1890 Treaty: Beijing’s trick of yesterday and today

China would like to forget this map

My article 1890 Treaty: Beijing’s trick of yesterday and today appeared in the Edit Page of The Pioneer


Here is the link...

The Chinese trick of hammering the 1890 Convention is very old. But it is mistaken. Beijing cannot justify ‘fixing' the tri-junction by quoting this ‘unequal' Treaty, when nobody knew where this place ‘Gipmochi' was

Two months into the confrontation with China near the tri-junction in between Tibet, Sikkim and Bhutan, the time has come to look at the lessons New Delhi can learn from the stand-off which may continue for several months. There is no doubt that India has won a battle; there will be no Chinese road on the ridge and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) may never be able to peep over into the Siliguri corridor.
Indeed, why should India back out from a legally and militarily strong position? Some in Beijing have started admitting the same, though the Government continues to shout that China’s territory has been invaded. Beijing’s violent reaction is due to internal factors such as the 90th anniversary of the PLA and the forthcoming change of leadership in the Communist Party of China (CPC).
One battle has, however, been lost by New Delhi — it has been unable to explain to the public some historical facts. The lack of a historical division in the Ministry of External Affairs has particularly ill-served India, letting Beijing have a field day. New Delhi did not point out to the Indian (and foreign) media, the Chinese trick about the 1890 Convention (known as the Convention of March 17, 1890, between Great Britain and China, relating to Sikkim and Tibet).
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson in Beijing, as well the tabloid media in the Middle Kingdom, vociferously managed to convince the Indian correspondents in Beijing that it was a valid treaty. However, the fact that the main stakeholders — Tibet and Sikkim (and Bhutan for the tri-junction) — were not even consulted, makes it an ‘imperial treaty’ with no validity.
In his book, Tibet: A Political History, Tsepon WD Shakabpa, the Tibetan politician and famous historian explained, “In 1890, a Convention was drawn up in Calcutta by Lord Lansdowne, the Governor-General of India and Sheng-t’ai, the manchu amban from Lhasa, without consulting the Government of Tibet. The first article of the Convention agreement defined the boundary between Tibet and Sikkim, and the second article recognised a British protectorate over Sikkim, which gave them exclusive control over the internal administration and the foreign relations of that country. There was, however, no corresponding acknowledgment on the part of the British of China’s authority over Tibet.”
Shakabpa continues: “It is also possible that because of the brief clash between the Tibetans and the British at Lungthur (in northern Sikkim in 1888), the manchus were afraid that Tibet and Britain might enter into direct negotiations; they therefore, agreed to a Convention to forestall such a possibility.”
Three years later, trade regulations were discussed over increasing the trade facilities across the Sikkim-Tibet frontier: “Again, the provisions of that agreement could not be enforced because Tibet had not been a party to the negotiations. It is surprising that the British entered into a second agreement with the Manchus, when they knew from the results of the first agreement that there was no way of putting the agreement into effect,” says Shakabpa.
The Convention of 1890 and the Trade Regulations of 1893 proved in practice to be of not the slightest use to the British as Tibet never recognised them; this eventually led London to directly ‘deal’ with Lhasa and send the Younghusband expedition to Lhasa in 1904 and open the doors to organise the tripartite Simla Convention in 1914, with British India, Tibet and China sitting on equal footing.
Today, Beijing speaks of ‘renegotiating’ the 1890 Convention. It would consequently imply that the ‘equal’ treaties signed with the Tibetans, particularly the Simla Convention and the border agreement (defining the McMahon Line) in 1914, would be scrapped and India would have no more border with Tibet in the North-East. The Chinese have tried similar tricks earlier.
In October 1948, the Nationalist Government in Nanjing sent a communication to London, notifying His Majesty’s Government of termination of Tibetan Trade Regulations of 1908. New Delhi was quick to see the game.
In 1943, London had reconsidered its attitude towards China’s suzerainty over Tibet. On August 8, Anthony Eden, Prime Minister of Great Britain, had given Dr TV Soong an informal memorandum containing the British policy towards Tibet: “Since the Chinese Revolution of 1911, when Chinese forces were withdrawn from Tibet, Tibet has enjoyed de facto independence. It has ever since regarded itself as in practice completely autonomous and has opposed Chinese attempts to reassert control.”
In 1948, by referring to the 1908 Treaty, China wanted to erase the 1914 Simla Convention from the books of history, omitting that the 1908 accord was made void by the 1914 agreement. The Ministry of External Affairs in New Delhi immediately cabled London that it was aware that “the Tibetan Trade Regulations of 1908 were specifically repealed by Article VII of Simla Convention of 1914.”
Lhasa was then in control of Tibet’s foreign policy; Tibetans could travel from and to India without visa or registration. It was not the case for the Chinese who, when they transited from Tibet to China via India needed a visa.
Hugh Richardson, who represented India in Tibet in the first years after Independence, cited an example: “The Chinese officer at Lhasa has approached the Tibetan Government with a request for help and the Indian mission has asked whether the Tibetan Government agree to the entry of this party.”
A long debate started in the Ministry of External Affairs in New Delhi on the policy that ought to be followed by independent India vis-à-vis Tibet.
An official pointed out “we only recognise their (Chinese) suzerainty contingent on their genuine recognition of Tibetan autonomy as it has existed for the last 36 years.”
But Nanjing was trying the same old trick: To find a ‘solution’ to the Tibet issue without reference to Tibet; it had worked in 1890. The Tibetan trade regulations of 1908 provided that the regulations would be in force for a period of 10 years and if not denounced. By trying to ‘renew’ it, the Chinese were trying to bypass the 1914 agreement. An official in the Ministry of External Affairs wrote that the Chinese assumed that “the Chinese are emphatic in ignoring the Simla Convention of 1914 of which no mention is made in their note. The trade regulations of 1908 were dead letter for long.”
It was a pretext to force Delhi to forget the 1914 Convention (and thereby the border agreement). However, the diplomats in South Block were not new to Chinese diplomatic niceties, the Foreign Secretary himself having served several years in Nanjing. Had the Indian Ministry accepted the Chinese contention, India and Tibet would have lost the only demarcated border (ie the McMahon Line). When it hammers on the 1890 Convention, Beijing is trying the same old ploy today.
Incidentally, the survey of the tri-junction was done several decades after the 1890 agreement was signed; China can’t justify ‘fixing’ the tri-junction by quoting this ‘unequal’ treaty, when nobody knew where this place ‘Gipmochi’ was.

When China did not claim what is today's Arunachal Pradesh

A photo China does not like to see
Sir Henry McMahon surrounded by Ivan Chen and Lonchen Shatra

I am posting extracts of an interesting document, the Proceedings of the 3rd meeting of the Tibet Conference (also known as Simla Conference).
During this particular meeting which was held at Delhi (not Simla) on January 12, 1914, the Tibetans and the Chinese representatives presented their views on their common border.

It was the follow-up of extensive discussions between Sir Charles Bell, the Assistant of Sir Henry McMahon, the Indian Foreign Secretary and the plenipotentiaries of Tibet and China.
Today, Beijing would like to believe that this Conference never took place, but it did (see the picture above).
The three plenipotentiaries sat on the table as equals, China has also forgotten this 'detail'.
I am posting here only the Chinese description of its borders with Tibet and India. it shows that Ivan Chen, the Chinese plenipotentiary has clearly little to offer in terms of proofs of 'ownership', while still claiming large chunks of Tibetan in Eastern Tibet; the Tibetans were far better prepared and could document their claims much better (see my website for the long Tibetan statements and the 90 attached documents).

The main discussion of the Conference was around the Sino-Tibetan border in Kham province of Tibet. In their statement, the Chinese representative nowhere claimed that the entire plateau, till what is today Xinjiang, belonged to China.
There is also no trace of claim of Tawang area or India's entire North-East (later NEFA).
The only area close to the Indian border which is mentioned is Zayul.
The Chinese statement says:

Zayul is divided into two parts, the upper and the lower, both of which are outside the pale of the Tibetan control and are inhabited by independent and barbarous tribes called Miris, Abors, and Mishmis.
On the approach of the Chinese army at the place in 1911, the Chiefs of Zayul tendered their submission to His late Excellency Chao Erh Feng [Zhao Erfeng], and he then took effective occupation of it, as evidence of which he caused seals of office to be issued to the Chiefs and placed it under the administration of Szechuan (Sichuan). It is now called Cha-yu Hien.

The truth is the Zhao Erfeng, known as 'Butcher Zhao' for his cruelty, conducted an expedition along the Lohit river till a place called Menilkrai, near Walong.
He planted a pillar and left.
On November 19, 1913, the Secretary of State sanctioned what the Bristish called a 'promenade' in the area.
TPM O'Callaghan, the Assistant Political Officer (APO) in Sadiya was in charge; he was accompanied by an escort of the 1/8th Gurkha Rifles led by Major C Stansfeld and Lt. HR Haringlon.
The British officers visited Rima in Tibet at the invitation of the Tibetan authorities, and cordial relations were established.
On May 6, 1914, Sir Archdale Earle, the Chief Commissioner of Assam writes:

Mr. O'Callaghan's report confirms the information in the possession of the Chief Commissioner that there are at present no Chinese troops anywhere in the neighbourhood of Rima. It urges nevertheless the importance of carrying the Lohit Valley road to our frontier, and of establishing a post as near the frontier as is practicable at the earliest possible date. This view is shared by the Chief Commissioner, but he realises that, for reasons which will presently be stalled, it will probably be found advisable to move slowly in the coming cold weather. He thinks, however, and he trusts that the Government of India will agree in this view, that the impossibility of recognising a Chinese boundary in the neighbourhood of Menilkrai has been finally established, and he regards Mr O'Callaghan's action in removing the boundary posts as thoroughly justified.

The APO had found Chinese markers at Menilkrai, just below Walong. One set dated from 1910 and new markers had been placed in 1912 by the Chinese troops. O'Callaghan removed the markers, repositioned them upstream, near Kahao, just south of the McMahon Line.
O'Callaghan confirms that a post needed to be established at Walong:

I am more than ever convinced of the necessity of the finishing of the road to our frontier and the opening of a post as near our frontier as soon as possible. From Walong to Rima, there is no difficulty in road making and the Lohit Valley road already constructed and open up to Mankum only required continuation to Manglor flat, a distance of less than 30 miles, to make the opening and rationing of the post a practicable scheme. I trust it will be clearly realised that a small force, operating from Walong, could occupy Rima and hold the Rong Chu and Zayul Valleys in 24-30 hours and, vice versa, a force moving from Rima can unopposed be in position on Menilkrai flat within 36 hours and effectually prevent any advance up the Lohit Valley. Should delay be made, it is not impossible that in the years to come it may take much more than the resources which the Local Administration will have at its immediate command, to assert our legitimate rights and claims, which the ready completion of the already sanctioned but uncompleted scheme for the Lohit Valley will confirm.

The APO studied the “the immense cost rationing the post”, but after he made some enquiries, he was “satisfied that within a few years the majority of the rice and other items required for the supplies can be procured locally, either grown or purchased.”
This was unfortunately not enough to convince Delhi at that time, but the India-Tibet border was clearly defined between Kahao (near Kibuthu) and Rima as marked the following year by McMahon on his map.
Ivan Chen did not make any claim on what is today Tawang district.
It is clearly an afterthought. At the end of 1959, Beijing reacted to the escape to the Dalai Lama in India and started wild claims.
Lonchen Shatra the Tibetan Plenipotentiary resumed nicely the situation in his statement:

Therefore unlawful encroachment, like a large insect swallowing up a small one, or in other words asserting 'might is right' — an uncivilised method — it is hoped, will not be permitted, and that lawful rights will be respected and the lawful owner will be allowed to enjoy peaceful possession.

Unfortunately, a century later, unlawful encroachments are still permitted.
The entire proceedings of this meeting is available on my website.
It is worth reading the Tibetan description of the border with China supported by 90 historical documents.

Map showing the Tibetan and Chinese 'perceptions' at Simla and the different proposals
The border with India is not disputed

Here are extracts of the Proceedings the Third Meeting of the Conference (the Chinese views on their borders with Tibet)

Present :-Sir Henry McMahon, G.C.V.O., K.C.I.E., C.S.I., British Plenipotentiary and staff.
Monsieur Ivan Chen, Chinese Plenipotentiary and staff.
Kusho Lonchen Shatra, Tibetan Plenipotentiary and staff.

The Plenipotentiaries took their seats at 11 A.M.

Sir Henry McMahon said that the meeting had been called in order that the Chinese and Tibetan Plenipotentiaries might have an opportunity of laying on the table statements  of the evidence in regard to the respective frontiers claimed by them.
The Lonchen Shatra said that he regretted he had not been able to complete the translation of all the appendices to his statement as he had only one translator, who was in bad health, but the translation of the remaining appendices was being pushed on as fast as possible.
Monsieur Ivan Chen said that since the last meeting of the Conference at Simla, there had been several informal meetings at the last of which it had been arranged that he and his Tibetan Colleague should submit the cases dealing with their respective territorial claims for Sir Henry McMahon's consideration and decision, after the communication of which they would refer to their respective Governments. He accordingly laid his case on the table for consideration.
The Chinese and Tibetan Plenipotentiaries then exchanged copies of their cases.
Sir Henry McMahon said that he would now proceed to consider the cases and communicate his conclusions to his colleagues as quickly as possible.
The Lonchen Shatra raised the question of the custody of the original Tibetan documents of which translations formed enclosures of the Tibetan case. The originals of these documents were produced and shown to the Conference. Sir Henry McMahon and Monsieur Ivan Chen agreed that in view of the great bulk of these documents they should remain in the custody of the Tibetan Plenipotentiary from whom they could be obtained for reference when required.

The Conference rose at 11.25 A.M.

T. G. B. WAUGH,
Acting Secretary to the Conference.

A. H. McMAHON,
British Plenipotentiary.

Enclosure No. 1.

Chinese Statement on limits of Tibet
At the informal meetings on the question of the limits of Tibet on the 5th, the 11th, the 12th, and the 15th of December last, the Chinese Plenipotentiary stated the claims of the Government of the Republic of China to Giamda and all the places east of it, and also gave reasons with which the Chinese Government put forward such claims.
At the last informal meeting on the 19th of the same month, the Chinese Plenipotentiary, being of the opinion that almost no progress had been made, suggested that he and the Tibetan Plenipotentiary should each submit a statement to the full Conference for the consideration of the British Plenipotentiary, who would in due course of time inform them of the result of his consideration, when they will be given time to consider it and telegraph to their respective Home Authorities on the matter. This mode of procedure was then agreed to unanimously.
Under these circumstances the Chinese Plenipotentiary begs to submit the following statement:

I. What are the claims of the Chinese Government in regard to the question of the limits of Tibet?
The Chinese Government claim to have Giamda and all the places east of it, viz., Jyade, Dam, Zayul, Chiamdo (Chamdo), Enta, Markham, Puyul (Poyul), Pemakoi–chen (Pemakoe), Darge (Derge), Lhojong (Lho Dzong), Shobando, and Tenk'e.

II. What rights are the claims of the Chinese Government based upon?
The Chinese Government derive their rights from the historic connections of all those places with China and from what is called in International Law "effective occupation '', evidences of which are given below.
Giamda, Lhojong and Shobando.
Giamda has returned to its allegiance towards China, since 1909, together with Rivoudze, Lhojong and Shobando. During that year, a punitive expedition was sent from Szechuan to Tibet under the command of His late Excellency Chao Erh Feng for the murder of the Chinese Amban Fung Chuan, and as soon as the Chinese army arrived, the native chiefs of all these places tendered their submission to His Excellency Chao, and in 1910 it was settled between him and the Tibetan Authorities that Giamda should be the boundary line between China and Tibet.
This settlement was reported to the Manchu Emperor Hsuan Tung and sanctioned by Imperial Rescript. On the 25th of May 1913, the President of the Republic of China issued a Mandate ordaining that the territorial limit of Szechuan (Sichuan) shall be the same as it has existed in the last days of the Manchu dynasty but no Chinese garrison shall cross to the west of Giamda.

Jyade, Dam
Jyade lies in the valley of the Kara Ussou and is called the thirty-nine "tutze" of Nak Tchou. It is under the control of the Chinese Deputy Amban of Lhasa, called Yeeching Chang-King. Dam is in the same position. A tax, called Kung Ma Nin or horse tax, is levied and collected every year by the Yeeching Chang-King, and its total amount is only about 391$ odd. Under the Yeeching Chang-King, there are Chinese officials, such as Kushanta, Tsuling, Yilling and Yaokeyao and five hundred soldiers in time of peace. The latter are all recruited locally.
When Colonel Younghusband stopped at Kampajong (Kampa Dzong) with his expedition in 1903-04, the Chinese Amban at Lhasa wished to meet him on the frontier, but he was prevented from carrying out his wishes by the Tibetans refusing to supply him with necessary transport. And when he turned to the authorities of Jyade and Dam for transport, they were quite ready to supply it because they were at liberty to do so.
When Tibetans are travelling about, they have to pay a certain toll, in crossing a river, but the people of Jyade and Dam are exempted from paying such a toll and others, if they can produce certificates from the Yeeching Chang-King certifying that the holders of the certificates are natives of Jyade or Dam.
This shows Jyade and Dam have nothing to do with Tibet at all and are absolutely beyond the jurisdiction of Tibet.
In "Mysterious Tibet" by Sir Thomas Holdich, a well-known authority on Tibet, pages 184-85, he says that "Rockhill's Tibetan escort had returned to Lhasa as he was now under direct Chinese jurisdiction in the province of Jyade. This Chinese province extends from east to west over two hundred miles and more of country, with a probable breadth of sixty or seventy miles, touching, to the north, the Dangla and its branches and, to the south, bordering on Lhasa governed provinces! Its people have in the oldest times preferred the Binbo religion (a form of devil worship or Lhamanism which has at one time or another prevailed over most parts of Asia) a creed not tolerated in the kingdom of Lhasa which tried for a long time to crush it out of these regions."
Furthermore all Tibetans can only receive their official appointments from the Chinese Amban on the recommendation of the Tibetan Kab-lon, but the official appointments in Jyade and Dam are made by the Amban on the recommendation of the Yeeching Chang-king.
It is also well known that Tibetans are not at liberty to settle anywhere they like in Jyade and Dam, and that the people of Jyade and Dam call themselves by the name of Gyashokpa, or, in other words, that they claim that they are of Chinese race and do not belong to the Tangut stock.
By what is stated in the above it is incontestably established that Jyade and Dam have been long administered by China as a Chinese province and Tibet has not the least claim to them.

Chiamdo, Gartok-Markham, Draya.
In Tibet there are four principalities which are directly under the Chinese control. These are Draya and Chiamdo on the east. Tashilumpo and Sakya Kongma to the south-east of Tashilumpo.
The Commander-in-Chief of Yunnan was formerly stationed in Chiamdo, and it was in the beginning of the reign of Yung Cheng that the administration of this place was transferred to the authorities of Szechuan.
There are Chinese civil and military officials in charge of the local revenue and the Chinese garrison. It is the same case with En-ta.

Poyul, Pemakoi-chen.
Poyul has never belonged to Tibet. It is a country inhabited by lawless herdsmen, and in the southern part of it there is a large number of Chinese settling there, with the result that there is now a thriving trade in blankets, baskets, silver and iron works, red pepper, and remarkably fine flour. Poyul is practically independent and Tibet has never been able to exercise any influence over the place. It surrendered its submission to China in 1909, and in the winter of that year Chinese officials were appointed to govern the place by His late Excellency Chao Erh Feng who was at that time stationed in Chiamdo.

Darge (Derge)
This place is situated in the north-east of Chiamdo. It is under a ''tutzi" whose head-quarters are in Kenching which has been instituted as a Chinese district and is now called Teh Hwa Chow.

III. With regard to the Tibetan claims in regard to the question of the limits of Tibet, the Chinese Plenipotentiary further begs to submit the following statement as a reply to them.

Batang, Litang, Nyarong, etc.
These places are all east of the range of Ning Tsin Shan and have been under Chinese administration since the early period of the reign of Yung Cheng. About one hundred miles west from Batang there is a boundary pillar bearing Chinese inscriptions which state that east of this range it is Chinese territory while west of it it is Tibetan. This was however the demarcation of the boundaries between China and Tibet for that time only, for after the death of Emperor Young Cheng, the Emperor Kien Lung, successor of Yung Cheng, formally annexed Tibet in 1720 and since then Tibet has been under Chinese sovereignty and the whole of Tibet cannot be otherwise considered than Chinese territory.
In order to show the effective occupation of these places, a Bill, passed in 1912 by the House of Senators of the National Assembly in Peking to constitute them as the eighth division of the Parliamentary election districts of Szechuan, is herewith appended.

Kokonor or Ching-hai (Qinghai)
The Kokonor regions were taken by Chinese, in the time of Yung Cheng (in about 1700) from Lopotsangdantsin, the great grandson of Gushi Khan, on account of his intrigues with the Sungarians for compassing a conquest of Tibet. The Chinese victorious army was under the command of Nien Ken Yao and Yo Tsung Ki, two well-known generals in the military history of China, and the conquest of Kokonor or Ching-hai is fully recorded in Chinese official records such as Pin-Ding-Ching hai-Fong-Liao, Shen-Wu-Si-Ching-ki( ).
Since this conquest the Kokonor regions have been under Chinese administration, at the head of which is the Chinese Amban whose head-quarters are at Siningfu. In the time of Yung Cheng an Imperial Edict was issued ordaining that "not more than two hundred lama monasteries shall be built in Kokonor, and that each monastery shall contain no more than two hundred lamas”.
The Kokonor regions are divided into twenty-nine banners under the leadership of Khoshoit, ( ) Choros, ( ) Khoit, ( ) Turgut, () Khalkha, ( ) and Tsahannomen, ( ). Under Khoshoit there are twenty-one banners; under Choros and Khoit, one banner each; under Turgut, four banners; under Khalkha, one banner; and under Tsahannomen, one banner.
The leader of each banner is either a prince of the second class or a duke, and they are all under the control of the Chinese Amban at Siningfu who in addition to these banners has the following tribes under his administration :-
(1) The Gyakp ( ) tribe and the Kongpo ( ) tribe in the region between U and Khamo ( ).
(2) The Gyaldo ( ) tribe in the region between Chien Tsang ( ) and Hou Tsang ( ).
(3) The Djak ( ) tribe in the south-west of Tsang.
(4) The Koshot ( ) tribe in the region between Hou Tsang and Lhari. ( ).
(5) The Gyppo tribe, ( ) the Gyldin tribe, ( ) in the north of Lhari.
More details about Chinghai or Kokonor can be given on referring to the Chinese official records called Ta-Ching-Hui-Tsin and Ta-Ching-Yi-Tung-Tze ( ).

IVAN CHEN.
January 12th, 1914.

The Simla Convention: A Hundred Years Later

I am posting here an article written 10 years ago about the tripartite Simla Conference. 
"The Simla Convention: Ninety Years Later" was the chapter of a book Colonial India: a Centenary Tribute to Prof. K.K. Datta, edited by Prof. Surendra Gopal (Veer Kunwar Singh University, Arrah, 2006).
The Convention between the Great Britain and Tibet signed on September 7 1904 in Lhasa mentions the opening Trade Agencies in Tibet. 
Article 2 says:

The Thibetan Government undertakes to open forthwith trade mart: to which all British and Thibetan subjects shall have free right of access at Gyantse and Gartok, as well as at Yatung.
The Regulations applicable to the trade mart at Yatung, under the Anglo Chinese Agreement of 1893, shall, subject to such amendments as may have after be agreed up on by common consent between the British and Thibetan Governments, apply to the marts above mentioned.
In addition to establishing trade marts at the places mentioned, the Thibetan Government undertakes to place no restrictions on the trade by existing routes, and to consider the question of establishing fresh trade marts under similar conditions if development of trade requires it.

The Anglo Tibetan Trade Regulations signed on July 1914 in Simla inter-alia confirmed the existence of these Trade Agencies.
The Panchsheel Agreement was supposed to be re-confirmation of the 1914, this time with a new regime in Beijing.
It was not to be, the Trade Agencies were harassed and progressively closed.
An article quoting me appeared a couple of days ago in The Daily Mirror. 
The title says it all: Celebrate the Panchsheel Agreement? It was one of India's worst political disasters.
Read it: a sad story!

Here is my article:
There is a prevalent custom in Asia: let’s first have a cup of tea.
Colonel Younghusband  had the customary cup when he visited the Tibetan camp at Guru near the Chumbi Valley in 1904 . A couple of days later, he officially received his Tibetan counterpart, General Lhading at his camp in Tuna. Then, despite the courteous offering of scarves, tea and refreshments, a battle started between the troops of Younghusband and Lhading. The Tibetans were crushed; they were no match for the British troops equipped with the most modern weapons.
The Choegyal of Sikkim, a relative of Lhading had warned the Tibetan General: “For the Tibetan army to challenge the British was like throwing an egg against the rock - the egg could only be smashed.”
After this easy victory, Younghusband continued towards Lhasa, the Tibetan capital. Lord Curzon, his boss, had instructed him to ‘start negotiations’ with the Tibetan authorities. For years, the Lhasa government had refused to even open the letters of His Gracious Majesty’s Government. This was extremely irritating for an all-powerful Viceroy and his officials.
An Englishman later wrote: “In 1903 the position of Britain and Tibet, was like that of a big boy at school who is tormented by an impertinent youngster. He bears it for sometime, but at last is compelled to administer chastisement.”
Younghusband himself described the situation before the battle:
There was no possible reasoning with such people. They had such overweening confidence in the Lama’s powers. How could anyone dare to resist the orders of the Great Lama? Surely lightning would descend from heaven or the earth open up and destroy anyone who had such temerity!  I pointed to our troops, now ready deployed for action. I said we have tried for fourteen years inside our frontier to settle matters. …For eight months now I had patiently tried to negotiate, but no one with authority came to see me, my letters were returned, and even messages were refused.”
The conflict had some unexpected consequences.
Perhaps even more than the bullets of the ‘British devils’ and the outcome of the battle, another factor flabbergasted the Tibetans. Soon after the end of the hostilities, some British officers visited the battlefield, and instead of killing those still alive, the ‘devils with long noses’ ordered their troops to take them to their field hospital. This was an incredible gesture for the Tibetans used to fighting wars on their eastern front with Chinese warlords where no prisoner was ever taken leave aside caring for the wounded. This incident, along with the fact that Younghusband paid well for whatever food or fodder he requisitioned on his way to Gyantse, made the Tibetans change their mind about the British; this change of attitude played an important role in future ‘negotiations’. For the first time after centuries of isolation, Tibet was forced to enter into contact with the Western world.

Download the article by clicking here...

The meaning of Tibetan autonomy

The Aksai Chin Road

One wonders why, during a visit to Beijing in June 2003, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee decided to put the border talks on a ‘fast track’.
Were Vajpayee’s advisors dreaming that China would return Aksai Chin and drop their claims on Arunachal Pradesh in a matter of months?
Though two Special Representatives were nominated, no quick-fix solution should have been anticipated. The issue had earlier been discussed in 1960 and then in the 1980’s, but the ‘perception gap’ is far too large to disappear in a short time. However now, instead of admitting the hard facts, Beijing is trying to put the blame on India.
An Editorial in The People’s Daily stated that some contradictions existed between China and India which “are still severely disturbing the normal development of the China-India relations”.
But the article only speaks of the Indian ‘contradictions’.
The mouthpiece of the Communist Party says that the 15 meetings have resulted in “many positive achievements”, though “it is still far away from reaching a fair, just and reasonable agreement”.
What would be a ‘reasonable’ agreement for China? It would be two-fold.
First, India would have to acknowledge that the Aksai Chin belongs to China (with perhaps some minor adjustments). Nobody can deny that New Delhi was foolish, to say the least, in the 1950’s when it did not notice that Mao’s Liberation Army had built a road through Indian territory; but the government’s foolishness does not make ipso facto the territory A part of the People’s Republic of China.
The People’s Daily further affirms: “The Indian side believes that the border dispute between China and India covers not only the eastern region of 90,000 square kilometers but also the western region of 30,000 square kilometers and the western region is India's too. This wrong argument, which totally disregards the history, still has supporters in India.”
The 90,000 square kilometers correspond to the entire State of Arunachal Pradesh.
The People’s Daily asserts that the first and most important issue is the McMahon Line: “The main barrier still comes from the Indian side. First, many Indian media insist that the border line between China and India should be based on the ‘McMahon Line’ left by British colonists.”
The fundamental issue is that China has traditionally tried to grab land which does not belong to it and it has done this with all its neighbours.
With this in mind, the government of British India and the Tibetan government decided to fix their border in 1914.
After China had invaded Tibet for a short time in 1910-11, (forcing the Thirteenth Dalai Lama to take refuge in Kalimpong), the ‘fixation’ of the border between Tibet and India had become imperative.
This was done during the Simla Conference in March 1914 when the Plenipotentiaries of British India (Sir Henry McMahon) and Tibet exchanged maps. Ivan Chen, the Chinese Representative who for several months also participated in the Tripartite Conference was aware of this. There was also an understanding that the British Administration would ‘softly’ penetrate the tribal areas south of the Line, as there were a number of religious institutions closely connected with Tibetan monasteries there.
In Simla, the three representatives were seated at the Conference table on the same footing simply because Tibet was at that time an Independent State.
It is what the Chinese would like to change today.
On August 5, 1943, Antony Eden, then British Foreign Secretary, gave to Dr. T. V. Soong, China’s Foreign Minister, a Memorandum defining the Status of Tibet: “Since the Chinese Revolution of 1911, when Chinese forces were withdrawn from Tibet, Tibet has enjoyed de facto independence. She has ever since regarded herself as in practice completely autonomous and has opposed Chinese attempts to reassert control.”
It is why British India decided in the 1940’s to reassert its control over Tawang area (covering less than a tenth of NeFA) where Tibetans had had an influence in the past.
A secret note on the McMahon Line written a couple of years later states the objectives: “Government of India’s main consideration …was the possibility of the Chinese establishing effective sovereignty over Tibet at the end of the war [WW II]. It was felt that Tibetan encroachments [in the monasteries] at that time might, if they were allowed to remain, help to embitter relations between China and India after the war.”
It is interesting to note that around the same time, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek spoke of ‘independence of Tibet’. Chiang stated in the Chinese Parliament that he desired to allow the ‘frontier racial groups’ to attain independence, if capable of doing so. He also affirmed: “I solemnly declare that if the Tibetans should at this time express a wish for self-government our Government would, in conformity with our sincere traditions, accord it a very high degree of autonomy. If in the future, they fulfill economic requirement of independence, the nation’s Government will, as in the case of Outer Mongolia, help them to attain this status”.
However the Tibetans, who then ran their own Foreign Affairs and the Government of British India had some doubt about the Chinese sincerity. They knew their irredentist attitude: “there is a considerable difference between the British and the Chinese conceptions of the word autonomy,” concluded the same note.
Now according to The People’s Daily, the blame for the failure of the border talks has to be put on India’s multi-party political system. The article says: “India’s society is extremely complicated. Various Indian political parties have different understandings on the China-India border issue, and therefore, it is hard for them to reach an agreement on the issue.”
India’s society might be complicated, but there is no doubt that the Indian public is well-informed (thanks to the freedom of the press) and vigilant. So why should India accept to change acknowledged historical facts such the one-time independence of Tibet?
The last argument of the Chinese official newspaper is strange: “India believes it is not a ‘benefited side’ but is a victim, and therefore, it should not accept the principle of ‘solving the border issue in a mutual understanding and mutual accommodation way’ proposed by China”.
What does it mean? You give us Aksai Chin, we give you Arunachal?
In 1945, Sir Olaf Caroe, India’s Foreign Secretary had mentioned two factors which should govern the Tibetan question. First, Tibet had in practice regarded herself as autonomous and had maintained her autonomy for over 30 years; second, India’s attitude had always been to recognize China’s suzerainty, but on the understanding that Tibet was regarded as autonomous by China.
This policy has been followed by Delhi after Independence and it is on this basis that the Dalai Lama made his Strasbourg Proposal in 1988, dropping Independence for a ‘genuine autonomy’ (which is in fact guaranteed in the Chinese Constitution).
Worrying news comes now from China. Zhu Weiqun, the deputy director of the United Front Work Department which ‘talks’ with the Dalai Lama’s Envoys since 2002, argued in The Study Times (Xuexi Shibao) that China must change some aspects of its present political and educational system in order to achieve national cohesion. It would obliterate the uniqueness of minority nationalities such as the Tibetans, the Uyghurs and the Mongols in the name of ‘national cohesion’.
It would remove the last vestige proving that Tibet was once a separate country with a separate language, culture and religion.
And without Tibet and Tibetans, Zhu probably believes that there will be no McMahon Line and no border issue left to solve.

Validity of the McMahon Line agreement (1914)

Recently the Chinese have used people like Neville Maxwell to renew their claim on Tawang area.
In a paper (Whose Tawang? A Dispute Within the Sino-Indian Boundary Dispute) published in China, Maxwell, the author of  India’s China War expounds the Chinese line.
However, he forgets to deal on the 'legality' of the McMahon L:ine, which was a valid agreement signed in 1914 between the Government of Tibet and the Government of India.
The Chinese Plenipotentiary, Ivan Chen was then fully aware of the Agreement and did not object to it.
I am posting here an historical document which is extracted of Report of the Officials of the Governments of India and the Peoples’ Republic of China on the Boundary Question (see my previous post on the subject).
It clarifies the validity of the Agreement and the legal status of the boundary in the Eastern Sector.

Report of the Officials of the Governments of India and the Peoples’ Republic of China on the Boundary Question (Extracts)
The Indian side [led by Shri J. S. Mehta, Director, China Division, Ministry of External Affairs and Dr. S. Gopal, Director, Historical Division, Ministry of External Affairs] also established beyond doubt that the traditional boundary in the Eastern Sector had been formalized in 1914 by an exchange of letters between India and Tibet. At that time, Tibet had enjoyed the power to sign treaties and to deal directly with neighbouring States on matters regarding the boundary. The Chinese Government had recognised these rights enjoyed by Tibet and had been aware of this formalization of the Indo-Tibetan boundary at the Simla Conference.
The Indian side had made it clear that, they were reluctant to discuss the history of the relations between China and Tibet and had only considered it in their initial statements to the extent that it was relevant to the exchange of letters formalizing the boundary in 1914.
Unable to establish that the agreement was void, the Chinese side [led by Mr. Chang Wen-chin, Director, First Asian Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Mr. Yang Kung-su, Director, Tibet Bureau of Foreign Affairs]endeavoured to set it aside by assertions which were not historically correct and by the most serious and unwarranted allegations against the Government of India. It was, for instance, repeatedly alleged that India was seeking to defend British Imperialist policy and to benefit from British aggression in Tibet; and it was sought to convey the impression that the Indian side regarded Tibet as an independent country. The Indian side could not but emphatically repudiate these most objectionable distortions of the well-known and clearly established policies of the Government of India. It had been clearly recognised by the Government of India and had been repeated innumerable times in these discussions, that Tibet was an autonomous region of China; and independent India had always dealt with the Central Government of China on matters pertaining to Tibet. The very fact that these talks pertaining to the boundary of India with, for the most part, Tibet, were being held with the representatives of the Chinese Central Government, was a clear indication of India's acceptance that the Chinese Government were responsible for all external affairs relating to Tibet. It was even categorically and explicitly stated by the Indian side that India did not regard Tibet as independent.
But the present status and powers of Tibet could obviously not be projected backwards or allowed to influence one's understanding of the nature of the relations subsisting between China and Tibet in 1914. That during the 300 years prior to 1950, Tibet, whatever her status, had enjoyed the right to sign treaties and have direct dealings with her neighbours on boundary questions, was clearly established by history. The Indian side had already drawn attention to the treaties of 1684 and 1842 signed by Tibet with Ladakh. In 1856, she signed a treaty with Nepal, and the People's Government of China themselves recognised the validity of this treaty, because they felt it necessary to abrogate it in their treaty, signed exactly a hundred years later, in 1956 with the Nepal Government. It was asserted by the Chinese side that the Chinese Amban in Tibet had assisted in the conclusion of the 1856 treaty. This, too, was an incorrect statement of facts; but even if true, it would only corroborate the Indian position that China recognised the treaty-making powers of Tibet. For it would mean that China assisted Tibet in directly negotiating a treaty which, among other things, granted extra-territorial rights to Nepal. The Tibetan Government protested against the conclusion of the 1890 Convention by Britain and China and successfully defied its implementation because they had not been a party to it. It, therefore, became necessary for Britain to sign an agreement with Tibet in 1904. Far from objecting to such direct negotiations by Tibet, the Chinese Amban in Lhasa assisted in its conclusion and two years later the Chinese Central Government confirmed it in their Convention with Britain. It may be noted that the 1906 Convention concluded in Peking did not suggest that the 1904 Convention was invalid, or merely repeat its provisions but specifically recognised it.
Furthermore, it was a fact of history — and the officials at these meetings were only concerned with an objective scrutiny of the facts of history — that after the 1911 revolution Tibet had issued a declaration of independence. The Indian side themselves had drawn attention to the fact that even the British Government at that time had not acknowledged this declaration. But the fact remained that whatever the theoretical conception of Chinese relations with Tibet, all working relations between the two seem to have been practically terminated. Not a single item of evidence was brought forward by the Chinese side from either the Chinese or the Tibetan archives that could suggest that this statement was incorrect. The then Central Government of China, eager to re-establish their connections with Tibet, agreed to attend the tripartite Simla Conference and designated a plenipotentiary to attend "jointly" with the Tibetan plenipotentiary and to negotiate with him and the British Indian representative on terms of equality. The Chinese Government conferred full powers on their representative and, what was even more significant, accepted without any reservation the credentials of the Tibetan representative which vested him with full powers in the name of the Dalai Lama and authorised him to function as an equal plenipotentiary with those of China and India and settle all matters pertaining to Tibet. Thus it was the Chinese Government of the time which accepted a procedure which under diplomatic usage, is normally adopted only at international conferences of the representatives of sovereign countries.
The fact that the Chinese Plenipotentiary did not sign the tripartite agreement which he had initialled did not in any way invalidate the agreement signed by the British and the Tibetan representatives.
All Chinese reservations to the Simla Convention, as stated at the time of the Conference and subsequently in 1919, were merely regarding the boundaries of Inner Tibet and Outer Tibet. There was never any objection, or indeed any comment of any kind, regarding that part of the boundary shown on the Convention Map between India and Tibet and formalized in the exchange of letters between the Indian and the Tibetan representatives.
The Chinese side sought to suggest that the Chinese Plenipotentiary had been unaware of the direct dealings and the Agreement concluded between the Tibetan and the British Indian Plenipotentiaries. There was no reason why the formal exchange of letters between the Indian and the Tibetan representatives should have been shown to the Chinese representative. In fact, all the Tibetan documents which have now been quoted by the Chinese side as supporting their alignment were not known, at the time they were written, to the Chinese Government. They knew nothing at the time, for example, of the negotiations regarding Dokpo Karpo in the Western Sector in 1924, and those regarding Nilang-Jadbang in the Middle Sector in 1926. However, far from regarding these ''secret'' documents of the Tibetan Government as invalid, they have now based their claim on them.
But in fact there is no doubt that the Chinese representative and -the Chinese Government were aware of the formalization of the Indo-Tibetan boundary in 1914. The substance of the agreement was mentioned at the tripartite conference; there was a general reference to it in the Simla Convention itself; and it was shown on the map presented to the conference in April 1914 and attached to the Convention in July 1914. The areas south of the red line in the Eastern Sector on this Convention Map could not be explained in any other way except by recognising that they constituted Indian territory. The Convention was published in the first edition of Aitchison's Treaties, Engagements and Sanads to be, issued after the Simla Conference.
Apart from these facts, the whole array of argument and evidence furnished by the Chinese side during these very discussion fully proved, if anything, that Tibet at that time had enjoyed treaty making powers and the right of direct dealings with neighbour States. These entire evidence produced by the Chinese side showed Tibet functioning all along her border without Chinese presence or support. In quoting such Tibetan actions with approval, and bringing forward such evidence of Tibetan activity the Chinese side confirmed the legality of Tibet's powers to negotiate and conclude treaties. In all inter-governmental talks between India and Tibet as at Dokpo Karpo, Barahoti and Nilang-Jadhang, no representative of the Chinese Central Government had been present. The representatives of the Government of Lhasa had dealt with representatives of the Central Government of India, who had been supported by officials of local Governments. There was no question, therefore, of these discussions having been conducted on a purely local levels and the fact that on the Tibetan side there had been no Chinese representation or any Chinese authority and, at any time, even a semblance of interest on the part of the Chinese Central Government, proved the Tibetan right to deal directly with the Government of India. The Chinese side were, therefore, unable to escape from the dilemma that to dispute the powers of Tibet to have direct dealings with India to confirm the traditional boundary in the Eastern Sector was to jettison all their evidence for the Eastern and Middle Sectors and almost all their evidence for the Western Sector. For the overwhelming majority of the records and documents quoted by the Chinese side were from Tibetan, and hardly any from Chinese sources. Indeed, the documents cited by the Chinese side referred throughout to a Tibetan Government. It was obviously, even according to the Chinese evidence, much more than a merely local authority or a provincial administration.
The Chinese side sought to argue that as the negotiations were "resultless" they could not prove Tibet's negotiating powers. It hardly requires to be stated that success or failure has no bearing on this point; but if the failure of these negotiations negated their legality then the Chinese side themselves were precluded from quoting them as evidence in other contexts.
The Indian side also mentioned, in this connection, that the Chinese side had referred to a non-aggression treaty having been concluded in 1853 by the then Government of India and the Regent of Tibet. There was, in fact, no such treaty and what the Chinese side had in mind was discovered to be an administrative arrangement between the Monba chiefs and the British Indian Government. But the Chinese contention was obviously based on the premise that the Tibetan authorities had the right to make peace and war and to conclude treaties of non-aggression. It was clearly illogical in the face of this to contend that a Tibetan Government with such ample treaty-making powers could not formalize an existing traditional boundary.
To place the matter beyond all possible doubt, the Indian side cited a note formally presented by the Government of China in November 1947, enquiring whether after the transfer of power the Government of India had assumed the treaty rights and obligations existing till then between India and Tibet. In their reply of February 1948, the Government of India formally informed the Chinese Government that they had assumed these treaty rights and obligations. The reference in this exchange to the treaty rights and obligations between India and Tibet, as distinct from those between India and China, was the strongest possible proof both of the validity of the "McMahon Line" agreement and of its recognition by the Chinese Government. The Indian side also brought forward documents to show that for many years after the establishment of the authority of the People's Government in Tibet, the Tibetan authorities had accepted the traditional international alignment in this sector.
Nowhere, in fact, as in its disputation of the validity of the so-called McMahon Line was the Chinese position so replete with contradictions. To mention but a few, the Chinese side throughout quoted with approval Tibetan negotiations on certain segments of the traditional alignment in the Western and Middle Sectors, but when confronted with the implications of this position they denied Tibet the right to confirm the traditional boundary in the Eastern Sector. They asserted that Tibet had no treaty-making powers but claimed that she had signed a treaty of non-aggression. Similarly Tibet, with no treaty-making powers, had signed an agreement conferring extra-territorial rights on Nepal which the People's Government had found necessary to abrogate. The Chinese side asserted that the Convention of 1904 between Britain and Tibet was invalid, though it had been negotiated with the assistance of the Chinese officials, and had been referred to with approval in the Convention signed between Britain and China in 1906. They argued that China had never recognised the treaty-making powers of Tibet but could not explain why the suzerain Chinese Government of 1914 had accepted the equal and plenipotentiary status of the Tibetan representative and had participated with Tibet in a tripartite conference in India. They argued that the red line in this sector on the Simla Convention Map was the boundary between Tibet and China but brought forward evidence which was said to show that the area south of this line had belonged traditionally to Tibet. The "McMahon Line" Agreement was described as a result of a secret imperialist intrigue and Tibet was said to have been coerced into signing it; but the fact remains that as late as 1943, Tibet successfully defied the combined pressure of the Chinese Central and British Governments to secure the use of Tibetan territory as a supply route for the defence of China.
This maze of contradictions makes it impossible even to comprehend the Chinese stand, much less to find evidence to sustain the Chinese claim. It needs to be stated clearly that the treaty-making powers of Tibet and in particular her formalization of the "McMahon Line" were acknowledged by the Chinese Central Government of the time; and it was profitless to distort the present position of the Government of India and the statements of the Indian side in a vain attempt to repudiate the confirmation of the traditional boundary. For it was conclusively established from every angle of law and history that the "McMahon Line" agreement which confirmed the traditional boundary in the Eastern Sector was a valid Agreement which had been signed by Tibet and was now binding on China.
Indeed, the Indian position regarding the' "McMahon Line" agreement found corroboration also from the documents and agreements cited by the Chinese side. Even the recently concluded Sino-Burmese Agreement which acknowledges that the Burma Sector of the "McMahon Line" was the traditional boundary between China and Burma was telling circumstantial proof that in the Indian Sector also it had obviously confirmed the traditional boundary.
The Indian side were most surprised at the statement of the Chinese side that they distinguished between the actions of past Chinese Governments, accepted what suited them and rejected what was not in consonance with the present Chinese attitude and claims. This was obviously an extraordinary position to adopt and unsettled all relations between Governments. It was an accepted principle of international law that all past commitments of previous governments were binding on successor governments, at least until they had been re-negotiated. The whole purpose and value of the assignment given to the officials would be undermined if either side refused to accept all the facts of history, regardless of past motives and present claims, but accepted only such evidence as confirmed their contentions and repudiated those facts which destroyed them.