According to The New York Times and several other newspapers, Bo Xilai was sacked because he taped the conversations of senior Party leaders, including President Hu Jintao.
Did Bo Xilai spied on Vice-President Xi Jinping’s when the latter paid a brief visit to Chongqing in December 20120?
We will probably never know.
In any case, bugging is not something new in China.
Dr Li Zhisui, Mao's Private Physician reported in his book, The Private Life of Chairman Mao that it happened to the Great Helmsman in 1961.
Extracts from The Private Life of Chairman Mao:
After a few days in Hangzhou, we headed west by train toward Wuhan, stopping briefly so Mao could meet with Zhang Pinghua, Hunan's first party secretary.
The meeting took place on the train, and Mao was late.
He was lingering in his compartment with the female teacher while Zhang and his deputy, Wang Yanchun, waited in the adjacent reception car. Wang was so rooted in his peasant ways that he squatted rather than sit on the sofa. When Mao finally emerged, I joined the teacher and several of his other female companions for astroll outside the train. The young technician responsible for secretly recording Mao's conversations, joined us in our meanderings.
"I heard you talking today," the young technician suddenly said to the teacher, interrupting our idle chatter.
"What do you mean you heard me talking?" she responded.
"Talking about what?"
"When the Chairman was getting ready to meet Zhang Pinghua. You told him to hurry up and put on his clothes."
The young woman blanched. "What else did you hear?" she asked quietly.
"I heard everything," he answered, teasing.
The woman was stunned. She turned and bolted for the train as the rest of us followed quickly behind. The other women were also distressed. If he had heard one conversation with Mao, surely he had heard others as well.
Mao's meetings were concluding as we returned to the train, and the teacher went immediately to his compartment, demanding to speak with him. She reported the entire conversation with the technician.
Mao was livid. He had never suspected the bugging. The revelation came as a shock. He called Wang Dongxing [Head of the Bodyguard Regiment] into his compartment, where the two stayed behind closed doors in intense conversation for an hour. Wang, so recently returned from exile, said he did not know about the bugging devices, either. When he emerged from the meeting, he ordered the train to proceed immediately, at top speed, to Wuhan.
As the train sped north, Wang called the technician and Mao's confidential secretary to meet with him, informing them that the Chairman wanted to know who had ordered the bugging. Wang claimed that since this was the first trip he had taken with the Chairman since his return, he simply took all the staff members who ordinarily accompanied the Chairman, including the recording technician. Wang began interrogating the young men and told the technician that Mao had ordered his arrest.
But Wang did not arrest the technician. "You have no place to ron," he told him. But he demanded to know who had ordered the bugging. ,
The confidential secretary pleaded ignorance. He said the bugging had started when Ye Zilong was in charge. Ye was the man to consult. But Ye was away doing labor reform. .
The technician also claimed not to know. He was just doing his job, he said, acting under orders from "the leadership”.
"And did the leadership order you to record the Chairman's private conversations, too?" Wang Dongxing demanded, glaring at the young technician. "Don't you have anything better to do? Why were you looking for trouble? Why didn't you tell Chairman you wanted to record his talks? You recorded all sorts of things you never should have. What am I supposed to tell Chairman?"
The young man was speechless.
By the time our train reached Wuhan and we had settled into the Plum Garden guesthouse, it was four o'clock in the morning. Wang Dongxing roused a local electrician and went immediately to remove all the bugging equipment from the train. I went to bed.
When I woke that afternoon, the bugging equipment — recording machines and tapes, speakers and wires — had been put on display in the conference room, and the staff was gathered around examining the paraphernalia. The Plum Garden guesthouse had also been bugged, and that equipment was on display, too. Mao ordered photographs taken as evidence, with Wang Dongxing, Kang Yimin, the secretary and the technician standing behind the table.
Kang Yimin, the deputy director of the Office of Confidential Secretaries who had worked just under Ye Zilong, had come from the General Office in Zhongnanhai [in Beijing] to discuss the matter with Wang Dongxing. Kang was a simple, honest, but uneducated man, and he and Wang quickly came to blows. Kang knew that the real decision to record the Chairman's conversations had come from higher up than Ye Zilong. Bugging the Chairman was far too serious a matter to be decided by Ye. Why they-or l-ever thought it could be gotten away with, I will never understand.
Confronted with Mao's discovery and not wanting to bring unknown higher levels into the dispute, Kang wanted Wang Dongxing to find some convincing way to explain the whole thing away. But Wang was determined to find out where the order had originated. Mao wanted an investigation, and Wang Dongxing was determined to conduct it.
In the end, though, the two men compromised. Wang Dongxing agreed to tell Mao that the bugging had been ordered to provide material for a party history.
Mao was infuriated. "So they're already compiling a black report against me, like Khrushchev?" he bellowed. A "party history" based on bugging his private conversations could only be used against him, and nothing bothered him more than ~he possibility of the type of attack Khrushchev had launched against Stalin. The attack against Stalin had also been full of damaging personal detail, and Mao did not want the details of his own personal life recorded on tape.
But it was not these revelations he most feared. His private life was an open secret among the party elite. His greatest fear was the potential threat to his power. Mao's frequent travel to other parts of China, where he met alone with local leaders, was part of his political strategy, a tactic designed to leap over the cumbersome bureaucratic machinery of the party and state and to maintain direct contact with local-level leaders. He did not want the central authority to know what he said to the provincial and local-level leaders. His role as the source of all policy would be diminished were representatives to carry his words back to Beijing, where central leaders could devise policy based on his conversations outside the capital. Mao wanted the central authorities to be more directly dependent on and loyal to him. If they knew what he said when traveling, they could pay lip service to their loyalty without having to be dependent. That was what he was trying to avoid.
He ordered Wang Dongxing to burn the tapes immediately. "Don't leave a single one," he commanded. "I don't want them providing material for any black report." Faced with Mao's fury, the technician confessed that other places, including the guesthouse in Hangzhou that we had just left, were also bugged. Mao ordered Wang to dispatch a team to remove that equipment and destroy those tapes, too.
Several people lost their jobs as a result of the incident. Ye Zilong's lieutenant Kany Yimin and Mao's confidential secretary were both fired. Kang went to work in the People's Bank. The latter was transferred to the Second Ministry of Machine Building and was replaced by Xu Yefu, the confidential secretary who had earlier lost his job when he talked openly about Li Yinqiao's accusation that Jiang Qing was running away to Hangzhou to avoid being criticized. The witless technician whose teasing of Mao's girlfriend had precipitated the discovery, was sent to Shaanxi for labor reform.
Mao never believed that the underlings who lost their jobs in 1961 were the real culprits. "They don't understand what this is all about," he said. "They don't know anything."
Mao, like Kang Yimin, believed that the orders to listen in on his conversations could have come only from leaders at the highest level. The Ministry of Public Security would have to be involved, too. Mao was convinced that they had been spying on him as part of a plot. His growing belief that there was a conspiracy against him within the highest ranks of the party dates from here. The differences between Mao and the other party leaders were still hidden, but the rift that would explode with the Cultural Revolution was quietly widening. Mao was biding his time.
Ousted Chinese Leader Is Said to Have Spied on Other Top Officials
The New York Times
April 25, 2012
By JONATHAN ANSFIELD and IAN JOHNSON
BEIJING — When Hu Jintao, China’s top leader, picked up the telephone last August to talk to a senior anticorruption official visiting Chongqing, special devices detected that he was being wiretapped — by local officials in that southwestern metropolis.
The discovery of that and other wiretapping led to an official investigation that helped topple Chongqing’s charismatic leader, Bo Xilai, in a political cataclysm that has yet to reach a conclusion.
Until now, the downfall of Mr. Bo has been cast largely as a tale of a populist who pursued his own agenda too aggressively for some top leaders in Beijing and was brought down by accusations that his wife had arranged the murder of Neil Heywood, a British consultant, after a business dispute. But the hidden wiretapping, previously alluded to only in internal Communist Party accounts of the scandal, appears to have provided another compelling reason for party leaders to turn on Mr. Bo.
The story of how China’s president was monitored also shows the level of mistrust among leaders in the one-party state. To maintain control over society, leaders have embraced enhanced surveillance technology. But some have turned it on one another — repeating patterns of intrigue that go back to the beginnings of Communist rule.
“This society has bred mistrust and violence,” said Roderick MacFarquhar, a historian of Communist China’s elite-level machinations over the past half century. “Leaders know you have to watch your back because you never know who will put a knife in it.”
Nearly a dozen people with party ties, speaking anonymously for fear of retribution, confirmed the wiretapping, as well as a widespread program of bugging across Chongqing. But the party’s public version of Mr. Bo’s fall omits it.
The official narrative and much foreign attention has focused on the more easily grasped death of Mr. Heywood in November. When Mr. Bo’s police chief, Wang Lijun, was stripped of his job and feared being implicated in Bo family affairs, he fled to the United States Consulate in Chengdu, where he spoke mostly about Mr. Heywood’s death.
The murder account is pivotal to the scandal, providing Mr. Bo’s opponents with an unassailable reason to have him removed. But party insiders say the wiretapping was seen as a direct challenge to central authorities. It revealed to them just how far Mr. Bo, who is now being investigated for serious disciplinary violations, was prepared to go in his efforts to grasp greater power in China. That compounded suspicions that Mr. Bo could not be trusted with a top slot in the party, which is due to reshuffle its senior leadership positions this fall.
“Everyone across China is improving their systems for the purposes of maintaining stability,” said one official with a central government media outlet, referring to surveillance tactics. “But not everyone dares to monitor party central leaders.”
According to senior party members, including editors, academics and people with ties to the military, Mr. Bo’s eavesdropping operations began several years ago as part of a state-financed surveillance buildup, ostensibly for the purposes of fighting crime and maintaining local political stability.
The architect was Mr. Wang, a nationally decorated crime fighter who had worked under Mr. Bo in the northeast province of Liaoning. Together they installed “a comprehensive package bugging system covering telecommunications to the Internet,” according to the government media official.
One of several noted cybersecurity experts they enlisted was Fang Binxing, president of Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, who is often called the father of China’s “Great Firewall,” the nation’s vast Internet censorship system. Most recently, Mr. Fang advised the city on a new police information center using cloud-based computing, according to state news media reports. Late last year, Mr. Wang was named a visiting professor at Mr. Fang’s university.
Together, Mr. Bo and Mr. Wang unleashed a drive to smash what they said were crime rings that controlled large portions of Chongqing’s economic life. In interviews, targets of the crackdown marveled at the scale and determination with which local police intercepted their communications.
“On the phone, we dared not mention Bo Xilai or Wang Lijun,” said Li Jun, a fugitive property developer who now lives in hiding abroad. Instead, he and fellow businessmen took to scribbling notes, removing their cellphone batteries and stocking up on unregistered SIM cards to thwart surveillance as the crackdown mounted, he said.
Li Zhuang, a lawyer from a powerfully connected Beijing law firm, recalled how some cousins of one client had presented him with a full stack of unregistered mobile phone SIM cards, warning him of local wiretapping. Despite these precautions, the Chongqing police ended up arresting Mr. Li on the outskirts of Beijing, about 900 miles away, after he called his client’s wife and arranged to visit her later that day at a hospital.
“They already were there lying in ambush,” Mr. Li said. He added that Wang Lijun, by reputation, was a “tapping freak.”
Political figures were targeted in addition to those suspected of being mobsters.
One political analyst with senior-level ties, citing information obtained from a colonel he recently dined with, said Mr. Bo had tried to tap the phones of virtually all high-ranking leaders who visited Chongqing in recent years, including Zhou Yongkang, the law-and-order czar who was said to have backed Mr. Bo as his potential successor.
“Bo wanted to be extremely clear about what leaders’ attitudes toward him were,” the analyst said.
In one other instance last year, two journalists said, operatives were caught intercepting a conversation between the office of Mr. Hu and Liu Guanglei, a top party law-and-order official whom Mr. Wang had replaced as police chief. Mr. Liu once served under Mr. Hu in the 1980s in Guizhou Province.
Perhaps more worrisome to Mr. Bo and Mr. Wang, however, was the increased scrutiny from the party’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, which by the beginning of 2012 had stationed up to four separate teams in Chongqing, two undercover, according to the political analyst, who cited Discipline Inspection sources. One line of inquiry, according to several party academics, involved Mr. Wang’s possible role in a police bribery case that unfolded last year in a Liaoning city where he once was police chief.
Beyond making a routine inspection, it is not clear why the disciplinary official who telephoned Mr. Hu — Ma Wen, the minister of supervision — was in Chongqing. Her high-security land link to Mr. Hu from the state guesthouse in Chongqing was monitored on Mr. Bo’s orders. The topic of the call is unknown but was probably not vital. Most phones are so unsafe that important information is often conveyed only in person or in writing.
But Beijing was galled that Mr. Bo would wiretap Mr. Hu, whether intentionally or not, and turned central security and disciplinary investigators loose on his police chief, who bore the brunt of the scrutiny over the next couple of months.
“Bo wanted to push the responsibility onto Wang,” one senior party editor said. “Wang couldn’t dare say it was Bo’s doing.”
Yet at some point well before fleeing Chongqing, Mr. Wang filed a pair of complaints to the inspection commission, the first anonymously and the second under his own name, according to a party academic with ties to Mr. Bo.
Both complaints said Mr. Bo had “opposed party central” authorities, including ordering the wiretapping of central leaders. The requests to investigate Mr. Bo were turned down at the time. Mr. Bo, who learned of the charges at a later point, told the academic shortly before his dismissal that he thought he could withstand Mr. Wang’s charges.
Mr. Wang is not believed to have discussed wiretapping at the United States Consulate. Instead, he focused on the less self-incriminating allegations of Mr. Bo’s wife’s arranging the killing of Mr. Heywood.
But tensions between the two men crested, sources said, when Mr. Bo found that Mr. Wang had also wiretapped him and his wife. After Mr. Wang was arrested in February, Mr. Bo detained Mr. Wang’s wiretapping specialist from Liaoning, a district police chief named Wang Pengfei.
Internal party accounts suggest that the party views the wiretapping as one of Mr. Bo’s most serious crimes. One preliminary indictment in mid-March accused Bo of damaging party unity by collecting evidence on other leaders.
Party officials, however, say it would be far too damaging to make the wiretapping public. When Mr. Bo is finally charged, wiretapping is not expected to be mentioned. “The things that can be publicized are the economic problems and the killing,” according to the senior official at the government media outlet. “That’s enough to decide the matter in public.”
Edward Wong contributed reporting.
Showing posts with label Spying. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Spying. Show all posts
Saturday, April 28, 2012
Friday, May 7, 2010
Huawei part of Chinese spy network says R&AW
Soon after I had published a post on Huawei, the Chinese Telecom equipment company, I came across this article in the Economic Times giving the reasons behind the banning of Huawei in India.
Huawei part of Chinese spy network, says R&AW
7 May 2010,
Bharti Jain,
Economic Times Bureau
NEW DELHI: Chinese telecom major Huawei may aggressively deny any link to the China’s People’s Liberation Army, but independent assessments of Indian intelligence agencies so far clearly point out that PLA remains a customer of the company and has become more involved with it.
The security concerns of Indian intelligence agencies about Huawei’s close connection with the Chinese security establishment are shared by the US administration and had led the latter to cancel Huawei’s 2008 bid to pick up stake in 3Com.
Even British intelligence agencies have warned that the Chinese could cripple IT-dependent telecom infrastructure and critical services like water, power and food supplies by embedding malware in equipment installed by firms such as Huawei and ZTE.
According to security assessments of Huawei Technologies put together by R&AW, the Chinese firm not only shares ties with the Chinese security establishment but is also suspected to be a part of its intelligence set-up. Not only was it founded by retired PLA officer Ren Zhengfei, a former director of the Information Engineering Academy of the PLA’s general staff department, in 1988, but one of the members on the company’s board was an officer of the PRC ministry of state security.
Huawei, intelligence inputs collected over a period of time point out, is responsible for sweeping and debugging all Chinese embassies and their expertise extends to bugging of the target telecommunication and computer systems. This explains Huawei’s involvement in projects for military purposes in Iraq during the Saddam Hussein regime and also in telecom projects in Afghanistan during the Taliban rule.
Given the adverse reports of Huawei’s alleged role in bugging systems for the benefit of the Chinese security establishment, the communication ministry has warned BSNL to test all equipment supplied by the Chinese firm for “trapdoors, black box, malwares” and check if it is susceptible to remote hacking before it can be allow to be operational.
Though BSNL was allowed to award telecom network contract to Huawei, it was to restrict the orders to southern states as they do not share borders with sensitive countries such as China, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar. The communications ministry also warned that networks provided by Huawei could go live only after all requisite audits were completed.
Security concerns over Huawei links with PLA are not restricted to Indian agencies alone. The Chinese telecom major’s proposal to purchase stake in 3Com, the US firm manufacturing internet router and networking equipment, was shot down after the US administration questioned the deal’s security implications. A reluctance of approval followed and the lucrative $2.2-billion deal — wherein Huawei had invited Boston-based private equity firm Bain Capital to jointly acquire 3Com — was cancelled in February 2008. The fact that 3Com makes anti-hacking computer software for the military and that Huawei has ties with PLA raised an alarm with the US authorities, leading them to disallow the deal.
According to R&AW reports, the US administration was concerned that Huawei would be able to alter the electronic equipment and computer software sold to the military in a way that would make these less effective in real-time operations.
Adverse security assessments of Huawei have also led British security agencies to warn of China’s attempts to hit telecom infrastructure as well as water, power and food supplies through equipment installed by Huawei through covert modifications to compromise systems in ways that are difficult to detect and could later be disrupted or disabled.
Cyber attacks and telecom equipment
Reading this article published by Timeonline along with the news of the recent 'ban' of Huawei in India, what I find most surprising is not that Huawei plants 'special' devices in its equipment (it is known for years), but that the Indian media is campaigning hard to defend the Chinese giant Telecom Co.
Some newspapers are even warning that if India does not allow Huawei to penetrate the Indian market, it may become a 'diplomatic issue'.
For the Indian bureaucrats in South Block, it is is the supreme threat, "if you don't do what we want, it will become a diplomatic issue."
When China is awake, Delhi is trembling, to paraphrase Napoleon.
I believe that India has her own interests to defend and should defend them, 'diplomatic issue or not.'
A lot has recently been written about 'paid articles', I am wondering if the current 'information' campaign in favour of Huewei is not part of this pattern. Why should the Indian press not give the Indian (security) side of the coin?
Spy chiefs fear Chinese cyber attack
Timeonline
Michael Smith
INTELLIGENCE chiefs have warned that China may have gained the capability to shut down Britain by crippling its telecoms and utilities.
They have told ministers of their fears that equipment installed by Huawei, the Chinese telecoms giant, in BT’s new communications network could be used to halt critical services such as power, food and water supplies.
The warnings coincide with growing cyberwarfare attacks on Britain by foreign governments, particularly Russia and China.
A confidential document circulating in Whitehall says that while BT has taken steps to reduce the risk of attacks by hackers or organised crime, “we believe that the mitigating measures are not effective against deliberate attack by China”.
It is understood that Alex Allan, chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), briefed members of the ministerial committee on national security about the threat from China at a top-secret Whitehall meeting in January.
According to Whitehall sources, the meeting, led by Jacqui Smith, the home secretary, heard that ministers had “not paid sufficient attention to the threat in the past”, despite repeated warnings from the intelligence services. These included warnings from the security arm of GCHQ, which expressed concern because government departments, the intelligence services and the military will all use the new BT network.
A Whitehall report is understood to warn that, although there is at present a “low” risk of China exploiting its capability, “the impact would be very high”.
Huawei was allegedly founded with significant funding from the Chinese state. Its head is Ren Zhengfei, a former director of the telecoms research arm of the 3m-strong People’s Liberation Army.
The company is providing key components for BT’s new £10 billion network, which will update the UK’s telecoms with the use of internet technology. The report says the potential threat from Huawei “has been demonstrated elsewhere in the world”.
The multi-million-pound deal, signed in 2005, has led to a string of risk warnings from the intelligence and security services, with officials complaining of the failure of ministers to take them seriously.
It is unclear whether Patricia Hewitt, then trade and industry secretary, was warned of the problems when the deal was agreed in April 2005. However, the British company Marconi, which failed to win the contract in the face of a far cheaper offer from Huawei, did ask her to intervene to protect British jobs.
Hewitt, now a nonexecutive director of BT, declined to intervene, saying it was “a competitive tender between two commercial companies”. The most recent warnings about the cyberthreat to Britain’s security came in the JIC report on UK cybersecurity circulated in January and a Cabinet Office briefing paper that is understood to have emphasised Huawei’s links to the Chinese military.
Despite Allan’s warnings, and repeated warnings in the past, ministers remain reluctant to fund any move to remove the threat, officials say.
Yvette Cooper, chief secretary to the Treasury, is understood to have cautioned that it would be difficult to find the necessary funds in the current downturn. Ministers expressed concern that replacing the Chinese components with British parts would clash with government policy on competition.
According to the sources, the ministerial committee on national security was told at theJanuary meeting that Huawei components that form key parts of BT’s new network might already contain malicious elements waiting to be activated by China.
Working through Huawei, China was already equipped to make “covert modifications” or to “compromise equipment in ways that are very hard to detect” and that might later “remotely disrupt or even permanently disable the network”, the meeting was told.
This would be likely to have a “significant impact on critical services” such as power and water supplies, food distribution, the financial system and transport, which were dependent on computers to operate.
While technical modifications suggested to BT reduced the threat from hackers, organised criminals and most “hostile adversaries”, they were “not effective against deliberate attack from China”. The current friendly relations between Britain and China meant there was no immediate threat of this happening but there was still a very real threat that “covert functionality” within the components was already being used to gather intelligence.
Intelligence chiefs are believed to have warned that it was impossible to say if such information-gathering had already been introduced, since they had “only limited understanding of our adversaries’ attack capability”.
Whitehall departments were reportedly targeted by the Chinese in 2007, and a few months later Jonathan Evans, the MI5 director-general, wrote to 300 chief executives warning them that the Chinese were hacking into their systems and stealing confidential information.
An attempt by Huawei to merge with the US company 3Com, which provides computer security systems for thePentagon, was blocked last year after US intelligence warned that it would not be in US national security interests. In a new-year e-mail, Sun Yafang, Huawei’s chairwoman, told the company’s 85,000 employees that the global economic situation offered “both challenges and opportunities”. Four weeks later she was inside Downing Street as Gordon Brown welcomed Wen Jiabao, the Chinese premier.
Both Wen and Sun were keen to promote Huawei, which in little more than 20 years has grown into one of the world’s most powerful companies, with projected sales this year of £21 billion. Last year its sales jumped 46%. Its tentacles have reached most of the world’s telecoms companies.
Four days before Brown met Sun, intelligence chiefs had warned ministers of fears that Huawei’s role in the new system might have given China the ability to shut down Britain. Nor was it the first warning. Members of the ministerial committee on national security were told that “ministers had not paid sufficient attention to the threat from Huawei”.
John Tindle, professor in telecommunications engineering at Sunderland University, said software or hardware could sit hidden in a network, waiting to be activated. “If an unauthorised person were able to gain control of the equipment, its mode of operation could be changed,” he said. “The ability to move traffic across the network could be switched off. Traffic could be re-routed to another node controlled by the attacker.”
Huawei was selected to provide key components for the BT network in April 2005 despite allegations that it was bank-rolled by the Chinese government. The firm has previously shown itself to be opportunistic. The US company Cisco, one of Huawei’s main rivals, sued the Chinese company for alleged theft of its intellectual property rights in 2003. The case was settled out of court.
It is Huawei’s links to the Chinese military that cause most concern. Ren set up the company in 1988 after an edict from Deng Xiaoping, then China’s leader, that the country’s defence industry turn itself into profitable companies able to acquire modern technology.
A Pentagon report last week cited Huawei as a key part of the cyberthreat from China, noting that it retained “close ties” with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Huawei denies any continuing links to the PLA. A spokeswoman at the company’s UK headquarters dismissed the alleged links as “rumour and speculation”.
Cyberspace targets
Chinese hackers have repeatedly targeted western networks
-Computers at the Foreign Office and other Whitehall departments were attacked from China in 2007. In the same year, Jonathan Evans, the MI5 director-general, warned 300 British businesses that they were under Chinese cyber-attack
-The People’s Liberation Army is reputed to hold an annual competition to recruit the country’s best hackers
-Two years ago, Chinese Trojan horse spyware was found in the offices of Angela Merkel, the German chancellor
Friday, November 27, 2009
Chinese spies
It is not only in Munich that the Chinese are active; it is the world over.
Spying is only one of the aspects of the Embassies' activities. With its economic power (not yet super), China has other ways to influence 'thinkers', 'scholars' and others leaders.
A few ago, Ramananda Sengyota wrote in Rediff.com an edifying article: Chinese 'gifts' worry India. This is going on full swing today.
Police raid homes of alleged Chinese spies
The Local [November 26, 2009]
Munich investigators on Tuesday searched the apartments of four alleged Chinese agents on suspicion they have been spying on the city's Uighur community, news magazine Der Spiegel reported.
Authorities told the magazine that the Chinese general consulate has been running a spy network from the Bavarian capital, where several hundred Muslim Uighurs form one of the largest communities outside of China.
The World Uighur Congress is also located in the city, and many members are politically active in protesting what they see as China's oppression of the ethnic group. Meanwhile China has in the past accused Uighur exile groups of supporting terrorism.
“According to findings by the Federal Public Prosecutor’s office, the Chinese government has therefore won a range of informants who report on the private lives of the Munich Uighur community for Beijing,” the magazine's website said.
Investigators have observed Chinese diplomats meeting with the informants, but only the alleged spies are under investigation due to matters of diplomatic immunity.
The efforts by German authorities are the result of new policies created last year to curtail possible Chinese espionage, though this is the first time they have taken such drastic steps, the magazine said.
Two years ago Chinese diplomat Ji Wumin left Germany after he was discovered meeting with an informant about Uighur issues. But he departed of his own accord without being expelled. China is said to be interested in returning Ji to his former post, but this is now unlikely after the latest raids, which are related to his successor, the magazine said.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)



