimated size of 235,000 personnel.
Two combat brigades have already been transferred to the PLAMC, increasing the size from about 12,000 to around 20,000. Each PLAMC brigade has two marine battalions and an armored regiment equipped with ZBD05 Tracked Amphibious Infantry Fighting Vehicles and ZLT05 Tracked Amphibious Assault Guns. This shows the rapid expansion of the Chinese interests beyond its coastal areas.

China to Reduce Army Reserves
The Global Times announced that Beijing planned to reduce its Army (PLAA) reserve while increasing reserves for other services. General Sheng Bin, the head of the National Defense Mobilization Department stated “while the army reserve will be reduced, the reserves of other military services including the navy, air force and the rocket force will be increased in a bid to keep up with China's military buildup.”
The structure of the reserve forces would have to adapt “to information warfare from traditional combat-oriented and mechanized ones,” he said.
A new structure is being established, the CMC would take care of the overall administration of the PLA, the People's Armed Police (PAPF) and the militia and reserve forces, while the five Theater Commands would focus on combat preparedness.
China had already announced a cut of 300,000 troops by the end of 2017 to build a more efficient military. In The Global Times, Major General Chen Zhou of the PLA Academy of Military Science is quoted saying that many officers would retire and be assigned to new positions; the CMC would “step up efforts on the national level to help retired servicemen resettle to civilian life by adopting a series of laws and regulations.”
It may be easier say than done.

Improved Military Training
An important aspect approved by the CMC is the military training. China Military Online reported that “the Training Management Department and the Discipline Inspection Commission of the CMC have jointly issued a notification of punishments for 28 cases of violations of military training regulations.”
The PLA and Armed Police Force have been urged “to conscientiously implement the important instructions of President Xi Jinping and the strategic decisions made by the CMC, and execute the combat effectiveness standards in the whole process of military training.”
It is obvious that the PLA has suffered of laxity and corruption in the recent past; this is not the case anymore under the Chairmanship of Xi.
The notification says: “In order to push forward the real combat-oriented military training, related departments of the CMC will conduct supervision over the implementation of the interim provisions on strengthening real combat-oriented military training in the PLA and Armed Police Force.”
And this applicable at all levels.
‘Training’ is the new leitmotiv of the Chinese armed forces.

Xi underlines innovation in military upgrading
On March 12, 2017, President Xi Jinping ‘joining’ a panel discussion with the PLA deputies at the NPC, called “for deepening military-civilian integration, while highlighting sci-tech innovation as the key to military upgrading.”
Xi said that efforts should be made to provide greater science and technology support for the PLA. He added that since the 18th CPC National Congress in 2012, “historic breakthrough in national defense and military reform has been made, significant progress in combat readiness has been achieved, and crushing momentum in fighting corruption has been realized.”
Xi spoke about one of his favorite topics, ‘military-civilian integration’ for national defense technology and military equipment. He emphasized strengthening military and civilian cooperation by training high-quality military personnel.
The CMC Chairman also said that “civil technologies should better serve military purposes, and defense technologies should be adapted and applied well for civil use.”
He noted that the Party’s decision to establish a central commission for integrated military and civilian development whose objective is to reinforce centralized and unified leadership.

Conclusion
Though it is not possible to compare the ‘strategic’ skills of Mao Zedong with those of his successors, particularly the present CMC Chairman, Xi Jinping, it is obvious that Beijing, today like yesterday, masters a clarity of goals to achieve for the revival of the Chinese nation; and it never hesitates to use the necessary means to materialize this vision. In strategic terms, the swift actions in Xinjiang and Tibet are still paying rich dividends, more then 60 years later.

Mr Xi, what have you gained in Ladakh?

My open letter to Chairman Xi Jinping (Mr Xi, what have you gained in Ladakh?) has been published by Rediff.com on the occasion of his 68th birthday (and one year of the Galwan incident)

'Why did your generals try to grab a few square kilometres of Indian territory in Ladakh?'
'And what happened to the hard work that you and Prime Minister Modi put into the Wuhan and Mamallapuram meets?'
Claude Arpi writes a letter to Xi Jinping, China's self-styled supreme leader, who turns 68 today, June 15.

Here is the link...

Comrade Xi Jinping
General Secretary, Communist Party of China’s Central Committee
President, People’s Republic of China,
Chairman, Central Military Commission (CMC)
Beijing, China

Dear Chairman Xi,
Greetings!
You may think it is presumptuous on my part to send a letter to you, the President of one of the two most powerful nations of the world, but being born in the country which invented Liberty, Equality, Fraternity and living in the one that believes in ‘Satyamev Jayate’ (‘The Truth will prevail’), it emboldened me to send you this letter.
I hope you will not misinterpret my audacity.

I was not sure how to address you, but here in India we see you first as the CMC Chairman, particularly since your Western Theater Command generals started an unnecessary confrontation with the Indian Army in Ladakh last year.
What has China gained from it? I don’t know.
What can the PLA gain in the future? Probably nothing.
In India, it has been taken very badly as it coincided with the chaos of the pandemic due to the COVID-19 which is said to have originated in Wuhan.
Till January 2020, ‘Wuhan’ was synonymous of ‘hope’: India and China could live together as partners in the changing world. It is why Prime Minister Modi invited you in Mamalapuram, to proceed on the sacred path of peace. It is no more the case today, after your generals forced India’s armed forces to spend a winter (and now a spring and a summer) in the previously paradisiacal and serene Himalayan mountains.
I am sure you realize that you lost a friend in the process.

A Community of Shared Future for Mankind
Mr Chairman, though I regularly read your speeches and follow your visits across your country, I must admit that I don’t always understand the actions of your Party.
Take your speech on the occasion of the New Year 2021.
Xinhua reproduced your article ‘Work Together to Build a Community of Shared Future for Mankind’ which had first appeared in the Qiushi Journal (the flagship magazine of the CPC’s Central Committee).
In it, you mention that “mankind is in an era of major development as well as profound transformation and change, and is also in an era of numerous challenges and increasing risks.”
Nobody can disagree with this.
When asked how to respond to this, you proposed “to build a community with a shared future for humanity and achieve shared and win-win development.” This is good.
You even added that “actions hold the key to building such a community, while  adding that “the international community should promote partnership, security, growth, inter-civilization exchanges and the building of a sound ecosystem.”
On this, everyone will agree with you in India; several thousand years ago, a rishi spoke of Vasudhaiva Kuṭumbakam (‘the world is one family’).
The Upanishad says:

One is a relative, the other stranger,
say the small minded.
For those who live magnanimously
the entire world constitutes but a family.

What I don’t understand is that if we share the same values, why did your generals try to grab a few square kilometers of Indian territory in Ladakh? What was the point that they were trying to make? Had they grasped the essence of your speeches?
And what happened to the hard work that you and the Indian Prime Minister put into the Wuhan and Mamallipuram meets?
Are you aware that the Ladakh episode has created a huge setback for the bilateral relations and that the Indian public will not forget soon?

About the Environment: the Irresistible Law
I wanted also to mention the all-important issue of environment
On April 30, 2021, you presided over a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee.
You had the occasion to speak of the construction of an ecological civilization; it is said to be a prominent objective for the Communist Party; you insisted on “comprehensively strengthening the construction of ecological civilization, and integrating the management of mountains, rivers, forests, fields, lakes, grasses and sand, and carried out a series of fundamental and pioneering activities.”
You further observed: “Ecological environmental protection and economic development are dialectically unified and mutually reinforcing. The construction of ecological civilization and the promotion of green and low-carbon circular development can not only meet the people’s growing demand for a beautiful ecological environment, but also promote the realization of higher quality, more efficiency, and more Fair, more sustainable, and safer development, and a civilized development path featuring production development, affluent life, and good ecology.”
The Chinese media emphasized your role in this: “General Secretary Xi Jinping’s important exposition on the construction of ecological civilization, with a lofty purpose, rich connotation, and profound thinking, is for us to deeply understand the significance of the construction of ecological civilization, fully and accurately implement the new development concept, and correctly handle the relationship between economic development and ecological environmental protection.”
On another occasion you ‘profoundly’ stated: “Humans and nature are the community of life, and humans must respect, conform to, and protect nature. Heaven and earth live side by side, and everything is one …When mankind makes rational use of nature and protects nature in a friendly manner, nature's rewards are often generous; when mankind develops disorderly and rudely plunders nature, nature's punishment must be ruthless. Human damage to nature will ultimately hurt mankind. This is an irresistible law."
Hundreds of millions on this planet agree with this.
It is why I can’t understand the announcement in The Global Times in December 2020 that your government was planning to build a cascade of mega hydropower plants (HPP) on the Yarlung Tsangpo: “The head of Power Construction Corp of China (POWERCHINA) suggested the planned hydropower station - which is expected to have three times as much generating capacity as the world-leading Three Gorges power station - aims to maintain water resources and domestic security.”
The information was confirmed by the administration of Metok County (of Nyingchi City); the project would be built north of the Indian border; a series of nine hydropower plants in cascade, which will threaten the life of India’s entire North-East region.
This would create unbelievable havoc not only in Pemakoe, the sacred Tibetan realm in the Great Bend of the Yarlung Tsangpo, but also downstream in Arunachal Pradesh (that you call ‘Southern Tibet’), Assam and Bangladesh. You are certainly aware that it is the most seismic area of the planet.
What will you achieve by going ahead with such a project?
You will certainly earn bad will from your neighbours while creating more anger, distrust, without speaking of the risk of a confrontation with India.

The Tibetan Issue
Mr Chairman, I am sure that you remember what your father the respected Xi Zhongxun wrote in The People’s Daily on February 20, 1989 after the untimely death of the revered Tenth Panchen Lama.
Your father condoled the death of the Tibetan leader: “Buddhist Master Panchen Lobsang Trinley Lhündrub Chökyi Gyaltsen died suddenly due to a heart ailment. The Chinese Communist Party has lost a loyal friend, and I have lost a colleague and intimate friend of 40 years standing.”
In the Panchen Lama’s obituary, your father noted “Over the past 40 years, the Panchen Lama and I established a deep friendship. Prior to his trip to Tibet to dedicate a statue at Tashilunpo Monastery, he took time to bid farewell to me and presented me with a khata (ceremonial silk scarf). It was his long-established habit to bid farewell to me when he left on trips, and to have a heart-to-heart talk with me when he returned. I knew him well. He was very enthusiastic, easily excited, and when he was working he could barely control his emotions. I advised him that because there was a severe lack of oxygen in this season in Tibet, he must be careful of his health, not get short-tempered, and that he should balance work and rest. He told me that he would die happy once his project was completed. I told him that Buddha didn’t want him to go yet, nor did Marx want him to go.”
That was the last time your father met the Tenth Panchen Lama.
In his long obituary, after mentioning the difficulties that both (him and the Panchen Lama) went through during the Cultural Revolution, your father wrote: “After the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Communist Party Congress in 1978, the Panchen Lama and I reunited. When old friends meet, all kinds of feelings well up. When the Panchen Lama saw me, he said uneasily: Because of my ‘70,000-Character Petition’ I got you in trouble, I’m very sorry for that. I answered: No one got anyone in trouble. We all got physically tempered, endured challenges and increased our experience. The Communist Party understands you.” At that time, we all hoped for a new China under reformist leaders like your father. Unfortunately, it has not yet happened, especially for Tibetans and the Uyghurs.
Your father had concluded: “I grieve the sudden death of the Panchen Lama, I hope that he is reincarnated. We must complete …make new contributions to a united, prosperous and civilized socialist new Tibet, and to the common prosperity of all ethnic groups.”
Today, the opposite is happening. It is difficult to understand why.
You must be realizing that the Tibetan question has been sullying the image of People's Republic for 70 years now. Why can’t you find a durable solution agreeable to all, it would be a win-win outcome.
The Dalai Lama is a sincere leader. Do you think that you can find a better interlocutor to bring about a radical change in the relations between Hans and Tibetans? I don’t think so.
I could, of course, mention several other issues, but it is better to leave at that today.

Mr Chairman, I feel that China has lost (or is losing) a golden opportunity to play a respectable place in the world, and this despite your vision of a shared future for humankind.

Yours sincerely
Claude Arpi

Dalai Lama in the US: 5 Burning Questions | in conversation with Claude Arpi | News9 Plus Show

My interview with News9

Dalai Lama in the US: 5 Burning Questions | in conversation with Claude Arpi | News9 Plus Show
 
The US on June 12, 2024, passed the Resolve Tibet Act that urges Beijing to re-engage with Tibetan leaders for a peaceful resolution with China. The Act is awaiting President Joe Biden's signature. Will there be fresh tensions between the US and China over Tibet? Analysing the scenarios are News9 Plus Editor Sandeep Unnithan along with Claude Arpi, a Tibetologist. Watch this topical discussion and don’t forget to like, share and subscribe for more such geopolitical discussions.

Can US Pressure Xi on Tibet?

Programme on News9

As India continues to grapple with Chinese aggression along the Line of Actual Control in Ladakh, a high-profile delegation of US lawmakers, led by House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Michael McCaul and former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, has met with the Dalai Lama in Dharamshala. This visit comes as the US House of Representatives has passed the Tibet Resolve Bill, which calls on Beijing to resume dialogue with the Dalai Lama and other Tibetan leaders about the governance of Tibet.

In this video, we explore the potential implications of this development and whether India can leverage the "Tibet card" to offset the pressure it faces from China on the border. Joining us to discuss this are Claude Arpi, a renowned author and Tibetologist, and Dr. Rajan Kumar from the Jawaharlal Nehru University, along with our in-studio expert, Deepak Bhadana.

Tune in to this insightful discussion as we analyze the complex geopolitical dynamics at play and the potential opportunities for India to assert its position on the global stage.

How China stokes unrest globally to contain West

My article Claude Arpi | How China stokes unrest globally to contain West appeared in The Asian Age and the Deccan Chronicle

Here is the link...

Examining China's expanding influence in Africa through infrastructure diplomacy, alleged connections with Hamas, and geopolitical maneuvers

At the end of an informal meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing earlier in May, the two leaders hugged each other, something rather unusual for Mr Xi (though he did it with Prime Minister Narendra Modi as well). US National Security Council spokesman John Kirby jokingly commented: “I’m not good at talking about personal human bodily affection one way or the other. I think I’ll leave it to these two gents to talk about why they thought it was good to hug one another.”
Whatever the US spokesman may say, the encounter was significant, as it heralded a still closer relationship between Russia and China. According to Reuters: “Russia, grappling with Western sanctions after its invasion of Ukraine, is increasingly reliant on its booming trade with China, which is challenging US supremacy in areas from quantum computing to espionage and hard military power…. The leaders signed a lengthy statement that sharpened their opposition to a US-led world order and pledged cooperation across fields ranging from space and nuclear technologies to finance and manufacturing.”
It is a fact that for Moscow, though the Chinese economy may be facing serious difficulties, Beijing is an ally of weight.

The Three Battles
At the same time, China is more and more asserting itself all over the planet. Long Kaifeng, a PLA commentator associated with the Kunlun Policy and Strategy Research Institute, a Communist Party of China think tank, recently wrote about “CPC’s 3-Battle Scheme” to erode America’s power prior to a clash in the Taiwan Strait; among other things, the author argues that the outcome of the “Three Battles” will see the US dollar becoming worthless.
Long explains: “On a global scale, three major battles are in Europe, the Middle East and Asia respectively. The Ukrainian war represents the European front; the Middle Eastern battle will be a conflict between Israel and Palestine, and the Asian theatre might be the second Korean war. After these battles, the US military and dollar dominance established post-Cold War will fall. The US dollar will depreciate, becoming worthless -- a trend seen as inevitable.”
The PLA scholar further notes: “Given the current situation, Russia seems poised to win in Ukraine. Reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Iran and unity in the Arab world are crucial to counter US-Israeli dominance. In East Asia, North Korea is ready, possessing nuclear capabilities and openly challenging US dominance.”

Beijing’s Assertiveness
In India’s neighbourhood, this translates, for example, in the Maldives falling for Beijing’s promises or in Nepal, a recrudescence of territorial claims in the Kalapani area, clearly influenced by Beijing.
Regarding Africa, China is, of course, deeply involved. In a research paper, Hema Narang from Delhi University believes that infrastructure diplomacy is the key to China’s influence in Africa.
The scholar gives an example: “China gifted Zimbabwe a new Parliament building in 2023. This gift is emblematic of China’s strategy of gifting large-scale projects worldwide, especially in Africa, to establish itself as a modernisation facilitator and gain international prestige. These projects, often grand structures such as government buildings and stadiums, transform the dynamics of donor-recipient relationships, augmenting China’s global reputation and subtly reinforcing material inequalities, while their architectural grandeur and visible labels such as ‘China Aid’ prominently emphasise China’s commitment to development and cooperation.”
She concludes: “In international societies, gifts work in a similar way, establishing prestige for the giver and reaffirming the receiver’s position.”
At the same time, everybody is not fooled by Beijing’s generosity: a “gift” does not always mean a free meal.

The Ukraine War
Another question often asked: Is China supporting Russia in the Ukraine war? There is no doubt that China is a vital partner for Russia, helping Moscow to soften the impact of sanctions imposed by the United States.
When asked if China was providing Russia with weapons, US secretary of state Antony Blinken told BBC: “What’s not happening is the provision of actual arms by China to Russia for use in Ukraine.” However, the US leader added: “About 70 per cent of the machine tools and 90 per cent of the microelectronics Russia imports come from China.”
Without Beijing, Moscow would certainly not have survived the Western sanctions so easily.

The Hamas War
More important perhaps is China’s hand behind the Hamas attack on Israel. A newspaper article says: “The evidence of the PRC green-signalling Hamas’ attack on Israel goes beyond the circumstantial.”
Quoting Guermantes Lailari, a retired US Air Force foreign area officer specialising in counter-terrorism, who recently visited New Delhi, the article says: “Massive quantities of Chinese arms, ammunition, military grade communication and other intelligence gathering equipment were found in Hamas warehouses in Gaza during the raids conducted by the Israel Defence Forces (IDF), in the aftermath of the October 7, 2023 attack on Israel by the Palestinian terrorist group. At least two tunnel engineers from China’s People’s Liberation Army were captured by the IDF, suggesting that extensive Chinese help was given to Hamas to construct the huge network of tunnels under Gaza City. Apart from this, the PLA has been giving military training to Hamas.”
The informant added that the head of Hamas’ military wing, Mohammed Deif, who masterminded the attack on Israel, lived in the China for years, and maintains deep contacts with the PLA.

One More Battle
One more front (or “battle”) seems to be in the French enclave of New Caledonia, which witnessed an insurgency from of the local population. While President Emmanuel Macron struggles to restore some order, a question is recurrently asked: Who is behind the unrest?
Paris has put the blame for the violence on extremist independence groups, supported from outside; Gérald Darmanin, the interior and Overseas France minister, asserted that Azerbaijan has some responsibility for the unrest: “It’s not a fantasy, it’s a reality”, he said. The Azerbaijan flag was repeatedly seen in the hands of rioters.
The next question is logically: “Who is behind Azerbaijan?”
Has Russia opened up a second front in its proxy war against France?
Though Azerbaijan has described the allegations “insulting”, and said: “We deny any link between the leaders of the Caledonian freedom struggle and Azerbaijan”, one could also put the question differently.

Who benefits most from the current mess in New Caledonia?
No doubt China is trying hard to make its presence felt in the chain of Pacific islands and an independent Caledonia would be a great boon for Beijing, while President Macron has never been in such a weak position, particularly after the recent European Parliament elections.

With China willing to discuss 'Dalai Lama’s future', Tibetan fate hangs in balance

When Modi was Chief Minister of Gujarat

My article With China willing to discuss 'Dalai Lama’s future', Tibetan fate hangs in balance appeared in Firstpost

Beijing has not called Dalai Lama a ‘separatist’ leader; instead, it has shown interest in discussing his ‘personal future’
With China willing to discuss 'Dalai Lama’s future', Tibetan fate hangs in balance

On May 24, Prime Minister Narendra Modi addressed a public meeting in Mandi to support Bollywood actress and BJP candidate Kangana Ranaut. In the course of his speech, he mentioned Tibet, something he rarely does. According to a press release from the PMO, Modi asserted: “The Congress government was so timid that it was afraid to even mention the name of Dalai Lama Ji. I frequently engage in discussions with Dalai Lama Ji. He is a stalwart of our rich heritage. India is the land of Buddha, and the Modi government has been actively promoting this heritage.”
The ‘frequent discussions’ are not in the public domain; we only know that from time to time, a phone call is made from Delhi to Dharamsala on the Dalai Lama’s birthday.
This statement, however, raises the issue of Tibet, which seems to have been dormant for years.
The political head of Tibet’s government-in-exile, Penpa Tsering, recently visited the United States and Canada. Everywhere, the Sikyong conveyed the urgent situation in Tibet “highlighting China’s efforts to eradicate Tibet’s distinct culture and identity and assimilate the Tibetan people”.
During an encounter with the Tibetan Diaspora, Penpa Tsering noted that the priorities and policies of his government were to enhance the stability and efficiency of departments within the Central Tibetan Administration and implement the Dalai Lama’s Middle Way policy.
He admitted that he was in contact with Beijing; according to Firstpost, the Sikyong stated: “We have had back-channel engagement since last year. But we have no immediate expectations from it. It has to be a long-term one.” Penpa Tsering, however, insisted that the talks were “very informal”.
PTI quoted him, saying, “I have my interlocutor who deals with people in Beijing. Then there are other elements also trying to reach out to us.”
Beijing was quick to retort: “[We] will talk only with the representatives of the Dalai Lama and not the officials of the Tibetan government-in-exile.”
The positive side was that Beijing did not call the Dalai Lama a separatist and instead said it was ready to discuss his “personal future”.
This has been Beijing’s position for the past four decades: the discussions can only be about the Dalai Lama’s future.

The Future
This, however, raises the issue of the future of Tibet and the Tibetan people.
In the early 1980s, the Dalai Lama envisaged a Middle Path approach, probably based on the “One Country, Two Systems” slogan coined by Deng Xiaoping at the end of the 1970s.
The Tibetan leader elaborated his vision for the future in two documents, a Five-Point Peace Plan in 1987 in Washington, DC, and his Strasbourg Proposal in 1988.
The first of the five points was “transformation of the whole of Tibet into a zone of peace”, a concept certainly appealing for India; another point was “respect for the Tibetan people’s fundamental human rights and democratic freedoms”.
The ‘Zone of Peace’ would soon be dropped, and the riots in Lhasa in 1989 and the subsequent imposition of martial law demonstrated the limits of the second.
In his Strasbourg Proposal, the Dalai Lama spoke of “the whole of Tibet known as Cholka-Sum (U-Tsang, Kham and Amdo) should become a self-governing democratic political entity founded on law by agreement of the people for the common good and the protection of themselves and their environment, in association with the People’s Republic of China”.
This was before the events of Tiananmen Square; before June 1989, there were probably chances that China could join the concert of democratic nations and be a normal state.
Ten rounds of negotiations took place between the Dalai Lama’s representatives (the CTA’s representatives have always been banned in Beijing) between 2002 and 2010. This led nowhere.

China, a Great Power
Things have changed since then; China has become the second most important economic player in the world, while the situation within the Middle Kingdom has grimly deteriorated since 2012, at least in terms of individual liberty.
Today, after the recent events in Hong Kong and the military threats against the ‘renegade island’ (Taiwan), ‘One Country, Two Systems’ cannot be envisioned anymore. This makes the situation in Tibet (and in Xinjiang, the other Chinese colony) more precarious than ever.

Taiwan
In February, a Chinese writer living in exile, Yuan Hongbing, revealed that China planned to use the Kuomintang’s (KMT’s) influence in Taiwan’s legislature to boost its United Front strategy. Yuan said that the information came from a “princeling” (son of a Chinese revolutionary leader) whom Xi Jinping does not dare to challenge. According to Chinascope, a US website carrying information on the Mainland, “the CCP is not just using military intimidation to destabilise Taiwan; it is also using propaganda, the deployment of agents, and the expansion of the KMT’s legislative power to override the Taiwanese administration.”
Last week, Chinese military spokesperson senior Colonel Wu Qian told a press conference that China’s reunification is an irreversible trend in history and that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is ready to take resolute actions to counter any “Taiwan independence”.
Soon after Lai Ching-te took charge as Taiwan’s president on May 20, the Chinese military warned Taiwan that “independence” would mean “war” and Beijing would thwart any foreign interference in support of “separatist activities” in the democratic-ruled island.
The recent military drills that followed were more to ‘scare the chicken’ than a rehearsal, as an ‘influence’ takeover will certainly be less costly and risky for Beijing. Yuan added that “the CCP’s Taiwan policy has shifted from coercion and enticement to psychological warfare, aiming to demoralise Taiwanese.”

Deterioration in Hong Kong
Around the same time, the BBC reported that a court in Hong Kong “found 14 pro-democracy activists guilty of subversion in the largest use yet of a China-imposed National Security Law. They included former lawmakers Leung Kwok-hung and Helena Wong, journalist-turned-campaigner Gwyneth Ho, and ordinary Hong Kongers who joined the mass protests of 2019, such as nurse Winnie Yu”.
Hong Kong Chief Executive John Lee took Beijing’s side and declared that his government will do its “utmost to prevent, suppress, and impose punishment” for any activities “endangering national security”.

Situation in Tibet
In Tibet, the situation is also rapidly deteriorating. A report by Human Rights Watch (HRW) noted, “Since 2016, the Chinese government has dramatically accelerated the relocation of rural villagers and herders in Tibet. The government says that these relocations—often to areas hundreds of kilometres away—are voluntary.” The Chinese rationale was to “improve people’s livelihoods and protect the ecological environment”.
Using over 1,000 official Chinese media articles between 2016 and 2023, as well as government publications and academic field studies, HRW said that China’s own media reports showed that participation in “whole-village relocation” programmes in Tibet is in fact compulsory. “In one case, 200 households out of 262 in the village did not initially want to relocate to a new location, which was nearly 1,000 kilometres away. In another village scheduled for relocation, all the residents except for a Chinese Communist Party activist initially disagreed with the plan to move the village,” said the report.
HRW could not find a single case where a village scheduled for relocation was able to avoid being moved.
What is left of the ‘genuine autonomy’ the Dalai Lama was dreaming of in the 1980s? Probably not much today.

Another Report

The Washington-based International Campaign for Tibet reported in May that the Buddhist Association of China (BAC), a non-political organisation, “is becoming a key instrument in the Chinese Communist Party’s strategy to assimilate and transform Tibetan Buddhism, particularly in relation to the search for and recognition of reincarnate lamas”.
When it speaks of the ‘sinification of Buddhism’, Beijing is obviously thinking of the succession of the Dalai Lama.
Since President Xi Jinping’s announcement of his intent to sinify all the religions in China, the BAC has been “mandated as the tool to implement campaigns that will contribute to its fruition, particularly in connection with Tibetan Buddhism”.
Founded in 1953, the BAC’s charter was amended in 2020 to include “Sinification of Buddhism in China”, one of its objectives in order to “support the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the socialist system, study and implement Xi Jinping’s Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, and adhere to the direction of the Sinification of Buddhism in China”.
During the recent Two Sessions held in Beijing in March 2024, Wang Huning, the Party’s chief ideologue, mentioned that the BAC “carried out 10 research and inspections in Tibet, Xinjiang, and Tibet-related counties in Sichuan Province on promoting the sinification of Tibetan Buddhism”.
In the present circumstances, hopes for a better tomorrow are presently limited.

One can only hope that when the Indian prime minister calls the Dalai Lama on July 6 to wish him on his 89th birthday, the Tibetan leader will be able to convince PM Modi that the fates of Tibet and India are intimately linked, in particular as far as the boundary between them is concerned.

As PoK rises in revolt against Pakistan, China continues infra-building in Shaksgam Valley

My article As PoK rises in revolt against Pakistan, China continues infra-building in Shaksgam Valley appeared in Firstpost

The new infrastructure could give a tremendous advantage to China in case of a new conflict with India in the region

Today, we are living in a world where everything can be seen from the sky, which often makes human intelligence (humint) irrelevant.
The latest case is a road illegally built by China in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). While in the old days, it would have taken months or years to discover the road passing close to India’s Siachen Glacier, satellite imagery of the new road was splashed over the Indian and foreign media.
The road, located in the Shaksgam Valley, branches out from an extension of Highway G219 (also known as the Aksai Chin road) and “disappears into mountains at a place approximately 50 km north of India’s northernmost point, Indira Col in Siachen Glacier,” according to India Today.
The construction that passes through Aghil Pass (India’s frontier with Xinjiang before 1947), was first flagged on X (formerly Twitter) by ‘Nature Desai’, an observer of the Indo-Tibetan boundary.
Tom Hussain, a Pakistani journalist who writes for The South China Morning Post, gave the Chinese motivation: “Pakistan is looking to develop new overland border crossings with China that would potentially boost the allies’ military interoperability against Indian forces in Ladakh and the rest of Kashmir.”
The Hong Kong newspaper asserted that the Gilgit-Baltistan region, today under Pakistan’s control, had proposed a new transit and trade route linking Xinjiang to Kashmir “[which] will increase Beijing and Islamabad’s military interoperability against Indian forces in the region”.
The spokesperson of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) immediately asserted: “Shaksgam Valley is a part of the territory of India. We have never accepted the so-called China-Pakistan Boundary Agreement of 1963, through which Pakistan unlawfully attempted to cede the area to China. …We have registered our protest with the Chinese side against illegal attempts to alter facts on the ground. We further reserve the right to take necessary measures to safeguard our interests.”
It is, however, necessary to understand the history behind the Shaksgam Valley.

The Role of Western Powers
When China invaded northern India in October or November 1962, Delhi had no alternative but to ask for the help of Western nations, particularly the United States and Great Britain. At first, the United States seemed only too happy to offer support, thus gaining leverage over India, which until then had been ‘non-aligned’; this ‘neutrality’ often meant an alignment with Moscow, while Pakistan, a member of the SEATO and the Baghdad Pacts, always sided with the West.
When, at the end of November 1962, Washington realised that north India was in danger of being invaded by Chinese troops, it immediately declared its support for Delhi, but instead of helping India, London and Washington chose instead to try to settle the Kashmir dispute between their Pakistani ally and India.
On November 22, Averall Harriman, the American Under-Secretary of State, and Duncan Sandys, the British Commonwealth Secretary, visited the two capitals of the subcontinent to persuade the enemy brothers that it was time to bury the hatchet and find a solution to their fifteen-year-old dispute. Harriman and Sandys eventually signed a joint communiqué and asked the two countries to resume negotiations.
Although India, in an extremely weak position, had some doubts about the possibility of obtaining positive results from negotiations conducted in such particular circumstances, Nehru accepted.
On December 22, 1962, Nehru wrote to the Chief Ministers of the provinces: “I shall briefly refer to Indo-Pakistan problems, notably Kashmir. In another four days’ time, Sardar Swaran Singh will lead a delegation to Rawalpindi to discuss these problems. We realise that this is not a good time to have such a conference because the Pakistani press and leading politicians have vitiated the atmosphere with wild abuse and attacks on India. Nevertheless, we have agreed to go and to try our best to arrive at some reasonable settlement. It is clear, however, that we cannot agree to anything that is against our basic principles and ultimately injures the cause of Indo-Pakistan friendship.”
In the end, the two delegations held a series of six meetings, but nothing much came out of them. The first negotiations took place in Rawalpindi, where Swaran Singh and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the two foreign ministers, confined themselves to a historical presentation of the problem and a reiteration of their respective points of view.

Derailing Talks
But soon the negotiations went off on a tangent: the Pakistan government announced that it had reached an agreement in principle with China on its northern border problem (with Xinjiang). Hardly a month after the end of the Sino-Indian war, Pakistan was prepared to give China a piece of India’s territory (as per the August 1948 UN Resolutions).
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What a slap in the face for India!
This agreement between China and Pakistan was obviously meant to derail the Kashmir talks.
It is indeed surprising that Pakistan, an ally of the United States and the Western world, should have chosen this moment to make the announcement. It was yet another proof that Pakistan expected nothing from the talks with Delhi, even though they had been initiated by their mentor, the US; at the same time, the support expected by India from the US for India’s northern borders had gone in smoke.
Nehru remained optimistic all the same, or perhaps, like the ostrich, preferred not to see anything. In a letter to the Chief Ministers, he remarked: “The talks have produced no results as far as our problems are concerned, except that they have reduced, to a small extent, the barriers of fear and mistrust that make it difficult to approach these problems.”
Negotiations continued, without tangible results, between 16 and 19 January in Delhi and 8 and 11 February in Karachi. Pakistan was only interested in a plebiscite for Kashmir, but India insisted on prior demilitarisation of the regions occupied by Pakistan.

The Treaty Discussed
On February 25, 1963, the government was asked in Parliament if the Note of Protest sent by Delhi to Pakistan regarding the Sino-Pakistan border treaty drew any response; if yes, what it said; and if the text of the agreement was available.
Dinesh Singh, the Deputy Minister in the MEA, answered: (a) No formal reply has been received to our protest note so far. (b) Does not arise. (c) No Sir.
At that time, Delhi did not even have a copy of the agreement.
Later, on the same day, Harish Chandra Mathur of the Congress asked again about the government’s reaction. Nehru answered: “The Government of India’s reaction is obviously unfavourable.” That was all.

The Treaty Cedes India’s Territory
China and Pakistan signed the agreement on March 2, 1963, by Bhutto and Chen Yi, the foreign ministers of the two countries. According to the two parties, this agreement was intended to promote “the development of good neighbourly relations and friendly relations and the safeguarding of peace in Asia and the world.”
In Article 1, it was acknowledged that the border had never been formally demarcated, and that the two countries wanted to draw it on the basis of “the traditional and customary border.”
As the Pakistani and Chinese maps did not match exactly, it was decided that the topographical features on the ground would be decisive.
It should be noted that in its description of the border, the agreement mentions the Karakoram Pass as the eastern end of the border. In practice, this seems to mean that the Siachen Glacier was occupied by Pakistan at the time. This was, of course, not the case. In fact, the Siachen glacier, long unexplored, has never been occupied by Pakistan, and it was only in 1984 that India took control of it.

Article 6
More interesting is Article 6, in which Pakistan and China agreed that after the settlement of the Kashmir dispute between Pakistan and India, “the sovereign authority concerned will reopen negotiations on the boundary with the Chinese Government so as to sign a formal boundary treaty to replace the present agreement.”
It means that even if the 1963 agreement was considered ‘legal’, which it is not, China is today building a road on a territory that is only temporarily with China. It is clearly a provocation in retaliation for India refusing to budge in Depsang and Demchok in Ladakh.
It remains that the new infrastructure could give a tremendous advantage to China in case of a new conflict with India in the region.
After maps of the new roads were published, External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar reasserted that Pakistan-occupied Kashmir is part of India; he also mentioned the resolution of the Indian Parliament, which states that PoK is part of the country, and observed, “So, what will happen in the future? Very difficult to tell. But, I always tell people one thing, today PoK is in the consciousness once again of the people of India.”
In the meantime, the people of Gilgit-Baltistan have started revolting against the Pakistani state. The game is certainly not over.

Tail End: India will soon have the occasion to protest again; Pakistan and China plan to ‘realign’ the Karakoram Highway to avoid Attabad Lake, which is prone to landslides.

The Last Indian Villages On Tibet Border

My article The Last Indian Villages On Tibet Border appeared  in Rediff.com

Here is the link...

'It is a breathtaking journey towards the Tibet border, especially since the Border Road Organisation has accomplished a fabulous feat in black-topping the road till the border.'

'One is left with a salute for the dauntless Indian soldiers who spend the winter in these majestic, though inhospitable areas (we were told that the temperature comes down to minus 40 in winter),' recounts Claude Arpi.

After searching for years in the old dusty files of the National Archives of India to unveil some of the secrets on a specific subject, one becomes rather familiar with the object of one's research ... but on paper only.
Often the physical reality is vastly different.
This is what happened to me when I recently visited a remote area in Uttarkashi district of Uttarakhand.
The places are Nilang (also written as Nelang), a village located in the Jadh Ganga valley, Jadhang (or Jadhung) and Pulam Sumda, the latter two lying on the upper reaches, towards the India-Tibet frontier. The Line of Actual Control (LAC) with the Chinese army occupying Tibet is located on top of the ridge.
The particularity of the place is that the area was claimed by Tibet before India's independence (and subsequently by China) as part of Tsaparang in Tsamda county of Ngari Prefecture of Western Tibet.

Today, when China claims any area, its Liberation Army first physically takes over the place and later Beijing announces that it is ready for discussions; the disagreement between the Lhasa government and the administration of the erstwhile princely Tehri state (and by extension British India) was different, it continued for decades, at the end of which no mutually acceptable solution was found, but the 'dispute' did not result in any physical clashes or even an increase of the police personnel posted on the border.
A large amount of correspondence took place between Tibet (Lhasa and the Dzongpen or commissioner in Tsaparang) and the princely states of Tehri‐Garhwal, Bashahr (today Kinnaur) as well as the provincial governments of the United Provinces, Punjab and, of course, the Foreign and Political Department of British India in Delhi.

The Brief History of the Dispute

The Gumgum nalla. Not really a border

Let us first look at the long history of the area.
The difference of perception seems to have arisen when the Dzongpen of Tsaparang, the nearby Tibetan district, visited the Gumgum nala in 1914. He publically announced his decision of setting up a boundary pillar on the spot near a bridge.
When the local villagers objected, the Dzongpen left without any further action.

A few kilometres beyond Gangotri, I kept asking my guide, "Where is this Gumgum nalla?" Finally, he pointed out a most insignificant place ...without a real nalla.
It is where the Tibetans had unilaterally decided to 'fix' their border with India. Of course, the watershed principle or other features determining a boundary were unknown to them.
Four years later, in 1918, the Tehri State decided to erect 3 pillars on the top of the watershed, at Tsang Chok‐la, following the watershed principle.
In 1920, the Tehri State surveyed for the first time the area and prepared cultivation maps of the Nelang area. The Jadh Ganga valley was then included in the maps of the princely state.
In 1921, the Tsaparang Dzongpen visited Nelang again. This time, he sent a letter to the Raja of Tehri requesting him to nominate an official to sort out the boundary issue; at that time, it was not yet considered a 'dispute'; it was only a 'difference of perceptions' between friendly neighbours.
The Raja answered that the issue had to be raised through the Government of India as it involved a problem between two foreign governments.
In 1924, it was finally proposed by British India to appoint a boundary commission, but due to the poor communications and the fact that these areas could only be visited in summer, the commission could meet only in the summer of 1926.
Travelling in the Valley, you first note the inaccessibility of the area. On the opposite side of the road, perched on a cliff, is the Gartang Gali (bridge), built some 150 years ago, by Pathans who are said to have come from Peshawar to build this bridge at a height of 11000 feet.
It was finally slightly easier for the villagers to move in the valley and eventually visit the trade marts in Tibet. This wooden step bridge path was closed after the 1962 War; today it has been opened for tourists.
The 3.5 km bridge is indeed a marvel of wooden architecture, worth the visit.

Gartang Gali, a wooden bridge, said to be built by Pathans from Peshawar

The Acton Commission
To return to history, in June 1926, T J C Acton, an officer of the Indian Civil Service, was nominated as the British representative to discuss the issue with Tibetan officials near the Gumgum nala.
The Tibetans claimed that the Tehri people had removed their boundary marks after they had returned to Tibet.
The British commissioner commented: 'Their attitude, I think, was that His Highness [His Holiness] the Dalai Lama had said that the boundary was the Gumgum nala, and that any criticism of that decree would be a dangerous form of blasphemy.'
It was the first of several commissions which would try to solve the problem with the Buddhist neighbour during the following years.

The Chor Gad, another route to Tibet.

At one point, the British, great adepts of compromise, suggested that Nelang could remain with Tehri State while Jadhang would go to Tibet. But a complication soon cropped up, Jadhang (and even Nelang) was claimed by the Bashahr state.
The Tibetan claim of a frontier in line with the Gumgum nala remained 'clearly absurd', according to Acton.

A moraine, a pile of unconsolidated debris, usually soil and rock
left behind by a moving glacier

The Saga Continues

Two years later, on November 14, 1930, Colonel J L R Weir, the political officer in Sikkim, informed the foreign secretary in Delhi that he had received a letter from Lhasa about the Tibet‐Tehri boundary question.
Weir commented: 'This Tehri boundary is one to which much importance is attached by the Tibetan Government so much so that they paid me a special visit to discuss the matter that day.' Nothing came out of a new enquiry.
Colonel Weir was replaced by Frederick Williamson as the political officer in 1932. During a tour in Western Tibet from August to October 1932, Williamson was requested by the Government of India to look into the 'Tehri‐Tibet' dispute again.
In his report, the political officer mentions the Acton Report which 'reported in favour of the watershed boundary claimed by Tehri, but the Government of India considered that the evidence showed that Tibet was entitled to a frontier further to the west.'
Williamson commented 'with the exception of the northwest corner, this tract appeared to my untrained mind to be practically valueless. But the south‐west corner contains valuable deodar forest.'
The discussions continued till Independence.

Nelang Village

Post Independence: The valley occupied
In the early 1950s, the government moved fast following the Himmatsinghji Committee report prepared by the Government of India. One of the actions suggested by the Committee was that areas such Tawang and Nelang should be immediately occupied by Indian forces.

Already in May 1950, the ministry of external affairs had sent a note to the ministry of defence asking the latter to comment on the feasibility to occupy the Nelang/Jadhang area; the Political Officer in Sikkim had noted: 'The guiding principle in the new circumstances must however be the Government of India's ability to vindicate what they would regard as the appropriate frontier.'
While visiting the area today, one realises the difficulty to sustain a permanent occupation of these villages. 

On April 4, 1950, the ministry of defence answered: 'The area under dispute is an extremely difficult country physically and climatically with hardly any communications. It therefore follows that operations in the area will have to be confined to short periods and undertaken by specially trained infantry.'

Six years later, China walked into the area.

On May 2, 1956, the ministry of external affairs complained about a Chinese intrusion. The ministry said: 'Nilang at the area right up to Tsang Chok‐la pass is clearly within Indian territory and has always been in our possession.'

Apart from the fact that the border follows the watershed, the area is clearly Hindu with two small mandirs being maintained by the Indian Army on behalf of the Jadh population.
Today, what remains of the villages of Nelang and Jadhang has been opened to visitors and the Government of India has decided to repopulate the villages under the Vibrant Village programme. This is a fine initiative, though it is not certain that the scheme will immediately succeed. In the meantime, the villages are worth visiting.

 As I entered the Jadh Ganga valley, the story of George Fernandes, the then defence minister, sending babus to the Siachen Glacier to study the topography of the place, instead of getting their knowledge from the files alone, came back to mind.
It is indeed an entirely different experience to travel on a road between two majestic ridges and slowly go up in altitude, from the base camp in Harsil village.
It is a breathtaking journey towards the Tibet border, especially since the Border Road Organisation has accomplished a fabulous feat in black-topping the road till the border.
One is left with a salute for the dauntless Indian soldiers who spend the winter in these majestic, though inhospitable areas (we were told that the temperature comes down to minus 40 in winter).
When India had a peaceful neighbour such measures were not necessary, but today Delhi has no other choice.

Jadh Ganga

 

Xi in Europe: How Chinese President posed as ‘ruler of world’ while Europeans 'begged' a solution for Ukraine

My article Xi in Europe: How Chinese President posed as ‘ruler of world’ while Europeans 'begged' a solution for Ukraine appeared in Firstpost

Here is the link...

Macron probably wanted to impress the French public with his diplomatic skills before the European elections in June. Unfortunately for him, banners and flags were unfurled by Uyghur, Tibetan and Chinese activists on the streets of Paris
Xi in Europe: How Chinese President posed as ‘ruler of world’ while Europeans 'begged' a solution for Ukraine

Observers could see that France was fascinated by China when President Xi Jinping of China paid a three-day visit to France; he was lavishly received by his French counterpart, President Emmanuel Macron.
What is strange is that at a time when President Vladimir Putin of Russia is considered to be the supreme villain in France (and in Europe in general), Xi is seen as a decent person that France needs to engage with.
But is Xi really different from Putin? Does he treat his minorities better? Have the Chinese people more freedom than the Russians? Certainly not. But Europeans and Westerners in general remain fascinated by China and prefer to bury their faces in the sand about the dark side of the Middle Kingdom.
Let us not forget that it is thanks to China that, for the past two years, Russia has survived all the US and European sanctions.
Putin may not be what one can call a ‘good human being, but unlike India, France has been unable to find a balanced relationship with Russia and China.
What were Macron’s motivations to receive so elaborately Xi Jinping and his wife Peng Liyuan (a major general of the People’s Liberation Army) with red carpets all over Paris and even in the snows of the Pyrenees mountains?

France’s Short Memory
In France, as elsewhere, political leadership has a short memory.
Who remembers February 23, 2017, when French Prime Minister Bernard Cazeneuve went to Wuhan to inaugurate a ‘P4’ virology laboratory? That day, Cazeneuve declared, “France is proud and happy to have contributed to the construction of the first high biological security ‘P4’ laboratory in China.”
The French Prime Minister further explained: “This cutting-edge tool is a central element in achieving the 2004 intergovernmental agreement on Franco-Chinese cooperation for the prevention and fight against emerging infectious diseases.”
This investment did not prevent or even foresee the forthcoming disaster, though it showed the level of trust between the two countries.
My point is that, despite having a very privileged relationship with India, Paris would not have trusted New Delhi enough to build a P4 lab in India.
But thankfully, during the following years, relations between New Delhi and Paris have grown in strength and depth.

First Visit to China
During his first state visit to China in 2018, the French President brought with him two key messages.
One was the huge possibility of cooperation between China and Europe and France’s commitment to that effort.
The other is a warning to not underestimate growing concern and frustration in Europe and elsewhere with what many regard as China’s unfair trade practices (such as investment restrictions).
At that time, Mathieu Duchatel, deputy director of the Asia and China Programme at the European Council of Foreign Relations, stated: “[Macron] wants to present himself as a leader of the EU, but at the same time, I think he wants to send a signal that Europe and the EU are in better shape than many think in China.”
In 2018, in a speech in Xi’an, in northwestern China’s Shaanxi province, Macron admitted that China faced a “united front from developed countries against its unfair trade practices”.
Nothing has changed since then. This has become acutely worse after the COVID crisis (made in Wuhan), though today the Chinese leadership desperately needs to be accepted by the world. This explains the Chinese President’s first outing after five years (to France, Serbia, and Hungary).

A Failure?
In an article published in Le Figaro (belonging to the Dassault family), President Xi Jinping spoke of “carrying forward the spirit that guided the establishment of China-France Diplomatic Relations [in 1964], working together for global peace and development.”
Xi wrote that he was bringing three messages with him: “China will work with France to carry forward the spirit that guided the establishment of their diplomatic ties, build on past achievements, and open new vistas for China-France relations.” He further observed: “I think it’s important to have a dialogue, everyone together, so we can all go in the same direction. It’s very important for French and Chinese people to communicate. China is a very important country."
He added that China understands the repercussions of the Ukraine crisis on the people of Europe, adding that the longer the Ukraine crisis drags on, the greater harm it will do to Europe and the world.
Good intentions indeed, but will they be followed by resolute action when an economic war is raging between China and the United States?

The French Motivations
Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, Macron has expressed his desire to ‘play a role’, but it was doubtful from the start that he could influence Beijing, which has its own interests with Russia; despite the official declarations, China has always stood firm behind Putin.
Further, the French President has stated several times that he does not rule out sending ground troops to Ukraine. Is it compatible with ‘playing a role’?
In an interview with The Economist earlier this month, Macron reaffirmed his previous statements backing Ukraine: “If the Russians were to break through the front lines, if there were a Ukrainian request, which is not the case today, we would legitimately have to ask ourselves this question,” he said.
Isabelle Lasserre in Le Figaro frankly noted: “Emmanuel Macron failed to win over his Chinese counterpart, reflecting France’s lack of clout in the face of China.”
Speaking of the joint press conference, she wrote: “Behind the tense face of the French president…and that of the Chinese president, uncomfortable and closed, we could not see the ‘friendship’…but the confrontation between two worlds that oppose each other on everything.”
It is indeed two opposite worlds.

Special Friendly Outing
In a very special gesture, Emmanuel Macron and his wife Brigitte took Xi Jinping and his wife to the Col du Tourmalet in the Pyrenees, where they watched folk local dancers and enjoyed local gastronomy.
Does it remind you of an outing in Mahabalipuram?
They had lunch on the spot; on the menu, typical Pyrenean dishes were chosen by Dominique Bouchait, the local chef. For starters, garbure, the traditional local soup. Then shoulder of lamb confit, with ham from Porc Noir de Bigorre cut into pieces, accompanied by Tarbais beans and porcini mushroom heads. After a cheese platter, for dessert, the chef had prepared a pastry known only to the local Béarnais: le russe (the Russian). It is made with an almond-based cookie and praline paste and is said to originate from Crimea.
However, in view of the war in Ukraine, this dessert, particularly appreciated by Emmanuel and Brigitte Macron, was at the last minute replaced by a banal blueberry tart. Diplomacy and politics prevailed.

Not Much Progress
The bilateral negotiations did not see much progress, though China will allow imports of pig origin protein feed as well as pork offal from France. However, European hopes for an Airbus plane order have been dashed, with the two sides only agreeing to expand cooperation.
A European diplomat said Xi was the ‘winner’ of the visit, having ‘cemented his image as the ‘ruler of the world’ where westerners are begging him to solve European problems in Ukraine’.
Macron probably wanted to impress the French public with his diplomatic skills before the European elections in June. Unfortunately for him, banners and flags were unfurled by Uyghur, Tibetan, and Chinese activists on the streets of Paris. “Free Tibet. Dictator Xi Jingping, your time is up!” stated a large white banner that his motorcade had to drive under on the Outer Boulevard. On the top of the banner was the flag of Tibet, a symbol of the Tibetan independence movement.
The protesters were joined by Chinese, Taiwanese, Mongolian, and Vietnamese human rights activists, as well as Hong Kong pro-democracy supporters, because after all, France is a democracy and people can express their views.

Indo-French Relations
More discreet but perhaps more concrete, on May 13 in Versailles, France will host its seventh edition of the ‘Choose France Forum’.
A French official told Business Today Television: “Seven Indian CEOs will meet President Macron on the 13th. There will be a Franco-India forum where the Indian CEOs will interact with the French CEOs."
The official objective is to welcome more Indian investments in France and to increase further partnership between both countries.
This may not bring votes for the European elections to Macron’s party, but it will certainly enhance relations between France and India.
The South China Morning Post summarised Xi’s three-nation tour: “Xi Jinping, his tour over, leaves behind a Europe split by how to deal with China,” adding: “Despite long-standing ties to President Emmanuel Macron, [Xi] made few if any concessions to reduce the flood of Chinese imports into the European Union.” And no concession on Ukraine either.
But for Xi, these few days must have been a relief from the pressure under which he lives in Beijing.