Showing posts with label Nyingchi. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Nyingchi. Show all posts

Friday, August 13, 2021

India must revisit Tibet policy to stop Beijing bullying

My article  India must revisit Tibet policy to stop Beijing bullying appeared in The Daily Guardian

Here is the link...

Xi Jinping visited Central and Southern Tibet after a gap of ten years. His objective was to ‘implement the party’s strategy for governing Tibet in the new era and write a new chapter in long-term stability and high-quality development of the snow-covered plateau’.

The last few weeks have been eventful as far as Tibet is concerned.

From June 21 to 23, Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) visited Central and Southern Tibet after a gap of ten years. When the Chinese president landed in Nyingchi City (previously called Prefecture), near the Indian border of Arunachal Pradesh, it immediately rang bells in the security establishment in India.

The China Daily reported about his stage-managed arrival: “He [Xi] was warmly welcomed by local people and officials of various ethnic groups.” Xi inspected the ecological preservation in the basin of the Yarlung Tsangpo River and its tributary, the Nyang River.

For India, this was an important part of the visit because first, the Chinese President was accompanied by Gen Zhang Youxia, Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission (chaired by Xi), and second, due to the proximity of ‘Bayi’ (which means ‘8-1 or August 1’, a term reserved to the People’s Liberation Army which was founded on August 1). Bayi is the Headquarter of the forces facing India in Arunachal Pradesh. Though no details have filtered, Xi was probably briefed about the situation on the border (a meeting with the PLA top brass of the Western Theater Command and the Tibet Military District was later organized in Lhasa).

The visit has to be seen in the context of the CPC’s 100th anniversary and the 70 anniversary of the so-called Liberation of Tibet (read ‘invasion’). The People’s Daily resumed the objectives of the visit: “to implement the party’s strategy for governing Tibet in the new era and write a new chapter in long-term stability and high-quality development of the snow-covered plateau.” This refers to the 7th Work Forum held in August 2020 which defined the development policies for Tibet for the five next years, particularly the sinicization of Tibetan Buddhism.

The Chinese President’s tour was hardly over, that another development took place in Delhi: on July 28 morning, US Secretary of State Blinken ‘briefly’ met the Dalai Lama’s representative Ngodup Dongchung during the former’s maiden trip to the Indian Capital.

Later photos of a meeting with members of the Indian ‘civil society’, attended by Geshe Dorjee Damdul, Director of Tibet House, the Dalai Lama’s cultural centre in Delhi were released. Confusion was created between the two meetings, because Dongchung was called ‘a’ representative of the Dalai Lama, while he is the ‘The’ Representative in Delhi. The US embassy should have certainly given the full name of the Representative, to avoid such ambiguity.

A couple of days earlier Wendy Sherman, the US Deputy Secretary of State had met State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi in China.

A State Department communiqué said: “The Deputy Secretary and State Councilor Wang had a frank and open discussion about a range of issues… [She] raised our concerns about human rights, including Beijing’s anti-democratic crackdown in Hong Kong; the ongoing genocide and crimes against humanity in Xinjiang; abuses in Tibet; and the curtailing of media access and freedom of the press.”

All this is fine and welcome, but one question remains: has India a Tibet Policy?

It is India that has long and tense border with Tibet from Demchok in Ladakh to Kibithu in Arunachal Pradesh; is it not high time for Delhi to have its own ‘Tibet’ Policy and start immediately engaging Dharamsala?

At first, Indian officials should meet the newly elected Sikyiong Penpa Tsering; it has not helped India to keep the relations with Dharamsala at a low key (or non-existent). Both India and the Tibetans need to seriously discuss several issues, whether of common interests or problems facing the Tibetan refugees in India.

The election of a new Sikyong Penpa Tsering as the head of the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) is an ideal time to sit together.

Contentious issues, if any, should also be brought to the table (for example, why, nearly three months after the result of the elections, half the recently elected members of the Assembly of Tibetan People’s Deputies have still not yet taken the oath? Is there a Chinese angle behind this?). This should be frankly discussed (and not necessarily made public).

Several areas of Indian interests need to be discussed.

First, the recruitment of Tibetans in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Militia; it has been reported in the Indian media that China wanted to match India by raising a Special Force composed of Tibetans. It is doubtful if this can succeed as Beijing’s trust in the Tibetans remains extremely low, even 70 years after the so-called Liberation of Tibet (read ‘invasion), but Delhi should ascertain Dharamsala’s views; and the CTA should eventually issue a statement stating its views.

Exchanges should also take place about some aspects of the Tibet-Indian border, whether in the Eastern Sector (Arunachal Pradesh), Central Sector (Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh) or the eastern part of the Western Sector (Demchok area); what is Dharamsala’s historical take on these issues?

This is particularly important at a time when it has been reported that the Chinese have erected tents on the Indian side of the Charding Nala near Demchok in Ladakh. The Tibetans are certainly aware of their traditional border with India and can hopefully openly state their position.

Another area of interest (not to say worry) for India, is the demographic change on the Indian frontiers. Since 2017, the mushrooming of ‘model’ villages in Tibet, at the proximity of the Indian border, is disturbing; hundreds of ‘xiaogang’ (‘moderately well-off’) villages have come up in the last four years with a mixed population of Tibetans and Hans.

Further, the authorities in Tibet have started to entice the local Tibetan population to side with the Communist Party. A new formula can be found in every speech of the local satraps, the inhabitants of China’s borders (with India) should be “the protectors of the sacred homeland and the builders of happy homes.” Officially, this development is linked with ‘poverty alleviation’ and the ‘defence of the borders’.

There are other areas of common interests, for example how to communicate with the Tibetans inside Tibet? Once the Ladakh episode is over, Delhi should facilitate cultural contacts between Tibetans in India with those in Tibet and why not invite the latter for religious or cultural happenings in India.

Environmental issues are also of concern for India, particularly the mega hydropower plants to be developed by China on the Yarlung Tsangpo/Brahmaputra; what are Dharamsala’s views on this?

From India’s side, assurance should be given that Delhi will stand by the Dalai Lama’s choice for his succession.

Finally, a mechanism should be set-up for regular exchanges between Delhi and Dharamsala; centuries of close kinship between the Roof of the World and the Indic civilization cannot be erased just for political expediencies , or due to Beijing’s bullying tactics.

Thursday, August 5, 2021

Hans on the Frontiers: The Worrying Message of Chairman Xi

Zhang Chunhuan and his wife Tashi Yudron in Metok

From July 21 to 23, President Xi Jinping went on an 'inspection tour' of Central and Southern Tibet. His visit was widely commented upon in the world media; especially as it was the first after a gap of ten years.
As soon as the Chinese President landed in Nyingchi City (previously called Prefecture), near the Indian border of Arunachal Pradesh, bells rang in the security establishment in India.
The China Daily soon reported: “He [Xi] was warmly welcomed by local people and officials of various ethnic groups.”
Why mention ‘various ethnic groups’ in Tibet? You will soon understand.
In the meantime, the fact that Xi, who is also the Secretary General of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) was accompanied by Gen Zhang Youxia, a CMC Vice-Chairman, and the proximity of Bayi, the Headquarter of the forces facing India in Arunachal Pradesh, was noticed in Delhi.
On the first day, Xi inspected the ecological preservation of the Yarlung Tsangpo River’s basin (which becomes the Siang and Brahmaputra in India), Nyingchi’s planning hall and a ‘model’ village. Officially, he was briefed about the development planning for the region and the City’s progress in rural revitalization; the next day, Xi left for Lhasa by train, travelling on the newly inaugurated strategic section of the Sichuan-Tibet Railway.
The visit was analyzed by the China watchers in the context of the CPC’s 100th anniversary and the 70 anniversary of the so-called Liberation of Tibet (read ‘invasion’).
Though very few details filtered through at first, fresh quotes from the New Great Helmsman have now appeared in The Tibet Daily; they unfortunately confirm the worst worries of the Indian Government.
On August 2, The Tibet Daily published several quotes attributed to Xi Jinping during his interaction with the local officials; an entire series was consecrated to the border with India. Xi’s views are encapsulated in different slogans: “protecting the country [China], building hometowns [border villages], ensuring the defense of [China’s] border and consolidating border security.”
Xi Jinping emphasized that “the border area is the first line of defense and the barrier for the national security. We must strengthen the construction of border infrastructure, encourage people of all ethnic groups to take root in the border, protect the country or build their hometown."
Xi added that he had “ardent expectations for speeding up the construction of border areas. We have to be serious about it,” he said.
The remark about ‘all ethnic groups taking root on the border’ is a clear message that Beijing wants Han Chinese to settle on the Indian borders.
For India, it means a dramatic change of the demography on the frontier areas which has had a Tibetan-stock population since immemorial times.
Since 2017, the borders right from Arunachal Pradesh to Ladakh, have witnessed a mushrooming of new model villages in Tibet.
Xi Jinping had thus described China’s relations with Tibet: “Govern the nation by governing the borders; govern the borders by first stabilizing Tibet; ensure social harmony and stability in Tibet and strengthen the development of border regions.”
The local satraps in Tibet started immediately to implement the ‘vision’ of their boss and the Party propaganda did its best to entice the local Tibetan population to side with the Communist Party.
A new formula could be found in every speech of Tibet’s authorities, the inhabitants of China’s borders should be “the protectors of the sacred homeland and the builders of happy homes.”
And as usual, the Tibetans were not asked for their opinion.
The policy has taken a concrete shape with the growing number of ‘model’ villages on the Tibetan side of the Indian border, mainly north of Arunachal Pradesh, but also of Sikkim, Uttarakhand, Himachal Pradesh and Ladakh. Officially, these ‘Xiaogang’ (or moderately well-off) villages are linked with poverty alleviation and the defence of the borders.
But for first time on August 2, through the mouth of its ‘Core Leader’, China has admitted that it wanted these villages to be inhabited by ‘people of all ethic groups’, a metaphor for Han migrants from the Mainland.
Xi also insisted “on the simultaneous deployment of troops and the people, and equal emphasis on strengthening the border, and safeguarding the sacred land.”
It was a hint to the fast-paced recruitment of Tibetans into the PLA to ‘defend the border’, which again could be dramatic for India; this issue has recently been reported in the Indian media, but Xi’s words give the true magnitude of this worrying perspective.
The Tibet Daily also mentioned that while encouraging people to settle on the border, Xi asked the local population to “build a shared spiritual home for all ethnic groups”; this might not be an easy proposal.
All this brings to light a new scenario which was never contemplated earlier by the Indian Government, particularly for its security agencies and defence forces; Delhi has little choice but to immediately act to counter these nefarious moves.


Tuesday, July 27, 2021

Why did Xi meet PLA generals?

My article
Why did Xi meet PLA generals? appeared in Rediff.com

Here is the link...

Important for India was Xi's meeting with representatives of PLA officers and soldiers stationed in Tibet.
The video of the encounter was interesting to watch, especially the large number of lieutenant generals and major generals, observes Claude Arpi.


On June 22 and 23, Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) visited Lhasa after a gap of ten years. A day before, the Chinese president went to Nyingchi City (previously called Prefecture), near the Indian border of Arunachal Pradesh.
The China Daily reported: “he was warmly welcomed by local people and officials of various ethnic groups. …He then visited the Nyang River Bridge, to inspect the ecological preservation in the basin of the Yarlung Tsangpo River [Brahmaputra] and its tributary Nyang River.”
This is an important part of the two-day visit (June 21 to 23) as far as India is concerned.
For China, it has to be seen in the context of the CPC’s 100th anniversary and the 70 anniversary of the so-called Liberation of Tibet (read ‘invasion’). The ‘Op Bakhor’, as we shall see, was certainly part of the ‘celebrations’, even if fully stage-managed.
Later The People’s Daily stated the objectives of the visit: “to implement the party's strategy for governing Tibet in the new era and write a new chapter in long-term stability and high-quality development of the snow-covered plateau.” This refers to the 7th Work Forum held in August 2020 which defined the development policies for Tibet for the five next years, particularly the sinicization of Tibetan Buddhism.


Visit of Comrade Hu Yaobang to Tibet
When I heard about Xi’s tour of Tibet, the ‘best’ visit of a Secretary General in Tibet immediately comes to mind.
From May 22 to May 31, 1980; Hu Yaobang went on an in-depth and honest inspection tour of Central Tibet. A Chinese report later explained: “it can be said that this event marked the beginning of a new era for the CPC’s Tibet policy. In the ten years that followed that visit history marched on with its strong steps, leaving behind impressive footprints: amongst them, indisputably, the open door, a revitalised economy, changes in the social structure and an improvement in people's lives.”
Unfortunately, it did not to last.
Wan Li, member of the Central Committee and Vice-Premier of the State Council, thus described Hu’s tour: “The choice of date pointed out that the Central Government was willing to settle matters through consultation with the local people. …it aimed to show the Central Government's wish to restore the harmonious atmosphere of cooperation which had prevailed in the early 1950s.”
On May 29, Hu Yaobang made a ‘passionate’ political speech at a gathering of 5,000 cadres in Lhasa; the slogan put forward in the speech was 'Strive to build a united, prosperous and civilised new Tibet.”
In the speech Hu listed six tasks facing Tibet, the first point was that Tibet should “exercise nationality autonomy in the region fully - that is to say, to let Tibetans really be the masters of their own lives.”
Unfortunately, this would never be followed, as the hard-liners soon prevailed.
Post-Tiananmen massacre, Jiang Zemin became the General Secretary and towards the end of July 1990, Jiang, accompanied by the PLA Chief of General Staff, Gen Chi Haotian, paid the ‘highest-level visit to the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) in a decade’ (incidentally, Gen Chi was responsible for the repression on the Tiananmen Square in June 1989).
They promised new economic incentives for Tibetans and urged continued vigilance against pro-independence activities. However, Jiang Zemin did not echo Hu Yaobang’s views in 1990: “It is necessary to strengthen education in patriotism and socialism in the light of conditions in China and Tibet, so as to make the students know from childhood that Tibet is an inalienable sacred part of the big family of the motherland, and that there will be no socialist new Tibet if there is no CCP.”
It appears that during Jiang Zemin's visit to Tibet, a close relationship was established between the general secretary and his future protégé, Hu Jintao.
From the end of the 1980s, Hu Jintao, the future General Secretary has been serving as Party boss in Lhasa, though he did not like Tibet at all.
There was a well known anecdote about Hu amongst Tibetan cadres: 'Where is Hu?' The answer was: 'Hu is in Beijing Hospital.' ‘Why?’ Because, Hu would report sick each time he had to go to Lhasa!
When he became General Secretary, Hu never visited Tibet.
Xi Jinping, who succeeded Hu (Junior) in 2012, had visited Tibet as Vice-President in 2011; the present tour was therefore his first in Central Tibet in nearly a decade.
However less than two months ago, the Chinese President went to Gangcha County in Haibei Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in Qinghai Province. The area is mainly inhabited by Tibetans and Mongols.
According to Xinhua: “Xi was briefed about the environmental protection efforts in the Qilian Mountains and Qinghai (Kokonor) Lake. At the lake, he inspected achievements made in comprehensively addressing environmental problems and protecting biodiversity.”
Later, Xi visited a Tibetan settlement in Shaliuhe Township “to learn about the lives of local Tibetan residents.” It was mainly a promotion tour for him; one could even hear Xi saying ‘Tashi Delek’ (‘namaste’ in Tibetan).

The Visit in Central Tibet
The present visit is therefore the second tour of Tibetan-inhabited area in the last two months. I list below some important implications of the Lhasa-Nyingchi visit:

  1. It comes at the end of July when routinely a member of the all-powerful Standing Committee of the politburo pays a visit to Tibet. The purpose of the ‘inspection tour’ is mainly to report to the informal conclave held yearly in Beidaihe, the sea resort where the top leadership (past and present) of the Communist Party meets and discusses threadbare the issues facing the Middle Kingdom.
    Usually, Wang Yang, the no 4 in the Communist hierarchy (in charge of ‘minorities’) goes to the Tibetan plateau. This year the New Great Helmsman himself went; this shows the importance that the Party attaches to Tibet …and the border with India.
  2. Though the visit was kept a State secret, videos started circulating on social media on July 22 in the evening. They had been shot during Xi’s tour of the Bakhor (the ‘shopping’ parikrama around the Jokhang Cathedral in Central Lhasa). The General Secretary was seen coming out of a shop and then walking between two ranges of people. Several hundred people must have been there, giving a tough time to the security personnel. Though it was certainly stage-managed and well-orchestrated to show the popularity of the Core Leader, the videos are quite impressive.
    We had to wait one more day to get the gist of the rest of the visit (which had taken place earlier), but the purpose to leak the videos of the visit which was still ‘secret’ was undoubtedly to show that the situation in Tibet is well under control. It was an indirect response to the Western attacks on China about Human Rights’ violations, particularly in Xinjiang and Tibet.
    The fact that no accident took place (the participants must have been carefully selected and screened before the event), added a feather to the Emperor’s cap (at least as far as the Party is concerned, certainly not for the Tibetans).
  3. It has to be noted that the Jokhang Cathedral was a few meters away. Xi Jinping did not go there; he probably wanted to re-state that Communist China is atheist (though later Xi visited Drepung monastery). The Jokhang Cathedral is too much historically linked with Independent Tibet (particular a stone stele which records the Treaty of 821 AD, between Tibet and China).
    The Treaty says: “Between the two countries [Tibet and China] no smoke, nor dust shall be seen. There shall be no sudden alarms and the very word 'enemy' shall not be spoken. Even the frontier guards shall have no anxiety, nor fear and shall enjoy land and bed at their ease. All shall live in peace and share the blessing of happiness for ten thousand years. …This solemn agreement has established a great epoch when Tibetans shall be happy in the land of Tibet, and Chinese in the land of China.”
  4. During the visit to the Bakhor, Xi was accompanied by Wu Yingjie, the Party Secretary of Tibet and Che Dralha, the No 3 and Governor. Lobsang Gyaltse, the senior most Tibetan was missing-in-action. Liu He, Xi’s faithful lieutenant (and member of the Politburo) was there, with Gen Zhang Youxia, one of the two vice-chairmen of the Central Military Commission (CMC), Yang Xiaodu, a regular of Xi’s visits also in attendance (both are members of the Politburo) and a couple of other politburo members.
  5. According to a report issued by Xinhua, Xi arrived July 21 morning at Linzhi (Nyingchi) airport. He drove to the Niyang River Bridge to learn about the ecological environment protection; the Nyang is a tributary of the Yarlung Tsangpo, which becomes the Siang in Arunachal and later the Brahmaputra. Xi wanted to learn about the river basins: “In the afternoon of the 21st, Xi Jinping came to Nyingchi City Planning Museum, Gagla (or Gala) Village and visited Gongpo Park in Bayi District, to inspect urban development planning, rural revitalization, urban park construction and other work.”
  6. ‘Other work’ certainly refers to ‘Bayi’ which means ‘8-1 or August 1’ a term usually reserved to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) which was founded on August 1. Bayi is the Headquarter of the forces facing India in Arunachal Pradesh. The presence of Gen Zhang Youxia was possibly necessary at this stage, though no details have filtrated. Xi later met the PLA top brass in Lhasa.
    The Xinhua report continues: “On the morning of the 22nd, Xi Jinping came to Nyingchi Railway Station to learn about the overall planning of the Sichuan-Tibet Railway and the construction and operation of the Lhasa-Nyingchi section, and then Xi had a ride in the train to Lhasa; he is said to have inspected the construction along the Lalin (Lhasa-Linzhi) Railway.
  7. Weibo resumed the visit in short sentences: “Xi Jinping went to Tibet for investigation, this is the first time since taking office. Xi Jinping communicated with local officials. Xi Jinping inspected Tibet. Xi Jinping interacted with the people in Tibet. Xi Jinping went to Tibet for investigation, this is the first time since taking office. Xi Jinping went to Tibet for research.”
  8. A worrying aspect of Xi Jinping’s tour was the visit to Nyingchi. On November 30, 2020, The Global Times had announced China's plan to build a large hydropower project on the Yarlung Tsangpo; the Communist tabloid admitted that it could raise concerns in India “over potential political and ecological threats as the river passes through Southwest China, India and Bangladesh. [But] Chinese experts refuted the claim that Chinese hydropower project have political aims, and said the project could help alleviate power shortage problem in northern India and boost regional economy." It is obviously a non-sense. Did the President come to give his green light to the project?
    It is difficult to answer. A series of hydropower plants (thrice the capacity of the Three-Gorges Dam) could be catastrophic for India.
  9. Also important for India was Xi Jinping’s meeting with the representatives of the officers and soldiers of the PLA stationed in Tibet. According to Xinhua: “Xi Jinping extended sincere greetings to all commanders and fighters of the troops stationed in Tibet and fully affirmed the outstanding contributions made by the troops stationed in Tibet.”
    In a speech Xi stated: “Over the past 70 years, the troops of Tibet Military District have resolutely implemented the decision-making and deployment instructions of the CMC. They have successfully completed a series of heavy tasks in the snowy plateau and have withstood the test of the arduous environment and the complexity of the country, towards maintaining national security, towards unifying and promoting and development of Tibet, have made outstanding contributions to the stability and development of the People's Republic of China. Thank you all!”
    Apart from the usual jargon, the video of the encounter was interesting to watch, especially the large number of lieutenant and major generals associated with Tibet; the presence of the CMC’s Vice-Chairman has already been mentioned.
  10. Lastly, someone was missing.
    Gyaltsen Norbu, the Panchen Lama selected by Beijing (and rejected by Dharamsala) was not to be seen, though he is the Chairman of the Buddhist Association of Tibet and a member of China’s top political advisory body, Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). Where was he? It appears that he was preaching in Gansu province. Why was he not invited? Why did he not take the Chinese President to Drepung or other religious places in Lhasa? It appears that he may not be in the good papers of the Beijing leadership. It is worth watching. 

It was certainly an important visit, and the policies/decisions taken in August during the 7th Work Forum will be implemented with more vigor after Xi’s visit. It does not augur well for the Tibetans …and India.

Some photos of the visit...