PLA: An Army without Generals?

China is a strange country; it has the most sophisticated war gadgets, the largest number of ships and the latest technology for rockets and space warfare, but it has less and less generals. Who is going to lead the troops in case of a conflict? It is a valid question.
In meantime, all sorts of rumours are floating around, mostly fake news, though indicating the present climate in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
Wanjun Xie, the New York based chairman of China Democracy Party, an active student during the Tiananmen Square events in 1989, recently wrote: “It is reported that the announcement stating that Xi Jinping is no longer the Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), has been issued to all military units at the brigade level and above throughout the entire army.”
A few days later, on September 17, Chairman Xi was seen in Beijing, when he met with representatives from various groups involved in organizing the commemorations marking the 80th anniversary of the victory against the ‘Japanese Aggression’.
But let’s go back a few weeks earlier. 
On August 20, Xi Jinping, the Secretary of the Communist Party of China and CMC Chairman landed at Lhasa Gongkar airport to celebrate sixty years of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). China watchers examined the composition of the large delegation accompanying Xi from Beijing to decipher the visit.
Xi was accompanied by Wang Huning, No 4 in the Party, Cai Qi, No 5 and director of the General Office of the Central Committee, Li Ganjie, head of the United Front Work Department …and Gen Zhang Shengmin, one of three remaining uniformed CMC members.
Gen Zhang Youxia, the CMC vice-chairman did not turn up probably because he and Xi have lately not seen eye to eye. One can assume that it is the difference of perceptions between the two leaders which has fuelled most of the recent wild rumours.
But there was more to be decoded. Lt Gen Wang Haijiang who since August 2021 has been commanding the Western Theatre Command opposite India, was missing in action. Earlier Wang had a long career in Tibet. Has he been purged? Also missing was Lt Gen Wang Kai, the commander of the Tibet Military District (TMD); only the TMD’s Political Commissar Lt Gen Yuan Honggang was seen with Xi. 
These absences are intriguing.
Another surprise for the watchers, during the Gala reception in the evening, Gen Zhao Zongqi, the artisan of the Doklam confrontation (2017) and the Eastern Ladakh Chinese intrusions in 2020, was posturing, seated in full uniform in the row behind the top leader. Gen Zhao retired from the PLA in December 2020; he was then serving as Commander of the Western Theatre Command. In the past Gen Zhao created havoc in Sino-Indian relations. So, why was he invited? Probably to show India that the border issue is far from being settled, despite the recent high-level meetings.
A friend, closing following the developments in China, told me: “Don’t worry, we will get more information on the absentee generals on September 3 during the grand parade.
It was not to be the case.
The South China Morning Post (SCMP) published a piece entitled: “Why were China’s generals missing in action during the Victory Day parade?”
The Hong Kong publication explained: “When China held its first Victory Day military parade in 2015, more than 50 generals joined troops to march down Changan Avenue in central Beijing. The generals of all stripes led dozens of formations past the Tiananmen rostrum, saluting President Xi Jinping as the official announcer read out each commander’s name.”
Four years later, the same practice was followed: “The generals were also out in force for the National Day parade in 2019, giving observers a rare opportunity to see the PLA’s new generation of rising stars,” the SCMP added: “[such] events were also a valuable chance to learn who was in charge of each unit.” 
Though 89 generals (including four full generals, two lieutenant generals, and 83 major generals) leading 59 formations were announced for the September parade, none appeared on September 3. 
Only senior colonels (brigadier equivalent) and colonels walked or rode a vehicle on the Tiananmen Square without their names being announced.
The SCMP quotes a Chinese political scientist: “It could be that too many major generals are suspected of having ties to senior generals under investigation, and Beijing may be hesitant to let major generals lead the parade.”
Two weeks after the impressive parade (though without generals), the Chinese Defense Minister Dong Jun spoke of China’s efforts to safeguard world peace at the 12th Beijing Xiangshan Forum. From September 17 to 19, under the theme "Upholding International Order and Promoting Peaceful Development," the forum brought together some 1,800 official representatives.
Dong pleaded for peace; he asserted: “The Chinese military stands ready to work with all parties to defend sovereign equality, uphold the post-war international order, bolster multilateralism, protect common interests, and jointly advance reforms to improve the global governance system.”
At the end Dong issued a veiled threat: “The Chinese People's Liberation Army stands ready to defeat any secessionist plot of Taiwan separatist forces, and will foil any military interference from external forces.”
But this does not explain where the generals are, and more importantly, if China can fight battles, in Taiwan or elsewhere, with revolving generals, who have a constant sword hanging over their heads.
Earlier this year, Joel Wuthnow, a senior research fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the US National Defense University wrote an essay Can Xi Jinping Control the PLA? for the publication China Leadership Monitor.
While presuming that Xi Jinping is in control of the PLA, he noted: “Recent purges of senior Chinese military officers have renewed the question of how firmly in charge of the People’s Liberation Army is Xi Jinping.” Wuthnow’ conclusions were: “[Xi] has largely preserved a tradition of PLA autonomy relative to the party leadership, both to consolidate his own power …and to focus on its warfighting missions. …the scope of the dismissals has remained narrow.” 
They may be relatively narrow, but they are significant; indeed, can an Army fight with a constant sword above the heads of its senior officers? Will the energy and time of the generals be spent to preserve their future (and their heads) or can they seriously do war preparation planning. The answer seems obvious that they can’t.

The Girls from Tawang

Thingbu villagers

On June 21, Arunachal Pradesh Chief Minister Pema Khandu wrote on X (former Twitter): “Now that Mago–Chuna, nestled near the LAC, is connected by road, you no longer walk out of necessity. You walk to soak in the silence, to breathe the mountain air, and to witness the untouched beauty of the land.”
During his visit, Khandu held detailed discussions with officials and stakeholders to promote sustainable spiritual, cultural, and eco-tourism in the remote Mago–Chuna region of Tawang district.
A joint collaboration between the district authorities, the Indian Army (the ITBP) and the local authorities will help developing the Mago–Chuna region into “a global tourism destination while preserving its fragile Himalayan ecosystem and cultural sanctity.”

This remote area has a historical background.
In 1975, a serious and uncalled-for incident took place, forcing the official spokesman of the Ministry of External Affairs to make a statement: “On the October 20, 1975, an Indian patrol party consisting of one NCO and four men, while on a routine patrol along India’s northern border, were ambushed by a Chinese party of about 40 persons. The ambush was well within Indian territory and in an area which has been regularly patrolled by us for many years and where no previous incident had taken place. Following this incident, four men were missing.”
While visiting the spot, I was told that the bodies of the four soldiers, all of Nepali origin and all called Chhetri, were repatriated a few days later, after the Chinese side informed the Indian post of the incident. A memorial has now been built at an altitude of 17,000 ft, just below the Tulung-la pass marking the LAC to commemorate the death of the four jawans.

Linked by tarred road
The Mago-Chuna area has only recently been linked by a proper tar road to the rest of a district, which saw the brunt of the first military operations with China in October and November 1962. 
The villages of Thingbu and Mago are today easily reachable and slowly getting integrated into the country’s mainstream, partly due to the Vibrant Village Program (455 such villages in Arunachal Pradesh only) and the close collaboration of the Indian Army which is deeply involved.

Mago Area
Before visiting Thingbu village in early August, I read again the report of Capt Henry Morshead of the Survey of India, probably the first explorer to visit the area with his colleague, Capt Frederick Bailey of the Intelligence. 
Morshead wrote in 1913: “Wedged in between Monyul [Tawang] and the Lopa country is the quaint and isolated little district of Mago. … on our arrival there we found it difficult to get the people to supply transport as the district is seldom visited by officials and they are not accustomed to do so.”
The British surveyor continues to describe the area: “The country is wooded and damp. The houses are of wood and stone with pent roofs of shingles, or, in some cases, of slate. They grow no crops but keep yaks in the upper parts of the valleys; the produce of these animals is exchanged with Monbas and Lopas (Daflas) for cereals and madder dye. …Mago is 11,800 feet in altitude and is under snow in winter. Most of the people live on the hills with their yaks in summer and return to the villages from the end of December to the end of May, during which period the grazing grounds are under deep snow.”
For decades, Morshead’s report was the only record about these remote villages: “The total population is only about two hundred and is, they say, decreasing. The people are quite illiterate. …They let their hair grow long and do not tie it in any way. …The women wear a short skirt of woollen cloth in broad red and blue longitudinal stripes under which they wear knickerbockers. They wear a great deal of jewellery.”

Thingbu village 
The village is located some 15 km from Mago at an altitude of 11,000 ft. the population belongs to the Monpa tribe, like in Tawang; the census said that 58 households live in Thingbu. 
I received a grand reception when I visited Thangbu; all the villagers were keen to see this white-skin person interested in their culture as well as what happened in 1962 during the war with China. 
This was one of the routes used by the Chinese Army to bring reinforcements to Dirang and Bomdila during the second phase of the Sino-Indian War (November 18-20, 1962).
Thingbu is just off the famous ‘Bailey Trail’, the historic route taken by Capts Bailey and Morshead who had been commissioned to survey the Tibet border during 1913. After completing the survey along the Great Bend of the Yarlung Tsangpo River, the two Britishers returned into Indian territory at Tulung-la pass, descending to Mago village, then crossing over Tse La to reach Pota, and from Poshing La down to Thembang before proceeding to Tawang and finally to Tsona Dzong in Tibet. The first part of their journey from Mago is known as the ‘Bailey Trail’. 

Meeting the villagers
During my encounters with the villagers of Thangbu, a couple of elders remembered the events of 1962. They said that the Chinese had not been too aggressive with the villagers. At that time, some villagers had gone grazing in the nearby Yangtse area; they came running back to inform people about the Chinese attack and their imminent arrival in the village. Apparently, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops just wanted guides as they did not know their way towards Dirang and Bomdila. 
Upon hearing the news of the Chinese troops’ arrival, all the young people left the village, leaving behind only older people, unable to serve as guides due to their age.
During the discussion, I learnt something interesting: the Chinese troops were usually sleeping during the day and marching at night. In a few days, several hundreds of soldiers passed on their way to Tse-la pass and Dirang Dzong. After seeing the gorges around Mago, one wonders how they could find a track to progress through this densely afforested area or how they could cross the rapid flow of the Mago chu (river).
The Chinese had very few Tibetans guiding them to their destination. 
The Thingbu villagers recounted that the Chinese were all smoking cigarettes and beedies. After seeing the PLA troops, the Monpas’ conclusion was that the PLA were not good soldiers, “nothing compared to Indian soldiers”, they added.
Contrary to other sectors (Tawang for example), the PLA had no mules or horses, they were carrying their own food (something like tsampa, barley flour) and did not take any food from the villagers. 
This reminded me of The Three Main Rules of Discipline given by Mao Zedong in 1947: “Obey orders in all your actions; Don’t take a single needle or piece of thread from the masses; Turn in everything captured” and The Eight Points for Attention: “Speak politely; Pay fairly for what you buy; Return everything you borrow; Pay for anything you damage; Don’t hit or swear at people; Don’t damage crops; Don’t take liberties with women; Don’t ill treat captives.” 
Though these rules were not followed in other sectors, the PLA soldiers told the Monpa villagers that they were from similar race and had not come to trouble them; they just wanted to kill the Indian Army soldiers.
At the end of the discussion, the older Monpa said that if today Chinese were to come inside India “I will fight and kill them”, prudently adding, “if they are of my age, if they are younger soldiers, I will not be able to fight”. The entire village had a good laugh.

The Girls of Tawang
Continuing in a lighter vein, I told them about the 1913 report of Morshead who wrote: “In Mago there were no officials and if we had tried to put on our act, the people would not have understood what we were doing. …They asked if we knew Tawang.”  “Not yet,” we said, “‘but we are going there.”   “What a place!” they answered. ‘‘So many houses! So many people! And the chang (barley beer)! There is no chang like the chang you get there. And the girls, who sing and dance for you. You haven’t seen girls, till you go to Tawang!” None of them had visited Tawang.
The Thingbu villagers could not stop laughing and the ladies vociferously denied that it was true: “here the girls are fine and chang is tasty, as good as in Tawang.” 
The village is quite prosperous, it owns about 1,000 yaks, however, they greatly appreciate the Vibrant Village Program of the Central Government and the role of the Indian Army in providing a good road, a school, a small dispensary and drinking water. 
They don’t need to dream of Tawang as the paradise on earth anymore.

Mago Village

Tulung la

Jang Village

The Tulung-la Killing

On the way to Tulung la

Prime Minister Narendra Modi will visit China for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit to be held in Tianjin n August 31 and September 1. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun asserted that the Tianjin Summit will be the largest in scale since the establishment of the SCO.

Beijing already stated that it will seek closer ties with New Delhi, especially after global concerns over the tariffs imposed by US President Donald Trump.
While there is no harm to meet, a question remains: can Delhi fully trust Beijing? The past tends to show that it is difficult.
A recent visit to the remote Mago sector of Tawang district showed me that India should remain cautious.
This area has only recently been linked by a proper tar road to the rest of the district, which saw the brunt of the first military operations with China in October and November 1962. 
The villages of Thingbu and Mago are now easily reachable by road and are integrating fast into the country’s mainstream partly due to the Vibrant Village Program of the Central Government. The close collaboration between the Indian Army and the Central and State governments has also greatly helped.

The Tulung-la Pass
Driving further north on a track, one reaches the McMahon Line marking the border between India and Tibet (Arunachal Pradesh Chief Minister, Pema Khandu rightly insists that his State has a border with Tibet only, not China).
The Tulung-la, the pass between the Tsona Dzong (County) in Tibet and Tawang district is located close to the Gorichen peak, on a watershed between the Tsona Chu (river) in Tibet and the Tawang Chu; the ridge clearly demarcates the border between the two countries.
During the 1914 Simla Convention conference, the British Indian Foreign Secretary Henry McMahon and the Tibetan Prime Minister Lonchen Shatra negotiated a mutual agreeable boundary, mainly based on the watershed principle. McMahon explained: “the boundary line ...follows the crest of the mountain range which runs from peak 21431 through Tulung-la ...To the north of it are people of Tibetan descent, to the south the inhabitants are of Bhutanese and Aka extraction. It is unquestionably the correct boundary.”
In fact, before 1975, the boundary was never disputed, though it was one of the routes used by the Chinese Army to bring reinforcements to Bomdila during the second phase of the Sino-Indian War (November 18-20, 1962).

The 1975 Incident
In 1975, a serious and uncalled-for incident took place forcing the official spokesman of the Ministry of External Affairs to make a statement: “On the October 20, 1975, an Indian patrol party consisting of one NCO and four men, while on a routine patrol along India’s northern border, were ambushed by a Chinese party of about 40 persons. The ambush was well within Indian territory and in an area which has been regularly patrolled by us for many years and where no previous incident had taken place. Following this incident, four men were missing and it was subsequently learnt through diplomatic channels that they had been killed. Their bodies have since been returned.”
While visiting the spot, we were told that the bodies of the four soldiers, all of Nepali origin and all called Chhetri, were repatriated a few days later, after the Chinese side informed the Indian post of the incident. The story also says that the fifth member of the patrol had gone around the corner when the killing took place and fate saved him.
The MEA statement continues: “The Government of India have taken a very serious view of this incident and have lodged a strong protest with the Chinese Government against the unprovoked and unjustified firing on the Indian personnel who were on routine duties within the Indian side of the border and against the deliberate killing of Indian personnel performing their routine duty.”
The question is, why did China deliberately kill these Assam Rifles jawans in this remote undisputed area?
I shall answer this later.

A CIA account
It is interesting to go through a CIA note on the incident; the note is entitled: “Peking restrained in denying Chinese crossed Indian border”. 
The US agency observes: “On 3 November PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement used relatively restrained language in denying charges made in a 1 November statement by the Indian Foreign Ministry spokesman.”
Beijing obviously did not want the matter to be scrutinised further; it was satisfied with the mild protest from Delhi, despite the fact that the incident had clearly taken place on the Indian side of the boundary.
The CIA gives its own explanation: “The Chinese statement avoided the harsh invective against the Indian government and its China policy that have characterized Chinese statements on the border since the 1962 Sino-Indian war. China did not comment on the border incident until after the Indian statement made it public.”
It appears that Beijing waited to see Delhi’s reaction; the note just says: “Indian soldiers crossed into Chinese territory on 20 October despite repeated warnings from ‘Chinese civilian checkpost personnel’ and opened fire on the Chinese side, causing the latter to ‘fire back in self-defense.”
It was obviously a lie. 
A further untruth from Beijing is that the Tulung Pass is located on the eastern Sino-Indian border near Bhutan (which is factually incorrect) and that the Indian troops crossed "the line of actual control of November 7, 1959 ".
There is NO 1959 Line. Moreover, the CIA report notes that it is “a phrase used by Peking in the past to refer to the so-called McMahon line which delineates the eastern part of the Sino-Indian frontier,” the Chinese assertion is absolutely incorrect since till date China has never exchanged maps or given its perceptions of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the Eastern Sector of the boundary.
According to the US spy agency: “Peking's statement noted that a Chinese protest on the incident had been delivered to the Indian Embassy in Peking on 22 October, that the Indian Embassy had agreed on the 25th to accept China's offer of the 22nd to collect the bodies of the four dead soldiers, and that an Indian representative at Tulung had accepted the bodies and captured Indian weapons and ammunition from the Chinese side on the 28th and had signed a receipt." This chronology might be correct. 
The issue remains, why this sudden unprovoked on Indian territory?
The order to ‘kill’ the Indian soldiers probably came from a local commander in Tibet who wanted to remind the Indian Army (and government) of the 1962 border conflict. The incident took place on October 20, the exact day the war had started on the Namkha chu river 13 years earlier. Any China watcher knows that there are no coincidences with China.
While visiting the Chhetri Memorial built on the site of the incident, I realised that this was the objective of the PLA’s uncalled for shooting, a strong reminder to India that Beijing could strike anywhere, at any time. 
The CIA reports does not make the connection between 1962 and 1975, but notes:“Though accusing the Indian side of spreading ‘slander’ about the clash, the Chinese statement was far milder than China's last official protest over an armed border clash, in 1967. At that time a series of Chinese Foreign Ministry statements in September and October had scathingly labeled the Indian ‘aggressors’, denounced the ‘reactionary Indian government’ for its alleged hypocrisy in calling for a peaceful border settlement and normalization of relations with China, and accused New Delhi of working closely with the United States and the USSR to foster anti-China opinion in the world.”
It was clearly to show India that the Chinese Army were the masters of the Himalaya and that the 1967 clash in Sikkim would be avenged.
For the CIA: “this current statement concluded by giving unusual emphasis to Peking's repeated measures to maintain the border status quo, avoid armed conflict, and ‘preserve peace’ pending a final settlement of the frontier issue.”
Prime Minister Modi will hear similar arguments in Shanghai at the end of the month.
Interestingly, on November 1, 1975, TASS news agency reposted the reports of the Indian protest. Two days later, TASS carried Indian a press comment condemning the Chinese action as an affront to India's expressed desire for normal Sino-Chinese relations; it remarked that it was the latest evidence of "the great power, hegemonistic policy of the Chinese leaders in South Asia”. 
The same day, Moscow Radio spoke of China’s “interference in the Kashmir and Sikkim issue and support for subversion and insurrection in northeastern India.” Interesting in today’s context.
The fact that the Indian Army has built a memorial for the four Assam Rifle soldiers who lost their lives at 17,000 ft is praiseworthy. One can only hope that in the near future, more Indians will visit the spot.
It remains that the Indian negotiators in Shanghai or elsewhere should not be taken in by China.

Mago Village

Mago chu (river)

Cave

Thingbu Village in Mago Circle

On the way to Tulung la

War Memorial & the pass behind