The Chinese Dream and more repression

Yu Zhengsheng and Zhu Weiqun

In the China Brief, Willy Lam speaks of "another significant phenomenon in the recent spate of personnel changes is the rise of the influence of the so-called Tibet Faction, a reference to cadres who have served in senior positions in the restive region."
As I mentioned earlier on this blog, several members of the Politburo and the government have been posted in Tibet in the past.
This does not stop or even slow down the repression on the Tibetan plateau.
Radio Free Asia (RFA) reported that the Chinese authorities are circulating a list of 13 'unlawful' behaviors in China’s northwestern Qinghai province. 
The Tibetans are warned against any involvement in self-immolation protests and a range of other activities which could challenge the Chinese rule.
RFA says: "An undated document listing the restricted behaviors, including filming self-immolation protests and seeking welfare donations, has been disseminated in all towns and villages of Rebgong county in Qinghai’s Malho Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture".
Apparently the document, written in Tibetan is aimed at “strengthening the protection of social stability and maintaining discipline by cracking down on unlawful activities in the relevant areas.”
Activities forbidden include fund-raising 'in the name of social welfare'; urging protection of the environment or the Tibetan language; conducting prayer rituals or other religious ceremonies if these carry 'overtones' of support for Tibetan independence; intimidating government officials; inciting self-immolation protests; obstructing the 'rescue' of self-immolators by Chinese security forces and sending images or information about self-immolations to 'outside separatist forces'.
The list particularly bars Tibetans from 'taking pictures and filming the actual scene of self-immolation and mass gatherings' and 'providing secret information to separatist forces'.
Let us hope that Yu Zhengsheng and his colleagues will soon realize that other methods may be more efficient than constant repression to diffuse the situation. 
Why can't he listen to the Tibetans?
It is what Hu Yaobang did in May 1980 when he visited Tibet. It immediately had salutary effects.

Centralized Power Key to Realizing Xi’s “China Dream”
China Brief Volume: 13 Issue: 7
March 28, 2013
Willy Lam
President Xi Discussing the "China Dream"
Immediately after Xi Jinping was elected state president at the just-ended First Session of the 12th National People’s Congress (NPC), he revisited his idea about fulfilling the “China dream.” Xi, who is also general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and commander-in-chief, cited three prerequisites for bringing about the “renaissance of the Chinese race:” following the “Chinese road,” “developing the China spirit” and “concentrating and crystallizing China’s strength” (Xinhua, March 17). The last imperative about the concentration of powers has been reflected by the fact that a number of key party and state organs have been strengthened considerably. As Xi has reiterated since the 18th Party Congress last November, a crucial challenge of the new leadership is that it must “ensure that [Beijing’s] policies and directives are smoothly followed” by the entire nation (CNTV.cn, February 6; China.com.cn, January 8).
Within the CCP’s higher echelons, more power has been given the party’s Secretariat, which is the “work organ” of the supreme seven-member Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) (People’s Daily, June 1, 2011). The Secretariat under Xi consists of seven members—one more than that of the previous Hu Jintao administration. For the first time in party history, the State Council secretary general has been inducted into the CCP Secretariat. This means that Yang Jing (age 59), who was appointed to this post at the NPC, has to report to both Premier Li Keqiang and Liu Yunshan, who is the PBSC member in charge of the Secretariat. Since the office of the State Council secretary general is considered the nerve center of the entire central government, both Liu and Xi—who exercises overall control over party affairs—can exert substantial influence on the operations of the government (Ta Kung Pao [Hong Kong]; March 17; Sina.com [Beijing], March 17) . Moreover, the ranking and authority of individual Secretariat members have been elevated. For example, Li Zhanshu concurrently serves as director of the Central Committee’s General Office. Li, who is Xi’s premier troubleshooter, was inducted into the Politburo last November. By contrast, Li’s predecessors, who include Wen Jiabao, Zeng Qinghong, Wang Gang and Ling Jihua, were merely Central Committee members when they were occupying that post (Sina.com, March 24; Ta Kung Pao, November 15, 2012).
Apart from Liu Yunshan, Li and Yang, other members of the Secretariat are in charge of hefty portfolios that embrace most of party and government procedures. Liu Qibao (age 60), a Politburo member who doubles as director of the party’s Propaganda Department, handles issues ranging from ideology to propaganda. Politburo member Zhao Leji (age 56), who is also director of the Organization Department, looks after personnel issues affecting not only party and government positions but also senior slots in state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Du Qinglin (age 66), who doubles as vice chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), runs the party and state’s united front apparatus. Finally, Zhao Hongzhu (age 65), who is executive vice secretary of the Central Discipline Inspection Commission (CDIC), is in charge of China’s highest-level anti-corruption agency (Beijing News, March 17; People’s Daily, March 12). The fact that Li, Zhao Leji and Zhao Hongzhu are deemed Xi protégés testifies to the fact that compared to the initial phases of the tenures of predecessors Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, Xi has been more successful in consolidating his power base ( “All the General Secretary’s Men: Xi Jinping’s Inner Circle Revealed,” China Brief, February 15).
In his first international press conference at the end of the NPC, Premier Li pointed out that his team will focus on “simplifying administrative [measures] and devolving powers to the regions.” He said “We must change the nature of the government’s function...Whatever can be done by society should be handled by society” (CCTV News, March 17; China News Service, March 17). The much-anticipated program of streamlining State Council departments, however, has proven to be a disappointment. Only two of the central government’s 27 commissions and ministries have been slashed. ( “National People’s Congress Marks Sharp Turn Toward Conservatism,” China Brief, March 16).
More significant is the fact that two major units of the State Council have assumed unprecedented clout. The first is the National Development and Reform Commission, which is often nicknamed the “Miniature State Council,” because it is entrusted with the task of “macro-level adjustment and control” (hongguan tiaokong) for most aspects of the economy. The post-NPC lineup of the NDRC leadership comprises four full Central Committee members: new NDRC Minister Xu Shaoshi (age 61), Executive Vice Minister Jie Zhenhua (age 63) and two newly-appointed vice ministers, Liu He (age 61) and Wu Xinxiong (age 63). By contrast, there is only one Central Committee member—usually the minister—in most ministerial-level units of the State Council. Under Premier Li, the NDRC has been given additional responsibilities, including overseeing the electricity-generation sector and engaging in long-time planning regarding population growth and urbanization (China Review News [Hong Kong] March 20; China News Service, March 13).
Given the top priority that the Xi-Li administration has given to preserving stability (weiwen), it is perhaps not surprising that the power of the Ministry of Public Security, or police, has been enhanced. The post-18th Party Congress MPS boasts three full members of the Central Committee. Apart from State Councilor and Minister Guo Shengkun (age 58), both Executive Vice Minister Yang Huanning (age 55) and Vice Minister Li Dongsheng (age 57) are Central Committee members. Like his predecessor Meng Jianzhu, who was last November promoted Politburo member and Secretary of the Central Political-Legal Commission (CPLC), Kuo is not a career policeman. A former head of SOEs in the metallurgical sector, Guo was party secretary of Guangxi Province when he was named the nation’s top cop last December. Li Dongsheng, who had an illustrious career in state television and the CCP Propaganda Department, was appointed MPS vice minister in 2009. By contrast, Yang, who holds a doctorate in criminal law from Peking University, is a veteran police officer who specializes in detective work (CNTV.cn, March 7; Sina.com, March 4).
That the police apparatus has gained more clout and responsibilities may have to do with the fact that President Xi is the PBSC member with direct oversight over the political-legal (zhengfa) hierarchy (Liberty Times [Taipei], February 3; Ming Pao [Hong Kong] January 31). Moreover, a number of cadres with experience in police and zhengfa work have been promoted in a post-NPC regional reshuffle that has affected up to 10 provinces. For example, CPLC Secretary General Zhou Benshun (age 60), a former police chief of Hunan Province, was appointed party secretary of Hebei Province. Wei Qiang (age 60), a former head of the political-legal department of the Beijing municipal party committee, was named party secretary of Jiangxi. In the same vein, Du Jiahao (age 57), a former zhengfa secretary of Heilongjiang Province, became deputy party secretary and governor-designate of Hunan Province. Finally, Hao Peng (age 58), the former political-legal boss and deputy party secretary of Tibet, became deputy party secretary and governor-designate of Qinghai Province (People’s Daily Online, March 21; China News Service, March 21; Xinhua, March 20).
Yet another significant phenomenon in the recent spate of personnel changes is the rise of the influence of the so-called Tibet Faction, a reference to cadres who have served in senior positions in the restive region. Two veterans of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), Guo Jinlong (age 65) and Hu Chunhua (age 49) were inducted into the Politburo at the 18th Party Congress. A former Tibet party secretary, Guo was appointed Beijing party secretary last year. Hu, a former Tibet deputy party secretary, was named Guangdong party secretary last November. At the just-finished CPPCC plenary session held in March, Zhang Qingli (age 62), who was Tibet party boss from 2005 to 2011, was promoted to vice chairman and secretary-general of the CPPCC, a united-front organ. Yang Chuantang (age 58), another former Tibet party secretary, became minister of the expanded Ministry of Transport at this NPC. Moreover, former-TAR Vice Chairman Qin Yizhi (age 47) recently was named first secretary of the Communist Youth League. A key factor behind the fast-track promotion of these cadres seems to be that their Tibet experience has testified to their ability to implement Beijing’s directives under extremely tough conditions (China.com, March 19; People’s Daily, March 15; Ifeng.com [Beijing], March 13).
Structural changes in the party-state apparatus as well as personnel movements the past several months have demonstrated the premium that the Xi-Li leadership has put on concentration of powers as well as upholding socio-political stability. These developments also mark a departure from the dictums of late patriarch Deng Xiaoping about the devolution of powers and in particular, the separation of party and government, which was written into the Political Report to the 13th Party Congress of 1987. President Xi, however, obviously favors a different approach to governance. As Zhang Ping, the just-retired NDRC minister, put it during the NPC session, “China’s best advantage is that [the authorities] can concentrate the nation’s resources and efforts to do big things” (People’s Daily Online, March 6; Sohu.com [Beijing], March 6). For President Xi, it is apparent that the Leninist doctrine of “democratic centralism” is the best way of realizing the China dream.

Censure and Confiscation

Confiscated dish antenna in Malho

In a previous post, (To call a Deer a Deer is Hard), I mentioned that in its December 31 issue, The People’s Daily affirmed: "it is hard to tell the truth", adding: “In the new year, we will work hard to tell the truth and write the truth … making [our paper] more readable and viewable to truly serve our readers.” 
The insistence on 'working hard to tell the truth' obviously drew many sarcastic comments from Chinese netizens. 
A day later, The Southern Weekly had to pay the price for telling the truth.
The article by Qian Gang published on China Media Project on how the censure functions in China, is quite telling about the situation of the press in the Middle Kingdom.
But  as usual, Beijing has been tougher on Tibet.
Radio Free Asia (RFA) reported that the local authorities have launched a seize-and-destroy operation against foreign broadcasting satellite equipment in Malho prefecture of Qinghai province (former Amdo province).
RFA says that the target of this action are the Tibetans who tune in to foreign radio and TV programs: "The move is part of a government clampdown on communications to stifle information on self-immolations protesting Chinese rule."
Hundreds of satellite dishes and receivers have been seized from homes in Malho prefecture and destroyed or burned as part of a 'cleansing' operation "launched on the orders of the ruling Chinese Communist Party following a surge in Tibetan self-immolation protests."

The campaign started in Rebkong county which has witnesseed a record number of self-immolations in the recent months.
Residents told RFA that those found with the satellite equipment, which Tibetans use to listen to Radio Free Asia and Voice of America programs, are given stiff fines.
Further, Chinese authorities reward those who indicate the places where such dishes can be found: "If the satellite equipment is not surrendered, each family is fined 5,000 yuan (US $ 800). If anyone reports others holding back satellite and radio equipment to listen to foreign programs, they will be awarded 10,000 yuan.”
Apparently, a six-member committee comprising Party and Government officials of the Prefecture has been set up to "seize and destroy all the illegal equipment in Malho prefecture.”
The authorities have asked the Tibetans to buy smaller satellite dishes and new receivers to replace the larger confiscated ones
Many suspect that this new equipment will only be able to receive 'official'  programs. 
Further they may be "equipped with hidden cameras and recording devices,” believe some Rebkong residents.
It appears that the latest move was initiated by Qinghai's Communist Party Secretary, Qiang Wei. 
In a speech at the end of November 2012, Qiang Wei would have said: 

The Party and the Government of Qinghai province should seize all the ground equipment used to receive satellite and radio program and clean them out in Malho, ...The cleansing efforts should be widely publicized in Malho prefecture. All those illegal equipments should be seized and replaced by those equipments that bring rich programs of the masses. The illegal and damaging, instigative programs from outside radio stations and TV should be stopped.

Between censure, as in the case of The Southern Weekly and confiscation of dish antennas in Tibet, the Party is bound to face more and more problems to tell the Truth to the masses.

Why Southern Weekly said “No”
China Media Project
Qian Gang
January 11, 2013
In a talk here at the University of Hong Kong more than a month ago, I made the modest suggestion that two initial steps toward political reform in China might be more tolerant treatment of the media and greater respect for the rights of ordinary Chinese. In the discussion that followed several people objected to the feebleness of these hopes. “Shouldn’t we expect more?” they asked.
But over the past week, even these “feeble” hopes have faced powerful resistance in China. And never would I have guessed that the first test, and China’s first major news episode of 2013, would unfold at my old newspaper, Southern Weekly.
The standoff now dubbed the “Southern Weekly New Year’s greeting incident” (南周新年献词事件) was ignited by the callous intrusion of provincial propaganda authorities in Guangdong into the production of the newspaper’s New Year’s edition. In the backlash that followed, censorship was singled out for criticism.
For people who want to better understand the Southern Weekly incident, there are two pieces in particular that I recommend. The first, “The Party’s Suppression of the Media is Exposed” (中 共钳制媒体揭秘), was written by former Southern Metropolis Daily editor-in-chief Cheng Yizhong (程益中). The second, “Who Revised the New Year’s Greeting at Southern Weekly” (究 竟谁删改了南方周末新年献词), was written by Zeng Li (曾礼).
Zeng, in fact, was assigned to Southern Weekly as a content reviewer (审读员), and in the midst of the crisis he published a blog post that struck a counterblow to suggestions that provincial propaganda leaders had not been responsible for the blow up at Southern Weekly. Zeng offered conclusive evidence of censorship.
To be exact, China does not have (or typically has not had) the kind of censorship over copy that was the practice under the Kuomintang. Under Mao Zedong, the message in the media was entirely unified. In the Deng Xiaoping era there was at last talk of news reform (新闻改革), and one deputy propaganda minister even said at the time: “What newspapers do and don’t publish should be decided by newspapers themselves.”
In the aftermath of the June Fourth crackdown in 1989, however, media returned to a state of strict control. In the Jiang Zemin era, daily controls on news media were mostly exercised as “prior orders and bans” (事前禁令) and as “ex post facto punishment” (事后追惩).

Ban and Punish
When I served as executive deputy editor-in-chief of Southern Weekly from 1998 to 2001, I witnessed numerous “orders and bans” and repeated instances of “punishment.”
Orders and bans essentially delimit and confine your work before publication. They tell you what you can and cannot cover, and how. They may tell you also what you must cover. Punishment is generally meted out by the News Commentary Group (阅评组) of the propaganda department, which monitors media content, sending orders for discipline when “problems” are discovered after the fact.
During my time at Southern Weekly we routinely received ten or more “news commentaries” each year from the Central Propaganda Department. Each time this happened, the leaders up top — at our mother paper, the official Nanfang Daily — would suffer palpitations of anxiety. Any time a news commentary came we would be summoned to discuss the matter. We would put our heads together and determine whether a self-criticism was necessary, or whether some other disciplinary measure had to be taken.
My own fate, my removal as a top editor at Southern Weekly, was sealed once I had collected a fair number of these “news commentaries.” One troublesome report became the final straw, and so it was my turn to go.
Southern Weekly has enjoyed the protection of Guangdong’s provincial Party leadership in the past. But during those years I was at the paper, the situation grew steadily worse. Even at that time, though, there were never any instances of prior censorship exercised from outside the newspaper.
While at Southern Weekly I oversaw the creation of three New Year’s special issues. All were the work of the editorial office.

Prior Censorship Released From Its Cage
As Cheng Yizhong has noted, toward the end of the Jiang Zemin era the orders and bans of the propaganda department went underground. They were no longer delivered in written form.
After 2005, controls tightened. Following the creation in the early 1990s of the News Commentary Group, the Central Propaganda Department then formed a “content review system” (审读制度), placing “reviewers,” or shenduyuan (审读员), directly inside media regarded as strategically important. These reviewers would exercise prior censorship on media content. At the same time, a group of trusted propaganda officials were appointed as editors in chief at newspapers in order to take strict precautions.
As tight as things got — with every branch and blade of grass mistaken for the enemy — the attitude of propaganda officials toward those media seen as more outspoken was one of trepidation. The Central Propaganda Department became much more hands-on, displaying its power before newspapers like Southern Weekly.
Zeng Li, the reviewer at Southern Weekly, has revealed that since May 2012, when Tuo Zhen (庹震) became the new minister of propaganda for Guangdong province, the control and oversight of newspapers in Guangdong reached an extent previously unseen. The theme of each issue of Southern Weekly had to be reported to the provincial propaganda office, and editorial could only proceed after this had been approved.
Important news reports and editorials all had to go through a review process at the propaganda office before they could be published. There was even one instance in which notification of a report’s deletion came only after the newspaper had gone to press, so that hundreds of thousands of copies had to be destroyed. (Another friend at Southern Weekly says that there were in fact four cases in 2012 of reports being killed after the issue had gone to press).

The Five Cuts (连挨五刀)
The editorial process surrounding the 2013 New Year’s special edition of Southern Weekly is in fact a living specimen of news censorship in contemporary China. In the midst of this storm, the Professional Ethics Committee of Southern Weekly (新闻职业伦理委员会) released a version of the internal process involved in the creation the New Year’s edition. This account paints a reliable portrait of the rough intrusion of news censorship.
Having been involved in the New Year’s edition, I understand just how important it is as a mark of the Southern Weekly brand. The issue is highly anticipated by readers, and the process of getting the issue out is painstaking. this is especially true when everything you do is so carefully scrutinized.
Preparations for this issue began in early December. The theme agreed upon initially was “crossing the river,” a reference of course to Deng Xiaoping’s famous statement about the reform process as “crossing the river by feeling the stones.” The theme proposal was passed on to the paper’s editor-in-chief, Huang Can (黄灿), by the editorial office. It was mid-month before a response came back from Huang. He advised instead that the issue center around the idea of the “China Dream” (中国梦), a decision made entirely to appease propaganda leaders.
On December 23, the editorial office provided a written plan for the issue to Huang Can. On the 24th, Huang submitted the plan to provincial propaganda authorities. Importantly, this was the first time in the paper’s history that the New Year’s special edition was subjected to prior censorship.
In fact, this prior censorship of the Southern Weekly involved what we can call “five cuts” (身挨五刀), as follows:

FIRST CUT: Many proposed topics for the issue were rejected. On December 26, the first opinion came back from the provincial propaganda office. It dealt mostly with “people.” Many planned profiles of certain people had to be removed.

SECOND CUT: The New Year’s Greeting (新年献词) in the issue was delivered twice for review and revision by propaganda authorities. The original title of the Southern Weekly greeting was “China’s Dream, the Dream of Constitutionalism” (“中国梦，宪政梦”). Huang Can was unhappy with the editorial and so he made revisions and then sent it to propaganda authorities. The paper was then ordered to work on another draft, which was again submitted. The draft submitted on December 31 was cut down to 1,000 words. The title was, “We Are Closer to Our Dream Than Ever Before” (我们比任何时候都更接近梦想).

THIRD CUT: Major cuts were made to the inside pages of the special issue. On the night of December 31, as production of the issue was in its final stages, Huang Can conveyed further opinions from the propaganda office to the paper’s editors. An entire page was cut that included an end-of-the-year round up of major news stories. An order later came for the deletion of two more articles. The editors had no choice but to spend another two hours laying out the issue.

FOURTH CUT: There was an attempt to entirely supplant the front page of the issue. As the editors were laying out the page, Huang Can took a photo of the front page with his mobile phone and sent it to the propaganda office.

In the early hours of January 1, 2013, Huang Can suddenly informed the editors of the latest “opinion” from propaganda authorities. First, authorities said the front-page image from Chinese history of Yu the Great Taming the Waters was too dark — it might be misinterpreted, they said. It had to be replaced by an image of an aircraft carrier. Second, the words “China’s Dream, a Dream [Glimpsed Through] Adversity” (中国梦, 梦之难) could not be used for the front-page of the issue.
After hearing these instructions, the mood of the editors essentially collapsed. The deadline for signing off on the proofs had long since passed. Major changes were basically impossible. After some back and forth, it was agreed that the image could stay. The headline was changed to “Homeland Dreams” (家国梦).

FIFTH CUT: This was the last and most serious cut, and it happened after the entire production process had finished. At around 3 a.m. on January 1, with work finally finished, the editors responsible for the special issue signed the pages. The deputy editor was the last to sign before the proofs went off to the printer. The editors then switched off their mobiles and went home.
At first light, the editor-in-chief and deputy editor-in-chief were called back to the provincial propaganda office and ordered to make further changes to the issue. The focus was on the front-page and the annual greeting. Provincial propaganda authorities said they wanted introductory remarks added to the front page. These words were attributed to Guangdong’s propaganda chief, Tuo Zhen (庹震), once the incident had boiled over onto China’s internet.
Based on what we know now, it is likely the introductory remarks were dictated orally by the deputy propaganda minister, Yang Jian (杨健), and transcribed by the deputy editor-in-chief before being sent back by mobile for a final approval. The final, final version of the introductory remarks was then sent back by propaganda authorities for publication.
It is not yet clear exactly who finalized the text, which included grade-school errors — referring, for example, to the historical episode of Yu the Great Taming the Waters as occurring 2,000 years ago. In fact, Yu the Great lived between 2,200 and 2,100 B.C.. You do the math.
Still unsatisfied, authorities also turned again to the New Year’s greeting (which, remember, had been censored three times already). Several lines were removed and around 100 words added. One casualty of this final draft was the last surviving instance of the word “constitutionalism,” the idea at the heart of the original. Additions to the greeting included language pulled directly from the political report to the recent 18th National Congress — “[We have] confidence in our theory, confidence in our path and confidence in our system.”
On the night of January 1, provincial propaganda authorities ordered that the title of the special issue be changed to “Seeking Dreams” (追梦). With the editorial staff now off duty, it was now up to the editor-in-chief and deputy editor-in-chief of Southern Weekly to head to the print room and carry out the final instructions.
I ask any of my fellow Chinese journalists to consider as they read this account: Have you ever seen such an editorial process as this? I am plenty familiar with the process of media control in China, but I find this case astounding! Is there anything these controls don’t fuss about? Content plans. Issues. Specific topics. Drafts. Photos . . . Everything, absolutely everything, must serve the goals of the propaganda office. And the journalists and editors of the newspaper are little more than servants to be ordered around. The staff at Southern Weekly labored through exhaustion day after day, not to put out the best issue of the newspaper possible but to deal with the tortuous whims of propaganda officials. These controls are like a nightmare that goes on day after day, month after month.
Southern Weekly is a commercial product — even though, naturally, it is a special kind of product. Southern Weekly is a commercially operating enterprise whose boss ultimately is the Chinese Communist Party. But China today already has a “modern enterprise system” (现代企业制度). Look at today’s state-run enterprises. Can Party leaders trifle as they please with the managers of these enterprises? Can they just head over and poke their fingers into the operation of these businesses? Of course not. But such chronic symptoms of the planned economy are still very much alive within today’s system of news and propaganda.

The First “No”
The Southern Weekly incident is important first and foremost because it exposes what has been happening behind the scenes. Over a period of several years, media controls have been transforming and becoming much stricter. Methods of prior censorship have been applied shamelessly in the darkness.
In recent years, devoted readers of Southern Weekly have bemoaned the fact that the newspaper has been less strong and less critical, that it has been missing altogether from many major stories. Increased doses of official jargon and empty talk in its pages has not gone unnoticed.
Former Southern Weekly reporter Li Haipeng (李海鹏) wrote on Chinese social media recently: “I arrived at Southern Weekly in 2002 and left in 2009. I saw for myself that there wasn’t a day that the paper didn’t struggle under strict control. It was like a tree that would lose a branch today and another tomorrow . . . ”
Readers of Southern Weekly had no way of knowing how much truth had been buried by the heavy hand of prior censorship — how many sparks had been snuffed out.
The staff at Southern Weekly had suffered long. But this time they hit their limit. Their demands were specific. They wanted a rollback of prior censorship. They wanted editors to have autonomy again.
Propaganda leaders may be more careful after this showdown over censorship. But the road to freedom of expression as guaranteed in Article 35 of China’s Constitution will be a long one. The orders and bans will continue. Punishments will still await those who step too far over the line.
But we can say that things have begun. For the first time, the word “NO” has resounded within China’s media system. The game of competing interests we saw played out this week was like none we have seen before.
My hope is that China’s leaders will have the wisdom to distinguish between those who desire and support a fresh approach to governance, and those whose disgusting actions only create anger and mistrust.
The time has come for greater tolerance of the media. The time has come to be more respectful of the people’s rights. On the issue of political reform, we can delay no longer.

Unrest in Amdo Province

According to the Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy in Dharamsala, several thousands Tibetans demonstrated  in  Rebkong County of Malho Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in Qinghai Province (formerly Amdo).
Who could have envisaged this only a year ago?
Not the China's watchers, for sure.
President Xi Jinping has a tough road ahead.
Will he be a new Hu Yaobang and bring some appeasement to these areas which have for so long suffered of the Great Han Chauvinism?
Let us hope.

 

 

 

 

 

Thousands of Tibetan schoolchildren hold demonstration; pull down Chinese flags after three burning protests in Rebkong
Thousands of Tibetan school children staged a protest march early today in Rebkong (Ch: Tongren) County where three Tibetans burned themselves alive in the past five days in Malho (Ch: Huangnan) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in Qinghai Province, in the Tibetan province of Amdo.
This is the second protest reported from Rebkong County after yesterday’s protest in which about 700 schoolchildren pulled down the five-starred Chinese flags hoisted on top of their school building in Dowa Township. Chinese flags on Dowa Township government office were also pulled down.
According to information received by TCHRD, about 5,000 students from different schools in Malho Prefecture and Rebkong County organized a demonstration at around 5 am (local time) today reciting prayers in honour of the Dalai Lama and shouting slogans for ‘equality of nationalities’, ‘free Tibet’, and ‘return of Dalai Lama to Tibet’.
Students participating in the demonstration hail from four major counties of Thunding, Chentsa (Ch: Jiancha), Tsekhog (Ch: Zeku) and Yulgan (Ch: Henan) in Malho Prefecture, according to sources.
The demonstrators walked across Rongwo town before assembling at Dolma Square in front of Rongwo Monastery. At the square, they kept on reciting prayers and shouting slogans even as more local Tibetans joined the crowd.
Sources told TCHRD that the demonstration at Dolma Square is gaining strength with more joining in. The streets in and around Rongwo are filled with school children causing intermittent halts in traffic movement.
There are no reports of official clampdown on the demonstration but People’s Armed Police are stationed at various road checkpoints and at the government offices in the County.
Yesterday, on the morning of 8 November, about 700 schoolchildren pulled down Chinese flags from a school building and township government office in Dowa Township. Moments after the protest, seven military trucks came from Rebkong County but local Tibetans and school children stopped the trucks from moving to Dowa Township. Faced with a crowd of Tibetan protesters, the military trucks backed off returning to Rebkong.
In the past five days, three Tibetans have set themselves ablaze in Rebkong County. On 8 November, Kalsang Jinpa, 18, a nomad burned himself to death in protest near Rongwo Monastery. Jinpa had been a monk at Rongwo Monastery.  According to sources with contacts in the region, Jinpa died calling for the return of the Dalai Lama to Tibet. The day before, on 7 November, Tamding Tso, 23, mother of a six-year-old boy set herself on fire and died calling for the return of the Dalai Lama to Tibet. Tamding Tso belonged to Dro Rongwo Village in Dowa Township. Earlier on 4 November, Dorjee Lhundup, a farmer in his mid-20s and father of a two-year-old girl and a four-year-old son died of self-immolation protest calling for the return of the Dalai Lama to Tibet.

The UN finally dared speaking

The UN finally dared speaking and questioning China's Tibet Policy.
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay sais: “I recognize Tibetans’ intense sense of frustration and despair which has led them to resort to such extreme means, but there are other ways to make those feelings clear.”
India is still very quiet on the issue.
It has not always been the case.
In 1965, India took a very strong stand at the UN. Here are some excerpts of the Indian Representative's remarks:

The United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 2079 (XX)
Remarks made in the United Nations General Assembly - 20th Session - 1394th Plenary Meeting. New York. UN Doc. A/PV.1394

Mr. Zakaria (India): As representatives are aware, for the past fifteen years the question of Tibet has been, from time to time, under the consideration of the United Nations. It was first raised here in 1950 at the fifth session of the General Assembly, but it could not be placed on the agenda. In fact, my country opposed its inclusion at that time because we were assured by China that it was anxious to settle the problem by peaceful means. However, instead of improving, the situation in Tibet began to worsen, and since then the question has come up several times before the General Assembly of the United Nations.
Our delegation participated in the discussion at the fourteenth session, in 1959, and although we abstained from voting we made it clear that, because of our close historical, cultural and religious ties with the Tibetans, we could not but be deeply moved and affected by what was happening in that region. I've hoped against hope that wiser counsel would prevail among the Chinese and that there would be an end to the sufferings of the people of Tibet.
However, the passage of time has completely belied our hopes. As the days pass, the situation becomes worse and cries out for the attention of all mankind. As we know, ever since Tibet came under the strangle-hold of China, the Tibetans have been subjected to a continuous and increasing ruthlessness which has few parallels in the annals of the world. In the name of introducing "democratic reforms" and of fighting a "counter-revolution", the Chinese have indulged in the worst kind of genocide and the suppression of a minority race.
To begin with, we in India were hopeful that, as contacts between the Chinese and the Tibetans under the changed set-up became closer and more intimate, a more harmonious relationship would emerge. In fact, in 1956, as a result of his long talks with Mr. Chou En-lai, the Chinese Premier, my late Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, felt confident that a mutually agreeable adjustment between the two peoples would be established. Even the Dalai Lama expressed a similar hope to our late Prime Minister, but, as subsequent events have proved, the Chinese never believed in living up to their assurances. They promised autonomy to Tibet and the safeguarding of its cultural and religious heritage and traditions but, as the International Commission of Jurists in its June 1959 report on Tibet has emphasized, they attempted, on the contrary: "to destroy the national, ethnical, racial and religious group of Tibetans as such by killing members of the group and by causing serious bodily and mental harm to members of the group."

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UN Speaks Out on Tibet
Radio Free Asia
2012-11-02
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay appears on a TV screen at a United Nation Human Rights Council meeting in Geneva, Feb. 27, 2012.
U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay called on China on Friday to address the grievances of Tibetans amid reports of new security clampdowns, travel restrictions, and disruption of communication links in Tibetan areas as Beijing prepares for a major leadership transition next week.
At the same time, the U.N. human rights chief urged an end to the Tibetan self-immolation protests challenging Chinese rule in which at least 62 Tibetans have set themselves ablaze since February 2009.
“I recognize Tibetans’ intense sense of frustration and despair which has led them to resort to such extreme means, but there are other ways to make those feelings clear,” she said.
In her statement, believed to be among the most forceful by a top U.N. official in directly addressing the situation in Tibet, Pillay pointed to “reports of detentions and disappearances, of excessive use of force against peaceful demonstrators, and curbs on the cultural rights of Tibetans.”
“I call on [China’s] government to respect the rights to peaceful assembly and expression, and to release all individuals detained for merely exercising these universal rights,” she said.
Cases cited by Pillay include the beating and imprisonment of a 17-year-old Tibetan girl who distributed flyers calling for Tibetan freedom and the return of exiled spiritual leader the Dalai Lama, along with other instances of Tibetans jailed for writing essays, making films, or sending information about events in Tibet to contacts outside the region.
Media access to Tibetan areas should be lifted, Pillay said, and “independent and impartial” monitors allowed to visit and report on the conditions they observe.
In addition, Pillay called on China to suspend the forced resettlement of Tibetan nomads and to review policies encouraging large-scale Han Chinese migration into ethnic Tibetan areas.
“Social stability in Tibet will never be achieved through heavy security measures and suppression of human rights,” Pillay said.
“Deep underlying issues need to be addressed."

Security clampdown
Meanwhile, Tibetan sources report that Chinese authorities have tightened restrictions on information flows and the movements of Tibetans during the lead-up to the Nov. 8 ruling Chinese Communist Party Congress in Beijing, at which a new group of national leaders will be chosen for the next ten years.
“Tibet has been virtually cut off from the rest of the world,” a Tibetan living in Sichuan province’s Kardze prefecture told RFA, speaking on condition of anonymity.
“It began a few days ago,” he said.
“Usually, local Tibetans communicate among themselves using [the texting service] WeChat, but even this is now entirely blocked, and Tibetans can no longer use it to send messages within China.”
“The purpose of the blackout is to prevent the spread of news concerning possible protests in Tibet during the 18th Party Congress,” a second Tibetan source in Kardze said, also on condition he not be named.
“New military posts have been set up in areas where they weren’t present before,” the source said, referring probably to units of China’s paramilitary People’s Armed Police.
“Whether this new security presence is permanent isn’t clear, but all major towns and cities in Tibetan-inhabited areas have seen a buildup.”
Separately, a Tibetan living in the Tibet Autonomous Region reported tightened controls on the movements of Tibetans traveling to large cities like Chamdo and the regional capital Lhasa, noting that travelers are now frequently stopped at police checkpoints and required to present government identification papers.
“These restrictions are due to the opening of the 18th Party Congress,” he said, adding that “monks and nuns are especially bearing the brunt of this heavy security clampdown.”
Reported by Norbu Damdul and Soepa Gyatso for RFA’s Tibetan service. Translated by Dorjee Damdul. Written in English with additional reporting by Richard Finney.