Where is Confucius gone?

“China is the developing country with the strongest potential, but is still lagging behind the US, the EU and Japan in terms of soft power, including the maturity of economy, technology, education and culture. [China] is an important Asian player with global interests and impact, but is still unable to take a leadership role in the region. [China] is a socialist country with unique governing and value systems, but is experiencing deep reforms and awaiting territorial unification as well as threatened by national separatism and social unrest.”
Thus spoke Wang Jisi, the Dean of the School of International Studies in Beijing University, also a member of President Hu Jintao’s personal think tank. Wang’s message was clear: China will continue to stick to a ‘peaceful rise’. Wang, who expressed himself in the very official Global Times, even disapproved of some Chinese analysts who, in 2010, made provocative statements extending China's ‘core interests’ to the South China Sea.
Soon after Dr Manmohan Singh returned from his trip to the island of Hainan (to attend the Third Summit of BRICS nations,) Willy Lam, the veteran China watcher wrote in East-Asia-Intel.com: “Call it damage-control diplomacy. Since President Hu Jintao's American visit in January, Chinese diplomats and ‘official’ academics have been trying to reassure the world of Beijing's non-aggressive, ‘peaceful development’ diplomatic posture.”
The Indian press also noted a thaw and immediately rejoiced about the renewed possibility of the recurrent friendship between India and China.
But there is another side to the ‘peaceful’ coin.
When the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Liu Xiaobo, (he had initiated the Charter 08 which calls for the introduction of democratic reforms in China) Beijing went wild. It enraged Beijing so much that a Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson described the award as 'obscene'.
Though Lui’s demands were rather mild, he was jailed for daring to speak about ‘reforms’.
Since February, when the Arab world began to ask for ‘reforms’, Beijing started trembling. The regime became nervous. Already in late January, an article entitled Major Social Unrest Every Five Days in 2010 appeared, quoting a report published by the Shanghai Jiao Tong University on social unrest in China. It affirmed that in 2010, there has been a major incident of social unrest in the Middle Kingdom every five days. This represented a 20% increase over 2009. While 60 major incidents of social unrest were reported in 2009, it climbed to 72 in 2010: “Social unrest had spread throughout 29 provinces and cities (over 90%), with most occurring in Henan, Beijing, and Guangdong.”
The unexpected upheavals in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya did not amuse the leadership in Beijing. According to The People’s Daily, in February Wu Banguo, a member of the all-powerful Standing Committee Politburo of the CCP stated: “Based on China's national conditions, [we] solemnly declare that we will not engage in a multi-party political system or in diversity of the guiding ideology. We will not pursue the ‘separation of powers’ and the bicameral system, or engage in federalism or privatization of property.”
Beijing's response was extremely tough when an online campaign called for weekly rallies all around China. The Sydney Morning Herald reported that during one of these rallies: “Hundreds of uniformed and plainclothes police smothered Beijing's designated rally site on the Wangfujing shopping street, aggressively pushing away foreign reporters with cameras and briefly detaining several.”
Soon after meeting, Zhou Yongkang, the member in charge of national and public security confirmed that a national database containing basic information on the different strata of the population would soon be set up. He also announced that an early warning system will be put in place to alert the authorities in case of social grievances to diffuse possible incidents before they happen.
Then Ai Weiwei was arrested. The artist-activist is famous in China for having worked as the artistic consultant for the Beijing National Stadium for the 2008 Olympics. His mistake was probably to have questioned the government on corruption, particularly about the construction of Sichuan schools which collapsed during the 2008 Sichuan earthquake.
In China, many had thought that Weiwei was ‘untouchable’. But even when several foreign governments and human rights groups called for the artist's release, Beijing officials did not move, except to say that he was accused of ‘economic crimes’.
Nicholas Bequelin who works for Human Rights Watch believes that his arrest was calculated to send the message that no one would be immune, in Chinese terms, ‘you kill the chicken to scare the monkey’.
The green light for the operation probably came from the top leadership. The Guardian analyzed: “Chinese authorities have made their biggest move against dissidents and activists for years, including artist Ai Weiwei. The crackdown followed an anonymous online call for protests inspired by Middle Eastern uprisings, although it is unclear if any of those held or missing were connected to the appeal.”
We are far from the ‘peaceful rise’ trumpeted by Wang Jisi and other academics.
Wei Jingsheng, the exiled ‘father’ of the democratic movement in China commented: “ Since this happened to one of China's most well-known cultural figures, it has prompted many to remember the opening shots of the Cultural Revolution, when the Maoist regime removed ideologically inconvenient artists, writers and intellectuals from the scene at will without even any pretense to legal procedures”.
More ironically, a 31 foot-high statue of Confucius erected three months earlier with great pomp in front of the National Museum (formerly The Museum of the Revolution, but the word ‘revolution is taboo in China today) near the famous portrait of Mao on Tiananmen Square, was suddenly removed on April 22.
Where did the statue mysteriously go? Nobody seems to know. But as Wei Jingsheng wrote: “no one in China is safe from the whims and anxieties of those [officials] in power”. Not even Confucius, said a commentator.
Even more brutal.
On 16 March 2011, the self-immolation of Phuntsok, a Tibetan monk belonging to Ngaba Kirti Monastery in Sichuan province triggered violent protests by several thousand monks in Eastern Tibet.

According to the Tibetan Center for Human Rights and Democracy: “Chinese security forces have cordoned the monastery and additional contingents of armed security forces (estimated to be around 800) have been brought in on 9 April 2011 to reinforce security clampdown in Ngaba County. The movement of the monks is totally restricted with no one being allowed to go in or come out of the monastery.”
Since then, more depressing news have circulated, particularly the increased presence of Chinese security forces in all Tibetan areas of Sichuan, Gansu and Yunnan.
According to other information, Chinese Communist cadres are roaming around villages “and talking about harmony and patriotism”.
After some 300 monks of Kirti monastery were trucked away by Chinese police to an unknown destination on April 21, some Tibetan prefectures of Eastern Tibet have been closed to foreign tourists. The latest reports affirm that the situation is extremely tense in the entire region.
The present leaders in Beijing may be less corrupt than the Qaddafis or the Mubaraks, but the repression of the ordinary people's aspirations is the same in China, in Libya or in Tunisia. Of course, the West is too scared of China and will not intervene or even condem the happenings there, but ultimately Beijing’s attitude does not lead to stability and peace and its recognition as a responsible power.

China in Pakistan

In August 2010, Selig Harrison, a former foreign correspondent in India (he interviewed Nehru after the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict) wrote in The New York Times, an Op-Ed entitled China's Discreet Hold on Pakistan's Northern Borderlands. He argued:

While the world focuses on the flood-ravaged Indus River valley, a quiet geopolitical crisis is unfolding in the Himalayan borderlands of northern Pakistan, where Islamabad is handing over de facto control of the strategic Gilgit-Baltistan region in the northwest corner of disputed Kashmir to China.
The entire Pakistan-occupied western portion of Kashmir stretching from Gilgit in the north to Azad (Free) Kashmir in the south is closed to the world, in contrast to the media access that India permits in the eastern part, where it is combating a Pakistan-backed insurgency. But reports from a variety of foreign intelligence sources, Pakistani journalists and Pakistani human rights workers reveal two important new developments in Gilgit-Baltistan: a simmering rebellion against Pakistani rule and the influx of an estimated 7,000 to 11,000 soldiers of the People’s Liberation Army.
China wants a grip on the region to assure unfettered road and rail access to the Gulf through Pakistan. It takes 16 to 25 days for Chinese oil tankers to reach the Gulf. When high-speed rail and road links through Gilgit and Baltistan are completed, China will be able to transport cargo from Eastern China to the new Chinese-built Pakistani naval bases at Gwadar, Pasni and Ormara, just east of the Gulf, within 48 hours.
Many of the PLA soldiers entering Gilgit-Baltistan are expected to work on the railroad. Some are extending the Karakoram Highway, built to link China’s Sinkiang Province with Pakistan. Others are working on dams, expressways and other projects.

At that time, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu affirmed: “The story that China has deployed some military in the northern part of Pakistan is totally groundless and out of ulterior purposes. Some people are making fabrications to destroy relations between China, Pakistan and India but their attempt will arrive nowhere".
While the chill between Washington and Islamabad increases, the Chinese are more and more present in infrastructure projects in Pakistan as this article of Reuters shows. 
This should worry India. 
But can India worry for anything apart from cricket?

China Eximbank to lend Pak $1.7bn for train system
Reuters
April 28, 2011
ISLAMABAD: The Export-Import Bank of China will loan Pakistan $1.7 billion to develop a city-wide train system in the eastern city of Lahore, a senior Pakistani government official said on Wednesday.
The 15-year loan will be disbursed in the next five years, and negotiations with Eximbank are under way to finalise other details, Khawaja Ahmed Hassan, chairman of the Lahore Transport Company (LTC), said.
“The bank agreed to lend us the money with a two-year grace period, and our aim is to get it at six per cent interest,” he told Reuters.
The Punjab government recently agreed to award the 27 km (16.7 mile) train line contract project to the Chinese company China North Industries Corp (Norinco). In 2008, a French company had estimated the cost of the project at $2.4 billion.
The Chinese “were very kind and they brought down the cost of the project to $1.7 billion,” Hassan said.
He said the project was likely to begin by the end of 2011.
Lahore, the capital of Punjab province, Pakistan’s most populous and prosperous province, is home to more than five million people.
Officials expect the new transport system, the first of its kind in the country, will substantially decrease road traffic.
“There will be a big change. If we are able to bring here the system which we saw in China, thousands of vehicles (will) eventually go off the road,” Hafiz Nauman, a provincial lawmaker and senior member of the LTC, said.
He said another Chinese company will supply 111 buses to the city in June.
Seen as an “all-weather friend” to Pakistan, China has invested heavily in infrastructure development, particularly in the strategic and mineral-rich southwest, bordering Iran and Afghanistan.
China Three Gorges Corp, China’s largest hydropower developer, is ready to invest $15 billion in Pakistan’s troubled energy sector, an investment that could add 10,000 megawatts to Pakistan’s main grid over the next 10 years, a senior company official told Reuters in an interview on April 7.
China is a main supplier of military and defence hardware to Pakistan, and has helped the country build nuclear power plants.

Beware of China’s new roads

My article Beware of China’s new roads on the new railway lines in China appeared in The Pioneer.

Apart from the increasing presence of PLA troops in PoK, India must take cognizance of the fact that China is fast spinning a web of roads and railway networks in the region that effectively traps India within its own borders and poses a serious security threat. India has ignored similar Chinese acts of aggression in the past and has paid heavily for it. New Delhi must not repeat its mistake.

With black money, we are the richest country in the world!

My interview with  Dr Subhash Kashyap is posted in Rediff.com. Click the title to read.

The recent revelations about multi-billion scams perpetrated by India's top politicians and administrators have managed to jolt the nation's populace out of its usual apathy towards corruption.
Dr Subhash C Kashyap, former secretary-general of the Lok Sabha and a well-known expert on parliamentary affairs, has been involved in fighting corruption for years.
The former member of the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution speaks to Rediff.com's Claude Arpi about the root cause of the massive corruption permeating the Indian system and the need to find a solution.

A New Prime Minister for Tibet

The Election Commission of the Central Tibetan Administration announced today the results of the Kalon Tripa's elections.
Dr Lobsang Sangay polled 27,051 votes (55 % of the total votes) while Tenzin Namgyal Tethong and Tashi Wangdi  got 18,405 and 3,173 votes respectively.  
Dr Lobsang Sangay will be Kalon Tripa for the next five years.

On March 10, a bombshell made the headlines worldwide, “the Dalai Lama retires”. But retires from what?
In his Tibetan Uprising Day’ Statement, the Tibetan leader explained the background: "As early as the 1960s, I have repeatedly stressed that Tibetans need a leader, elected freely by the Tibetan people, to whom I can devolve power. Now, we have clearly reached the time to put this into effect.”
In June 1991, the Tibetan Parliament in exile (also known as the Assembly of Tibetan People's Deputies) had adopted a ‘Charter’, a sort of Constitution guaranteeing all Tibetans equality before the law without discrimination on the basis of sex, religion, race, language and social origin. While providing a separation of power between the judiciary, legislature and executive powers in the Central Tibetan Administration (or Government in exile), the Charter assigns specific functions to the Dalai Lama as the Head of the State.
With the recent announcement, the Assembly had no choice but to amend the Charter as the Tibetan leader’s functions will have to be allotted to other bodies or individuals.
It is a difficult task, though the Dalai Lama said: "It is to benefit Tibetans in the long run. It is not because I feel disheartened. Tibetans have placed such faith and trust in me."
A five member 'Constitutional Amendment Drafting Committee' was formed, with representatives from the Kashag (Cabinet) and the Assembly to suggest a legal solution to the tricky situation.
Let us try to understand the issue.
In an interview in 2006, the Dalai Lama had told us:
"I have three commitments: promotion of human values, promotion of religious harmony and promotion of awareness of the Tibetan cause."
He had further elaborated: "Out of three commitments, number one and two are mostly on volunteer basis. Till my death I committed myself to these causes. Regarding the third one (Tibet), in a way it not a voluntary commitment, it is due to past history and to the Dalai Lama institution. I am bound to this commitment and this responsibility, because I am the Dalai Lama who played a role in the past history of Tibet”.
The Dalai Lama had acknowledged his historical role as the Protector and Symbl of the Tibetan Nation.
The Drafting Committee has chosen the Middle Path, keeping in mind both aspects of the issue: the past historical role of the Dalai Lamas and his 'divine' status vis-a-vis the Tibet Nation as well as his request to be relieved of all day-to-day responsibilities.
Having completed its job, the Committee will present the outcome of its deliberations to a National General Meeting scheduled to be held at Dharamsala from May 21 to 23. This enlarged consultative group comprises of a few hundred ‘senior’ Tibetans such as ‘former ‘prime ministers’, members of the Cabinet, former ministers, present and former members of Parliament, officials above joint secretary rank, representatives from the local assemblies of Tibetan settlements and eminent members of the civil society.
The 'draft' which will later need to be ratified by the Assembly, gives the legal background and the dual role of the Dalai Lama: “The Charter provided that the successive Dalai Lamas shall exercise their responsibilities as head of the Tibetan nation and as chief executive of the Tibetan administration.”
However, “in deference to His Holiness the Dalai Lama's irrevocable decision to relinquish his administrative and political roles and in the face of His Holiness' rejection of pleas to reconsider that decision”, the Assembly should adopt some amendments to separate the Dalai Lama’s two roles and take care of his recent request, while safeguarding the continuity of the Central Tibetan Administration as the legitimate governing body of the Tibetans in exile.
The proposal is as follows: “His Holiness the Dalai Lama fully vests the Central Tibetan Administration and in particular its democratic leadership organs with the powers and responsibilities formerly held jointly by His Holiness the Dalai Lama and the Central Tibetan Administration to represent and serve the whole people of Tibet.”
However, a Preamble is added to the Charter in the same way as the US Constitution is amended, by adding amendments rather than by incorporating the amendments into the body of the Constitution as in India.
In a way, it is a legal Middle Path solution which should satisfy all the parties involved, except Beijing perhaps.
In Article 1, the Dalai Lama is termed as the ‘Protector and the Symbol of the Tibetan Nation’: “[as] human manifestation of Avaloketeshvara, is the guardian and protector of the Tibetan nation. He is the guide illuminating the path, the supreme leader, the symbol of the Tibetan identity and unity, and the voice of the whole Tibetan people. His authority is derived from centuries old history and heritage and, above all, from the will of the people in whom sovereignty is vested and therefore comprises the following inherent rights and responsibilities.”
Though freed from day-to-day official functions, the Dalai Lama would continue: “To provide advice and encouragement with respect to the protection and promotion of the physical, spiritual, ethical and cultural well being of the Tibetan people, to remain engaged in the efforts to reach a satisfactory solution to the question of Tibet and to accomplish the cherished goals of the Tibetan people.”
Apart from being the Protector, the Dalai Lama will also be a mentor and an advisor. This formulation takes care of one of the major legal hurdles. In any system of governance, a head of the State is required (he/she can be an elected leader in the case of a Republic, a King/Queen in a monarchy or a religious leader in a theocracy), but there can’t be a constitutional vacuum.
The elected Prime Minister (such as the new Prime Minister whose name will be announced on April 27), is only the head of the Executive body.
The Dalai Lama could continue to provide guidance in various forms “in matters of importance to the Tibetan people, including the community and its institutions in exile”, either on his own or at the request of the Administration.
The Dalai Lama could also be requested to continue to meet with world leaders and other important individuals and bodies to speak on behalf of the Tibetan people.
This clever formulation takes care of several serious issues.
For example the Government in exile in Dharamsala is known as the ‘Central Tibetan Administration of HH the Dalai Lama’, his embassies in Delhi and abroad are ‘The Office of the Representatives of HH the Dalai Lama’, the officials conducting the talks with Beijing are the ‘Envoys of HH the Dalai Lama’, etc., the proposal of the Drafting Committee should solve these issues, as the above institutions should be able to retain their respective names.
Vis-à-vis the Government of India who has a Liaison Office (Ministry of External Affairs) in Dharamsala, this should answer their queries, if any.
It also solves the problem of ‘succession’ as all the executive powers will be concentrated on the elected Prime Minister. Where then is the question of a successor taking over the Dalai Lama’s responsibilities?
Regarding the relations with Beijing, it is more difficult. It is perhaps because the situation has not moved for the past 30 years and that the future seems rather bleak that the Dalai Lama has decided to withdraw at this point in time.
The Chinese have repeatedly said: “The Central Government will never discuss the future of Tibet with the Dalai Lama. What we can discuss with him is his [own] future and that of some of his supporters.”
The Dalai Lama has always stated that he was not bothered by his status, but was only interested in the welfare of the 6 million Tibetans in Tibet.
The present radical changes will not alter the respective positions of Beijing and Dharamsala, unless something drastic happens within China, for example a movement à la Tunisian, nothing can be expected on the negotiation front.
Tibetan ‘democracy’ remains however very young and shaky: recently the results of the elections for the new Prime Minister were leaked one week before they were to be officially announced. Some solid home work still needs to be done by these institutions if they want to truly represent the aspirations of the Tibetan people.

Trading pettily with China

On May 2, the border will reopen between India and Tibet at Nathula in Sikkim.
Business is not flourishing.
An article in iSikkim reported: "The fifth edition of Indo-China trade through the Nathu-La border in 2010 recorded absolute zero import."
At the same time, a few hundreds kilometers westwards the trade is with Nepal is increasing (though one-way only). 
The website China Tibet Online affirms that the "total volume of cross-border petty trade between Tibet and Nepal has increased remarkably in the first quarter of 2011".
Lhasa Customs figures show that the overall petty trade value amounted to 131 million US dollars, 62.3 % higher than the figure over the same period of last year, accounting for 98.4 % of the total cross-border trade value. 
Of the total petty trade volume, imports reached up to 748,000 US dollars, dropped by 16.2 % while exports took up 130 million dollars, increased by 63.2 %."
Like in the case of India and the United States, the trade is heavily tilting in China's favour, but the Nepalis do not seem to mind too much.
An amusing story about the term 'petty trade'. At the time of signing the Panchsheel Agreement in 1954 and despite the nice preamble (The Five Principles), the two delegations were miles apart. 
A telling incident shows how little confidence there was between India and China. 
In the Hindi version of the Agreement, the Indian translators had written 'chhota mota vyapar' for ‘petty trade’. 
'Chhota' means ‘small’ and 'mota', ‘fat’ or ‘big’. The Chinese Hindi expert could not reconcile the two contradictory words. He did not realise that it was a widely used idiomatic Hindi phrase for ‘petty’. He thought that there was some trick behind the term. It took two weeks to convince the Chinese that the term chhota mota was correct. They finally accepted it only after having cross-checked with their embassy in Delhi.
The problem is the trade is 'chhota' for India and 'mota' for the Chinese side.

Nathu La opens from May 2 for trade
April 20, 2011
iSikkim
Gangtok: The sixth edition of Nathu-la border trade with Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) of China will start on May 2 this year. It will continue till November 30 when the pass at 14,420 ft closes down for winte. Under the bilateral agreement between India and China, there are 29 exportable items. Sikkim traders are allowed to export them to TAR. But the Indian business community can import only 15 items. The trade through the Nathu La pass started in 2006.
The fifth edition of Indo-China trade through the Nathu-La border in 2010 recorded absolute zero import. In 2009 also the Nathu-La border trade closed for the season recording zero import.
As per the official record 2010 saw exports worth a little over Rs 4 crore. Canned foods, utensils, textiles, copper items, vegetable oil, tea, cigarette, coffee, misri, and blankets have been the most popular export items.
ist of items allowed for trade across Nathu La border
List of items allowed for trade across Nathu La border (Pic Courtesy: The Hindu)
China’s In-charge of Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR), Ms Kesang Diki said that the reason for zero import was because of the non-feasible list of items for trade across the historic post. She requested the Indian Government to expanding the trade list so as to cater to today’s market demands.
As per the bilateral agreement in 2006 only 29 items can be exported to TAR from the Indian side while the Chinese traders can export only 15 items. Most of these items listed in the schedule are obsolete and do not have commercial value, a fact both the Chinese and the Sikkimese traders have highlighted in the past four years.
The Chinese traders, however, did brisk business by selling non-permitted items such as blankets, woollen jackets and carpets to tourists and locals. Custom officials said it was difficult to check imports of such items in the absence of adequate staff.

China, Shale Gas and Earthquakes

While a debate is raging in Europe, and more particularly in France, whether the exploitation of shale gas is safe or not, China has decided to go for this relatively new source of energy, extensively used in the United States since a few years.
A long article in The New York Times (Regulation Lax as Gas Wells’ Tainted Water Hits Rivers) explains: "

The gas has always been there, of course, trapped deep underground in countless tiny bubbles, like frozen spills of seltzer water between thin layers of shale rock. But drilling companies have only in recent years developed techniques to unlock the enormous reserves, thought to be enough to supply the country with gas for heating buildings, generating electricity and powering vehicles for up to a hundred years.
So energy companies are clamoring to drill. And they are getting rare support from their usual sparring partners. Environmentalists say using natural gas will help slow climate change because it burns more cleanly than coal and oil. Lawmakers hail the gas as a source of jobs. They also see it as a way to wean the United States from its dependency on other countries for oil.
But the relatively new drilling method — known as high-volume horizontal hydraulic fracturing, or hydrofracking — carries significant environmental risks. It involves injecting huge amounts of water, mixed with sand and chemicals, at high pressures to break up rock formations and release the gas."

Since the projection of a documentary Gasland on the extraction methods, shale gas has become highly controversial.
Another report from Reuters China set to unearth shale power goes into detail about China's efforts to get the new technology. It states "China has spent billions in its hunt for energy across the globe, but it may have untold riches in its own backyard." 
Not only the extraction of the shale gas is extremely polluting for the aquifers, but according to some recent scientific studies, it could provoke earthquakes.
A scientific report "Potential Connection Between Earthquakes and Saltwater Injection" says: 

A study of seismic activity near Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport by researchers from SMU and UT-Austin reveals that the operation of a saltwater injection disposal well in the area was a "plausible cause" for the series of small earthquakes that occurred in the area between October 30, 2008, and May 16, 2009.

Two Injection Methods Used in Gas Production
The incidents under study occurred in an area of North Texas where the vast Barnett Shale geological formation traps natural gas deposits in subsurface rock. Production in the Barnett Shale relies on the injection of pressurized water into the ground to crack open the gas-bearing rock, a process known as "hydraulic fracturing." Some of the injected water is recovered with the produced gas in the form of waste fluids that require disposal.
The earthquakes do not appear to be directly connected to the drilling, hydraulic fracturing or gas production in the Barnett Shale, the study concludes. However, re-injection of waste fluids into a zone below the Barnett Shale at the nearby saltwater disposal well began in September 2008, seven weeks before the first DFW earthquakes occurred and none were recorded in the area after the injection well stopped operating in August 2009. The largest of the DFW-area earthquakes was a 3.3 magnitude event reported by the USGS National Earthquake Information Center.

Faults Near the Injection Site
A state tectonic map prepared by the Texas Bureau of Economic Geology shows a northeast-trending fault intersects the Dallas-Tarrant County line approximately at the location where the DFW quakes occurred. The study concludes, "It is plausible that the fluid injection in the southwest saltwater disposal well could have affected the in-situ tectonic stress regime on the fault, reactivating it and generating the DFW earthquakes."

Field Investigations and Non-Felt Earthquakes
An SMU team led by seismologists Brian Stump and Chris Hayward placed portable, broadband seismic monitoring equipment in the area after the earthquakes began. The seismographs recorded 11 earthquakes between Nov. 9, 2008 and Jan. 2, 2009 that were too small to be felt by area residents. Cliff Frohlich and Eric Potter of UT-Austin joined the SMU team in studying the DFW-area sequence of "felt" earthquakes as well as the 11 "non-felt" earthquakes. Their study appears in the March issue of The Leading Edge, a publication of the Society of Exploration Geophysicists.

Let us hope that the Chinese geologists will conduct studies in Sichuan before starting extracting the gas, especially at a time when Beijing has decided to dam most of the Tibetan rivers, thereby creating another risk of earthquake.  Read my earlier posting on the subject.

Sichuan's Gas Frontier
Reuters
April 21, 2011
Sichuan province is about four times the size of Pennsylvania, the US state which holds the huge Marcellus shale deposit.
Sichuan is where China's Song Dynasty people invented bamboo wells to drill for salt about 1,000 years ago. Today, the province pumps nearly a quarter of China's total natural gas production.
One of China's main rice-growing provinces, Sichuan has rich water sources, sitting at the upper reaches of China's longest river, the Yangtze. Access to water is key to shale development because fracking is so water-intensive.
"If there are any major breakthroughs, they should come from Sichuan," said Guo Tonglou , chief geologist of Sinopec South Exploration Company. "We've done lots of work in the basin."
Explorers have sunk wells over 7 kms deep and made major discoveries such as Puguang, a conventional gas reservoir with proven reserves of 400 billion cubic metres, one of the country's largest gas fields. Geologists believe shale deposits normally sit close to big conventional reservoirs.
Few at Chinese firms think money will be a problem once companies prove sizeable reserves can be tapped.
"Decisions on spending come really quick nowadays if you can convince management it's a good project," said Sinopec's Wei.
The rising cost of importing gas is imparting some urgency to those decisions.
China is set to secure nearly a third of its gas consumption through imports by 2020, much of it from costly sources such as gas piped from Turkmenistan and a string of long-term purchase agreements for liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Australia, Qatar and Indonesia. The price of the gas in those contracts is indexed to oil, making them relatively expensive when oil prices are high compared to other fuels.
A rapid rise in domestic gas reserves, boosted by shale development, would be likely to depress domestic prices and may make China think twice about those LNG deals.
PetroChina's Chief Financial Officer Zhou Mingchun said in March the company lost 3.7 billion yuan in marketing 4.3 bcm of imported gas last year, mostly from Central Asia, because domestic gas prices were capped lower than import costs.
Still, China faces huge development costs in bringing shale gas supplies online. It only has 49,000 kms of gas pipeline grids, barely a tenth of the US system, and would need to spend billions of dollars to build infrastructure to pump the gas to market.
Farmers such as Cui Jinlian, who is planting peas and eggplants by a conventional gas well near Yuanba county in Sichuan, say they've never heard of "shale gas" -- or had any idea it could contaminate the water they use for cooking and farming.
But Cui is aware the gas under their land has a poisonous component -- hydrogen sulphide (H2S)-- that can kill people. Gas pumped from the Sichuan basin, both conventional and unconventional, is mostly sour gas that contains H2S.
"It is no good for immediate use. The gas needs to be sent somewhere for processing first," said Cui in her musical Sichuan dialect, while resting by her small vegetable field. Piling up at the backyard of her simple one-story brick house were the dried tree twigs her family uses for cooking.
She knew also that hydrogen sulphide leaked from an explosion at a PetroChina exploration well in 2004 in Chongqing, killing hundreds of villagers in their sleep.
"Shale gas is a bit controversial, it can have a negative impact if done improperly," said Johnny Browaeys of CH2M, a US consulting firm providing environmental and engineering services with an office in Shanghai.
"It's something we need to do right from the very start," said Browaeys, a fluent mandarin speaker who once lived in western China. "You don't want to get into a reputation issue."

Revolution No More

Beijing is nervous.
Today, the last thing that the Communist regime wants to hear is the word 'revolution'. 
Even if it is their own.
In the present circumstances, the leadership believes that it is too risky to discuss the modern history of the Middle Kingdom, it may trigger the fall of the present dynasty. 
Text books might have been rewritten in China: no Xinhai Revolution, no May 4 Student's Revolution! 
What about the Great Prolatarian Cultural Revolution?
Mr. Hu Jintao probably does not remember Chairman Mao's words: "Revolution is not a tea party. It is not like writing an essay, painting or embroidering flowers,... revolution is an act of violence, it is the violent overthrow of one class by another..."
Revolution has occurred in China, whether it was for good or bad is another issue. To obliterate this past is wrong, it just proves that the leadership lives in fear to be questioned ...or to be violently overthrown. 

Beijing’s Communist Youth League Cancelled Debate Due to its Sensitivity
Sources: Radio Free Asia April 13, 2011
The Beijing Communist Party Youth League recently canceled a debate forum that was to be given in memory of the 100th anniversary of the “1911 Revolution,” even though students from 16 universities in Beijing and Tianjin were expected to participate. Experts suggest that the cancellation was due to the sensitivity of the topic because it touched the subject of “revolution” and also used the words “college students” and “rally.”
Communist Party officials have always considered these to be unstable factors.
Hu Xingdou, a professor of economics at the Beijing Institute of Technology, said he was surprised by the cancellation of the debate but could understand the reason. “The memory of the 1911 Revolution could indeed awaken people’s awareness of revolution. College students have historically been the driving force behind China’s revolutions, including the 'June 4th' student movement. The government is on a high alert for them, just as it is for the Jasmine Revolution."
According to Wikipedia, the “1911 Revolution” (or Xinhai Revolution) began on October 10, 1911, with the Wuchang uprising, and ended on February 12, 1912, with the abdication of Emperor Puyi. It resulted in the fall of the Qing Dynasty and marked Sun Yat-sen as the Founding Father of the Republic of China.                                        

It takes a spoonful of muscle to help Nicolas Sarkozy go back up

My article on President Sarkozy's policy in Africa appeared in DNA. Click on the title to read.

Fast Trains to China's Periphery

In my book, Born in Sin, I consecrated a chapter to the "New Roads" built by China in the 1950's to link different parts of its territory. I wrote:

Soon after the PLA entered Lhasa, the Chinese made plans to improve communications and built new roads on a war-footing.  The only way to consolidate and ‘unify’ the Empire was to construct a large network of roads. The work began immediately after the arrival of the first young Chinese soldiers in Lhasa. Priority was given to motorable roads: the Chamdo-Lhasa , the Qinghai-Lhasa  and the Tibet-Xinjiang Highway (later known as the Aksai Chin) in the western Tibet. The first surveys were done at the end of 1951 and construction began in 1952. 
We already discovered that the construction of one of the feeder roads leading to Nathu-la, the border pass between Sikkim and Tibet had some strange consequences. India began feeding the Chinese road workers in Tibet, sending tons of rice through this route. John Lall, posted in Gangtok, witnessed long caravans of mules leaving for Tibet.
The official report of the 1962 China War prepared by the Indian Ministry of Defense  gives a few examples showing that the construction of the road cutting across Indian soil on the Aksai Chin plateau of Ladakh was known to the Indian ministries of Defense and External Affairs long before it was made public.

Fifty years later, Beijing has extended the scope of its strategic vision. Beijing's influence now reaches  'China's periphery' as this article published by Jamestown Foundation and Asian Times shows. But it is not through roads anymore, but with railway lines. 

I have often written about this worrying development, particularly about the most strategic railway lines (at least for India), the Qinghai-Tibet line which will branch to Xinjiang during the 12th Five-Year Plan.

China's neighbours should meet to discuss a true strategic partnership to counter the rise of China.
 

PLA on board an Orient express  

Asian Times
Christina Lin
China's rise on the international stage has been accompanied by an increase in its military's presence. Beijing's expanding ambition is prompting calls on the country's leaders to be more proactive in protecting its national interests. These calls by Chinese analysts have raised concerns about the military's capability to mobilize troops to defend the country's vast borders.
For example, in the aftermath of the April 2010 Kyrgyzstan crisis when violent protests forced the collapse of the government, Chen Xiangyang, an associate researcher at the Chinese Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), called for a "Large Periphery" strategy to safeguard China's neighboring areas.
Chen's call was echoed by senior Chinese military leaders about possibly intervening in Central Asia. The Hong Kong-based Jing Bao in a January 2010 article argued that railways - and their military significance - need to be infused into Chinese leaders' strategic lens when exporting railway technology as they enhance military power projection.
Indeed, in applying this strategic vision, on November 17, 2010, the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) took the Shanghai-Nanjing express train for the first time to return to their barracks after completing security duty at the Shanghai World Expo 2010.
According to the Military Representative Office of the PLA stationed at the Shanghai Railway Bureau, the Shanghai-Nanjing express railway is an inter-city railway that can run at a maximum speed of 350 kilometers (km) per hour. Some Chinese military analysts touted this as an ideal way for the PLA to project troops and light equipment in military operations other than war (MOOTW).
China has built rail lines to Tibet, is building connections to Nepal, and is planning high-speed rails to Laos, Singapore, Cambodia, Vietnam, Thailand and Burma (Myanmar). On November 15 last year, then Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki announced that Iran, Afghanistan and Tajikistan had agreed to cooperate with China to build a China-Iran rail link from Xinjiang, passing through Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and finally arriving in Iran.
The longer plan seems to connect westward into Iraq (where China has large oil and gas investments), Syria, Turkey and onto Europe. This is based on an overall United Nations-sponsored Trans-Asia Railway (TAR) network to link China to Europe, using the Middle East as a transit hub.
Although the UN engineered the TAR agreement, China has done more than any other nation to re-forge trade and transport links to reestablish the Silk Route. Negotiations are already underway with 17 countries across Eurasia. With China's high-speed trains having clocked speeds as high as 486.1 km/h (302 mph) and the PLA aggressively upgrading its long-range combat capabilities by using rail as logistical support for its air force (PLAAF) and troop projection, this new "Orient Express" across the revived Silk Road will have important military and strategic implications for US and Western interests in the region.

Militarization of the Iron Silk Road
Military requirements are part of China's rail development, and the PLA actively participates in the design and planning of China's high-speed rail. For example, Chengdu Railway Bureau has 14 military officers taking lead positions in key departments at all major stations, are tasked to coordinate railway planning, design, construction, timing of requirements and track implementation.
Shenyang Railway Bureau, which is in the strategic location of Liaoning province next to North Korea, Inner Mongolia and the Yellow Sea, has also established a regional military transportation management mechanism with the PLA. According to the Military Transportation Department of the PLA General Logistics Department (GLD), over 1,000 railway stations have been equipped with military transportation facilities, thereby establishing a complete railway support network that enhances the PLA's strategic projection capability.
GLD had cooperated with the PRC's Ministry of Railway in 2009, and fulfilled over 100 military requirements for 20 odd railways in China with the capability of military transportation. In 2009, large sums of money were invested to build military transportation facilities for a few railway stations and military platforms for loading and unloading materials.
This investment was made to meet military requirements used for activities such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's (SCO) Peace Mission in 2010. GLD is actively involved through the entire process of the railway construction, varying from the programming to the completion of the railways. For example, when building the railway from Kunming, capital of Yunnan province, to Nanning, capital of Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, in order to meet troop maneuver requirements the Ministry of Railway had to revise a partial route and prolong 12.4 km of railways at an increased cost of 1.55 billion yuan ($232.66 million).
With China's expansionist policy and infrastructure projects toward its neighbors, some analysts are beginning to sound the alarm on the militarization of these projects.

Central, Southeast and South Asia
For example, Konstantin Syroyezhkin, in Kazakhstan's Institute of Strategic Studies, points out the rapid development of road and railroad infrastructure in Central Asia with Chinese participation may be used for future PLA troop deployments in case of a serious conflict threatening China's security or strategic interests. This concern is corroborated by the recent SCO Peace Mission 2010 military exercise, whereby China transported troops to Kazakhstan by rail.
Likewise, other countries such as Vietnam, and India, as well as the Tibet Autonomous Region share the same concern. Vietnam for one rejected China's high-speed railway technology ($32.5 billion) in favor of Japan's Shinkansen technology ($55 billion) despite its higher cost.
On June 19, 2010, Vietnam's National Assembly voted down China's high-speed rail plan. According to Chinese language magazine Yazhou Zhoukan, some Vietnamese politicians oppose adopting Chinese high speed rail technology out of the fear that China might use it to transport PLA troops to invade Vietnam, in reprise of its 1979 Sino-Vietnam War.
In the Tibet Autonomous Region, China's high altitude Qinghai-Tibet railway that opened in 2006 is being used as a supply line to enhance PLAAF mobilization capability. On August 3, 2010, PLA Daily reported that a train loaded with important air combat readiness material for the PLAAF arrived in Tibet via the railway.
China is rapidly upgrading railways and airports in Tibet, with four operational airports and a fifth one under construction. During the March 2008 Tibetan protests, the Qinghai Tibet rail enabled rapid PLA deployment. Within 48 hours, at the start of Lhasa riots, T-90/89 armored personnel carriers and T-92 wheeled infantry fighting vehicles appeared on the streets - apparently from the 149th Division of the No. 13 Group Army under the Chengdu Military Regional Command.
This was indicated by the "leopard" camouflage uniforms specifically designed for mountain warfare operation from the 149th Division. Should Sino-Indian relations ever deteriorate to the verge of military confrontation and if riots in Tibet spread, the PLA's Mountain Brigades can rapidly deploy to the region via the railway. Indeed, railway and road construction have been China's Himalayan strategy for decades - as the PLA prepared to annex Tibet, Mao Zedong advised it "to advance while building roads".

China-Iran railway
In October 2010, the transport ministers of China, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Iran signed an agreement in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, to commence China-Iran railway construction. The railway from Xinjiang, China, would pass through Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Afghanistan, arrive in Iran and split into a southern line to the Gulf and a western line to Turkey onto Europe.
Earlier in August, China and Iran had signed a $2 billion agreement on construction of the railway network in western Iran, which will continue westward into Iraq, eventually connecting with Syria, Turkey and the Mediterranean coastal countries.

China-Turkey railway
Around the same time, in October 2010, Turkey and China elevated their relations to one of "strategic partnership", signed deals for high-speed rails in Turkey to eventually link with China, upgraded their military ties, and participated in the traditional NATO air combat exercise of Anatolian Eagle - with China replacing Israel and the United States.
China will extend $30 billion to construct 7,000 km of high-speed rail lines across Turkey, as well as upgrading rail links between Turkey and Pakistan and planning a railway around Lake Van to Iran and Pakistan. Moreover, China has invited Bulgaria to join Turkey in its Eurasian high-speed rail plan. China offered huge loans for construction in return for the use of Bulgarian rivers, seaports and airports, as transit hubs onto Western Europe.
Given the Sino-Turkish strategic partnership and anticipation of future military exercises, Chinese railways could enhance PLA military projection and presence in the Middle East and wider Black Sea region. In addition to Chinese warplanes over the Black Sea region during the October 2010 Anatolian Eagle exercise, Chinese special op forces conducted joint exercises at a Turkey commando school in early November. With reports of PLAAF refueling in Iran en route to Turkey, high-speed rail could enable logistic support and transport of combat readiness materials in the future.

Missing links - Iraq and Afghanistan
While China is constructing railways across Eurasia, Iraq and Afghanistan still present significant missing links due to the security situation and large presence of US and NATO troops.
Yet, when the United States' draw down, China may try to push for UNPKOs to take over and deploy the PLA under blue berets to protect China's energy and strategic interests. It has a $3.4 billion investment in the Aynak copper mine in Afghanistan as well as various oil and gas fields in Iraq.
China will also likely use SCO to foment regional cooperation for constructing the railways through Afghanistan to Iran, eventually linking with Iraq. China and Iran are not interested in joining western-led initiatives, such as the Transport Corridor of Europe, Caucasus, and Asia (TRACECA), which is also known as the "new Silk Road". Rather, they want to forge their own projects and not be beholden to Western interests or sanctions.

Conclusion
China's ambitious high-speed rail projects across Asia and the Middle East have important strategic implications. It links up poorer regions with more prosperous regions, provides jobs during an economic downturn, and allows Chinese military and security services to better project power both within and outside the country's borders. While air transport is faster, it is limited to fewer people and lighter gear, whereas rail is a crucial means for moving soldiers and heavy equipment, and is much easier to sustain logistically.
As China's economic and energy portfolio continues to increase in the Greater Middle East, there may be future conditions under which the PLA might deploy troops using high-speed rails for MOOTW to protect its strategic interests. Indeed, in January 2011 there were reports that the PLA had deployed troops to the economic zone of Rajin-Sonbong in northeast North Korea in order to "guard port facilities China has invested in".
Whether this is a telltale sign of what may happen with China's interests in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere, will still remain a mystery for the future of the PLA's Orient Express.
Christina Y Lin, PhD is research consultant for IHS Jane's and former director for China affairs in policy planning at the US Department of Defense. Her 2008 paper linking Middle East and East Asia nuclear issues, "The King from the East" published by the Korea Economic Institute, was recently referenced in The Wall Street Journal.

Damage-control diplomacy?

'Opacity' is a key-word in Chinese politics.
Why suddenly last year, the leadership found new 'core issues' to fight for and why these core issues have suddenly been dropped from Beijing's agenda, is a matter of pure speculation.
One can always say that the 'generals' have been put back in their places (or send back to their barracks), at least for the time being. 
It does not explain why they had come out in the first place.
One point seems certain, the power struggle for the 2012 leadership change has started.
Another intriguing issue!
Why did Vice President Xi Jinping praise the departing U.S. ambassador, Jon Huntsman, calling him 'an old friend of the Chinese people'?
Huntsman had earlier challenged the CCP's clampdown on protesters and sided with Chinese dissidents.
When Huntsman called on him with a delegation of US Senators, Vice President Xi said: "I must take the opportunity to say a few words about Ambassador Huntsman. His term is coming to an end and we are reluctant to see him go. You are an old friend of the Chinese people".
Xi continued: "Let me express our appreciation for your contributions. We will never forget what you have done, I hope that wherever you work in the future that you come back to China often and continue to make contributions to friendship and cooperation between our two people."
The same Huntsman was earlier criticized the Chinese government when he was seen with demonstrators in a crowd that gathered on Beijing's Wangfujing shopping street. Online messages had called for a pro-democracy gathering inspired by the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt.
Is the praise of Huntsman part of a 'damage-control' policy or is Xi just preparing his Presidency? Future will tell us.
The 'damage-control' was also apparent when President Hu met Dr Manmohan Singh during the BRICS meet.
The 'Kashmir' visa issue seems to have been dropped for the time being.

Hu Jintao deploys his damage-control spin doctors; Now if only the generals would cooperate
East-Asia-Intel.com, April 13, 2011
INSIDE CHINA    
Willy Lam
Call it damage-control diplomacy. Since President Hu Jintao's American visit in January, Chinese diplomats and "official" academics have been trying to reassure the world of Beijing's non-aggressive, "peaceful development" diplomatic posture.
Throughout 2010, Beijing alienated a number of its Asia-Pacific neighbors through measures including revving up territorial disputes with countries including Japan, Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines. Relations between China and the U.S. also became tense in the wake of large-scale war games that the American Navy and Air Force were holding with Asian countries in China's backyard.
Spearheading Beijing's fence-mending effort is well-known Peking University foreign-policy professor Wang Jisi, who is also a senior member of President Hu's personal think tank. In an article in the mass-circulation Global Times newspaper and Web site earlier this week [April 13], Wang pointed out that China had no ambition of displacing the U.S. as the world's No. 1 power.
"It's unrealistic to think that China can reach parity with the U.S. in one to two decades," Wang pointed out. "The development of China's soft power is particularly lagging behind. China's voice is weak within international opinion. It's far from 'world No. 2.' "
In the current issue of Foreign Affairs, Wang further pointed out that for the foreseeable future, the focus of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership will continue to be economic development and maintaining domestic harmony. Wang in particular criticized unnamed commentators for making inflammatory statements about extending of China's "core interests" to cover the South China Sea and other parts of Asia.
Wang indicated that apart from Taiwan, "the Chinese government has never officially identified any single foreign policy issue as one of the country's core interests. Last year, some Chinese commentators reportedly referred to the South China Sea and North Korea as such, but these reckless statements, made with no official authorization, created a great deal of confusion," he added.
Other liberal academics, including well-known international relations expert Professor Chu Shulong at Tsinghua University, have blasted People's Liberation Army generals for inappropriately "intervening in China's foreign and security-related policymaking."
It remains a fact, however, that within China's labyrinthine foreign-policy establishment — which is headed by the CCP Leading Group on Foreign Affairs (LGFA) — the generals are having a bigger say. For example, President Hu, who chairs the LGFA as well as the party's Central Military Commission, is on occasion known to have sided with PLA representatives rather than career diplomats on issues including relations with the U.S., Japan, Taiwan, and in particular, North Korea.
Moreover, the diplomats — as well as government advisers such as Professors Wang and Chu — are powerless to prevent the generals from aggressively flexing their muscle. A classic example was the test-flight of the Jian-20 stealth jetfighter on January 11 this year, the same day that visiting Defense Secretary Robert Gates had his meeting with President Hu.
In the past fortnight, official Chinese papers and Web sites have run pictures of what is billed as China's "first aircraft carrier," which is actually a remodeled version of the Varyag flattop that the PLA bought from Ukraine a few years ago. While some military analysts believe that news about the Varyag was put out to distract attention from the couple of indigenously designed aircraft carriers that the PLA Navy is building, the graphic photographs have served to demonstrate the generals "commitment to hard-power projection" and to closing the military gap with the U.S.
The generals' clout is also tipped to grow after "crown prince" Vice-President Xi Jinping takes over power from President Hu at the 18th CCP Congress scheduled for next year. Xi, the putative Head of the Gang of Princelings (a reference to the offspring of party elders), is on very friendly terms with the more than 100 princeling PLA officers who hold the rank of major-general or above. Xi is expected to replace Hu as CMC Chairman — China's equivalent of commander-in-chief — at or soon after the 18th Congress.
(Willy Lam is a Hong Kong-based China scholar and journalist specializing in Communist Party politics and foreign policy.)

A Middle Path retirement

On March 10, a bombshell made the headlines worldwide, “the Dalai Lama retires”. But retires from what?
In his Tibetan Uprising Day’ Statement, the Tibetan leader explained the background: "As early as the 1960s, I have repeatedly stressed that Tibetans need a leader, elected freely by the Tibetan people, to whom I can devolve power. Now, we have clearly reached the time to put this into effect.”
In June 1991, the Tibetan Parliament in exile (also known as the Assembly of Tibetan People's Deputies) had adopted a ‘Charter’, a sort of Constitution guarantying all Tibetans equality before the law without discrimination on the basis of sex, religion, race, language and social origin. While providing a separation of power between the judiciary, legislature and executive powers in the Central Tibetan Administration (or Government in exile), the Charter assigns specific functions to the Dalai Lama as the Head of the State.
With the recent announcement, the Assembly had no choice but to amend the Charter as the Tibetan leader’s functions will have to be allotted to other bodies or individuals.
A difficult task, though the Dalai Lama said: "It is to benefit Tibetans in the long run. It is not because I feel disheartened. Tibetans have placed such faith and trust in me that as one among them."
A five member 'Constitutional Amendment Drafting Committee' was formed, with representatives from the Kashag (Cabinet) and the Assembly to suggest a legal solution to the tricky situation.
Let us understand the issue.
In an interview in 2006, the Dalai Lama had told us:
"I have three commitments: promotion of human values, promotion of religious harmony and promotion of awareness of Tibetan cause."
He had further elaborated: "Out of three commitments, number one and two are mostly on volunteer basis. Till my death I committed myself to these causes. Regarding the third one (Tibet), in a way it not a voluntary commitment, it is due to past history and to the Dalai Lama institution. I am bound to this commitment and this responsibility, because I am the Dalai Lama who played a role in past history of Tibet.
The Dalai Lama had acknowledged his historical role as the Protector and Symbol of the Tibetan Nation.
The Drafting Committee has chosen the Middle Path, keeping into account both aspects of the issue: the past historical role of the Dalai Lamas and his 'divine' status vis-a-vis the Tibet Nation as well as his request to be relieved of all day-to-day responsibilities.
Having completed its job, the Committee will present the outcome of its deliberations to a National General Meeting scheduled to be held at Dharamsala from May 21 to 23. This enlarged consultative group comprises of a few hundred ‘senior’ Tibetans such as ‘former ‘prime ministers’, members of the Cabinet, former ministers, present and former members of Parliament, officials above joint secretary rankl, representatives from the local assemblies in the Tibetan settlements and eminent members of the civil society.
The 'draft' which will later need to be ratified by the Assembly, gives the legal background and the dual role of the Dalai Lama: “The Charter provided that the successive Dalai Lamas shall exercise their responsibilities as head of the Tibetan nation and as chief executive of the Tibetan administration.”
However, “in deference to His Holiness the Dalai Lama's irrevocable decision to relinquish his administrative and political roles and in the face of His Holiness' rejection of pleas to reconsider that decision”, the Assembly should adopt some amendments to separate the Dalai Lama’s two roles and take care of his recent request, while safeguarding the continuity of the Central Tibetan Administration as the legitimate governing body of the Tibetans in exile.
The proposal is as follows: “His Holiness the Dalai Lama fully vests the Central Tibetan Administration and in particular its democratic leadership organs with the powers and responsibilities formerly held jointly by His Holiness the Dalai Lama and the Central Tibetan Administration to represent and serve the whole people of Tibet.”
However, a Preamble is added to the Charter the same way as the US Constitution is amended, adding amendments, instead of incorporating the amendments into the body of the Constitution as in the Indian case.
In a way, it is a legal Middle Path solution which should satisfy all the parties involved, except Beijing perhaps.
In the Article 1, the Dalai Lama is termed as the ‘Protector and the Symbol of the Tibetan Nation’: “[as] human manifestation of Avaloketeshvara, is the guardian and protector of the Tibetan nation. He is the guide illuminating the path, the supreme leader, the symbol of the Tibetan identity and unity, and the voice of the whole Tibetan people. His authority is derived from centuries old history and heritage and, above all, from the will of the people in whom sovereignty is vested and therefore comprises the following inherent rights and responsibilities.”
Though without day-to-day official function to perform the Dalai Lama should continue: “To provide advice and encouragement with respect to the protection and promotion of the physical, spiritual, ethical and cultural well being of the Tibetan people, to remain engaged in the efforts to reach a satisfactory solution to the question of Tibet and to accomplish the cherished goals of the Tibetan people.”
Apart from being the Protector, the Dalai Lama will also be a mentor and an advisor. This formulation takes care of one of the major legal hurdle. In any system of governance, a head of the State is required (he/she can be an elected leader in the case of a Republic, a King/Queen in a monarchy or a religious leader in a theocracy), there can’t be a constitutional vacuum.
The elected Prime Minister (such as the new Prime Minister whose name will be announced on April 27), is only the head of the Executive.
The Dalai Lama could continue to provide guidance in various forms “in matters of importance to the Tibetan people, including the community and its institutions in exile”, either on its own or at the request of the Administration.
The Dalai Lama could also be requested to continue to meet with world leaders and other important individuals and bodies to speak on behalf of the Tibetan people.
This clever formula takes care of several serious issues.
For example the Government in exile in Dharamsala is known as the ‘Central Tibetan Administration of HH the Dalai Lama’, his embassies in Delhi and abroad are ‘The Office of the Representatives of HH the Dalai Lama’, the officials conducting the talks with Beijing are the ‘Envoys of HH the Dalai Lama’, etc., the proposal of the Drafting Committee should solve these issues, the above institutions should be able to retain their respective names.
Vis-à-vis the Government of India who has a Liaison Office (Ministry of External Affairs) in Dharamsala, the trick should answer their queries, if any.
It solves also the problem of ‘succession’ as all the executive powers will be concentrated on the elected Prime Minister. Where is the question of a successor taking over the Dalai Lama’s responsibilities?
Regarding the relations with Beijing, it is more difficult. But it is perhaps because the situation has not gone anywhere for the past 30 years and that the future seems rather bleak that the Dalai Lama to withdraw at this point in time.
The Chinese have repeatedly said: “The Central Government will never discuss the future of Tibet with the Dalai Lama. What we can discuss with him is his [own] future and that of some of his supporters.”
The Dalai Lama has always stated that he was not bothered by his status, but was only interested in the welfare of the 6 million Tibetans in Tibet.
The present radical changes will not alter the respective positions of Beijing and Dharamsala, unless something drastic happened within China, for example a movement à la Tunisian, nothing can be expected on the negotiation front.
The Tibetan ‘democracy’ remains however very young and shaky: recently the results of the elections for the new Prime Minister were leaked one week before they were to be officially announced. Some solid home work still needs to be made by these institutions if they want to be truly representing the aspirations of the Tibetan people.

Dams are safe in India?

I have often written about the danger of building large dams in the Himalayas.
My last article appeared in The Statesman (Quakes, N-plants & dams, Where Does India Stand?)
The latest research of the California Institute of Technology brings even more worrying news. Just watch this video, you will understand why.
Of course, the Government says that the Indian dams are safe. 
Union minister for Water Resources Salman Khurshid stated recently that "the required precautionary measures had been taken during their construction and design".
He boldly affirmed that "dams in the country, even those in seismic zones, were safe and would be able to withstand natural calamities like earthquakes."
Let us pray!


Tibet Tectonic Theory Questioned
Source: CalTech
April 15, 2011
New research questions the established view that Tibet is essentially floating on a layer of molten crust—and suggests a radically new idea.
“Our research proposes the opposite view: that there is actually a really strong lower crust that originates in India,” says Jean-Philippe Avouac, professor of geology at the California Institute of Technology (Caltech).
These insights lead to a better understanding of the processes that have shaped the Himalaya Mountains and Tibet—the most tectonically active continental area in the world.
Alex Copley, a former postdoctoral scholar with Caltech’s Tectonics Observatory, along with Avouac and Brian Wernicke, the Chandler Family Professor of Geology, describe their work in a paper published recently in the journal Nature.
Tibet and the surrounding Himalaya Mountains are among the most dynamic regions on the planet. Avouac points out that underground plate collisions, which cause earthquakes and drive up the Himalaya and Tibet, are common geological processes that have happened repeatedly over the course of Earth’s history, but are presently happening with a vigor and energy only found in that area.
Even though the elevation is uniform across the Tibetan Plateau, the type of stress seen within the plateau appears to change along a line that stretches east-west across the plateau—dividing the region into two distinct areas (southern and northern Tibet, for the purposes of this research.)
The researchers propose that a contrast in tectonic style—primarily east-west extension due to normal faulting in southern Tibet and a combination of north-south compression and east-west extension due to strike-slip faulting in northern Tibet—is the result of the Indian crust thrusting strongly underneath the southern portion of the Tibetan Plateau and locking into the upper crust.
Strike-slip fault surfaces are usually vertical, and the rocks slide horizontally past each other due to pressure build-up, whereas normal faulting occurs where the crust is being pulled apart. They believe that the locked Indian crust alters the state of stress in the southern Tibetan crust, which can explain the contrast in the type of faulting seen between southern Tibet and northern Tibet.
To test their theory, the team performed a series of numerical experiments, assigning different material properties to the Indian crust. The simulations revealed evidence for a strong Indian lower crust that couples, or locks in, with the upper crust. This suggests that the “channel flow” model proposed by many geophysicists and geologists—in which a low-viscosity magma oozes through weak zones in the middle crust—is not correct.
“We have been able to create a model that addresses two long-standing debates,” says Copley, who is now a research fellow at the Univ. of Cambridge. “We have constrained the mechanical strength of the Indian crust as it plunges beneath the Tibetan Plateau, and by doing so have explained the variations in the types of earthquakes within the plateau. This is interesting because it gives us new insights into what controls the behavior of large mountain ranges, and the earthquakes that occur within them.”
According to Wernicke, the results have motivated the team to think of ways to test further the “weak crust” hypothesis, at least as it might apply to the active tectonic system.
“One way we might be able to image an extensive interface at depth is through geodetic studies of southern Tibet, which are ongoing in our research group,” he says.
The Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation funded the research. The Univ. of Cambridge provided additional funding for Copley.

Greed in Kaliyug

We are really living during Kaliyug (the Dark Age). 
Greed seems to prevail everywhere. 
Why did President Karzai 'offer' mining concessions in this particular area?
More than 2500 years ago, Buddha said: "Inflamed by greed, incensed by hate, confused by delusion, overcome by them, obsessed by mind, a man chooses for his own affliction, for others' affliction, for the affliction of both and experiences pain and grief". 
Ironically this place which, 1400 years ago, was visited by the Chinese pilgrim Hieun Tsang has now been 'bought' by a Chinese mining company.
Even in this Bamyan Valley, which has been so greatly influenced by the Great Monk, men have become greedy.
Ten years ago, I wrote a piece on Bamyan entitled From Mao to Bin Laden for Rediff.com. Today, I could write, From Bin Laden to the Chinese miners.
More than 40 years back, I remember visiting Bamyan. I have never seen such grandiose, simple and peaceful place.
Now the ants are digging. Perhaps they are digging their Karmic tomb.

Bamiyan II? Buddhist site in Afghanistan faces threat from China miners
Julius Cavendish,
NYT News Service
Apr 16, 2011,
Few thought they would do it until they did, firing fusillade after fusillade into two giant statues of the Buddha that had weathered 1,500 turbulent years of conquest and chaos, but could not withstand the Taliban's tanks. As shells and anti-aircraft rounds thudded into the sandstone giants, Afghans who eked out their lives in the shadow of the statues were aghast.
Now, almost 10 years to the month after Taliban fundamentalists blew the Bamiyan Buddhas apart, Afghanistan's archaeological treasures face a new threat: capitalism. Just south of Kabul, French and Afghan archaeologists have unearthed a 5th-century Buddhist monastery at a 4,000 hectare site called Mes Aynak — and are racing against time to excavate more ruins before Chinese miners obliterate them in their quest for natural resources.
In 2007, China Metallurgical Group, a Beijing-based mining group, signed a $3bn deal with the Afghan government —the biggest foreign investment in the country to date — to exploit vast copper deposits less than 1,000m from the then yet-to-be-discovered monastery. In its day, the building would have stood 15m (50ft) high, and measured 80m by 40m .Now it sits half-concealed by the mound it rises from beside the main road to Kabul; a warren of newly excavated halls and passages with giant feet, hands and faces emerging from earth.
Following a recent visit to Mes Aynak (it means "little copper well"), archaeologist Joanie Meharry described the treasures emerging from the dig. "Among the ruins were found a stupa more than 9m tall, frescoes with details in black and red paint, plaster statues adorned with jewelled ornaments, some laced in a fine layer of gold, and shards of pottery," she wrote.
The team of 16 French and Afghan archaeologists conducting the dig at Mes Aynak has 38 months before the Chinese miners move in, although the hope is that Afghanistan's mining and culture ministries will step in to protect some of the settlement's remains.
NYT news service

Tibet in Eisenhower Administration - 1955–1957

I have posted on my website the references on Tibet in the Volume III (China) of the Foreign Relations of the United States related to the Eisenhower Administration (1955-1957).
Nothing extraordinarily interesting except a remark from the US President during the 327th Meeting of the National Security Council held in Washington on June 20, 1957.
After a discussion of a report by a United Nations committee on the Hungarian uprisings, the Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles "noted a withdrawal of significant numbers of Chinese Communist troops from Tibet. He believed that these troops were being withdrawn in the face of Tibetan-inspired difficulties, on the one hand, and for reasons of economy, on the other. The Chinese Communists would presumably attempt to win the allegiance of Tibetans by different methods than the military methods of the past."
At this point in time, President Eisenhower "inquired whether the stationing of Chinese Communist troops in Tibet had not been considered a means of maintaining pressure on India. Mr. Dulles replied that this was certainly a consideration in the deployment of Chinese Communist forces in Tibet."

Sarko in Africa

Many Indian friends have been asking me: “What is happening to Sarko? He is trying to emulate Napoleon Bonaparte? What is this new Campaign of Africa?”
The French President’s size makes for easy comparison between the Emperor and Carla Bruni’s husband, but it does not explain why in the recent times, Sarkozy has been in such a belligerent mood.
In the past months, world events have taken an unexpected turn. Who could have expected popular revolutions against Presidents Ben Ali or Mubarak a few months back?
Events went so fast that the French Government was caught on the wrong foot. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ms Alliot-Marie had gone holidaying to Tunisia, enjoying the hospitality from a close associate of President Ben Ali, till recently a great friend of France. Alliot-Marie eventually resigned, but the episode was tough on Sarkozy, barely 14 months before the Presidential elections. His popularity had reached a historical low with a large majority of French disapproving of his policies.
The Libyan ‘revolution’ against a psychopathic tyrant as well as the ‘civil war’ in Ivory Coast where the outgoing President Laurent Gbagbo lost the elections against his opponent Alassane Ouattara, but refused to vacate his seat, were the ideal occasions to show La Grandeur (greatness) of France.
When the situation started to degenerate into a bloodbath in Ivory Coast, Sarkozy considered it politically safe to intervene, particularly after the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1975 authorizing the use of force to get Gbagbo out of the way.
With Ban-ki-moon personally writing to the French President on April 3 to authorize Force Unicorn to “jointly conduct operations with the UNOCI”, to arrest Gbagbo, it became an ‘easy’ affair.
A French defence expert wrote: “If you take the example of a Bakers’ shop. The French had the recipe, they prepared the cake, baked it and Ouattara’s troops were left to put the cherry (arrest Gbagbo) and eat the cake”.
In a way, it was a victory for Sarkozy who had showed that he was a great defender of ‘democracy’ and ‘human rights’. He could further argue that this intervention will be a precedent for other African nations which go to the polls in 2011. The UN-led operations in Abidjan could act as a deterrent to other leaders who may be tempted to refuse to recognize election results. Therefore Merci Sarko!
In Libya, the situation is more complicated and the stakes are higher.
Let us remember that in 2007, Gaddafi planted his tent not far from the Elysees Palace where Sarkozy lives; he was called a bastion of secularism in the Arab world and a great friend of France. When Rama Yade, the pretty junior minister of Foreign Affairs said that “tyrants were wiping their bloodied boots on the doormats of France”, she was severely reprimanded by the Presidency and eventually dismissed. Her popularity improved, while Sarkozy’s plummeted. The President probably had this in mind (as well as the Alliot-Marie Tunisian blunder) when he decided to push for the UN resolution on Libya.
If the French President’s advisors thought it would be easy, they were wrong. Three weeks after the first strikes, Gaddafi is still around. His troops have been able to adapt remarkably well to the destruction of the air-defenses. They now use guerilla warfare with ordinary vehicles indiscernible by the NATO satellites. While the pro-Gaddafi troops have a leader and a military tactic, it is not the case for the insurgents.
Despite the grand show orchestrated by Bernard-Henri Levy, the French philosopher-turned White Knight who advised Sarkozy to go to war, the ‘rebels’ are not a homogenous group.
A French defence expert wrote: “We French have too much contempt for our enemies. Did we expect that they will just run away after the first passage of a fighter plane in the sky?”
The other difficulty is that the coalition is extremely fragile, with the United States having already left the boat and others increasingly reluctant to go for Gaddafi.
Sarkozy, the Chef de guerre, is lonely these days; though the British and the Italians are still on board, others coalition members play a minor role while nations (such as the BRICS) are dead against any intervention.
In this nightmarish situation, there is a positive aspect for Paris. The Rafale has done quite well, much better than the Eurofighter, its rival in the 126 MMRCA tender by the Indian Air Force. The Eurofighters remained on their bases in UK and Italy, they were not ‘polyvalent’ enough according to defence sources.
Now the real issue remains: how can Sarkozy come out of the quagmire without losing face and points in the surveys? Difficult.